Outlines of Pyrrhonism, Book 2 Book 1 having given the “general account” of Skepticism, “stating its basic idea, its origins, definitions, criterion and goal, as well as the modes of epoch and how we take the Skeptic statements, and the distinction between Skepti- cism and the competing philosophies,” Sextus proceeds in Books 2 and 3 to give the “specific account,” in which he raises questions about various specific doctrines of the Dogmatists. Taking their division of philosophy into logic, s Book 2 to matters classified as belongin physics, and ethies, he devo logic, and Book 3 to those belonging to physics and ethics. 12 Can the Skeptic Question What Is Said by the Dogmatists? These sections are interesting for the light they throw on the meaning of “apprehension.” Sextus takes up an old puzzle: how is it possible to look for (seek, inquire into, investigate, question, zetein) something of which one has no conception? Here the puzzle is phrased as follows: how can the Skeptic raise questions about that which he does not apprehend? At M 8.337Mf it is presented in a somewhat different way, I have discussed the matter on pp. 24~5 of the Introduction. In sections I-12 Sextus uses 1d.” In one sense, he tells us, n for distinguishing two senses of “appreh © apprehend something is just to conceive of it, without also maintaining the existence of what one is talking about; in the other sense, to apprehend something involves not only conceiving of it but also grasping that it exists. Thus, in one sense “A apprehends an X” does not imply “An X exists,” and in the other sense it does, Now since, as the Dogmatists say, we conceive not only of things and states of affairs that exist es that there is no problem with raising q but also of those that do not (section 10), Sextus arg tions about the existence of something we apprehend in the first of the two senses. “For I suppose,” he says, “the Skeptic is not precluded from a conception that arises during the discussion itself from ir appearances affecting him passively, and which does not at all imply the existence of its objects.” On the other hand, Sextus conjectures that not even the Stoies themselves will want to claim that one cannot raise questions about things that one has not apprehended in the second of the two senses. There isSkepti 2 and 3 to 0 Io ematists? meaning of 330M it is pp. 24-5 distinguishing d something es not only sense “A sense it does. s and states of rgues that nething we s, “the Skeptic sion itself from all imply the hat not even stions about Outlines of Pyrthonism, Book 2 265 no trace elsewhere of the “first” sense of “to apprehend,” in which it just means to conceive of”; this is surely not surprising, for in the Dogmatists’ epi- stemologies the role of apprehension is to give us knowledge ot justifiable beliefs about a world of objects that exist independently of our souls and all their pathe and parts (including the dianola or intellect), But the present passage does show that Sextus understands the Dogmatists’ use of “appre hhend” to be such that having a concept of X is a minimal condition for apprehending X. You could see a wombat without knowing what a wombat is (ie, without having a concept of wombat), but under that condition you could not apprehend one. For a general discussion of apprehension, see se 8 of the Introduction. The “by means of two conditionals theorem” (si dix dio spd cSpnux) is the following inference schema If P, then 0 It P, then not 0 Therefore, not P. Or perhaps it is the metatheoretic assertion that all instances of the schema are sound, In any case, we are indebted to Origen for preserving a Stoic example of this sort of argument (cf. Mates 1953, pp. 80-1) If you know that you are dead, you are dead. If you know that you are dead, you are not dead Therefore, you do not know that you are dead. Presumably, this would qualify not only as a sound argument, but as a proof No one has satisfactorily explained what the so-called “reduced with respect to” theorem is, Manuscript T, which is a Latin translation, gives the theorem as “omnis triangulus habet tres angulos equales duobus rectis,” which is half of theorem 32 of Book 1 of Euclid’s Elements. But Euclid’s statement and proof make no mention of anything being “reduced with respect to anything. With 5 cf. 3.219; with 8 ef. 1178-9, 13, Where the Criticism of the Dogmatists Should Begin The division of philosophy into three parts is taken up at gres th at M 7.2f., where it is ascribed principally to Xenocrates (the successor in the Academy to Speusippus, who was the successor to Plato) and to the Peripa- teties and the Stoics. They plausibly compare philosophy to a garden with every kind of fr ening the physics part [of philosophy] to the height ofthe plants, the ethics part to the ripeness of the fruit, and the logie part to the security of the walls, And others claim that itis like an egg, with ethies like the yolk, which some say is the chick, and physics like the white, which is food for the yolk, and logic like the hard external shell. But since the parts of philosophy aresto all s. and logy ce and truth, stinct fairly Outlines of Pyrrhonism, Book 2 that of the “application” and “use.” The “by whom,” for instance, would b human being, the “by means of which be sense perception, and thy ind might be the application [ of the phantasia. For just asin th mination of heavy and light things there are three criteria, the weigher and balance beam and the placement of the balance beam, and of these the igher is the “by whom” criterion, the balance beam is the “by means of whieh,” and the placement of the balance beam is the “use"; and again, just as for the determination of things straight and crooked there is need of the technician [6 sezfens] and the rule and the application of the rule, so in the same way in philosophy, for the determination of things truc and false we have need of the aforementioned three criteria, and the human being corresponds to the weigher and the technician, “by whom” the decision is made, and sense perception and in sorrespond to the balance beam and the rule, “by means of which” the decision is made, and the application of the phant corresponds to the “use” ofthe implements mentioned above. It thus appears that in this discussion the word “criterion” is used, with reference to a given decision-making process, for those factors that mos significantly affect the outcom 18-21, Does There Exist a Criterion of Truth ades of Corinth is also mentioned at M 7.53, 388, and Xenophanes of Jophon at M 7.48, 110 Note that Sextus says we need an “agreed-upon” criterion, and not just a criterion. This is an indication of what I am describing as his debate-mode approach When Sextus keeps saying that there is no “agreed upon” eriterion, it migh be replied: “So what? It doesn't follow that there is no criterion.” The criterion sought is a criterion for determining from our phantasiai—“the evident” — the attributes of external objects — the “non-evident” —and he seems to think that the criterion must be something evident, But surely it is one thing for the criterion to be something evident (e.g. the taste of the honey under normal conditions) and quite something else for it to be evident that this is 22-47, The “By Whom” Criterion The structure of this chapter is as follows. The question is: by whom sh determinations be made as to which phantasial are veridical and which are not? The only answer considered is: by human beings. In sections 22-8 it is gued that “human beings are inconceivable.” that is, that there is no satisfactory concept of human being. Sections 29 such a concept, human beings would not be apprehensible, that is, that is no way of determining that something is a human being. In sections 34-6 