GANZON VS CA

G.R. No. 93252 August 5 1991

FACTS:
Ganzon, after having been issued three successive 60-day of
suspension order by Secretary of Local Government, filed a petition for prohibition
with the CA to bar Secretary Santos from implementing the said orders. Ganzon was
faced with 10 administrative complaints on various charges on abuse of authority
and grave misconduct.
ISSUE:Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government (as the alter ego of the
President) has the authority to suspend and remove local officials.
RULING: The Constitution did nothing more, and insofar as existing legislation
authorizes the President (through the Secretary of Local Government) to proceed
against local officials administratively, the Constitution contains no prohibition. The
Chief Executive is not banned from exercising acts of disciplinary authority because
she did not exercise control powers, but because no law allowed her to exercise
disciplinary authority.
In those case that this Court denied the President the power (to suspend/remove) it
was not because that the President cannot exercise it on account of his limited
power, but because the law lodged the power elsewhere. But in those cases in
which the law gave him the power, the Court, as in Ganzon v. Kayanan, found little
difficulty in sustaining him.
We reiterate that we are not precluding the President, through the Secretary of
Interior from exercising a legal power, yet we are of the opinion that the Secretary
of interior is exercising that power oppressively, and needless to say, with a grave
abuse of discretion.
As we observed earlier, imposing 600 days of suspension which is not a remote
possibility Mayor Ganzon is to all intents and purposes, to make him spend the rest
of his term in inactivity. It is also to make, to all intents and purposes, his
suspension permanent.

Garcia v. Mojica G.R. No. 139043 September 10, 1999

Facts: On May 7, 1998, petitioner, in his capacity as Cebu City mayor, signed a
contract with F.E. Zuellig for the supply of asphalt to the city. The contract covers
the period 1998-2001, which was to commence on September 1998 upon F.E.
Zuelligs first delivery. Sometime in March 1999, news reports came out regarding
the alleged anomalous purchase of asphalt by Cebu City, through the contract
signed by petitioner. This prompted the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) to
conduct
an
inquiry
into
the
matter.
Respondent Jesus Rodrigo T. Tagaan, special prosecution officer of the Office of the
Ombudsman, was assigned to conduct the inquiry, docketed as INQ-VIS-99-0132.

After investigation, he recommended that the said inquiry be upgraded to criminal

and administrative cases against petitioner and the other city officials involved.
Respondent Arturo C. Mojica, Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, approved this
recommendation
Issues:
1. Whether Garcia may be held administratively liable.
2. Whether the Ombudsman was stripped of its powers by virtue of the Local
Government Code.
Held:
1. No. As previously held, a reelected local official may not be held
administratively accountable for misconduct committed during his prior term of
office. The rationale is that when the electorate put him back into office, it is
presumed that it did so with full knowledge of his life and character, including his
past misconduct. If, armed with such knowledge, it still reelects him, then such is
considered a condonation of his past misdeeds. However, in the present case,
respondents point out that the contract entered into by petitioner with F.E. Zuellig
was signed just 4 days before the date of the elections. It was not made an issue
during the election, and so the electorate could not be said to have voted for
petitioner with knowledge of this particular aspect of his life and character.
Petitioner can no longer be held administratively liable for an act done during his
previous term. The agreement between petitioner and F.E. Zuellig was perfected on
the date the contract was signed, during petitioners prior term. At that moment,
petitioner already acceded to the terms of the contract, including stipulations now
alleged to be prejudicial to the city government. Thus, any culpability petitioner
may have in signing the contract already became extant on the day the contract
was signed. It hardly matters that the deliveries under the contract are supposed to
have
been
made
months
later.
While petitioner can no longer be held administratively liable for signing the
contract with F. E. Zuellig, this should not prejudice the filing of any case, other than
administrative, against petitioner. The ruling does not mean the total exoneration of
petitioners wrongdoing, if any, that might have been committed in signing the
subject contract. The ruling is now limited to the question of his administrative
liability therefore, and it is our considered view that he may not.
2. No. There is nothing in the LGC to indicate that it has repealed, whether expressly
or impliedly, the pertinent provisions of the Ombudsman Act. The two statutes on
the specific matter in question are not so inconsistent, let alone irreconcilable, as to
compel us to only uphold one and strike down the other. The decision of the
Ombudsman (6 month suspension) will prevail over the LGC (60day suspension) if
the evidence of guilt is strong. The power to preventively suspend is available not
only to the Ombudsman but also to the Deputy Ombudsman.

