THE ART OF GUERRILLA WARFARETHE ART OF GUERILLA WARFARE, Goneral Principles. Object. i. The object of guerilla warfare is to harass the enemy in every way puasible within atl the territory he holds to such an extent that he is eventuatly incapable either of embarking on a Sar or of continuing one that may already have commenced, The sphere of action skould include bis home country, and also, in certain circumstances, such neutral countries as hr uses ae on saree of supply, | This object is achieved by compelling the enemy 10 disperse his forces in order to guard his flanks, his com. munications, his detachments, supply depots, ete. against the attacks of guerillas, and thus se to wereken his main armies thit the conduct of a campaign Lecomes impossibie, 2 There are three main types of guerilla warfare i— (a) The activities of individuals, or of sinall groups working by stealth on acts of sabotage, (b} The action of larger groups working 28 a band under « nominated leader, and employing military tactics. weapons Ste.. to assist in. the achievement of their abject. which is usually of a destructive nature, () The operations of large guerilin forces; whose strength necessitates a certain degree of military organization in order to secure their cohesion and to make and carry out effectively a plan of campaign, 3. The type of guerilla warfare that oan be carried out in any particular tevritory is dependent on the local conditions at the time: as explained later. The greater. however, should always include the less—i.e., where circumstances are favourable to the employment of large guerilla forces, they will also permit the action of partisan bands and of sahotenrs. Where conditions are unsuitable to large scale operations. the action of partisan bands should be supported by that of saboteurs. 4 The’ culminating stage of guerilla warfare should always he to produce in thé field large formations of guerillas, well-armed and well-trained, which are able to take a direct part in the fight- ing by attacks on suitable hostile formations and objects in direct conjunction with the operations of the regular troops. IL may well be, however, that, in the early dava of the war, guerilla activities must, owitg to tho enemy's strength and to lack of support of the local population. be limited to acts of sabotage.‘As the war progress, and as the enamy’s hold begina'to. weaken owing to euacessfi? sabotage, to war weariness of ‘the oriemy’s troops, and ax the inhabitants cease to be: overawed, conditions will become ripe for the formation of partisan bunds. These bands will, gt, the commencement, act-singly or in small local concetitintions. By their audacity ad’ apparent im- monity from hostile countermeasures, they uiuat then fan the flame of revolt until circumstances become favourable for the orgenization of laige groups of baods, working. under central lenderghip on a semi-military basis, necessitating a: considerable: degrea of co-ordination vs -regards arrangomenta for supplies, manitions, collection of military intelligence, ete. 5 There are: tvo wnain points in this connection to bear in mind — is) To obtain the masimum effect from guerilla warfare it is necessary to wake use of all three types. Therefore, a careful study must be made as carly as possible of the territories conadrned, so as to determina for what methods of warfare each territory ia suited, and to make the nec- ry preparations in advance, It is an extravagant waste of effort and opportunity if, for éxariple, in an area suited For large seale guerilla operations, activities ure, for want of preparation and forethought, limited to. the uneo-ordinated aetions of partisan bands and saboteurs. Further, it abt be remembered thet the enemy will insti- (ute counter-mensures as soon ag guerilla, activities -againat him commence. Té theae activities are oa’ a small scale, it may be relatively easy for him not only to aupprese them temporarily, hut alex, by that action, to prevent their resuscitation on either that a larger scale. It bas been shown countless times in history that where fim enemy action has, been taken in time against suall beginnings, such’ action has always meb with avccess. To counter this, therefore. it is again important that, the commence- ment of guerilla operations should be on the highest and widest scale that the area concerned will permit. : The two arguments abave overwhelmingly support this policy. (b) The second point to be noted ia that the organization of guerillas must not be of » higher degree. than. ciroum- stances. will, with reasonable safety, .and a view to effi- sieney, pormait, __ The factor of ‘safety ” concerné possible enemy ‘counter. neticn; the closer aud higher the organization, the