DUE PROCESS CASES

ARSENIO P. LUMIQUED
APOLINIO G. EXEVEA

Honorable

Facts:
Arsenio P. Lumiqued, the Regional Director of
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) was
charged by Jeanette Zamudio, the Regional
Cashier, for allegedly having committed
malversation through falsification of official
documents, violating the Commission on Audit
(COA) rules and regulations by his unliquidated
cash advances in the total amount of P116,
000.00, and for oppression and harassment
when she was unjustly removed by Lumiqued
two weeks after she filed the first two
complaints. The issues were referred to the
Department of Justice (DOJ) and committee
hearings were set on July 3 and 10, 1992, but
Lumiqued was not assisted by counsel.he
moved for the resetting oof the second hearing
date from July 10 to July 17 to allow him to be
assisted by a counsel. It was granted by the
committee, however, neither Lumiqued nor his
counsel appeared on the date he himself had
chosen, so the committee deemed the case
submitted for resolution. The investigating
committee recommended the dismissal or
removal from office of Lumiqued which was
acted upon and adopted by DOJ Secretary
Franklin M. Drilon. President Fidel V. Ramos
himself issued Administrative Order No. 52,
dismissing Lumiqued from service. Lumiqued
filed a motion for reconsideration averring that
that he was denied the constitutional right to
counsel during the hearing.

the Constitution or the law. In Nera v. Auditor

General, the Court said that there is nothing in
the Constitution that says that a party in a noncriminal proceeding is entitled to be represented
by
counsel
and
that,
without
such
representation, he shall not be bound by such
proceedings. The assistance of lawyers, while
desirable, is not indispensable. The legal
profession was not engrafted in the due process
clause such that without the participation of its
members, the safeguard is deemed ignored or
violated. The ordinary citizen is not that helpless
that he cannot validly act at all except only with
a lawyer at his side.
In administrative proceedings, the essence of
due process is simply the opportunity to explain
ones side. One may be heard, not solely by
verbal presentation but also, and perhaps even
much more creditably as it is more practicable
than oral arguments, through pleadings. An
actual hearing is not always an indispensable
aspect of due process. As long as a party was
given the opportunity to defend his interests in
due course, he cannot be said to have been
denied due process of law, for this opportunity to
be heard is the very essence of due process.
Lumiqued, a Regional Director of a major
department in the executive branch of the
government, graduated from the University of
the Philippines (Los Baos) with the degree of
Bachelor of Science major in Agriculture, was a
recipient of various scholarships and grants, and
underwent training seminars both here and
abroad. Hence, he could have defended himself
if need be, without the help of counsel, if truth
were on his side.

Issues:
I.

II.

Whether or not Lumiqued was

deprived of due process of law
when
he
was
denied
the
constitutional right to counsel during
the hearing.
Whether or not there was a violation
of his security of tenure.

Ruling:
The court ruled that the right to counsel is not
indispensable to due process unless required by

Moreover, this constitutional mandate is deemed

satisfied if a person is granted an opportunity to
seek reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. Lumiqueds appeal and his
subsequent filing of motions for reconsideration
cured whatever irregularity attended the
proceedings conducted by the committee.
Jurisprudence provides that the constitutional
provision on due process safeguards life, liberty
and property. When the dispute concerns ones
constitutional right to security of tenure,
however, public office is deemed analogous to

property in a limited sense; hence, the right to

due process could rightfully be invoked.
Nonetheless, the right to security of tenure is not
absolute. Of equal weight is the countervailing
mandate of the Constitution that all public
officers and employees must serve with
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency. In
this case, it has been clearly shown that
Lumiqued did not live up to this constitutional
precept.
SECRETARY
OF
JUSTICE, petitioner,
vs. HON. RALPH C. LANTION
Facts:
On June 19, 1999, the Department of Justice
(DOJ) received from thr Department of Foreign
Affairs US Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a
request for the extradition of Mark Jiminez to the
United States.
Jiminez, through counsel, wrote a letter dated
July 1, 1999 addressed to petitioner requesting
copies of the official extradition request from the
U. S. Government, as well as all documents and
papers submitted therewith; and that he be
given ample time to comment on the request
after he shall have received copies of the
requested papers. Private respondent also
requested that the proceedings on the matter be
held in abeyance in the meantime.
On its January 18, 2000, resolution, the court
ordered the petitioner to furnish private
respondent copies of the extradition request and
its supporting papers and to grant him a
reasonable period within which to file his
comment with supporting evidence.
Issue:

An extradition proceeding is sui generis. It is not

a criminal proceeding which will call into
operation all the rights of an accused as
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. To begin
with, the process of extradition does not involve
the determination of the guilt or innocence of an
accused. His guilt or innocence will be adjudged
in the court of the state where he will be
extradited. Hence, as a rule, constitutional rights
that are only relevant to determine the guilt or
innocence of an accused cannot be invoked by
an extraditee especially by one whose
extradition
papers
are
still
undergoing
evaluation.As held by the US Supreme Court
in United States v. Galanis:
"An extradition proceeding is not a criminal
prosecution, and the constitutional safeguards
that accompany a criminal trial in this country do
not shield an accused from extradition pursuant
to a valid treaty.
As an extradition proceeding is not criminal in
character and the evaluation stage in an
extradition proceeding is not akin to a
preliminary investigation, the due process
safeguards in the latter do not necessarily apply
to the former. This we hold for the procedural
due process required by a given set of
circumstances "must begin with a determination
of the precise nature of the government function
involved as well as the private interest that has
been affected by governmental action. The
concept of due process is flexible for "not all
situations calling for procedural safeguards call
for the same kind of procedure.
GOVERNMENT OF THE USA v GUILLERMO
PURGANAN

Whether or not the private respondent is entitled

to the due process right to notice and hearing
during the evaluation stage of the extradition
process.

