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Bail Nature and Definition Definition Persons Covered or Required To Post Bail
Bail Nature and Definition Definition Persons Covered or Required To Post Bail
Herras Teehankee vs. Rovira [GR L-101, 20 December 1945] En Banc, Hilado (J): 3
concur, 4 concur only in the result Facts: Haydee Herras Teehankee is a political
detainee delivered by the Counter Intelligence Corps, United States Army, to the
Commonwealth Government, pursuant to the Proclamation of General of the Army
Douglas MacArthur, dated 29 December 1944. She was one of the petitioners in
case No. L-44, "Raquiza vs. Bradford," of the Supreme Court. She is now confined in
the Correctional Institution for Women under the custody of the Commonwealth
Government since October, 1945, when she was thus delivered to the said
government. On 2 October 1945, Herras Teehankee, through her husband, Alberto
Teehankee, filed with the People's Court a petition wherein, invoking the provisions
of Executive Order No. 65, promulgated by His Excellency, the President of the
Philippines, dated 3 September 1945, she prayed that her immediate release be
ordered on the ground that no evidence exists upon which she could be charged
with any act punishable by law, or, alternatively, that the People's Court fix the bail
for her provisional liberty, in conformity with the aforesaid executive order, and
upon approval of such bail, that an order be forthwith issued directing the officer
having official custody of her person to immediately release her. On 9 October 1945,
the Hon. Leopoldo Rovira, Presiding Judge of the People's Court, entered an order
referring the petition for provisional release for consideration by the Fifth Division of
the People's Court, but adding the following statement: "in my opinion, it should be
denied notwithstanding the recommendation of the Solicitor General for her
provisional release under a bond of P50,000." On the same date, the Hon. Pompeyo
Diaz, Associate Judge of the People's Court, entered an order disposing of said
petition and denying the same "in view of the gravity of the offense as can be
deduced from the fact that the office of the Special Prosecutors recommends as
high as P50,000 for her provisional release." Herras Teehankee filed for
reconsideration, but the Court, through Associate Judge Pompeyo Diaz, denied said
motion. Herras Teehankee filed a petition for the writs of certiorari and mndamus on
19 October 1945 with the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether a person may file for bail
even before a formal charge or information is filed against him. Held: Article III,
section 1(16) of the Commonwealth Constitution -- which provides that "All persons
shall before conviction be bailable by sufficient sureties, except those charged with
capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong. Excessive bail shall not be
required" -- refers to all persons, not only to persons against whom a complaint or
information has already been formally filed. It lays down the rule that all persons
shall before conviction be bailable except those charged with capital offenses when
evidence of guilt is strong. According to the provision, the general rule is that any
person, before being convicted of any criminal offense, shall be bailable, except
when he is charged with a capital offense and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Of
course, only those persons who have been either arrested, detained or otherwise
deprived of their liberty will ever have occasion to seek the benefits of said
provision. But in order that a person can invoke this constitutional precept, it is not
necessary that he should wait until a formal complaint or information is filed against
him. From the moment he is placed under arrest, detention or restraint by the
officers of the law, he can claim this guarantee of the Bill of Rights, and this right he
retains unless and until he is charged with a capital offense and evidence of his guilt
is strong. Indeed if, as admitted on all sides, the precept protects those already
charged under a formal complaint or information, there seems to be no legal or just
reason for denying its benefits to one as against whom the proper authorities may
even yet conclude that there exists no sufficient evidence of guilt. To place the
former in a more favored position than the latter would be, to say the least,
anomalous and absurd. If there is a presumption of innocence in favor of one
already formally charged with criminal offense (Constitution, Article III, section
1[17]), a fortiori, this presumption should be indulged in favor of one yet so
charged, although already arrested or detained.
