LEGAL MEDICINE
Petition for review under Rule 45
RIC: Allowed respondents to take oth and register CA: affirmed
r fh oF
ey passed the Physician Licensure
ination conducted in February 1993 by the Board of Medicin
PRC then released their names as successful examinees in the
medical licensure examination.
‘The Boars observe that the\grades ofthe 79 successul examinees!
fram Fatima Colege inthe two most dificult subject inthe medial
licensure exam, ‘Blocheristry (Bio-Chem) and Obstetrics and
Gecibey OP Biel Were Unusual vod: exceptional igh)
1 Fatima examines Scored 100% nSk-Chem and 10 g0 10% in
Os-Gime, another 11 got 99% In i-Chem, and 21 unred 99% in
Ose. he ord od ot el wo ped
from Fatima got marks of or better in subjects, and no one
Wp RI TRA OESD: compara ce porters of
er SORE ort orca ioale nas ase, Toe nae ech
thoes tein Neh answer on
OMRERIMED twas 's reowsrastng
hevcrneed toa Wife We Pies tare Barinetony
‘The Board issued a Resolution.
The Board requested FRvBienVEhdO FS NEbIES Sj fon expert
tmatheratian and authorty in statist, and later president ofthe
‘Ateneo de Mania University, to conduct a statistical analss ofthe
reautsin io-Chem and Ob-Gyne othe sald examination
Fr. Nebres reported that a comparison of the scores in Bio-Chem
‘and Ob-Gyne, of the Fatima College examinees with those of
examinees from De La Sale Unversity and Perpetual Hep Colas of
Medicine showed that the scores of Fatima College examinees were!
‘not only incredibly high but unusually clustered close to each other.
He concluded that there must be some unusual reason creating the
clustering of scores in the two subjects. It must be a cause strong
‘enough to eliminate the normal variations that one should expect
from the examinees [of Fatima College] in terms of talent, effort,
energy, etc.
‘NBI found that the questionable passing we re
Respondents (Arlene V. De Guzman et of, fled a special civil action
for mandamus, with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction
with ATC,
Meanwhile, the Board issued 2 Resolution charging respondents
‘with immorality, dishonest conduct, fraud, and deceit in connection
with the Bio: It recommended
that the
Elbe an oer rig he sinacion
SOuEM ty te repontens toatl Rea
the piscine onthfo lene V. De Gutman er and ee te
panei ie Sorte
Theypettionastien fed 3
ith cA,
{0 set aside the mandatory injunctive wrt. This petition was
ranted.
RULING: Yes
On The Existence of o Duty of the Board of Medicine To Issue
‘ertficates of Registration as Physicians under Rep. Act No. 2382.
For mandamus to prosper, there must be a showing that the officer,
board, or official concerned, has a clear legal duty, not involving,
discretion. Moreover, there must be statutory authority for the
performance of the act, and the performance of the duty has been
Tefused. Thus, it must be pertinently asked now: Did petitioners
have the duty to administer the Hippocratic Oath and register
respondents as physicians under the Medical Act of 1959?
‘As found by CA, on which we agree on the basis ofthe records:
Ie bears emphasing. herein. ca: (raommpappalaces aa
inerenot appellee Rae fl conpleePURIPaT he SGN dT
fequirements for admission into the licensure examinations for
‘physicians conducted and administered by the respondent-
epelonts on February 12,18, 2 and 2,199. Ses, to, mus
bbe made of the fact that all of them successfully passe
eee
A careful reading of
that the law uses the word ith respect to the issuance of
certificates of registration. TAds-the petitioners shall sign and issue
certificates of registration to those who have satisfactorily complied
with the requirements of the Board. In statutory construction the
term shall is a word of command. {It is given imperative meaning.
Thus, when an examinee satisfies the requirements for the grant of
pvc hws vs cg one om
‘oath and register him as a physician, pursuant to Section 20 and pac.
(hot section a ofthe Media act of 1959.
However, the surrounding circumstances in this case cal for serious
inquiry concerning the satisfactory compliance with the Board
requirements by the cespondents. The unusually high scores in the
two most difficult subjects was phenomenal, according to Fr.
Nebres, the consultant of PRC on the matter, and raised grave
doubts about the integrity, if not validity, of the tests. These doubts
have to be appropriately resolved.
Under the\second paragraph of Section’22;the Board is vested with
the power to conduct administrative investigations and disapprove
applications for examination or registration, pursuant to. the
objectives of Rep. Act No, 2382 as outlined in Section 1 thereof
Until the moral/and’ mental fitness of the’ respondents could
faaee to petitioners, the Board has diser eg
in abeyance the administration ofthe Hippocratic Oath and the,
cates nda
Sections of Reps Act Now 2382 prescrbes, among others, that 9
Person who aspires to practice medicine in the Philippines, must
hhave satisfactorily passed the corresponding Board Examination.
Section 22, in turn, provides that the oath may only be administered
to physic Qualified in the examinations. The operative word
here isGatisfactoril) defined as sufficient to meet a condition of
obligation fe of dispelin ‘Or ignorance, Gleaned from
m he licensing authority apparently did not
find that the respondents satisfactorily passed the’ licensure
examinations. The Board instead sought to'nulliy the examination
results obtained by the respondents.
@on te ian ofthe respondents To Be Regiered s Physiion
‘The function of mandamus
an ca al remedy, and the writ
of mandamus is a legal remedy for a legal right. There must be a
well-defined, clear and certainLEGAL MEDICINE
The aforementioned guidelines are provided for injReps/Act|No:y
‘amended, which prescribes thdequirements for admission
to the practice of medicine®he qualifications of candidates for the
board examinations, th€@icope and conduct of the examinations,
Qe grounds for denying the issuance of a physicians license, or
‘@evoking a license that has been issued. Verily, to be granted the
privilege to practice medicine, the applicant must show that he
possesses all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications. Furthermore, it must appear that he has fully
with all the conditions and requirements imposed by the
law and the licensing authority. Should doubt taint or mar the
compliance as being less than satisfactory, then the privilege will not
issue, For said privilege is distinguishable from a matter of ght,
“which may be demanded if denied. Thus, without a definite showing
that” the aforesaid) requirements and conditions have been
satisfactorily met, the courts may not grant the writ of mandamus
to secure sald privilege without thwarting the legislative will
3.) On the Ripeness of the Petition for Mandamus
Section 260f the Medical Act of 1959 provides for the
administrative and judicial remedies that respondents herein can
avail to question Resolution No. 26 of the Board of Medicine,
‘namely: (a) appeal the unfavorable judgment to the PRC; (b) should
the PRC ruling still be unfavorable, to elevate the matter on appeal
to the Office of the President; and (c) should they still be
unsatisfied, to ask for a review of the case or to bring the case to
court viaa special civil action of certiorari. Thus, aS_a_tule,
‘mandamus! will not fielwhen administrative remedies are still
availables However, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies does not apply where, as in this case, a pure question of
Jaws raised. On this issue, no reversible error may, thus, be laid at
the door of the appellate court.
‘This Decisions binding only onthe remeining respondents, namely: Acene V
de Guzmon, ClerinaS Novorro, Roe! |. Tolentino, Bernordite Sy, Glerio
7: Jularbl, Hubert. Nezareno, Nancy J. Chavez, Ernesto L. Cue, Herminio V.
Fernandes, J, Morie Victoria IM. Leesomona and Mery O. Ste. Ain, os well,
(0 the petitioners.
2. DECS vs. SAN DI
claims that he took the NMAT three times and flunked it as many’
times; When he applied to take it again, the petitioner rejected his
application. The petitioner contends he may not, under its rule that
hh) A student shall be allowed only three (3)
chances to take the NMAT. After three (3}
successive failures, a student shall not be
allowed to take the NMAT for the fourth time.
‘The private respondent insists he can, on constitutional grounds. He
then went to RTC Valenzuela, to compel his admission to the test. In
his original petition for mandamus, he first invoked his
‘constitutional rights to academic freedom and uality education| By
‘agreement of the parties,
nged. the constitutionalty of the above-cited rule.
‘The additional grounds raised were due process and equal
protection,
|RTCjtigeldeciored the chalenad ordes valde It was held thatthe
patitoner had been deprived of his fight to pursue a medial
education through an arbitrary exercise of the police power,
>) Whether 2 person who has thrice failed the National
Admission Test (NMAT) is entitled to take it again.
HELD: NO. We cannot sustain the respondent judge. Her decision
must be reversed.
In his Court Upheld the Constitutionality of
the NMAT as a measure intended to limit the admission to medical
schools only to those who have intially proved their competence,
and preparation for a medical education.
‘The proper exercise of the police power requires the concurrence of
a lawful subject and a lawful method. The subject ofthe challenged
regulation.is certainly within the.ambit of the:police,power,Itis the
right and indeed the responsibilty of the State to insure that the
imedial_ profession ig not infltrated by incompetents to_whom)
Patients may unwarlly entrust thelr lives and health.
‘The method employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant
to the purpose of the law nor isi arbitrary or oppressive. The three:
flunk ‘rule is intended’ to’ insulate the medical schools and
ultimately the medical profession from the intrusion of those not
qualified to be doctors.
While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he'doesinot)
hhaVe'a' constitutional right to be/a doctor! This is true of any other
calling in which the public interest is involved; and the closer the
link, the longer the bridge to one’s ambition. The State has the
responsibilty to harness its human resources and to see to it that
they are not dissipated or, no less worse, not used at all. These
resources must be applied in a manner that will best promote the
‘common good while also giving the individual @ sense of
satisfaction.
‘A person cannot insist on being a physician if he will be'a menace
to his patients. f one who wants to be a lawyer may prove better
‘36 a plumber, he should be so advised and adviced. Of course, he
may not be forced to be a plumber, but on the otfier hand he may
not force his entry into the bar. By the same token, a student who
hhas demonstrated promise as a pianist cannot be shunted aside to
take a course in nursing, however appropriate this career may be for
others.
The to alt education voted by the private respondent
There can be no question that a Substantial distinction "ests
[between medical” studentsand other students) who are not
subjected to the NMAT and the three-flunk rule. The medical
profession directly affects the very lives of the people, unlike other
careers which, for this reason, do not require more vigilant
regulation.
‘The Court feels that itis not enough to simply invoke the right to
uality education as a guarantee of the Constitution: one must show
‘that he is entitled to it because of his preparation and promise. The
private respondent has failed the NMAT five times. While his
ppersistence is noteworthy, to say the least, it is certainly
misplaced, like a hopelesslove-K 11's 4AM ana this?
No depreciation is intended or made against the private
respondent. I is stressed that a person who does not qualify in the
NMAT is not an absolute incompetent unfit for any work orLEGAL MEDICINE
‘occupation. The only-inference is that-he-is-a-probably-better,-not.
for-the:medical. profession, but-for-another-caling that has-not
excited his interest
In the former, he may be a bungler or at least lackluster; in the
latter, he is more likely to succeed and may even be outstanding. It
Is for the appropriate calling that he is entitled to quality education
for the full harnessing of his potentials and the sharpening of his
Fatent talents toward what may even be a briliant future
We cannot have a society of square pegs in round holes, of dentists
who should never have left the farm and engineers who should have
studied banking and teachers who could be better as merchants,
Ie is time indeed that the State took decisive steps to regulate and
enrich our system of education by directing the student to the
course for which he is best suited as determined by intial tests and
evaluations. Otherwise, Wet
in who prescribed
‘medicines which she religiously took. Nevertheless, the abdominal
pains and fever kept on recurring and bothered Mrs. Villegas to no
: lof the exaanalion mpeled Kr
agg tat Mr igs be aah rh hh!
inte atl wien sh oe he atone o vee
peed eee asicliacoera tones
ofthe lett nd rah ovres which gave out pus eta pos being
the urs ands pee of ube ateralson the ight seo the
tts embered on] Uw oratan et 2 ches 6a
size. This piece of rubber material described as a
have been a torn section of a surgeon's
5 oF could have come from other sources. And this foreign
‘body was the cause of the infection of the ovaries and consequently
ofall the discomfort suffered by Mrs, Villegas after her delivery.
‘There are now two different versions on the whereabouts of that
offending "rubber" (1) that it was sent to the Pathologist in Cebu as
testified to in Court by Dr. Kho and (2) that Or. Kho threw it away as
told by her to Defencant.
ISSUE: The appreciation of Or. Kho's testimony.
RULING: While the petitioners claim that contradictions and falsties
punctured Or. Kho's testimony, a reading of the said testimony
reveals no such infirmity and establishes Dr. Kho as a credible
witness. Dr. Kho was frank throughout her turn on the witness
Considering that we have assessed Dr. Kho to be a credible witness,
her positive testimony (that a piece of rubber was indeed found in
private respondent Villegas’ abdomen] prevails over the negative
testimony in favor of the petitioners.
‘As such, the rule of res ipsa loquitur comes to fore
ebuttable
presui lant was negligent, which
arises upon proof that [the] instrumentality causing injury was in
defendant's exclusive control, and that the accident was one which
ordinary does not happen in absence of negligence. Res ipso
Inthe insfant case,
arse» entire proceedings of the cé 3n section were
tunder the exclusive control of Or. Batiqun. In tis ligt, the private
respondents were bereft of direct evidence as to the actual culprit
or the exact cause of the foreign object finding its way into private
respondent Vilegas' body, which, needless to es not occur
unless through the intervention of negligencet ince aside
from the cesarean section, private respondent Vilegas underwent
no other operation which could have caused the offending piece of
rubber to appear in her uterus, it stands to reason that such could
only have been a by-product of the c
Dr, Batiquin. The:
CU
Sometime in 1985, finda Ramos} was advised to undergo an
operation for the removal of a stone in her gall bladder
(cholecystectomy). She was referred to:DrsHosaka/a surgeon, who
agreed to perform the operation on her.The operation was
Scheduled for June 17, 1985 at 9:00 in the morni
Erlinda was admitted to the DLSMC the day before the scheduled
‘operation. By 7:30 in the morning of the following day, petitioner
Erlinda was already being prepared for operation. Upon the request
‘of petitioner Erlinda, her sister-in-law, /Herminda Cruz! who was
then pe e
was allowed to accompany her
5 morning, when
Rogelio already wanted
to pull out his wife from the operating room. He met:
‘who remarked that he was also tired of waiting for Or. Hosaka. DrLEGAL MEDICINE
Hosaka
ie E88 was then sil inside the operating room, heard about Dr.