Facts:

Ruling:

On May 18, 2001, the Government of the United

States prayed through petition, the immediate
arrest of Mark Jiminez in order to prevent the
flight of the latter. Jiminez thereby filed an
Urgent Manifestation/Ex Parte Motion praying
for his application for an arrest warrant be set for

The court held that private respondent is bereft

of the right to notice and hearing during
the evaluation stage of the extradition process.

This Petition is really a sequel to the case4 of

Secretary of Justice v. Ralph C. Lantion.

hearing.
After
hearing
submitted
his
Memorandum praying that in case a warrant
should issue, he be allowed to post bail in the
amount of P100,000.00. the court ordered the
issuance of warrant of arrest but fixed the bail at
P1 million.
Issues:
I.

II.

Whether
or
in
extradition
proceedings,
prospective
extraditees are entitled to notice and
hearing before warrants for their
arrest can be issued.
Whether or not they are entitled to
the right to bail and provisional
liberty
while
the
extradition
proceedings are pending.

Ruling:
The court ruled in the negative. On the basis of
extradition law, Section 6 of PD 1069 states:
SEC. 6. Issuance of Summons; Temporary
Arrest; Hearing, Service of Notices.- (1)
Immediately upon receipt of the petition, the
presiding judge of the court shall, as soon as
practicable, summon the accused to appear and
to answer the petition on the day and hour fixed
in the order. [H]e may issue a warrant for the
immediate arrest of the accused which may be
served anywhere within the Philippines if it
appears to the presiding judge that the
immediate arrest and temporary detention of the
accused will best serve the ends of justice. Upon
receipt of the answer, or should the accused
after having received the summons fail to
answer within the time fixed, the presiding
judge shall hear the case or set another date for
the hearing thereof.
It is significant to note that Section 6 of PD 1069,
our Extradition Law, uses the word immediate to
qualify the arrest of the accused. This
qualification would be rendered nugatory by
setting for hearing the issuance of the arrest
warrant. Hearing entails sending notices to the
opposing
parties,
receiving
facts
and
arguments from them, and giving them time to
prepare and present such facts and
arguments. Arrest subsequent to a hearing can
no longer be considered immediate. The law

could not have intended the word as a mere

superfluity but, on the whole, as a means of
imparting a sense of urgency and swiftness in
the determination of whether a warrant of arrest
should be issued.
By using the phrase if it appears, the law further
conveys that accuracy is not as important as
speed at such early stage. The trial court is not
expected to make an exhaustivedetermination to
ferret out the true and actual situation,
immediately upon the filing of the petition. From
the knowledge and the material then available to
it, the court is expected merely to get a good first
impression -- a prima facie finding -- sufficient to
make a speedy initial determination as regards
the arrest and detention of the accused.
In the instant petition, the documents sent by the
US Government in support of [its] request for
extradition of herein respondent are enough to
convince the Court of the existence of probable
cause to proceed with the hearing against the
extradite.
On the basis of Constitution, even Section 2 of
Article III of our Constitution, which is invoked by
Jimenez, does not require a notice or a hearing
before the issuance of a warrant of arrest. It
provides:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be
seized.
To determine probable cause for the issuance of
arrest warrants, the Constitution itself requires
only the examination -- under oath or affirmation
-- of complainants and the witnesses they may
produce. There is no requirement to notify and
hear the accused before the issuance of
warrants of arrest.

Art. III, Sec. 13. All persons, except those

charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall,
before conviction, be bailable by sufficient
sureties, or be released on recognizance as may
be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail
shall not be required.
As suggested by the use of the word conviction,
the constitutional provision on bail quoted
above, applies only when a person has been
arrested and detained for violation of Philippine
criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition
proceedings, because extradition courts do not
render judgments of conviction or acquittal.
PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS
INC. v COMELEC

BROTHERHOOD

Facts:
The COMELEC en banc issued on October 13,
2009 Resolution No. 8679 deleting several
party-list groups or organizations from the list of
registered national, regional or sectoral parties,
organizations or coalitions for the upcoming May
2010
elections. Among
the
party-list
organizations affected was PGBI; it was delisted
because it failed to get 2% of the votes cast in
2004 and it did not participate in the 2007
elections.
Issue:
Whether or not PGBIs right to due process was
violated.
Ruling:
The court agreed with the COMELEC that
PGBIs right to due process was not violated for
PGBI was given an opportunity to seek, as it did
seek, a reconsideration of Resolution No.
8679. The essence of due process, we have
consistently held, is simply the opportunity to be
heard; as applied to administrative proceedings,
due process is the opportunity to explain ones
side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration
of the action or ruling complained of. A formal or
trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all
instances essential. The requirement is satisfied

where the parties are afforded fair and

reasonable opportunity to explain their side of
the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon
is absolute lack of notice and hearing.
Based on the attendant circumstances, PGBI
was not denied due process. In any case, given
the result of this Resolution, PGBI has no longer
any cause for complaint on due process
grounds.
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE CASES
ELVIRA AGULLO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
Facts:
Agullo was charged with malversation based on
an audit findings on July 14, 1986 by Ignacio
Gerez, Auditing Examiner III, as a result of which
a P26,404.26 cash shortage was discovered on
petitioners accountability.
In the course of the pre-trial, petitioner Agullo
conceded the fact of audit and admitted the
findings in the Report of Cash Examination and
the facts set forth in the Letter of Demand. In
effect, she admitted the fact of shortage in the
amount
stated
in
the
Information.
Notwithstanding, petitioner Agullo, at all stages
of the criminal indictment, persistently professed
her innocence of the charge and categorically
denied having malversed or converted the public
funds in question for her own personal use or
benefit.
With petitioners admission of the fact of cash
shortage, the prosecution then rested its case.
For its part, the defense, in its bid to overturn the
presumption of malversation and shatter the
prima facie evidence of conversion, offered the
testimony of the following witnesses: petitioner
Elvira Agullo; Rene Briones Austero, Cashier III
of the Department of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH), Region VIII; and Engracia
Camposano-Camaoy, Barangay Captain of
Hinabuyan, Dagame, Leyte.
At the witness stand, petitioner Agullo
unrelentingly maintained her innocence and
vehemently denied the accusation against her
claiming that she lost consciousness as she was
walking from her residence to report for work to