Paderanga vs. Court of Appeals [GR 115407, 28 August 1995] Second Division,
Regalado (J): 4 concur Facts: On 28 January 1990, Miguel Paderanga was belatedly
charged in an amended information as a coconspirator in the crime of multiple
murder in Criminal Case 86-39 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18 of Cagayan de
Oro City for the killing of members of the Bucag family sometime in 1984 in
Gingoog City of which Paderanga was the mayor at the time. The original
information, filed on 6 October 1986 with the Regional Trial Court of Gingoog City,
had initially indicted for multiple murder 8 accused suspect, namely, Felipe
Galarion, Manuel Sabit, Cesar Sabit, Julito Ampo, Eddie Torion, John Doe, Peter Doe
And Richard Doe as the alleged conspirators in the indiscriminate slaying of the
spouses Romeo and Juliet Bucag and their son, Romeo, Jr. However, only one of the
accused, Felipe Galarion, was apprehended, tried and eventually convicted.
Galarion later escaped from prison. The others have remained at large up to the
present. In a bizarre twist of events, one Felizardo ("Ely") Roxas was implicated in
the crime. In an amended information dated 6 October 1988, he was charged as a
co-accused therein. As Paderanga was his former employer and thus knew him well,
Roxas engaged the former's services as counsel in said case. Ironically, in the
course of the preliminary investigation therein, Paderanga, in a signed affidavit
dated 30 March 1989 but which he later retracted on 20 June 1990, implicated
Paderanga as the supposed mastermind behind the massacre of the Bucag family.
Then, upon the inhibition of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City from the
case per his resolution of 7 July 1989, the Department of Justice, at the instance of
said prosecutor, designated a replacement, State Prosecutor Henrick F. Gingoyon,
for purposes of both the preliminary investigation and prosecution of Criminal Case
86-39. Pursuant to a resolution of the new prosecutor dated 6 September 1989,
Paderanga was finally charged as a co-conspirator in said criminal case in a second
amended information dated 6 October 1992. Paderanga assailed his inclusion
therein as a co-accused all the way to the Supreme Court in GR 96080 entitled "Atty.
Miguel P. Paderanga vs. Hon. Franklin M. Drilon, Hon. Silvestre H. Bello III, Atty.
Henrick F. Gingoyon, Helen B. Canoy and Rebecca B. Tan." In an en banc decision
promulgated on 19 April 1991, the Court sustained the filing of the second amended
information against him. The trial of the base was all set to start with the issuance
five others, with the crime of qualified theft of a motor vehicle (criminal case 285Pasay) in the Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig, Rizal, presided by Judge Onofre Villaluz.
The amount of the bond recommended for the provisional release of Almeda was
P15,000, and this was approved by the judge with a direction that it be posted
entirely in cash. At the hearing of 18 February 1970, Almeda asked the trial court to
allow him to post a surety bond in lieu of the cash bond required of him. This
request was denied, and so was an oral motion for reconsideration, on the ground
that the amended information imputed habitual delinquency and recidivism on the
part of Almeda. At the same hearing, the city fiscal of Pasay City (Fiscal Gregorio
Pineda), thru his assistant, reiterated his oral motion made at a previous hearing for
amendment of the information so as to include allegations of recidivism and
habitual delinquency in the particular case of Almeda. The latter vigorously
objected, arguing that (a) such an amendment was premature since no copies of
prior conviction could yet be presented in court, (b) the motion to amend should
have been made in writing in order to enable him to object formally, and (c) the
proposed amendment would place him in double jeopardy considering that he had
already pleaded not guilty to the information. The trial court nevertheless granted
the fiscal's motion in open court. An oral motion for reconsideration was denied.