mote: ensily can it be broken up and become ineffective; Tt is valaéless and dangerous prematurely to organize partisan bands, ‘acting inde- Fendenily as they sofmally should, into platoohs, ‘companies, 2Sijaddions, obsand. then’ into ‘regiments ob Trigadés, veithy nomi ated commanders, skeleton orders of battle, intelligence setvines etd; such 'orgenization necessitates docamenta, writlen orders, files; ste., alt or-sny of which, fa/ling'into the enemy's bande, man enable tim to destroy the guitilla mdverwent ot w blows In any case, euch organization is iinnedeastry in the early stages. Tn thesé conditions, except for a central reiting brain and a few trusted emissaries, partisan bands should be self-con tained, acting wider then own leader's initiative towards the ends directed by’ the controlling authority, obtaining thelr own information by ‘the iost direct arid siniplest means (aanally by ord of manth) and maintaining the loosost organisation coupal- ihte with effective action, (6). ‘Phe fuctor of effigioncy coneems the inherent advantages that gieviMas enjoy through theit superior mobility and their Tack of communiestions, A premative tightening of crganisatian is directly inimical to these two advantages, so that an increase fn the degree of orgauisation over tha hare minimum neeosaary must inevitably lead to decreased efficiency. Tt is obvious, haw ever, that, in the culminating stages of gierilla warfare, with larga insres of guatillag taking “an open part, some degree of nrganization ia necegsery in order to establish a chain of com: mand, to rendey administrative arrangements possikle, and to collect intelligence ‘as a basis for plans, ete. 7 At any tine. therefore, the correct degree of organization ta be established mast he a matter for the most serious consider ation of the controlling authority: as conditions changé, so will the degree, To meet changing etreumstances, therefore, the con trolling authority mist plan in advance, s6 that ‘closer organiza. tion can he instituted when the moment demands, or can be re- laxed if enemy actin temporarily necessitates, Objectives of guerilla warfare, 8. The whole art of guerilla warfare ties in striking the enemy where he least expects it, and yet where he ig most ruluer- ablo: this will produce the greatest effect in indueing, and even compelling, bim to usc ith levge numbers of troops’ in guarding against such blows. Modern large-sized armies, entirely dependent ag they are an the regular deivery of supplies, munitions, petrol. ete, for theiy “operations, preset a partienlarly favourable opportunity Tow guerilla warfare, directed against their communications by road, vail of ‘water, and aigainst their system of internal pastel and telegraph communications, Further, the maintenance of theae large armies necessitates the evtablishment of dumps and stocks uf supplies, munitions, cts. 3at focal points, which offer.mogt. suitable tangets. for, guerilla stn guarding of thése communications aud. dumps :agaipst attack will, even before the. threat is evident, necessitate the institution. hy the enemy of detachmenta-and posta, more particu. ‘arly at vital points on the commanications and where dumpe of importance are Toxated. These detachments themeelyes are a i gbject of attach. eee the operations of guerillas. will usually be directed against the flanks of armies, azainst their communicatioss and against posts and detachments established by the enemy for the express purpose of protecting his important localities against such sporadic attempts. Methods and Principles. 9. The methods and principles of gueritla warfare must be based ou a proper estimation of the relative advantages and .dis- advantages enjoyed by the eneray on ong band, and the guerillas uc the other, in srmaments, mobility, muuibers, information, reraie, traini 10. The enemy will almost invarinbly. possess armament sup- eriot both in. quantity and quality—i.e., he will have artillery ortars, gag, armaured vehicles, ets., in addition to.the automaties ard rites with which: the guerillas will alsa be armed. — In total strength the enemy will normnlly have the superiority ae well, but ¢ distribution of his forces will nevessitate the use of detachments against which superior guérilla forees ean be bronght. ih Tt is in mobility, in inforation, and in morale that the guerillas can secure che advantage, and those factors ara the means by which the enemy's superior armament und numbers can beg? be combatied. The superior mobility, however, is not absolute, tut relative - i.e. to the type of country in which the activities are staged, to the detailod knowledge of that country by the guerillas, sto. Tn abpolute mobility, the enemy inust always bave the ad- vantage — Le, the use of railway systema, the pussession of large uumbers af motors, lorries, armoured cars, tanks, ete, of large furcea of cavalry, etc. By the judicious selection of ground, however, and by moves in darkness to secure suprise, the guerillas can enjay Telatively superior mobility for the pertod neceseary for each operation, ‘The enemy will usually be in a country’ whére the pop- ulation is largely hostile, sn that the people will actively co-operate 4 providing information for the guerillas and withholding tt from the enemy. The proper encoyragemoat of thie natural. situation and the developement. of thr systesn of obtaining information will ensure that the guerillas are kept du fait with the eneiny's mevetnents and intentions, whereas their own are hidden from fn, 413. .... Moxley, trainings ete, ara factors of importanes in whic firth cone side asid- then the other. may ‘have thie “navanteae Where theenemy ‘a -constraindd by ‘demands on his fercus to uso reneryé and.escond-line, units, for Svarding. communications ete, neither, the morsle nor training. wall be of a high, standurd. ‘The morale, of the guerilld should aliaya bo high; Bghting in his uwn country, smeng his dwn peojle, ‘ageinst a foreign foo who has invaded his land, “the justice ‘of Bis cause ‘will inflame his em- bitterthonk At the mime tlie, the tarrow limits of the training he requires, hia natural dash and courage, and-the careful, de. tailed ‘rehearsal of projected coups should enable bim,. with the advantage of the initiative, te match woven. the best trained traaps. 14. Guotilles oust cbtain and make every effort to retain the initiative, To have the initiative eonters the invaluable ad- vantage of selecting the place 6f aporstions that most favour suecene as regards! locality,..ground, time, relative.strengths, ete. The initiative can always. be secured, by remaining completely quicueent upsil the moment for the commencement of guerilla activities arrives, and thon suddenly Inunching out against an unsuspecting enciny. To retain ‘the initiative conferring these advantages demands 4 ceaseless activity, wo tint the enemy ix prevented from getting’ in hia: blow ‘by ‘the ecnstantiy’ recurring: necessity of partying these aimed at him. 15. Vutil the, foal snd culminating stages of partisan war- fnxo where larg? bodies of guerilla, are co-operating with the regular forces, it must be the object of partisans to avoid pro. longed! engagements with their opponenia, unless in such over- whelming strengil that sagcess can be assured before the arrival of winforcements. The object must be to strike hard and die appear hefore the. enemy: tan recover and sirike back. Therefore. the action uf all partisan bands must be governed by the nec: ecasity of a sgcure ling.of retirement for use when the moment for calling off the action arrives Tt musi he berne in mind, too, that the iminunity of partisans from enemy action is » most valu- able moral factor; to inflict dawage aid death on the enemy and to eSeape acot-iree has an irritant sind deprensing cect ox the chotiy's spirit, and q vdrréspondingly encouraging effect on the radrale, aot only of the guerillas but of the loca] inhabitants, a majtér of considerable monent; in this aphere of action nothing suctéeds like success. 16. From the above review af the circumstances of gucvilla warlave, the-2im of the guerillas must be to develop their inherent a¢vantages 0 as ta nullify: those of the enemy. The pringiples of this type of warlare are therefore :— (a) Suvprico first und-iforemost, by finding out: the enemy's _plang.and concealing your own intentions and movements, 5th) Never undartabe tr! opiertati on’ inate aertanii-o8! Guscied | owing to careful -planaing- ane! govd' information, ~ Breads) aff the action vihes.it:-bedomes -bop,.cioky to, continues «i .- (ce) Ensure that's severedine of retvent is always‘ available, () ‘Chodse aslegs bud incalities ‘tor’ actig 7 ea fe). Confine, sll movements .as, much ag possible to the: of darknesgi. ron ' 1) Never engage in’ pitehsd battle unless in ‘overwhelming strength and thing sore-‘of access; ts ig) Avoid~being pinmed:déwn ii 9. battle by--the enemy's: superior forces.or armainont; hreak off the action: bafore: such.s situation. can develop, : th) Retain the initiative: at all costs ‘by rédoublitig activities when tha eieny coittiences ‘ountér-meastres, 4) When the Gine for action comes, act with the greatest belduess and audacity, ‘The partisqn’s wotto' is’ Valiant yet vigilant,’ Thete are the-nine points.of the, queritla’s creed. Organization. 