Sextus says that, even granting that human beings are apprehensible, we cannot show that the sought-after determinations should be made by them,ding to s (cl. M definition 9 not tell hilosopher Socrates of Pyrrhonism, Book 2 » The “definition” attributed to Democritus (Av pends tory 5 aivees fousv) is unclear, since, among other reasons, ‘oj ("we know") is ambiguous between kennen and wissen. Thus the statement might mean “human beings are what we all are acquainted with” or “human beings are what we all have knowledge of.” Or, 1 suppose, it might be inte more than “Ev knows what a human being is” —an impatient dismissal of the question. Greek stinction with yr ydeKo and cide, but in this passage the two verbs are apparently used interchangeably. A comment in the correspondin at M 7265-6 su ritus’s statement to mean or imply “we all know what sort of thing a human sometimes makes the Kenen-wisser ggests that Sextus takes Democ being is” (rv 3@permo ¢ fa), Sextus's argument against Democritus’s definition is even less clear than the definition itself, as it is beset by another ambiguity besides the one iy éxivorz ro av@pdsmov), oF hu ote the com or it can be used in quantifications like “If a do different phantasiai of the same thing, the human being will give preference to his own.” The same applies, of course, to the term } xiv (“the dog hat the concept of human being is a How can Sextus, Skeptic that he is, assert in section 26 th is possible that Democritus was sayi mals are the first Mode is a kind of joke with capable of thought and knowledge? He says that this is shown, of Epoche. What we find there, especially at 1.6 serious point, It is humorously argued on, knowledge nd virtue, and clearly the serious point is that if we go by the Dogmatists definitions of the relevant terms, we are led to this absurd conclusion. So I take section 26 as another dialectical jibe at the Dogmatists: “You define a human being as a rational, mortal animal, capable of thought and knowledge, but on rational’ ‘thought, and ‘knowledge’ it will follow that human beings all animals Note the is devat2t0c, incapable of holding or what is ascribed to Plato in section 28 at Theaetetus 152D ¢ that “nothin nelusion at the end of section 27: the concept of human being Pyrrhonist has suspended judgment The scenario in the extus says to the Dogmatist, “By what part of are you going to decide 1 By the intellect.” Sextus responds, “But the intellect is supposed to be the most non-evident part of the soul, so you are proposing to establish the his passa her souls exist?” The Dogmatist less questionable by the more questionable.” The point, I suppose, is: Don't tell me you are using the intellect to establish the existence of souls, for if there ar270 Commentar ation of xpivety I am using “to make a determination about” Bury’s “to judge,” in order to reflect the “separating the wheat from aspect of its sense. When claims about the external world are try to determine which of them, if a phrase, “to make d ses and the intellect” therefore means to determine which of them, if any, is telling the truth; and “to about + xpiyyxex” means to determine which state ments about the external obj ue. 34-36. Note that a “true” proof is a sound argument with true premises. We are trying to decide by whom determinations about things and issues atist says, “By hun Ith ves a proof, we say. inconsistent with one another, w make determin ts and states of affairs should es no proof of this, we will not be convinced. If he By whom ha to be a true proof?” If he says, “By a human being,” we have circularity. Ifhe says, for example, “By a dog,” we have an infinite regress e made, The Dogs his been determine It is a peculiar argument. The “saying” is part of the inscription on the tomb of Midas, as quote: by Plato, Phaedrus 264D. 46. The “conclusion” Sextus draws is that the “by whom” criterion is not he has shown is that the apprehensible, whereas it looks as though thi L circularity or an infinite reg factory way, that is, without 1 thing is the “by whom 47. We really do not net ‘according to whic! these headings are, by definition, either parts or pathé or actions of human beings, and since it has been shown that human beings are not apprebensible (if we go by what the Dogmatists say), these are not apprehensible either. That is to say, if you cannot recog: as human beings, you cannot recognize anything as a part, pathé, or action of a human being. However, in order to avoid appearing evasive, Sextus will say a few things about the “by means of id to consider the “by means of which” and the Dogmatists have proposed under 48-69. The “By Means of Which” Criterion In this chapter it is argued that if human beings are the “by whom” criterion, n, since they have only the senses and the intellect by means of which to decide conflicting claims about the external world, one or both of these will have to be the “by means of which” criterion. But neith (section 56), nor the intellect aloi (section 63) suffice. Ai intellects are to be trusted? And will it be the senses or the intellect by means get an answer to that question? In general, the testimony of them t (section 61), nor bo d there are further difficulties. Whose senses and whoseabout” dare intellect nd “to 10 proof jom has s quoted nis not that the s, without by whom ich” and ed under orehensible her. That ecognize order to eans of which to these will cogether ‘and whose ct by means testimony Outlines of Pyrrhonism, Book 2 m of the senses as well as that of the intellect will have to be determined by the senses or the ct to be reliable; but, bearing in mind that the question before us is w it is possible for a human being to make the requisite determinations about any subject by means of either the senses or the intellect of both, we see that every proposed way of evaluating this testimony will involve begging the question. In sum, going by what the Dogmatists say, there is no “by means of which” criterion (section 69). CE. M 7.243, In other words: Some people say that the senses by themselves give us no answers to questions about the external world. (Cf. Santayana’s “nothing given exists.”) Others say that every sensory experience is the effect of, or a sign of, the existence of something in the external world; and still others say that some sensations give us information about the external world and some do not. Obviously we cannot determine by means of the senses which of these conflicting claims is true At M 7.126f, the first of these views ( ) is associated with Heraclit ind Democritus; at M 7.369 the second (“all”) is associated with Epicurus and Protagoras, (Notice that the issue raised in this section, that is, the question which of the three views is correct, is itself treated as one that concerns +i broxeiicw, the objects and states of affairs that constitute the external world, and hence it is considered self-applicable. Thus a statement about the reliability of the speaker's senses may, for him as well as for anyone else, be a statement about his external world 51. “For example, taste perceives the same honey sometimes as bitter and sometimes as sweet, and to sight the same color seems sometimes blood red ‘and sometimes white.” (A “color” [zpcz), for the ancients, is the colored surface of the thing, not the color of the thing.) Despite Sextus’s use of yobv (of course”) in the quoted sentence, I do not regard this statement or others like it as showing that Sextus accepts the existence of the external world (see my note on 1.32). Thus, at the beginning of this section he grants, but only fo the sake of argument, that the senses are fit to perceive things, and the subsequent statements are further premises which he takes from the Dogmatist without committing himself to their truth or falsity, or even to their meaning: fulness. It is not excluded, of course, that he might assent to some of them as expressions of his own path 57. This section corresponds to M 7.348! 