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Laka as a Creative Function

of Language
Article in Journal of Indian Philosophy October 2012
DOI: 10.1007/s10781-012-9166-z

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J Indian Philos
DOI 10.1007/s10781-012-9166-z

Laka as a Creative Function of Language

Nirmalya Guha

Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

Abstract When somebody speaks metaphorically, the primary meanings of their

words cannot get semantically connected. Still metaphorical uses succeed in conveying the message of the speaker, since laka, a meaning-generating faculty of
language, yields the suitable secondary meanings. Gangesa claims that laka is a
faculty of words themselves. One may argue: Words have no such faculty. In these
cases, the hearer uses observation-based inference. They have observed that
sometimes competent speakers use the word w in order to mean s, when p, the
primary meaning of w does not make any semantic sense. In all such cases, s is
actually related to p. After having observed this, when the hearer hears the utterance
of w, and realizes that ws primary meaning p is semantically unfit for the sentencemeaning, they infer on the basis of their prior observation that the competent
speaker must mean s by uttering w. Thus laka becomes a success. This
apparently well-argued reduction does not stand the critical examination; neither in
Gangesas framework, nor even in the general theory of language. For one can
compose and interpret potentially infinite novel sentences based on laka while
the observational inferences one can make are finite. Gangesa says very clearly that
as far as the secondary meaning is concerned, no prior observation is required. This
paper will argue that not only does language yield secondary meanings through
laka, but it also restricts the use of secondary meanings; for one cannot mean just
anything by saying something. Laka is a creative function with infinite potential
within the limits set up by the language faculty.
Keywords

Gangesa Laka Inference Linguistic creativity

N. Guha (&)
The Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, Indian Institute of Technology,
Kanpur 208016, UP, India
e-mail: nguha@iitk.ac.in

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N. Guha

Once the Vaisesika wanted to reduce testimonial cognition (bda-jna) to

inferenceto be more specificobservation-based inference (anumna), which is

somehow similar to the hypotheotico-deductive reasoning. The Naiyayika tried to
refute the Vaisesika and establish that verbal testimony (abda) was an irreducible

tool for valid cognition. Most of the Indian philosophers would agree with the
Naiyayika on this. The Naiyayikas argument (which I shall discuss later) in this
regard is perhaps invincible.
In a recently published paper, Das has tried to reduce laka to inference;
although he spares akti.1 According to the Naiyayika, both akti and laka are
semantic relations (vttis) that tie the basic linguistic units (padas) with their
meanings; akti brings forth the primary meaning while laka the secondary
meaning.2 Das reduction is very clever. Still I think that we have to pay very
heavily for such a reduction. For it will weaken the Nyaya theory of language (and
for that case most of the Indian theories of language) by robbing it of much of its
efficacy and explanatory power. A careful reading of Gangesas Tattvacintmai
(TC) will perhaps help us understand this argument.
I am not responding to Das (2011) argument just because it finds faults with
Gangesas theory of laka, but because, I think, it is the best objection raised
against any theory of laka as a linguistic function.
Finally I would like to show that not only is laka an indispensable part of the
linguistic mechanism, but it contributes immensely to the creativity of natural
language. People do successfully communicate with each other by using sentences
with deflected meaning. Laka makes their communication successful and sets the
limits of deflection too.
Laka: Definition, Ground and Mechanism
In order to introduce Gangesas theory of laka, I quote Das (2011, p. 354):
Let us take, for example, the sentence: Ghosa lives on the Ganges (gagy

ghoa prativasati). Ghosa is a dairyman. The expression Ganges ordinarily

of course refers to the river of that name: that is its primary referent (vcyrtha
or akyrtha). . Now, in our attempt to understand this sentence, if we take
into account just the primary referent of the word Ganges, we land ourselves
in some sort of difficulty; for, a dairyman cannot surely live directly on the
surface of a river. . So, we must assign another referent a secondary
referent to the word Ganges: namely, the bank of the Ganges. . the
sentence now makes perfect sense. The secondary referent that is assigned is

Das (2011, p. 354) claims that at least Gangesas framework should accept Das reduction. But his
claim has a general approach that cannot be ignored by anybody who thinks that laka is basically a
linguistic function. I shall try to defend the Nyaya theory of laka in general, and Gangesas theory of
laka in particular.
2
For the sake of convenience, I am simplifying the Nyaya theory. Actually akti is a saketa (primary/
direct meaning) of a special type. But the details are irrelevant here.

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Laka as a Creative Function of Language

called lakyrtha and the relation that mediates our cognitive transition from
the word to its secondary referent is called laka.
Definition
Here is Gangesas definition of laka:
laka ca vttyantaram, yatra vcyrthnvaynupapatty vcyasambandhopasthpite vkyrthnvaya. yath gagy ghoa ity atra gagpadasya tre.
laka tu akyasambandhasvarp ek lakayaviayakavddhavyavahrntarnapek ceti.
laka ca.... aakysadnvayapratiyogyupasthitihetu. svaakyasambandho lakaeti paramrtha. upasthitihetur hi vtti, aktivat.
Jtiaktivda, TC3
Translation: Laka is the other semantic relation. In the case of laka, the
primary meaning [of a word] suffers from inexplicability (anupapatti). Thus the
semantic composition (anvaya) of the sentence takes place only after supplying
the sentence with a meaning that is related with the primary meaning. Example: In
the case of the sentence The dairyman lives on the Ganges, the word Ganges
gives the bank (tra) [as its secondary meaning] and the composition takes place.
[The primary meaning of a word is learned through observing the linguistic
behaviours of a speech community (vddhavyavahra).] No other prior observation
is required in order for a word to yield its secondary meaning through laka.
Laka is the process that brings about an indirect meaning that is fit for the
semantic composition and is related to the direct meaning through some relation.
A semantic relation (vtti) is nothing but a cause that brings forth a meaning. akti
[too] is such a relation.4
Comment: I begin with the notational conventions I shall use in this paper. akti
connects a word w with its direct meaning (akya or vcyrtha) which I shall denote
as [|w|]. Thus, [|Ganges|] = a specific stream that is called the river Ganges. Laka
connects w with its indirect meaning (lakya) that is presented through [|w|].5 We
shall denote the indirect meaning of w as (|w|). Thus (|Ganges|) = the bank of the
river Ganges. The sign will denote the semantic connection or anvaya. Thus
x y would represent x as semantically connected with y.
After one says that The dairyman lives on the river Ganges, the hearer realizes
that no dairyman can actually live on [|Ganges|], which is nothing but the stream
known as the river Ganges. The hearer cannot semantically connect the dairyman
3

Tarkavagish (1990b, pp. 660, 662, 678679).

