1

THE EVOLUTION OF US-PAKISTAN SECURITY RELATIONS POST 9/11:

FROM BUSH TO OBAMA ADMINISTRATION
Cdr Hj Ahmad Fahmi bin Jahaya RMN
ABSTRACT
This study is about the shift in the US policy and strategy in dealing with Al-Qaeda and
Taliban threats and how it is affecting the US-Pakistan security relationship. Specifically, it
seeks to explain the shift in the US policy and strategy from President Bush to Obama
administration, and how it transformed Pakistan from being the US frontline state into
becoming the theatre of operations in the US fight against terrorism. The broad and unclear
objective of the Global War on Terror campaign during President Bush administration and the
rise of Islamic Militant in the safe havens along the Pakistan and Afghanistan borders have
been identified as the crucial factors for the Obama administration in declaring Pakistan and
Afghanistan as a unified theatre of operations in attaining US core objective to disrupt,
dismantle and defeat Al-Qaeda threat. The shift in policy and strategy had eventually affected
the US-Pakistan security relationship from being the US Major non-NATO ally into distant
relations as the US military forces conducted operations inside Pakistans sovereign territory.
The study concluded that US policy in the post-withdrawal era after 2014 is aimed at ensuring
the stability of Afghanistan by providing training and assistance in counterinsurgency
strategy; providing assistance and aid to enhance Pakistans effectiveness in the border areas
of Pakistan and Afghanistan; and making India as the US reliable partner in securing US
interests and as a catalyst to ensure stability in the region and at the same time to balance the
rise of China.
INTRODUCTION
The United States renewed security relationship with Pakistan was the result of the deadly
terrorist attacks on the US soil by the Afghanistan based terror group Al-Qaeda. The extent of
its severity and casualty was beyond imagination which had led the Bush administration to
retaliate and declare the Global War on Terror (GWOT) as the threat posed by this non state
actor had threatened the lives of many Americans worldwide. Since Afghanistan is a
landlocked country, the US requires a strategic forward base in the South Asian region to
carry out attack to the Al-Qaeda terrorist network, and Pakistan has been identified as the best
option due to its historic security relationship with the US and its geostrategic location.
Upon taking over as the new US president in 2009, President Obama had opted for a
shift in policy and strategy in dealing with Al-Qaeda and Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan.
The policy which stressed on the US Counterinsurgency (COIN) Operations had categorized
Afghanistan and Pakistan as the US new theatre of operations in the fight against Al-Qaeda
and Taliban. The withdrawal of the US forces in Iraq, and the surge in the US troops level in
Afghanistan were part of the strategies to ensure protection of Afghanistans new government.
Additionally the increased in the US drone attacks and military operations inside Pakistans
sovereign territory were also part of the strategies to reduce the rise of insurgency and to
prevent from any future attacks. The implementation of the US policy and strategies during

the Obama administration had eventually affected the US and Pakistan security relations to
the extent that Pakistan has decided to freeze its relations with the US.
US-PAKISTAN SECURITY RELATIONS UNDER THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION
US-Pakistan security relations was quickly improved when Pakistan decided to join the USled forces. Both the US and Pakistan finally shared the same interest in ending the Al-Qaeda
network and other militant activities which had created terror and destruction around the
world. Pakistan had agreed to provide unprecedented access to its ports, airfields, air space
and ground lines control during the Operation Enduring Freedom which had begun on 7
October 2001.1 The operation started with massive US air strikes which were followed by
ground troops to topple the Taliban regime.
In line with the US-Pakistan security relationship in the fight against terror, the US
carrot and stick strategy had provided Pakistan with various kinds of assistance. The
assistance was in the form of military and security cooperation, aid, arms sale and protection
of Pakistans nuclear arsenals. The lifting of all nuclear proliferation related sanctions had
allowed the US to continue providing large economic and military aid, and to support
Pakistan in dealing with international financial institutions. 2 This has given advantage to
Pakistan in many aspects such as flow of fund to improve its dire economic situation, uplift
Pakistans dignity internationally and enhancing its military forces; and protecting its nuclear
arsenals.
Military Cooperation
Pakistans immediate commitment came in the form of unprecedented assistance to the US
such as the use of the strategic facilities including ports and airfield access, ground lines of
communication, and air space. Without Pakistans support, the US ability to launch Operation
Enduring Freedom in October 2001 would have been in question.3 The logistic support and
air bases provided by Pakistan ensured the continuation of air attack by the US-led forces. In
the first five months, a total of 28,000 sorties were flown over the Pakistans airspace from
strategic bases of Jacobabd, Pasni, Shamsi and Dalbandin.4 Continuous assistance from
Islamabad had contributed to the swift defeat of the Al-Qaeda and subsequently the fall of the
Taliban regime in Afghanistan.
A total of 57,000 US military operations were originated from Pakistans territory. 5
Advance military radar facilities were installed by the US military personnel at three
Pakistans airfields, allowing for coverage of the entire Pakistans airspace. In order to prevent
the remaining Al-Qaeda and Taliban regime from entering into Pakistan, more than 115,000
regular and paramilitary troops were deployed along the tribal belt bordering Afghanistan in
1 Kronstadt, Report For Congress. p. 22.
2 Fair, C. C. and Crane, K. 2010.

