PRESIDENTIAL

DESIERTO

AD

HOC

FACT-FINDING

COMMITTEE

v.

Doctrine: In the nature of things, acts made criminal by special laws are frequently
not immoral or obviously criminal in themselves; for this reason, the applicable
statute requires that if the violation of the special law is not known at the time, the
prescription begins to run only from the discovery thereof, i.e., discovery of the
unlawful nature of the constitutive act or acts.

FACTS:
On 8 October 1992, President Ramos issued AO 13, creating the
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest (refer to
amounts granted to individuals mainly connected or associated
with late dictator Ferdinand Marcos despite their lack of
qualifications) Loans, with the Chairman of the PCGG as Chairman;
the Solicitor General as Vice Chairman; and one representative
each from the Office of the Executive Secretary, Department of
Finance, Department of Justice, Development Bank of the
Philippines, Philippine National Bank, Asset Privatization Trust,
Government Corporate Counsel, and the Philippine Export and
Foreign Loan Guarantee Corporation as members.
On 9 November 1992, President Ramos issued Memorandum Order
No. 61 directing the COMMITTEE to include in its investigation,
inventory, and study all non-performing loans which shall embrace
both behest and non-behest loans.

President Ramos directed COMMITTEE Chairman Gunigundo to

proceed with administrative and judicial actions against the twentyone firms.
On 2 March 1996, the COMMITTEE through Orlando O. Salvador, the
PCGG consultant detailed with the COMMITTEE, filed with the
OMBUDSMAN a sworn complaint against the Directors of PSI and
the Directors of the Development Bank of the Philippines who
approved the loans.
In the resolution, the OMBUDSMAN dismissed the complaint in
OMB-0-96-0968 on the ground of prescription.
Relying on People v. Dinsay, a case decided by the Court of
Appeals, he ratiocinated that since the questioned transactions
were evidenced by public instruments and were thus open for the
perusal of the public, the prescriptive period commenced to run
from the time of the commission of the crime, not from the
discovery thereof.
ISSUE: WON public respondent Ombudsman Desierto gravely
abused his discretion in holding that the prescriptive period in this
case should be counted from the date of the grant of the behest
loans involved, and not from the date of discovery of the same by
the committee.
HELD:

Moreover, a behest loan may be distinguished from a non-behest

loan in that while both may involve civil liability for non-payment or
non-recovery, the former may likewise entail criminal liability.
In its fourteenth report on behest loans to President Ramos, the
COMMITTEE reported that the Philippine Seeds, Inc., (hereafter PSI)
of which the respondents in OMB-0-96-0968 were the Directors,
was one of the twenty-one corporations which obtained behest
loans.

Yes. The right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired

by public officials or employees, from them or from their nominees
as transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches, or
estoppel.
Even assuming that the right to file criminal charges against the
respondents is prescriptible, the prescriptive period should be
counted from the discovery of the crimes charged, and not from the
date of their commission.

The COMMITTEE was unable to bring the action, for the cause
therefor was not known or reasonably known to it owing to the fact
that (1) the loans, being behest, were concealed; (2) both parties to
the loan transactions were in conspiracy to perpetrate the fraud
against the State; and (3) the loans were granted at the time then
President Marcos was at the threshold of his authority when no one
dared question, much less investigate, any of his orders.
The Court agrees with the OMBUDSMAN that Section 15 of Article XI
of the Constitution applies only to civil actions for recovery of illgotten wealth, and not to criminal cases, such as the complaint
against the respondents in OMB-0-96-0968. This is clear from the
proceedings of the Constitutional Commission of 1986.
The upshot of the foregoing discussion is that the prosecution of
offenses arising from, relating or incident to, or involving ill-gotten
wealth contemplated in Section 15, Article XI of the Constitution
may be barred by prescription.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are
instituted against the guilty person and shall begin to run again if
the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting double
jeopardy.
This simply means that if the commission of the crime is known,
the prescriptive period shall commence to run on the day it was
committed.

In the present case, it was well-nigh impossible for the State, the
aggrieved party, to have known the violations of R.A. No. 3019 at
the time the questioned transactions were made because, as
alleged, the public officials concerned connived or conspired with
the beneficiaries of the loans. Thus, we agree with the COMMITTEE
that the prescriptive period for the offenses with which the
respondents in OMB-0-96-0968 were charged should be computed
from the discovery of the commission thereof and not from the day
of such commission.
n the case at bar the OMBUDSMAN forthwith dismissed
complaint in Case No. OMB-0-96-0968 without even requiring
respondents to submit their counter-affidavits and solely on
basis of the dates the alleged behest loans were granted, or
dates of the commission of the alleged offense was committed.

the
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Since the computation of the prescriptive period for the filing of the
criminal action should commence from the discovery of the offense,
the OMBUDSMAN clearly acted with grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing outright Case No. OMB-0-96-0968. It should have first
received the evidence from the complainant and the respondents
to resolve the case on its merits and on the issue of the date of
discovery of the offense.