63. This section corresponds to M 7.354If 64. Concerning “determinations,” see the note on 2.34, 69. Sextus concludes that “for these reasons” there would be no such iterion as the “by means of which” criterion, But all the considerations he raises seem designed to show, not that no such criterion exists, but that the Dogmatist cannot support in a satisfactory way any claim that this or that is the criterion,Criterion 70-9 The general Dogmatic position under scrutiny is evidently the claim that human beings, usin nses or the intellect or both, can somehow “read off” truths about chapter Sextus attacks this claim from several standpoints. His first and most ‘ious objection is that the Dogmatists have not even given us an intelligible atter might illustrate I world from th siai. In the present the point he You are and it looks broken, You wonder: is it really The Stoic advises: examine four phan hensive, But, with no intelligible Sefinition get started on following th Of course, one mig understand well enou; definitions of them. But I suppose that no one would expect to learn a technic term like p acknowledg: respond that there are many terms —“greer ave never been given al we have learned those (although I must that G. E, Moore id others have attempted to introduce the ed term “sense datum” by indicating purported examples and adding “and things like those”). In any case, Sextus goes on to argue that even if the Dogmatists had given a satisfactory concept of phantasia, phantasial would not be apprehensibl (section 70). For a phantasia is a pathos of the ruling part of the soul, and the ensible (section 71). Clearly, Sextus is taking the “a phantasia is a pathos of the rul ing part is not a Dogmatists’ stat nt th analytic and hence as expressing a relation betwee i ruling part; and his inference he concept “X' is composed of the concepts Y, Z,..., then X is apprel and only if ¥, Z,..., are apprehensible”; see pp. 48-9 above. Next, even if phantasiai could be apprehended, that is to say, if they cou asiai, it would not be possible to make de the external world “according to” or “in accord with” them. For the concepts of phantasia, seems to presuppose that if the ble if pathos, nized as being p ni nations ab the Dogm: external objects and re the does not of itself contact the ists say (first) that the inte ntasiai, but does so only by means of the senses, not apprehend the external objects but onl ot identical with those objects. Thus the and (secon phantasiai will no ‘own pathe, which of of the external objects but only of the ations m external objects but only, if anythit ese difficulties, there would remain the roeiver's path. He will not characterize our own path (section 73). But even question of which ph way of findis aiving all t nd, on the Dogmatists’ theory, the onm that read present most technical h T must duce the ng “and nad given ‘ehensible iad the aking the hat if the ensible if they could e determi- n. For contact the but only s. Thus the only of the own pathe {remain the sory, the only rustworthy phantasiai. Thus phantasiai, if there are any, will in any ease have no utility as criteria for making determinations about the external world (seetion 78). With this chapter compare M 370 70. Note that it is here sai an att (technd) is constituted by -Emata, principles 72, Here and in section 74 itis asserted that the senses apprehend only their own pathé, “if anything.” Sextus ascribes this view explicitly only to the Cyrenaics (at 1.215 and M 7.191), but probably he has in mind mainly the Epicureans, who identified phantasiai with certain pathe of the soul (M 7.203). 74, The claim that the soul can apprehend the external objects by means ofits sensory pathé because these pathe are in some sense similar to the objects is dismissed on the familiar ground that the alleged similarity (or even abstract isomorphism) cannot be determined 79. Compare M 7.443 80-84. The True and Truth We are going to consider “the true”; it is defined in section 81 as an axidma and ergo a lekion. Presumably this is only the Stoic definition, for the Epicureans regard the phdn@ as the bearer of truth and say (107) that lekta do not exist. Already in section 84 “the true” seems used in a wider sense. But in most of what follows Sextus is attacking the Stoics and seems to be using the principal terminology in their way rw, in accord with the Latin translation T 85-96. Is There Anything True by Nature The point of this chapter is surely that if there is no such thing as a true proposition, there will be no (nontrivial) criterion for distinguishing true propositions from false, or, what comes to the same thing, for distinguishing rue phantasiai from false 85. To understand the circularity charge, one must understand that “true s used both of propositions and of arguments (and, a fortiori, of proofs). Cl 2.143: a proof is an argument that is valid and true and has a nonevident conclusion disclosed by means of the force of the premises. Also 2.135-8: an argument is a system of propositions consisting of premises and a conclusion; an argument is valid if the corresponding conditional is sound; an argument is rue if it is valid and has true premises, 86-7. “X is something.” which is equivalent to “X exists,” is treated as analogous to “X is a man,” “X is an animal,” or “X is a living thing,” an as amounting to “X belongs to a huge class named ‘somethi 88-94, If we bear in mind that “the true” are propositions (axidmata), the alternatives given at the beginning of section 88 seem to be: either all true propositions are appearances, or all are non-evident, or some are appearances274 Commentar some are non-evident. I think that this means: either all true propositions at..."), oF they all 1 to deseribe the non-evident, that is, the independently existing external express ap world, of some express appearances and some purport to describe the 90, Read 95. Ri section 80), and the eriterion of truth “is that by which we decide questions of member that we are talking about the criterion of truth (see also existence and non-existence” (section 14), which, in view of the wide sense of 10 be,” will include deciding questions about what is or is not the case, tha is, uth of falsity of propositions. 97-103. Signs This would seem to be of essential importance to the Dogmatists’ epistemologies, for they all hold that in one way or another we justify assertions about reality (the “non-evident by nature”) on the basis of what hatin appears to us to be the case, But how is this possible, we ask, grantin there is any similarity or even isomorphism between the two. The Dogmatists nat the motion and certain other attributes of the body are signs of the soul In effect, therefore, to the question, “How do you know that there is an external world?” the Dogmatist is replying, “The same way that you know that there are other mind ed by this; indeed, as I interpret him, he is nvinced that there is any truth or even meaning in the whole Dogmatic fect that by m an independently existing external world It can be argued that, in view of the pre-evident-non-evident distinction f ns (sweat invisible pores: bodily present connection the Dogma: (considered as things but rather about a ts, We have seen (p. 14-15) that motions-souls), we must suppose that in tion between appearanc to which the Skeptics will assent) and external c relation between two sorts of external obj the expression rd darvéuevov is ambiguous in an epistemologically significant way. Literally it means “what appears,” and the question is: what's