Bolastig vs. Sandiganbayan 235 SCRA 103 August 4, 1994

Mendoza

Justice

Facts: Antonio M. Bolastig is the governor of the province of Samar. Information was
filed against him and two others Pedro Ason the provincial treasurer and Prudencio
Macabenta the property officer of the province- for alleged overpricing of 100 reams
of onion skin paper in violation of Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The
Sandiganbayan acting upon the motion of the Special Prosecutor suspended the
Petitioner for 90 days with the strength of the provision of sec. 13 of the Anti graft
and corrupt practices act which provides for the preventive suspension of public
officers if they are under criminal prosecution under valid information under the
same act or under title 7, Book II of the RPC, or for any offense involving fraud upon
government or public funds or property as basis. However, herein petitioner
contends that his suspension was a mindless and meaningless exercise and it was
imposed without regard to the spirit and intent of the law in which it is based. He
further contends that his suspension may deprive his constituents of the services of
an elected official elected by them. Sandiganbayan rejected the motion of the
accused hence this petition.
Issue: Whether the Sandiganbayan is correct in suspending herein petitioner as
Governor with the strength of Sec. 13 of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Held: Yes, it is now settled that sec 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 makes it mandatory
for the Sandiganbayan to suspend any public officer against whom a valid
information charging violation of the law, Book II, Title 7 of the RPC, or
any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property is
filed. The fact that an elected officials preventive suspension may deprive his
constituents of the official elected by them is not a sufficient basis for reducing what
is otherwise a mandatory suspension provided by law

GLORIA V. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Abad, Bandigas, Somebang and Margallo, private respondents, are public
schoolteachers. Some time in September and October 1990, during the teachers
strikes, they did not report for work. For this reason they were administratively
charged with 1) grave misconduct; 2) gross violation of Civil Service Rules; 3)
gross neglectof duty; 4) refusal to perform official duty; 5) gross insubordination; 6)
conductprejudicial to the best interest of service and; 7) AWOL. They were placed
under preventive suspension. Investigation ended before the lapse of the 90 day
period. Margallo was dismissed from the service. The three others were suspended
for 6 months. On appeal to the CA, the court mitigated the punishment to
reprimand only. Hence their reinstatement. Now the reinstated teachers are asking
for back wages during the period of their suspension and pending appeal (before
the CA exonerated them).

ISSUE: Whether the teachers are entitled to backwages for the period pending their
appeal if they are subsequently exonerated.
HELD: YES, they are entitled to full pay pending their appeal. To justify the award of
back wages, the respondent must be exonerated from the charges and his
suspension be unjust. Preventive suspension pending appeal is actually punitive,
and it is actually considered illegal if the respondent is exonerated and the
administrative decision finding him guilty is reversed. Hence he should be
reinstated with full pay for the period of the suspension. Section 47 (4) of the Civil
Service Decree states that the respondent shall be considered as under preventive
suspension during the pendency of the appeal in the event he wins. On the other
hand if his conviction is affirmed the period of his suspension becomes part of the
final penalty of suspension or dismissal. In the case at bar the respondents won in
their appeal, therefore the period of suspension pending their appeal would be
considered as part of the preventive suspension, entitling them to full pay because
they were eventually exonerated and their suspension was unjustified. They are still
entitled to back salaries even if they were still reprimanded.

*RECALL
Evardone v. Comelec, 204 SCRA 464, 472, December 2, 1991
Petitioner:
Felipe
Evardone
Respondents: Comelec, Alexander Apelado, Victorino Aclana and Noel
Nival
Ponente: Padilla
Facts: Felipe Evardone the mayor of Sulat, Eastern Samar, having been elected to
the position during the 1988 local elections. He assumed office immediately after
proclamation. In 1990, Alexander R. Apelado, Victozino E. Aclan and Noel A. Nival
filed a petition for the recall of Evardone with the Office of the Local Election
Registrar, Municipality of Sulat. The Comelec issued a Resolution approving the
recommendation of Election Registrar Vedasto Sumbilla to hold the signing of
petition
for
recall
against
Evardone.
Evardone filed a petition for prohibition with urgent prayer of restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction. Later, in an en banc resolution, the Comelec
nullified the signing process for being violative of the TRO of the court. Hence, this
present petition.

Issue 1:
WON Resolution No. 2272 promulgated by the COMELEC by virtue of its
powers under the Constitution and BP 337 (Local Government Code) was valid.
Held: Yes
Ratio: Evardone maintains that Article X, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution
repealed Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 in favor of one to be enacted by Congress. Since
there was, during the period material to this case, no local government code
enacted by Congress after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution nor any law for
that matter on the subject of recall of elected government officials, Evardone
contends that there is no basis for COMELEC Resolution No. 2272 and that the recall
proceedings in the case at bar is premature.
The COMELEC avers that the constitutional provision does not refer only to a local
government code which is in futurum but also in esse. It merely sets forth the
guidelines which Congress will consider in amending the provisions of the present
LGC. Pending the enactment of the amendatory law, the existing Local Government
Code remains operative.
Article XVIII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution express provides that all existing
laws not inconsistent with the 1987 Constitution shall remain operative, until
amended, repealed or revoked. Republic Act No. 7160 providing for the Local
Government Code of 1991, approved by the President on 10 October 1991,
specifically repeals B.P. Blg. 337 as provided in Sec. 534, Title Four of said Act. But
the Local Government Code of 1991 will take effect only on 1 January 1992 and
therefore the old Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337) is still the law applicable to
the present case. Prior to the enactment of the new Local Government Code, the
effectiveness of B.P. Blg. 337 was expressly recognized in the proceedings of the
1986 Constitutional Commission. We therefore rule that Resolution No. 2272
promulgated by the COMELEC is valid and constitutional. Consequently, the
COMELEC had the authority to approve the petition for recall and set the date for
the signing of said petition.