17. To guerilla wartate ‘It ii the personality of ‘the Jeader' that vounts? he it is who thas to make decisions én his own respon: i and lead his men in each entépriga. He must thetefors be decisive and résiurcaful, bold in action and cool in council, +f wreat mental ‘and ‘physical endurarise, and of strong’ petsdn- ait, These qualities aloné will enable him to coritrol his fol- lowers and win ‘their -anquestioning ‘obedience ‘without ‘the close constraints of military organisation and discipline which are the antithedis of gueritla'détion aid » ‘drag on its efficiency. A backgrouad of mililary training is invalunble for # guerilla, der, tempering his judgements and. strongthening his accigions. The alwest universal adoption. of compulaony military training throughout Europe.and the levees en masse of the Greet War vill usually ensure that every leader will have had a. militery rperience of some sort or gther, To this shauld be added, by. ud and instruction, a realisation of the influences of w mechar ized age on the operations of large armies, hoth aa a factor handicapping initiative and te a factor opening uf row pnesibilities of mobility, of air action; of fire power, te! The selection of suitable, leadeis i8 therefore of parduiquat’ importance, The central authority must, and perfarse wil! be, rome man of prestige and weight who’ has-been ‘a teading person- ality Jn the tertitory ip tite: of peace, as the-leadereither of some 6wRowarful association or Jeague :on- minority; ‘Ledtiors of Joon partisan bande willbe selected trom th ! u hose-of standitig or fark in the locality whi piidsads the Nidcessary ntttbiter of ReTeonnlity, 18 Tt May, bomever frequently be. advantageous to Appoint certain serving aruy officers for duty, with guerilias, either nerve directly as cummanders, mare particul spheres, ov ws specially qualified staff officers or aasistante [1 guetille, comunanidera. Th auch cédsens ie willoften hapjen that the serving effietr works hand and glove with the title. Teader, the litter, owing to-his Ineal Couneetions, ‘ete., éusnriiy the echesiin Of his guerillas, while the former supplies to. the partnership the Sechwienl knowledge ndeexaary- For ‘tho must efeetive direction fad co-orlinttion ul the giteritlas™ operations: 19. The wider the suevilla movement spreads, and the closer that its organisation urns ultimately in that case heme. the asreater will Le the weed for a teaven of regular officers ty earns ont the ba work of simply staf dutivs, and tu affect liaison with the lar furees. These abies Must, however, lear their tninds of all pre conceived ideas regarding military pin eefire and apply their minds entirely “and objectively tn the success of the matter in kand, ‘Tho very fact of their héeing regu. lav efReers way prejtitier their pesition iu the syes ‘of the parti- sans, and such prejudice can only be overcame by the proof they ean give of their vilue tu the guerilla cause. Tn cara where the guerillas are a nation. in am: if, fighting for their freedom in alliance with or aayisted and instigated by a third power which is williug and anxious to render all assistance to them, it will usually be advisable for that third power to be represented by a missiun atthe headqiuters of Lhe rilla movement. The dutics of such a mission wonid he tu provide expert advice, to ensnre Haison, to arrange the sumply of aris, Animunition, money, etc. and to provine leaders and ayeis- tants to loadurs, if such wero iound to bo necessary. or part 2. Ht is of great importance that the Sons should he au courant with the coun : they are to work; the ‘more detailéd knowledye, personal liaiser and reeonnaiseants that they have or ean effect before operations are even nvinaged. the greater is the chanes of their sucess, Thew must stidy ‘the languages.” diqlecta, topayephy. ote. ; thes must know the ethnological, political and religions groupings of the neople, the history and aspirations of the. eumtry, its heroes oF the present and martyrs of the pant. They must in Fast be breparcd, at the risk of future regrets.and disillusion, to identify themselves in'every way with the peoples they are to serve. ‘ ii i rf i ts it that the . As deseribed in paragraph 5 (b), it is important thn Pe of internal organization of the guerillas chovld he suitnhle 7 personnel af such in ies and territories whereto the conditions in which. they are operating ;: over-organization Js more dangerous aad detrimental ta guerilla, operations than toa losse au, organizatiua. The latter can be tightened es.circumstan- ces presiribe, whereas the relaxing of control thet has once heen established, even thodgh necessitated by chinged conditions, oust a first lead {> some embarrassment, confusion, and loss of direction. 