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434 19 PDF
434 19 PDF
Evacuation,
escape &
rescue
International Association of Oil & Gas Producers
ublications
Global experience
The International Association of Oil & Gas Producers has access to a wealth of technical
knowledge and experience with its members operating around the world in many different
terrains. We collate and distil this valuable knowledge for the industry to use as guidelines
for good practice by individual members.
Disclaimer
Whilst every effort has been made to ensure the accuracy of the information contained in this publication,
neither the OGP nor any of its members past present or future warrants its accuracy or will, regardless
of its or their negligence, assume liability for any foreseeable or unforeseeable use made thereof, which
liability is hereby excluded. Consequently, such use is at the recipients own risk on the basis that any use
by the recipient constitutes agreement to the terms of this disclaimer. The recipient is obliged to inform
any subsequent recipient of such terms.
This document may provide guidance supplemental to the requirements of local legislation. Nothing
herein, however, is intended to replace, amend, supersede or otherwise depart from such requirements. In
the event of any conflict or contradiction between the provisions of this document and local legislation,
applicable laws shall prevail.
Copyright notice
The contents of these pages are The International Association of Oil and Gas Producers. Permission
is given to reproduce this report in whole or in part provided (i) that the copyright of OGP and (ii)
the source are acknowledged. All other rights are reserved. Any other use requires the prior written
permission of the OGP.
These Terms and Conditions shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of England and Wales. Disputes arising here from shall be exclusively subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of
England and Wales.
Contents
1.0
1.1
1.2
2.0
2.1
2.1.1
2.1.2
2.1.3
2.1.4
2.1.5
2.1.6
2.1.7
2.1.8
2.1.9
2.1.10
Application.................................................................................................................. 2
Generic Stages of EER .............................................................................................. 3
Evacuation Decision and its influence on EER Analysis ....................................... 6
Helicopter Evacuation................................................................................................ 7
TEMPSC Evacuation .................................................................................................. 7
Times and Failures Modes of Lifeboat Evacuation................................................. 7
Activity Undertaken to Improve TEMPSC Evacuation ............................................ 8
Bridge-Link Evacuation ............................................................................................. 9
Escape to Sea ............................................................................................................. 9
Rescue and Recovery ................................................................................................ 9
2.2
2.2.1
2.2.2
2.2.3
2.2.4
2.2.5
2.2.6
2.2.7
2.2.8
3.0
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
3.5
3.6
3.7
3.8
3.9
3.9.1
4.0
5.0
6.0
References .......................................................................... 20
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Abbreviations:
ARRC
DC
DoE
EPIRB
EER
ERP
ERRV
ERRVA
FRC
GEMEVAC
H 2S
HSE
NPD
OIM
OREDA
OSC
PFEER
PLB
POB
QRA
SAR
SBV
TEMPSC
UKCS
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1.0
1.1
Scope
This data sheet provides Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) data and guidance for
Evacuation, Escape and Rescue (EER) from offshore installations as this has the
potential to be more significant in personnel risk terms compared to onshore
installations.
Total evacuations of installations are rare events and each has very different
circumstances. Thus, data relating to real EER events are sparse and QRA tends to rely
on detailed analysis of escalation scenarios and EER activities within each scenario.
This datasheet contains a number of example data rule sets and general guidance for
EER analysis.
Assuming personnel have survived the initial events, personnel EER from onshore
facilities tends to be less complex and of inherently lower risk. Qualitative analysis,
geared towards provision of suitable escape routes and appropriate rescue and medical
contingency planning, will normally be adequate. On some onshore facilities the
provisions of temporary shelters are required for sheltering from certain toxic gas
releases e.g. H2S. In addition some emergency procedures are required for remote
onshore facilities such as being overdue in desert, cold climate and jungle
environments.
The data presented is for North Sea and the user should seek local legislation for
guidance.
It is noted that maintenance activities on Totally Enclosed Motor Propelled Survival
Craft (TEMPSC) in particular have been a source of risk. QRAs do not typically
distinguish this risk as part of EER analysis but take account of maintenance risk within
the general occupational risk category. Specific guidance on TEMPSC maintenance risk
is provided by the UK HSE in its SADIE (Safety Alert Database Information Exchange).