Hosakas arrival. While she held the hand oF Ena, Cri saw Oe
Gutired tring to intubate the patent. Cruz heard Dr. Gutierrez
Utter ong firap masintubate nto, mali yaa ang pogtokapasok. 0
[umole ong tion Cruz noticed a Bish dscoloraton of Erindas
ralleds on er left hand. She then heard Dr. Hosaka instruct
Someone to call Dr: Calderon, another anesthesoigist When he
arrived, Dr. Caléeron attempted to intubate the patient. The
railbeds ofthe patient remained bush, thus, she was placed ina
A postion wiere the Mead ofthe patient is
,, "placed ina poston lowe than her fet.
3 WORD!
‘at almost 3:00 in the afternoon, she saw Ends bing Wheeled ta
ihe fCUsThe decors explained to petitioner Rogelio that his wie
had bronchospasm, Eins stayed in the ICU for @ month She was
released from the hosital ony four non lter, Since he i-ated
opeation, lind remained in comatose condition unt sh
Pettoner filed with te RTCof Quezon City chi case for damages
aoinst prvate respondents,RTCFendered judgment in favor off
petioners:On appeal by private respondents, the
“Tesdecsion! gkoncriospasm sudden consiricin of the
muses in te nals of the bronchioles;
ISSUE: abnormal contraction of smooth muscl€ oF the
1. WON Dr. GutbrretTaiesthesilogst is lable for neligence
2. WON Dr Hosaka (surgeon) abe For negligence ; and
2, WON DISMC sable for any act of negligence commited by thei
Visiting consultant surgeon and anesthesiologist. RUSCULT~ fo listen
(heart, ngs,
Fie OE RR ts ilo GANAS noraibhpreonsrat
evaluation-on Erlinda. As she herself admitted, she saw Erlinda for
the fist time on the day ofthe operation itself, one hour before the
scheduled operation. she GisculttaBthe patients heart and lungs
and checked the laters blood pressure to determine if Eriinda was
endelenburg pe
indeed fit for operation. However, Shedd not proceed to examine
taken by physicians
er Sep ts Sa CEN tbe a ee ee
ea ony aneRaUe before the scheduled operate procedure was
°c, therefore, an act_of exceptional negligence and_ profesional
o upholffresponsibility: ‘The measures cautioning prudence and vigilance In”
Mal esi wih human lives lie a the core ofthe physicians centres-
dards cleGippocratic ORT He flue to folow this medical procedure,
therefore, @ clearindicia of her negligence. It was the faulty
intubation on Erlinda that caused her comatose condition. There is
ro question that Erlinda became comatose after Or. Gutierrez
performed a medical procedure on her
The€QRSRBLIsh coloration ofthe skin or mucous membranes
caused rfock of nen or abnormal hemogoin nthe lod) ad
enlargement of the stomach of Etnds indate that the
tndovoceal tube was impronety igered ite the esophagus
ata ofthe tacheo,Conseauert, xen Was Gelvared t
the lungs bok fo tHe qasoinestnal tact Ths concson Is
Supported by the fet that Enda wat leced in wrecelenburg
postion. This ndeaes tat thee was a decease of blood spa 0
the patients brain. The brain was thus temporarily deprived of
‘oxygen supply causing Erlinda to go into coma.The
BR.HOSAKA is tigble, ‘e.
2 Wes) Bre ves For ene pecana? Facil circumstances obtaining
in this case justly the application of the|Captain-othe:ship
GORI the fats on record it can be logically inferred that
Dr. Hosaka exercised a certain degree of, at the Very least,
supervision oer the procedure then being performed on Ernda
(Gis) t was Dr. Hoska who recommended to pettioners the
services of Dr. Gutierrez. In elfect, he represented to petitioners
that Dr. Guieres possessed the necessary competence and
ski. Whenever Dr. Hosaka performed a surgery, he would always
engage the services of Or. Gutiere to administer the anesthesia on
hie patient
ond) Dr. Hosaka himself admitted that he was the attending
Dilan of Elinda, Thus, when Erlinda showed signs ofeyanoss, it
was r. Hosaka who gave instructions to call for another
anesthesiologist and cardiologist to help resuscitate Erlinda.
Chird) ors. Hosaka and Gutierrez worked as a team. Their duties
Inleraect with each other
br, Hosaka was keeping an eye on the intubation of the patient by
br. Gutierrez, and while doing so, he observed that the patients
rails had become dusky and had to call Dr. Gutierrezs attention
thereto. They have a common responsiblity to treat the patient,
which responsibility necessitates that they call each others attention
to the condition of the patient while the other physician Is
performing the necessary medical procedures.
duty of attending to petitioner Erlinda promptly for he arrived more
than 3 hours late for the scheduled operation. The unreasonable
[delay In petitioner Erindas scheduled operation subjected her to,
continued starvation and consequently, to the risk acidosis, or the
Condition of decreased alkalinity of the blood and tissues, marked
by sickly sweet breath, headache, nausea and vomiting, and visual
Gisturbances, The long period that Dr. Hosaka made Erlinda wait for
hhim certainly (aggravated the)anetyithat she must have been
feeling at the time. It could be safely sid that her anxiety adversely
affected the administration of anesthesia on her.
It is equally important to point out that Or. Hosaka was remiss in his |
brs Hosaka's responsible ‘conduct of arriving very late for the
Scheduled operation of petitioner Erlinda is violative, not only of his,
duty as a physician to serve the interest of his patients with the
sreatest solcitude, giving them always his best talent and skil, but
busMic, NOT HABLE.
3.NOs There is no emplayer-employée relationship between DISMC
‘and Ors. Cue SEER HSSEE WET WoUTE Ral OLSMC soliary
liable for the injury suffered by petitioner Erlinda under/Article 2180)
Further, no evidence was adduced to show that
the injury suffered by petitioner Erlinda was due to a failure on the
part of respondent DLSMC to provide for hospital facilities and staff
necessary for her treatment.
oe
Ey BHLEGAL MEDICINE
Facts: Pregnant with her ath child, Corazon Nogales, 37 years old,
‘was under the exclusive prenatal care of Dr. Oscar Estrada beginning
‘on her ath month of pregnancy or as early as December 1975. While
Corazon was on her last trimester of pregnancy, Dr, Estrade noted
fan increase in her blood pressure and development of leg
edemaindicating preeclampsia,which is a dangerous complication of
pregnancy.
‘Around midnight of 25 May 1976, Corazon started to experience
‘mild labor pains prompting Corazon and Rogelio Nogales to see Dr.
Estrada at his home. After examining Corazon, Or. Estrada advised
her immediate admission to the Capitol Medical Center (CMC).
(On 26 May 1976, Corazon was admitted at 2:30 am. at the CMC
after the staff nurse noted the written admission requestof Or.
Estrada. Corazon was then brought to the labor room of the CMC.
Dr. Rosa Uy, who was then a resident physician of CMC, conducted
‘an internal examination of Corazon. Dr. Uy then called up Or.
estrada to—notify him = of-—her_‘findings.
Based on the Doctor's Order Sheet, around 3:00 a.m., Dr. Estrada
ordered for 10 mg. of valium to be administered immediately by
‘nteamuscular injection. Dr. Estrada later ordered the start of
Intravenous administration of syntocinon admixed with dextrose,
5%, in lactated Ringers’ solution, at the rate of eight to ten micro-
‘drops per minute. Subsequently, when asked ifr. Estrada needed
the services of an anesthesiologist, he refused. Despite Dr. Estrada’s
refusal, Dr. Enriquez, an anethesiologist at CMEC, stayed to observe
Corazon's condition.
[At 6:22 am, Dr. Estrada, assisted by Or. Villaflor, applied low forceps
to extract Corazon's baby. In the process, a 1.0 x 2.5 em. piece of
cervical tissue was allegedly torn. The baby came out in an apnic,
cyanotic, weak and injured condition. Consequently, the baby had
to be intubated and resuscitated by Dr. Enriquez and Dr. Payumo.
‘At 6:27 a.m,, Corazon began to manifest moderate vaginal bleeding
which rapidly became profuse. Corazon's blood pressure dropped
from 130/80 to 60/40 within five minutes. There was continuous
profuse vaginal bleeding.
[At 9:15am, Corazon died and the cause of death was "hemorrhage,
post partum.” Rogelio, the husband, filed complaint for damages
‘against CMC, Dr. Estrada and the other doctors who assisted during
the delivery of Corazon.
Issue: Whether CMC is vicariously liable for the negligence of Or.
Estrada
Ruling: YES. Or. Estrada is an independent contractor. Applying the
control test, SC did not find evidence pointing to CMC's exercise of
‘control over Dr. Estrada's treatment and management of Corazon's
condition, The patient was under the exclusive prenatal care of Or.
Estrada, CMC merely allowed Dr. Estrada to use its facilties when
Corazon was about to give birth, which CMC considered an
emergency,
But while SC held that Dr. Estrada is not CMC's employee, CMC is
vicariously liable under the @ectrine of apparent authority
General Rule: A hospital is not liable for the negligence of an
independent contractor-physician,
Except: When physician is the "ostensible" agent of the hospital
(doctrine of apparent authority)
(‘ete ieee
(2) the hospital, or its agent, acted in a manner that would lead a
feasonable person to conclude that the individual who was alleged
to be negligent was an employee or agent of the hospital;
(2) where the acts of the agent create the appearance of authority,
the plaintiff must also prove that the hospital had knowledge of and
‘acquiesced in them; and
{@) the plaintiff acted in reliance upon the conduct of the hospital or
at with ordinary care and prudence.
ther the hospital acted in a manner which
would lead a reasonable person to conclude that the individual who
was alleged to be negligent was an employee or agent of the
hospital.
‘The hospital need not make express representations to the patient
that the treating physician is an employee of the hospital; rather a
representation may be general and implied.
2) An inquiry on whether the plaintiff acted in reliance upon the
‘conduct of the hospital or its agent, consistent with ordinary care
and prudence.
plication of these factors to this che:
‘a member of its medical staff.
a) CMC granted staff privileges to Or. Estrada. CMC
‘extended its medical staff and facilities to Dr. Estrada.
b) CMC made Rogelio sign consent forms printed on CMC
letterhead. These forms did not indicate that he was an
independent contractor- physician. No one from CMC
Informed the Spouses,
¢) Dr. Estrada’s referral of Corazon's profuse vaginal
bleeding to Dr. Espinola, who was then the Head of the
Obstetrics and Gynecology Department of CMC, gave the
impression that Dr. Estrada as a member of CMC's medical
staff was collaborating with other CMC- employed
specialists in treating Corazon.
2) Rogelio testified that he and his wife specifically chose Or. Estrada
to handle Corazon's delivery not only because of their friend's
recommendation, but more importantly because of Dr. Estrada's
connection with a reputable hospital, the CMC." In other words, Dr.
Esteada's relationship with CMC played @ significant role in the
Spouses Nogales’ decision in accepting Dr.
Estrada’s services.
“The element of "holding out" on the part of the hospital does not
require an express representation by the hospital that the person
alleged to be negligent is an employee. Rather, the element is
satisfied if the hospital holds itself out as a provider of emergency
room care without informing the patient that the care is provided
by independent contractors.
‘The doctrine of apparent authority is a species of the doctrine of
estoppel. Article 1431 of the Civil Code provides that "through
estoppel, an admission or representation is rendered conclusive
‘upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved 2s
‘against the person relying thereon.” Estoppel rests on
"Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission,
intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular
thing tru, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation
arising out of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted to
falsity a”
In the instant case, CMC impliedly held out Dr. Estrada as 2 member
of its medical staf. Through CMC's acts, CMC clothed Dr. Estrada
with apparent authority thereby leading the Spouses Nogales toLEGAL MEDICINE
believe that Or. Estrada was an employee or agent of CMC. CMC
cannot now repudiate such authority.
‘The Court finds respondent Capitol Medical Center vicariously liable
for the negligence of Dr. Oscar Estrada. The amounts of P105,000 as
actual damages and P700,000 as moral damages should each earn
legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum computed
from the date of the judgment of the trial court.
GR
Ponent
Quisumbing
FACTS: Petitioner Dr. Milagros L. Cantre is a specialist in Obstetrics
‘and Gynecology at the Dr. Jesus Delgado Memorial Hospital. She
was the attending physician of respondent Nora S. Go, who was
‘admitted atthe said hospital on April 19, 1992.
[At 1:30 a.m, of April 20, 1992, Nora gave birth to her fourth child, &
aby boy. However, at around 3:30 am., Nora suffered profuse
beading inside her womb due to some parts of the placenta which
were not completely expelled from her womb after delivery.
Consequently, Nora suffered hypovolemic shock, resulting in a drop
in her blood pressure to "40" over "0." Petitioner and the assisting
resident physician performed various medical procedures to stop
the bleeding and to restore Nora's blood pressure. Her blood
pressure was frequently monitored with the use of a
sphygmomanometer. While petitioner was massaging Nora's uterus
for it to contract and stop bleeding, she ordered a droplight to warm
"Nora and her baby. Nora remained unconscious until she recovered,
While in the recovery room, her husband, respondent John David 2.
Go noticed a fresh gaping wound two and a haf (2 %) by three and
a half (3 %) inches in the inner portion of her left arm, close to the
armpit. He asked the nurses what caused the injury. He was
lnformed it was a burn
Thereafter, on April 22, 1992, John David filed a request for
investigation, and in response, Dr. Rainerio S. Abad, the medical
director of the hospital, called petitioner and the assisting resident
physician to explain what happened. Petitioner said the blood
pressure cuff caused the injury.
(On May 7, 1992, John David brought Nora to the National Bureau of
Investigation for a physical examination, which was conducted by
‘medico-legal officer Or. Floresto Arizala, Jr. The medico-legal officer
later testified that Nora's injury appeared to be a burn and that @
| premature. Citing Section 26 of Republic Act (R.A) No. 2382 or the
ditha to undergo 2 Dilstation and Cucsttage Procedure (DECTOr | Medical Act of 1959, the CA held that the plain, speedy and
Osea. adequate remedy under the ordinary course of law which petitioner
< should have availed herself of was to appeal to the Office of the
n July 30, 1994, petitioner performed the D&C procedure. Editha | President.
wa chara rom ne hora he folowre dyLEGAL MEDICINE
Petitioner claims that the law does not allow complainants to
appeal to the PRC from the decision of the Board. She invokes
Article 1V, Section 35 of the Rules and Regulations Governing the
‘Regulation and Practice of Professionals, which provides:
Sec. 35. The respondent may appeal the decision of the Board
within thirty days from receipt thereof to the Commission whose
decision shall be final. Complainant, when allowed by law, may
interpose an appeal from the Decision of the Board within the same
period. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner asserts that a careful reading of the above law indicates
that while the respondent, as a matter of right, may appeal the
Decision of the Board to the Commission, the complainant may
interpose an appeal from the decision of the Board only when so
allowed by law.