I have not translated the term asada since it will invite unnecessary complications and problems. It
literally means dissimilar. According to Jayadeva, the author of loka commentary on TC, this term is
used in order to distinguish laka from similarity-based metaphors (gau vtti). [gauopasthitivraya asadasyeti. loka of Jayadeva. See Tarkavagish (1990b, pp. 678679)]. Perhaps at the time
of Gangesa and Jayadeva, the distinction was maintained. Most of the Neo Naiyayikas treat similaritybased metaphors as laka. I am following them on this issue.
5

This is a standard notational convention used by the formal semanticists. The denotation of the
linguistic expression x is denoted by [|x|]. See Dowty et al. (1981, p. 19).

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N. Guha

with the stream. So they make a cognitive adjustment. They look for an entity
where the dairyman can live, and at the same time it must be related to the stream.
They find the bank of the river. Here the inexplicable akya or the primary meaning
is the stream, and the bank is related to the stream through the relation of proximity.
Thus R(Ganges)(bank), i.e., the semantic relation that takes Ganges as the input and
yields the bank through the primary meaning (i.e., [|Ganges|] = the stream) is
laka. It is evident that R(Ganges)(bank) = R(Ganges)((|Ganges|)).
According to most of the schools of Indian philosophy, language-learning
(vyutpatti) is (at least) partly based on the observation of the linguistic behaviours of
a speech community. The child learns the meanings of the basic units (padas) by
observation only. We may notice here that observation enables one to learn the
primary meanings of words. Thus one has learned that the word w primarily means
[|w|]. Gangesa claims that, as far as the indirect meaning (lakyrtha) is concerned,
one does not have to observe any other linguistic behaviours (lakayaviayakavddhavyavahrntarnapek). To be more precise, the cognition of [|w|] from
w depends on prior observation. But the cognition of (|w|) from [|w|] does not
depend on any prior observation.
One may notice here in the translation that there is an ambiguity in defining
laka. So is the case with any semantic relation in the Indian tradition. This I
believe is a convenient and innocent ambiguity. Both akti and laka are vttis
(semantic relations). Any such relation may either mean the relation itself, or the
mechanism through which it generates a meaning. For example, akti is either
Rw[|w|], or the linguistic function that takes w as an input and yields [|w|].
The mechanism of laka, which has been mentioned in the above translation, will
be elaborately discussed in Mechanism section.
Ground
According to Gangesa, the ground (bja) of laka is anvaya-anupapatti which is
the non-formation of the sentential compositional meaning (anvaya) due to the
semantic unfitness of the direct meaning of some word. We have already seen that in
the case of the dairyman, the stream (= [|Ganges|]) could not be semantically
connected with the dairyman since he could not live on the stream. Thus the
connected sentential meaning failed to be formed. Hence laka was needed. But
here one may raise the following question: consider the sentence ya praveaya
which literally means Let the sticks enter. It is about entering the dining room for
eating. It actually means to say Let the stick-bearers enter. But there is no problem
in letting the sticks, which are the primary meanings of ya, enter the dining
room. Still laka is invoked. Then how can Gangesa say that laka is invoked
only when the primary meaning fails to bring forth a semantically compatible
sentence-meaning? Maybe what happens here is the following. The hearer realizes
that even though there is no problem with the sentential meaning in this case, still
the intention of the speaker is to say Let the stick-bearers enter since the context
here is eating, and sticks do not eat. In this case, the issue is with the intention of the
speaker (ttparya-anupapatti) since the speaker cannot intend to feed the sticks.

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Laka as a Creative Function of Language

Thus one should rather say that the trouble pertaining to the speakers intention is
the ground of laka.6 Gangesa says that the speakers intention does not play any
causal role here. For even before the intention is known, laka has been invoked
to fix the problem pertaining to the sentence-meaning. I quote:
lakye ttparyagraht prvam eva mukhyasya anvayyogyatvajnena
lakaopapdant. astu v tatrpi lakye ttparyagraha. tathpi mukhye
nvaynupapattir eva lakabjam, prathamopasthpitatvt, ttparynupapatti vinaiva lakabjatvasambhavc ca. ya praveayety atra ajahatsvrthy ca mukhyasya anvaynupapattir eva. tathhi prakaradin praveayety
asya bhoktparatva.
Jtiaktivda, TC7
Translation: I am partially quoting Das (2011, p. 356) translation of the Sanskrit
passage:
Even in the case of ya praveaya, the secondary referent of the word yai
is assigned on the basis of a failure of semantic composition. It is just that in
this case the meaning of the word praveaya (referring to the action of
making diners enter) is known, in abstract, from the context. Since the primary
referent, that is, stick cannot be combined with that action to compose a
sentential meaning, the need for assigning a secondary referent arises.
Comment: According to Gangesa, ttparya or the intention of the speaker is to be
known through inference.8 It plays no causal role in the generation of the
testimonial cognition. So it cannot play a causal role in the generation of testimonial
cognitions that involve laka. Let us consider the following case of polysemy
(having multiple meanings):
Suppose he [a burglar] had said, The cops are inside the bank. Then on that
occasion, bank meant a commercial bank, not a river bank, and this is
relevant to what the words meant, on that occasion. (On other occasions, the
same words might mean that the police were at a river bank.)
Kripke (1985, p. 256)
How does one know that on that occasion, bank meant a commercial bank? It
seems that one argues in the following way: The speaker must intend to mean the
commercial bank, since such is the context. So he means to say that The policemen are inside the commercial bank. Here the hearers knowledge of the speakers
intention seems to play a causal role for the generation of the formers testimonial
cognition; for without that the hearer could not arrive at the aforementioned
meaning. In this case, perhaps Gangesas reaction would be this: Here from the
context itself, bank will get its meaning. After the meaning has been picked up, the
6

Compare:
paran tu yady anvaynupapattir lakabja syt tad ya praveaya itydau laka na syt, yaiu
pravenvayasya anupapatter abhvt. tena yaipravee bhojanattparynupapatty yaidhareu
laka. Lakapark, Nyyasiddhntamuktval by Visvanatha; Sastr (1968, p. 442).
7

Tarkavagish (1990b, pp. 691692)

For a discussion on this, see Das (2011, p. 356).