3 Fair, 2014, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Strategic Change. p. 225.

4 Sattar, A. 2007. Pakistan Foreign Policy 1947-2005. London: Oxford University. p. 247.
5 Naveed, A. 2005. Terrorism: Realit of Invisible Balance of Power. Lahore: Ferozsons. p. 249.

support of the US forces to capture the remaining Taliban and Al-Qaeda soldiers.6 In 2002, a
combined military operations between the US military and Pakistan security forces beginning
to involve in low-profile operations in Pakistan territory to track and capture the remaining of
the Al-Qaeda and Taliban soldiers. 7 It was claimed that the operation had captured 700 AlQaeda suspects and most of them were remanded in US custody.8 The US and Pakistan troops
continue to operate in the traditionally autonomous FATA on the Afghan frontier without
crossing the border into Pakistan. About 45,000 Pakistans troops were involved during the
first year, in support of the US-led operations in Afghanistan.9
The Bush administration had launched an initiative to strengthen the capacity of the
Frontier Corps (FC) with 80,000 paramilitary forces overseen by the Pakistans Interior
Ministry.10 The FC has the primary responsibility of overseeing the border security in the
NWFP and Baluchistan provinces. Starting from 2007, the US began to increase its
involvement with Pakistan ground troops in order to increase their counterterrorism efforts by
having the US Special Operations Command to train and equip the FC. 11 The US has also
assigned 100 of its soldiers to train Pakistans elite Special Service Group commandos with
the intention to double the force size to 5,000. 12 Nevertheless, despite various assistances in
areas of counterinsurgency, Pakistan military did not show much of interest, as the focus was
more on retaining its conventional capabilities to counter the threats from India.
Arms Sales
President Bush immediate change of policy regarding arms sales to Pakistan was to enable
support from Islamabad for the US counterterrorism program. In 2001, the US resumed arms
sale to Pakistan for counter terrorism purposes. Nevertheless, the bulk of US arms sale was
solely intended to increase Pakistans conventional forces. The total amount of arms sale that
were transferred to Pakistan until 2007 had reached a total of USD4.55 billion.13 The US had
also provided Pakistan with nearly USD1.6 billion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) used
to purchase military equipment. However most of the military platforms and assets purchased
were directly related to countering Indias conventional threats.
Security Cooperation

6 Hidayat, K. 2013. Pakistan Contribution to Global War on Terror after 9/11. IPRI Journal XIII. No (1):
37-56. p. 46.

7 Kronstadt, K. A. 2006. Pakistan US Relations. Report for Congress. 1-33. p. 10.

8 CBS News. 2008. Musharraf: Bhutto Knew of Risks (interview). 6 January.

9 Kronstadt, K. A. 2003. Pakistan US Anti-Terrorism Cooperation. Report for Congress. 1-27. p. 13.
10 Katzman, K. and Kronstadt, A. K. 2008. Islamist Militancy in the Pakistan-Afghanistan Border
Region and US Policy. CRS Report for Congress. 1-21. p. 15.
11 Kronstadt, K. A and Epstein B S. 2013. Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance. Report for Congress. 1
52. p. 15.
12 Katzman, K. and Kronstadt, A. K. 2008. CRS Report for Congress. p.15.
13 Kronstadt, K. A. 2008. Pakistan US Relations. Report for Congress. 1 106. p 63