Petitioner cited Section 26 of Renublic Act No, 2382.0r The Medical
‘Act of 1959, to wit
Section 26, Appeal fcom judgment. The decision of the B887TGF
‘Medical Examiners (now Medical Boar) shall automatically become
final thirty days after the date of its promulgation unless the
respondent, during the same period, hasappealed: tow the’
wv Professional Regulations
Commission)
Philippiness if the final decision is not satisfactory, the respondent,
may ask for Tein Niece ora le eet een ee may file in court a petition fo
fh
Petitioner posits that the reason why the.
‘only the respondent in-an administrative case to file an anneal with,
the Commission while the complainant is not allowed to do so i
joubTe jeopardy. Petitioner is of the belief that the revocation of
Ticenseto practice a profession is penal in nature
feld)The Court does not agree. For one, the
Double
Jeopardy attaches only: () upon a valid indictment; (2) before a
‘competent court; (3) after arreignment; (4) when a valid plea has
been entered; and (5) when the defendant was acquitted or
convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated
‘without the express consent of the accused, These elements were:
‘ot present in the proceedings before the Board of Medicine, as the
proceedings involved in the Instant case were administrative and
‘ot criminal in nature. The Court has already held that double
Jeopardy does not le in administrative cases,
Moreover, Sgction 35 of the Rules and Regulations Govesning the
Regulation 2h cited by petitioner was
Subsequently amended to read:
Sec, 35. The complainant/respondent may appeal the order, the
‘resolution or the decision of the Board within thirty (30) days from
receipt thereof to the Commission whose decision shall be final and
executory. interlocutory order shall not be appealable to the
Commission. (Amended by Res. 174, Series of 1990),
Whatever doubt was created by the previous provision was settled
with said amendment. Its axiomatic that the right to appeal is not a
natural right or a part of due process, but a mere statutory privilege
that may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by law.
‘Such conclusion is bolstered by the fact that in 2006, the PRC issued
Resolution No. 06-342(A), or the New Rules of Procedure in
‘Administrative Investigations in the Professional Regulations
Commission and the Professional Regulatory Boards, which provides
for the method of appeal, to wit:
Sec. 1. Appeal; Period NonExtendible.- The decision, order or
‘resolution of the Board shall be final and executory after the lapse
of fifteen (15) days from receipt of the decision, order or resolution
without an appeal being perfected or taken by either the
respondent or the complainant. A party aggrieved by the decision,
‘order or resolution may file a notice of appeal from the decision,
‘order or resolution of the Board to the Commission within fifteen
(25) days from receipt thereof, and serving upon the adverse party 3
notice of appeal together with the appellants brief or memorandum
‘on appeal, and paying the appeal and legal research foes. xxx
‘nent the substantive merits of the case, petitioner questions the
PRC decision for being without an expert testimony to support its
conclusion and to establish the cause of Edithas injury
Clee riparia particular form of negigence whied
‘const MEYanure of a physician or surgeon to apply to his
prortce of medicine that degre of cae and stl which ordinary
tavcored ithe protein geval under nla Solis, ot
in He surrounding ceumstances. in order to sucessfully pursua
Bait
There are
EP
Gryscian patient relations} wes created when Editha employed
the Sear or Grier. As Ecithas physician, petitioner was
duty-bound to use at least the same level of care that any
reasonably competent doctor would use to treat a condition under
the same cumstances. The breach ofthese professional duties of
Skil ond cote, or their improper performance by a_physicaq
strgeon, whereby the ‘patient is injured in body or in health,
Constitutes actionable. malp 0 th of mes
In the present case,
WITNESS
Generally, to qualify as argéxpert witness, one must have acquired
eee nie exmesneee ee
or by practical experience.
‘Manald specializes in gynecology and obstetrics, authored and,
co-authored Targus pubWations on the subject and
Stihe Une mes, According to him, his lagnoss
faiths case was Ectopic Pregnancy Intersil (also referred to as
_Aeorwsal, Ruptured stating that the OBC procedure was nt the
proximate couse ofthe rupture of Edthas uterus resuiting in her
hysterectomy
It is clear thatLEGAL MEDICINE
to treat a condition under the same circumstances, and that there
was nothing irregular in the way the petitioner dealt with Editha,
Medical malpractice, in our jurisdiction, is often brought as a civil
action for damages under -Aftic| the Givi he
defenses in an action for damages, provided for under Article 2179
of the Civil Code a
Aart. 2179. When the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate
and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if
his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate
cause of the injury being the defendants lack of due care, the
plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the
damages to be awarded.
‘An injury or damage is proximately caused by an act or a failure to
‘act, whenever It appears from the evidence in the case that the act
(or omission played a substantial part in bringing about or actually
‘causing the injury or damage; and that the injury or damage was
either a direct result or a reasonably probable consequence of the
‘actor omission,
which could have avoided
the injury. The omission in not returning for a follow-up evaluation
played a substantial part in bringing about Edithas own injury. Had
Editha returned, petitioner could have conducted the proper
‘medical tests and procedure necessary to determine Edithas health
condition and applied the corresponding treatment which could
have prevented the rupture of Edithas uterus. T
proper diligence required to avoid the injury.
WHEREFORE, theg@iition is GRANTED The assailed Decision of the
Court of Appeals dater in CA-GR SP No, 62206 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Board of Medicine
Gated March 4, 1999 exonerating petitioner is AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as t0 cost.
FACTS: Petitioner Peter Paul Patrick Luca (Peter) con
Gedmtimpecat Complaining of a
Peter made use of his health core insurance issued by
Philamcare Health ystems, Inc @iiameare) for a possible consult
The Phlamcare Coordinator, Dr. Edwin Oca, MO.,referes
respondent, Dr. Prospero Ma. C. Tuake, M.D. (Or
acted
Upon consuittion with Dr. Tuafo, Peter narrated that it had been
ine (9 ays since the problem with his right eye began; and that he
was address the problem in his eye.
According to Dr. Tuafo, he performed "ocular routine examination’
fon Peter's eyes. On that particular consultation, Dr. Tugito
diagnosed that Peter was suffering from conjunctvitisor
Tuato then prescri for Peter
‘and told the latter to return Tor follow-up after one week. Peter
‘went back to Dr. Tuafio/ Upon examination, Or. Tuafo told Peter
Address the new problem with Peter's right eye, (py. Tuafo
dosage of six (6) drops per day. To recall, Peter hati already been
Using Maxitcol prior to his consult with Dr. Tuafio.
Peter would go back and forth to Tuano’s clinic to complain about
the worsening condition of his right eye. In these instances, Tuano
weds to counter the recurring EKC. On
Ghserved by his wife, Fatime, who had
juano ordered the Immediate discontinuation of
‘Maxiteol and prescribed other meds. eter had no vision in his right
eye. Fatima observed that Peter's right eye appeared to be bloody
‘and swollen, Thus, spouses Peter and Fatima rushed to the clinic of
Dr. Tuaflo: Peter reported to Or. Tuafio that he had been suffering
from constant
Peter went to
110 I), on 21 December 1988, who allegedi
‘onducted @ complete ophthalmological examination of Peter's
eyes. Dr. Batungbacal's diagnosis wasGlaucoma))He recommended
ser Te for Peter's right eye. Peter to Dr. Agul to who
‘concurred on Peter's condition and recommended the same
‘medication. Also, Peter was padded by his friends to seek a second
‘medical opinion. Thus hel
He informed Peter that his
opi
eyes were relatively normal ex
right eye, Petitioners claimed that Or. Aquino essentially told Peter
that the latter's condition would require lifetime medication and
foliow-ups. Thus, he underwent 2 procedures of the aser
trabeculoplasty.
*
Claiming to have sterold- induced glaucoma and blaming Tuano fo,
the same.
,
@s aera
GI crac rtbbece of hs protrged vse of Mantra, Be
suffered from steroid induced glaucoma as well as incurable
impairment of vision which may lead to permanent blindness. They
prayed that prayed that Tuafo be adjudged liable for compensation
for his impaired vision, actual, moral and exemplary damages plus
attorney's fees
AIO
In his defense, Tuano asserted that the dru
temporary and curable and that Steroids are prescribed to treat
induced glaucoma is
ie
Stressed that Peter's glaucoma can only be due to other causes not
attributable to steroids long standing glaucoma; and that in factLEGAL MEDICINE
steoits were in fact nated) asthey provoked the latest
glaucoma to be revealed earl
(CDYamissed she complaint fornsuifcent evidences The RTC
‘Oped that petitioners failed to prove by preponderance of
evidence that Dr. Tuarlo was negligent in his treatment of Peter's
condition. in particular, the record of the case was bereft of any
evidence to establish that the steroid medication and its dosage, as
prescribed by Dr. Tuafo, caused Peter's glaucoma. The tral court
reasoned that the "recognized standards of the medical community
has not been established in this case, much less has causation been
established to render {Tuafo] lable.
(@eIAMEDATCs DECISION upon appeal
ISSUE: whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in
affirming the judgment of the RTC that petitioners failed to prove,
by preponderance of evidence, their claim for damages against Dr.
Tuafo.
‘We are not convinced, The judgments of both the Court of Appeals
and the RTC are in accord with the evidence on record, and we are
accordingly bound by the findings of fact made therein.
‘The case at bar is a medical negligence case against a physician
based on the later's professional negligence.
2
Gzae of sil care, ond learning possessed by other persons in he
Same profession; and that as a proximate reul of such feiure, the
patient or his heirs suffered damages. Such claim for damages is
favs anchored on the alleged violation of Article 2376 of
damages, 4@l&mhts Must be shown to co-exist: (1) duty (2) breach;
(ery: od) prxiete custo, There tach of Bay
cae Sl and gece, ofthe improper prformagsoF ch dy
when the poet injured in Boy oF route reas
the estimony af an expert ness thatthe estmencrse to
th paint fed to mest the sonar lvl of cae, aki and
igen whch pico lathe sare general Une of paca
ondary possess ard err ne caves Prot of beth of dy
‘injury for which recovery is sought must
consequence of the wrong done. In other words, negli
be the proximate cause of the injury or that caust Saar ihe
Saran canines sequences urbrolan By any efficent
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result
would not have occurred. To establish the proximate cause, one
‘must similarly use expert testimony {0 present to the court 2
realistic assessment of the likelihood that the physician's alleged
negligence caused the patient's injury. No question that a physician-
patient relationship developed between Dr-Tualo and Peter,
The ous probandi was on
the patient to establish before the tial court that the physicians ign.
lored standard medical procedure.
failure on
However, there wasabsolute
to
‘he standard of care to be implemented by competent physicians 2
that,_in is treatment of Peter, Or, Tuafio failed in his _dut
(Geercise sald standard of care that any other competent physician
‘would usp, 3) that the injury or his glaucoma was the result of his
‘seof Maxitrol as prescribed by Dr. Tuafo. Failure to prove the first
“element alone is already fatal, Petitioners maintain that Or. Tuano
falled to follow in Peter's case the required procedure for the
rolonged use of Maxitro
Beene ts THERE MUST BE pf STANDARD
he Court has 10
‘Jardstick upon which to evaluate or weigh the attendant facts to
state with confidence that the acts complained of, indeed,
constituted negligence. Critical and clinching factor in a medical
negligence case is proof of the causal connection between the
regligence which the evidence established and the plaintt's
injures itis necessary to prove not only that he has been injured
‘and defendant has been at fault, but also that the defendant's fault
‘caused the injury. Causation must be proven within a reasonable
medical probability based upon competent expert testimony - proof
that Peter's glaucoma would not have occurred but for Dr. Tuano's
supposed negligent conduct.
‘What constitutes proper medical treatment is 3 medical question
that should have been presented to experts.
Cnet
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES, INC. vs. NATIVIDAD and ENRIQUE AGANA
GR. No. 126467
BRUM net ee oan
EN cw MNO G A cE!
Ane ni ones
Cianeerre)
Pence ems
EEL
Geren ccUn)
Teac
ror
evan Cay
FACTS: On April 4, 1984, 1as rushed to the
se ofCGificuity of
Dr. Miguel Ampll diagr
her to be suffering fror (On April 11, Dr.
Amgil, assisted by the medical staff of the said hospital
He found that the
far Fe sro en tS on er oe
pace ete she removal of cera potter e Ts OF Are
obtained th@Lonsent of Natividad’s husband, Enrique Agana, to
permit juan Fuentes, respondent ino perform bystesectomy.on
Fiera couple of dvs, she complained Orexeriting
ana FEBGRE she consulted both Or. Api and Dr Fuentes about i.
They told her thatthe pain was the natural consequence of theLEGAL MEDICINE
surgery. Or. Ampil then recommended that she consult an
fogist to examine the cancerous nodes which were not
Femoved during the operation.
OnMay 9, 3884, Navidad, eecomparied by her husband ROAR
er four neh of conatatos
Pe Bboatoy examinations she wes tl she yas
avid ew back the Pipies, stl iff
mpl. upon being Ifomed that there was 3
‘ompting her to seek treatment at
she underwent another surgery to
remedy the damage caused by a foreign object in her vagina
(another
@
oF
November 12, 1984, Natividad and her husband filed with the
Aeic)ot cueron Ciy + comple for damages agains the
@Qréessional Services, Inc, (PSI), owner of the Medical City Hospital,
br. Ampil, and Or. Fuentes They alleged thatthe later are lable for
FeGiigengh for leaving two pleces of gauze inside Natividac's body
Se gcealing their acts of negligence. Envigue gf
filed with t fe ministrative complaint for gross negligence
and maloractioe ainst Or. Ari and Or. Fuentes. The PRC Board of
Medicine heard the case only wit respect to Dr Fuentes because it
fale to acquire jurisdiction ove Or. Amp who was then inthe US.
In 1986, pending the outcome of the above case, Nativided died
fan appeal to the CA. Incidentally, the Aganas fled with
the RTC @ motion for a partial execution of its decision where
certain properties of Dr. Ampil were levied aad sold and the amount
s 's was the one who left the two pieces of gauze
inside Natividad’s body, and that he concealed such fact from her.