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N. Guha

sentential composition will be formed. And the hearer would conclude that
the speaker means to say that The police-men are inside the commercial bank,
since his sentence means this. Likewise, in the case of laka too, the context will
supply the concerned word with the appropriate meaning, and from the resulting
semantically compatible sentence-meaning, the hearer will infer the intention of the
speaker. Das (2011, p. 356) considers this thesis of Gangesa a manoeuvre and
writes, One aim of this paper is to show that even this manoeuvre turns out to be
futile at the end. First of all I fail to see any manoeuvre since Gangesas theory
here is simple and commonsensical. It is not a patchwork. And secondly I would
argue that it will not turn out to be futile.9
We may consider slightly trickier metaphorical uses from Stern (1983, p. 587):
Einstein has a good head, John is getting peanuts for his labor, and Bill is
unavailable because he is tied up. Stern observes that in each of these cases, both
the literal and the metaphoric interpretations are possible, since none of the literal
meanings is absurd. Apparently this observation sides with the speakers intention
claim. For without knowing the speakers intention it does not seem to be possible
for the hearer to interpret these sentences. Stern (1983, p. 587) tells us: [F]ully
grammatical sentences like these can be interpreted metaphorically or literally in
some contexts, only metaphorically or only literally in others, and both literally and
metaphorically in yet others. I too believe that here also what is available for the
hearer is the context, not the intention of the speaker which is beyond the reach of
the direct access of the hearer. These cases are ambiguous because the metaphors
used here are dead. Head now means both intelligence and the physical head.
Thus these words are almost polysemous. We shall discuss dead/frozen metaphors
(nirha-laka) again in Laka and Creativity section.
Mechanism
Thus Gangesa describes the mechanism of laka:
tathhi vyutpanno nirpitptabhvasya gagy ghoa prativasatti vkya
rutv vimati ida pramam ptoktatvt. sambhavati ca ida tath, yath
vastrea pidhehty atra karmatvpanne dvre adhyhte yogye itarapadai
svrthnvayo bodhyate tath akty gagpadasmrite tre yogykkite
itarapadai svrthnvayabodho trpi sambhavati iti . evaca trnvitavkyrthabuddhi trapratibaddhavddhavyavahrdidarana vinaiva jyate,
padn smtayogynvitasvrthapratipdanasya prg eva vyutpannatvt.
evaca trasmtyanubhavayo akyasambandhajnd eva upapatte na akti.
svrthasambandha eva ca laka, pact tu paramparay gagsambandhitrapratipattaye anena ptena gagpada prayuktam iti ttparyadhr jyate.
Jtiaktivda, TC10
Translation: One who knows the meanings of words [of some language] hears the
following sentence uttered by a trustworthy person (pta): The dairyman lives on
9
10

See The Problems of the Reduction section.

Tarkavagish (1990b, pp. 663665).

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Laka as a Creative Function of Language

the river Ganges. After hearing this, one argues, This sentence must be true, since
it has been uttered by a trustworthy person. It is possible and is like the following
case. When somebody hears somebody else command, Close with the cloth, the
former supplements the utterance of the latter with the door and conceptualizes the
complete sentence-meaning in which the meaning of the supplementary the door is
perfectly suitable and semantically connected with other words. Similarly [in the
case of the dairyman too] the word Ganges gives the meaning the stream known as
Ganges through akti. Then memory presents the meaning bank which is
[physically] related to the stream, the primary meaning of the word Ganges. As
the meaning bank is compatible with other word-meanings, it gets semantically
connected with all other words [and the sentence-meaning gets formed]. The
generation of the cognition of the sentence-meaning that contains the bank is not
preceded by any observation of linguistic behaviours which are associated with the
bank. For the direct meaning of a word is known before its remembered meaning
(indirect meaning) gets semantically connected with other words. The bank is
cognized through memory since it is physically related with the primary meaning of
the word Ganges. akti has no role to play in the generation of the cognition of the
bank. First laka brings forth the object that is physically related to the primary
meaning, i.e., the stream known as Ganges. After having cognized the bank through
laka, the hearer argues that The speaker, who is a trustworthy person, intends to
mean the bank that is associated with Ganges. That is why he used the word
Ganges. This is a mediate step (parampar).
Comments: Let us summarize the whole process in the following steps.
1.

2.

3.

4.

11

First the hearer H hears the sentence The dairyman lives on the Ganges and
concludes that the sentence must be true since it is uttered by a trustworthy
person.
The word Ganges gives [|Ganges|]. H faces a problem regarding the meaning of
the sentence, since the dairymans living cannot be semantically connected to
the stream, i.e., [|Ganges|].
H looks for something that is at the same time physically related to Ganges and
semantically fit for the composition of the sentence. H finds/remembers the
bank that fulfils both the criteria. The bank is indeed related to the Ganges, and
is hence akya-sambandhi. Here the job of laka is over. The bank easily gets
semantically connected with the dairyman. Thus H cognizes the composition
(|Ganges|) [|dairyman|].
But still [|Ganges|] is standing unconnected with other words. It must be
incorporated in the composition. Otherwise the use of the word Ganges would
turn out to be futile.11 It gets semantically connected with the bank, i.e.,
(|Ganges|), and H cognizes the following composition: [|Ganges|]

gagpadavaiyarthyaprasagt. Jtiaktivda, TC; Ibid (675).

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N. Guha

(|Ganges|) [|dairyman|], i.e., Ganges bank dairyman. This is not an

immediate step, but a mediate one (parampar) that follows laka.12
Gangesa uses an analogy while presenting his account of laka. It is an
example of linguistic supplementation (adhyhra). Laka, semantic supplementation and polysemy share the following feature: in all these cases, the hearer
chooses some meaning out of multiple options. And the choice is based on the
context (prakaraa). This we have seen both in the case of laka and the case of
Kripkes burglar. Gangesa presents a case of supplementation. But this is not
laka. In laka, the trouble (anupapatti) is due to incompatibility. The utterance
is complete. And in semantic supplementation, where the hearer supplements the
command Close with the cloth with the door, the linguistic expression itself is
incomplete; no semantic incompatibility is involved here. According to the
Mmamsaka (as portrayed by Gangesa), such a case is ruta-arthpatti (which I

shall discuss later).

Several times Gangesa says that laka is not preceded by the prior observation
of the linguistic behaviours of ones speech community. He mentions it here also.
I shall argue that this theory is of a great significance as far as the creativity of
laka is concerned. Let us now consider the following comment: For the direct
meaning of a word is known before its remembered meaning (indirect meaning) gets
semantically connected with other words. Much before remembering the bank (i.e.,
(|Ganges|)) through cognizing the stream (i.e., [|Ganges|]), H learned that Ganges
primarily meant the stream known as Ganges. No other meaning replaces the
meaning of Ganges on Hs cognitive meaning-list. Therefore, no observation can
precede the cognition of laka.
Meaning (artha)
We have been talking about words and their meanings. What are these meanings
(arthas)? They are certainly not the denotations of words in this context. They are
rather semantic objects that make one understand the compositional content of
linguistic utterances. Saha (2009, p. 73) clarifies a few relevant points: Gangesa
and his followers further insist that words produce the non-mnemic awareness by
first producing the image. The mere cognition of the river Ganges through hearing
the word Ganges is mnemic, mere remembrance. But the understanding of a novel
sentence is not mere remembrance; it is fresh non-mnemic cognition. How to reach
the non-mnemic verbal cognition from the mnemic mental representations?
According to Saha (2009, p. 73), the steps are the following: (i) Word (or
listening to word), (ii) image of the term only, and (iii) primary awareness of the
12

I cannot help quoting a few lines from Searle (1985, p. 430):

[T]he question we are trying to answer is, How is it possible for the speaker to say metaphorically
S is P and mean S is R, when P plainly does not mean R; furthermore, How is it possible for
the hearer who hears the utterance S is P to know that the speaker means S is R? The short and
uninformative answer is that the utterance of P calls to mind the meaning and, hence, truth
conditions associated with R, in the special ways that metaphorical utterance have of calling other
things to mind.

