Studies in group decision II: Differences of positions, differences of opinion and group polarization SERGE MOSCOVICI WILLEM DGISE RENAUD DULONG Laboratoire de Psychologie Sociale Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes Centre National de fs Recherche Scientifique 1. The problem Interaction seems to be a necessary variable to take into account for a complete explanation of the phenomenon of group polarization (Zajonc, Wolosin, Wolosin and Sherman, 1969; Moscovici and Lecuyer, 1972). The amount of interaction is directly related to the amount of shift toward an extreme position in group decisions. This relation presupposes that: (a) The shift is a dependent and continuous variable whose magnitude expresses the greater or smaller effect of an underlying independent variable, and (b) the amount of shift is a function of the divergence between the individuals in the group in terms both of their positions (choices, preferences) and their opinions concerning the issue the group is discussing and deciding. In an earlier publication (Moscovici and Zavalloni, 1969) we tentatively proposed the idea that the underlying variable involved in (a), and which would be a function of the amount of interaction provoked by divergences if opinion in the group, is the commitment. We are not directly concerned here with the theoretical status of this variable. While evidence confirming the existence of the phenomenon of group polarization is accumulating, evidence is also beginning to confirm that what has been called ‘risky shift’ is a special case in this phenomenon (Doise, 1969; Fraser. Gouge and Billig, 1971; Myers and Bishop, 1970; McCauley, 1970; Gouge and Fraser, 1971). However, this convergence of empirical findings cannot conceal a certain number of disagreements regarding the theoretical assumptions which have been the basis of explanation of the risky shift. These theories actually assume that (a) the shift is a dependent, discontinuous variable requiring the presence of two separate mechanisms and that (b) the production of the shift is a function of the divergence between individuals with respect to their positions and not with respect to the opinions accompanying these positions. In other words, whereas we define the nature of the interaction in terms of a conflict, of a difference in choices and386 Serge Moscovici, William Doise and Renaud Dulong opinions, these theories define it in terms of a comparison and exchanges concerning these choices exclusively. Since these two points of view lead as we shall see to different experimental predictions, we will have to clarify them. At the same time, empirical convergence should go hand in hand with conceptual convergence and calls for a single definition of the nature of the interaction leading to group polarization. 2. The risky shift viewed as a social conformity phenomenon: Assumptions and consequences We shall try to understand why the studies on the risky shift view this shift as a discontinuous variable in which it is a matter of all or nothing, and why one is concerned only with the divergences between individual positions (Vinokur, 1971). We shall not attempt a complete explanation and limit ourselves to theoretical considerations without taking methodological aspects into account. To begin with, it must be remembered that the risky-shift phenomenon aroused so much interest because it looked like an exception to the group tendency toward averaging, nor- malizing individual preferences or judgments. Allport (1924) had shown that in- dividuals in a group situation avoid giving extreme responses and give more moderate responses in the presence of other persons than in their absence. Research on the pressure toward uniformity in turn proved that a group confronted with a deviant tries to make him change his opinions or to expel him from the group (Festinger, 1950). Rejecting this tradition, Brown’s value theory (1965) assumes that individuals who share the norms of a culture placing a high value on risk and who discover that there are more daring individuals in the group than themselves become more daring in turn. A comparable hypothesis was raised by Levinger and Schneider (1969). In the same context, Pruitt (1971) suggests what he calls a release theory. According to the theory, shift occurs in groups because the discovery of a group member serving as a model ~ who endorses high risk taking — liberates the most cautious members of the group from the assumed social constraints that prevent them from taking a risk. On causal inspection, there seems to be a contradiction: According to Allport (1924) and Festinger (1950), extreme or deviant responses are repressed or eliminated, while according to Brown (1965), Levinger and Schnei- der (1967) and Pruitt (1971), extreme and in some way deviant responses are adopted and followed. Nevertheless, as these two series of assumptions are backed by ex- perimental facts, one would have to assess either their respective validity or the conditions of validity of each of them. But from our point