23. ‘The organization of partisans muss usually commenne. with The fornation of local bands, numbering not more. than about 30 mon each. Tt ie not only simpler and more convenient to farm them an a leeal basis, but also quicker, The men.live in the neighbourhend, they know the country, they know each other; and their leaders. and ean ascemblo rapidly when required, either for ' ions in their own area, if targets for attack exist, or for transfer to some area Where conditions are more favonrable. At the same time, Utere will be many aréas where it will not be pwssible to fonn hands, Suitable and willing mien in tueb areas must be given a rallying place, to which they will move under their owa arrangements and there join existing bands. 24. Modern developments, particularly in airerafi, mechan- d forces and wireless, have profound influences on guerilla rare, enubling the enemy rapidly to concentrate in opposition any moves ef guerillas that have been discovered. aecalment from sirevaft, therefora, beeomes one of the most. important faeters and inevitably curtails the possiblities of large forces of guerillus moving at will throughout the country. In effet, such large forées, if they are to retaain uniliscovered, can tly move by aight and must conceal themselves by day or els» move by rantes—ie, through thick forests ete—which afford ciaeealment from reconneitring airerath; such routes however thansnlres offer some difioulty to movement. Tn addition, areas which offer good opportunities for iment are usually just those areas where the niainteaanee a’ supply of large guerilla forces becomes dificult. They are evaally wild, with little cultivation or pasture land for oarryiig stuck or feeding the guerillig? animals, and supplies would have to he brought in specially. At once the guerillas would begin tr Le dependent on ccmuannications, a situstion cramping their mobility and exactly opposed tr the characteristic whieh canstit- utes their chief military value, 26. Ttmust be clearly realized therefore that in myst European sonntries, excopt for large arcan in tho east ‘and ‘eouth-east:ein- ditions will rarely at the commencenient ofa. cémpaign be suitable for the enployment of guerillas in large masses. Even in Aviatle awl North African countries, the presence of hostile aireraft will make this difiault. 627, Ie hs thetefore: probable thet in. the car ths fale of guerilla “warfare will nab exceed the activities of partiean bands; even iF ié should never exczed thia, however, 3 guerilla campaign of this type divected with akill and executed, with sudacity and censelesis nativity will ’ us d ty will be a moat potent factor i absorbing hostile forees and thus rendering. a proper campaign hy the enemy impossible For this i ly stages of war, “The Ghiet", or Military Mission or Gueritia Bureau, 2 comegthe Chiet” may be either an individual of the country seemed Incated with hie small etait in tho area of guerills aeurities, or x seetion of the General Stalf (Intelligence Traneh) of the Any concerned, and located at its General Headquarters, or even a military miasion from a third party, located either at the General Readquarters of one of the armies in the field, or some other more suitable place. “The Chief"may thut be estale lished in either friendly territory, ‘or in territory occupied sunin, ally by the enemy. The relative advantages of cither course are as follows 29. Ii Ineated in enemy territory—ie. in the aren where guerilla bands are to opornte—contact and direction are eavivr, @) The nomination. of local partisan Jeadora, ‘Gy The provision of mms, amiaunition, destiuetive devices, wireless sets, étc., and’ their concealment. , ) Belection of “The Chiet” aind of the personnel of his staff. {d) Provi ion uf, ensuring, liaizon, between Gencral Hend- auarters in the field and “The Chie!” with kis guerillas. NBL If * The Chiet” is at General Headqaariers, lisisou is required between him and the deputy chiet, () The formaulation of a plan of eampaign. () The selection of vital points for destruction after hostile vecupation, and their preparation to that end. ETC. RTC. 63. Tt may well-be that among a group of two or more allied powers, one power by its wealth, ite strategic position, its military experience or its initiative is in. .a position ty eneaurage and ussist the others in these preparations. Such assistance may take the following farms (a) The provision .of special weapons and destructive deviees for use by guerillas. th) The provision of technical experts in destructive device: specially trained to. assist the lewlers of partisan bands. (o) The establishment of n mission or bussan either at the alhed General Readquarters, or in the field with the guerilla, to direet operations in co-ordination with that General Herdqnarters, and to arrange for the further supply aud distribution of money, amas, ete. (ly The provision of military experts in the field to assist and co-ordinate the activities of assistant leaders, Preparatory Planning, 61 A complete survey of likely territories must he made with a view to detormiting for what types of gia avtivities they ‘will initially be suitable, Pulitieally, the Geld of action for gucrill, warfare may be hwoadly divided into three distinet spheres — {) Where the population, except for aumeriesliy insignificant minorities, supports the hestilé power This teriitery usnally comprises the enemy's home country and that of his. allied anit associate. powers. thy Whera the population -is, in varying degrees, hostile tu the power Jn, cocupation. {e} Neutral countries. 