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Laka as a Creative Function of Language

relationship obtaining between the terms. What the speaker captures through
auditory perception is the mere unrelated physical words. The conceptualized words
are the images of the terms. Here term has a technical meaning. A term has the
potential to be semantically connected with another, and hence make the
composition possible. Finally the fresh cognition of the connected terms emerges.
This cognition is bda-bodha or the verbal cognition.13 In this context, meanings
are constituents of this cognition, not the external objects. Gangesa himself clarifies
this point thus: Verbal cognition (bda-bodha) is caused by the mental
representation of meanings (padrtha-upasthiti). A semantic relation (vtti) relates
those words with their meanings, which make this mental representation
possible.14
rutrthpatti and Laka
According to the Mmamsaka, postulation or arthpatti is something like this: one

cognizes A and does not have the knowledge of any relation between A and B. Still
one cognizes B on the basis of the cognition of A. One stock example of nonlinguistic (da) postulation is the following. One knows that Devadatta is alive, but
does not find him at home. From Devadattas absence at home, one postulates that
Devadatta is out. An example of linguistic (ruta) postulation is the following.
When the sentence, A fat man does not eat by day is heard, the cognition of
eating-by-night emerges. This is linguistic postulation.15 The Mmamsaka tries

their best to prove that postulation is not preceded by the observation of the
pervasion (vypti) between objects; hence it is not observation-based inference. The
Naiyayika believes that the prior knowledge of pervasion (vypti-graha) is a
prerequisite for inference. And they claim that any case of postulation is actually
preceded by some observation.16
Let us now get back to linguistic postulation. Kumarila says that it is not
inferential, since the co-occurrence of these two sentences [i.e., a fat man does not
eat by day and he eats by night] has not been experienced.17
Gangesa wants to reduce all postulations to (observation-based) inference. In this
context, we would like to see how Gangesa reduces the linguistic postulation to
inference.

13

There is an insightful discussion on bda-bodha in Chakrabarti (1992, pp. 422423).

vtti ca bdabodhahetupadrthopasthityanuklapadapadrthayo sambandha. Jtiaktivda, TC;

Tarkavagish (1990b, p. 627).
14

15
pno div na bhukte cety evamdivaca rutau/ rtribhojanavijna rutrthpattir ucyate// 51,
Arthpattipariccheda, lokavrttika (SV) by Kumarila; Jha (1971, p. 559).
16
17

Guha (2008) discusses the Naiyayikas reduction and a possible defense of the Mmamsa views.

nnumna na ceda hi da tena saha kvacit// 60, Arthpattipariccheda, SV; Jha (1971, p. 561).

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N. Guha

Gangesas Reduction
Gangesa cites three examples of linguistic postulation. (1) the aforementioned
example of the fat man who does not eat by day, (2) one commands, The door! and
the hearer supplements ones utterance with Close, and (3) from the injunction
The one who desires heaven shall perform [jyotioma sacrifice] somebody
concludes that there must be a causal link between the performance of the sacrifice
and the attainment of heaven.18 I must admit that I did not find the close the door
example in the basic texts of Mmamsa, such as barabhyam, lokavrttika or

Bhat. I do not know where Gangesa picked up this example from. Let us examine
his reduction:
bdhakaprambhvo nvayavirodhirpaviraho v yogyat, ato divbhojane
rtribhojanprattau api bhojanasdhanapnatvt div na bhukta iti abdt
dhr utpadyate, na prattyanupapatti, kintu prattnupapatty rtribhojana
kalpyate. ata evprvam api na vcyam iti vakyate. tasmt nrthpattir
anumnt atiricyata iti.
Arthpattiprakaraam, TC19
Translation: Semantic compatibility (yogyat) is nothing but the absence of any
factor that could block the genesis of the semantic meaning from a sentence [and
make the sentence insignificant], or the absence of anything that would not allow the
words to get grammatically related to each other. Even though nobody immediately
cognizes eating-by-night after cognizing not-eating-by-day, the cognition of eatingby-night follows from the cognition .does not eat by day and the cognition of
stoutness that implies eating. There is no problem in conceptualizing [the sentence,
Devadatta is stout without eating by day] (na prattyanupapatti). But the
understood meaning appears to be begging an explanation (prattnupapatti). That
is why eating-by-night is assumed. So aprva is not the primary meaning [of
anything in the sentence, One who desires heaven shall perform jyotioma
sacrifice]. Therefore we can conclude that postulation is not different from
inference.
Comment: According to Gangesa, the Mmamsaka thought that some semantic

incompatibility (ayogyat) was involved in understanding the sentence about

somebodys being fat without eating by day. But Gangesa tells us that there is no
incompatibility in this case. Nothing stops the words in the sentence The fat man
does not eat by day from getting semantically connected since a fat mans not
eating by day is not inexplicable. Thus there is no trouble in conceptualizing the
sentence. But of course the fat mans obesity is a mystery in the sense that it begs an
explanation. It is certainly a case of Petitio Explicati (begging explanations). This is
our prattnupapatti, an issue associated with the content of a piece of cognition.
This case is comparable to the following case. Suppose somebody tells a physicist
that a stone does not obey the laws of gravity. The physicist will understand the
sentence perfectly without compromising the primary meanings of the words. Still
the content is problematic since it begs an explanation. Thus, prattyupapatti and
18

For a discussion on these examples and Gangesas text, see Das (2011, pp. 359361).

19

Tarkavagish (1990a, pp. 687688).

