Abdulla vs People 455 SCRA 78, April 6, 2005

Facts:
Convicted by the Sandiganbayan of the crime of illegal use of public funds, appellant
Abdulla is before the Court on petition for review under Rule 45. Appellants coaccused, Aguil and Darkis, were both acquitted. Only appellant was found guilty and
sentenced by the Sandiganbayan. Upon motion for reconsideration, the
Sandiganbayan amended appellants sentence by deleting the temporary special
disqualification imposed upon her. Still dissatisfied, appellant, now before this Court,
persistently pleas innocence of the crime charged.
Issue:
Is there a presumption of criminal intent in malversation cases?
RUling:
No. The presumption of criminal intent will not automatically apply to all charges of
technical malversation because disbursement of public funds for public use is per se
not an unlawful act. Here, appellant cannot be said to have committed an unlawful
act when she paid the obligation of the Sulu State College to its employees in the
form of terminal leave benefits such employees were entitled to under existing civil
service laws. In the absence of any presumption of unlawful intent, the burden of
proving by competent evidence that appellants act of paying the terminal leave
benefits of employees of the Sulu State College was done with criminal intent rests
upon the prosecution.

Mercado vs Vitriolo 459 SCRA 1, May 26, 2005

Facts: Rosa Mercado is seeking for the disbarment of Atty. Julito Vitriolo as he
allegedly maliciously filed a criminal case for falsification of public document against
her thereby violating the attoyrney client privilege. It appears that Vitriolo filed a
case against complainant as she apparently made false entries in the certificate of
live birth of her children. More specifically she allegedly indicated that she is married
to a certain Ferdinand Fernandez when in fact her real husband is Ruben Mercado.
Mercado claims that by filing the complaint the attorney client privilege has been
violated. Mercado filed a case for Vitriolos disbarment.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent violated the rule on privileged communication
between attorney-client when he filed the criminal case for falsification
Held: No. The evidence on record fails to substantiate complainants
allegations.Complainant did not even specify the alleged communication disclosed

by the respondents. All her claims were couched in general terms and lacked
specificity. Indeed the complaint failed to attend the hearings at the IBP. Without any
testimony from the complainant as to the specific confidential information allegedly
divulged by respondent without her consent, it would be difficult if not impossible to
determine if there was any violation of the rule on privileged communication. Such
information is a crucial link in establishing a breach of the rule on privileged
communication between attorney and client. It is not enough to merely assert the
attorney client privilege. The burden of proving that the privilege applies is placed
upon the party asserting the privilege.

Vidallon-Magtolis vs Salud 469 SCRA 439, September 9, 2005

Facts:
Respondent is charged and held liable for offenses on inefficiency and incompetence
of official duty; conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service; and
directly and indirectly having financial and material interest in an official transaction
considering his undue interest in the service of the order of release and actual
release of Melchor Lagua.
Lagua was found guilty of homicide and was then detained at the Bureau of Prisons
National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa City. Laguas petition for bond was approved in a
Resolution where the appellate court directed the issuance of an order of release in
favor of Lagua. The resolution was brought to the office of Atty. Madarang, Division
Clerk of Court, for promulgation.
Respondent served the resolution and order of release of Lagua at the National
Penitentiary, where Lagua was detained for homicide.
Meanwhile, Atty. Madarang received a call from a certain Melissa Melchor, who
introduced herself as Laguas relative, asking how much more they had to give to
facilitate Laguas provisional liberty, and that they sought the help of a certain
Rhodora Valdez of RTC Pasig, but was told that they still had a balance. When Atty.
Madarang was able to get the mobile number of respondent, he represented himself
as Laguas relative and exchanged text messages with said respondent for a
possible pay-off for the Laguas provisional liberty. Atty. Madarang later discovered
that the respondent did not properly serve the copies of the Resolution and Order of
Release upon the accused-appellant and his counsel. but gave them to a certain Art
Baluran, allegedly Laguas relative.
Later on, Complainant called the respondent to her office. When confronted, the
respondent denied extorting or receiving money for Laguas release, or in any other
case. He, however, admitted serving the copies of resolution and order of release

intended for Lagua and his counsel to Art Baluran. Complainant then lodged the
complaint against the respondent in a Letter dated November 14, 2003.
Issue:
Whether or not the admission of text messages as evidence constitutes a violation
of right to privacy of the accused?
Held:
No. The respondents claim that the admission of the text messages as evidence
against him constitutes a violation of his right to privacy is unavailing. Text
messages have been classified as ephemeral electronic communication under
Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, and shall be proven by the
testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has personal knowledge
thereof. Any question as to the admissibility of such messages is now moot and
academic, as the respondent himself, as well as his counsel, already admitted that
he was the sender of the first three messages on Atty. Madarangs cell phone.
This was also the ruling of the Court in the recent case of Zaldy Nuez v. Elvira CruzApao. In that case, the Court, in finding the respondent therein guilty of dishonesty
and grave misconduct, considered text messages addressed to the complainant
asking for a million pesos in exchange for a favorable decision in a case pending
before the CA. The Court had the occasion to state:
The text messages were properly admitted by the Committee since the same are
now covered by Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, which
provides:
Ephemeral electronic communication refers to telephone conversations, text
messages and other electronic forms of communication the evidence of which is
not recorded or retained.

Lee vs People 455 SCRA 256, April 11, 2005

Facts:
The trial court rendered judgment finding Lee guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
nine (9) counts of the crime of Estafa, defined and penalized under Art. 315, par.
1(b) of the Revised Penal Code. The petitioner appealed the decision which the CA
dismissed, hence this petition for review.
Issue:

Whether the petitioner can be convicted for the crime of estafa throug conversion
lacking the element of formal demand before filing the cases against him.
Ruling:

The petition was denied for lack of merit. Contrary to petitioner s proposition, prior
demand need not be made formally. Demand is not an element of the felony or a
condition precedent to the filing of a criminal complaint for estafa. Indeed, the
accused may be convicted of the felony under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the
Revised Penal Code if the prosecution proved misappropriation or conversion by the
accused of the money or property subject of the Information. In a prosecution for
estafa, demand is not necessary where there is evidence of misappropriation or
conversion. However, failure to account upon demand, for funds or property held in
trust, is circumstantial evidence of misappropriation. Demand need not be formal. It
may be verbal. In Barrameda v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that even a query
as to the whereabouts of the money is tantamount to a demand. In the present
case, the prosecution adduced proof upon cross-examination of the petitioner Lee
that he failed to return the funds held in trust before the complaint for estafa was
filed against him. Further, the cashier of Atoz Trading Corporation stated that the
accused did not remit the payments of Ocean. It is evident that the accused
assumed the right to dispose of the remittances as if it were his own, thus,
committing conversion with unfaithfulness and a clear breach of trust.