thar? When jncvov the oar ot the proposition that the g else? If t the oar appears broken, is 13 4 oar is broken (ie, what appears to be the case), oF som Dogmatists are only claiming that one kind of external object —for example invisible pores in the skin —it is hard to see how this is in any way relevani to the proble before the house, namely, how knowledge of t he Sex (PE Buposition: ibe th (ee als whether natis n the w the s0 n extern ts ul al him, he ie Dogma Sb pores; bod 1e Dos 4-15) hat ‘ant that? When position that g else? IF way relev wledge of the the ple ple he Outlines of Prrthonism, Book 2 external objects can be obtained from the appearances (+ gxivdyieva) to which the Skeptic gives his asseni 100. Note the definitions of mnemonic and indicative signs. The Skeptic does not question the existence of mnemonic signs, where the terms of the -significate relation are both appearances or types of appearances; perhaps he is granting that whi ems to him that there is smoke, it seems to him that there is fire (section 102), But he challenges the existence of indicative s; they have been invented by the Dogmatists, he says, and obviously they are at the root of the Dogmatists’ epistemologies. However, as I have indicat in section 4 of the Introduction, I suspect that, if pushed, Sextus would have to follow Hume and consider anything other than a person's pathe at a given time to be part of that person's “external world” at that time, so that inf: from our present pathe to other people's pathe or to our own pathe of the past and future would be on the same weak footing as inferences from our pathé to independently existing material objects At M 8.157, where Sextus discusses the two kinds of signs, he again uses the example of smoke as a mnemonic sign of fire. He says, ofa» Kab ain veer, éx pév xanvod mip, Ew BF Obl te 05... day pivove (“but as it is, we ourselves think along the same lines [: ‘ommon man inferring fire from smoke, a previous wound from a scar”). The use of voc and Anyptivovzeg has been taken to support the view that the Skeptic in many instances does think of himself as knowing something. In my opinion, however there is no knowledge claim here. As this passage of the Outlines confirms, all Sextus has in mind is association: after smoke-pathé are repeatedly conjoined with fire-pathe, the next smoke-pathos brings with it a fire-pathos; that is, when it seems ere is smoke, it seems that there is fire, Note that living in accord with the xpodjyers of the common man does not even require belief (PH 2.246), let alone knowledge 101. Mau, following Heintz and Natorp, deletes the last sentence of this section, on the ground that it roughly interrupts the course of the argument. But the sentence does not seem to me to be especially incongruous, The “whence” is at first puzzling, until one realizes that it relates particularly to the last clause of the Stoie definition, 104-33. Is There Such a Thing as an Indicative Sign? The answer to this question, reached at section 133, is that “with such plausible arguments presented both for and against the existence of [indicative] signs it must be said that it is ‘not more’ the case that they exist than that do not Sextus tells us that the Stoics characterize the indicative sign (onto intixév) as “a proposition that is the true antecedent in a true conditional and serves to disclose the consequent.” On this basis, both the indicative signCommentary and what is signified are lekta, since each is a proposition (déiwy2). But if not lekton and hence not part of the s notion of sign would be of any use to the epistemologist in his task of explaining to reality (On the other hand, when in chapter 10 the Stoics distin signs from mnemonic, they do so on the basis of a distinction between thing that are “pre-evident” (xp4n22) and those that are “non: the indicative signs are supposed to be pre-evident things that are signs of non-evident thin, vident™ (ci Séyi) usually of allairs, this seems to be th kind of sign needed for the explanation sought, But how can the significat only the sign but also the object signified is a rnal world, itis hard to see why i how appearances give us a clue Therefore, since “the non denotes the external world of objects and sta at once a lekron and an externally existing object? After all, in the well-known passage at M 8.11-3 ist in the intellect and are contra with externally existing objects. The answer, I fear, is that we have here another 1a are said to & example of the fundamental confusion of s nse and denotation: propositions about the external world are being confused with the states of affairs they denote, both being called indif Sextus does not s estion whether there is any such thing as a rently 13 1002 /e upon on this ambiguity of ¢ on. He observes that while some of the Dogmatists hold that lekia do exist, others claim that they do no And he points out that the Stoics are in a poor position to offer any doubter a proof that lekta exist, for a proof is defined as a system of lekta, Next, he argues that even if some lekta exist, propositions (which the Stoics consider t be composite lekta) do not, since a composite object cannot exist unless its parts of a being utte this too aside, he argues that in any case the Stoic parts exist simultaneously, and 1 seriatim as the corresponding sounds (ef. section 144), The applied, as there is no agreement among the Dogmatists on the truth onditions for conditional proposition The most that would seem to follow from this is something we already know, namely, that we shall not find a definition of “sign” that is satisfactory to all the Dogmatists. But again Sextus contents himself with showing that the Stoies are in no position to prove to the Dogmatists or anyone else that one of another of the alternative criteria for the truth of conditionals is correct, the ‘oof would have to be a sound ment, and the Stoic criterion for the ng to the wines of an a is that the condition sou correspond argument is tru Next, Sextus they are apprehended together with one ed bel Therefore, itis impossible to cor ified, and hence nother (see also section 125). But the in order (0 reveal it ues that the sign is relative to what is sig sign must be appreh are not “relative”; one might say that a thing is relative “under a description”, but it is better to say that “relative” is at most a predic concepts, not of the things that fall under them. See my note on 1.135-40.hat while do not. doubte: Next, he nsider to unless its n for the ind hence ). But the a given edicate of 40. Outlines of Pyrrhonism, Book 2 ea He goes on to argue that there is no use offering us a proof that signs exis as a proof is supposed to be a special case of a sign. Again, it seems that we have to think of this “argument” in a dialectical context. The Dogmatist says to the Skeptic, “Here is a proof that signs exist.” The Skeptic says, “What do n by ‘proof’?" The Dogmatist replies that a proof is a certain sequence of signs. The Skeptic then says, “I am not convinced that what you have given me is a proof, for I am not convinced that there are any signs. At this point (section 124) Sextus’s arguments cease to be directed specifically against the Stoics. Presupposing the internal-external, or appea aance-reality, distinction, which of course is nowadays suspected of being the souree of the entire quagmire, he raises the crucial question of the status 0 signs in this regard. Either all of them are appearances or all are nor evident —parts of the external world — or some are appearances and some are non-evident. If all the signs are external, then, since the Dogmatists hold that an external object can only be apprehended via something that is not external, we have the conclusion that, on