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Laka as a Creative Function of Language

prattnupapatti are not opposed to each other. In the case of the fat man, the
mystery gets dissolved the moment one realizes that he can eat at night.
Gangesas reduction-route is something like this: The cognition that the fat man
eats at night could be inferential. The whole deduction could be reduced to the
following negative (kevala-vyatireki) inference: The fat man eats by night, since
one who does not eat at night cannot be fat without eating by day. The unseen
(aprva) is an invisible causal link that is created by a cause that will yield its effect
remotely. Ones inference of the causal link may follow from the perception of the
effect, separated from its cause by a time gap. But curiously Gangesa does not
directly reduce the case of closing the door to an inference.
Reducing laka to Inference
By reducing all rutrthpattis to inferences, Gangesa seems to reduce the cases like
close the door, since these too are cases of rutrthpatti. Now Gangesa does not
give any specific reduction scheme for such cases of linguistic supplementation.
That gives Das (2011) a chance to do his reduction.
Let us summarize Das arguments that led him to his reduction.
Gangesa wants to reduce all rutrthpattis to inferences.
According to Gangesa, the postulation of close from the utterance of the door
too is linguistic postulation.
3. The close case is surely a case of linguistic supplementation. Hence all cases of
linguistic supplementation are reducible to inference.
4a. Laka involves linguistic supplementation of some sort, since one has to
supplement The dairyman lives on the Ganges with the bank of in order to
have a significant sentence-meaning. Similarly, in the case of close the door,
without supplementing close the semantic composition of the meanings of
these words remains inexplicable.20 Both the cases involve a cognitive
adjustment of some sort.
4b. Laka involves some trouble associated with inexplicability. According to
Gangesa, linguistic postulation too has the same trouble.21
5. Hence laka too is reducible to inference. Das (2011, p. 363) shows the
reduction in clear terms:
1.
2.

For example, within Gangesas theory, the inference in the case of Ghosa

lives on the Ganges could take the form, Ghosa lives on the bank of the

20

Das (2011, p. 359).

21

Das (2011, pp. 362363):

The initial cognition of sentential meaning, which results from the sentence, Devadatta, who is
fat, does not eat by day, lacks yogyat, in Gangesas sense, because a persons daytime abstinence
from food is contradicted by the fact of his fatness. Thus, the meanings yielded by the various
clauses of the sentence in question cannot be combined together to make much sense. Here, even
under Gangesas account, the initial cognition of sentential meaning suffers from an inexplicability
with respect to semantic composition, the very ground of laka. To remove this inexplicability,
we simply imagine the further fact that Devadatta eats at night, just as we assigned a secondary
referent to a word in cases of laka.

123

N. Guha

Ganges, because (i) he is portrayed by a competent speaker as someone

who (or something that) lives directly on the Ganges and yet (ii) he is the
counterpositive of an absence that lies in the river. Whatever does not live
on the bank of the Ganges is either not portrayed by a competent speaker as
something that lives directly on/in the Ganges or is not the counterpositive
of an absence that lies in the river. For example, a Gangetic dolphin!
The Problems of the Reduction
Even within Gangesas theory, the above reduction is not possible. First of all, Das
claim that according to Gangesa, the cases of linguistic postulation involve an
inexplicability with respect to semantic composition is incorrect. The claim is
based on Das misreading of Gangesas comment: na prattyanupapatti, kintu
prattnupapatty rtribhojana kalpyate.22 Das (2011, pp. 362333) has surely
mistaken prattnupapatti for prattyanupapatti and this mistake is responsible for
his comment that Gangesas manoeuvre would turn out to be futile.23 As I
discussed earlier, Gangesa clearly says here that there is no trouble as far as the
understanding or composition of the sentence The fat man does not eat by day is
concerned. But the content of the cognition generated by the sentence suffers from
Petitio Explicati, begging explanations. This is completely different from laka,
since in the case of the latter, due to the semantic incompatibility of the primary
meanings, no composition can be formed. That is why the hearer rereads the
utterance after supplementing it with something else. In the case of linguistic
postulation, the primary meanings are not found to be mutually incompatible. We
may note another point. The inexplicability (anupapatti) involved in the case of
laka is an antecedent one while that involved in the case of postulation (anyathanupapatti) is a consequent one. The very first reading of the sentence, The
dairyman lives on the Ganges is problematic, while the first reading of The fat man
does not eat by day is perfectly understandable. If one denies that the fat man does
not eat at night, then there would arise an issue of inexplicability. In fact, this
consequent-ness is by definition a mark of postulation. Gangesa clearly says that
laka is needed only when a word presents a meaning that is different from its
primary meaning (svrtha).24 Neither does linguistic supplementation share this
feature, nor does polysemy.25
Secondly, Gangesa tells us:
ata eva dhmo stty atra dhmapadasya vahnibodhaparatve pi na laka,
akty dhmopasthitau anumnadvr tatprattisambhavt. yatra hi

22

See Gangesas Reduction section. Das (2011, p. 362) comment on this has already been quoted in
footnote 21.

23

See Ground section.

24

svrthd anyena rpea jte bhavati laka, tratvena jte gagpadasyeva. Jtiaktivda, TC;
Tarkavagish (1990b, p. 587).
25

The polysemous w gives [|w'|], [|w''|], [|w'''|]. All these are primary meanings.

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Laka as a Creative Function of Language

mukhyay skt paramparay v na ttparyanirvha, tatra laka.

Krynvitaaktivdasiddhnta, TC26
Translation: When the sentence There is smoke [is uttered], it brings forth the
knowledge that fire must be there at that very place. But this is not laka. For in
this case, the cognition of smoke is brought forth by both akti and the cognition of
fire by inference.. Laka is needed only when neither akti (mukhy), nor even a
mediate process (parampar) [such as inference] succeeds to grasp the meaning of a
sentence.
Comment: After saying this, it is not possible for Gangesa to accept that laka
is an inference of some sort.
The Argument Against the Reduction
This would be my argument against Das reduction:
laka nnumnam, vddhavyavahntarnapekitvt, anantbhinavalakamlbhtavddhavyavahrm nantyaprasagt, akyalakyasambandhnm
aniyatatvc ca.
Translation and comments: I have already mentioned in Laka: Definition,
Ground and Mechanism that Gangesa says that the prior observation of linguistic
behaviours is not necessary for laka with respect to R[|w|](|w|). If laka is
inference, then it will involve some prior observation, the observation of the cooccurrence of the terms of inference (sahacra-darana). Before inferring fire from
smoke, one has to observe that any case of smoke is indeed a case of fire. Das
inference too will require some observation of co-occurrence, positive (anvaya) or
negative (vyatireka). In Das inference the co-occurrence is this: Whatever does not
live on the bank of the Ganges is either not portrayed by a competent speaker as
something that lives directly on/in the Ganges or is not the counterpositive of an
absence that lies in the river. It involves the linguistic behaviour (vyavahra) of a
trustworthy/competent speaker. For one has to observe that a competent speaker
does not portray somebody who does not live on the bank of Ganges as something
that lives directly on/in the Ganges. If we grant that the dairyman case is actually
this inference, then we have to say that this case depends on the prior observation of
the behaviour of a competent speaker. If Gangesa accepts this inference, then he
will have to contradict himself. For his laka is independent of any vddhavyavahra. Of course one has to know the primary meaning of w before laka
yields (|w|).
Secondly, as a function of language, laka is creative. There would be infinite
number of novel lakas. I shall elaborate on this point in the following section.
Here it will suffice to say that if one accepts that laka is based on some prior
observation of linguistic behaviours (vddha-vyavahra-darana), then one has to
accept that each case or each type of laka would be preceded by such an

26

Tarkavagish (1990b, pp. 545547).