of view, at a deeper level, there is no real contradiction at stake. In both cases the deviant is made to submitStudies in group decision il 387 to the norm. The difference only stems from the fact that for Allport (1924) and Festinger (1950) deviance is expressed as an extreme response compared to an average, moderate response, whereas for the risky-shift theories just mentioned, the average, moderate response would be deviant and the extreme response the norm, Just as in studies on group conformity where individuals discover that others are more moderate than they, which results in their abandoning their extreme po- sitions, in the risky-shift experiments individuals discover that others are more extreme and abandon their cautious choices. The common factor in these different response displacements in group situations is the existence of a divergence between the members of the group with respect to their responses: The greater this divergence, the greater the pressure toward uniformity or the shift toward a moderate or extreme position, Let us note in passing that in this way the risky-shift phenomenon has been ‘recuperated’. After having been interpreted as an exception to conformity which underlies the averaging phenomenon, it has been converted into a case of conformity to the cultural norms (Brown, 1965; Levinger and Schneider, 1967) or of conformity to a model (Pruitt, 1971). Let us examine more closely how these theories on the risky shift assess the importance of the divergence between individuals with respect to their individual choices. In what way does this divergence affect the shift? According to the theories we have just presented, awareness of this divergence as such should be sufficient to give rise to a shift, By contrast, according to the theory proposed by Kogan and Wallach (1967) to explain the shift, the responsibility-diffusion theory, group dis- cussion is what permits establishing socio-emotional links and what leads to a shift. According to this theory divergence is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition. As long as risk taking is viewed in the context of pressures toward uniformity exerted in a group, the inevitable consequence is that awareness of the divergence between individuals must all by itself give rise to a shift which will reduce this divergence, Experiments were undertaken to show that this awareness, arising from the exchange of information about the individuals’ respective positions (Teger and Pruitt, 1967) will by itself cause the risky shift. A difficulty remains unresolved. however. As was shown from the start by Wallach and Kogan (1965), the discussion which takes place does produce a shift and, what is more important, a larger shift. Hence one is faced with a paradox. The fact that a shift can be obtained merely by information exchange was considered sufficient to prove that there is no connection between group discussion and risk taking, ‘In sum, Dion [Baron, and Miller] (1970), write, the available research indicates that participation in group discussion is not @ necessary prerequisite for the risky shift. Non-verbal information exchange and exposure to discussion by other persons constitute sufficient conditions for producing the effect. However, it appears that group discussion is still capable of producing388 Serge Moscovici, Willem Doise and Renaud Dulong increment in risk taking over and above these sufficient conditions’ (p. 317). On the other hand, Wallach and Kogan (1965) have stressed the fact that although information exchange does not account for this increment in shift, that is, it is not a necessary but a sufficient condition for the shift, this fact has not been considered an obstacle to the adoption of theories linking these exchanges with the risky shift. The only thing that matters and that one seeks to explain is that the risky shift is produced by one means or another. What remains unexplained and what the dif- ferent theories are not expected to explain is the magnitude of the risky shift produced, In other words, the shift is treated as a discontinuous variable. Having settled on an approach which accounts for its appearance by relating to a con- formity process, the task still remains to explain why the shift is greater where there is discussion (which is not tantamount to explaining why it is smaller when there is no discussion). For this purpose, a second, unspecified mechanism is invoked, one for instance relating to the nature of the arguments used. As Pruitt (1971) notes, interaction defined as a pure social comparison ‘has some difficulty accounting fully for the fact that discussion produces a larger shift than information exchange. Hence a two-process theory involving the social comparison mechanism plus one other mechanism must be indicated’ (p. 349). The shift as a whole would result from the summation of two mechanisms, a double rather than a single effect, which would vary with an unpredictable magnitude as a function of the cause that produces it. The procedure is unusual and its