CONSTANCIO SIENES, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, -versus- FIDEL ESPARCIA, ET AL.

,
defendants-appellees.
G.R. No. L-12957 March 24, 1961
DIZON, J.:
FACTS: The subject lot was originally owned by the deceased Saturnino Yaeso. With his first wife,
Teresa Ruales, he had four children named Agaton, Fernando, Paulina and Cipriana, while with his
second wife, Andrea Gutang, he had an only son named Francisco. Upon the death of Saturnino
properties were left to all of his children, among which, Lot 3368 to Francisco.
Francisco died on May 29, 1932 at the age of 20, single and without any descendant, his mother, as
his sole heir, executed the public instrument entitled EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT AND SALE
whereby, among other things, for and in consideration of the sum of P800.00 she sold the property in
question to appellants. When thereafter said vendees demanded from Paulina Yaeso and her
husband Jose Esparcia, the surrender of Original Certificate of Title No. 10275 which was in their
possession the latter refused.
Thereafter, Cipriana and Paulina Yaeso, the surviving half-sisters of Francisco, declared the property
in their name executed a deed of sale in favor of the spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes.
ISSUE: Whether or not the subject property is reservable.
HELD: Yes. It is clear upon the facts already stated, that the land in question was reservable
property. Francisco Yaeso inherited it by operation of law from his father Saturnino, and upon
Francisco's death, unmarried and without descendants; it was inherited, in turn, by his mother, Andrea
Gutang. The latter was, therefore, under obligation to reserve it for the benefit of relatives within the
third degree belonging to the line from which said property came, if any survived her. The record
discloses in this connection that Andrea Gutang died on December 13, 1951, the lone reservee
surviving her being Cipriana Yaeso who died only on January 13, 1952.
This court has held in connection with this matter that reservista has the legal title and dominion to
the reservable property but subject to a resolutory condition; that he is like a life usufructuary of the
reservable property; that he may alienate the same but subject to reservation, said alienation
transmitting only the revocable and conditional ownership of the reservists, the rights acquired by the
transferee being revoked or resolved by the survival of reservatarios at the time of the death of the
reservista.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision as above modified is affirmed, with costs, and without
prejudice to whatever action in equity the Esparcia spouses may have against the Estate of Cipriana
Yaeso for the reconveyance of the property in question.

VICENTE B. TEOTICO, petitioner-appellant , VS. ANA DEL VAL, ETC., oppositor appellee
G.R. No. L-18753 March 26, 1965
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
FACTS: Maria Mortera died in 1955. She left a will, duly acknowledged before a notary public and
witnesses. The will stated that she freely executed the will with sound mind, good health. Among the
many legacies and devisees made in the will was one P20,000.00 to Rene Teodico, husband of her
niece Josefina Mortera. She also instituted Josefina as her sole and universal heir to all the
remainder of her properties not otherwise disposed of in the will.
Vicente Teodico filed a petition for probate of will before the CFI and a hearing was set. Ana del Val
Chan, claiming to be an adopted child of Francisca Mortera, a deceased sister of the testator, as well
as an acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera, deceaseed brother of testator, filed an opposition
of the will alleging that: 1.) said will was not executed as required by law; 2.) testator was physically
and mentally incapable to execute the will at the time of the execution; 3.) the will was executed
under duress, threat or influence of fear.
Vicente Teotico filed a motion to dismiss the opposition alleging that the oppositor had no legal
personality to intervene. The probate court, however, allowed the oppositor to intervene as the
adopted child of Francisca. She amended her opposition, alleging the additional ground that the will is
inoperative as to the share of Dr. Rene Teotico because he was the physician who took care of
testator during her last illness. Petitioner Teotico, together with Josefina, filed a motion for
reconsideration on the decision on the nullity of the legacy made to Dr. Rene Teotico, while the
oppositor filed a motion for reconsideration on the decision decreeing the probate of the will. Both
motions were denied. Both appealed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the probate court erred passing on the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the
will and in determining who should inherit the portion to be vacated by the nullification of the legacy
made in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico?
RULING: The question of whether the probate court could determine the intrinsic validity of the
provisions of a will has been decided by this Court in a long line of decisions among which the
following may be cited:
"Opposition to the intrinsic validity or legality of the provisions of the will cannot be entertained in
probate proceeding because its only purpose is merely to determine if the will has been executed in
accordance with the requirements of the law."
The authentication of a will decides no other questions than such as touch upon the capacity of the
testator and the compliance with those requisites or solemnities which the law prescribes for the
validity of wills. It does not determine nor even by implication prejudge the validity or efficiency of the
provisions; these may be impugned as being vicious or null, notwithstanding its authentication. The
questions relating to these points remain entirely unaffected, and may be raised even after the will
has been authenticated.
"To establish conclusively as against everyone, and once for all, the facts that a will was executed
with the formalities required by law and that the testator was in a condition to make a will, is the only
purpose of the proceedings under the new code for the probate of a will. (Sec. 625.) The judgment in
such proceedings determines and can determine nothing more. In them the court has no power to
pass upon the validity of any provisions made in the will. It cannot decide, for example, that a certain
legacy is void and another one valid."