give the salaries of the permanent employees

which she encashed the day before.
Striking down the defense as incredible and
without basis, the Sandiganbayan rendered its
assailed decision, convicting petitioner Agullo of
the crime of malversation of public funds,
ratiocinating principally that no evidencehas
been presented linking the loss of the
government funds with the alleged sudden heart
attack of the accused.
Issue:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan disregarded
or overlooked evidence of substance thereby
violating petitioners constitutional right to be
presumed innocent until proven otherwise.
Ruling:
The
Supreme
Court
held
that
the
Sandiganbayan disregarded or overlooked
evidence of substance which bear considerable
weight in the adjudication of petitioners guilt or
the affirmation of her constitutional right to be
presumed innocent until proven otherwise.
The evidence for the prosecution, upon which
the Sandiganbayan riveted its judgment of
conviction, was limited to documents to wit, the
Report of Cash Examination and Letter of
Demand. As could be readily gleaned from the
assailed decision, the verdict adjudging herein
petitioner guilty of the crime of malversation was
anchored solely on the presumption provided
under Article 217, paragraph 4 of the Revised
Penal Code, which prima facie evidence, in turn,
was rooted loosely on the documentary
evidence presented by the prosecution, to wit;
the Report of Cash Examination and Letter of
Demandpieces of evidence which the defense
concededly admitted, but which do not suffice to
convict the petitioner beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime charged.
Upon thorough scrutiny of the evidence adduced
by both prosecution and defense, we hold that
petitioner Agullo has satisfactorily overcome and
rebutted by competent proof, the prima
facie evidence of conversion so as to exonerate
her from the charge of malversation. To this end,
petitioner presented evidence that satisfactorily

prove that not a single centavo of the missing

funds was used for her own personal benefit or
gain.
Sandiganbayan,
in
convicting
petitioner,
obviously relied more on the flaws and
deficiencies in the evidence presented by the
defense, not on the strength and merit of the
prosecutions evidence.This course of action is
impermissible for the evidence of the
prosecution clearly cannot sustain a conviction
in an unprejudiced mind.
All
told,
this
Court,
through
the
scholarly ponencia of Mr. Justice Isagani Cruz
in People vs. De Guzman, inked in vivid prose
the premium accorded to the right of an accused
to be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved, to wit:
The constitutional presumption of innocence is
not an empty platitude meant only to embellish
the Bill of Rights. Its purpose is to balance the
scales in what would otherwise be an uneven
contest between the lone individual pitted
against the People of the Philippines and all the
resources at their command. Its inexorable
mandate is that, for all the authority and
influence of the prosecution, the accused must
be acquitted and set free if his guilt cannot be
proved beyond the whisper of doubt.
PEOPLE v BATO
Facts:
On January 15, 1990, Sergio and Abraham Bato
was convicted guilty of murder. They appealed
their case before the Court of Appeals but the
finding was sustained and the penalty increased
to reclusion perpetua. Appellants raised the
defense of denial. They maintained that their
identification as the alleged perpetrators of
Ernestos murder is merely an afterthought,
necessitated by a death of strong evidence on
the part of the prosecution.
Issue:
Whether or not the prosecution evidence is more
than sufficient incriminatory and inculpatory

circumstances to overcome the presumption of

innocence.
Ruling:
The conviction of Appellant Abraham Bato is
based on circumstantial evidence gleaned from
the sole testimony of the son of the deceased.
True, in the absence of direct proof, a conviction
may be based on circumstantial evidence, but to
warrant such conviction, the following requisites
must concur: (1) there is more than one
circumstance, (2) the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven, and (3) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as
to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.
Hence, it has been held that a judgment of
conviction based on circumstantial evidence can
be upheld only if the circumstances proven
constitute an unbroken chain leading to one fair
and reasonable conclusion that the defendants
are guilty, to the exclusion of any other
conclusion. The circumstances proved must be
concordant with each other, consistent with the
hypothesis that the accused is guilty and, at the
same time, inconsistent with any hypothesis
other than that of guilt. As a corollary to the
constitutional precept that the accused is
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved,
a conviction based on circumstantial evidence
must exclude each and every hypothesis
consistent with his innocence.
In the instant case, the totality of the prosecution
evidence does not constitute an unbroken chain
leading beyond reasonable doubt to the guilt of
the accused
The Constitution mandates that an accused
shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proven beyond reasonable doubt. Where the
State fails to meet the quantum of proof required
to overcome the constitutional presumption, the
accused is entitled to an acquittal regardless of
the weakness or even the absence of his
defense. By constitutional fiat, the burden of
proof is accordingly vested on the prosecution.
PEOPLE V DE GUZMAN

Facts:
De Guzman was found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs,
punishable under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165.
He appealed to the Court of Appeals who
affirmed the decision of the RTC.
De Guzman argues that the prosecution failed to
show that the police officers complied with the
mandatory procedures under R.A. No. 9165. In
particular, he points to the fact that the seized
items were not marked immediately after his
arrest; that the police officers failed to make an
inventory of the seized items in his presence or
in the presence of his counsel and of a
representative from the media and from the
Department of Justice (DOJ); and that no
photographs were taken of the seized items and
of appellant. Appellant also claims that the
unbroken chain of custody of the evidence was
not established. Further, appellant contends that
the failure of the police officers to enter the buybust operation in the police blotter before the
said operation, the lack of coordination with the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA),
and the failure to observe the requirements of
R.A. No. 9165 have effectively overturned the
presumption of regularity in the performance of
the police officers duties.
Issue:
Whether or not the degree of proof to overcome
the presumption of innocence has been met.
Ruling:
When the circumstances are capable of two or
more inferences, as in this case, one of which is
consistent with innocence and the other is
compatible with guilt, the presumption of
innocence must prevail, and the court must
acquit.
The duty to prove the guilt of an accused is
reposed in the State. Law enforcers and public
officers have the duty to preserve the chain of
custody over the seized drugs. This guarantee of
the integrity of the evidence to be used against
an accused goes to the very heart of his
fundamental rights.