justification non-existent, (At last it is analogous to the procedure used in factor analysis, where one adds post hoc as many factors as are needed to explain the natures of the correlations.) But we can see why it could not be done differently. Once the risky shift has been reintegrated into the context of conformity processes, it was investigated as an ordinary influence phe- nomenon with an informational component (the exchange of information regarding individual positions) and a normative component (glorification of risk), In this process the only divergence that is critical is the divergence in position, choice and preferences, as well as group pressures, the arguments related to the content being immaterial, The content of the discussion, the arguments pro and con are of no importance by this theory. It is the information about other people’s answers that makes individuals move toward greater risk after group discussion (Brown, 1965, p. 702). One understands, then, that from this point of view the conditions generally con- sidered necessary to produce the risky shift are: — The presence of one or several extremist individuals in the group and the pressure toward conformity that they exert;Studies in group decision II 389 — awareness of difference between positions, preferences or choices of the in- dividuals composing the group; — the supplementary intervention of a group process — probably of a normative sort — during the discussion. These conditions taken as a whole would explain both the direction and the magnitude of the observed shift. Of course one merely has to think of certain empirical results, such as those obtained in experiments where information exchange failed to produce any shift (Wallach and Kogan, 1965) or where discussion without revealing the subjects’ respective positions produced a large shift (Saint John, 1970) in order to realize the limitations of the conclusions we have just analyzed. This would not get us much further, since it is our purpose to elucidate the nature of the variable under consideration and the role of interpersonal divergence. 3. ‘Two types of divergences in group decision and their effect The starting point of this elucidation is the process of decision-making itself as it occurs in experimental groups, a point that has often been neglected (cf. Cartwright, 1971; Dion er al., 1970). Without wishing to give a complete description of it here. let us just recall a few elements: 1. Generally individuals gathered in such groups are supposed to establish a consensus. For this purpose, they carry out exchanges, notably exchanges of pre- ferences (choice) and of opinions. The former focus on transactions between indi- viduals and the latter on the analysis and evaluation of the issue or object. Usually exchanges of preferences are embedded in exchanges of opinion and both contribute to the common consensus or to post-discussion decisions. But for analytic reasons, it is possible to distinguish between exchanges leading to a consensus of pre- ferences or choice and exchanges leading to a consensus of opinion. 2. Exchanges can only take place when there are differences between individuals, otherwise the group can only record agreement among its members. In that case, there is no reason for a shift to take place or for the discussion to provoke a shift. Differences between individuals may assume two forms: They may involve diversity of choice or they may involve a conflict or divergence of opinions. Ex- changes between individuals depend on which aspect of these differences one focuses on. If one focuses on diversity of choices and the consensus that can be attained taking this diversity as a starting point, these exchanges cannot cause much involvement, and individuals, who by definition have equal status and capa- Cities, have no way of defending or imposing their positions vigorously. In contrast, if the exchanges bear on divergences of opinion, and a consensus must be reached390 Serge Moscovici, Willem Doise and Renaud Dulong in terms of these opinions, individuals will be in a better position to defend their points of view, especially those who are sure and committed. In the latter case, group activity will involve the participants more fully. Let us point out, however, that as we stated at the beginning, it may well be that the concepts of involvement and commitment are only tentative and that other concepts may replace them. For the moment we only wish to stress the difference between the modes of interaction involved in each of the two cases. 