ROSA K. KALAW, petitioner, vs. HON. JUDGE BENJAMIN RELOVA, Presiding Judge of the CFI
of Batangas, Branch VI, Lipa City, and GREGORIO K. KALAW, respondents.
G.R. No. L-40207 September 28, 1984
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
FACTS: On September 1, 1971, private respondent GREGORIO K. KALAW, claiming to be the sole
heir of his deceased sister, Natividad K. Kalaw, filed a petition for the probate of her holographic Will
executed on December 24, 1968.
The holographic Will, as first written, named ROSA K. Kalaw, a sister of the testatrix as her sole heir.
Hence, on November 10, 1971, petitioner ROSA K. Kalaw opposed probate alleging, in substance,
that the holographic Will contained alterations, corrections, and insertions without the proper
authentication by the full signature of the testatrix as required by Article 814 of the Civil Code.
ROSA's position was that the holographic Will, as first written, should be given effect and probated so
that she could be the sole heir thereunder. After trial, respondent Judge denied probate.
ISSUE: Whether or not the alterations, insertions, and/or additions in the will affect its validity
RULING: Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and interlineations made by the testator
in a holographic Will litem not been noted under his signature, ... the Will is not thereby invalidated as
a whole, but at most only as respects the particular words erased, corrected or interlined.
However, when as in this case, the holographic Will in dispute had only one substantial provision,
which was altered by substituting the original heir with another, but which alteration did not carry the
requisite of full authentication by the full signature of the testator, the effect must be that the entire
Will is voided or revoked for the simple reason that nothing remains in the Will after that which could
remain valid. To state that the Will as first written should be given efficacy is to disregard the seeming
change of mind of the testatrix. But that change of mind can neither be given effect because she
failed to authenticate it in the manner required by law by affixing her full signature.
WHEREFORE, this Petition is hereby dismissed and the Decision of respondent Judge, dated
September 3, 1973, is hereby affirmed in toto. No costs.

REMEDIOS NUGUID, petitioner and appellant, vs. FELIX NUGUID and PAZ SALONGA NUGUID,
oppositors and appellees.
No. L-23445, June 23, 1966
SANCHEZ, J.:
FACTS: Rosario died without descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving her were her
legitimate parents Felix and Paz, and 6 brothers and sisters.
Remedios, one of the sister filed in court a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario instituting
the former as the sole, universal heir of all her properties. She prayed that said will be admitted to
probate and that letter of administration be issued to her.
Felix and Paz opposed to the probate of the will on the ground that by the institution of Remedios as
universal heir of the deceased, oppositors who are compulsory heirs in the direct ascending line
were illegally preterited and that in consequence, the institution is void.
Article 854 provides that preterition of one, some or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line,
whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul
the institution of heir.
Petitioners contention is that the present is a case of ineffective disinheritance rather than one of
preterition drawing the conclusion that Article 854 does not apply in the case at bar.
ISSUE: Whether or not the institution of one of the sister of the deceased as the sole, universal heir
preterited the compulsory heirs.
HELD: Yes. Where the deceased left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate, but she left forced
heirs in the direct ascending line her parents, and her holographic will does not explicitly disinherit
them but simply omits their names altogether, the case is one of preterition of the parents, not a case
of ineffective disinheritance.
Preterition consists in the omission in the testators will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either
because they are not mentioned therein, or, through mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs
nor are expressly disinherited. Disinheritance, in turn, is a testamentary disposition depriving any
compulsory heir of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law .
Where the one sentence will institutes the petitioner as the sole, universal heir and preterits the
parents of the testatrix, and it contains no specific legacies or bequests, such universal institution of
petitioner, by itself, is void. And intestate succession ensues.
WHEREFORE, upon the view we take of this case, the order of November 8, 1963 under review is
hereby affirmed. No costs allowed. So ordered.

TESTATE ESTATE OF FELICIDAD ESGUERRA ALTO-YAP deceased. FAUSTO E. GAN,

petitioner-appellant,
vs.
ILDEFONSO YAP, oppositor-appellee.
G.R. No. L-12190 August 30, 1958
BENGZON, J.:
FACTS: On November 20, 1951, Felicidad Esguerra Alto Yap died of heart failure leaving properties
in Pulilan, Bulacan, and in the City of Manila. On March 17, 1952, Fausto E. Gan initiated a petition
for the probate of a holographic will allegedly executed by the deceased.
Opposing the petition, her surviving husband Ildefonso Yap asserted that the deceased had not left
any will, nor executed any testament during her lifetime. The will itself was not presented. Petitioner
tried to establish its contents and due execution by the statements in open court of Felina Esguerra,
Primitivo Reyes, Socorro Olarte and Rosario
Gan Jimenez, whose testimonies.
ISSUE: Whether or not a holographic may be probated upon the testimony of witnesses who have
allegedly seen it and who declare that it was in the handwriting of the testator
HELD: No. Unlike holographic wills, ordinary wills may be proved by testimonial evidence when lost
or destroyed. The difference lies in the nature of the wills. In the first, the only guarantee of
authenticity is the handwriting itself; in the second, the testimony of the subscribing or instrumental
witnesses (and of the notary, now). The loss of the holographic will entails the loss of the only medium
of proof; if the ordinary will is lost, the subscribing witnesses are available to authenticate.
The will having been lost the forger may have purposely destroyed it in an "accident" the
oppositors have no way to expose the trick and the error, because the document itself is not at hand.
And considering that the holographic will may consist of two or three pages, and only one of them
need be signed, the substitution of the unsigned pages, which may be the most important ones, may
go undetected.
Thus, the Court reached the conclusion that the execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed
holographic will may not be proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read
such will.
Wherefore, the rejection of the alleged will must be sustained.