1.2
Definitions
The following definitions are based on those within the UK Prevention of Fire and
Explosion, and Emergency Response (PFEER) Regulations 1995 [1] .
Evacuation
Evacuation means the leaving of an installation and its vicinity, in an emergency, in a
systematic manner and without directly entering the sea. Successful evacuation will
result in persons being transferred to a place of safety, by which is meant a safe
onshore location, or a safe offshore location or marine vessel with suitable facilities.
Evacuation means may include helicopters, lifeboats and bridge-links.
Escape
Escape means the process of leaving the installation in an emergency when the
evacuation system has failed; it may involve entering the sea directly and is the last
resort method of getting personnel off the installation.
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Means of escape cover items which assist with descent to the sea, such as life-rafts,
chute systems, ladders and individually controlled descent devices; and items in which
personnel can float on reaching the sea such as throw-over liferafts.
Rescue
In the PFEER regulations, this is normally addressed as Recovery and Rescue.
Recovery and rescue is the process of recovering of persons following their evacuation
or escape from the installation, and rescuing of persons near the installation and taking
such persons to a place of safety.
Place of safety means an onshore or safe offshore location or vessel where medical
treatment and other facilities for the care of survivors are available.
The recovery and rescue arrangements are:
Facilities and services external to the installation, such as vessels, public sector and
commercially provided search and rescue facilities; and
2.0
2.1
Recommended Methods
2.1.1 Application
All EER activities expose personnel to an element of risk. However, three broad classes
of EER can be distinguished:
Precautionary. For example, these might occur in the event of a drilling kick, an unignited gas leak, a drifting ship nearby, a minor structural failure or threatening
platform movements in rough seas. Such an activity is not usually done under great
pressure, and there have historically been few fatalities in such events.
Emergency. For example, these might occur in the event of an ignited blowout, leak
from process equipment, a collision or a structural collapse. Such activities are
usually performed with urgency. These are historically more likely to result in
fatalities.
In developing predictions about the frequency of EER activities, for a given installation,
influences will include, for instance, local environmental factors, the nature and extent
of processing facilities, and the intrinsic hazards of the process.
A multitude of variables can influence the outcome success of offshore EER activities.
In particular, the weather is an important factor. Should an emergency evacuation be
necessary during severe storm conditions, the risks of the EER activities are greater.
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As each installation has its own unique characteristics, it is necessary to model the EER
operation to give some basis for EER effectiveness. This can be done by using
computer models, manual calculation methods, or a combination of these.
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Possible Problems
Alarm
Appreciation of
an incident.
Detection fails.
Delay (any cause).
Operator error.
Public Address System fails.
Public Address System not heard.
Access
Movement from
immediate area
of the hazardous
condition.
Muster
Personnel
assemble in a
place of refuge.
Personnel
assemble
in
designated muster /refuge area.
Egress
Personnel move
from a muster/
refuge area to a
point of
embarkation
Evacuation
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Stage +
Generic
Description
Possible Problems
Escape
Rescue
Recovery to a
Place of
Safety
Personnel make
further transfer
to arrive at shore
or a place of
safety before
return to shore.
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Remain on the installation until the incident is over. This may be adopted for small
incidents (e.g. false alarms, minor oil leaks etc), but these are not usually modelled
in a QRA. It may also be adopted for major incidents of short-duration (e.g. large
isolated process releases) where it is considered that staff in a muster/refuge area
are safer to remain onboard
Evacuate all personnel. This emergency evacuation is the only case typically
analysed in offshore QRA and is outlined in the evacuation model within Figure 2.2
that can be utilised as a basis for EER analysis.
Figure 2.2 EER Analysis Decision Model
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The possible timing of the incident in relation to the availability of helicopters and
crew (i.e. day or night).
Availability of TEMPSC suitable for launch, given the event necessitating evacuation.
Time required to load and launch the TEMPSC compared to the time for the event to
escalate.