123

N. Guha

observation. That means there would be infinite vddha-vyavahra-daranas.

Absurd!
Thirdly and finally, in the case of laka, the relations between the concerned
primary meanings (akyas) and secondary meanings (lakyas) are of various types
(aniyata). For example, in the case of the dairyman, the relation is proximity. In the
case of entering the stick-bearers, the relation is ownership (svmitva). In the case of
a similarity-based metaphor, the relation will be similarity (sdya). There is no
general rule for predicting the relations involved in various lakas. Therefore it
would be impossible to capture all the (infinite) relations through inferences.
Another Objection and Gangesas Possible Response
Gangesa reduces rutrthpatti to inference, but claims that laka is independent
of prior observation. Against this one may raise the following objection: If you say
that laka is not preceded by any observation of co-occurrence, then this should
hold good for linguistic supplementation too. But you reduced the cases of linguistic
supplementation to inference. Is this not self-contradictory? Well, this is a tricky
objection. If Gangesa says that linguistic supplementations of all sorts depend on
inference, I would probably not agree with him. But all his examples of linguistic
supplementation in this context revolve around one single case, closing the door. I
think the nature of this case is such that it has something to do with inference. It is
easy to see that closing (pidhna) implies closing something open. Gangesa might
have responded to this issue in the following way.
My formulation of Gangesas possible response: pidhehti padasya udghitavastun avinbhvo dyate, yath vastrea pidhehi ity asmt dvramitikalpanam, dvramiti padt pidhehti padakalpana ca. vastrea pidhehti
shtale dvrapadnumitir evam. prathamam udghitavastu karmatvpannam,
vastuni udghite sati pidhehti padaprayogd ity anumiti. anantaram atra
dvra karmatvpannam, tasya eva udghitatvd iti paramparay. dvram
iti shtale pidhnnumna kevalavyatireki. tat tu atra pidhehti pada
kalpyam, udghite dvre dvrapadamtraprayogt; yatra pidhehti pada na
kalpyam, tatra na udghitavastusamanvita dvrapadamtraprayoga iti.
sthaladvaya atra vddhavyavahrpekitam.
Translation: It is easy to see that the term pidhehi has got a natural relation with
something open. We can see that in both the cases, closing-by-cloth (vastrea
pidhehi) and the-door (dvram). In the case of closing-by-cloth, the inference takes
place in the following way. First the hearer infers that Here the thing that has to be
closed is open, since somebody uses the word close. Then they argue that The
only open thing here is the door. Therefore I am asked to close the door. In the case
of the-door, the following negative inference takes place. Here I must supply the
command with the word close, since the door is open and the speaker has
commanded the door. Where there is no postulation of closing, there is nobody
who utters the door when the door is open. Thus both the cases depend on some
prior observation.

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Laka as a Creative Function of Language

Comment: Perhaps a sentence containing words like close, open etc. is such
that one may drop either the grammatical subject or the object (definitely not both).
The learner sees that sometimes either the subject or the object is dropped. Such
incomplete sentences are perhaps uttered when the missing word can be picked up
from the immediate surroundings, shared by both the speaker and the hearer. For
example, it does not make sense if the speaker, who is sitting at Varanas,

commands the hearer, who is sitting at Kanc, Close (maybe over the telephone).
But it makes perfect sense if such a speaker tells such a hearer that My village is on
the Ganges. Perhaps there is some here-and-now-ness involved in the cases of
word-dropping that contains open or close.
Laka and the Creativity of Natural Language
Linguistic expressions are of two types; words and sentences. The semantic
relation conveyed by a sentence is not known before cognizing the sentence.
All the sentence does is make its meaning [which is nothing but the semantic
relation] known. This is evident from the fact that one, who knows the
meanings of the words of a newly composed verse, understands its sentential
meaning. On the contrary, the relation that constitutes the base for an
inference, has to be known before making the inference. Such being the case,
how is testimony the same as inference? It is true that in order to know the
[primary] meaning of a basic unit, one has to know the relation between the
word and its meaning. But still, knowing word-meanings from words is
different from inferring [something from something else] in terms of the
contents they present and their causal modes of production.
Nyyamajar by Jayantabhatta27

Creativity in Language
The basic units of language are finite. But the sentences are potentially infinite. A
sentence can be of infinite length. After learning the meanings of finite units, one
composes and understands numerous novel sentences. What a mystery! This
mystery drew the attention of most of the classical Indian philosophers. Every
school had to come up with its own story of language. The Vaisesika wanted to say

that cognizing the meaning of a linguistic expression was not different from
inferring fire from smoke; for in the former case too one would infer the meaning
[|w|] from the word w.28 This section has begun with Jayantabhattas response to this

Vaisesika reduction. One has learned that the words w1 and w2 primarily mean [|w1|]

27
dvividha abda, padtm vkytm ceti. tatra vkyam anavagatasambandham eva vkyrtham
avagamayitum alam, abhinavaviracitalokaravae sati padasasktamatn tadarthvagamanadarant. ata sambandhdhigamamlapravttin anumnena tasya katha smyasambhvan?
padasya tu sambandhdhigamaspekatve smagrbhedd viayabhedc ca anumnd bhinnatvam.
Chapter III, Pramalakaam, Nyyamajar; Sukla (1936, p. 140).
28
yath pratyakato dhma dvgnir anumyate, tathaiva abdam karya tadartho py avagamyate.
Chapter III, Pramalakaam, Nyyamajar; Sukla (1936, p. 139).