In a prosecution for violation of the Dangerous

Drugs Act, the existence of the dangerous drug
is a condition sine qua non for conviction. The
dangerous drug is the very corpus delicti of the
crime.
The identity of the prohibited drug must be
established with moral certainty. Apart from
showing that the elements of possession or sale
are present, the fact that the substance illegally
possessed and sold in the first place is the same
substance offered in court as exhibit must
likewise be established with the same degree of
certitude as that needed to sustain a guilty
verdict. The corpus delicti should be identified
with unwavering exactitude.
The Court finds that the apprehending officers
failed to comply with the guidelines set under
R.A. No. 9165 and its IRR.
Accordingly, the failure to establish, through
convincing proof, that the integrity of the seized
items has been adequately preserved through
an unbroken chain of custody is enough to
engender reasonable doubt on the guilt of an
accused. Reasonable doubt is that doubt
engendered by an investigation of the whole
proof and an inability after such investigation to
let the mind rest upon the certainty of guilt.
Absolute certainty of guilt is not demanded by
the law to convict a person charged with a
crime, but moral certainty is required as to every
proposition of proof requisite to constitute the
offense. A conviction cannot be sustained if
there is a persistent doubt on the identity of the
drug.
Indeed, the prosecutions failure to prove that the
specimen submitted for laboratory examination
was the same one allegedly seized from
appellant is fatal to the prosecutions case.
The evidence for the prosecution must stand or
fall on its own weight and cannot be allowed to
draw strength from the weakness of the
defense.
RIGHT TO BE HEARD CASES

PEOPLE v MAGSI
Facts:

This is a mandatory review of the death

sentence imposed upon Teodoro del Rosario,
defendant-appellant.
On January 14, 1968, del Rosario and his
other co-accused were charged with the crime
of murder qualified by abuse of superior
strength, use of a motor vehicle, the offense
being committed in the dwelling place of the
offended party and that it was committed by a
band.
Del Rosario was arraigned on October 19,
1970 and entered an unqualified plea of guilt
to which the Court based its judgment the next
day and charged him with the crime of
murder, sentencing him to a death penalty.
In his brief, defendant-appellant assailed the
decision and alleged that the trial court erred
in imposing the death penalty when the former
plead guilty without ascertaining that the
accused fully understood the charges against
him and the penalty that may be imposed
notwithstanding his plea of guilty.
Records show that soon after defendantappellant was apprehended on August 20,
1970, his arraignment was scheduled before
the Criminal Circuit Court of San Fernando, La
Union.
Altogether, this case was actually set and
rescheduled for six (6) times, first of which
was on August 1, 1970. On that date, despite
appointment by the court of Atty. Mario Rivera
as de officio counsel for the accused, hearing
was re-set to September 8, 1970 on motion of
Atty. Rivera, who was prompted to ask for it
because of accused desire to be represented
by a de parte counsel. Prior to the next
hearing, Atty. Rivera moved to withdraw as de
officio counsel and it was favorably acted on
by the court on September 7, 1970. At the
second hearing on September 8, 1970, for
failure of the de officio and de parte counsels
to appear, despite a second call of the case,
the hearing was re-set for the next day and
the court appointed Atty. Dominador Cariaso
de officio counsel for the accused. On the

third hearing date, neither the de parte nor the

de officio counsel was in Court, so Atty. Rivera
was reappointed that day as de officio counsel
for arraignment purposes only. The accused
del Rosario entered a plea of guilty but
qualified it with the allegation that he
committed the crime out of fear of his coaccused Eloy Magsi and the other coaccused.
Recorded proceedings at the first instance on
September 9, 1970 reproduced previously
showed that, de officio counsel Atty. Rivera
and accused were hardly afforded by the
Court any opportunity to discuss the case
together, and the qualified plea of guilty
resulted from the Courts proddings rather than
from accused's spontaneous volition.
Issue:
Whether or not there was a violation of right of
the accused.
Ruling:
The Court held that mere pro-forma
appointment of de officio counsel, who fails to
genuinely protect the interests of the accused,
resetting of hearing by the court for alleged
reception of evidence when in fact none was
conducted, perfunctory queries addressed to
the accused whether he understands the
charges and the gravity of the penalty, are not
sufficient compliance.
In People v Valera, it was held that:
In the absence of an explanation why Atty.
Ansaldo Jr. asked to be released as counsel
de officio as soon as he was appointed by the
trial court; why he failed to appear for the trial
on July 2, 1968 when the court ordered his
arrest and on July 3, 1968 when the Court
had to appoint another (the third) counsel de
officio and that when Ansaldo appeared on
July 16, 1968 he informed the Court that his
client, upon his advice wished to change his
previous plea of not guilty to one of guilty, this
Court is forced to conclude that counsel was
not disposed to discharge his duties as