FELIX AZUELA, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, GERALDA AIDA CASTILLO substituted by
ERNESTO G. CASTILLO, Respondents.
G.R. 122880, 12 April 2006
TINGA, J.:
FACTS: Petitioner filed a petition with the trial court for the probate of a notarial will purportedly
executed by Eugenia E. Igsolo on June 10, 1981 and notarized on the same day. The will consisted of
two (2) pages and was written in Filipino. The attestation clause did not state the number of pages
and it was not signed by the attesting witnesses at the bottom thereof. The said witnesses affixed
their signatures on the left-hand margin of both pages of the will though. Geralda Castillo opposed the
petition, claiming that the will was a forgery and that the true purpose of its emergence was so it could
be utilized as a defense in several court cases filed by oppositor against petitioner, particularly for
forcible entry and usurpation of real property, all centering on petitioners right to occupy the
properties of the decedent.3 It also asserted that contrary to the representations of petitioner, the
decedent was actually survived by 12 legitimate heirs, namely her grandchildren, who were then
residing abroad. She also argued that the will was not executed and attested to in accordance with
law. She pointed out that the decedents signature did not appear on the second page of the will, and
the will was not properly acknowledged.
Azuela argues that the requirement under Article 805 of the Civil Code that the number of pages
used in a notarial will be stated in the attestation clause is merely directory, rather than mandatory,
and thus susceptible to what he termed as the substantial compliance rule.
ISSUE: Whether or not the subject will is valid.
RULING: The court held that a will whose attestation clause does not contain the number of pages on
which the will is written is fatally defective. A will whose attestation clause is not signed by the
instrumental witnesses is fatally defective. And perhaps most importantly, a will which does not
contain an acknowledgment, but a mere jurat, is fatally defective. Any one of these defects is
sufficient to deny probate.
The failure of the attestation clause to state the number of pages on which the will was written
remains a fatal flaw. This requirement aims at safeguarding the will against possible interpolation or
omission of one or some of its pages and thus preventing any increase or decrease in the pages. In
this case, however, there could have been no substantial compliance with the requirements under Art.
805 of the Civil Code since there is no statement in the attestation clause or anywhere in the will itself
as to the number of pages which comprise the will. The subject will cannot be considered to have
been validly attested to by the instrumental witnesses. While the signatures of the instrumental
witnesses appear on the left-hand margin of the will, they do not appear at the bottom of the
attestation clause. Art. 805 particularly segregates the requirement that the instrumental witnesses
sign each page of the will, from the requisite that the will be attested and subscribed by them. The
signatures on the left-hand corner of every page signify, among others, that the witnesses are aware
that the page they are signing forms part of the will.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner.

VILLACORTE. CELSO ICASIANO, petitioner-appellee, vs. NATIVIDAD ICASIANO and ENRIQUE

ICASIANO, oppositors-appellants.
G.R. No. L-18979, 11 S 422, June 30, 1964
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
FACTS: Petitioner Celso Icasiano filed a petition for the allowance and admission to probate of the
alleged will of Josefa Villacorte, deceased. Petitioner also filed a motion for the admission of an
amended and supplemental petition, alleging that the decedent left a will executed in duplicate with all
the legal requirements, and that he was, on that date, submitting the signed duplicate which he
allegedly found only after the filing of the petition.
Respondent then filed her opposition; and she petitioned to have herself appointed as a special
administrator. The records show that the original of the will, which was surrendered simultaneously
with the filing of the petition consists of five pages. While signed at the end and in every page, it does
not contain the signature of one of the attesting witnesses, Atty. Jose V. Natividad, on page three
thereof; but the duplicate copy attached to the amended and supplemental petition is signed by the
testatrix and her three attesting witnesses in each and every page.
Witness Natividad who testified on his failure to sign page three of the original, admits that he may
have lifted two pages instead of one when he signed the same, but affirmed that page 3was signed in
his presence.
Oppositors-appellants in turn introduced expert testimony to the effect that the signatures of the
testatrix in the duplicate are not genuine nor were they written or affixed on the same occasion as the
original, and further aver that granting that the documents were genuine, they were executed through
mistake and with undue influence and pressure because the testatrix was deceived into adopting as
her last will and testament the wishes of those who will stand to benefit from the provisions of the will.
ISSUE: Whether or not the absence of one of the instrumental witnessess signature on a page of the
original copy of the will is fatal where the duplicate has the complete signatures of the testator and all
witnesses on every page.
RULING: The Court held that the testatrix signed both original and duplicate copies of the will
spontaneously, on the same in the presence of the three attesting witnesses, the notary public who
acknowledged the will; and Atty. Samson, who actually prepared the documents. Moreover, there is
no adequate evidence of fraud or undue influence. The fact that some heirs are more favored than
others is proof of neither.
The failure of one witness to affix his signature to one page of a testament, due to the simultaneous
lifting of two pages in the course of signing, is not per se sufficient to justify denial of probate.
Impossibility of substitution of this page is assured not only by the fact that the testatrix and two other
witnesses did sign the defective page, but also by its bearing the coincident imprint of the seal of the
notary public before whom the testament was ratified by testatrix and all three witnesses.
Furthermore, that the failure of witness Natividad to sign page three (3) was entirely through pure
oversight is shown by his own testimony as well as by the duplicate copy of the will, which bears a
complete set of signatures in every page.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against
appellants.

Estate of Miguel Mamuyac, deceased.

