Directores

GERMN M. TERUEL LOZANO

ANTONIO PREZ MIRAS

EDOARDO C. RAFFIOTTA

Desafos del
constitucionalismo ante la
integracin europea
Sfide del costituzionalismo di
fronte al processo di
integrazione europea

Constitutional challenges
regarding European
integration

Con prlogo de

Pablo Lucas Murillo de la Cueva

Desafos del constitucionalismo

ante la integracin europea
Sfide del costituzionalismo di fronte al
processo di integrazione europea
Constitutional challenges regarding
European integration

GERMN M. TERUEL LOZANO

ANTONIO PREZ MIRAS
EDOARDO C. RAFFIOTTA
(Directores)

Desafos del constitucionalismo

ante la integracin europea
Sfide del costituzionalismo di fronte al
processo di integrazione europea
Constitutional challenges regarding
European integration
Con prlogo de Pablo Lucas Murillo de la Cueva

MURCIA, 2015

Primera edicin, 2015

No se permite las modificaciones ni las adaptaciones de la obra as como su

uso comercial
El Editor no se hace responsable de las opiniones recogidas, comentarios y
manifestaciones vertidas por los autores. La presente obra recoge
exclusivamente la opinin de su autor como manifestacin de su derecho de
libertad de expresin.

Diseo portada: Luis Gil Palacios

Germn M. Teruel Lozano, Antonio Prez Miras, Edoardo C. Raffiotta (dirs.)

y otros
EDITUM. Ediciones de la Universidad de Murcia
Centro de Estudios Europeos de la Universidad de Murcia
ISBN: 978-84-608-4331-3

"Il problema che in primo luogo va risolto, e fallendo il quale qualsiasi altro progresso non che
apparenza, la definitiva abolizione della divisione dell'Europa in stati nazionali sovrani."
"La via da percorrere non facile n sicura, ma deve essere percorsa e lo sar!"
Il Manifesto di Ventotene (1941)
ALTIERO SPINELLI, ERNESTO ROSSI, URSULA HIRSCHMANN

NDICE
ndice sistemtico .............................................................................. VII
PRLOGO .......................................................................................XXV
Pablo Lucas Murillo de la Cueva
PRESENTACIN ......................................................................... XXXVII
igo A. Navarro Mendizbal
PRESENTAZIONE .............................................................................. XL
igo A. Navarro Mendizbal
NOTA DE LOS DIRECTORES .......................................................... XLIII
NOTA DEI CURATORI ...................................................................... XLV
PARTE 1
El poder: la forma poltico-constitucional de Europa, gobierno de la
economa y sostenibildiad en la sociedad del bienestar
Il potere: la forma politico-costituzionale di Europa, governo
delleconomia e sostenibilit nella societ del benessere
IL POTERE: LA FORMA POLITICO-COSTITUZIONALE DELLEUROPA, IL
GOVERNO DELL'ECONOMIA E LA SOSTENIBILIT NELLA SOCIET
DEL BENESSERE............................................................................... 3
Edoardo C. Raffiotta
A) Forma de gobierno y proceso de integracin europea...................... 11
A) Forma di governo e processo di integrazione europea ..................... 11
QUO VADIS EUROPA? ....................................................................... 13
Luca Di Majo
OLTRE LE FORME DI GOVERNO. APPUNTI IN TEMA DI ASSETTI DI
ORGANIZZAZIONE COSTITUZIONALE DELLUNIONE EUROPEA ...... 31
Renato Ibrido
LOS EFECTOS SECUNDARIOS DE LA CRISIS ECONMICA SOBRE
LAS INSTITUCIONES EUROPEAS: APUNTES SOBRE LA AFECTACIN
DE SUS FUNCIONES Y DE LOS PROCESOS DECISORIOS ................ 53
Sabrina Ragone
QUO
VADIS
EUROPA?
LA
DEGENERAZIONE
POPULISTICA
UNGHERESE TRA CRISI ECONOMICA E CRISI COSTITUZIONALE .... 69
Fausto Vecchio