3. Interaction which takes a diversity of preferences (choices) as its starting point can only be resolved by a compromise, no matter how divergent the indi- vidual preferences, and whether extremists are involved or not, Of course, we will rarely be dealing with an interaction which is a pure difference in preferences, and the difference in preferences may be based on a divergence of opinion, Con- sequently, shifts may take place. In that case, theories of value, of pluralistic ignorance, of release, which are limited to a social comparison of preferences, should produce a compromise or a shift in that direction. Experiments based on information exchange do in fact get results along these lines. In the other hand, an interaction which takes place where there is divergence or conflict of opinion releases a mechanism that we shall tentatively call commitment in which the nor- mative aspect of the issue is highlighted and which leads to polarizations. It is self-evident that only within the framework of these interactions can a difference in preferences, which reflects a difference of opinions, have an impact on the outcome. (In quantitative terms this might be stated as follows: The more ex- changes among group members lead to commitment, supposing that this is the mechanism at stake, the greater will be the amount of the shift; when exchanges are not of this sort, we will find averaging or a majority effect, with no shift at all.) Supposing that these desciptions and intuitions are valid, we can conclude that: — Divergence or the presence of an extremist individual in a group has no influence as such. What is decisive is the interaction triggered by this divergence and this presence; — contrary to prevailing assumptions, differences of opinion alone are responsible for the production of the shift. Differences in preference play a secondary role or none at all; — the dichotomy that has been stressed between information exchange and dis- cussion is misleading and secondary. What one actually does is to manipulate experimentally one variable — interaction — without taking it into account theo- Tetically.Studies in group decision II 391 4. Experimental study of two kinds of group interaction It remains to be shown that the preceding conjectures are not unfounded and that experiments can provide initial confirmation. How can the mode of interaction of a small group, and, consequently, the nature of its group decision, be manipulated in a laboratory situation? We could certainly have applied a familiar procedure by creating a situation in which individuals establish a consensus exclusively on the basis of the knowledge of their choices and another situation in which they do so solely on the basis of their opinions. In a way, this has already been done, and repeating it would have amounted to reexamining the opposition between information exchange and discussion, isolating the first situation from the second. We have taken a different approach by orienting the discussion so that this or that aspect of group decision and exchanges — diversity in positions or divergence of opinions — would lead to consensus and would spontaneously carry more weight. Our experimental procedures were inspired by observations made in connection with real-life group discussions or assembly debates. In situations of this sort, exchanges concerning the rules of procedure and suggestions as to time limitation are not unusual. It is a well-known fact that such interferences ~ for instance the famous case where Mendés-France set a time limit to the Geneva Conference on the war in Indochina — often discourage a group from discussing the problem and force it to reach an agreement instead of seeking a unified view of the problem. Under these conditions there will be a greater stress on comparing choices than on the content related to these choices. Consequently, this disengagement of the group should lead the group to a compromise. By asking our experimental groups in one experiment to reach a common decision with due regard to procedure and in a second experiment to take into account the length of time involved in reaching an agreement, we introduced two manipulations which should result in the ex- perimental groups polarizing less than the control groups which carry on their discussion without additional instructions. Why do we use two experiments to show a single effect? In the first experiment, by stressing procedure we implicitly lead the subjects to formulate a rule, which would be, although we have only rarely observed it, the explicit rule of compromise which leads to averaging. In the second experiment, there is no explicit encourage- ment, at least in the instructions, for the subjects to formulate such a rule. In both cases, relations between individuals will be determined by the establishment of a consensus based on the diversity of preferences, since the expression of divergences of opinion is hampered, if not discouraged, and reduced in importance by the definition of the task. The amount of shift will thus not be determined by the absence or presence of discussion, its modality ~ face to face or by intercom392 Serge Moscovici, Willem Doise and Renaud Dulong system (Kogan and Wallach, 1967) — but the nature of he discussion and inter- action will compel the subjects to move toward a compromise or polarization. ‘We thus predict, as mentioned above, that (a) polarization will be less pronounced for the experimental than the control groups, where consensus will be reached on the basis of divergences of