FRANCISCO GAGO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
CORNELIO MAMUYAC, AMBROSIO LARIOSA,
FELICIANA BAUZON, and CATALINA MAMUYAC, opponents-appellees.
G.R. No. L-26317 January 29, 1927
JOHNSON, J.:
FACTS: Miguel Mamuyac died on the 2nd day of January, 1922, in the municipality of Agoo of the
Province of La Union. It appears from the record that on or about the 27th day of July, 1918, he
executed a last will and testament. On January, 1922, Francisco Gago filed a petition for the probate
of that will. The probate was opposed by Cornelio Mamuyac, Ambrosio Lariosa, Feliciana Bauzon,
and Catalina Mamuyac. The petition for the probate of said will was denied on the ground that the
deceased had on the 16th day of April, 1919, executed a new will and testament.
On February 21, 1925, an action was commenced to secure the probate of the 1919 will. The
oppositors alleged (a) that the said will is a copy of the second will and testament executed by Miguel
Mamuyac, (b) that the same had been cancelled and revoked during the Mamuyacs lifetime and (c)
that the said will was not the last will and testament of the deceased.
The judge denied the probate of said will on the ground that the same had been cancelled and
revoked in the year 1920.
The appellant contends that the lower court committed an error in not finding from the evidence that
the will in question had been executed with all the formalities required by the law; that the same had
been revoked and cancelled in 1920 before his death; that the said will was a mere carbon copy and
that the oppositors were not estopped from alleging that fact.
ISSUE: Whether or not the will in question was revoked by the testator.
HELD: Yes. There is positive proof, not denied, which was accepted by the lower court, that the will in
question had been cancelled in 1920. The law does not require any evidence of the revocation or
cancellation of a will to be preserved. The fact that such cancellation or revocation has taken place
must either remain unproved or be inferred from evidence showing that after due search the original
will cannot be found. Where a will which cannot be found is shown to have been in the possession of
the testator, when last seen, the presumption is, in the absence of other competent evidence, that the
same was cancelled or destroyed. The same presumption arises where it is shown that the testator
had ready access to the will and it cannot be found after his death. It will not be presumed that such
will has been destroyed by any other person without the knowledge or authority of the testator. The
force of the presumption of cancellation or revocation by the testator is never conclusive, but may be
overcome by proof that the will was not destroyed by the testator with intent to revoke it.
In view of the facts that the original will of 1919 could not be found after the death of the testator and
the positive proof that the same had been cancelled, the Court concludes that the conclusions of the
lower court are in accordance with the weight of the evidence. In a proceeding to probate a will, the
burden of proof is upon the proponent clearly to establish not only its execution but its existence.
Having proved its execution by the proponents, the burden is on the contestant to show that it has
been revoked.

Suroza v. Honrado
A.M. No. 2026-CFI, December 19, 1981
FACTS: Mauro Suroza and his wife Marcelina Salvador reared a boy named Agapito who used the
surname Suroza. Agapito got married to Nenita and begot a child named Lilia. Agapito became
disabled and his wife Nenita was appointed as his guardian when he was declared an incompetent.
Meanwhile, a couple entrusted their child Marilyn to Arsenia de la Cruz (apparently a girl friend of
Agapito). The child was later delivered to Marcelina Suroza who brought her up as a supposed
daughter of Agapito and as her granddaughter. She stayed with Marcelina but was not legally
adopted by Agapito. Marcelina supposedly executed a notarial will when she was 73 years old. That
will which is in English was thumbmarked by her. She was illiterate. In that will, Marcelina bequeathed
all her estate to her supposed granddaughter Marilyn.
Upon learning of the existence of a testamentary proceeding for the settlement of Marcelina's estate,
Nenita and the other occupants of the decedent's house filed a motion to set aside the order ejecting
them. They alleged that the decedent's son Agapito was the sole heir of the deceased, that he has a
daughter named Lilia, that Nenita was Agapito's guardian and that Marilyn was not Agapito's daughter
nor the decedent's granddaughter. In spite of the fact that Judge Honrado was already apprised that
persons, other than Marilyn, were claiming Marcelina's estate, he issued an order probating her
supposed will wherein Marilyn was the instituted heiress.
In a motion for the consolidation of all pending incidents, Nenita V. Suroza reiterated her contention
that the alleged will is void because Marcelina did not appear before the notary and because it is
written in English which is not known to her. Judge Honrado in his order of June 8, 1976 "denied" the
various incidents "raised" by Nenita.
ISSUE: Should disciplinary action be taken against respondent judge for having admitted to probate a
will, which on its face is void because it is written in English, a language not known to the illiterate
testatrix, and which is probably a forged will because she and the attesting witnesses did not appear
before the notary as admitted by the notary himself?
HELD: Yes. In this case, respondent judge, on perusing the will and noting that it was written in
English and was thumbmarked by an obviously illiterate testatrix, could have readily perceived that
the will is void. In the opening paragraph of the will, it was stated that English was a language
"understood and known" to the testatrix. But in its concluding paragraph, it was stated that the will
was read to the testatrix "and translated into Filipino language". That could only mean that the will
was written in a language not known to the illiterate testatrix and, therefore, it is void because of the
mandatory provision of article 804 of the Civil Code that every will must be executed in a language or
dialect known to the testator.
Had respondent judge been careful and observant, he could have noted not only the anomaly as to
the language of the will but also that there was something wrong in instituting the supposed
granddaughter as sole heiress and giving nothing at all to her supposed father who was still alive.
Furthermore, after the hearing conducted by respondent deputy clerk of court, respondent judge
could have noticed that the notary was not presented as a witness.
In spite of the absence of an opposition, respondent judge should have personally conducted the
hearing on the probate of the will so that he could have ascertained whether the will was validly
executed.