ECLIPSE OF THE GOLDEN DAWN. THE CONSTITUTIONAL

CONUNDRUM OF THE CASE AGAINST THE GREEK NEO-NAZIS ...... 85
Evangelos Liaras
DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND THE PROHIBITION OF THE BINDING
MANDATE ....................................................................................... 103
Elena Falletti
IL CONCETTO DI ESSENZIALIT, CRITERIO PER LA TASSONOMIA
DEGLI ATTI GIURIDICI EUROPEI E SCHEMA DELLA DIVISIONE DEI
POTERI
TRA
ISTITUZIONI
DELLA
COSTELLAZIONE
POSTNAZIONALE ..................................................................................... 119
Giuliano Vosa
LA PROTECCIN DE LAS MINORAS TNICAS Y NACIONALES EN EL
PROCESO DE AMPLIACIN Y CONSTITUCIONALIZACIN DE LA
UNIN EUROPEA ............................................................................ 139
Ana Toms Lpez
EL PRINCIPIO DE SUBSIDIARIEDAD EN LA ACCIN EXTERIOR DE LA
UNIN EUROPEA ............................................................................ 155
Paula Garca Andrade
B) Gobierno de la economa y sostenibilidad financiera .................... 177
B) Governo delleconomia e sostenibilit finanziaria ......................... 177
IL PRINCIPIO DI CONDIZIONALIT NELLA CRISI DELLORDINE DI
MAASTRICHT .................................................................................. 179
Federico Losurdo
LA SOVRANIT LIMITATA DI BILANCIO COME PRINCIPIO SUPREMO.
PRIMI APPUNTI SU DUE CONCETTI AMBIGUI A MARGINE DELLA
RECENTE GIURISPRUDENZA COSTITUZIONALE TEDESCA ............ 197
Federico Pedrini
LA DISCIPLINA DEI SERVIZI PUBBLICI LOCALI: QUALE MODELLO DI
GESTIONE? ..................................................................................... 215
Maria Antonella Gliatta
LIMPULSO DELLUNIONE EUROPEA NELLA RIORGANIZZAZIONE
DELLAGIRE AMMINISTRATIVO NAZIONALE: GLI STRUMENTI DI
COLLABORAZIONE TRA PUBBLICO E PRIVATO. ............................. 237
Federico Laus
EL SISTEMA DE FINANCIACIN FORAL COMO UN EJEMPLO DE
DESCENTRALIZACIN FINANCIERA ASIMTRICA VIABLE EN EL
AMBITO DE LA UNION EUROPEA ................................................... 253
Jokin Babaze Aizpurua

II

C) Estado del bienestar .................................................................... 273

C) Stato del benessere...................................................................... 273
LA APORTACIN DE LA UE A LA RECONFIGURACIN TCNICA DEL
ESTADO SOCIAL ............................................................................. 275
Fernando Prez Domnguez
UNA RESPONSABILIZZAZIONE SOCIALE PER LEUROPA ................ 297
Marta Caredda
LE
PROSPETTIVE
DI
TUTELA
DEI
DIRITTI
SOCIALI
NELLORDINAMENTO
EUROUNITARIO
IN
PREVISIONE
DELLADESIONE DELLUE ALLA CEDU. .......................................... 317
Francesca Polacchini
LA CARTA SOCIALE EUROPEA PRESA SUL SERIO .......................... 337
Claudio Panzera
LA PROTEZIONE DEI DIRITTI SOCIALI ATTRAVERSO IL PRISMA
DELLA CRISI. RIFLESSIONI SUL CASO PORTOGHESE E SPUNTI DI
COMPARAZIONE CON QUELLO ITALIANO ....................................... 357
Caterina Drigo
EUROPEAN CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIAL RIGHTS: AN ASSESSMENT
THROUGH HEALTH PROTECTION ................................................... 383
Marco Inglese
LEFFETTIVIT DEI DIRITTI SOCIALI DEI RICHIEDENTI ASILO: IL
RUOLO DELLEASO. ........................................................................ 397
Irene Grif
PARTE 2
El territorio: los dilemas de la ampliacin a nuevos Estados y de la
regionalizacin
Il territorio: il dilema sullallargamento ai nuovi Stati e il ruolo delle
autonomie regionali
LAS TENSIONES TERRITORIALES EN LA UNIN EUROPEA ............ 413
Antonio Prez Miras
A) Problemticas ante la cuestin territorial ..................................... 423
A) Problematiche sulla questione territoriale .................................... 423
RETOS DE LOS NACIONALISMOS EN LA EUROPA DE LAS
REGIONES ...................................................................................... 425
Alberto Jimnez-Piernas Garca
LE ISTANZE INDIPENDENTISTE NELLUNIONE EUROPEA .............. 449
Tanja Cerruti