47Feiendty Population. 65. Unless a war has-been’ began in evpesition to the general veight ublic opinion, the.enemy’a. home..country will at the raiahe ue heen Nprought ta 4 high. , pitch of Patriotiom and Jingoism, Such conditions offer no scope, for the. organization of armed intervention by guerillas, and this type of warfare musp therefore be Timfted to subtirranean ‘attack’ by disaffected indiy. intvals or smal! groupe agaihat targets that ‘will intereaupt commun. feations, iuverfere-widh or damage supplies- ‘The; institution of guerilla. sotivities in noutral territories from: which the,enewy:draws supplies muat depend to some extent on. the-politigal and other relations hetween.the powers coneernad. Tel certain, casse it may be politic to. ignore the apsiatance given to.the enemy by a particular neutral country in view of the even gveater aid that.is being secqivad. Whenbowever, the .supplics whieh the enemy. jsobtaining ane, vital. to his: conduct of the war it my. be necessary. aatively te binder thir provision in spile of otherwise ‘friendly relations with,.the. country coneerned, and to risk the rupture -of such. relations. J2- +! Wis -ridk, however, must He redused to # mininum and postponed as'long ‘as posable. Ite’ elimination depends primasity on -the-skill with which -the-eampaigatsnariied out. The’ methods to be emplogedté hinder dupply range from the purchase of supplies, over the, head of the. enemy, ganization of labour strikes at the vital pointe—ie., factories, mines, docks, cte.. to the sebotegingat ships, trains and machinery, ‘The engagement of Joga) firms of solicitors, | not, too serupulous end at, the enme time experienced, in neutrality and Jabour legislation, and in the procrastination .of, judicial. propedyre , will be of the greatest ansisbance, : . : ’ : 73. Ae in the éxga of giterilla. wenfare nroper, - this a subject whichvequires eloie atitdy and preparation: « before: hostilities gommenee, and the selection of suitable parsomuel, experieuced wein shipping and commerce genetelly, and sfaritime and neutrality laws of the countries conenrned, me Geagraphical, see ie 74. The geographical stidy of a tervitéry Yi: éoncained with two factors s+ woe {a) Its suitability as an, area for: guexilla warfare. ‘The move broken and forested it is, the. more. guitable.will it he. (&) ‘The potential targets for’ guerilla: wetion Which it offers, ‘These will usually be in the shape of'vodd, rai? and diver communications which the enemy. wold’ have to employ fur the niaintenance of his armies in the-field. Vulnerable points within the enemy's. own territory must -alga. he marked. The yecoanaiséanee: of territorfes should: when- ever possible, be carried abst: in time. of pence. by selected officers wha have been grounded in. the principles. of guerille warfare -Their reports will be of grent assistance in formulating 9 plan: a Organization of Bands, 3, One of the principle cessons for insisting on, the. advantages of peace time preparation ix that, failing such arrangemonts, the itution of guerilla warfare BEHIND THD ENEMY'S ‘LINES will be a mttor of the utiiost difienlty, "The ideal at which to aim is that when the enemy invasion tekes placa the men whovaré to beeome the partisans should remain in their homies with their sums conventently toncesled, and’ allow themselves to be aver-tin. Th then hold themselves in readiness to commieneé action soier their feader the moment tha order iv given: Where “the fronts covered by the main opposing armies are wide and broken, there will be opportunity for partiean hands te’ penetrate the hostile Hues for operations in the enemy's rear, ‘but when: the fronts are continuous, as may frequently happen, there will be no. fuch opportunity ; witheut previous provision, therefore, guerilla warfare on the enemy's lines of communication, his most vulnerable aud tender spot, could only be #gnradic and-half-hearted, 76. Alost of the greai powers InclidS in their forced formations «f a paramilitary chayecter sach as Frontior’ Quads, Cnstoms Guards, Frontier Gendaimerie, ‘and Fotest Guarda, ete. ‘Those organizations, dealing as they do with the prevenLigh of eniuggling, Micit crossing of frontiers, poaching, et2., sontaln sen with an itimate knowledge of frontier distticts, trained ‘to'xet Ky night, aul to be solf-dependent, Aw frontiers frequently vest orf natural boundaries such az mountainy, lange- rivers; ete, which fori gocid aren for guerilla activities, such mon. will bo of immense value as the nuclei of partisan bands. . . 