counsel de officio and it was naive for the

court to have proceeded to re-arraign the
accused with a counsel of such disposition
and expect that the rights of the accused
would be amply protected.
In People v Simeon, it ruled that the desire to
speed up the disposition of cases should not
be effected at the sacrifice of the basic rights
of the accused.
PEOPLE v RIVERA
Facts:
This is a review pursuant to Rule 122. Section
10 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure of the
decision, finding accused-appellant Rolando
Rivera guilty of rape and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of death for having raped
his thirteen-year old daughter Erlanie Rivera.
After private complainant testified on directexamination, counsel for accused attempted
to cross-examine her on matters relevant to
the complaint for Acts of Lasciviousness which
was objected to by Asst. Provincial Prosecutor
Arturo G. Santos on the ground that private
complainant did not testify on that matter but
limited her testimony on the rape case only.
Counsel for the accused argued that although
that is correct nonetheless because [of] the
sworn statement executed by private
complainant identified by said witness in her
direct examination and marked as Exhibit C
for the prosecution, he is at liberty to crossexamine the witness on all matters stated in
her sworn statement including that portion
touching on the acts of lasciviousness subject
matter of another case before another court.
The Court sustained the objection. Section 6,
Rule 132, Revised Rules on Evidence
provides that the witness may be crossexamined by the adverse party as to any
matters stated in the direct examination, or
connected therewith, with sufficient fullness
and freedom to test his accuracy and
truthfulness and freedom from interest or bias
or the reverse, and to elicit all important facts
bearing upon the issue.

Accused-appellant insists that his counsel

should have been allowed to ask questions in
relation to the sworn statement executed by
complainant. He cites Rule 132, 17 of the
Revised Rules of Evidence which provides
that:
When part
of
an
act,
conversation, writing or record
evidence by one party, the whole
subject matter may be inquired
other.

declaration,
is given in
of the same
into by the

Accused-appellant invokes his right to due

process of law. He claims that he was denied
the same because the trial judge disallowed
his lawyer from cross-examining Erlanie
Rivera concerning the latters sworn
statements on the ground of irrelevance and
immateriality, and the trial courts decision was
promulgated just one day after accusedappellant submitted his memorandum
Issue:
Whether or not the lower court failed to
observe the constitutional right of the
Accused-Appellant to due process.
Ruling:
Procedural due process simply means that a
person must be heard before he is
condemned. The due process requirement is
a part of a persons basic rights, not a mere
formality that may be dispensed with or
performed perfunctorily. Considering both the
evidence and the law applicable to this case,
we hold that accused-appellant has been
accorded his right to due process.
The right of a party to cross-examine a
witness is embodied in Art. III, 14(2) of the
Constitution which provides that the accused
shall have the right to meet the witnesses face
to face and in Rule 115, 1(f) of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure which states that,
in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
have the right to confront and cross-examine
the witnesses against him. The crossexamination of a witness is essential to test

his or her credibility, expose falsehoods or

half-truths, uncover the truth which rehearsed
direct
examination
testimonies
may
successfully suppress, and demonstrate
inconsistencies in substantial matters which
create reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the
accused and thus give substance to the
constitutional right of the accused to confront
the witnesses against him.
The right of the accused to cross-examine a
witness is, however, not without limits but is
subject to the rules on the admissibility and
relevance of evidence. Thus, in People v.
Zheng Bai Hui, this Court upheld the ruling of
the trial judge disallowing the questions
propounded by the accuseds counsel on the
ability of the arresting officer to distinguish
between tawas and shabu without a
laboratory examination, the academic degree
of his training instructor, and the officers
authorship of books on drug identity and
analysis for being irrelevant, improper, and
impertinent.
In this case, accused-appellants counsel
argued that his questions to Erlanie on the
other acts of lasciviousness supposedly
committed by accused-appellant against her
were for the purpose of testing her credibility.
There was, however, no showing on his part
how these questions had any bearing on
complainants credibility or on the truth of her
claims. One is led to suspect that the purpose
of these questions was to confuse
complainant into committing mistakes in her
answers during cross-examination that
accused-appellants counsel could later use to
possibly put complainants credibility, not to
mention her character, in question.
As for the decision rendered by the trial court,
it gives a clear account of the facts and the
law on which it is based. It discusses in full the
courts findings on the credibility of both the
prosecution and defense witnesses and its
evaluation of the evidence of both parties.
What we said in the analogous case of People
v. Mercado applies to this case:

. . . A review of the trial courts decision shows

that its findings were based on the records of
this case and the transcripts of stenographic
notes during the trial. The speed with which
the trial court disposed of the case cannot
thus be attributed to the injudicious
performance of its function. Indeed, a judge is
not supposed to study a case only after all the
pertinent pleadings have been filed. It is a
mark of diligence and devotion to duty that a
judge studies a case long before the deadline
set for the promulgation of his decision has
arrived. The one-day period between the filing
of accused-appellants memorandum and the
promulgation of the decision was sufficient
time to consider their arguments and to
incorporate these in the decision. As long as
the trial judge does not sacrifice the orderly
administration of justice in favor of a speedy
but reckless disposition of a case, he cannot
be taken to task for rendering his decision with
due dispatch.
PEOPLE v ALCANZADO
Facts:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
decision dated April 5, 1999 finding accused
Oscar Alcanzado guilty of the crime of murder.
However, a careful examination of the records
reveals that the assailed decision will have to
be set aside and the records remanded back
to the RTC for reception of evidence for the
defense.
Appellant pleaded not guilty during his
arraignment on July 30, 1998. Trial on the
merits ensued. The prosecution rested its
case on October 13, 1998. Upon motion of
appellant, the RTC issued an Order dated
November 10, 1998 allowing appellant to file a
demurrer to evidence. On November 19,
1998, appellant filed his Demurrer to Evidence
which was opposed by the prosecution. On
April 22, 1999, the RTC promulgated herein
assailed decision convicting appellant.