their theory, signs are not apprehensible, For ase in which all the signs are internal, that is, appearances, Sextus offers (sections 125-6) a purely sophistical argument based on the notion of relatives” (see my note on 1.135~40) and involving the claim that since the sign and the signifcate are “relatives,” one is an appearance if and only if the other is an appearance as well. But "if the significatum is an appearance, it wil not be a signficatum, since it will nt need anything to signify and disclose i (ection 126). The case in which some signs are appearances and some are nc isin effect reduced to the first two cases. Thus, this portion of the chapter is especially disappointing: forthe case we should have liked Sextus to analyze seriously is precisely the case in which ie and the objec signifed is an object or state of alfars in the external world. He could have argued that, on the Do ry, we ate never able to discover that this case exists, for to determine that an appearance isa sign of an external objec we would need to apprehend the external object by means of some other appearance; otherwise we would be assuming what we were trying to discover Finally, Sextus tips his hat to the “not mors” slogan by adding a fow equally spurious arguments to support the thesis that signs do exist afer all 1 translating xpox2n7o\jvov as “guiding proposition’: it denotes true antecedent of a true conditional, but I need another expression for it n order thatthe definition in this section and in section 115 not have the form Ais A 110-2. This passage is important for the history of logic. Fou interpretations of the “ifthen are given, in order of strength.” The passage is or each of the first three cases an example is provided that is + that interpretation but false under th next. Part of the con sented in greater detail at M 8113-7, The dispute over the truth conditions for conditionals was notori antiquity, Callimachus reports (M_1.309-10) that “Even the crows oi78 Commenter rooftops are cawing al Cicero says (Academica 2.143): out the question which conditionals are true,” and Even on this matter that is among the very rudiments taught by the I hat is, the proper mode of determining the truth or falsity conditional as “If itis day, it is goes on! One view suits Diodorus, anather Philo, another Chrysippus. The condition proposed by Philo of Megara seems to define what is now called “material implication” (cf. M 8.113. for what amounts to the truth table for material “ifthen”). It is not quite clear, however, whether Philo’s notion of, ruth is relativized to time—whether, for instance, he “If itis day. then I am conversing” is true at any’ tin conversing. or he means that the conditional is true on the assumption that it is day and I am conversing. Diodorus, Philo’s teacher, laid the foundation for so-called ‘temporal logic” by (in effect) definin holds at all times in the Philonean sense. (It appears also that he defined a proposition as necessarily true if and only if it holds at all times; this, nncidentally, impressed Leibniz, who often cites Diodorus as the first of a long line of philosophers who confuse hypothetical with absolute.) 4 definition, where of course “inconsistent” propositions are such as not only are not both true but cannot be both true, is commonly thought to be that of Chrysippus (see Mates 1958, p. 48). This ‘ation of the “i-then” connective seems required if sense is to be made of the neans th hen it is day and 1 ai a conditional as true if and only if it tively strong int Stoic version of the so-called “conditionalization” principle, that an argument conditional (ie, the conditional whose antecedent is the conjunction of the premises of the argumen is sound if and only if the correspondit consequent is the argument’s conclusion) true, *sound”) and éanéhis is ke As applied to propositions they are for the most part used truth, but as applied to arguments there is a tis defined as an argument that is not only sound, The usage of the two adjectives 00 but also has true premises 113. the note on section 137 be w. Also, s to what proof and what circularity Sextus has in mind. He may only rguing, with respect to an argumen re is some unclarity he Ay Agysens Aye therefore, B. IPA, and A, and....and A,, then B, ment to t a ct that one of the four views in section 1 3), that in order to prove that the argument is a proof we have to prove al is true, and, in order to do that, we have to pro its antecedent, which in effect is no different fromtruth table 's notion of I it is day s day and I oF so-called only if it e defined a st of a long 3s are such y thought to interpre made of the conditional and whose rue”) is less art used nelarity here nay only be ection 11 Outlines of Pyrrhonism, Book z proving that the original argument is valid and hence is a proof. (Sextus apparently considers it obvious that both B and the statement that the argument is a proof are “non-evident” —see the definition of “proof” in section 35) (Or, his point may be that any argument we offer as a proof that the original argument is a proof will itself have to be established as being a proof, which will involve proving its corresponding conditional, So that the “cir would be that to establish that an argument is a proof you have to give a proof of the corresponding conditional, but then you have to establish that what you hhave given is in fact a proof, and this requires proving a correspondin, conditional (though not the same one as before) 134-43, Proof This chapter is of interest principally for the definitions and examples it gi for terms in Stoic logic. From here and elsewhere we learn that An argument (/70<) is a system of propositions consisting of premises aurea) and conclusion éxtpops or avpnipxayi2) The premises of an argument ate the propositions agreed upon for the establishment of the conclusion The conclusion of an argument is the proposition established from the premises An argument is valid (oovzxtixde) if the conditional (avvriyyievov) whose antecedent (zp/6uevov or Hyatcvov) isthe conjunction (avj:nenieysévov ‘or avpixioxs) of the premises and whose consequent (/jyo¥) is the conclusion of the argument is sound (ié), that is, tr ‘An argument is true if it is valid and the conjunction of the premises is true. A proof (dndéeré1c) is an argument that is true and has a non-evident conclusion disclosed by the force of the premises. Elsewhere we have definitions for the other technical terms employed here A conditional is a proposition that is formed from two occurrence single proposition or from different propositions by means connective “if-then” (M 8.101ff. The antecedent of a conditional is the proposition that immediately follows “if” even if the whole proposition is expressed in reverse order, “Q if P”; the other part is the consequent (M 8.110) A conjunction is a proposition compounded by means of “and” (Diogenes Laertius 7.72). Propositions are inconsistent (jrxyé1ev2) if it is impossible that all be true (Diogenes Laertius 7. 73, 77). 