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Table 2.2 Typical Tim es and Failure Modes for Evacuation of a North Sea
Installation by 40-person TEMPSC
Action
(with Indicative Duration)
Muster
Go to stations
Head Count
Order to abandon
(5 to 15 mins)
Possible Problems
Prepare to launch
Embark
(4 to 10 mins)
Start to lower
Descend under control to near
sea level
Final descent to sea
Release
(1 min)
Personnel recovered
successfully
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Currently additional effort is being applied to the safety of Freefall TEMPSC in relation to
issues associated with increased average offshore worker mass and its effect on craft
load distribution, canopy strength etc. Increased mass effects are also being addressed
for conventional davit fall TEMPSC.
Availability of means of escape to the sea, such as ladders, scrambling nets, ropes
and personal escape equipment. These may be impaired by the event requiring the
evacuation.
The time taken to rescue people from the sea, compared to their survival time in the
prevailing conditions. This depends on the availability of suitable rescue craft, their
reliability and performance in the rescue task, the environmental conditions
affecting survival times and rescue performance, and the clothing and survival
equipment used by the people in the water.
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2.2
Recommended Data
The following sub-sections discuss the data and rule sets utilised in the EER analysis.
There is little or no further update on the EER data used by the industry, hence the data
and rule sets presented in the report are mainly adopted from OGP member database
1996, unless otherwise stated. The industry focus has been on making practical
improvements in hardware rather than enhancing the nature and basis of EER analysis.
Such practical improvements have been highlighted for TEMPSC evacuation in Section
2.1.7 and for other general EER activity in Section 3.9.
The rule sets describe the adopted principles in the EER analysis and may be further
developed in conjunction with the installation specific EER arrangements. The rule set
will ensure consistent approach and provide a guideline on industry best practice for
EER analysis.
Note that much of the data set out in the following sub-sections has been provided by
OGP members, in which case it should be taken as indicating the type of data required
at each stage and values typically used, rather than definitive recommended values.
Less than 5 kW/m will cause pain in 15 to 20 seconds and injury after 30 seconds exposure
[12].
2
Greater than 6 kW/m will cause pain within approximately 10 seconds; rapid escape only is
possible [12].
An unprotected route is impassable if the smoke concentration is higher than 2.3%.
In addition, many companies adopt smoke obscuration criteria such that routes
are deemed to be blocked if the visibility is less than 10 m. It is noted also that
many companies provide escape packs with smoke hoods, although little credit
is adopted for using smoke hoods for the access (immediate escape) stage as
they are located typically in accommodation areas for limited use in aiding
helicopter or TEMPSC boarding.
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Davit-Launched
[2],[6]
Free-Fall
[OGP Member]
0.8
0.6
0.1
0.05
0.95
0.9
0.75
0.4
(0-3) (0 - 5 m/s)
(4-6) (5 - 14 m/s)
(7-9) (14 - 24 m/s)
(>9) (> 24 m/s)
Notes:
1. Success, in this context, is achieved when no fatalities occur during the TEMPSC
evacuation event. Thus 100% of the personnel on board the TEMPSC will be safely
transported away from the installation and potentially to shore. As a rule of thumb it is
commonly assumed in QRA that 50% of the occupants of a failed TEMPSC will become
evacuation phase fatalities and the remaining 50% are immersed with the potential to suffer
rescue and recovery phase risk.
The Computer Model was the Escape model as documented within [6] developed by
Technica, now part of DNV and is available within the NEPTUNE Software toolkit,
upgraded as ESCAPE III to cater for mobile unit motion dynamics.
It is noted that the probability of successful TEMPSC evacuation is strongly influenced
by the facility layout. As a result of the research conducted in developing the ESCAPE
model and by the associated D.En Guidance, installation designers and facility
operators created greater clearance distances between TEMPSC and structures that
could be impacted on descent and in offset sea level clearances to minimize the
potential to be swept back towards the facility once released. By remounting new and
existing TEMPSC from a parallel/side on mount to a perpendicular/end-on mount this
reduced the wind loading on descent which could cause platform collisions and offered
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the ability to drive more quickly away (without a need to turn) when seaborne reducing
the swept back collision potential.
In addition, OREDA-92 [7] includes some recorded failure incident and failure rate data
for davit launched TEMPSC.
Over a 25 year installation life, this implies a 7.5% probability that there will be a TEMPSC
evacuation and 19% probability of an evacuation by helicopter.
identifying alarm = P1
Overall Success = (P1 P2 P3 P4 P5) = (0.95 0.80 0.98 0.85 0.90) = 0.57 for
the 5 people in the area where the incident takes place. Note that the chance can be
improved to 0.74 (P1 P2 P3) if people can stay on the installation.