ISSUES:
41) whether Or. Ampilis liable for negligence and malpractice
2} whether Dr. Fuentes is absolved of any lability
3) whether PSI may be held solidarly lable for the negligence of Or.
Ampil
auuns: Da. Amp 26 beable
Go —
SS a ReTTe e oretrel we pu pn
Domistewrsnne ocd hatte cout choad or aur
repaints tr Foe fe gees a Nati
ea ea ve nae rear
oe ie pier Radon omen acts ron te Suto
Sartre ous nenoads boa Ar rumen
pur contend wit ass
All the major circumstances, taken together, as specified by the CA,
directly point to Dr. Ampil as the negligent party. Surgeons used
‘gauzes as sponges to control the bleeding of the patient during the
surgical operation. After the operation, the nurses noted in thelr
report that 2 sponges were lacking and after search was done but to
no avail, Dr. Ampil continued for closure. After the operation, 2
‘gauzes were extracted from the same spot of the body of Mrs.
‘Agana where the surgery was performed.
“An oration requiring the placing of sponges in the incision Is not
complete until the sponges are properly removed, and itis settled
that the leaving of sponges or other foreign substances in the
‘wound after the incision has been closed is at least prima facie
geeligence by the operating surgeon. To put it simply, such act i
Considered so inconsistent with due care as to raise an inference of
negligence. There are even legions of authorities to the effect that
Such aét is negligence per se.
#
‘isle
experiencing was the ordinary consequence of her operation.
1 what was intially an act of negligence by Dr.
(mpl has ripened Into a deliberate wrongful act of deceiving his
patient. This is a clear case of medical malpractice or more
‘appropriately, medical negligence. To successfully pursue this kind
of case, a patient must only prove that a health care provider either
failed to do something which a reasonably prudent health care
provider would have done, or that he did something that 2
reasonably prudent provider would not have done; and that failure
or setion caused injury to the patient. Simply put, the elements are
duty, breach, injury and proximate causation. Of, Ampil, as the lead
surgeon, beached both duties to remove all foreign objects, suchas
gauzes, from Natividad’s body before closure,of the incision and
when he filed to do s0, to inform Natividad about it. What further
agggavated such injury was his deliberate concealment of the
‘missing gauzes from the knowledge of Natividad and her family.
aes Die Faantes it not Wabpeo.
‘The Court is not convinced with the arguments of the Aganas. They
assdiléd’the dismissal by the tral court of the case against Dr.
Fuentes on the ground that itis contrary to the doctrine of res ipse
loguitur. According to them, the fact that the two pieces of gauze
were left inside Natividad’s body is a prima facie evidence of Dr.
Fuentes’ negligence.
Lkerally, eis
the rule that the fact of the occurrence of an injury, taken with the
surrounding ciccumstances, may permit an inference or raise @
presumption of negligence, or make out a plaintiffs prima facie
case, and present a question of fact for defendant to meet with an
‘explanation. Stated differently, where the thing which caused the
injury, without the fault of the injured, is under the exclusive control
of the defendant and the injury Is such that it should not have
‘occurred if he, having such control used proper. care, it affords
reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation that the injury
‘arose from the defendant's want of care, and the burden of proof is
shifted to him to establish that he has observed due care and
itigence. From the foregoing statements of the rule, the
: (2) theio
LEGAL MEDICINE
defendant; (3) the
‘operating surgeon is the person in complete charge of the surgery
room and all personnel connected with the operation. Their duty is
to obey his orders. In this case, he was the one who called Or.
Fuentes to perform hysterectomy and examined his work and found
It to be in order. He granted Or. Fuentes’ permission to leave. He
‘was about to finish the procedure when the attending nurses
informed him that two pleces of gauze were missing, A “diligent
search” was conducted fut the misplaced gauzes were not found,
7 Amplt then directed that the incision be closed. It was this act of
lordering the closure of the incision notwithstanding the fact that
two pieces of gauze remained unaccounted for that caused injury to
NNatividad’s body. Clearly, the
spbstantive law, hence. dass not per se create or constitute an,
independent_or separate sround of ability. being a_mere,
evidentiary rule. In other words, mere invocation and application af
{Be doctrine does not dispense with the requirement of proof of
Degligence. Here, the negligence was proven to have been
‘Committed by Dr. Ampil and not by Or. Fuentes.
ged the injury was
‘there is no reason to exempt hospitals from the universal rule of
frst place, hospitals exercise significant control in the hiring end
firing of consultants and in the conduct of their work within the
hospital premises. Accordingly, the Court ruled that for the purpose
of allocating responsibility in medical negligence cases, an
Syer-employee relationship in effect exists between hospitals
ding and visiting physicians. *
Tali ts perros nee pre FRED)
Geos) agency by estoppel aed the socte of Sram
‘Apparent authority, or what is sometimes referred to as the
Sievers ‘Out” theo’), or doctrine of ostensible agency or agency by
‘estoppel, Tas Ts origin from the law of agency. It imposes lability,
not as the result of
The concept is essentially one of estoppel.
"The principal is bound by the acts of his agent with the apparent
‘authority which he knowingly permits the agent to assume, or which
he holds the agent out to the public as possessing. The question in
‘every case is whether the principal has by his voluntary act placed
the agent in such a situation that a person of ordinary prudence,
conversant with business usages and the nature of the particular
business, is justified in presuming that such agent has authority to
Perform the particular act in question. Art. 1869 of the Civil Code
recognizes the concept of an agency by Implication or estoppel
ich states that agency may be express, or implied from the acts
3) Yes. Propessiewat~ penvi tea-tve~is- solidarity ‘of the principal, from his silence or lack of action, or his failure to
In this jurisdiction, the statute govérning liability fornegligent acts is
Aicles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code.
A prominent civlist commented that professionals engaged by an
employer, such as physicians, dentists, and pharmacists, are not
“employees” under this article because the manner in which they
ferform their work i not within the control of the employer. They
re considered personaly lable for the fault oF negligence they
commit in the discharge of their duties, and their employer cannot
be held liabie for such fault or negligence. In the context of the
present case, "a hospital cannot be held lable for the fault or
negligence of a physician or surgeon in the teatment or operation
EF patients." The Weemtoendo 5 (egards a physician, ever
employed by a hospital as af independent contractor because of
the skill he exercises and the lack of contol exerted over his work.
Under this doctrine, hospitais are exempt from the application of
the respondeat superior principle for fault or negligence committed
by physicians in the discharge of ther profession.
However, the efficacy of the foregoing doctrine has weakened with
the significant developments in medical care. Courts came to realize
‘that modern hospitals are increasingly taking active role in supplying.
and regulating medical care to patients. They regularly employ, on a
salaried basis, a large staff of physicians, interns, nurses,
administrative and manual workers. They charge patients for
‘medical care and treatment, even collecting for such services
through legal action, if necessary. The court then concluded that
repuciate the agency, knowing that another person is acting on his
behalf without authority, 7
In this case, PSI publicly displays in the Jobby of the Medical City
Hospital the names and specializations of the physicians associated
fEntamount to holding out to the public that Medical City Hospital,
through its accredited physicians, offers quality health care services.
By accrediting Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes and publicly advertising
their qualifications, the hospital created the impfession that they
‘were its agents, authorized to perform medical‘or surgical services
for its patients. As expected, these patients, Natividad being one of
them, accepted the services on the reasonable belief that such were
bbeing rendered by the hospital or its employees, agents, or servants.
PSI is also liable for breach of duty premised on corporate
negligence. Its formulation proceeds from the judiciary’
‘acknowledgment that in these modern times, the duty of providing
quality medical service is no longer the ‘ole prerogative and
responsibility of the physician. Hospitals now tend to organize a
highly professional medical staff whose competence and
performance need to be monitored by the hospitals commensurate
with thelr inherent responsibilty to provide quality medical care. inLEGAL MEDICINE
the present case, it was duly established that PSI operates the
‘Medical City Hospital for the purpose and under the concept of
providing comprehensive medical services to the public. PS failed in
lis duty to exercise reasonable care to protect from
patients admitted into its facility for medical treatment.
ividad wit ssistance of the Medical
City Hospitals staff, composed of resident doctors, nurses, and
interns. A corporation is bound by the knowledge acquired by or
notice given to its agents or officers within the scope of their
authority and in reference to 2 matter to which their authority
extends. This means that the knowledge of any of the staff of
‘Medical ci Now, the failure
Cf PSI, despite the attending nurses’ report, to investigate and
inform Natividad regarding the missing gauzes amounts to callous
negligence. Not only did PS! breach its duties to oversee or
supervise all persons who practice medicine within its walls it also
falled to take an active step in fixing the negligence committed. This
renders PSI, not only vicariously liable for the negligence of Dr.
Ampill under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, but also directly lable for
its own negligence under Aticle 2176. It filed to adduce evidence
showing that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in
the accreditation and supervision ofthe latter. In neglecting to offer
such proof, PSI failed to discharge its burden under the last
paragraph of Article 2180 cited earlier, and, therefore, must be
adjudged solidarily liable with Or. Ampil. Moreover, PSI is also
ditectiy liable to the Aganas.
4
SENT
FACTS: Raymond S. Olavere (Raymond), af
Gees ese ot ec eee ae
a Z sd a to bf
Raymond's parents (Deogenes Olavere and Fe Serrano)
artived at the BRMC, accompanied by one Andrew Olavere
(Raymond's uncle).
After extending intial medical treatment to Raymond,
Olavere went to the
required blood,
‘n6G30>.m., Raymond was wheeled inside the operating
room. X(%:18)PM. Raymond's parents returned wth the bag of
blood witty h - a
ant
to secure the
Barents to ‘cS of pe “0 Gs ene for the
operation. Comping with the request, Deogenes and Andew
Deere ererenen ter
ate (Maluhy-On ard Agua) bere stig on
israel bees popeioat ar (cae! aerator?
rcpalar ail ce tr slecr Rrc e
tod a tle" preter teal ed ating
him ns eaten or Keres Reason
rete terre, the RB de the hoa ent of
two other
2
Upon opening of Raymond's thoracic cavity, howeve, Drs.
ate and Cereno found that 3,200 cc of
‘The blood was evacuated and patitioners found a puncture at the
inferior pole of the left lung. In his testimony, Dr. Cereno stated that
considering the loss of blood suffered by Raymond, he did not,
ately transfuse blood because he had to control the bleeders
Becsnn Gnt 250 Amro doh coat
dhetolnsof bond
Raymond's parents, claiming that there was negligence on
the part of the doctors who attended to their son, fled before the
\gainst Nurse Balares, Dr. Realuyo and
attending surgeons Or. Cereno and Or. Zafe.
a
Th in not immediately
conducting surgery on Raymond. It noted that petitioners have
already finished operating on one of the two other patients in the
Of as early as 10:30 in the evening, and yet they only started the
operation on Raymond at around 12:15 early morning of the
following day. The RTC held that had the surgery been performed
promptly, Raymond would not have lost so much blood and,
therefore, could have been saved.
‘The tral court also held that the non-availability of Or.
‘Tatad after the operation on the first patient was not a sufficient
‘excuse for the petitioners to not immediately operate on Raymond.
It called attention to the testimony of Dr. Tatad herself, which
disclosed the possibilty of calling a standby anesthesiologist in that
situation. The trial court opined that the petitioners could have jus
requested for the standby anesthesiologist from Dr. Tat
‘against Or. Ruel Lewy and Arlene Balares for lack of merit,
but ordered
for the death of Raymond, as well as moral and exemplary dama;
Storney’s Tees, and costs of suit. Qo appeal, the CA affirmed in toto
the judgment rendered by the RTC Paging herein petitioners guilty
of gross negligence in the performance Otxheir duties and awarding
damages to private respondents. Pabee (are)
ISSUE: WON the CA erred in ruling that petitioners were grossly
‘negligent in the performance of their duties.
ana pe Cf lawsuit which has been nse ical
‘malpractice or, more appropriately, medical negligence, is that type
Of claim which a victim has available to him or her to redress 2
wrong committed by a medical professional which has caused bodily,
harm. In order to successfully pursue such a claim, a patient must
prove that a health care provider, in most cases a physician, either
failed to do something which a reasonably prudent health care
Provider would hay meth
provider would have dane, or that he ar she did something that a
Feasonably prudent provider would not have done; and that the
Talure or action caused injury to the patient. Stated otherwise, theLEGAL MEDICINE
st way to prove these is through the opinions of
longing in the same neighborhood and in the
cipert witnesses
‘same general line of practice as defendant physician or surgeon. The
deference of courts to the expert opinion of qualified physicians
stems from the former's realization that the latter possess unusual
technical skils which laymen in most instances are incapable of
Inteligently evaluating, hence, the indispensabllity of expert
testimonies.
==)
The tral court first imputed negligence on the part of the
petitioners by their failure to perform the operation on Raymond
immeciately after finishing the other patient's operation. It rejected
{as an excuse the non-availability of Dr. Tatad. The trial court relied
fon the testimony of Or. Tatad about 2 "BRMC protocol” that
introduces the possibility that a standby anesthesiologist could have
‘been called upon. From there, the trial court concluded that it was
the duty of the petitioners to request Or. Tatad to call on Dr.
Rosalina Flores, the standby anesthesiologist. Since petitioners
failed to do so, their inability to promptly perform the operation on
Raymond becomes negligence on their part.
‘This Court does not agree with the aforesaid conclusion.
First. There is nothing in the testimony of Or, Tatad, or in
any evidence on the re
titioners were aware of vghat the hospital
5 2 standby anes Indeed, other
than the testimony of Dr. Tatad, there is no evidence that proves
that any such "BRMC protocol” is being practiced by the hospita’s
surgeons ata
aa
Evidence to the effect that petitioners knew of the "BMC
protocol” is essential, especially in view of the contrary assertion of
the petitioners that the matter of assigning anesthesiologists rests
within the full discretion of the BRMC Anesthesiology Department,
Without any prior knowledge of the "BRMC protocol,” We find that
it is quite reasonable for the petitioners to assume that matters
regarding the administration of anesthesia and the assignment of
anesthesiologists are concerns of the Anesthesiology Department,
‘while matters pertaining to the surgery itself fall under the concern
of the surgeons. Certainly, We cannot hold petitioners accountable
{ornot complying with something that they, in the first place. do not
drow,
Second. Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that there is
such "BRMC protocol” and that petitioners knew about it, We find
‘that their failure to request for the assistance of the standby
‘anesthesiologist to be reasonable when taken in the proper context.