Immediately thereafter, the assistant fiscal took hold of the original information and,
then and there, entered his amendment by annotating the same on the back of the
document. Almeda forthwith moved for the dismissal of the charge on the ground of
double jeopardy, but this motion and a motion for reconsideration were denied in
open court. Almeda filed the present special civil action for certiorari with
preliminary injunction with the Supreme Court. Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 23 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Issue: Whether the insistence of a cash bond, over any
other surety, renders the recomended bail excessive. Held: Bail is "the security
required and given for the release of a person who is in the custody of the law, that
he will appear before any court in which his appearance may be required as
stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance." The purpose of requiring bail is to
relieve an accused from imprisonment until his conviction and yet secure his
appearance at the trial. The accused, as of right, is entitled to bail prior to
conviction except when he is charged with a capital offense and the evidence of
guilt is strong. This right is guaranteed by the Constitution, and may not be denied
even where the accused has previously escaped detention, or by reason of his prior
absconding. In order to safeguard the right of an accused to bail, the Constitution
further provides that "excessive bail shall not be required." This is logical because
the imposition of an unreasonable bail may negate the very right itself. "Where
conditions imposed upon a defendant seeking bail would amount to a refusal
thereof and render nugatory the constitutional right to bail, we will not hesitate to
exercise our supervisory powers to provide the required remedy." Herein, the
amount fixed for bail, while reasonable if considered in terms of surety or property
bonds, may be excessive if demanded in the form of cash. A surety or property bond
does not require an actual financial outlay on the part of the bondsman or the
property owner, and in the case of the bondsman the bond may be obtained by the
accused upon the payment of a relatively small premium. Only the reputation or
credit standing of the bondsman or the expectancy of the price at which the
property can be sold, is placed in the hands of the court to guarantee the
production of the body of the accused at the various proceedings leading to his
conviction or acquittal. Upon the other hand, the posting of a cash bond would
entail a transfer of assets into the possession of the court, and its procurement
could work untold hardship on the part of the accused as to have the effect of
altogether denying him his constitutional right to bail. Aside from the foregoing, the
condition that the accused may have provisional liberty only upon his posting of a
cash bond is abhorrent to the nature of bail and transgresses our law on the matter.
The sole purpose of bail is to insure the attendance of the accused when required by
the court, and there should be no suggestion of penalty on the part of the accused
nor revenue on the part of the government. The allowance of a cash bond in lieu of
sureties is authorized in this jurisdiction only because our rules expressly provide for
it. Were this not the case, the posting of bail by depositing cash with the court
cannot be countenanced because, strictly speaking, the very nature of bail
presupposes the attendance of sureties to whom the body of the prisoner can be
delivered. And even where cash bail is allowed, the option to deposit cash in lieu of
a surety bond primarily belongs to the accused. Thus, the trial court may not reject
otherwise acceptable sureties and insist that the accused obtain his provisional
liberty only thru a cash bond. The court is not without devices with which to meet
the situation, considering that Almeda's past record that is the range of his career in
crime weighs heavily against letting him off easily on a middling amount of bail.
First, it could increase the amount of the bail bond to an appropriate level. Second,
as part of the power of the court over the person of the accused and for the purpose
of discouraging likely commission of other crimes by a notorious defendant while on
provisional liberty, the latter could be required, as one of the conditions of his bail
bond, to report in person periodically to the court and make an accounting of his
movements. And third, the accused might be warned, though this warning is not
essential to the requirements of due process, that under the 1973 Constitution "Trial
may proceed notwithstanding his absence provided that he has been duly notified
and his failure to appear is unjustified." With respect to the amount of the bail bond,
the trial court is well advised to consider, inter alia, the following factors, where
applicable: (1) the ability of the accused to give bail: (2) the nature of the offense;
(3) the penalty for the offense charged; (4) the character and reputation of the
accused; (5) the health of the accused; (6) the character and strength of the
evidence; (7) the probability of the accused's appearance or non-appearance at the
trial; (8) forfeiture of previous bonds; (9) whether the accused was a fugitive from
justice when arrested; and (10) whether the accused is under bond for appearance
at trial in other cases. It is not amiss, at this point, to remind all courts to exercise
extreme care and caution in the screening of bondsmen and sureties in regard to
their reputation, solvency and promptitude. Aside from the other precautions
hitherto considered useful, courts should see to it that all surety bonds are
accompanied by corresponding clearances from the Office of the Insurance
Commissioner. Bondsmen who cannot make good their undertakings render inutile
all efforts at making the bail system work in this jurisdiction.