123

N. Guha

and [|w2|] respectively. But [|w1|] [|w2|], i.e., the semantic connection (anvaya)
between [|w1|] and [|w2|], which is conceptualized from the novel phrase w1 w2,
was not known as something related to any linguistic expression before the phrase
was heard. Testimony as an epistemic tool is irreducible since it causes the
cognition of such a connection.29 The Naiyayika has taken so much pain just to
avoid any idea that would force them to accept that one has to learn infinitely many
basic linguistic expressions (ananta-akti-graha-prasaga) in order to compose or
understand novel sentences. Almost a millennium after Jayanta, Wilhelm von
Humboldt stated that language did make infinite use of finite means.30 Chomsky
(1969, p. 7) writes:
Normal mastery of a language involves not only the ability to understand
immediately an indefinite number of entirely new sentences, but also the
ability to identify deviant sentences and, on occasion, to impose an
interpretation on them. it is clear that a theory of language that neglects
this creative aspect of language is of only marginal interest.
Laka is semantic deviance, and the uses that involve laka needs to be
interpreted by the hearer.
Laka and Creativity
Very recently one of my relatives has started his doctoral research. He called me a
few days ago and told me (very happily) that My grandpa is a great chatterbox.
I knew that he lost both his grandpas. And his PhD supervisor, who was an English
gentleman, was nearly eighty-six years old. By no means could the professor be
related to my Indian relative through kinship. Still I understood immediately that
my grandpa meant my supervisor despite the fact that for the first time in my life,
somebody referred to his supervisor as his grandpa! In this case, R[|w|](|w|), i.e.,
the relation between the primary meaning and the secondary meaning of the
deviant word (w) is similarity. We do use and understand new lakas, creative
metaphors. The relations (R[|w|](|w|)) that underlie such lakas are innumerable.
Let us consider a few other R[|w|](|w|)s.
Classical Nyaya texts often talk about the following case. There is a procession
on the street and somebody tells someone else, The umbrella-bearers (chatria)
are going [somewhere] (ynti). Not all the people in the procession carry umbrellas;
but many of them do. Here the R[|w|](|w|) is sharing the same purpose or being the
members of the same group (eka-srtha-vhitva).31
Often we say, Wait five minutes. It is most of the time six or seven minutes, or
even more. Still the hearers do not mind waiting a little longer (or less). Here the
29
I am not elaborating on Jayantas comment that even the cognition of [|w|] from the word w is not
inferential, since it is not relevant in the present context. For an elaborate discussion on the subtle
differences between knowledge of x by being told and inferring x from some word see Chakrabarti
(1992, pp. 433436).
30

Chomsky (1965, p. 8).

31

eva chatrio ynttydau chatripadasya ekasrthavhitve laka. Lakapark, Nyyasiddhntamuktval by Visvanatha; Sastr (1968, p. 443).

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Laka as a Creative Function of Language

R[|w|](|w|) is little more or little less than. Searle (1985, pp. 431434) gives many
examples of metaphoric uses involving various relations.
The cases of laka discussed above demand the full interpretative agency of
the speaker-hearer. The speaker-hearer has to actively interpret those lakas. But
there are standardized lakas too. Grammatical rules dictate the interpretation of
such lakas. Let us consider a few standardized cases. In TC, Samsavda,
Gangesa shows how laka is used for interpreting most of the compound words
(samsa). When one interprets a compound word, one gets a phrase having more
linguistic units than the word itself contains. Examples: redhead, ofce manager,
blackboard, underwater etc. The interpretative phrase that elaborates a compound is
called a vigraha-vkya. A redhead is neither red, nor a head; it is a person with red
hairs. An ofce manager is the manager of an ofce. Thus in the case of redhead,
which is like (Sanskrit) bahuvrhi, units such as person or hairs are not contained in
the compound. In the case of ofce manager, which is like (Sanskrit) tatpurua, of
is not contained in the compound. According to Gangesa, the new units are brought
forth by laka. Karmadhraya (such as blackboard: a board which is black) and
dvandva (such as ghter-bomber: an aircraft that is both a ghter and a bomber)
compounds do not involve any laka.32 It is evident that the vigraha-vkyas of
these compounds contain various relations. Gangesa (along with other Naiyayikas)
calls the laka involved in interpreting compounds nirha laka, a standardized deviation.33 Here the deviation is so natural that one thinks that the primary
meaning of redhead is a person with red hairs. We may say that these are frozen or
dead lakas. The speaker-hearer interprets them almost passively.
All I am trying to say is, like novel sentences, a use of laka too can be novel.
To say that each case of laka is grounded in observation-based inference is to cut
off the wings of laka and tie it to mere observations. It also implies that if a
speaker-hearer is able to interpret n number of metaphorical uses correctly, then
they have already made at least n number of corresponding inferences. A speakerhearer can recognize potentially infinite cases of laka. But they cannot observe
infinite linguistic behaviours. That is why such a reduction is problematic. Searle
(1985, p. 430) says: The question, How do metaphors work? is a bit like the
question, How does one thing remind us of another thing? There is no single
answer to either question, though similarity obviously plays a major role in
answering both. I hope Searle is not trying to reduce metaphorical understanding to
remembrance. Finally he says, I believe that there is no single principle on which
metaphors work.34 For me the most important question in this context is: When the
speaker metaphorically says S is P and means S is R, the hearer understands that
S is R. In another context, the primary meaning of P, i.e., [|P|] may not remind the
hearer of [|R|]. How is it that in the metaphorical context P presents [|R|]? In an
ordinary context, grandpa does not remind me of supervisor. But when somebody
wanted grandpa to mean supervisor, grandpa meant supervisor to me. This is the
most important question for the Indian theories on laka. I believe that the answer
32

I picked up the examples from here: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/English_compound.

33

Samsavda, TC; Tarkavagish (1990b, pp. 746, 753).

34

Searle (1985, p. 430).

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N. Guha

to this question lies in the way language, rather the language faculty, is understood
in Indian philosophy in general, and Nyaya in particular.
Is Laka Caused by Words?
Das thinks that the Naiyayika has just assumed that laka is caused by words.35
One may always question the validity of such an assumption. I explicitly spell out
the apparent problems associated with this assumption in terms of causal relations.
Suppose x causes y, and y z. In this case, according to the Naiyayika, x is not a cause
of z, since, with respect to z, x is causally redundant or conditioned otherwise
(anyathsiddha); for x is the cause of the cause of z (kraa-kraa).36 That is why
the father of the potter is not a cause of a pot that is produced by the potter.
Similarly, w causes [|w|] which in turn causes (|w|). In that case, with respect to (|w|),
w is conditioned otherwise. We know that a factor x which is conditioned otherwise
with respect to another factor z cannot be a cause of z. Fair enough! But this
objection can be overruled by considering the intuitions about causation. Suppose an
object X is tied to another object Y, which in turn is tied to the object Z. X and Z are
not directly related. Whenever one pulls X, X pulls Y, and Y Z. If we appeal to our
intuition, we shall easily see that despite the fact that pulling X does not directly
cause pulling Z, pulling X seems to trigger the causal process for pulling Z. For Xs
pulling Y is not independent of pulling X. Every time each event of pot-making is
preceded by a potter, but not by the potters father. Suppose Devadattas son
Visnumitra is a potter. Visnumitra can make n number of pots even after the death

of Devadatta. Each of those n cases of pot-making necessarily requires Visnumitra,

not Devadatta. By contrast, each event of (|w|)-cognition-generation is necessarily

preceded by w, though in an indirect way (paramparay). Thus w must not be
conditioned otherwise with respect to (|w|) and must cause (|w|). I quote a very
profound and insightful comment of Gangesa in this regard:
When first the effect is known as something that regularly precedes the
production of X, and then the cause is known as something that regularly
precedes the effect, then the cause is conditioned otherwise there with respect
to the production of X. When first the cause is known as something that
regularly precedes the production of X, and then the effect is known as

35

Das (2011, p. 365):

It seems to take it for granted that cognition of words characterized by laka directly causes
verbal cognition.