III

IL RECESSO DEGLI STATI DALLUNIONE: EFFETTIVA POSSIBILIT O

PREVISIONE MERAMENTE ANSIOLITICA? ................................... 469
Ilario Nasso
LUNIONE EUROPEA E IL RUOLO DELLE ASSEMBLEE LEGISLATIVE
REGIONALI E LOCALI ..................................................................... 491
Benedetta Vimercati
REDIMENSIONALIZACIN COMPETENCIAL Y MODIFICACIN DE LA
REGULACIN DE LA PROVINCIA EN LA UNIN EUROPEA. ............ 511
Luis Miguel Garca Lozano
B) Anlisis particualres de Estados miembros .................................. 529
B) Analisi particolari sugli Stati membri ........................................... 529
LE REGIONI A STATUTO SPECIALE NEL QUADRO DEI RAPPORTI CON
LUNIONE EUROPEA ....................................................................... 531
Luca Fanotto
TRA SCILLA E CARIDDI: LE REGIONI TRA CRISI E RIFORME. ........ 549
Francesca Minni
LE SENTENZE 198/2012 E 35/2014 DELLA CORTE COSTITUZIONALE
ITALIANA SUL NUMERO DEI CONSIGLIERI REGIONALI TRA VINCOLI
DI BILANCIO E AUTONOMIA TERRITORIALE: UN BILANCIAMENTO
DIFFICILE? ...................................................................................... 577
Gianluca Marolda
LA 6 REFORMA DEL ESTADO EN BLGICA UN PROBLEMA O UNA
SOLUCIN? ..................................................................................... 599
Jos Miguel Martn Rodrguez
HACIA UNA FEDERALIZACIN DE ESPAA: UN ANLISIS A LA LUZ
DEL SISTEMA FEDERAL ALEMN ................................................... 613
Sonsoles Arias Guedn
PARTE 3
La ciudadana: la persona y el reconocimiento y tutela de sus derechos
La cittadinanza: persona, riconoscimento e tutela dei diritti
LOS
DERECHOS
FUNDAMENTALES
EN
EL
ESPACIO
CONSTITUCIONAL EUROPEO.......................................................... 631
Germn M. Teruel Lozano
A) Ciudadana en el proceso de integracin europea ......................... 641
A) La cittadinanza nel processo di integrazione europea ................... 641
CITTADINANZA
ECONOMICA,
CITTADINANZA,
SOCIALE
E
CITTADINANZA EUROPEA: CONSIDERAZIONI E PARADOSSI ......... 643
Chiara Edvige Caterina Camposilvan

IV

THE FUTURE OF INDIVIDUALS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: THE EVER

DEAR MARKET CITIZEN. ................................................................. 669
Gracy Pelacani
CITTADINI, A QUALE COSTO? IL RAPPORTO TRA LE FORME DI
INVESTOR-CITIZENSHIP E LASSETTO DEMOCRATICO EUROPEO. . 685
Claudio Di Maio
KOIN COSTITUZIONALE E CITTADINANZA EUROPEA. LA LUNGA
STRADA DELLA TUTELA DEI DIRITTI IN EUROPA ........................... 703
Ilaria Del Vecchio
CIUDADANA POST-NACIONAL E IDENTIDAD EUROPEA: LA
INICIATIVA CIUDADANA EUROPEA ................................................. 725
Leyre Burguera Ameave
B) El dilogo judicial en el espacio europeo sobre derechos .............. 745
B) Il dialogo giudiziario nello spazio europeo dei diritti ..................... 745
PROTECCIN DE DERECHOS FUNDAMENTALES Y DILOGO
JURISDICCIONAL EN EL MBITO EUROPEO .................................. 747
M. Olaya Godoy
LA TUTELA DEI DIRITTI IN EUROPA NEL DIALOGO TRA CORTI:
"EPIFANIE" DI UNA UNIONE DAI TRATTI ANCORA INDEFINITI ........ 763
Antonia Baraggia
DERECHOS FUNDAMENTALES Y JUDICIAL REVIEW: EL RENOVADO
CONSTITUCIONALISMO DE LA UNIN EUROPEA ........................... 781
Carmen Montesinos Padilla
ngel Aday Jimnez Alemn
I DIRITTI FONDAMENTALI NEL DIALOGO TRA CORTI, UNA
COSTITUZIONE IN FIERI? ................................................................ 801
Valentina Capuozzo
IL
PRINCIPIO
DI
PROPORZIONALIT
E
LA
VOCAZIONE
COSTITUZIONALE DELLA CORTE DI GIUSTIZIA ............................. 819
Stella Romano
IL PRIMO RINVIO PREGIUDIZIALE DEL CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL:
SPUNTI DI RIFLESSIONE IN TEMA DI INTERAZIONI DIALOGICHE TRA
CORTI E DI TUTELA MULTILIVELLO DEI DIRITTI............................ 837
Chiara Sorbello
C) La tutela de derechos: problemas concretos ................................. 857
C) La tutela dei diritti: casi e problemi.............................................. 857
EL TRIBUNAL DE JUSTICIA Y LOS ESTNDARES EUROPEOS DE
PROTECCIN DE LOS DERECHOS DE LA PERSONALIDAD ............ 859
Miryam Rodrguez-Izquierdo Serrano