137. Here, and at every other place in Sextus's writings where a so-called ‘corresponding conditional” occurs, the texts —as found in most of the MSS and as presented by all the editors before Mau—are garbled. However, there280 Commentary are two circumstances that make it quite easy to see what the original text mus have been. One is that in most cases Sextus gives us a description of the conditional before he formulates it, The oth seen garbled in different ways in different occurrences and in different MSS. so that by laying the Jook through” them to the original text. the conditional in this section, Bekker has “If itis day, and if itis day itis light,” which is not even Thus, instead o » doubt in this case the erroneous text arose when somebody deleted the fina from the condi Similarly, for the conditional in section 139 Bekker gives, h nal, Supposing that it was a scribe’s repetition. is night, and i herefore [pa] it is dark,” which is not a conditional (because not have a conjunction as an antecedent as the text specifies. Here again, somewhere along the line the final “It is dark” has been cut off, presumably as a supposed repetition, and a ‘therefore” has been inserted, where the premises of the argument conjoined in the opposite order, the corr nditional has to be one of them as superfluous, and the result is nonsense : For details, see Mates (19 144-92, Are There Proofs? The official answer to this question, as stated in sections 180 proof “no more” exists than not. But most of the present strung ‘guing that, if we go by what the Dog hing as a proof. Most of the argumentation does not repetitive chapter is devoted to ai say, there is no such the concept of proof, but at section 171fl, Sextus offers to make plain that not only does proof not exis, it is no even conceivable Like its predecessor, this chapter is noteworthy as one of the principal sources of information ab itional calculus. stoic prop 144. If you go by the Dogmatists’ definition of “proof.” the thing as a proof. For a composite thing cannot exist unk simultaneously, but @ proof, as defined by the Dogmatists, would be a site thing with parts that existed seriatim. Cf. section 109, (On the Dogmatists’ definition of validity we cannot determine whet for this depends on whet 3s its parts exist comp 1 her or not the corresponding 5 that there is no way (0 determine whether a given conditional is sound 146-50. Sextus now considers four ways in which the Dogmatists say that an argument may be invalid, namely, it may be (1) incoherent, (2) defic in an unsound schema, or (4) redundant. After arguing in the succeeding in any of the our ways, he concludes in seetion 167 that it is not possible to determine sections that we cannot determine that an argument is invaliof the MSS. 0 begin 92, is that out and Dogmatists n does not make plain principal is no such uld be a ne whether tists say that deficient, (3) a any of the 0 det Outlines of Psrthonism, Book 2 281 whether an argument is valid, which presumably is a corollary of the unstated conclusion that we cannot determine whether an argument is invalid 3. We cannot determine that an argument is invalid by incoherence, for this requires determining that the corresponding conditional is not sound, which we cannot do. 154, To establish that a given argument is invalid by being in an unsous schema, a valid argument to that effect is needed, which, in turn, requires us to determine that the corresponding conditional is sound, 155, For the same reason, we cannot establish that a given argument is invalid by deficiency. 156-8. The Stoic propositional calculus consisted of five basic (or “unde- monstrated”) valid inference patterns, from which other valid inference pat- terns were derived in accord with four metarules (@uata), of which we possess only the first and the third. The five undemonstrated patterns were very well known in antiquity, and in addition to the present statement of them there a many others, often giving the same examples (see Mates 1953, p. 66). Sextus says that we cannot distinguish a redundant argument from a (Stoic) proof, for all five of the postulated (“undemonstrated”) valid inference patterns of the Stoics are redundant, and hence so are allt nce patterns that the Stoics reduce to chains of these simples. (He implies that the Stoies thought that all valid inference patterns are reducible to their five basic ones.) 59-62. In support of the aforementioned claim that each of the five basic types of inference is redundant, Sextus considers them seriatim. In each case, the argument given is a version of what used to be included in logic books under the heading, “Is the syllogism a petitio principii?” For example, it is claimed that if If it is day, then it is light. It is day. Therefore, it is light, is a proof of “It i light,” the conditional “If itis day, then itis light” would be superfluous, for anyone for whom this proposition could serve as a premi that is, to whom its truth is evident, would be willing to infer “It is light directly from “It is day” alone. 163-6. Like the arguments of the Stoies, the categorical syllogisms of the Peripatetics are redundant when offered as proofs. For example, if the second mise of the argument at section 164 is not evident to a person, the argument will not be a proof for him; but if it is evident, he will infer the conclusion from the first premise alone. The modern (and equally bad) variant of this is, I think, the following. Nobody will be convinced by this argument that Socrates is an animal, for in establishing the second premise he will already have considered the case of Socrates along with all the other human beings. In other words, anybody who grants the premises will not need the argument in order to grant the conclusion; or, “nothing new” will be learned from the conclusion.pattern of sections 14655 he should It seems that if Sextus is be showing that we cannot redundancy. Inst Stoics and Peripatetics all valid arguments are redundant and hence invalid, From this it would appear to follow that all arguments, redundant or not, are «i, he tries to show that according to the doctrines of the valid; but whether from that it follows in turn that we cannot establish that given argument is invalid by redundancy, I leave to the reader 167-8. After inferring from sections 146-66 that, goin; Dogmatists say, it is not possible to Sextus briefly a yy What the srmine whether an argument is valid ves that true arguments are indeterminate (ie, cannot be must be valid but also because he conclusion must be true and non-evident. His discussion is puzzling. First althc nt” at sections 138-9 there is no indication that the conclusion need be anything more than a true consequence determined to be such) not only because th in the definition of “true argun of true premises, here he seems to assume that, like the conclusion of a proof, i must also be “disclosed” by means of the premises, There is also a problem about the inference from the “dispute” to non-apprehensibility. The clause, “as we have pointed out previously.” seems to reler to section 116, where the dispute in question is described as a dispute as to which, if any, of the non-evident things are true and which are false, But if that is what the d about (rather than about the concept of non-apprehensibility itself) it is difficult to see how it follows that the Dogmatist will be unable to apprehend non-evident thing. 