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0.1
Source: Sample extract from a typical Rule Set document of an OGP member.
Note: Does not allow for use of tertiary devices, such as rope ladders etc., or for distance to sea.
Table 2.8 provides sample rule set that may be developed to assess the probability of
fatality upon entering the sea to escape in the North Sea.
Table 2.8 Sam ple Rule Set for Fatality Probability Upon Entering the Sea to
Escape (North Sea Data)
Stand-by vessel status
Probability
of fatality
0.8
0.06
0.15
0.22
0.92
Source: Sample extract from a typical Rule Set document of an OGP member.
Notes:
Probabilities cover full scope of evacuation: entering sea; remaining at sea surface; rescue.
Personnel making a sea entry expected to be wearing survival suit and life-jacket.
Data do not differentiate sea temperature effects on personnel survival rate. In reality,
personnel survival time immersed in sea, depends on local sea temperatures and generic
human endurance times.
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Hazard
Radiant Gas/H 2
Heat
S/
Smoke
Evacuation Time
< 15
< 60 < 180
mins mins mins
Weather
Calm
Mod Severe
Preferred
Evacuation
Helicopter
2/2
8/2
9/9
Bridge
Direct Marine
5
5
5
5
9/9
2/2
9/9
9/5
9/9
9/9
9
9
9
8
7
3
TEMPSC
Evacuation
Protected
Access
9/7
9/9
N/A
Unprotected
Access
7/7
9/9
N/A
Liferaft,
Ropes, Jump
etc.
8/8
N/A
N/A
Escape to
Sea means
Historical
Success Rates
1
Preferred
Evacuation
Helicopter
Low
Bridge
Direct Marine
High
2
N/A
TEMPSC
Evacuation
Protected Access
N/A
Escape to
Sea means
Unprotected Access
Liferafts, Ropes,
Jumping etc.
Low
Low
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Calm
Moderate
Rough
Summer
Winter
Summer
Winter
Summer
Winter
180
75
120
45
165
30
60
30
120
15
100
15
180
180
180
180
180
180
150
75
60
30
30
15
150
180
60
80
180
60
20
10
15
10
10
Survival times can be extended for warmer water environments with the following rough
guidance, depending on a variety of factors such as body type, clothing etc:
In warmer water factors other than hypothermia may become more important.
3.0
The following sub-sections provide guidance on use of data presented in Section 2.2.1
to 2.2.7.
3.1
The criteria shown in Table 2.3 are samples of rule sets that can be used to evaluate the
number of fatalities to personnel trapped in a fire area over an extended period due to
effects from a fire of long duration. The criteria may be considered conservative when
escape is possible within a few minutes after the start of a fire. Rule sets should be
developed specific to the circumstances.
The Vulnerability of Humans datasheet provides data complementary to that given in
Section 2.2.
3.2
Lifeboat Embarkation
Similar to the above, the rule set for inoperability of TEMPSC embarkation areas should
be developed specific to the installation circumstances.
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3.3
Lifeboat Evacuation
The various references in Table 2.5 give a range of predictions for the success rate of
TEMPSC evacuation. These data figures are not precise, but give an indication that
launching of TEMPSC does not guarantee safe evacuation.
The outlines of the various ways in which the TEMPSC evacuation process can fail are
as indicated in Table 2.1 and Table 2.2.
TEMPSC evacuation success data are generally predictions based on North Sea
experience of davit launched TEMPSC. Installations in other areas may use craft which
are not davit launched TEMPSC. This could affect the success rate for evacuation.
3.4
Table 2.6 shows the predicted frequency of having to evacuate an installation is derived
from generic information. Some installations may never have an evacuation, others may
have several over their lifetime.
Helicopter evacuation might not be achievable until some hours after the initiating
event. Fire, smoke and gas presence can prevent the use of helicopter. For such cases,
TEMPSC and bridge transfer (for bridge linked platforms) provide further alternative
means of evacuation.
3.5
The probabilities presented are based on typical OGP member database. Any
probabilities used should be scrutinised and developed specific to the installation
evacuation arrangement and facilities.