content, and (b) polarization will be more significant as differences between individuals are more pronounced, but only in the groups where divergence of opinion is stressed (control groups) over diversity of preferences (experimental groups). If these predictions are verified, many of the preceding observations, which are obvious from the point of view of logic, will have to be given further thought and their consequences spelled out. 4.1 Experimental procedure 41,1 First experiment Subjects: 16 groups of 4 boys, all first Physical Education majors at Teachers’ College, participated in this experiment. Experimental material: The questionnaire which was used was a French adaptation of the ‘Choice dilemma questionnaire’ by Kogan and Wallach (Kogan and Doise, 1969). As in the original questionnaire, anwers were to be given on a probability scale. Experimental conditions: The four members of each group began the experiment by answering the questionnaire individually. Then the control groups were asked to discuss each situation and agree on an answer. The eight other groups (ex- perimental situation) were given the same instruction, but in addition the ex- perimenter asked them to pay attention to the procedures whereby the decision was reached. At the end of each discussion group members took turns in working out a ‘procedure communiqué’ after group discussion. In this ‘communiqué’ the manner in which the group decision was reached was set forth. The experimenter insisted on the need to pay attention to the decision procedure even during the discussion. For all groups, though this was not explicitely spelled out in the instruc- tions, the discussion time for each item was limited to seven minutes, Once the time was up, the experimenter urged the subjects not to spend any more time on the problem and to pass on to the next question if they did not reach an agreement within the next minute or two. Principal experimental measures: As in the studies on risk-taking, the dependent variable was measured by adding up the differences for each group between theStudies in group decision II 393 pre-consensus and the consensus averages. When this difference is positive, risk- taking is increased. Since individual answers were polarized in the direction of greater caution for only one item, the increase in the risk-taking index can be considered as an index of group polarization, The connection between the initial divergence and polarization was calculated on the basis of the correlation between the amount of polarization for each question and the divergence between the two pre-consensus responses furthest apart from each other. Since responses to the different items on the part of a given group are not necessarily independent of each other, the statistical significance of this index is only indicative. 4.1.2 Second experiment Subjects: 19 groups of four girls, enrolled in the second-to-last year of a Paris lycée, took part in the experiment, Experimental material: The same questionnaire as in the Experiment I was used. This time, however, the subjects had to give their answers on the basis of a 7-point Libert scale going from —3 (strongly recommend not taking the risky action) to +3 (strongly recommend taking the risky action). Experimental conditions: The subjects in each group first answered the question- naire individually. Then the experimenter gave 9 groups (control set-up) the same instruction as the control groups in Experiment I. These groups were not given any special instructions about time limitations. However, during the experiment, as soon as the discussion of an item took 6 minutes, the experimenter intervened and suggested that the new situation be discussed if no agreement were reached within a minute. The ten other groups (experimental set-up) were told on the contrary that they only had 7 minutes to reach an agreement. The experimenter visibly checked the time with the help of a stopwatch and intervened as he did with the control groups when discussion time reached 6 minutes. In order to keep this instruction present in the mind of the subjects, members of the experimental groups were asked to tell the experimenter at the beginning of each discussion to set his stopwatch back to zero. Principal experimental measures: A collective polarization index was calculated for each group by adding up the differences between the pre-consensus averages for the four dilemmas where individual responses on the average went in the direction of caution and the differences in the pre-consensus and consensus averages for the items where individual responses on the average went in the direction of tisk. A weighted collective polarization index was calculated in the same way, by394 Serge Moscovici, Willem Doise and Renaud Dulong using the weighted pre-consensus average using the formula which gives a greater weight to extreme responses. The relation between the divergence of initial responses and collective polarization was evaluated in the same way as in Experiment I. Other analyses were carried out to