1. OKABE vs. DE LEON GUTIERRES, G.R. No. 150185, May 27, 2004
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Facts: Petitioner was charged with Estafa for failure to deliver the money agreed upon
with Cecilia Maruyama through door- to- door delivery. The 2nd Assistant City
Prosecutor Joselito J. Vibandor came out with a resolution finding probable cause
for estafa against the petitioner. The trial court issued a warrant of arrest and
recommenced a bond of Php 40, 000. The petitioner posted a personal bail bond in the
said amount, duly approved by Judge Demetrio B. Macapagal, Judge of RTC of
Quezon City, who forthwith recalled the said warrant. The approved personal bail bond
of the petitioner was transmitted to the RTC of Pasig City. Upon her request, the
petitioner was furnished with a certified copy of the Information, the resolution and the
criminal complaint which formed part of the records of the said case. The petitioner left
the Philippines for Japan without the trial courts permission, and returned to the
Philippines. She left the Philippines anew and returned. The trial court issued an order
setting the date for arraignment. The private prosecutor files an urgent ex parte motion
for the issuance of the hold departure order which was granted by the court. The
petitioner found that there are documents lacking as to determine probable cause. The
petitioner filed a Very Urgent Motion To Lift/Recall Hold Departure Order to allow her to
regularly travel to Japan because she has minor children. She refused to enter her plea
with leave of court. When it was elevated to the CA, her petition was partially granted.
The CA ruled that by posting bail and praying for reliefs from the trial court, the
petitioner waived her right to assail the respondent judges finding of the existence of
probable cause.
Issue: Whether bail is a waiver of contending the decision of the trial judge.
Ruling: No. We agree with the contention of the petitioner that the appellate court erred
in not applying Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure:
SEC. 26. Bail not a bar to objections on illegal arrest, lack of or irregular preliminary
investigation. An application for or admission to bail shall not bar the accused from
challenging the validity of his arrest or the legality of the warrant issued therefor, or from
assailing the regularity or questioning the absence of a preliminary investigation of the
charge against him, provided that he raises them before entering his plea. The court
shall resolve the matter as early as practicable but not later than the start of the trial of
the case.
It bears stressing that Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
is a new one, intended to modify previous rulings of this Court that an application for bail
or the admission to bail by the accused shall be considered as a waiver of his right to
assail the warrant issued for his arrest on the legalities or irregularities thereon. The
new rule has reverted to the ruling of this Court in People v. Red. The new rule is
curative in nature because precisely, it was designed to supply defects and curb evils in
procedural rules. Hence, the rules governing curative statutes are applicable. Curative
statutes are by their essence retroactive in application. Besides, procedural rules as a
general rule operate retroactively, even without express provisions to that effect, to
cases pending at the time of their effectivity, in other words to actions yet undetermined
at the time of their effectivity. Before the appellate court rendered its decision on
January 31, 2001, the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure was already in effect. It
behooved the appellate court to have applied the same in resolving the petitioners
petition for certiorari and her motion for partial reconsideration.
Moreover, considering the conduct of the petitioner after posting her personal bail bond,
it cannot be argued that she waived her right to question the finding of probable cause
and to assail the warrant of arrest issued against her by the respondent judge. There
must be clear and convincing proof that the petitioner had an actual intention to
relinquish her right to question the existence of probable cause. When the only proof of
intention rests on what a party does, his act should be so manifestly consistent with,
and indicative of, an intent to voluntarily and unequivocally relinquish the particular right
that no other explanation of his conduct is possible. In this case, the records show that a
warrant was issued by the respondent judge in Pasay City for the arrest of the
petitioner, a resident of Guiguinto, Bulacan. When the petitioner learned of the issuance
of the said warrant, she posted a personal bail bond to avert her arrest and secure her
provisional liberty. Thus, the posting of a personal bail bond was a matter of imperative
necessity to avert her incarceration; it should not be deemed as a waiver of her right to
assail her arrest.