3.6
There are insufficient data on the use of liferafts to give reliable figures for the
probability of fatality when these devices are available. The probabilities presented in
Table 2.7 and 2.8 are sample extract from typical rule sets document of OGP member
database. Similar to the above, probabilities used should be scrutinised and developed
specific to the installation escape arrangement and facilities.
3.7
Tables 2.9 and 2.10 are provided to aid estimates of EER systems effectiveness under
different accident circumstances. The data is qualitative estimate of the applicability and
success rates for different types of EER equipment.
3.8
The survival times are taken from HSE Offshore Technology Report OTO 95 038 [9].
Survival times may be multiplied by 0.6667 to give a factor of safety as suggested in
guidance PBN 97/20 of HSE for demonstration of good prospect.
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All of these references date from the late 1980s/early 1990s. There has been little
subsequent development in this area, as explained by the following brief account.
Prior to the PFEER (Offshore Installations (Prevention Of Fire and Explosion, and
Emergency Response)) Regulations 1995 in the UK, a significant degree of EER analysis
was performed associated with the Piper Alpha Disaster report by Lord Cullen which
required EER Analysis as a forthwith study in advance of the Safety Case Regulations
which were enacted in 1993 (Updated in 2005 [10]). Much of the new numerical analysis
work was performed at this time building on the earlier DEn ESCAPE work involving
Technica.
The PFEER Regulations set out more firm requirements on emergency response issues,
principal among which was the requirement to demonstrate a good prospect of rescue
and recovery. The Regulations enabled the possibility of Standby Vessel sharing. A lot
of industry application was then devoted to demonstrating good prospect, particularly
in cases of SBV sharing. Post PFEER many SBV sharing studies were performed using
analysis methods developed before PFEER. Industry activity then drifted away from
numerical risk methods and focused more on the practicalities of effective rescue and
recovery. Section 2.3 gives a more detailed account of activity observed post PFEER in
the UK.
3.9
Whatever offshore evacuation technique is used, two areas have been developed to
improve the success of EER, principally stemming from Lord Cullens report on the
Piper Alpha Disaster. Firstly there is the development of concept, specification and
performance of Temporary Refuges. Secondly, there is increased allowance for human
factors, comprising command, control, human behaviour and ergonomics in the design
of equipment, procedures etc with significant efforts given to training emergency
command teams in simulated exercises. Much work has been done in these areas and
there is continuous focus from operators and regulators.
A number of innovative EER systems are in various stages of development. Several
systems have been adopted by operators as risk reduction measures and best available
means for EER. Examples of these innovative systems can generally be grouped into
the following categories:
Levels of operational testing and experience for each particular system vary. Due to
these systems relatively limited usage within the industry, there are little or no data
currently available.
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17
To deploy new and different resources to get to people in the water more quickly.
The development of Caley davits for FRC quick recovery in rough weather with an
inbuilt heave compensation device
Lower freeboard, and better illuminated and defined SBV rescue zones.
A SBV code of practice was developed to harmonise the specification of SBVs, outlining
different classes of vessel essentially related to the POB on the installations they are
attending. This was then developed more recently as the Emergency Response Rescue
Vessel (ERRV) code.
The specifications of equipment and manning requirements were developed to ensure
effective resources could be available to rescue, recover, attend survivors and crew the
vessels effectively.
With respect to SBV, the industry began to increase the number, capacity, reliability,
endurance and speed of fast rescue craft. From the mid 1990s, fast rescue craft began
to develop towards the daughter craft (DC) principle. These craft were larger, had
canopies and could operate somewhat independently of the SBV for defined periods.
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This enabled more distant deployments and enabled closer support for example for
helicopter operations between local facilities, greater support under shared SBV
circumstances e.g. over the side work close in support. DC have greater weather
limitations than FRC as their weight makes rough weather recovery a problem, limiting
their deployment to moderate seas.
Also from the late 1990s, BP and various partners began to advance the Jigsaw concept
that would provide good prospects of rescue and recovery by a more focused
deployment of higher specification SBV and offshore based Search and Rescue (SAR)
helicopter provisions (essentially equipped with forward looking Infrared systems, for
the location of those immersed, and winch recovery provisions). The Jigsaw vessels are
equipped with Autonomous Rescue and Recovery Craft (ARRC). These are essentially
vessels that can be deployed using dual davits, which have a Rigid Inflatable Boat basis
but with large cabs over 2 decks allowing comfortable autonomous operations and
effective recovery capabilities.