20Whew: From a consideration: ‘of-the above: factors it ix apparerit ‘that, -tho institution: of guerilla warfare te: s¥siet the regular ‘armies in: the defeab of the onemy in d vubjett which must in all ite natacte be considered gre Prepered in peacs to the furthest ‘oxteat possible, Snch planning “and acti i extent na ing “and action should include the fh) A-cdretul study of the tertitories convernédl from the pofut of view of geography,’ communications, ethnology, racial arid religious habitg, historical associations, ete., and a decision as to possibilities, (b) The supply aud distribution of army, ammunition, devices, pamphlets, etc. and the inatinetion éf potential partisans in their use, fe) The aclection aiid training of ‘regular army officers in the art of guerilla warfare; these would be sent to organize and take charge of guerilla operations in their respective areas, ar to act ag ndvisers to the local leaders, Such training should includes period of restdence-in the terri- tory concerned: Conclusion. 78. ‘The niote the subject is considered dbe more apparent ib becomes that in gacrilla warfare it ig the. personality of Uh leader Nhich cmants above everything. Ib is he who by his personality and steadfastness raust hold the loosely organized partisans to gether, and by his courage, audacity aud high intelligence sucedasfully direct and lead their operations. 79. ‘These operations range over ‘an unlimited field accyrding to lucal cireumatanees. Large forces of guerillis can harry the fanks of an advancing or retrening aumy, cun raid his communi cations in force, destroying milways, burning supply dumps umd capturing convoys, and then withdvaw again to the seeurity of their own lines. Snuall bands of partisens can live bebind the enemy’s lines, or filter throngh gaps in bis front, and carry on similar activitios on a snialler seals, Tndividual gueriilas ean be permanently located in the enemy's rear, where by the sniping of gards, the destruction of military vehicles, buildings, etc., they cant be a running sore in his flesty draining bis vitality and hampering hia action, 80. Guerillas obtain their advantage over the enemy by their greater knowledge of the country, their relatively greater mobility, and their vastly superior sources of information. Those sve the factors which, when properly exploited, enable them to engage with enecess an enamy who is better equipped, more closely disci Ened, and asnally in greater strength. 2tBI. The main objects of guctilla waréare are to inflict divect damage and loss on the enemy, to hamper his operations ani mauvemnents by attacks on bis communications, and to compel bim to withdraw the maximum number af troops from the main from vt battle vo as to weaken his offensive power. Dircet action of the types envisaged will bring the desired result abont, Tt must always be remombered that guerilla warfare is whet regular armice have most to fear. When directed with skill and carried out with courage aud whole-heatted endeavour, an effeetive eampaign by the enemy becomes almost impossible. 82, Guerilla warfare is much facilitated by the co-operation of the lecal inhabitants, but in the face of an unconlpromising hostile oceupation thie will only become active as the result of successful action by the guerillas. It is this alone that will awoken in the people the spirit of revolt, of andacity and of endurance, and make them foresee and ‘assist towards the vietory that wili he theirs. 83. __In the modem world the time has now come when aggressar nations, to gain their ends, use every device and ingenuity that their perverted wits can devise to hreak down the resistance of their intended victims both before and after the oceupation of their territory, Given the leadership, the courage, the arms and the preparation, however, there is one thing remaining that they eanniot break, and that is tho spirit of the people whose. territory has been overrun. a spirit expressing itself in uncompromising and steadfast resistance to defeat and in a ruthless and uncom. Promising’ warfare of partisans until the enemy is fareed to ery “Halt! and depart. In the long history uf the world such deeds have been dare, such. causes wonj and they ean be won again, given opportunity, FINI S§ 22