The RTC committed a very serious error in

promulgating a decision after denying the
demurrer to evidence filed by appellant upon
prior leave of court, without first giving
appellant the opportunity to present his
evidence.
Issue:
Whether or not the right of the accused to be
heard was violated after the RTC denied the
demurrer to evidence filed by the appellant.
Ruling:
Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court
provides:
SEC. 15. Demurrer to evidence. After the
prosecution has rested its case, the court may
dismiss the case on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence: (1) on its own
initiative after giving the prosecution an
opportunity to be heard; or (2) on motion of
the accused filed with prior leave of court.
If the court denies the motion for dismissal,
the accused may adduce evidence in his
defense. When the accused filed such motion
to dismiss without express leave of court, he
waives the right to present evidence and
submits the case for judgment on the basis of
the evidence for the prosecution.
Contrary to the RTCs assertion in its decision
that the demurrer to evidence was denied, the
records of the case do not reveal that there
was any prior order denying appellants
demurrer to evidence before the rendition of
the assailed judgment. Evidently, the trial
court violated the aforequoted provisions of
Section 15, Rule 119. Appellant had filed a
motion for leave to file a demurrer to evidence
which was granted by the RTC and therefore
upon denial of his demurrer, if indeed it was
denied, the trial court should have given
appellant the opportunity to present his
evidence. Equally astonishing is the fact that
appellants counsel did not raise said
irregularity as an issue in the RTC or in this

Court. In effect, appellant has not been

accorded due process.
Due to the procedural unfairness and
complete miscarriage of justice in the handling
of the proceedings in the RTC, a remand of
the case for reception of defense evidence is
warranted. The constitutional right of the
accused to be heard on his defense has been
violated.
So that appellant may be spared from further
delay, the Court deems it necessary to treat
the herein assailed judgment as a mere
resolution denying the demurrer to evidence
and ascertain whether the RTC has
committed grave abuse of discretion in not
granting the same.
The RTC committed grave abuse of discretion
in outrightly convicting appellant of the crime
of murder and sentencing him to suffer
reclusion perpetua when appellant has not
been given the opportunity to adduce
evidence in his defense, pursuant to Section
15, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court.
RIGHT AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY CAES
CUIZON v CA
Facts:
The Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court
of Pangasinan (Branch 39) rendered a Joint
Decision in Criminal Cases finding accused
Eduardo Cuison guilty of the crime of double
homicide, beyond reasonable doubt sentencing
him to suffer imprisonment from 6 years and 1
day of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years
and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum,
for each offense, and to indemnify the heirs of
Rafael Sapigao the amount of P30,000.00 and
the heirs of Rulo Castro also the amount
of P30,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency.

On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the said

decision was affirmed with the modification that
the
civil
indemnity
was
increased
to P50,000.00. The dispositive portion of said
Decision of this Court dated July 30, 1991 reads:
PREMISES
CONSIDERED,
the joint decision appealed
from is hereby MODIFIED by
ordering accused Eduardo
Cuison to indemnify the heirs
of Rafael Sapigao the amount
of P50,000.00 and the heirs of
Rulo Castro also the amount
of P50,000.00
without
subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency.
The case was remanded to the Regional Trial
Court of Pangasinan (Br. 39) for promulgation of
the decision. However, respondent Judge
promulgated on April 4, 1995 the decision of [the
Court of Appeals] only with respect to the
modified civil liability of the accused but did not
commit the accused to jail to commence service
of his sentence.
Asst. City Prosecutor Abraham L. Ramos II
reported the matter to the Solicitor General and
requested that a motion for clarification be filed
with this Court to clarify the decision dated July
30, 1991. On July 7, 1995, the Solicitor General
filed a Motion to Clarify Decision. On August 17,
1995, the Court of Appeals rendered a
Resolution which states in pertinent portions
thereof:
In the dispositive portion of this Courts
decision, We simply modified the
appealed decision of the court a quo in
one respect only - the increase of the
indemnity to be paid by the appellant to
the heirs of the victims from P30,000.00
to P50,000.00 as ruled in various cases
including that cited in Our decision,
People vs. Sison, 189 SCRA 643, 646.
Respondent Judge then set the promulgation of
the decision anew. The accused, however, filed
a Motion to Set Aside Promulgation on the
following grounds:

1. That the judgment in said case was

already promulgated on 4 April 1995 and
therefore there is nothing to promulgate
anymore.
2. To pursue with [sic] the scheduled
promulgation will violate the accuseds
constitutional right against jeopardy.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners right against double
jeopardy was violated.
Ruling:
To substantiate a claim of double jeopardy, the
following must be proven:
(1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to
the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have
been validly terminated; (3) the second jeopardy
must be for the same offense, or the second
offense includes or is necessarily included in the
offense charged in the first information, or is an
attempt to commit the same or is a frustration
thereof (citations omitted).
And legal jeopardy attaches only: (a) upon a
valid
indictment; (b) before
a
competent
court; (c) after arraignment; (d) [when] a valid
plea [has] been entered; and (e) the case was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without the
express consent of the accused (citation
omitted).
Petitioner contends that the promulgation by
Judge Ramos on April 4, 1995 of the
Respondent Courts decision of June 30, 1991
by
reading
its
dispositive
portion has
effectivelyterminated the criminal cases against
the petitioner x xx. In other words, petitioner
claims that the first jeopardy attached at that
point.
The Court is not persuaded. As a rule, a criminal
prosecution includes a civil action for the
recovery of indemnity. Hence, a decision in such
case disposes of both the criminal as well as the
civil liabilities of an accused. Here, trial court
promulgated only the civil aspect of the case,
but not the criminal.