Issue 2:
WON the TRO issued by this Court rendered nugatory the signing
process of the petition for recall held pursuant to Resolution No. 2272.
Held: No
Ratio: In the present case, the records show that Evardone knew of the Notice of
Recall filed by Apelado, on or about 21 February 1990 as evidenced by the Registry
Return Receipt; yet, he was not vigilant in following up and determining the
outcome of such notice. Evardone alleges that it was only on or about 3 July 1990
that he came to know about the Resolution of the COMELEC setting the signing of
the petition for recall on 14 July 1990. But despite his urgent prayer for the issuance

of a TRO, Evardone filed the petition for prohibition only on 10 July 1990. Indeed,
this Court issued a TRO on 12 July 1990 but the signing of the petition for recall took
place just the same on the scheduled date through no fault of the COMELEC and
Apelado. The signing process was undertaken by the constituents of the
Municipality of Sulat and its Election Registrar in good faith and without knowledge
of the TRO earlier issued by this Court. As attested by Election Registrar Sumbilla,
about 2,050 of the 6,090 registered voters of Sulat, Eastern Samar or about 34%
signed the petition for recall. As held in Parades vs. Executive Secretary there is no
turning
back
the
clock.
The right to recall is complementary to the right to elect or appoint. It is included in
the right of suffrage. It is based on the theory that the electorate must maintain a
direct and elastic control over public functionaries. It is also predicated upon the
idea that a public office is "burdened" with public interests and that the
representatives of the people holding public offices are simply agents or servants of
the people with definite powers and specific duties to perform and to follow if they
wish to remain in their respective offices. Whether or not the electorate of Sulat has
lost confidence in the incumbent mayor is a political question. It belongs to the
realm of politics where only the people are the judge. "Loss of confidence is the
formal withdrawal by an electorate of their trust in a person's ability to discharge his
office previously bestowed on him by the same electorate. The constituents have
made a judgment and their will to recall Evardone has already been ascertained and
must be afforded the highest respect. Thus, the signing process held last 14 July
1990 for the recall of Mayor Felipe P. Evardone of said municipality is valid and has
legal effect.
However, recall at this time is no longer possible because of the limitation provided
in Sec. 55 (2) of B.P. Blg, 337. The Constitution has mandated a synchronized
national and local election prior to 30 June 1992, or more specifically, as provided
for in Article XVIII, Sec. 5 on the second Monday of May, 1992. Thus, to hold an
election on recall approximately seven (7) months before the regular local election
will be violative of the above provisions of the applicable Local Government Code

DANILO E. PARAS, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

Ponente: FRANCISCO
FACTS:
Petitioner was the incumbent Punong Barangay who won during the
last regular barangay election. A petition for his recall as Punong Barangay was filed
by the registered voters of the barangay. At least 29.30% of the registered voters
signed the petition, well above the 25% requirement provided by law. Acting on the
petition for recall, public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) resolved
to approve the petition and set recall election date. To prevent the holding of recall

election, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court a petition for injunction
which was later dismissed. Petitioner filed petition for certiorari with urgent prayer
for injunction, insisting that the recall election is barred by the Sangguniang
Kabataan (SK) election under Sec. 74(b) of Local Government Code (LGC) which
states that no recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the
officials assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local
election.
ISSUE: Whether or not the prohibition on Sec.74(b) of the LGC may refer to SK
elections, where the recall election is for Barangay post.
HELD: NO. But petition was dismissed for having become moot and academic.
RATIO: Recall election is potentially disruptive of the normal working of the local
government unit necessitating additional expenses, hence the prohibition against
the conduct of recall election one year immediately preceding the regular local
election. The proscription is due to the proximity of the next regular election for the
office of the local elective official concerned. The electorate could choose the
officials replacement in the said election who certainly has a longer tenure in office
than a successor elected through a recall election.
It would, therefore, be more in keeping with the intent of the recall provision of the
Code to construe regular local election as one referring to an election where the
office held by the local elective official sought to be recalled will be contested and
be filled by the electorate.
By the time of judgment, recall was no longer possible because of the limitation
stated under the same Section 74(b) now referred to as Barangay Elections.
CONCURRING OPINION:
DAVIDE:
A regular election, whether national or local, can only refer to an election
participated in by those who possess the right of suffrage, are not otherwise
disqualified by law, and who are registered voters. One of the requirements for the
exercise of suffrage under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution is that the person
must be at least 18 years of age, and one requisite before he can vote is that he be
a registered voter pursuant to the rules on registration prescribed in the Omnibus
Election Code (Section 113-118).
Under the law, the SK includes the youth with ages ranging from 15 to 21 (Sec. 424,
Local Government Code of 1991). Accordingly, they include many who are not
qualified to vote in a regular election, viz., those from ages 15 to less than 18. In no
manner then may SK elections be considered a regular election (whether national or
local).