Under the circumstances, we find his negligence and dereliction of duty to be inexcusable.
Testacy of Sixto Lopez. JOSE S. LOPEZ, petitioner-appellee, vs. AGUSTIN LIBORO, oppositorappellant.
G.R. No. L-1787, 81 P 429, August 27, 1948
TUASON, J.:
FACTS: The will of Don Sixto Lopez was submitted for probate but was opposed by the appellant
alleging the following grounds to wit: (1) that the deceased never executed the alleged will; (2) that
his signature appearing in said will was a forgery; (3) that at the time of the execution of the will, he
was wanting in testamentary as well as mental capacity due to advanced age; (4) that, if he did ever
execute said will, it was not executed and attested as required by law, and one of the alleged
instrumental witnesses was incapacitated to act as such; and it was procured by duress, influence of
fear and threats and undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiaries
instituted therein, principally the testator's sister, Clemencia Lopez, and the herein proponent, Jose S.
Lopez; and (5) that the signature of the testator was procured by fraud or trick.
The appellant also alleges that the trial court has committed an abuse of discretion when it allowed
the appellant to offer evidence to prove knowledge of Spanish by the testator, the language in which
the will is drawn, after the petitioner had rested his case and after the opponent had moved for
dismissal of the petition on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.
The will in question comprises two pages, each of which is written on one side of a separate sheet.
The first sheet is not paged either in letters or in Arabic numerals. This, the appellant believes, is a
fatal defect.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lack of pagination in a 2-page will is fatal
RULING: The Supreme Court held that the purpose of the law in prescribing the paging of wills is
guard against fraud, and to afford means of preventing the substitution or the loss of any of its pages.
The omission to put a page number on the first sheet is supplied by other forms of identification more
trustworthy than the conventional numerical words or characters. The unnumbered page is clearly
identified as the first page by the internal sense of its contents considered in relation to the contents
of the second page. By their meaning and coherence, the first and second lines on the second page
are undeniably a continuation of the last sentence of the testament, before the attestation clause,
which starts at the bottom of the preceding page. By their meaning and coherence, the first and
second lines on the second page are undeniably a continuation of the last sentence of the testament,
before the attestation clause, which starts at the bottom of the preceding page. Furthermore, the
unnumbered page contains the caption "TESTAMENTO," the invocation of the Almighty, and a recital
that the testator was in full use of his testamentary faculty, all of which, in the logical order of
sequence, precede the direction for the disposition of the marker's property.
The order of the lower court ordering the probate of the last will and testament of Don Sixto Lopez is
affirmed, with costs.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF RICARDO B. BONILLA

deceased, MARCELA RODELAS, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
AMPARO ARANZA, ET AL., oppositors-appellees, ATTY. LORENZO SUMULONG, intervenor.
G.R. No. L-58509 December 7, 1982
RELOVA, J.:
FACTS: On January 11, 1977, appellant filed a petition for the probate of the holographic will of
Ricardo B. Bonilla and the issuance of letters testamentary in her favor. The petition was opposed by
the appellees Amparo Aranza Bonilla, Wilferine Bonilla Treyes Expedita Bonilla Frias and Ephraim
Bonilla on the following grounds:
(1) Appellant was estopped from claiming that the deceased left a will by failing to produce the will
within twenty days of the death of the testator as required by Rule 75, section 2 of the Rules of Court;
(2) The alleged copy of the alleged holographic will did not contain a disposition of property after
death and was not intended to take effect after death, and therefore it was not a will
(3) The alleged hollographic will itself,and not an alleged copy thereof, must be produced, otherwise it
would produce no effect, as held in Gam v. Yap, 104 Phil. 509; and
(4 ) The deceased did not leave any will, holographic or otherwise, executed and attested as required
by law.
ISSUE: Whether a holographic will which was lost or cannot be found can be proved by means of a
photostatic copy.
HELD: Yes. A photostatic copy or xerox copy of the holographic will may be allowed because
comparison can be made with the standard writings of the testator. Pursuant to Article 811 of the Civil
Code, probate of holographic wills is the allowance of the will by the court after its due execution has
been proved. If the holographic will has been lost or destroyed and no other copy is available, the will
cannot be probated because the best and only evidence is the handwriting of the testator in said will.
It is necessary that there be a comparison between sample handwritten statements of the testator
and the handwritten will. Even a mimeographed or carbon copy; or by other similar means, if any,
whereby the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased may be exhibited and tested before the
probate court," Evidently, the photostatic or xerox copy of the lost or destroyed holographic will may
be admitted because then the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased can be determined by
the probate court.
WHEREFORE, the order of the lower court dated October 3, 1979, denying appellant's motion for
reconsideration dated August 9, 1979, of the Order dated July 23, 1979, dismissing her petition to
approve the will of the late Ricardo B. Bonilla, is hereby SET ASIDE.