As earlier observed, the promulgation of the CA

Decision was not complete. In fact and in truth,
the promulgation was not merely incomplete; it
was also void. In excess of its jurisdiction, the
trial judge rendered a substantially incomplete
promulgation on April 4, 1995, and he repeated
his mistake in his April 12, 1996 Order. We
emphasize that grave abuse of discretion
rendered the aforementioned act of the trial
court void. Since the criminal cases have not yet
been terminated, the first jeopardy has not yet
attached. Hence, double jeopardy cannot
prosper as a defense.
Respondent Courts questioned Decision did not
modify or amend its July 30, 1991 Decision. It
merely ordered the promulgation of the
judgment of conviction and the full execution of
the penalty it had earlier imposed on petitioner.
ALMARIO v CA
Facts:
Petitioner is one of the accused in Criminal Case
No. 91-6761, for estafa thru falsification of public
document, and Criminal Case No. 91-6762, for
estafa, with respondent RCBC as the offended
party in both cases.
The informations were filed on October 22,
1992. After petitioners arraignment on March
18, 1992, pre-trial was held, which was
terminated on October 21, 1994. Thereafter, the
cases were scheduled for continuous trial in
December 1994, and in January and February
1995, but the hearings were cancelled because
the Presiding Judge of the court was elevated to
this Court and no trial judge was immediately
appointed/detailed thereto.
The hearing set for June 21, 1995, was
postponed for lack of proof of notice to all the
accused and their counsel. The hearing on July
17, 1995, upon request of private prosecutor,
and without objection on the part of petitioners
counsel, postponed to July 24, 1995. However,
for lack of proof of service of notice upon
petitioners three co-accused, the hearing set for
July 24, 1995, was likewise cancelled and the

cases were reset for trial on September 8 and

25, 1995.
On September 8, 1995, private complainant
failed to appear despite due notice. Hence, upon
motion of petitioners counsel, respondent court
issued an order dismissing the case against the
accused Almario for failure to prosecute and
considering that accused is entitled to a speedy
trial.
Upon motion of the private prosecutor and
despite the opposition of petitioner, respondent
court in its Order dated October 25, 1995,
reconsidered the Order of September 8, 1995.
Issue:
Whether or not double jeopardy had set in so
that petitioners constitutional right against such
jeopardy had been violated.
Ruling:
As observed by respondent appellate court,
delay in the trial was due to circumstances
beyond the control of the parties and of the trial
court. The first and third postponements were
clearly justified on the ground of lack of notice to
accused, co-accused, and/or counsel. Another
was made without objection from petitioners
counsel.
That there was no unreasonable delay of the
proceedings is apparent from the chronology of
the hearings with the reasons for their
postponements or transfers. Petitioner could not
refute the appellate courts findings that
petitioners right to speedy trial had not been
violated. There being no oppressive delay in the
proceedings,
and
no
postponements
unjustifiably sought, we concur with the
conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals that
petitioners right to speedy trial had not been
infringed.
It follows that petitioner cannot invoke the
constitutional right against double jeopardy
when
that
order
was
reconsidered
seasonably. For as petitioners right to speedy
trial was not transgressed, this exception to the
fifth element of double jeopardy that the

defendant was acquitted or convicted, or the

case was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without the express consent of the accused was
not met.
MANANTAN v CA
Facts:
In the morning of September 25, 1982, Fiscal
Wilfredo Ambrocio decided to catch shrimps at
the irrigation canal at his farm. He invited the
deceased who told him that they borrow the car
of the accused Manantan. Both proceeded to
Manantan Technical School where they drank
beer there before traveling on to the farm of the
accused. At the farm, they consumed one
(more) case of beer. At about PM 12:00 they
went home. Then at about PM 2:00 or PM 3:00,
Tabangin, Nicolas, and the accused returned to
the house Fiscal Ambrocio, ate, and drank one
more case of beer. They ate and drank until
about PM 8:30 when the accused invited them
to go bowling. They went to Vicap Bowling
Lanes at Isabela but unfortunately there was no
available parking space. While waiting for one,
they drank a beer each. After waiting for about
40 minutes to no avail, the accused invited his
companions to go to the LBC Night Club. They
had drinks and took some lady partners at the
LBC. After one hour, they left the LBC and
proceeded to a nearby store where they
ate arrozcaldoand then they decided to go
home. The accused was driving at a speed of
about 40 kilometers per hour along the
Maharlika Highway at Malvar (although
according to Charles Cudamon, the car was
running at a speed of 80 to 90 kilometers per
hours on the wrong lane of the highway) when
they met a passenger jeepneyhead on. The
accused immediately tried to swerve the car to
the right but he unable able to avoid the vehicle
and the two vehicles collided.
The accused was acquitted on the ground that
the prosecution failed to provide proof beyond
reasonable doubt. The parents of the victim now
seek for the enforcement of civil liability against
the accused. The accused contends that he can
no longer be held civilly liable for he was

acquitted of the crime, and doing so would

amount to double jeopardy.
Issue:
Whether or not a person who has been
acquitted on the grounds of lack of proof beyond
reasonable doubt, and made civilly liable
thereafter, is tantamount to double jeopardy.
Ruling:
Petitioners claim that the decision of the
appellate court awarding indemnity placed him
in double jeopardy is misplaced. The constitution
provides that no person shall be twice put in
jeopardy for the same offense. If an act is
punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction
or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to
another prosecution for the same act as such
would constitute double jeopardy has the
following elements: (1) a first jeopardy must
have attached prior to the second; (2) the first
jeopardy must have terminated; and (3) the
second jeopardy must be for the same offense
as the first.
Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with
different effects on civil liability. First is an
acquittal on the ground that the accused is not
the author of the act or omission complained
of. This instance closes the door to civil liability,
for a person who has been found to be not the
perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and
can never be held liable for such act or
omission.There being no delict, civil liability ex
delicto is out of the question, and the civil action,
if any, which may be instituted must be based on
grounds other than the delict complained of. The
second instance is an acquittal based on
reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In
this case, even if the guilt of the accused has not
been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt
from civil liability which may be proved by
preponderance of evidence only.