The US-Pakistan security cooperation accelerated rapidly in the post 9/11 period and in 2004
President Bush formally designated Pakistan as a Major Non-NATO Ally. The designation
had benefitted Pakistan, as it allowed the purchase of US restricted military equipments, such
as weapons and fighter jets. The US began allowing commercial sales that enabled Pakistan
to refurbish part of its fleet of F-16 jets purchased prior to being sanctioned, and subsequently
the US had committed to resume sale of new F-16 fighters to Pakistan after a sixteen year
hiatus.14
There were other security cooperations reinitiated or established during the Bush
administration, such as the US-Pakistan Defense Consultative Group (DGC). The DCG
which was first initiated in 1950 was reconvened post 9/11 due to the large amount of US
military assistance flowing back to Pakistan.15 The primary purpose of this group is to
provide a platform for both countries to exchange ideas and discuss strategies and policies
with regard to the war on terrorism and other factors relating to defense and security matters.16
To strengthen Pakistans counterinsurgency roles and capabilities, the US was willing to
provide security assistance in reorienting its army for counterinsurgency efforts.
Protection of Pakistan Nuclear Arsenals
Among the concerns of the US officials during the crisis has been the security of Pakistans
nuclear weapons and materials. In order to ensure the security of Pakistan nuclear arsenal
from falling into the wrong hands, the US offered Islamabad nuclear security assistance. The
assistance however requires Islamabad to comply with nonproliferation guidelines, such as
sharing the common practices and technical expertise to prevent unauthorized use of nuclear
weapons.17 Other assistances offered to Islamabad, amongst others were to secure or destroy
radioactive materials which could be used to produce radioactive dispersal device and to
provide secure shipment outside of Pakistan for the highly enriched uranium used in the
civilian sector.18 The United States reportedly had spent nearly USD50 to USD100 million
since 2001 on a classified program which would permit nuclear technology transfer such as
purchase of sensors and other technologies from the US in order to help secure Pakistans
strategic interest.19 The assistance given by the US indicated for the first time that the US has
now recognized Pakistan as a nuclear power state.
Economic and Military Aid

14 Fair, C., Crane, K., et all. 2010. Pakistan. Can the US Secure an Insecure State. RAND Project Air
Force. RAND Corporation. 1-262. p 148.
15 ibid, p. 150.
16 ibid, p. 150.
17 Joby Warrick. 2007. US has concerns over security of Pakistans nuclear weapons. The Washington
Post. 11 November; David Sanger and William Broad. 2007. US secretly aid Pakistan in Guarding Nuclear
Arms. The new York Times. 17 November.
18 Bryan Bender. 2009. Pakistan, US in Talks on Nuclear Security. The Boston Globe. 5 May.

19 David E. Sanger and William J. Broad. 2007. U.S. Secretly Aids Pakistan in Guarding Nuclear Arms.
New York Times 18 November.

While the GWOT is a top priority with Pakistan, it is clear that the US perception of urgent
changes needed within Pakistan, has led to the proposed USD3 billion aid package initiatives.
Pakistans support in the US fight against terrorism has also benefitted Pakistans ailing
economy, as President Bush had decided to cancel a huge foreign debt of almost USD43
billion.20 The total aid received during Bush administration since 2001 had made Pakistan the
worlds leading recipient of US aid, obtaining around USD11.2 billion, where USD8.1 billion
allocated to security related assistance while the remaining USD3.1 billion was channeled to
economic development programs.21
Table 1.1 US Assistance to Pakistan FY 2002 2009 (in million)

Source: Kronstadt 2008, p. 99.

US-PAKISTAN SECURITY RELATIONS UNDER THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION
Throughout the two terms of the Bush administration in the GWOT campaign, Pakistan has
managed to work closely with the US in the fight against Al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters by
providing support and intelligent information regarding the whereabouts of Al-Qaeda leaders
in the border areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan. As the US was focusing on its war in Iraq, it
had provided the opportunity for the Al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters in the border areas of
Pakistan and Afghanistan to recruit, plan and conduct attacks towards the US and Pakistan
interests and the newly formed government in Afghanistan. 22 This was evidently seen from
the rise of terrorist attacks in Pakistan and Afghanistan by the end of the Bush administration.
Nevertheless, President Bush had remained cautious in pursuing military force in Pakistans
territory and eventually decided to leave the problem with the Pakistans indigenous forces.23
The increased in the number of cross border attacks in Afghanistan that were originated from
these unruly areas had made President Obama regarded these areas as the most dangerous
place in the world.24
20 Kronstadt, 2008.
21 ibid.