Das (365) clearly states that it is difficult for one to accept words to be the cause of a secondary meaning
since the causal relations would be very unclear in that case.
36

The phrase conditioned otherwise is due to Matilal (1990, p. 293).

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Laka as a Creative Function of Language

something that regularly precedes the production of X, then the cause is a

factor that causes the production of X through the mediation of the effect.
varnumnam, TC37
As far as the production of a pot is concerned we first think that a potter is its
cause. After that we may consider that the potter too is caused by his father. Here
the consideration of the production of a pot does not necessarily begin with the
potters father. In fact the potters father is irrelevant in the causal chain. Thus the
potters father is conditioned otherwise. But when we think of moving Z that is tied
up to Y which in turn is tied up to X, our consideration begins with moving X, not Y.
Moving X causes moving Y which in turn causes moving Z. But moving Y is not
independent of moving X. The causal chain of moving Z is triggered by X. We may
say that moving X causes moving Z through moving Y. The case of laka is like
moving Z. Words trigger the causal chain. The primary meaning is just an
intermediate step through which words finally yield the secondary meaning. This is
why Gangesa insists that (|w|), i.e., the secondary meaning is not yielded by
anything else, but w itself; (|w|) is ananyalabhya.38 Another intuitive way for testing
this causal theory is this. In order to have a pot produced, I must find a potter; a
potters father is not necessary here. But in order to yield a secondary meaning,
I have to use words; without using w, I cannot have [|w|] which would finally bring
forth (|w|). Thus w is part of my minimal causal requirement with respect to laka.
Thus w causes (|w|) through producing [|w|].

Conclusion
Words have powers, as do the people who understand them. A word has the
power to stand in for or take the place of a thing. . People who understand
words have powers as well; most remarkably, the capacity to acquire
knowledge about people, places, planets and so on, just by hearing noises or
seeing marks. This too is a power, just as surely is the power to see or
remember or reason. It is the power to receive knowledge from the testimony
of others. It is not all that surprising that these two powers, the semantic power
of a word and the epistemic power of a hearer or reader, should be connected;
but it was the singular achievement of the Indian philosophers of language to
analyze the nature of that connection in far greater depth than anyone had
done before.
Ganeri (2006, p. 1)
Instead of reducing laka to observational inference or any other epistemic
instrument, we may grant that language as a communication system is autonomous.
It has powers. The power to transmit a message encoded in an ordinary sentence is
37
yatra janyasya prvabhve vagate janakasya prvabhvo vagamyate, tatra janyena janakasya
anythsiddhi. yatra ca janakasya tathtve vagate janyasya prvabhvvagama, tatra taddvr tasya
janakatvam eva. Tarkavagish (1990c, p. 155)
Pancanana Sastris commentaries, Muktvalsagraha (Sanskrit) and Vivti (Bengali) on Nyyasiddhntamuktval of Visvanatha discuss this textual passage. See Sastri (1968, pp. 114116).
38

ananyalabhyasyaiva abdrthatvt. Jtiaktivda, TC. Tarkavagish (1990b, p. 606).

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N. Guha

surprising enough. But still, a lot more surprising is the power to successfully
transmit a message encoded in a deviant sentence. The speaker has a power to
encode their message in a semantically deviant sentence. Language has a power to
preserve it. And the hearer has a power to decode the sentence and read the
message. Metaphorical sentences work successfully, salva intentione. One can
always try to manually enumerate and describe finitely many cases of laka or
deviant uses, as Searle (1985, pp. 431434) did. But ones enumeration cannot be
exhaustive, since words have wings to fly freely. They are not omnipotent. But they
can do infinite things.
I might have wanted Ganges to mean the Brazilian rainforest. But as a normal
speaker, who wants to communicate with others, I would not do so; nor shall I tell
my hearer which R[|w|](|w|) (i.e., the relation between the primary meaning and the
secondary meaning) I do have in my mind when I use a metaphorical sentence. The
hearer will read my message anyway. Thus language somehow restricts my
metaphorical uses in the sense that I cannot mean just anything by uttering a specific
word. This too perhaps is a power of language.
Is it the case that if I use a sentence that involves laka, everybody (from my
speech community of course) will understand my intention? Is deviant but
successful communication universal? Perhaps the answer is: yes, in most of the
cases. Perhaps the people who do not understand laka are those who have
problems in understanding other communication systems too. I have a friend who is
a mathematician. His observational and inferential skills are excellent. Still in his
early childhood, whenever his mom would ask him to wait five minutes he would
wait exactly five minutes and then leave. He learned the meaning of five minutes
the hard way. It seems that for him most of the cases of laka are inferential. He
cannot understand sarcasms, social contexts and body language. He has been
suffering from hyperactive autism. I have seen other people who do not understand
laka naturally. As far as my knowledge goes, their understanding of indirect
communication is not great.
Although Das (2011, p. 354) says that . at least within Gangesas theory, the
cognition of sentential meaning in cases of laka can be shown to be inferential in
nature, his argument has a general approach. It is not just against Gangesas theory.
Had that been the case, Das (2011, pp. 364366) would not have taken so much of pain
to show how his reduction would fix other problems within the Nyaya framework. The
problem with Das reduction is twofold. Firstly, Gangesas framework does not allow
him (Gangesa) to accept laka as observational inference, because he very clearly
states that (1) laka does not depend on the observation of any linguistic behaviour
(lakayaviayakavddhavyavahrntarnapek), and (2) laka is used only
when no other epistemic tool works (yatra hi mukhyay skt paramparay v na
ttparyanirvha, tatra laka). Secondly, the reduction does not account for the fact
that a normal speaker-hearer can compose and understand potentially infinite novel
sentences based on laka. One may of course say that Gangesas critique of
postulation (arthpatti) is wrong; for postulation too does not depend on any prior
observation. In fact, Kasturirangan, Guha and Ram-Prasad (2011) and Guha (2008)
argue in favour of such a view. But that is another issue altogether. Gangesas view on
postulation may be wrong. But that has nothing to do with his views on laka.

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Laka as a Creative Function of Language

The connection between the preservative power of language and the communicative power of the speaker-hearer is no less a mystery than the connection
between mathematics and natural sciences. Maybe language is an invisible, yet
partly audible, network that runs through the minds of the speaker-hearers and
controls their linguistic behaviours to a great extent.

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