Accused-appellant Feliciano and de la Cruz

were charged with the crime of robbery with
homicide. That, on June 5, 1995, armed with a
handgun, by means of force and violence, with
intent to gain, accused-appellants unlawfully
took, stole, and robbed the amount of ten
thousand pesos from one Teresita Fuentes and
for the purpose of enabling to take, steal, and
carry away the amount, the accused-appellants
unlawfully attacked and wounded Teresita
Fuentes which resulted to the latters death.
In the trial that ensued, the prosecution sought
the discharge of accused Rodel de la Cruz so
that the latter could testify against his coaccused Carlos Feliciano. Feliciano, after de la
Cruz fulfilled his obligation to be a state witness,
was found guilty of the crime.
Issues: Whether or not the discharge of an
accused to become a state witness has the
same effect as an acquittal
Ruling: A discharge, if granted at the stage
where jeopardy has already attached, is
equivalent to an acquittal, such that further
prosecution would be tantamount to the state
reneging on its part of the agreement and
unconstitutionally placing the state witness in
double jeopardy. The rule is not absolute. In an
instance where the discharged accused fails to
fulfil his part of the bargain and refuses to testify
against his co-accused, the benefit of his
discharge can be withdrawn and he can again
be prosecuted for the same offense.
That,despite an obvious attempt to downgrade
his own participation in the crime, state witness
de la Cruzdid not renege from his agreement to
give a good account of the crime, enough to
indeed substantiate the conviction of his coaccused, now appellant Carlos Feliciano, by the
trial court.
MERCIALES v CA
Facts:

PEOPLE v FELICIANO
Facts:

The accused was charged with the crime of rape

with homicide. The prosecution filed a motion for
accused JoselitoNuada to be utilized as a state

witness. Furthermore,
the
prosecution
contended that it was not required to present
evidence to warrant the discharge of accused
Nuada since the latter had already been
admitted into the Witness Protection Program of
the Department of Justice. But the judge
contended, in accordance with the Rules on
Criminal Procedure, that evidence needs to be
presented to admit a state witness. During the
trial process, the prosecution was given time to
present evidence by the judge however, the
prosecution failed to do so. Rather, the
prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration
and the case was reset multiple times. The
counsel of the accused filed a demurrer of
evidence and as a result, the accused was
acquitted. The mother of the victim appealed but
was denied, on the grounds that re-opening the
case after the accused has been convicted is
equivalent to double jeopardy.
Issue:
Whether or not there is double jeopardy when
an acquitted person is tried again for the same
case, provided that the acquittal lacked due
process
Ruling:
The prosecution is duty bound to present
evidence in all trial court proceedings. By
refusing to comply with the trial courts order to
present evidence, the public prosecutor grossly
violated the aboverule. Moreover, the public
prosecutor violated his bounden duty to protect
the interest of the offended party, at least insofar
as the criminal aspect is concerned. After the
trial court denied his motion to discharge Nuada
as a state witness, he should have proceeded to
complete the evidence of the prosecution by
other
means. Instead,
he
wilfully
and
deliberately refused to present an available
witness. The public prosecutor was duty-bound
to exhaust all available proofs to establish the
guilt of the accused and bring them to justice for
their offense against the injured party.
By failing to discharge his duties, the public
prosecutor committed non-feasance. By failing
to present evidence, due process was not

observed. The dismissal of the case was thus

invalid for lack of a fundamental prerequisite:
due process.Hence, the acquittal of the accused
is null and void.
POTOT v PEOPLE
Facts:
On February 3, 2000, the accused was
convicted of homicide. The convict also waived
his right to appeal on the same date. On
February 11, 2000, the wife of the victim filed
through
counsel
a
motion
for
reconsideration/retrial praying that the decision
be set aside and that the case be heard again
due to irregularities committed before and during
the trial which caused miscarriage of justice. The
prosecution withheld from presenting two key
witnesses, the two key witnesses having vital
information to prove the case as murder instead
of homicide. The two witnesses were withdrawn
due to the intervention of the mayor. Hence, the
information was only for homicide.
Issue:
Whether or not the review of a crime sentenced
by final judgment, for the purpose of modifying
the charge to a higher offense, constitutes
double jeopardy.
Ruling:
Double jeopardy not only applies to acquitted
persons but also to those convicted. To invoke
the defense of double jeopardy, the following
requisites must be present: (1) a valid complaint
or information; (2) the court has jurisdiction to try
the case; (3) the accused has pleaded to the
charge; and (4) he has been convicted or
acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express
consent.
The prosecutor did not abuse his discretion as
he is privileged to judge the best crime to charge
in the cases he handles.The fact that the two
witnesses were not presented was not the
prosecutors liability. Records do not show any
irregularity in the prosecution.

PEOPLE v ASTUDILLO
Facts:
On November 21, 1995, the accused-appellant
was arraigned and the accused pleaded not
guilty. On March 16, 1998, the accusedappellant was convicted of murder qualified by
abuse of superior strength. The accusedappellant appealed and, upon review of the
case, the Court of Appeal revised the decision,
modified,
and
replaced
the
qualifying
circumstance into treachery, thus increasing the
accused-appellants civil liability. Hence this
appeal by accused-appellant on the grounds
that the actions of the Court of Appeals violated
his right against double jeopardy.
Issues:
Whether or not the modification of the charge
from murder qualified by abuse of superior
strength to murder qualified by treachery
violates the accuseds right against double
jeopardy
Ruling:

When the accused himself files or consents to

the filing of a motion for reconsideration or
modification, double jeopardy cannot be invoked
because the accused waived his right not to be
placed therein by filing such motion. His motion
gives the court an opportunity to rectify its errors
or to reevaluate its assessment of facts and
conclusions of law and make them conformable
with the statute applicable to the case in the new
judgment it has to render. The raison detre is to
afford the court a chance to correct its own
mistakes and to avoid unnecessary appeals
from being taken.In effect, a motion for
reconsideration or modification filed by or with
consent of the accused renders the entire
evidence open for the review of the trial court
without,
however,
conducting
further
proceedings, such as the taking of additional
proof. Let it be known that appellate courts are
triers of law, and not triers of facts.