G.R. No. 81389 February 21, 1989
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RENATO C. DACUDAO, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch
XIV, and REY CHRISTOPHER PACLIBAR, and NERO DESAMPARADO alias TOTO
DESAMPARADO alias WALDAS,respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Bernardito A. Florido for private respondents.
raised the issue before us, instead of the private prosecutor with the conformity of one of the
Assistant Provincial Fiscals of Cebu. In the interest of a speedy determination of the case, however,
and considering the stand taken by the Office of the Solicitor General whom we asked to comment,
we have decided to resolve this petition on its merits, with a warning to the private prosecutor and
the Assistant Provincial Fiscal to follow the correct procedure in the future.
The respondent court acted irregularly in granting bail in a murder case without any hearing on the
motion asking for it, without bothering to ask the prosecution for its conformity or comment, and, as it
turned out later, over its strong objections. The court granted bail on the sole basis of the complaint
and the affidavits of three policemen, not one of whom apparently witnessed the killing. Whatever
the court possessed at the time it issued the questioned ruling was intended only for prima
facie determining whether or not there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that the
crime was committed and pinpointing the persons who probably committed it. Whether or not the
evidence of guilt is strong for each individual accused still has to be established unless the
prosecution submits the issue on whatever it has already presented. To appreciate the strength or
weakness of the evidence of guilt, the prosecution must be consulted or heard. It is equally entitled
as the accused to due process.
Thus, this Court, in People v. San Diego (26 SCRA 522 [1968]), held:
The question presented before us is, whether the prosecution was deprived of
procedural due process. The answer is in the affirmative. We are of the considered
opinion that whether the motion for bail of a defendant who is in custody for a capital
offense be resolved in a summary proceeding or in the course of a regular trial the
prosecution must be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the
evidence that it may desire to introduce before the court should resolve the motion
for bail. If, as in the criminal case involved in the instant special civil action, the
prosecution should be denied such an opportunity, there would be a violation of
procedural due process, and the order of the court granting bail should be
considered void on that ground. The orders complained of dated October 7, 9 and
12, 1968, having been issued in violation of procedural due process, must be
considered null and void.
The court's discretion to grant bail in capital offenses must be exercised in the light of
a summary of the evidence presented by the prosecution; otherwise, it would be
uncontrolled and might be capricious or whimsical. Hence, the court's order granting
or refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution followed
by its conclusion whether of not the evidence of guilt is strong. The orders of October
7, 9 and 12, 1968, granting bail to the five defendants are defective in form and
substance because they do not contain a summary of the evidence presented by the
prosecution. They only contain the court's conclusion that the evidence of guilt is not
strong. Being thus defective in form and substance, the orders complained of cannot,
also on this ground, be allowed to stand. (at p. 524; Emphasis supplied)
Certain guidelines in the fixing of a bailbond call for the presentation of evidence and reasonable
opportunity for the prosecution to refute it. Among them are the nature and circumstances of the
crime, character and reputation of the accused, the weight of the evidence against him, the
probability of the accused appearing at the trial, whether or not the accused is a fugitive from justice,
and whether or not the accused is under bond in other cases. (Section 6, Rule 144, Rules of Court)
It is highly doubtful if the trial court can appreciate these guidelines in an ex-parte determination
where the Fiscal is neither present nor heard.
The effort of the court to remedy the situation by conducting the required hearing after ordering the
release of the accused may be a face-saving device for the Judge but it cannot serve the purpose of
validating the void order granting bail and stamping an imprimatur of approval on a clearly irregular
procedure.
The defense counsel insists that the accused should be entitled to bail considering the abolition of
the death penalty in the 1986 Constitution. He advances the argument that due to the abolition of the
death penalty, murder is no longer a capital offense being no longer punishable with death. This is
erroneous because although the Constitution states that the death penalty may not be imposed
unless a law orders its imposition for heinous crimes (Constitution, Art. III, Section 19 [1], it does not
follow that all persons accused of any crime whatsoever now have an absolute right to bail. In Art.