‘There is simply no competent evidence to the contrary.
From the testimony of Or. Tatad herself, iis clear that the
matter of requesting for a standby anaesthesiologist is not within
the full discretion of petitioners. The "BRM protocol” described in
the testimony requires the petitioners to course such request to Dr.
TTatad who, as head of the Department of Anesthesiology, has the
final say of calling the standby anesthesiologist
‘As revealed by the facts, however, after the Maluluy-on
Operation, Or. Tatad was already assisting in the Lilia Aguila
‘operation. Ors. Zafe and Cereno then proceeded to examine
the life of Raymore
Raymond and they found that the latter's blood pressure was
normal and “nothing in him was significant." Dr. Cereno even
concluded that based on the x-ray result he interpreted, the fluid
inside the thoracic cavity of Raymond was minimal at around 200-
300 cc. Such findings of Ors. Cereno and Zafe were never challenged
and were unrebutted
Tatad was alre
Given that Or
‘that @ prudent surgeon faced with similar circumstances would
decide otherwise.
ee tere wae
thane course of acon kn by peitoner Was notin accord wth
those adopted by ther enone surges Insist
Nether was there any testimony gen, excep ht of Or. Tatas,
on which may be inferred that pettiones fled to exec the
andad of cae, digence, leanne, a sil expected om
brttnes of th pote SEED
nether in the fi
Causation Not Proven
tn medal epasnce case, ft sled that he
compliant has the burden of easing reach of ety ote
papel the dtr or suger tut be proven tat sux(@ae)
Gait cma sonar
Bef: n maroc scion cnn be bed on secon
carer. Guton ms be proven hn xsl med
pobbiy Seetiporconpetencenertesinen
Tne pret of Raya aed nts spec te om
thei 0 alone, they
do cased the
iu TH case anon he mee SUTTON hat Rome's
fe woud tv Den saved had peter surgeons needy
peated on hi od the ood been ess nthe needy
and tad the od been tanssed nmedaey Thee way,
however no 0 rested that Raymore fe wel ave een
sovednedtove things bre one, Tose ae ere sumptions sa
Cannot pares he desired sik, Such eanot be mace as ot
2 ecson in ths cae, especialy consermg tht the rae,
ceuaon nd cae of atone ee at ata
‘The Court understands the parents’ grief over their son’s
death. That notwithstanding, it cannot hold petitioners liable. It was
‘noted that Raymond, who was a victim of a stabbing incident, had
‘Multiple wounds when brought to the hospital. Upon opening of his
thoracic cavity, it was discovered that there was gross bleeding
Inside the body. Thus, the need for petitioners to control first what
was causing the bleeding. Despite the situation that evening, i.
humerous patients being brought to the hospital for emergency
treatment considering that it was the height of the Pefafrancia
Fiesta, it was evident that petitioners exerted earnest efforts to save
Je was st unfortunate that the loss of his life"LEGAL MEDICINE
‘was not prevented. Doctors are protected by a special law. They are
rot guarantors of care. They do not even warrant a good result
‘They are not insurers against mishaps or unusual consequences.
Furthermore, they are not lable fs bagest mistake of judgment
Petition for Review on Certiorar Grate Pa ruling REVERSED and
SET ASIDE
Next m Of 26
Fea
Natal fury af Inestzaton agit thy peor, [DE
Get af goferSoral GA hh eed her sn, Roy Afonso
Sarangi avy Hse
Seslerion te: R0l fed oat pn e)
Goren bees rset the Mania Doctors Hoel Tr
Tate toca ade tht eo th es
eso tng cr sk aed ia e
Ja Bastan entered the emergency room and, af
‘Conducting her own examination of the victim, informed Ms
Sn it was only the ankle that was hit, there w:
need to examine the upper leg. despite Mrs. Santiago's protest the
Zoctors did not examine the upper portion of the leg of Roy. that
even (3) ete fy. eed ee
leg and esalignmens bf the rant foo; thST Ws Saigo brought
him back tothe Fospal; and tat the Xray revealed a cght id-
tibial fracture anda linea hairline facture inthe hat ofthe bond
‘ter tial and applying the doctrine of ces ipsa oguitor o>
found petitioners to be gyiK of simple negligence. he decision Was
affirmed in toto by the CA.
(2) Whether of not the petitioner physicians are negligent, hence
liable for
damages.
1s to the first issue: This doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
here the thing which causes injury is shown to be under
the management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in
the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the
‘management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the
‘absence of an explanation by the defendant, thatthe accident arose
from want of care." The requisites for the application of the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur are:
(1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless
someone is negligent;
(2) the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under
the exclusive control ofthe person in charge: and
(a) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary
‘action of contribution of the person injures.
However, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as 2 rule of evidence is
‘unusual to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie
negligence may be established without aaa tai
substitute for spacific proof of negligence.
Stcemmenem
Relative to the case,
It was established that they are mere
resie nts of the Manila Doctors Hospital at that time who attended,
to th victim at the emergency room. While it may be true that the
sireu astances pointed out by the courts below seem doubtless to
constitute reckless imprudence on the part of the petitioners, this
conclusion is still best achieved, not through the scholarly
assumptions of a layman like the patient’s mother, but by the
unquestionable knowledge of expert witness/es. AS ro whether the
petitioners have exercised the requisite degree of skill and care in
treating patient Roy, Jr. is generally a matter of expert opinion.
"oe eae i se i: (a) that there Is lack of
precaution on TRE BaP ofthe offender, and (2) tat the damage
impending to be caused is not Immediate or the danger is not
clearly manifest.
br. Jareia and Or. Bastan, explained the court, cannot pass on the
liability to the taxi driver who hit the victim. It may be tre thatthe
actual, direct, immediate, and proximate cause of the injury
(fracture of the leg bone oF tibia) of Roy Jr. was the vehicular
accident when he was hit by 2 tax. The petitioners, however,
‘cannot simply invoke such fact alone to stiarstestion a 9M
iabinty ff this would be so, doctors would have a ready defense
‘Should they fail to do their job in attending to victims of hit-and-run,
maltreatment, and other crimes of violence in which the actual
Tiree, immediate, and f the injury i indubitably
the at of the perpetrators
In falling to perform an extensive medical examination 10
determine the extent of Roy Jr injuries, Dr. Jarcia and Dr. Bastan
were remiss of their duties as members of the medical profession.
‘Assuming for the sake of argument that they did not have the
capacity to make such thorough evaluation at that stage, they
should have referred the patient to another doctor with sufficient
training and experience instead of assuring him and his mother that
everything was allright.
‘Moreover, the contention of petitioners that they cannot be Rel
Physician-patient relationship exists when a patient engages the
services of a physician, a physician-patient relationship is generated.
‘And in accepting a case, the physician, forall intents and purposes,
represents that he has the needed training and skil possessed by
physicians and surgeons practicing in the same field; and that he will
employ such training, care, and skill in the treatment of the patient.
‘Thus, in treating his patlent, a physician is under a duty to exerciseLEGAL MEDICINE
Stated otherwise, the
physician has the obligation to use at least the same level of care
that any other reasonably competent physician would use to treat
the condition under similar circumstances.”
‘There is 2 physician-patient relationship in this case since the
pelraoner oblged Temselves and examiied the victiny and later
aSsured the mother that everything was fine and that they could go
home. Theicassurance that everything is fine deprived the victim of
seeking, medical hel
FERN OEIC
ald) was born on June 2, 1992 with an
Two days after his birth, Gerald underwent
ical procedure to bring one end of the large
InTERUTRE out through the abdominal wall, enabling him to excrete
through a colostomy bag attached to the side of his body.
On May 17, 1995, Gerald, then three years old, was admitted at the
Qspital_ng Maynila fora pullthrough operation. Dr. Leandro
SEE ase GAS aaa oar Sal
ico oe ae ees
Peeloeuss debe atcha hai ctl ha od
ee a ee eee ae
crs) Cent Sib tcadl bd ard und wert ess eae
Ys-comt lasted Tor iwo weeks, but he regained consciousness only
after a month He coulaoionger bx ear oF movy
Agitated by her son’s helpless and unexpected condition, Ma. Luz
Gercayo (Luz) lodged a complaint for reckless imprudence resulting
Jn serious physical injuries with the City Prosecutor's Office of
‘Wanila against the attending physicians.
The¢RTEYound Or, skin BS beyond reasonable doubt of
reckBssTmprudence resulting To-Physical injuries. Th
the conviction stating that the case isa textbook example of ses ipsa.
loquitur. According to the CA, the child except for his imperforate
‘Snus, was healthy. The tests and other procedures failed to reveal
that he was suffering from any known ailment or disability that
could turn into a significant risk. There was not 2 hint that the
nature of the operation itself was 2 causative factor in the ev
‘Tot finaly led to hypoxia, In short, the lower court has been left
Sith no reasonable hypothesis except to attribute the accident to a
failure in the proper administration of anesthesia, the gravamen of
the charge in this ease, Dr. Solidum appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issues:
1. Whether of not the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was applicable
herein
2, Whether or not Dr. Solidum was lable for criminal negligence
RULING:
1(%9)Res ipsa loquitur is literally translated as “the th
transaction speaks for itsell,” The doctrine res ipsa Toquitur means
That “where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the
management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the
ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the
‘management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the
‘absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose
from want of care.”
In order to allow resort to the doctrine, therefore, the following
essential requisites must first be satisfied, to wit: (1) the accident
‘Was of @ kind that does not ordinarily occur unless someone is
negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency that caused the injury
was under the exclusive control of the person charged; and (3) the
injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or
contribution ofthe person injured.
‘Goons alent det
patra fnappropriaie, Although it should be conceded without
Gificulty that the second and third elements were present,
considering that the anesthetic agent and the instruments were
‘exclisively within the control of Dr. Solidum, and thatthe patient,
being then unconscious during the operation, could not have been
guilty of contributory negligence, the first element was undeniably
wanting. Luz delivered Gerald to tW@ care, custody and control of his
“Physicians for a pull-through operation. Except for the imperforate
anus, Gerald was then of sound body and mind at the time of hs
submission to the physicians. Yet, he experienced bradycardia
during the operation, causing loss of his senses and rendering him
immobile. Hyporia, or the insufficiency of oxygen supply to the
brain that caused the slowing ofthe heart rate, scientifically termed
as bradycardia, would not ordinarily occur inthe process ofa pull
through operation, or during the administration of anesthesia to the
patient, but such fact alone did not prove thatthe negligence of any
of his attending physicians, including the anesthesiologists, had
caused the injury In fact, the anesthesiologist attending to him had
sensed in the course of the operation that the lack of oxygen could
have been triggered by the vago-agal reflex, prompting them to
administer atropine to the patient.
—— net pmb
ercae a aan er
fallre to monitor and properly regulate the level of anesthetic
agent administered on Gerald by overdosing at 100% halothane. In
affirming the conviction, the CA observed:
‘On the witness stand, Or, Vertido made a significant turnaround. He
affirmed the findings and conclusions in his report except for an
observation which, to all intents and purposes, has become the
storm center of this dispute. He wanted to correct one piece of
information regarding the dosage of the anesthetic agent
‘administered to the child. He declared that he made a mistake in
reporting a 100% halothane and said that based on the records it
should have been 100% oxygen.
The implication of Dr. Vertido’s admission is that there was no
overdose of the anesthetic agent, and the accused Dr. Solidum
stakes his liberty and reputation on this conclusion. He made the
assurance that he gave his patient the utmost medical care, never
leaving the operating room except for a few minutes to answer the
call of nature but leaving behind the other members of his team Ors.
‘Abella and Razon to monitor the operation. He insisted that he
administered only a point 1% not 100% halothane, receivingLEGAL MEDICINE
corroboration from Or. Abella whose initial MA in the record should
bbe enough to show that she assisted in the operation and was
therefore conversant of the things that happened. She revealed that
they were using a machine that closely monitored the concentration
of the agent during the operation.
‘The Prosecution did not prove the elements of reckless imprudence
beyond reasonable doubt because the circumstances cited by the
‘cAwere insufficient to establish that Or. Solidum had been guilty of
iiexcusable lack of precaution in monitoring the administration of
the anesthetic agent to Gerald.
[An action upon medical negligence - whether criminal, chil or
‘administrative - calls for the plaintiff to prove by competent
evidence each of the following four elements, namely: (1) the duty
‘owed by the physician to the patient, as created by the physician-
patient relationship, to act in accordance with the specific norms or
standards established by his profession; (2) the breach of the duty
by the physician’s falling to act in accordance with the applicable
standard of care; (3) the causation, ie, there must be a reasonably
close and causal connection between the negligent act or omission
‘and the resulting injury; and (4) the damages suffered by the
patient.
Here, the Prosecution presented no witnesses with special medical
qualfications in anesthesia to provide guidance to the trial court on
what standard of care was applicable. It would consequently be
ttuly dificult, f not impossible, to determine whether the first three
elements of a negligence and malpractice action were attendant.
Dr, Solidum was criminally charged for “failing to monitor and
regulate properly the levels of anesthesia administered to said
Gerald Albert Gercayo and using 100% halothane and other
anesthetic medications.” However, the foregoing circumstances,
taken together, did not prove beyond reasonable doubt that Or.
Solidum had been recklessly imprudent in administering the
anesthetic agent to Gerald. indeed, Dr. Vertido's findings did not
preclude the probability that other factors related to Gerald's major
‘operation, which could or could not necessarily be attributed to the
‘administration of the anesthesia, had caused the hypoxia and had
then Jed Gerald to experience bradycardia. Or. Vertido revealingly
concluded in his report, instead, that “although the anesthesiologist
followed the normal routine and precautionary procedures, still
hypoxia and its corresponding side effects did occur.”
‘The existence of the probability about other factors causing the
hypoxia has engendered in the mind of the Court 3 reasonable
doubt as to Dr. Solidum’s guilt, and,moves us to acquit him of the
crime of reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries.
H Ie OO
FACTS: Pedrito was married to one Carmen Castillo Dela
Torre(Carmen). She was due to give birth on February 2,1992 and
‘was brought at around 11:30 p.m. on that day. At around 3:00 p.m.
‘on February 3, Carmen was brought to the hospital's operating.
room for her caesarian section operation, which was to be
performed by Dr. Nestor. By 5:30 p.m. of the same day, Pedrito was
informed of his wife's delivery of a baby boy. Inthe early morning of
February 4, Carmen experienced abdominal pain and difficulty in
urinating. On February 10, Pedrito noticed that Carmen's stomach
‘was getting bigger, but Dr. Norma dismissed the patient's condition
as mer flatulence (kabag).