22 Brookes, P. and Smith, J. 2008. Course Correction in Americas War on Terror. In Chollet, D.,
Lindberg, T. and Shorr, D. (ed.). Bridging the Foreign Policy Divide. New York: Routledge. p. 57
23 Cohen, C. 2007. A Perilous Course. US Strategy and Assistance to Pakistan. CSIS Report. 1-141. p.
5.
24 Obama H, B. 2009. Remarks by the President on a New Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. Speech
27 March 2009 9 (online) http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-on-a-New-

To assess the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan, in the middle of 2009, President

Obama had requested CIA policy advisor to conduct a review of the security environment in
Afghanistan.25 The results showed that despite the initiative and efforts taken by the US-led
forces, the Taliban insurgency continues to grow and present immediate danger. A strategy
which was based on a population centric approach through an integrated civilian-military
counterinsurgency campaign was recommended in order to provide a more secure
environment.26 Based on this recommendation, Obama in his speech in December 2009 stated
that we must deny Al-Qaeda safe havens. We must reserve the Talibans momentum and
deny it the ability to overthrow the government and immediately approved an additional
33,000 troops to secure and strengthen Afghanistan security forces to create an environment
that would prepare Afghanistan to be independent of the US forces in the future. 27 Obamas
decision to withdraw the US troops from Iraq and concentrating the US troops in Afghanistan
significantly marked the shift in Obamas policy in the fight against terrorism. As Iraq was no
longer the focus of Obama administrations policy, Afghanistan and Pakistan have now
became the new theatre of operations in the fight against terrorism.
Figure 1.2 US Troops Level in Afghanistan from Bush to Obama

Source: http:www.brookings.edu/about/programs/foreign-policy/Afghanistan-index
Figure 1.3 Comparison of US Troops Level in Iraq and Afghanistan

Strategy-for-Afghanistan-and-Pakistan/. [14 Sep 2015].

25 Coster, L. J. 2014. Negotiating the Great Game: Ending the US Intervention in Afghanistan. The
Fletcher Forum of World Affair 38(2): 73-100. p. 75.
26 ibid. p .75.
27 ibid. p .75.

Source: US Department of Defence

Afghanistan and Pakistan in a Unified Theatre of Operations
Concentration of US forces in Iraq had provided the opportunity not only for the remaining
Al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters to reinforce but also the rise of other Islamic Militants in
Pakistan. Due to this factor, Obamas counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy which deviated
from Bush GWOT strategy has adopted a leaner and meaner strategy in dealing with the
Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan.28 Obama also realized that to achieve the objective to
disrupt, dismantle and defeat the Al-Qaeda and Taliban networks, both Afghanistan and
Pakistan must be addressed as a unified theatre of operations to stop future attempts of their
return.29 The transnational nature of the terrorist and militant activities, especially coming
from the border areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan requires a more holistic approach which
not only deals with the Taliban insurgents in Afghanistan but also to the roots of Al-Qaeda in
Pakistan.30 This policy was in line with his campaign speech which stated that We must
refocus our efforts on Afghanistan and Pakistan, the central front in our war against Al-Qaeda
so that we are confronting terrorist where their roots run deepest.31
Drone Attacks
The US covert drone attacks in Pakistan started in 2004 under the Bush administration and
until now are still in operation, targeting individuals who are in the US most wanted list.
Upon taking office as the President, Obama has significantly increased the number of drone
attacks and adopted the policy of to kill and not to capture in the hunt for the remaining Al28 Nathan, K. S. 2012. US Foreign Policy in Asia: A Comparison of the Bush and Obama Strategies of
Engagement. Journal of Diplomacy And Foreign Relations 12(1): 5-26. p. 18.
29 Ra'ees, W. 2010. Obamas Afghanistan policy: A policy of balancing the reality with the practice.
Journal of Politics and Law 3(2): 80-93. p. 86.
30 Fair, C. 2014. U.S.-Pakistan relations: Ten years after 9/11. In Krause, J and Mallory, K, C. (eds.).
Afghanistan, Pakistan and Strategic Change. New York: Routledge. p. 37.
31 Davis J. 2011. Assessing Obamas War in Afghanistan. In Davis J. (ed.). The Barack Obama
Presidency: A Two Year Assessment. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. p. 178.

Qaeda who have occupied the safe havens of Pakistan and Afghanistan borders. 32 The precise
and accurate attacks using advanced drone technology also explained the increased use of
targeted killing under Obama. Additionally, the attacks reduced the possibility of casualty to
the US soldiers which reflects a conscious shift in Obamas counter terrorism strategy.33
Increased in the Number of Attacks
Obama was reportedly authorised 52 attacks on suspected militants in Pakistan which was
more than the total number of attacks throughout the two terms of the Bush administration. 34
The attacks were more than double in 2010 and until the beginning of 2015 it has
accumulated up to 309 attacks which was six time higher than the total amount of attacks
during the entire Bush administration35 However, due to the Salala border incident which
killed twenty four Pakistani, the two bases in Pakistan which were used to support US
operations in Afghanistan were forced to be closed resulting in the decline in the number of
drone attacks in 2011.36 Continuation of these attacks especially into Pakistans sovereign
territory had rendered dissatisfaction among not only to the military but also among the
majority of Pakistan population.
Figure 1.4 Number of US Drone Attacks in Pakistan

Source: New American Foundation. The Drone War in Pakistan.

http://natsec.newamerica.net/drones/pakistan/analysis.
US INDIA STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP
32 Waseem, Z. K. 2013. US Drone Policy and Anti American Sentiments in Pakistan (2001-2012). New
Delhi: EduPedia Publications Ltd. p. 3.