Parish Priest of Roman Catholic vs Rigor

89 SCRA 493
FACTS:
This case is about the efficaciousness or enforceability of a devise of ricelands located at Guimba,
Nueva Ecija, with a total area of around forty- four hectares That devise was made in the will of the
late Father Pascual Rigor, a native of Victoria Tarlac, in favor of his nearest male relative who would
study for the priesthood.
The parish priest of Victoria, who claimed to be a trustee of the said lands, appealed to this Court
from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the order of the probate court declaring that the
said devise was inoperative (Rigor vs. Parish Priest of the Roman Catholic Church of Victoria, Tarlac,
CA-G.R. No. 24319-R, August 1, 1963).
The record discloses that Father Rigor, the parish priest of Pulilan, Bulacan, died on August 9, 1935,
leaving a will executed on October 29, 1933 which was probated by the Court of First Instance of
Tarlac in its order of December 5, 1935. Named as devisees in the will were the testators nearest
relatives, namely, his three sisters: Florencia Rigor-Escobar, Belina Rigor-Manaloto and Nestora
Rigor-Quiambao. The testator gave a devise to his cousin, Fortunato Gamalinda.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the parish priest of Victoria could administer the rice lands in the absence of the
qualified devisee?
HELD:
It is contended by the legal heirs that the said devise was in reality intended for Ramon Quiambao,
the testator's nephew and godchild, who was the son of his sister, Mrs. Quiambao. To prove that
contention, the legal heirs presented in the lower court the affidavit of Beatriz Gamalinda, the
maternal grandmother of Edgardo Cunanan, who deposed that after Father Rigor's death her own
son, Valentin Gamalinda, Jr., did not claim the devise, although he was studying for the priesthood at
the San Carlos Seminary, because she (Beatriz) knew that Father Rigor had intended that devise for
his nearest male relative beloning to the Rigor family (pp. 105-114, Record on Appeal).
Mrs. Gamalinda further deposed that her own grandchild, Edgardo G. Cunanan, was not the one
contemplated in Father Rigor's will and that Edgardo's father told her that he was not consulted by the
parish priest of Victoria before the latter filed his second motion for reconsideration which was based
on the ground that the testator's grandnephew, Edgardo, was studying for the priesthood at the San
Jose Seminary. Parenthetically, it should be stated at this juncture that Edgardo ceased to be a
seminarian in 1961. For that reason, the legal heirs apprised the Court of Appeals that the probate
court's order adjudicating the ricelands to the parish priest of Victoria had no more leg to stand on (p.
84, Appellant's brief).
Of course, Mrs. Gamalinda's affidavit, which is tantamount to evidence aliunde as to the testator's
intention and which is hearsay, has no probative value. Our opinion that the said bequest refers to the
testator's nephew who was living at the time of his death, when his succession was opened and the
successional rights to his estate became vested, rests on a judicious and unbiased reading of the
terms of the will.
Had the testator intended that the "cualquier pariente mio varon mas cercano que estudie la camera
eclesiatica" would include indefinitely anyone of his nearest male relatives born after his death, he

could have so specified in his will He must have known that such a broad provision would suspend for
an unlimited period of time the efficaciousness of his bequest.
What then did the testator mean by "el intervalo de tiempo que no haya legatario acondicionado"?
The reasonable view is that he was referring to a situation whereby his nephew living at the time of
his death, who would like to become a priest, was still in grade school or in high school or was not yet
in the seminary. In that case, the parish priest of Victoria would administer the ricelands before the
nephew entered the seminary. But the moment the testator's nephew entered the seminary, then he
would be entitled to enjoy and administer the ricelands and receive the fruits thereof. In that event,
the trusteeship would be terminated.
Following that interpretation of the will the inquiry would be whether at the time Father Rigor died in
1935 he had a nephew who was studying for the priesthood or who had manifested his desire to
follow the ecclesiastical career. That query is categorically answered in paragraph 4 of appellant
priest's petitions of February 19, 1954 and January 31, 1957. He unequivocally alleged therein that
"not male relative of the late (Father) Pascual Rigor has ever studied for the priesthood" (pp. 25 and
35, Record on Appeal).
Inasmuch as the testator was not survived by any nephew who became a priest, the unavoidable
conclusion is that the bequest in question was ineffectual or inoperative. Therefore, the administration
of the ricelands by the parish priest of Victoria, as envisaged in the wilt was likewise inoperative.
The appellant in contending that a public charitable trust was constituted by the testator in is favor
assumes that he was a trustee or a substitute devisee That contention is untenable. A reading of the
testamentary provisions regarding the disputed bequest not support the view that the parish priest of
Victoria was a trustee or a substitute devisee in the event that the testator was not survived by a
nephew who became a priest.
It should be understood that the parish priest of Victoria could become a trustee only when the
testator's nephew living at the time of his death, who desired to become a priest, had not yet entered
the seminary or, having been ordained a priest, he was excommunicated. Those two contingencies
did not arise, and could not have arisen in this case because no nephew of the testator manifested
any intention to enter the seminary or ever became a priest.
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that this case is covered by article 888 of the old Civil Code, now
article 956, which provides that if "the bequest for any reason should be inoperative, it shall be
merged into the estate, except in cases of substitution and those in which the right of accretion exists"
("el legado ... por qualquier causa, no tenga efecto se refundira en la masa de la herencia, fuera de
los casos de sustitucion y derecho de acrecer").
This case is also covered by article 912(2) of the old Civil Code, now article 960 (2), which provides
that legal succession takes place when the will "does not dispose of all that belongs to the testator."
There being no substitution nor accretion as to the said ricelands the same should be distributed
among the testator's legal heirs.
The effect is as if the testator had made no disposition as to the said ricelands.
The Civil Code recognizes that a person may die partly testate and partly intestate, or that there may
be mixed succession. The old rule as to the indivisibility of the testator's win is no longer valid. Thus, if
a conditional legacy does not take effect, there will be intestate succession as to the property
recovered by the said legacy (Macrohon Ong Ham vs. Saavedra, 51 Phil. 267).