111, Sec. 13 of the Constitution, "capital offenses" is replaced by the phrase "offenses punishable
by reclusion perpetua."
Bail is not a matter of right as regards persons charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when the evidence of guilt is strong. Thus, Sec. 5, Art. 114 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure requires a hearing before resolving a motion for bail by persons charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua where the prosecution may discharge its burden of showing that
the evidence of guilt is strong. The case at bar, which is murder, is punishable by reclusion perpetua.
In its comment, the defense interposes an objection to the petition on the ground that it is premature
and therefore, should be dismissed. It contends that certiorari will not lie unless the inferior court
has, through a motion for reconsideration, the opportunity to correct the errors imputed to it. The
general rule is that a motion for reconsideration should first be availed of before a petition
for certiorari and prohibition is filed. (Cebu Institute of Technology [CIT] v. Ople, 156 SCRA 529
[1987]) However, this rule does not apply when special circumstances warrant immediate or more
direct action. A motion for reconsideration may be dispensed with in cases like this where execution
has been ordered and the need for relief is extremely urgent (Phil. British Assurance Co., Inc. v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 150 SCRA 520 [1989]). In the case at bar, the petitioner is left with no
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law considering that the respondent
court insists on the continuation of the hearing of the criminal case even while the accused is free to
roam around. Moreover, there is an allegation that the accused is harassing, threatening and
coercing witnesses who are now afraid to testify. (pp. 87-88, Rollo)
Finally, the defense contends that the Judge did not commit any error because actually the
complaint in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court is for homicide only (Annex A. p. 60, Rollo), and the
recommended Information was also for homicide (Annex B, p. 61, Rollo). We note, however, that
when the same was filed with the Regional Trial Court, it was already an Information for murder.
The amendment or changing of an information prior to the plea of the accused is allowed there being
no prejudice to him. Thus, in the case of Gaspar v. Sandiganbayan (144 SCRA 415 [1986]), this
Court held that, "no actual double jeopardy exists where the petitioner had not yet pleaded guilty to
the offense."
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The order granting bail is SET ASIDE and the
accused is ordered recommitted to jail pending the hearing on the bail application.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan C.J., Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.
FACTS:
Alfredo Gatus was charged with illegal recruitment in large scale and estafa in
five (5) separate Information, before the sala of respondent Judge Elma. In the
Information for Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale, no bail bond was
recommended.
Nonetheless, Gatus filed a motion to fix his bail in Criminal Case No.
94126 (Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale) at P60,000.00. But, Judge Elma, instead
of setting the application for hearing, directed the prosecution to file its
Comment or Opposition to accused's Motion to Fix Bail within five (5) days
from notice.
In his Comment, Judge Elma admitted that he failed to conduct a formal
hearing prior to his grant of accused Gatus' application for bail in Criminal Case No.
94126. He, however, maintained that in ordering the prosecution to comment on
accused's motion to fix bail, he has substantially complied with the requirement of a
formal hearing. He further claimed that he required the prosecution to adduce
evidence but the latter refused and left the determination of the motion to his
discretion.
Petitioner applied for provisional liberty and preliminary injunction before the court which was granted.
However De Villa refused to release petitioner for provisional liberty pending the resolution of the appeal
they have taken before the court invoking that military officers are an exemption from the right to bail
guaranteed by the Constitution. Decision was rendered reiterating the release for provisional liberty of
petitioners with the court stating that there is a mistake in the presumption of respondents that bail does
not apply among military men facing court martial proceeding. Respondents now appeal before the
higher court.
Issue: Whether or not military men are exempted from the Constitutional guarantee on the right to bail.
Held: The SC ruled that the bail invoked by petitioners is not available in the military as an exception to
the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. Thus the right to a speedy trial is given more emphasis in
the military where the right to bail does not exist. Justification to this rule involves the unique structure of
the military and national security considerations which may result to damaging precedents that mutinous
soldiers will be released on provisional liberty giving them the chance to continue their plot in
overthrowing the government. Therefore the decision of the lower court granting bail to the petitioners
was reversed.