study more closely the impact of the manipulation. They will be presented later on. 4.2 Results and discussion The changes introduced in the group interactions did have the predicted impact on group polarization. As expected, group polarization was noticeable in the control groups but not in the experimental groups. When a group is diverted from con- fronting the differences of opinion among its members, polarization diminishes (p <..05) and averaging is more common: In short, the results obtained in our experimental groups are similar to those obtained by others for the information exchange condition, that is, when groups decide only on the basis of exchanges of choices and preferences. Table 1. Average collective polarization indexes — Control groups Experimental groups t of the difference between control and experimental groups Experiment I +4-6.20 (N:8) 41.58 (N:8) 2.02 * Increase in risk (3.52) *** (1.08) Experiment II Collective +-4.42 (N:9) -+ 1.35 (N10) 2.19 ** polarization (3.70) *#* (1.20) Weighted collective +2.30 —093 2.38 ** polarization (2.13)* (2.10) (1) Figures in parentheses are the t of Stu- * = p<.05 unil. hyp. dent for comparison with 0. ** = p< 025 unil. hyp. *** = p <,005 unil. hyp. Analysis of the relation between the initial divergence and polarization shows that it decreases in both experiments for the experimental groups. These groups’ ‘dis- engagement’ results in blotting out the relation (Experiment Il) or in bringing about a negative relation (Experiment I) between divergence and polarization. Incidentally, the differences in the average value of correlations for the first and second experiments may be due to the fact that the two subject populations were different or that the scales used in the two experiments were not identical,Studies in group decision II 395 Table 2. Correlation indexes between collective polarization and divergence of initial positions * Control groups Experimental groups Z of differences between the two correlations Experiment I +0.114 (N:79) —0.333 (N:69) 2.73 (y= 15) (p < .002) (p < 003) Experiment I +0,372 (N:85) +0.003 (N:97) 2.58 (p < 001) (p< .005) * Probabilities correspond to one-tailed hypotheses. Secondary analyses make it clear that those groups which must take procedural or temporal factors into account have their own ways of confronting their dif- ferences. Thus, there was only one instance in the first experiment where no consensus could be established in the control groups, while this happened 11 times in the experimental groups. Out of 11 cases, divergences between the most extreme members of the groups in 10 cases exceeded the median of differences which is around 5. This result suggetsts that for groups generally dealing with preferences and choices, a compromise becomes difficult to achieve when, involuntarily, the differences of opinions embedded in the differences in choices assert themselves too openly. Such divergences need to be resolved at their own level, of course, something that was hampered by the instructions. The response scale used in the second experiment allowed us to compare situa- tions where the group was evenly distributed on either side of the middle with other situations where one of the poles was approved by the majority. We compared the length of time groups needed to resolve the problems raised by this difference in the control situation with the time needed for the same divergences in the ex- perimental situations (Table 3). For the experimental groups the effect is that they failed to get involved in a debate about the content, which would inevitably take some time, and limited themselves to decisions on the level of choices and prefer- ences. For situations with a lesser degree of conflict, there is no difference between the groups with time limitations and groups without time limitation (significant interaction between experimental condition and presence or absenc of bi-partition: F: 14.65; df 1,12; p < .005), In these latter cases, one can assume that divergences of opinions are minimal and that in any case it is a situation involving choices and preferences.396 Serge Moscovici, Willem Doise and Renaud Dulong Table 3. Average time used by groups in-Experiment II to reach consensus * Control set-up Experimental set-up Bi-partition soi” vas" ‘Other situations i‘s9”* 200” * F between conditions: F: 7.03; df. 1,11, This analysis is based only on 13 groups (6 p< 05 bil. hyp. control and 7 experimental groups), Time F between bi-partition and non-bi-parti- was not checked for the three other groups tion: 35.89; df. 1,12, p <.001 bil. hyp. nor for three groups in which preconsensus F for interaction: 14.65; df. 1,12, p < .005 showed no bi-partition. bil. hyp. There is an additional index which reveals that the experimental groups in the second experiment failed to execute the collective task at the same level as the control groups. We know from other experiments that the distribution entropy of pre-consensus responses is greater than that of the consensus responses. This reduction in entropy is