Re: Testamentary Capacity

LETICIA VALMONTE ORTEGA, Petitioner, vs. JOSEFINA C. VALMONTE, Respondent.
G.R. No. 157451 December 16, 2005
PANGANIBAN, J.:
FACTS: The facts were summarized in the assailed Decision of the CA, as follows:
Like so many others before him, Placido toiled and lived for a long time in the United States until he
finally reached retirement. In 1980, Placido finally came home to stay in the Philippines, and he lived
in the house and lot located at #9200 Catmon St., San Antonio Village, Makati, which he owned in
common with his sister Ciriaca Valmonte and titled in their names in TCT 123468. Two years after his
arrival from the United States and at the age of 80 he wed Josefina who was then 28 years old, in a
ceremony solemnized by Judge Perfecto Laguio, Jr. on February 5, 1982. But in a little more than two
years of wedded bliss, Placido died on October 8, 1984 of a cause written down as COR
PULMONALE.
Placido executed a notarial last will and testament written in English and consisting of two (2) pages,
and dated June 15, 1983 but acknowledged only on August 9, 1983. The first page contains the entire
testamentary dispositions and a part of the attestation clause, and was signed at the end or bottom of
that page by the testator and on the left hand margin by the three instrumental witnesses. The second
page contains the continuation of the attestation clause and the acknowledgment, and was signed by
the witnesses at the end of the attestation clause and again on the left hand margin.
Notary Public Floro Sarmiento, the notary public who notarized the testators will, testified that it was
in the first week of June 1983 when the testator together with the three witnesses of the will went to
his house cum law office and requested him to prepare his last will and testament. After the testator
instructed him on the terms and dispositions he wanted on the will, the notary public told them to
come back on June 15, 1983 to give him time to prepare it. After he had prepared the will the notary
public kept it safely hidden and locked in his drawer. The testator and his witnesses returned on the
appointed date but the notary public was out of town so they were instructed by his wife to come back
on August 9, 1983, and which they did. Before the testator and his witnesses signed the prepared will,
the notary public explained to them each and every term thereof in Ilocano, a dialect which the
testator spoke and understood. He likewise explained that though it appears that the will was signed
by the testator and his witnesses on June 15, 1983, the day when it should have been executed had
he not gone out of town, the formal execution was actually on August 9, 1983. He reasoned that he
no longer changed the typewritten date of June 15, 1983 because he did not like the document to
appear dirty. The notary public also testified that to his observation the testator was physically and
mentally capable at the time he affixed his signature on the will.
ISSUE: Was there a valid will?
HELD: The Petition has no merit. We are not convinced. Fraud is a trick, secret device, false
statement, or pretense, by which the subject of it is cheated. It may be of such character that the
testator is misled or deceived as to the nature or contents of the document which he executes, or it
may relate to some extrinsic fact, in consequence of the deception regarding which the testator is led
to make a certain will which, but for the fraud, he would not have made.
We stress that the party challenging the will bears the burden of proving the existence of fraud at the
time of its execution. The burden to show otherwise shifts to the proponent of the will only upon a
showing of credible evidence of fraud. Unfortunately in this case, other than the self-serving
allegations of petitioner, no evidence of fraud was ever presented.

It is a settled doctrine that the omission of some relatives does not affect the due execution of a will.
That the testator was tricked into signing it was not sufficiently established by the fact that he had
instituted his wife, who was more than fifty years his junior, as the sole beneficiary; and disregarded
petitioner and her family, who were the ones who had taken the cudgels of taking care of [the
testator] in his twilight years.
Moreover, as correctly ruled by the appellate court, the conflict between the dates appearing on the
will does not invalidate the document, because the law does not even require that a [notarial] will x
x x be executed and acknowledged on the same occasion. More important, the will must be
subscribed by the testator, as well as by three or more credible witnesses who must also attest to it in
the presence of the testator and of one another. Furthermore, the testator and the witnesses must
acknowledge the will before a notary public. In any event, we agree with the CA that the variance in
the dates of the will as to its supposed execution and attestation was satisfactorily and persuasively
explained by the notary public and the instrumental witnesses.
Notably, petitioner failed to substantiate her claim of a grand conspiracy in the commission of a
fraud. There was no showing that the witnesses of the proponent stood to receive any benefit from
the allowance of the will. The testimonies of the three subscribing witnesses and the notary are
credible evidence of its due execution. Their testimony favoring it and the finding that it was executed
in accordance with the formalities required by law should be affirmed, absent any showing of ill
motives.
It must be noted that despite his advanced age, he was still able to identify accurately the kinds of
property he owned, the extent of his shares in them and even their locations. As regards the proper
objects of his bounty, it was sufficient that he identified his wife as sole beneficiary. As we have stated
earlier, the omission of some relatives from the will did not affect its formal validity. There being no
showing of fraud in its execution, intent in its disposition becomes irrelevant.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