169-70. After another application of the confused principle that “relatives ended together with one another,” Sextus draws a majo conclusion: “It is plain that there is no such thing as a proof” 171-6. But not only that: proof is not even conceivable. Thi cctions involves confusion compounded. First, the distinction (M 8.382) between the generic proof (j yev1xy) dnd3i particular proofs ( must be appr gument in the is a supposed 1) and the ini pipovg amodelEexc) Now if we propose to object to the particular proofs and thos each art, we shall be making our objection in an unmethodical way, as there are an infinite number of such proofs, But if we abolish [ie, refute the existence of] the generie proof, which is thought to include all the particular proofs it is evident that we shall have thereby abol just as if animal does not exist, neither does human being, and if human being does not exist, neither rates — the particulars being abolished along with the genera-—so if generic proof does not exist, particular proof wholly disappears as well. (M 8.337atf) One sour or “proof in general of confusion is that the term ndde1é1¢ yevta7) (generic proof, ugh it denoted a certain kind of proof ynable it is cles ) is treated as thor ly syncategorematic. whereas in such of its uses as are unob) Thus presumably the phrase “to abolish generic proof” should me generally that there is no such thing as a proof,” to be contrasted with showing. that, for example, there is no such thing as a proof that the number of the starsdispute sell), it is ipprehend supposed cfute the ticular For in being i roof wholly generic proof, kind of proof an “to show <é with showing er of the stars Pyrrhonism, Book 2 283 is even. But Sextus treats that phrase as if it meant that there is no such thing as a certain very special kind of proof, namely, a “generic” proof. A second source of confusion making this passage practically untranslatable is a problem that we have mentioned elsewhere, namely, that due in part to the fact that Greek has no indefinite article and uses the definite article in ways that do not completely match the use of English “the,” the expression # ndéer1c can refer either to the concept of proof of to a particular proof that is under discussion, or it can be used to express generality (“the proof.” like “the tiger” in “The tiger ‘a mammal”). And here Sextus uses it to refer to what he calls “generie proof Thus he can argue that if the so-called “generic” proof does not have premises and a conclusion, it is not a proof (since every proof, by definition, has premises and a conclusion), whereas if it does have these, it is a particula proof (sinee only particular propositions qualify as premises and conclusion). In any case, he is surely right in his conclusion, that there is no such thing generic proof. Cf. M 7.222, where he describes the generic man (yev1x iO pn givexaya, (something imaginary), and M 7.246 where he xplains that althou; Greel rbarian, the generie man is neither, 177-9, Four cases are distinguished, of which only the fourth (in which something non-evident is to be inferred from evident premises) is relevant to the central epistemological problem of ity from appearances. Alas, the only argument Sextus offers to eliminate this case rests on the confused relatives must be apprehended together” principle. 180-2, Whether @ given system of propositions is a proof of its conclusio: s in general a non-evident matter and hence needs to be proved. This, unlike many of the other difficult us raises, is a serious problem; indeed, it h n one of the primary motivating factors in the development of modern logic. It lies behind the demand that mathematical proofs be formalized in such sequence of formulas is a proof can be determin. by their shape and independently of their meaning. Thus, 10 avoid the problems that obviously result when a proof is considered to be just any series of statements sufficient to convince a “reasonable person” of the truth of t conclusion, it was proposed to define a proof as a finite sequence of formalized sentences such that every term or “step” of the sequence is ether an assumptio or follows from predecessors by certain formal rules of inference, For a formalized theory the task of deciding whether a given sequence of formulas is proof of X can be accomplished “mechanically” and may therefore be quite different from the task of finding a proof of X 82-92. In a perfunctory way, Sextus gives and discusses purported proofs that there are proofs; obviously he feels he must do this in order to support the “conclusion” in section 192 that “If, on the one hand, the arguments on behalf of proof are plausible (and let them be so), while, on the other hand, the attacks made against proof are also plausible, it is necessary to suspend judgment about proof, saying that it “no more’ exists than not 183-4, It is unclear exactly what Sextus has in mind, but one possibility would be something like the following. Suppose that I claim that there is a284 Commentary er to write it out (ie., to produce proof of X, You doubt that there is, so I 0 “sign” of it) for you. But then you question whether what I have written re signifies a system of propositions constituting a proof of X. So I need to give a proof that it does. And so on. 188. CE 1.206, M 8.480. 193-203. Syllogisms 204, Induction Sextus now turns he elai “all the remain is based on these. his attention to Peripatetic logic. As in the case of Stoic logi 194) that if the “undemonstrated syllogisms” are abolished arguments are overthrown, since the proof of their validity This time he takes as “undemonstrated” the syllogisms in the modes B: t. (In the Prior Analytics Aristotle reduces all the valid modes to those of the first figure, and then he shows, first, that the first figure modes Darii and Ferio can be reduced to the modes of the second figure, while second, all modes of the second figure can be reduced to Barbara .nd Celarent of the first figure.) 195-7, This is the kind of argument with whi (seetior ara and Cela generations of philo: sophers have claimed to show that “the syllogism is a petitio principii.” 196. I follow Bury’s text, which inserts the words inayonniag PeBauoivtes, 6 Kavi yspos, in the lacuna indicated by Bekker. 198ff. Sextus now attempts to transfer the circularity argument from Peripatetic logic to that of the Stoics. His account seems garbled, but the point appears to be that if we take the conditional I it is day, itis light in the sens: Whenever it is day, it is light, we find that in order to establish the conditional we must examined the present day and found it accompanied by ligh 205-12, Defi In order to check whether a proposed definition correctly defines X°s, you must be able to recognize an X when you meet one, that is, you must be able to apprehend things as being X's. Thus, to one who cannot apprehend X's it is of no help to be furnished with a purported definition of X Further evidence of this lack of utility, says Sextus, is the fact that in practice we reject a proposed definition if it does not fit the already established basis0 produce written really T need to give se of Stoic logic re abolished, heir validity ¢ syllogisms in tle reduces all ws, first, that the s of the second jument from but the po must already have fines X"s, you mus! ou must be able to pprehend X°s it is s the fact that in dy established Outlines of Pyrrhonism, Book 2 28s extension of the term; hence the extension cannot have been established on the basis of th 213-8, Division [d:xipeoic] Sextus next takes up the topic of “division” or “classification,” which, from its prominent role in Plato's Sophist and Aristotle's Organon, was traditionally regarded as a part of logic. In line with his goal of showing that logic, as presented by the Dogmatists, is at best useless and at worst unintelligible Sextus raises questions about four kinds of classification or division thai logicians have postulated. 