Jojo Pastor Bravo
----vs--Hon. Melecio Borja
Capital Offense
FACTS:
1. Detained after his arrest (for murder), Petitioner filed a motion for bail based
on the following grounds:
a. Evidence of guilt is not strong because the prosecution witness Del
Rosario retracted his testimony identifying Petitioner as the assailant
b. That he is a minor entitled to a mitigating circumstance which would
make the murder charge non-capital.
2. At the hearing, retracting witness Del Rosario made another turnabout
3. Respondent Judge denied motion for bail, evidence of guilt is strong and
minority is not proven
4. Petitioner filed MR, saying that the birth certificate proved his age, as was
attached in his previous motion
5. Respondent Judge denied MR
6. Petitioner then filed a motion to be placed in the custody and care of the
DSWD for youth offenders on trial. Denied by Respondent Judge for lack of
merit.
a. The law cited by Petitioner in moving for the DSWD custody only
applies where the minor is charged with a bailable offense.
7. Meanwhile, the NBI submitted a report that it was actually prosecution
witness Del Rosario who killed the deceased, and not Petitioner.
a. From this, Petitioner moved to have the case reinvestigated.
b. Respondent Judge denied this, saying that it was dilatory. No
reinvestigation has taken place ever since.
8. Hence, this petition.
FACTS:
After conducting a preliminary investigation, Asst, Fiscal of Tagbilaran City filed to RTC
Bohol 2 information against Marcos for violation of BP 22.
Marcos appeared during the scheduled arraignment but asked for resetting because
his lawyer has just withdrawn from the case. The court granted his request.
Later, Marcos was able to settle his obligation with the complainants and the latter
executed an Affidavit of Desistance. Because of that, Asst. City Fiscal filed a Motion to
Dismiss the case because without the testimony of the complainants who withdrew,
he cannot successfully prosecute the case.
During the arraignment, Marcos pleaded not guilty. When the case was called for
hearing, Marcos and his lawyer already left. The prosecution proceeded in the
presentation of its evidence and rested its case.
Because Marcos did not attend the trial, the court forfeited his bail bond. Counsel
explained that he was unable to attend the trial because he had attended urgent
matter which needed his personal attention. He also explained that Marcos left in
belief that there would no presentation of evidence since an Affidavit of Desistance
was already filed before the court.
Essentially, the 2nd information was the same as the 1st so the counsel of the accused
offered that reading of information is waived and plea of not guilty be directly
entered.
ISSUE:
WON the court erred in in forfeiting the petitioners bail bond for his non-appearance during
trial. Stated otherwise, what are the instances where the presence of the accused during
trial is indispensable? May a counsel enter a plea in behalf of the accused?
RULING:
The forfeiture of the bail bond was inappropriate. A bail bond may be forfeited only in
instances where the presence of the accused is specifically required by the court of
the RoC and, despite due notice to the bondsmen to produce him before the court on
a given date, the accused fails to appear in person as so required.
Under the RoC, the accused has to be present:
1 at the arraignment pursuant to par. (b), Section 1, Rule 116;
2 at the promulgation of judgment, except when conviction is for a light
offense, in which case the judgment may be pronounced in the
presence of his counsel or representative pursuant to Section 6 of Rule
120, or unless promulgation in absentia is allowed under 3 rd par of said
Section; and
3 when the prosecution intends to present witnesses who will identify
the accused.
Thus, the petitioners appearance was not required at the subject trial. It is true that
he has the right to be present at every stage of the proceeding (from arraignment to
promulgation), but he can waive his presence. The failure of the accused to appear at
the trial despite due notice and without justification is deemed an express waiver of
his right to be present. As such, the trial may proceed in absentia.
With regard to the 2nd information, the court made no ruling on the manifestation and
offer by petitioners counsel that the reading of the information is waived and a plea
of not guilty is entered. The petitioner was neither made to confirm the manifestation
nor directed to personally make the plea. There was no valid arraignment as it is
required that the accused would personally enter his plea.