ANDALIS VS. PULGUERAS

59 Phil 643
Topic/Doctrine: Forms of Wills
FACTS:
The alleged will of Victor Pulgueras was admitted to probate. The testimony of only one to the
attesting witnesses was taken. The testimony was: a) that the 6 pages of the will were signed on the
margin by the testator and two of the witnesses on January 4, 1931; b) the remaining three pages
were signed by the testator and the three attesting witnesses on January 11, 1931, and that the third
attesting witness then signed the first six pages.
ISSUE:
Was the will executed properly?
HELD:
Such an execution of the will was not in conformity with the law. Under our statute, the execution of a
will is supposed to be one act and cannot be legally effective if the various participants sign on
various days and in various combinations of those present.
Garcia v. Lacuesta
G.R. L-4067 November 29, 1951
Ponente: Paras, C.J.
Facts:
1. The CA disallowed the probate of the will of Antero Mercado dated Jan 1943. The said will was
written in Ilocano dialect.
2. The will appears to have been signed by Atty. Florentino Javier who wrote the name of the testator
followed below by 'A ruego del testador' and the name of Florentino Javier. In effect, it was signed by
another although under the express direction of the testator. This fact however was not recited in the
attestation clause. Mercado also affixed a cross on the will.
3. The lower court admitted the will to probate but this order was reversed by the Court of Appeals on
the ground that the attestation failed to recite the facts surrounding the signing of the testator and the
witnesses.
Issue: Whether or not the attestation clause in the will is valid
HELD: NO the attestation is fatally defective for its failure to state that Antero or the testator caused
Atty. Javier to write the former's name under his express direction as required by Sec. 618 of the Civil
Procedure. Finally, on the cross affixed on the will by the testator, the Court held that it is not prepared
to liken the mere sign of a cross to a thumbmark for obvious reasons- the cross does not have the
trustworthiness of a thumbmark so it is not considered as a valid signature.
Gonzales vs. Gonzales, 90 Phil. 444
if the testimony of such physician is not in the nature of mere professional speculation, as when it is
established that he attended the testator during his last illness and saw him on the day when the will
was supposed to have been executed, such testimony shall be given more credence

ANGELA M. BUTTE, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
MANUEL UY and SONS, INC., defendant-appellee.
FACTS
1.

Jose V. Ramirez was a co-owner of a house and lot located at Sta Cruz, Manila. Upon the death of
Jose V. Ramirez, all his property including the 1/6 undivided share was bequeathed to his children
and grandchildren and 1/3 of the free portion to Mrs. Angela M. Butte.

2.

Mrs. Marie Garnier Vda de Ramirez sold the property to Manuel Uy and Sons, Inc. including the
undivided 1/6 share property in Sta Cruz, Manila. On the same day, a copy of letter regarding the
above-mentioned sell was sent to Bank of the Philippine Islands, as administrator of the property of
Jose V. Ramirez.

3.

Mrs. Angela M. Butte filed a case against Manuel Uy and Sons, Inc for legal redemption when the
latter refused Mrs. Butte to redeem the said sold property.
ISSUE
Whether or not Mrs. Angela M. Butte has the right of succession to exercise legal redemption over the
share sold by Mrs. Marie Garnier Vda de Ramirez.
HELD
Yes, Mrs. Angela M. Butte has the right of succession to exercise legal redemption over the share
sold by Mrs. Marie Garnier Vda de Ramirez for being one of the co-owners of the heirs of the 1/6
undivided property of Jose V. Ramirez.
According to Article 1620 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, a co-owner of a thing may exercise the
right of redemption in case the shares of all the other co-owners or of any of them, are sold to a third
person. If the price of the alienation is gross expensive, the redemptioner shall pay only a reasonable
one.
Should two or more co-owners desire to exercise the right to redemption, they may only do so in
proportion to the share that may respectively have in the thing owned in common.

Roxas vs. De Jesus Jr.

134 SCRA 245
Petitioners: "In the matter of the intestate estate of Andres G. De Jesus and Bibiana Roxas De
Jesus, Simeon R. Roxas & Pedro Roxas De Jesus
Respondent: Andres R. De Jesus, Jr.
FACTS:
-Pet.- Simeon R. Roxas, brother of the deceased Bibiana Roxas De Jesus, was appointed
administrator of the Holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana Roxas De Jesus. 26-May-1973, Judge
Colayco set the probate of the holographic will. Pet.-Simeon testified that he found a notebook
belonging to the deceased (Bibiana R. De Jesus), that on pages 21-24, a letter-Will address to her
children and entirely written and signed in the handwriting of the deceased Bibiana was found. The
Will dated "FEB./61" and states:"This is my Will which I want to be respected although it is not written
by a lawyer. x x x". His testimony was supported by the testimonies of Pedro R. De jesus and Manuel
Roxas.
-However, Respondent Luz R. Henson (another compulsory heir), Opposed to probate the Will
because:
a. It was not executed in accordance with the Law;
b. It was executed through force, intimidation and/or under duress, undue influence and improper
pressure, and
c. the alleged testatrix (Bibiana R. De jesus) acted by mistake and/or did not intend, nor could
have intended the said Will to be her Last Will and Testament at the time of its execution.
-Aug 24,1973, Judge Colayco dismissed the appeal and allow the probate of the Holographic Will of
Bibiana R. De Jesus
- Respondent file a motion for reconsideration opposing that the said date "FEB./61" was not in
accordance with Article 810 of the Civil Code which provides that in the holographic will, it should
provide the Day, month, and year the will was executed.
ISSUE:
-W/N the Date "FEB./61" appearing on the holographic will of the deceased Bibiana R. De Jesus is a
valid compliance with the Article 810 of the Civil Code.
HELD/RULING:
- Yes, as a general rule, the "date" in a Holographic Will should be include the day, month, and year
of its execution. HOWEVER, when as in the case at bar, there is no appearance of fraud, bad faith,
undue influence and pressure and the authenticity of the Will is established and the only issue is
whether or not the date "FEB./61" is a valid compliance with Article 810 of the Civil Code, probate of
the holographic will should be allowed under the principle of substantial compliance.
- There is no question that the holographic will of the deceased Bibiana R. de Jesus was entirely
written, dated and signed by her, in the language of which she known. All of her children agreed on
the genuineness of the Holographic Will of their mother.