(On February 12, Carmen had her second operation. The condition of
Carmen, did not improve. it instead worsened that on February 13,
she vomited dark red blood. At 9:30 p.m. on the same day, Carmen
died. Per her certificate of death upon information provides by the
hospitalthe immediate cause of Carmen's death was “cardio-
respiratory arrest secondary to cerebro vascular accident,
hypertension and chronic nephritis induced by pregnancy.” An
autopsy Report prepared by Dr. Richard Patilano(Or. Patileno),
Medico-Legal Officer-Designate of Olongapo City, however,
provided that the cause of Carmen’s death was "shock due to
peritonitis, severe, with multiple intestinal adhesions; Status post
Clalesarian Section and Exploratory Laparotomy.”
Pedrito filed a complaint for damages against herein respondents. In
their answer to the complaint, they explained that there was no
‘unusual events that were observed during the course of Carmen’s
caesarian section operation. The second surgery, however, became
necessary due to suspected intestinal obstruction and adhesions.
This procedure was fully explained to Carmen and Pedrito prior to
its conduct, During the second operation, the diagnosis of intestinal
obstruction and adhesion was confirmed but resolved by her
doctors, Despite the observance of due care by the doctors,
however, Carmen died on February 13, 1992.
TC of Olongapo City, Branch 75, rendered its Decision in favor of
Pedrito, The tral court gave greater weight to the testimony of Dr.
Patilano. CA rendered its Decision reversing and setting aside the
decision of the RTC. For the appellate court, it was not established
that the respondents failed to exercisethe degree of diligence
required of them by their profession as doctors. The CA also granted
the respondents’ counterclaim for the amount of P48,$15.58.
ISSUE: Should respondents be held liable forthe death of Carmen?
RULING: No. "[Mledical malpractice or, more appropriately,
‘medical negligence, is that type of claim which a victim has available
to him or her to redress @ wrong committed by a medical
professional which has causéd bodily harm.” In order to successfully
pursue such a claim, a patient, or his or her family as in this case,
"must prove that a health care provider, in most cases a physician,
either failed to do something which a reasonably prudent health
‘care provider would have done, or that he or she did something that
2 reasonably prudent provider would not have done; and that
failure or action caused injury to the patient.”
‘The Court emphasized in Lucas, et al. v. Tuatlo that in medical
negligence cases, there is @ physician-patient relationship between
the doctor and the victim, but just lke In any other proceeding for
damages, four essential elements must be established by the
plaintiff, namely: (2) duty; (2) breach; (3) injury: and (4) proximate
causation. All four elements must be present in order to find the
physician negligent and, thus, able for damages.
It is settled that a physician’s duty to his patient relates t0 his
‘exercise of the degree of care, skill and diligence which physicians in
the same general neighborhood, and in the same general line of
practice, ordinarily possess and exercise in like cases. There is
breach of this duty when the patient is injured in body or in heath.
Proof of this breach rests upon the testimony of an expert witnessLEGAL MEDICINE
that the treatment accorded to the patient failed to meet the
standard level of care, skill and diligence. To justify an award of
damages, the negligence of the doctor must be established to be
the proximate cause of the injury.
Upon review, the Court agrees with the CA that the report and
testimony of Or. Patilano failed to justify Pedrito's entitlement to
‘the damages awarded by the RTC. Considering that it was not duly
established that Or. Patilano practiced and was an expert in the
fields that involied Carmen's condition, he could not have
accurately identified the said degree of care, skil, diligence and the
‘medical procedures that should have been applied by her attending
physicians.
Similariy, such duty, degree of care, skill and diligence were not
sufficiently established in this case because the testimony of Or.
Patilano was based solely on the results of his autopsy on the
cadaver of Carmen. His study and assessment were restricted by
limitations that denied his full evaluation of Carmen's case. He could
have only deduced from the injuries apparent in Carmen's body,
{and in the condition when the body was examined. Judging from his
testimony, Dr. Patilano did not even take full consideration of the
‘medical history of Carmen, her actual health condition at the time
(of hospital admission, and her condition as it progressed while she
was being monitored and treated by the respondents. There was
also no reference to the respondents’ defense that the emergency
‘caesarian section operation had to be performed in order to protect
the lives and safety of Carmen and her then unborn child. For lack of
sufficient information on Carmen's health condition while stil alive,
Dr, Patilano could not have fully evaluated the suitability of the
respondents’ decisions in handling Carmen's medical condition as it
turned critical
Itis also significant that the Chief of the Medico-Legal Division of the
PNP Crime Laboratory Service, Dr. Torres, testified before the trial
court that based on the autopsy report issued by Dr. Patilano, the
latter did not comply with the basic autopsy procedure when he
examined the cadaver of Carmen, Dr. Patilano did not appear to
have thoroughly examined Carmen's vital organs such as her heart,
lungs, uterus and brain during the autopsy. His findings were then
inconclusive on the issue of the actual cause of Carmen’s death, and
the claim of negligence allegedly committed by the respondents.
[As the Court held in Spouses Flores v. Spouses Pineda, et al,, the
critical and clinching factor in a medical negligence case Is proof of
the causal connection between the negligence and the injuries. The
Claimant must prove not only the injury but also the defendant's
fault, and that such fault caused the injury. A verdict in 2
‘malpractice action cannot be based on speculation or conjecture.
Causation must be proven within a reasonable medical probability
based upon competent expert testimony, which the Court finds
absent in the case at bar
Petition is DENIED.
15. DR. ANTONIO P. CABUGAO V PEOPLE; DR. CLENIO YNZON V
Booman)
(Sorry kung mahaba, | included the ruling of TC and CA; also there
‘are two decisions, one for each doctor)
FACTS: On June 14, 2000 at 4pm, 10-yr old Rodolfo Palma Jr, (JR)
complained of abdominal pain to his mother Rosario. At Spm,
together with her husband, Atty. Rodolfo Palma Sr., they brought JR
to the clinic of Dr who racttioner
specializing in family medicine. Or. Cabugao gave them medicine for
the pain and told them to call him if the pains continue. Due to
persistent abdominal pains, the following morning, they returned to
Dr. Cabugao who advised them to bring JR to Nazereth Gen.
Hospital in Dagupan for confinement. JR was admitted at 5:30am.
Blood samples were taken for testing and ultrasound was also
conducted. After Or. Cabugao’s rectal examination, the initial
impression was Acute Appendicitis, hence he coferrad the case to
De Ynson, a surgeon, Late that morning, Or. Ynzon went to the
hospital and read the lab results and ordered the administration of
‘massive antibiotics and pain relievers and put JR on observation for
24 hes,
ln the mocning of lune 16, 18 complained of abdominal pains and 3
swelling in the scrotum. That afternoon, JR vomited out several
times and had watery bowels. The nurses on-duty relayed JR's
condition to Or. Yazon who merely gave orders via telephone. He
advised them to continue the medications to alleviate the
abdominal spasms and diarrhea. By midnight, JR vomited, had
watery bowels and could not sleep. On June 17, JR had a fever of 38
dlegress C. He was glven one ampule Aeknil and 1 ampule Valium
‘out by 2pm that day/his temperature soared to 42 degreesC. He
had convulsions and died,
(On the death certificate prepared by Or. Cabugao, the Immediate
cause of death was Cardiorespiratory arrest. The Antecedent cause
was Metabolic Encephalopathy. The underlying cause was
Speticemia (Acute Appendicitis).
[An information was filed against the doctors for reckless
imprudence resulting to homicide. At the arraignment, both
doctors pleaded not guilty.
The trial court convicted both accused. According to the trial court,
JR was under the medical care of the accused from the time of
admission to the hospital until his death, The initial working,
diagnosis was acute appendicitis. However, the accused, as the
attending physicians, did not personally monitor JR in order to check
fon subtle changes thet may occur. Rather, they left the monitoring
‘and_actual_ob " cians wi 4
res aining and in doing so, they substituted their own
xpertise, skill and comy with 3f physicians who a
merely new doctors still on training. Throughout the course of the
hospitalization and treatment of JR, the accused failed to address
the acute appendicitis which was the initial diagnosis. They did not
take steps to find out if indeed acute appendicitis was what was
‘causing the massive infection. Appendicitis, according to exert
done by the accused,
‘On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction: Expert testimony clearly
revealed such want of reasonable skill and care on the part of JR's
attending physicians, appellants Dr. Cabugao and Dr. Ynzon in
neglecting to monitor effectively and sufficiently the
developments/changes during the observation period and act upon
the situation after said 24-hour period when his condition
worsened. Considering the brief visit only made on regular rounds,
records clearly show such gross negliger aleLEGAL MEDICINE
roprate st ter seal cause of JR's abdominal
nso that the crucial decision to perform sur endecto
had even been ruled out because of the inexcus
neglect to undertake such efficient diagnosis by process of
elimination, as correctly pointed out by the trial court.
In treating JR, appellants have demonstrated indifference and
neglect of the patient's condition as a serious case. Appendectomy
is the only rational therapy for acute appendicitis, Although difficult,
prompt recognition and immediate treatment of the disease
prevent complications. Under the factual circumstances, the
inaction, neglect anc indifference of appellants who, after the day
‘of admission and after being apprised of the ongoing infection from
‘the CBC and initial diagnosis as acute appendicitis from rectal
examination and ultrasound test and only briefly visited JR a1
during regular round lon or telephon
constitutes g70ss negligence leading to the continued deterioration
of the patient, his infection having spread in so fast a pace that he
died within just two and a hal (2%) days’ stay inthe hospital
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners’ conviction of the crime of
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, arising from an alleged
‘medical malpractice, s supported by the evidence on record
DECISION:
‘As to Dr. Ynzon’s Liability
Reckless imprudence consists of voluntarily doing or failing to do,
without malice, an act from which material damage results by
reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the
person performing o falling to perform such act. The elements of
reckless imprudence are: (1) that the offender does or fails to do an
‘act; (2) that the doing or the failure to do that act is voluntary; (3)
‘that it be without malice; (4) that material damage results from the
reckless imprudence; and (5) that there is inexcusable lack of
precaution on the part of the offender, taking into consideration his
employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical
condition, and other circumstances regarding persons, time and
place.
with respect to Dr. Ynzon, all the requisites of the offense have
been clearly established by the evidence.
It wos sufficiently established that to prevent certain death, it was
necessary to perform surgery on JR immediately. Even the
prosecution's own expert witness, Dr. Antonio Mateo, testified
during cross-examination that he would perform surgery on JR. Dr.
(Mateo testified that if surgery was not performed, the appendix
would rupture and infection would spread throughout the body. If
unchecked, this will result to death. He testified that the surgeon
rust decide within the 24 hour period whether or not to perform
surgery, depending upon the changes in the body of the patient.
It is clear that if JR's condition remained unchecked it would
Ultimately result in his death, 2s what actually happened in the
present case. Another expert witness for the defense, Or. Vivencio
Vilalor, I. testified on direct exsmination that he would perform @
personal and thorough physical examination of the patient as
frequent as every 4 to 6 hours. He also testified that the only way
to rule out the initial diagnosis of acute appendicitis was to
perform surgery.
Whether a physi has exercised the requisite d
cate in the treatment is, in the generality
‘of cases, a matter of expert opinion. From the testimonies of the
expert witnesses presented, it was irefutably proven that Or. Ynzon
failed to practice that degree of skill and care required in the
treatment of his patient.
‘As correctly observed by the appellate court, Dr. Ynzon revealed
"want of reasonable skill and care in attending to the needs of JR by
neglecting to monitor effectively the developments and changes on
JR's condition during the observation period, and to act upon the
When the patient worsened. He was not there during the crucial
times on June 16, 2000 when JR's condition started to deteriorate
until JR's death. As the attending surgeon, he should be primarily
responsible in monitoring the condition of JR, as he is in the best
position considering his skills and experience to know ifthe patient's
condition had deteriorated, While the resident-doctors-on_duty
kewise monitor the patient's condition, he is the one direct
ible for the patient as the attendin
reckless and gross negligence of duty to relegate his personal
responsibility to observe the condition of the patient. Again, acute
appendicitis was the working diagnosis, and with the emergence of
_raver symptoms after the 24-hour observation, Dr. Yazon ruled
0. Indeed, itis
‘out surgery for no apparent reason.
‘Among the elements constitutive of reckless imprudence, what
perhaps is most central to a finding of guilt is the conclusive
determination that the accused has exhibited, by his voluntary act
without malice, an inexcusable lack of precaution. Quasi-ffenses
penalize the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the
dangerous recklessness, the lack of care or foresight, the
imprudencia punible,” unlike willful offenses which punish the
Intentional criminal act.
To be sure, whether or not a physician has committed an
“inexcusable lack of precaution" in the treatment of his patient is
to be determined according to the standard of care observed by
‘other members of the profession in good standing under similar
circumstances bearing in mind the advanced state of the
profession at the time of treatment or the present state of medical
science. In accepting 2 case, a doctor in effect represents that,
having the needed training and skill possessed by physicians and
surgeons practicing in the same field, he will employ such training,
care and skill in the treatment of his patients. He, therefore, has a
‘duty to use at least the same level of care that any other reasonably
‘competent doctor would use to treat a condition under the same
circumstances, Sadly, Dr. Ynzon did not display that degree of care
and precaution demanded by the circumstances,
Decision as to Dr. Ynzon affirmed.
‘As to Dr. Cobugao’s Liability
Every criminal conviction requires of the prosecution to prove two
things — the fact of the crime, ie, the presence of all the elements
of the crime for which the accused stands charged, and the fact that
the accused is the perpetrator of the crime. Based on the above
disquisitions, however, the prosecution failed to prove these two
things. The Court is nat convinced with moral certainty that Or.
Cabugao is guilty of reckless imprudence as the elements thereof
were not proven by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt.LEGAL MEDICINE
The TC and CA held that the failure to perform the appendectomy
‘on JR was the primary cause of his death, However, a review of the
‘ecords show that Dr. Cabugao was not in the position to perform
the required surgery. Dr. Cabugao is not a surgeon but a general
practitioner specializing in family medicine. Even if he wanted to,
he cannot do an operation like an appendectomy. It is precisely for
this reason that he referred JR's case to Dr. Ynzon after he
suspected appendicitis. As testified by Or. Mateo, one of the expert
witnesses, it is the surgeon who was in the best position to
‘observe the sudden changes in the condition of the patient.
br. Cabugao’s supervision does not cease upon his endorsement of
his patient to the surgeon. Here, Dr. Cabugao has shown to have
exerted all efforts to monitor his patient and under these
circumstances he did not have any cause to doubt Dr. Ynzon's
‘competence and diligence.