a very important result, for it reflects a cognitive restructuring of the issue under discussion by the groups. Of course this restructuring takes place ‘on the opinion level. It must therefore be smaller when groups do not go beyond the level of choices and preferences. It is therefore not unexpected that for 9 items out of 10 the reduction in entropy is greater for the control groups than for the experimental groups. Table 4, Entropy measures for the different pre-consensus and consensus items * Control groups Experimental groups Pre-consensus Consensus Diff.in% Pre-consensts Consensus Diff. in % Ttem 1 241 1,75 274 248 1.84 25.8 Item 2 247 175 193 239 2.17 92 Item 3 1,88 1.66 17 2.19 242 3.2 Trem 4 2.24 091 59.4 250 1.36 45.6 Ttem 5 214 Las 322 2.61 245 6.1 Ttem 6 1.76 0,99 43.7 193 136 29.5 Ttem 7 2.67 L7S 34.5 2.50 2.37 52 Item 8 2.25 1.66 26.2 2.27 57 30.8 Item 9 244 0,99 59.4 2.60 217 16,5 Item 10 2.07 1.53 26.1 1.97 1.57 203 Average difference 34% Average difference 19 192 % * Entropy was calculated on the basis of the formula g ™ jog 2" N NStudies in group decision II 397 4.3 Conclusion These results in the aggregate confirm the conjectures underlying the experiments undertaken by us. Polarization is expressed by a shift whose magnitude isa relatively continuous function of the interaction. It therefore seems to us that one should give up attributing the shifts to awareness of individual choices, the mere presence of one or several high-risk or low-risk subjects in the group. Their impact is determined by the nature of the interaction. Attention should rather be concentrated on something that has been completely by-passed theoretically and experimentally: Differences of opinion, But we have also clearly established that the process of comparison between individual and group is not what is of crucial importance, since a group may well tend toward a compromise of individual positions without ceasing to be a group. What matters is to compare groups dealing in different ways with divergences of choices and opinions. Generally it is considered proper to end an article by pointing out that much remains to be done and that many problems remain to be explored. The truth of the matter is that such an effort would make little sense unless a specific model for group decisions can be elaborated. If one limits oneself to the existing models, notably the conformity models, applying them over and over again to phenomena that do not fall under their scope, one will be doomed to fruitless repetitions and the exploration of non-existant problems.398 Serge Moscoyici, Willem Doise and Renaud Dulong REFERENCES Allport, F. H. (1965) Social Psychology. New Cartwright, D. (1971) Risk taking by indi- viduals and groups. An assesment of research employing choice dilemma. J. Pers, soe. Psychol., 20, 361-378. Dion, K. L., Baron, R. S., and Miller, N. (4970) Why do groups make riskier de- cisions than individuals? In: L. Berko- witz (Ed.), Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. 5. New York, Academic Press, Doise, W. (1969) Intergroup relations and polarization of individual and collective judgments. J. Pers. soc. Psychol, 12, 136-143. 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(1965) The roles of information, discussion and consensus in group risk taking, J. exp. soc, Psychol., | (1), 1-19. Zajone, R. B., Wolosin, R. J., Wolosin, M. A, and Sherman, S, J, (1969) Group risk taking in a two choice situation: Repli- cation, extension and a model. J. exp. soc. Psychol., §, 127-140.Studies in group decision II 399 Pesrome Orkputrne xtbekton U3MeHeHMA CTereHH pHCKA NPHBcKAcT BHHMAHHe K H3yHeHHIO Mpoweccon NpItnATHs peLeHHs. Tem He MeHee, 110 CHX Nop B HCcHeMoBAHUAX Ho STOIt Teme oGHapyxipaetca CMeLICHHe TeOpeTHACcKOrO H OKCHCPUMCHTAabHOTO anasn3a Yyka3aHHBIX NOWECCOB H CBRIAHHOFO C PHCKOM MoveacHHs. B nepsoli qacru RANK CTaTbH ABTOPbI MbITAIOTCA YCTPAaHUTS sTy NyTaHMLy HW ONPeACTHTh YCHOBHA CHCTe- MaTHYeCKOrO H3Y4eHUA MeXAHKGMOB IPHBATHA peulenns, BeMyLUWX AGO K yepeAHe- HO, WH6o K NONApH3IAaLMN MHMUBHAyaNbuBIX MHeHHi. ABTOpbl HaCTaMBaloT Ha MeoOXoaUMOCTH CpaBHHEATh FpyNnsl, a He OTNETHEIX HHANBUTOB ¢ rpynnamH. Ja Havana npemmaraerea rmnotesa o so3nelicTeu Oprann3auma rpynnbt Ha NoapH- 3ALMEO TOYeK 3peHHs. SKcnepHMeHT, ONHCAHIe KOTOpOrO ConepAKTCA BO BTopoit WaCTH AaHHOi CTaTLM, NowrBepxaeT runoTesy: rpynna, YeHb! KOTOpO HMcIOT BOSMOAHOCTE OGULATECA H HeMOcpesCTBeHHO BIaHMOxeiicTBOBATS Apyr ¢ ApyroM, npuuumaer Gonee Kpaiinwe peleHHs, 4eM rpyiiia, AMUleHHaa TaKOH BO3MO%*KHOCTH. Bsrro 6st npeaxmespeMeHubiM YTBEpAATb, 4TO FpynMet npHHHMaloT Oomee PHCKO- BAHHBIC PeUICHIA, 4M OTACAbHbIC HEAMBHABI, O7MAKO €CTb BCC OCHOBAHHA TOBOPHTb, 4TO rpyanbl HT Ha puck NpH OnaronpaATHyIX OGcTOATeAbCTBAX, NB, Regen ae Russian abstracts of this article appear in European Journal of Social Psychology, G), 243,Copyright of European Journal of Social Psychology is the property of John Wiley & Sons Inc. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. 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