3.9.1.3 Non UK Developments
Away from the UKCS and the North Sea, newer work has been applied in the field of
Emergency Response towards colder and ice oilfield environments. The Terra Nova
development demonstrated the need to keep TEMPSCs in warmed garage facilities to
ensure quick, effective use. The Sakhalin developments have demonstrated the need for
new thinking in relation to evacuating onto full or partial sea ice cover. More recently the
Kashagan development in the northern Caspian Sea, icebound in winter, has required
creative solutions for emergency response arrangements, also influenced by significant
potential for high concentration H2S situations.
4.0
The principal source of the data presented in Section 2.2 is the data published by OGP.
References [4], [4] and [6] include a useful overview of offshore EER, including fatality
assessment, as well as evacuation modeling (helicopters, lifeboats, bridge, sea entry).
OREDA-92 [7] includes some recorded failure incident and failure rate data for
conventional davit launched life boats.
The Vulnerability of Humans datasheet provides data complementary to that discussed in
Section 2.2.
Most of the data presented are generally based on the North Sea experience.
Installations in other areas operating in different environmental conditions and
operating standards may be subjected to area specific data.
5.0
There are limited data available for use in EER analysis, however, a number of
organisations provide guidance on EER best practice through their websites, within the
UK this includes the Oil and Gas UK (formerly known as UKOOA), the Health and Safety
Executive (HSE) UK, Emergency Response and Rescue Vessel Association (ERRVA)
UK, and The Step Change in Safety group. For Norway the Norwegian Petroleum
Services Authority (PSA) (formerly the NPD) provides guidelines. For other offshore
sectors local authorities can be referred to such Transport Canada, Mineral
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6.0
References
[1] HSE, 1995. Prevention of Fire and Explosion, and Emergency Response on Offshore
Installations. Not yet available electronically in full; link to summary information:
(http://www.hsebooks.com/Books/product/product.asp?catalog%5Fname=HSEBoo
ks&category%5Fname=&product%5Fid=2788)
[2] Sykes, K, 1986. Summary of conclusions drawn from reports produced by, or made
available to, the Emergency Evacuation of Offshore Installations Steering Group,
MaTSU.
[3] Technica, 1988. Escape II - Risk Assessment of Emergency Evacuation from Offshore
Installations, OTH 88 8285, London: HMSO, ISBN 0 11 412920 7.
[4] Robertson, D, 1987. Escape III - The Evaluation of Survival Craft Availability in
Platform Evacuation, Intl. Offshore Safety Conference, London.
[5] Department of Energy, 1988. Comparative Safety Evaluation of Arrangements for
Accommodating Personnel Offshore, Section 9 + Appendix 7.
[6] Technica, 1983. Risk Assessment of Emergency Evacuation from Offshore Installation,
Report F 158, prepared for DoE.
[7] DNV Technica, 1993. OREDA-92, Offshore Reliability Data Handbook, 2nd ed.,
ISBN 82 515 0188 1.
[8] HSE, 1995. A Methodology for Hazard Identification on EER Assessments, RM
Consultants Ltd, OTH 95 466.
http://www.hse.gov.uk/research/othhtm/400-499/oth466.htm
[9] HSE, 1995. Review of Probable Survival Times for Immersion in the North Sea,
OTO 95 038. http://www.hse.gov.uk/research/otopdf/1995/oto95038.pdf
[10] The Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005, SI2005/3117, Norwich: The
Stationery
Office,
ISBN 0 11 073610 9.
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/si/si2005/20053117.htm
[11] (UK) Step Change in Safety, 2003. Loading of Lifeboats during Drills - Guidance.
http://stepchangeinsafety.net/ResourceFiles/Lifeboat%20Loading%20Guidance%20
Final%20Copy.pdf
[12] International Association of Oil & Gas Producers, 2009. Vulnerability of Humans,
DNV Report no. 32335833/14, rev 2.
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www.ogp.org.uk