Neither do we find evidence that Dr. Cabugao has been negligent or
lacked the necessary precaution in his performance of his duty as a
family doctor. On the contrary, a perusal of the medical records
would show that during the 26-hour monitoring on JR, it was Or.
CCabugao who frequently made orders on the administration of
Antibiotics and pain relievers. There was also repetitive instructions
from Or. Cabuga0 to refer JR to Dr. Ynzon as it appeared that he is
suspecting appencicitis. The referral of JR to Dr. Ynzon, a surgeon,
is actually an exercise of precaution as he knew that appendicitis is
not within his scope of expertise. This clearly showed that he
employed the best of his knowledge and skill in attending to JR's
condition, even after the referral of JR to Or. Ynzon. To be sure, the
calculated assessment of Or. Cabugao to refer JR to a surgeon who
hhas sufficient taining and experience to handle JR's case belies the
finding that he displayed inexcusable lack of precaution in handling,
his patient.
Dr. Cabuago was acquitted.
Asto Civil Liability
while pending on appeal, counsel for Dr. Yazon informed the Court
that the latter died in 2011 due to multiorgan failure.
In view of the foregoing, its clear that the death of the accused Dr.
‘Yoon pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal
liability, However, the recovery of civil ability subsists as the same
is not based on delictbut by contract and the reckless imprudence
he was guilty of under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.For this
reason, @ separate cwvil action may be enforced elther against the
‘executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on
‘the source of obligation upon which the same is based, and in
accordance with Section 4, Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure.
OUTLET
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‘March 11, 2015,
Pesan
Facts:
‘This cate is a result of three consolidated petitions for
review on certiorari. This stemmed from the first case was filed by
Nelson Cortejo for the wrongful death of his son allegedly due to
the medical negligence of the petitioning doctors and the hospital
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from “Dengue Hemorrhagic Fever.”
One hous later, Dr. Casumpang arrived at Edmer’s room and he
recommended his transfer to the ICU, to which the respondent
consented, Since the ICU was then full, the respondent insisted on
transferring his son to Makati Medical Center. At 12:00 midnight,
Eder, accompanied by his parents and by Or. Casumpang, was
transferred to Makati Medical Center. Or. Casumpang immediately
gave the attending physician the patient’s clinical history andLEGAL MEDICINE
laboratory exam results, Upon examination, the attending physician
diagnosed “Dengue Fever Stage IV" that was already in its
irreversible stage. Edmer died at 4:00 in the morning of April 24,
1988. His Death Certificate indicated the cause of death as
“Hypovolemic Shock/hemorshagic shock;* “Dengue Hemorrhagic
Fever stage IV.”
Believing that Edmer’s death was caused by the negligent and
erroneous diagnosis of his doctors, the respondent instituted an
action for damages against San Juan De Dios, and its attending
physicians: Dr. Casumpang and Dr, Sanga before the RTC of Makati
City
‘The RTC ruled in favor of Cortejo. The trial court faulted
them for heavily relying on the chest xray result and for not
considering the other manifestations that Edmer’s parents had
relayed. It held that in diagnosing and treating an illness, the
physician's conduct should be judged not only by what he/she saw
and knew, but also by what he/she could have reasonably seen and
known. It also observed that based on Eémer’s signs and symptoms,
his medical history and physical examination, and also. the
information that the petitioning doctors gathered from his family
members, dengue fever was a reasonably foreseeable illness; yet,
the petitioning doctors falled to take a second look, much less,
Consider these Indicators of dengue. Such decision was affirmed by
a.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petitioning doctors had committed
“inexcusable lack of precaution” in diagnosing and in treating the
patient.
2, Whether or not there is a causal connection between the
petitioners’ negligent act/omission and the patient’s resulting
death.
DISCUSSION ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE SUIT:
‘A medical malpractice suit isan action available to victims to redress
‘a wrong committed by medical professionals who caused bodily
hharm to, or the death of, a patient. As the term is used, the sult is
brought whenever a medical practitioner or health care provider
fails to meet the standards demanded by his profession, or deviates
from this standard, and causes injury to the patient, To successfully
pursue a medical malpractice suit, the plaintiff must prove that the
doctor either failed to do what 2 reasonably prudent doctor would
have done, or did what a reasonably prudent doctor would not have
done; and the act or omission had caused injury to the patient. The
patient's heir/s bears the burden of proving his/her cause of action.
‘The elements of medical negligence are:
1. DUTY refers to the standard of behavior that imposes restrictions
fon one's conduet. it requires proof of professional relationship
‘between the physician and the patient. Without the professional
relationship, a physician owes no duty to the patient, and cannot
therefore incur any lisbilty. A physician-patient relationship is
‘created when a patient engages the services of a physician and the
latter accepts or agrees to provide care to the patient. The
establishment of this relationship is consensual and the acceptance
bby the physician essential. The mere fact that an individual
approaches @ physician and seeks diagnosis, advice or treatment
does not create the duty of care unless the physician agrees. The
consent needed to create the relationship does not always need to
be express. In the absence of an express agreement, a physician:
patient relationship may be implied from the physician's affirmative
action to diagnose and/or treat a patient, or in his participation in
such diagnosis and/or treatment, The usual illustration would be the
case of a patient who goes to a hospital or a clinic, and is examined
and teated by the doctor. In this case, we can infer, based on the
established and customary practice in the medical community that a
patient-physician relationship exists. Once a physician-patient
relationship is established, the legal duty of care follows. The doctor
accordingly becomes duty-bound to use at least the same standard
‘of care that 2 reasonably competent doctor would use to treat a
‘medical condition under similar circumstances.
2. BREACH, 3. INJURY - Breach of duty occurs when the doctor fails
to comply with, or improperly performs his duties under
professional standards. This determination is both factual and legal,
and is specific to each individual case. if the patient, as a result of
the breach of duty, is injured in body or in health, actionable
malpractice is committed, entitling the patient to damages.
4. PROXIMATE CAUSATION - To successfully claim
damages, the patient must lastly prove the causal relation between
the negligence and the Injury. This connection must be direct,
natural, and should be unbroken by any intervening efficient causes.
In other words, the negligence must be the proximate cause of the
Injury. The injury oF damage Is proximately caused by the physician’s
negligence when it appears, based on the evidence and the expert
testimony, that the negligence played an integral part in causing the
Injury or damage, and that the injury or damage was either a direct
result, oF a reasonably probable consequence of the physician's
negligence.
a.ourTY
2. The Relationship Between Or. Casumpang and Edmer
In the present case, the physician-patient relationship between Dr.
Casumpang and Eémer was created when the latter's parents
sought the medical services of Or. Casumpang, and the latter
knowingly accepted Edmer as 2 patient. Dr. Casumpang’s
‘acceptance is implied from his affirmative examination, diagnosis
‘and treatment of Edmer. On the other hand, Edmer’s parents, on
their son’s behalf, manifested their consent by availing of the
benefits of their health care plan, and by accepting the hospita’s
assigned doctor without objections.
», The Relationship Between Dr. Sanga and Edmer
‘With respect to Dr. Sanga, her professional relationship with Edmer
arose when she assumed the obligation to provide resident
supervision over the latter. As second year resident doctor tasked to
do rounds and assist other physicians, Dr. Sanga is deemed to have
agreed to the creation of physician-patient relationship with the
hhospital’s patients when she participated in the diagnosis and
prescribed a course of treatment for Edmer. Her affirmative acts
‘amounted to her acceptance of the physiclan-patient relationship,
‘and incidentally, the legal duty of care that went with it.
2. Standard of Care and Breach of Duty.
Based on Dr. Jaudian’s expert testimony on dengue diagnosis and
‘management, ifthe patient was admitted for chest pain, abdominal
pain, and difficulty in breathing coupled with fever, dengue fever
should definitely be considered; if the patient spits coffee ground
‘with the presence of blood, and the patient's platelet count drops to
47,000, it becomes a clear case of dengue fever, and
bbronchopneumonia can be reasonably ruled out.
Furthermore, the standard of care according to Dr. Jaudian ik to
‘administer oxygen inhalation, analgesic, and fiuid infusion or
dextrose. If the patient had twice vomited fresh blood and
thrombocytopenia has already occurred, the doctor should orderLEGAL MEDICINE
blood transfusion, monitoring of the patient every 30 minutes,
hemostatic to stop bleeding, and oxygen if there is difficulty in
breathing. Therefore, we find that Or. Casumpang, as Edmer’s
attending physician, did not act according to these standards and,
hence, was guilty of breach of duty. In tis case, the Court ruled that
Dr. Casumpang is negligent, while. Dr. Sanga is not liable. The Court
‘algo ruled that the hospital is solidarity abe.
Dr, Casumpang'’s Negligence
Ie will be recalled that during Dr. Casumpang's first and second visits
to Edmer, he already had knowledge of Edmers laboratory test
result, medical history, and symptoms. However, these information
did not lead Dr. Casumpang to the possibilty that Edmer could be
suffering from either dengue fever, or dengue hemorrhagic fever, as
hhe clung to his diagnosis of broncho pneumonia. It was lost on Dr.
Casumpang that the characteristic symptoms of dengue. All these
manifestations were present and known to Or. Casumpang at the
time of his first and second visits to Edmer. While he noted some of
these symptoms in confirming bronchopneumonia, he did not seem
to have considered the patient’s other manifestations in ruling out
dengue fever or dengue hemorrhagic fever. To our mind, Dr.
Casumpang selectively appreciated some, and not all of the
symptoms; worse, he casually ignored the pieces of information that
could have been material in detecting dengue fever. By the time
that Edmer had blood streaks in his sputum, neither did Dr.
Casumpang order confirmatory tests to confirm the source of
bleeding. Dr. Casumpang only used a stethoscope in coming up with
the diagnosis that Eémer was suffering from bronchopneumonia; he
ever confirmed this finding with the use of a bronchoscope.
Significantly, itis only after Edmer's third episode of bleeding that
br. Casumpang ordered the conduct of hematocrit, hemoglobin,
blood typing, blood transfusion and tourniquet tests, such tests
‘came too late.
Even assuming that Edmer’s symptoms completely coincided with
the diagnosis of bronchopneumonia, we stil find Dr. Casumpang
guilty of negligence. In the present case, evidence on record
established that in confirming the diagnosis of bronchopneumonia,
Dr. Casumpang selectively appreciated some and not all of the
symptoms presented, and failed to promptly conduct the
appropriate tests to confirm his findings. In sum, Dr. Casumpang
failed to timely detect dengue fever, which failure, especially when
reasonable prudence would have shown that indications of dengue
‘were evident and/or foreseeable, constitutes negligence.
‘Dr. Sanga is Not Liable for Negligence (SHE WAS A JUNIOR RESIDENT
poctoa)
\We find that Dr. Sanga was not independently negligent. Although
she had greater patient exposure, and was subject to the same
standard of care applicable to attending physicians, we believe that
2 finding of negligence should also depend on several competing
factors, among them, her authority to make her own diagnosis, the
degree of supervision of the attending physician over her, and the
shared responsibilty between her and the attending physicians. in
this case, before Dr. Sanga attended to Edmer, both Or. Livelo and
‘Dr. Casumpang had diagnosed Edmer with bronchopneumonia,
There is also evidence supporting Dr. Sanga’s claim that she
‘extended diligent care to Edmer. In fact, when she suspected that
Edmer could be suffering from dengue fever, she wasted no time In
conducting the necessary tests, and promptly notified Or.
Casumpang about the incident. Indubitably, her medical assistance
led to the finding of dengue fever. We note however, that during
Edmer’s second episode of bleeding, Dr. Sanga failed to immediately
‘examine and note the cause of the blood specimen. Like Or.
CCasumpang, she merely assumed that the blood in Edmer’s phlegm
was caused by bronchopneumor
Based on her statements we find that Or. Sanga was not entirely
faultess, Nevertheless, her fallure to discern the import of Edmer's
second bleeding does not necessarily amount to negligence as the
‘espondent himself admitted that Dr. Sanga failed to examine the
blood specimen because he washed it away. We believe that Or.
‘Sanga’s error was merely an honest mistake of judgment influenced
in no small measure by her status in the hospital hierarchy; hence,
she should not be held liable for medical negligence.
3 and 4. Injury and the Causation Between Dr, Casumpang’s
‘Negligent Act/Omission, and the Patient’s Resulting Death
br. Casumpang’s failure to timely diagnose Edmer with dengue, the
latter was not immediately given the proper treatment. In fact, even
after Dr. Casumpang had discovered Edmer’s real illness, he still
failed to promptly perform the standard medical procedure. Dengue
fever, if left untreated, could be a life threatening disease. As in any
fatal diseases, It requires immediate medical attention, With the
correct and timely diagnosis, coupled with the proper medical
management, dengue fever is not a life threatening disease and
could easily be cured.
To reiterate, Dr. Casumpang failed to timely diagnose Edmer with
dengue fever despite the presence of its characteristic symptoms;
and as @ consequence of the delayed diagnosis, he also failed to
promptly manage Edmer's illness. Had he immediately conducted
confirmatory tests and promptly administered the proper care and
management needed for dengue fever, the risk of complications or
even death, could have been substantially reduced. Edmer died of
“Htypovolemic Shock/hemorchagic shock,” “Dengue Hemorrhagic
Fever Stage IV,” a severe and fatal form of dengue fever, established
the causal link between Dr. Casumpang’s negligence and the injury.
Luabilty of San Juan De Dios Hospital
We affirm the hospital's liability on the basis of the
doctrine of apparent authority or agency by estoppel. On one hand,
there is no Employer-Employee relationship between SIDH and the
Doctors. The power of control is not present in this case. Based on
the records, no evidence exists showing that SIDH exercised any
degree of control over the means, methods of procedure and
‘manner by which the petitioning doctors conducted and performed
their medical profession. In these lights, the doctors were not
employees of SIDH, but were mere independent contractors.