214. I think that the rather odd phrase, “to divide a term into its just means “to give the meanings that the term has.” Thus the point here is that there can be no such science as lexicography, which seeks to do this for each term in the language. For scientific knowledge (éniorjun) aims al being—“wants to be”—something firm and unchanging (péfaiov 11 Kai iucrdxcotov mpiyux) and thus is supposed to consist of information about the he case independently of our thoughts, external world, that is, about what is feelings, and other parhé (cf, 1.13). From this, Sextus infers that there can be no scientifie knowledge of what words mean, since that is a matter of convention, that is, itis “in our power” ("when J use a word, it means what I want it to mean, neither more nor less"). No doubt there is a fallacy here, bu there will be little agreement on exactly where it lie 215-8, Cf. 398. The modern reader will notice that Sextus is here confusing the aggregate or heap (such as a herd of sheep or a bunch of grapes) with a set whose elements are parts of the aggregate, and correspondingly tha he is also confusing the whole-part relation with the set-element relation. F pointed out long ago that numerical predicates, such as “eight,” “nine.” or en” apply to sets and not to aggregates. When Sextus speaks of “the eight,” nine.” and so on, ambiguity and confusion threaten because the same aggregate or heap can be the “fusion” of many different sets — for instance, the pyramidal stack of 14 cannon balls is not only the fusion of the set of the 14 cannon balls but also that of the much larger set of all molecules in the stack swell as that of the still larger set of all atoms in the stack. Consider, for example, the twelve Apostles. “Twelve” is a predicate of the set, not the aggregate, even though we say, “The Apostles were twelve.” Hence such a phrase as “the twelve” is misleading in that it seems simply to denote the ate when in fact it contains a reference to a set whose fusion is the The matter is further complicated by the fact that in Greek a numeral with 2-par gate like the Apostles, but also the number 12 itself. So the present passage is also ambiguous as to whether it concerns the divisior numbers into factors or the division of aggregates into subaggregates286 Commentary 219-27. G wera and Species 219. As Bury notes in connection with the remark “we shall treat it at greater length elsewhere,” no such discussion is to be found in the extant works of Sextus. 220 ff. The argumentation in these sections, though unintelligible to 1 nevertheless reminiscent of that in the Parmenides and involves what Gil Ryle used (0 call “category mistakes.” This is especially clear in section 220, “human being” and “animal” refer ambiguously to the concepts and to objects that fall under the concepts. Thus, just as the “Third Man” argument in the Parmenides takes the Idea of Largeness to be one of the large things, 90 here we find a reductio ad absurdum argument rest the implication that the concept of human being is an animal and hence is animate and sensitive, 224, Between yév0s and ipa; in line 26 Mutsch sctures a lacuna, to be filled with the words dorm, cl 5 de 20 yév0s. This would make the nce read: “But if Something, that is, the genus, is absolutely none of these the wher the genus does not exist, and if not ev terminated. 225. | follow Pappenheim’s sus 19, with Heintz nus exists, the inquiry is sestion and place Cdiov after doyor. 226, Adding +6 1 in li 227. The 1¢ cannot have the same meaning when applied ‘0 Dion that it has when applied to Theon, for otherwise the proposition “a man is walking” (iv8pemog roprmacel) would have the same truth value when of itting down and Theon edicate Wvpon applied to the tw. m, even though Dion we were walking. The argument clearly confuses the sense of &v¥panos with its denotation. Note the word-for-word example of what was later called “Leibniz’s Law.” lents, As treated in this section, accidents (ovjifeBnxét2) are not to be confused with attributes or concepts, The accidents of individuals are peculiar to those individuals, whereas attributes may be shared by different individuals. Thus Ajax and Mil the attribute “strong,” or fall under the concept Strong, but the strength of Ajax is one thing and that of Milo is another; and is by virtue of those individual accidents that they share the attribute. Incidentally, this distinction plays an important role in the m Leibniz, We know that the present section is very Leibnizian. The same matter is also involved in the proper interpretation of Pl Plato there are just two kinds of ely, the Ideas (e., Justice) and the things that participate in the Ideas (¢g. just acts), or there are in addition kind, denoted by such phrases as “the justice in us.” Thus physics of ead and wrote out comments on the Outlines, and known scholarly dispute netaphysies, as to whether for ities, entities of a thi egory Vlastos sought to disarm the “Third Man” argument by distinguish- ess in us (ef. Vlastos, 1973, pp. 344), the Idea of Largeness from the laapplied Thus physics of dispute whether fo Justice) and in addition us” Thus distinguish: Outlines of Pyrrhonism, Book 2 229-59. Sophisms ‘The point of this chapter is stated in section 236: “In the case of those sophisms that logic seems particularly capable of refuting, the explanation is useless ds those for which explanation is useful, itis not the logician who Id explain them away but rather those in each art who have got understanding of the facts.” This is echoed in sections 246 and 255. However, most of the sophisms depend upon violations of Greek syntax and are practically impossible to translate into English. (They are not very good in Greek, cither.) In a number of places the text is obviously corrupt. 230, Even in the Greek, the absinthe case looks like a plain mistake. As 233, the point of the doc- tor/murder example seems to be that éonov (“nonsense”) is used in the suggested by Sextus’s explanation in section premise and the conclusion as a predicate of propositions, and propositions, being senses of sentences, are never nonsense. Thus the conclusion follows from the presumably true premises and accordingly is true. But the unwary reader, now taking Zorov in its common meaning of “odd,” will feel that the conclusion is false 231. The verb éperrdes, when used by Sextus in reference to the steps of @ dialectical argument, does not have its ordinary meaning, “to question,” but instead means “to put forward as a matter to be debated.” Thus, as Sextus explains in section 234, the puzzle, such as it is is the result of the fact that “I have already asserted something” changes from false to true during presentation of the argument, The solecistic “look” and “see” examples are untranslatable into English, as they depend on the accusative case being improperly used in place of the nominative in the conclusions —as if, for example, the argument were 241. The “horn fallacy” (® xepxcivme) is usually stated as follows (Diogenes Laertius 7.187 ‘What you have not lost, you still have You have not lost horns. Therefore, you still have horns. In the version given here, Mau, following Oskar Bekker, deletes the initial x from the antecedent of the first premise and supposes that the fallacy arises from taking the second premise in the sense of “You don't both have beautiful horns and have horns.” This seems to be the only way to given even a modicum of plausibility to the second premise. 242, It is interesting that when this argument, which is described in section 244 as “nonsense,” reappears at 3.71, itis characterized (at section 3.81) as an ;gument that “we are unable to dismiss” and is thus by implication at least strong enough to keep the Skeptic from agreeing that motion exists288 Commentary According to 3.71 and M 1.311 the argument was due to Diodorus Cronus, 243. Cf. 3.110 and M 7.71; in the latter passage the argument is ascribed Gorgias 244, AU 1.33 the “snow” argument is ascribed to Anaxagoras. The “certain philosopher” is identified by Diogenes Laertius (6.39) as Diogenes the Cynic. CT. 3.66 246. The Skeptic Way is succinctly described: px? vip, ofp, 2d iyimeipess néyovexs, The Buotint) vipnots is described at 1.23, and the xpodiiyers are th imprecise and “pre-philosophical” notions that function as meanings of our words in ordi 250. R 252. The question whether Russell's Antinomy rendered “naive” s everything ion), remarked that “We don't have to fall over cliffs just b fe is a possibly apocryphal story that A. M. Turing, apropos the lows from a contr 's Bury notes, no such discussion is to be found in the extant