33 McCrisken, T. and Phythian, M. 2014. The offensive turn: US intelligence and the war on terror. In
Parmar, I., Miller, L. and Ledwidge, M. (ed.). Obama and the World: New Directions in US Foreign Policy. New
York: Routledge. p. 189.
34 McCrisken, T. and Phythian, M. 2014. Obama and the World: New Directions in US Foreign Policy.
p. 188.

35 New America Foundation. 2013. Analysis: The Drone War in Pakistan. 7 June (online)
http://natsec.newamerica.net/drones/pakistan/analysis. Unless specifically cited, all numbers regarding drone
strikes and casualty rates in Pakistan come from this database. [30 Sep 2015].
36 DeYoung, K. 2012. A CIA veteran transforms US counterterrorism policy. Washington Post. 24
October (online) https://www.washingtonpost.com/cia-veteran transformed-us-counterterrorism. [30 Sep 2015].

The US-India strategic partnership initiative and defense framework agreement which were
initiated during the Bush administration had continued to be part of the Obama
administrations strategy. The initiative which was based on common values, such as
democracy and security, would further enhance bilateral security cooperation especially in
relation to bilateral military exercises and counterterrorism programs. India was seen as the
US most reliable partner as described by the Secretary of State Hillary Clinton during the
2010 Strategic Dialogue that India is an indispensible partner and a trusted friend and a
critical part in ensuring stability in the region.37 President Obama was the first US president
who has visited India twice during his term as the president in order to increase the
momentum in both countries relationship. The US-India relationship has been characterized
by Obama as one of the defining partnerships of the 21st Century which would provide
various opportunities for the US and India in areas of strategic significant in sectors such as
economy, energy, security and defense.38
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the shift in the US policy and strategy in fighting terrorism in Afghanistan is to
ensure the stability of the new Afghanistans government. The GWOT campaign during the
Bush administration was focusing more on the US military operation in Iraq which had given
ample time for the remaining Al-Qaeda and Taliban soldiers in the border areas of
Afghanistan and Pakistan to recruit, plan and develop strategy to launch attacks on the US
forces in Afghanistan. The Obamas COIN strategy which involved the withdrawal of troops
in Iraq and troops surge in Afghanistan was intended to provide Afghan National Forces with
training and counterinsurgency capability to deal with the insurgency. The drone attacks was
also part of the US air counterinsurgency strategy to act as a deterrence to eliminate future AlQaeda and Taliban terrorist attacks to ensure the stability of Afghanistan.
This
counterinsurgency strategy would provide greater protection to the civilians and at the same
time provide the Afghan National Forces with assistance and training prior to the US military
withdrawal.
The US wants Pakistan to strengthen its control over the unruly areas of Pakistan by
providing assistance and training in the area of counterinsurgency. This is not only to defeat
the rise of Al-Qaeda in the border areas, but also as a means to ensure the stability of Pakistan.
The US drone attacks would reduce the strength of Al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters in the
unruly areas of Pakistan and prevent them from carrying out terrorist attacks either to Pakistan
or Afghanistan to ensure stability in both countries. The instability of Pakistan and the
possibility of Pakistans nuclear weapons or technology being transferred into the wrong
hands are the worst nightmare for the US, India or the rest of the world.
The US perceived India as a more reliable partner in securing US interests and as a
catalyst to ensure stability in the region. Being economically and politically stable had
provided India with advantage to become the regions hegemony. As the US decided to
withdraw from Afghanistan, India is seen as the most reliable partner to ensure the regions
stability and also at the same time to balance the rise of China.

37 Syed Shahid Hussain Bukhari. 2011. India-US Strategic Partnership: Implication for Pakistan.
Berkeley Journal of Social Sciences 1(1): 1-28. p. 8
38 ibid. p. 11.

10

Finally it is concluded that the US-Pakistan security relationship has always been
dependent upon the US regional or global policy of either to contain the threats to US national
interests or to ensure the US remains as the global hegemon.

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12

McCrisken, T. and Phythian, M. 2014. The offensive turn: US intelligence and the war on
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