(On the other hand, SIDH is solidarily liable based on the principle of
‘agency or doctrine of apparent authority. As a rule, hospitals are not
liable for the negligence of its independent contractors. However,
‘may be found liable if the physician or independent contractor acts
as an ostensible agent of the hospital. This exception is also known
23s the “doctrine of apparent authority
In this case at bar, SIDH clothed Or. Casumpang with
‘apparent authority. Based on the records, the respondent relied on
SIOH rather than upon Dr. Casumpang, to care and treat his son
Edmer. The spouses Cornejo brought their son to SIDH for diagnosis
because of their family doctor's referral. The referral did not
specifically point to Dr. Casumpang or even to Dr. Sanga, but to
SIDH. Significantly, the cespendent had relied on SIOM's
representation of Dr. Casumpang's authority.
‘Mrs. Cortejo accepted Dr. Casumpang's services on the reasonable
belief that such were being provided by SIDH or its employees,LEGAL MEDICINE
agents, or servants. By referring Dr. Casumpang to care and treat for
Edmer, SJOH impliedly held out Or. Casumpang, not only as an
accredited member of Fortune Care, but also as a member of its
medical staff. SIDH cannot now disclaim liability since there is no
showing that Mrs. Cortejo or the respondent knew, or should have
known, that Dr. Casumpang is only an independent contractor of
the hospital. In this case, estoppel has already set in.
PAs
OT
crime: rape
RTC: Guilty CA: affirmed SC: affirmed, Reclusion Perpetua
Victim: AAA, 14 y.0
Prosecution’s Version:
In the afternoon of June 2, 2002, AAA, along with her friends
Sabanag and Sinangote, went to the house of her grandmother to
‘attend @ dance event. At around 8:30pm, during the dance,
Sabanag and Sinangote danced with Alverio but AAA did not. At 2
a.m., AAA noticed that her friends were no longer at the dance so
she decided to go home to her grandmother's house. As she was
‘nearing the barangay hall, Alverio suddenly appeared and took hold
of AAA, She tried to resist him but he was too strong and he
‘managed to pull her away. AAA started to cry while she was being
dragged towards the back of the barangay hall. There, Alverio held
her hair, undressed her, and started to kiss her. AAA kept on
resisting and even punched Alverio after he kissed her, at which
point, Alverio told her that it was painful and that he might retaliate
if she continued, This caused AAA to stop resisting and Alverio then
proceeded to insert his penis in her vagina repeatedly, After having
carnal knowledge with her, Alverio stood up and put on his clothes,
He warned AAA that if she told anyone about what happened, he
will kill her. After threatening her, he left. During this entice
incident, Alverio was armed with a knife which he used to poke
AAX's side. Dazed, AAA could not muster enough strength to go
home. She just sat on the road beside the barangay hall until § a.m.
when her Uncle Intoy passed by. He brought her home to her
parents but she did not tell him anything, Upon reaching home, AAA
told her parents about what happened.
Version of the Defense:
Alverio was in the barangay chapel with his friend, Toledo, waiting
for the dance to begin. At 8:30 pm, the dance started. He danced
with some persons whose names he could no longer recall. But he
‘categorically remembered that he did not see AMA in the dance
area. At 12:00 mn, Alverio and Toledo walked home to Toledo's
hhouse, where Alverio was staying. Upon reaching home, they slept
‘and woke up at 5:302.m
Issuer Is Alverio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape?
(a) Is the trial court for giving credence to the sole testimony of the
victim?
(b) Should the medical certificate presented be considered as
corroborative evidence though it wos not testified to by the
signatory himself?
vEs.
(2) YES. “in cases involving the prosecution for forcible rape,
corroboration of the victim's testimony is nat a necessary condition
to a convition for rape where the victim’s testimony is credible, or
clear and convincing or sufficient to prove the elements of the
offense beyond a reasonable doubt." More importantly, courts
generally give full credence to the testimony of a complainant for
tape, especially one who is only 2 minor. The victim testified in a
steadfast and straightforward manner. It is strikingly clear from the
transcript that AAA's testimony was very coherent and candid.
(2) YES. Medical evidence is dispensable and merely corroborative in
proving the crime of rape. Besides, a medical certificate is not even
necessary to prove the crime of rape. The gravamen of rape is carnal
knowledge of @ woman through force and intimidation. The
elements needed to prove the crime of rape under paragraph (a)
of Article 266-A of the RPC are: (1) the offender is a man; (2) the
offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (3) the act is
accomplished by using force or intimidation. All these elements
were sufficiently proved by the prosecution. The testimony of AAA
overwhelmingly proves that Alverio raped her with the use of force
and intimidation. Furthermore, Alverio's defense of alibi cannot
stand versus the positive identification of AAA. Nothing is more
settled in criminal law jurisprudence than the rule that alibi and
denial cannot prevail over the positive and categorical testimony
and identification of the accused by the complainant.
Fara
FACTS: The facts hark back to the afternoon of October 17, 1996, at
‘around 4 oclock, when the body of six-year old Jennifer Domantay
‘was found sprawled amidst a bamboo grove in Gullig, Malasiqu,
Pangasinan. The child’s body bore several stab wounds. Jennifer had
bbeen missing since lunch time,
‘The medical examination conducted the following day by Or.
Macaranas, the rural health physician of Malasiqui, showed that
Jennifer died of multiple organ failure and hypovolemic shock
secondary to 38 stab wounds at the back. Dr. Macaranas found no
lacerations or signs of inflammation of the outer and inner labia and
‘the vaginal walls ofthe victim’s genitalia, although the vaginal canal
easily admitted the little finger with minimal resistance. Noting
possible commission of acts of lasciviousness, Dr. Macaranas
recommended an autopsy by a medico-legal expert ofthe NBI.
‘The investigation by the Malasiqui police pointed to accused-
appellant Bernardino Domantay, a cousin of the victim's
frandfather, as the lone suspect in the gruesome crime. On the
basis of the post-mortem findings of Or. Macaranas, SPO4 Carpizo,
the PNP chief investigator at Malasiqui, fled, on October 21, 1996, a
criminal complaint for murder against accused-appellant before the
MTC-Malasiqui. On October 25, 1996, Dr. Bandonill, medico-legal
‘expert of the NBI, performed an autopsy on the embalmed body of
Jennifer. The result of his examination of the victim's genitalia
Indicated that the chile's hymen had been completely lacerated on
the right side. Based on this finding, SPO4 Carpizo amended the
‘criminal complaint against accused-eppellant to rape with
homicide.
During trial, Dr. Bandonil, the NBI medico-tegal_ who
conducted an autopsy of the victim on October 25, 1996, testified
that Jennifer Domantay died as a result of the numerous stab
wounds she sustained on her back, the average depth of which was,
six inches, He opined that the wounds were probably caused by @
pointed sharp-edged instrument. He also noted contusions on the
forehead, neck, and breast bone of the victim. As for the results of
the genital examination of the victim, Dr. Bandonill said he found
tat the laceration on the right side of the hymen was caused within
24 hours of her death, He added that the genital area showed signs
of inflammation.
‘rial court found accused-appellant guilty as charged. Hence,
this appeal.
ISSUE: WON the autopsy report indicating that the child's hymen
had been completely lacerated on the right side is sufficient to
warrant the conviction of the accused on the crime of Rape with
Homicide.
HELD: NO. There is no sufficient evidence to hold accused-appellant
juilty of raping Jennifer Oomantay. As the victim here was six yearsLEGAL MEDICINE
‘old, only carnal knowledge had to be proved to establish rape.
Carnal knowledge is defined as the act of a man having sexual
intercourse or sexual bodily connections with a woman. For this
purpose, it is enough If there was even the slightest contact of the
male sex organ with the labia of the victim's genitalia. However,
there must be proof, by director indirect evidence, of such contact.
br, Ronald Bandonills report on the genital examination he
had performed on the deceased reads: GENITAL EXAMINATION;
showed a complete laceration of the right side of the hymen. The
surrounding genital area shows signs of inflamation
REMARKS: 1) Findings at the genital area indicate the probability of
penetration of that area by a hard, rigid instrument.
Hiymenal laceration is not necessary to prove rape; neither
does its presence prove its commission. As held in People v. Uli, 2
medical certificate or the testimony of the physician is presented
not to prove that the victim was raped but to show that the latter
hhad lost her virginity. Consequently, standing alone, a physician's
finding that the hymen of the alleged victim was lacorated does
not prove rape. It is only when this is corroborated by other
‘evidence proving carnal knowledge that rape may be deemed to
have been established.
‘This conclusion is based on the medically accepted fact that 2
hhymenal tear may be caused by objects other than the male sex
‘organ or may arise from other causes. Dr. Bandonill himself
admitted this. He opined that the laceration had been inflicted
‘within 24 hours of the victim’s death and that the inflammation was
due to a trauma in that area. When asked by the private prosecutor
whether the lacerations of the hymen could have been caused by
the insertion of a male organ he said this was possible. But he also
said when questioned by the defense that the lacerations could
have been caused by something blunt other than the male organ.
Court has sustained @ number of convictions for rape with
homicide based on purely circumstantial evidence, In those
instances, however, the prosecution was able to present other tell
tale signs of rape such as the location and description of the victim's
clothing’s, especially her undergarments, the position of the body
when found and the like.In People v. Mocolino, for instance, the
Court affirmed a conviction for the rape of a two year-old child on
the basis of circumstantial evidence. In the case at bar, there is no
circumstantial evidence from which to infer that accused-appellant
‘sexually abused the vitim, The only citcumstance from which such
inference might be made is that accused-appellant was seen with
‘the vietim walking toward the place where the gir's body was
found, Maybe he raped the girl. Maybe he did not. Maybe he simply
inserted a blunt object into her organ, thus causing the lacerations
Jn the hymen, Otherwise, there is no circumstance from which it
might reasonably be inferred that he abused her, e.g., that he was
zipping up his pants, that there was spermatozoa in the girs vaginal
canal.
Indeed, the very autopsy report of Dr. Sandonill miltates,
‘against the finding of rape. In describing the stab wounds on the
body of the victim, he testified: (Ajfter examining the body | took
rote that there were several stab wounds . .. these were all found
at the back area si ... extending from the back shoulder down to
the lower back area from the left to the right.
Considering the relative physical positions of the accused and the
victim in crimes of rape, the usual location of the external bodily
injuries of the vietim is on the face, neck, and anterior portion of her
body. Although it is aot unnatural to find contusions on the
posterior side, these are usually caused by the downward pressure
‘on the victim's body during the sexual assault It is unquestionably
different when, ag in this case, all the stab wounds (except for a
‘minor cut in the lower left leg) had their entry points at the back
‘unning from the upper left shoulder to the lower right buttocks.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court is SET ASIDE and
another one is rendered FINDING accused-appellant guilty of
homicide with the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior
strength
TOR CORPORATION vs. NLRC
TM
FACTS: The respondent was hired by the petitioner as an
automotive mechanic at the service department of the petitioner
company. During his employment, he received various awards for
his exemplary performance. OnSeptember 22, 1997, the
respondent made a phone call to Rosita dela Cruz, the company
nurse, and informed her that he had to take a sick leave as he had @
painful and unbearable toothache. The next day, he again phoned
Dela Cruz and told her that he could not report for work because he
still had to consult a doctor. Finding that the respondent's ailment
was due to a tooth inflammation, the doctor referred him to a
dentist for further management. Dr. Rodolfo Pamor, a dentist, then
scheduled the respondents tooth extraction on September 27, 1997
but on that day the Inflammation has not yet subsided so the
dentist rescheduled it on another date. The dentist advised him to
rest for the time being so he was not able to report for work.
‘Meanwhile, Mr. Dumagan, 2 company security guard, visited the
respondent in his house upon the company’s instruction and
confirmed that the latter was il. On October 2, 1997, the petitioner
issued an Inter Office Memorandum terminating the services of the
respondent for having incurred more than five (5) consecutive
absences without proper notification. The petitioner considered the
consecutive absences of the respondent as abandonment of office
under Section 6.1.2, Article ill of the Company Rules. On October 4,
1997, Dr. Pamor successfully extracted the respondents tooth. AS
soon as he had recovered, the respondent reported for work, but
‘was denied entry into the company’s premises. He was informed
‘that his employment had already been terminated. The petitioner
avers that the respondent's absences were unauthorized, and that
the latter failed to notify the petitioner in writing of such absences,
the reasons therefor, and his (respondents) whereabouts as
prescribed by the company rules which led to his dismissal from
‘work. Moreover, the petitioner's posits that respondent's dismissal
was justified on the ground of gross and habitual neglect of duties
‘as found in the Labor Code.
ISSUE: WON the respondent was terminated fora just cause.
RULING: No. The termination by respondent-appellee of
complainant's service despite knowledge of complainants ailment,
{as shown by the telephone cals made by the latter to the company
nurse and the actual confirmation made by respondents company
guard who personally visited complainants residence clearly
establishes the illegality of complainants dismissal. From the facts
of this case, itis only but reasonable to conclude that complainant's
service was, indeed, terminated without legal or valid cause. Where
the law protects the right of employer to validly exercise
management prerogative such as to terminate the services of an
employee, such exercise must be with legal cause as enumerated in
Article 282 of the Labor Code or by authorized cause as defined in
{ticle 283 of the Labor Code. The company rules do not require
that the notice of an employee's absence and the reasons therefor
be in writing and for such notice to be given to any specific office
‘and/or employee of the petitioner. Hence, the notice may be verbal;
it is enough then that an officer or employee of the petitioner,
competent and cesponsible enough to receive such notice for and in
behalf of the petitioner, was informed of such absence and the
corresponding reason. This, the respondent complied.
‘While the records do not reveal that the respondent filed the
required leave of absence for the period during which he suffered
froma toothache, he immediately reported for work upon recovery,
armed with medical certificates to attest to the cause of his
‘absence, While it is true that the petitioner had objected to the
veracity of the medical certificates because of lack of notarization, itLEGAL MEDICINE
hhas been said that verification of documents is not necessary in
lrder that the said documents could be considered as substantial
evidence. The medical certificates were properly signed by the
physicians; hence, they bear all the earmarks of regularity in their
issuance ane are entited to full probative weight.
‘The petitioner, likewise falled to prove the factual basis for its
dismissal of the respondent on the ground of gross and habitual
negligence. The petitioner has not sufficiently shown that the
respondent had willfully disobeyed the company rules and
regulation. The petitioner also failed to prove that the respondent
abandoned his job. The bare fact that the respondent incurred
excusable and unavoidable absences does not amount to an
abandonment of his employment.
Petition is dismissed.
G EE)
Facts: Sometime in December 2002, AAA's parents attended a
wedding celebration