IL DIRITTO ALLA LIBERA CIRCOLAZIONE DEI CITTADINI EUROPEI

NELLA RECENTE GIURISPRUDENZA DELLA CORTE DI GIUSTIZIA
DELLUE.......................................................................................... 877
Michele Gradoli
I DIRITTI DELLA FAMIGLIA E DEI SUOI COMPONENTI NELLA VISIONE
EUROPEA ........................................................................................ 899
Manuel Giacomazzi
TUTELA DEL MEDIO AMBIENTE, INSTRUMENTOS DE MERCADO Y
UNIN EUROPEA ............................................................................ 921
Mara del Carmen Cmara Barroso
INFLUENCIA DEL DERECHO COMUNITARIO EN LA INTERPRETACION
DEL DERECHO A LA TUTELA JUDICIAL EFECTIVA Y EL DERECHO
PROCESAL CIVIL ............................................................................. 937
Francisco De Asis Gonzalez Campo
LA AUSENCIA DE PARTICIPACIN DE LA CIUDADANA MEDIANTE
CONSULTA POPULAR POR VA DEL REFERNDUM, EN LA REFORMA
DEL ARTCULO 135 DE LA CONSTITUCIN ESPAOLA .................. 957
Francisco Javier Sanjun Andrs

VI

DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND THE PROHIBITION OF

THE BINDING MANDATE

Elena Falletti
Assistant professor in Private Comparative Law
Universit Carlo Cattaneo LIUC, Castellanza (VA)

Summary:
1. Introduction.
2. The constitutional prohibition of binding mandate
3. M5S' proposal on political chosices and direct democracy.
4. Direct democracy, proportionality and accountability to the voter
5. Conclusion.
Bibliography

103

Abstract in English
DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND THE PROHIBITION OF THE BINDING
MANDATE
Parties and unions are grounded on the concept of representation.
However, historically political representation has not always been
expressed by them. Indeed, the experience of the first parliaments
shows that the rule was the binding of the mandate. Basically, the
representative's activity was limited to an oral exposure of the content of
the cahiers de dolances prepared by the constituency that elected him.
During the French Revolution the binding mandate was an issue to
discuss. During the drafting of the Constitution of 1793, Robespierre
questioned the liability of representatives and public officials towards
the sovereign people with his famous speech On the constitution and
representative government.The Jacobins immediately realized that once
the political autonomy of the representatives has been guaranteed, the
accountability of the mandate was lacking and consequently the
political essence of the connection between the representative and the
represented should be enhanced. Following Rousseau's theories,
Robespierre argued that popular sovereignity could not be represented:
"The domain of the people only lasts a day" and, in any case, "its
delegates are corruptible". This awareness causes the fall of the illusion
that the will of the absent (the represented) can find immediate
expression in those who are present (the representative). This leads to
the necessary debate on how to maintain communication between
voters and elected officials. Even more than two hundred years later,
these criticisms have not lost their relevance and, as then, methods of
participation and control of the representatives by the governed must
still be provided in many legal systems.
This abstract analyzes the idea proposed by the Five Star Movement,
that is a political party represented in both the Italian Parliament and
in the European Parliament. This idea would consider the prohibition of
the binding mandate as the key for a possible choice to face the
irresponsibility of MPs in political life against laxity and corruption.

104

Resumen en espaol
LA DEMOCRACIA DIRECTA Y LA PROHIBICIN DEL MANDATO
IMPERATIVO
Los partidos y los sindicatos estn construidos sobre el concepto de
representacin. Sin embargo, histricamente la representacin poltica
no siempre se ha expresado a travs de los partidos polticos. De hecho,
la experiencia de los primeros parlamentos era la existencia del
mandato imperativo que vinculaba a aquellos llamados a representar a
los grupos, comunidades o partes del territorio. Es la Revolucin
Francesa la que introduce la prohibicin del mandato imperativo. Sin
embargo, an durante los trabajos preparatorios de la Constitucin de
1793, Robespierre plante la cuestin de la responsabilidad de los
representantes y funcionarios pblicos en contraposicin con el "pueblo
soberano" con su famoso discurso "Sobre la constitucin y el gobierno
representativo". Los jacobinos se dieron cuenta pronto de que una vez
que la autonoma poltica de los representantes se ha garantizado, la
rendicin de cuentas del mandato era escaso y en consecuencia, la
esencia poltica de la conexin entre representante y representado deba
ser mejorada. Siguiendo las teoras de Rousseau, Robespierre
argument que la soberana popular no puede ser representada: "El
dominio del pueblo slo dura un da", y en cualquier caso "sus
delegados son corruptibles". Esta toma de conciencia implica el fin de la
ilusin de que la voluntad de los ausentes (los representados) poda
encontrar una expresin inmediata en aquellos que estn presentes (los
representantes). Esto nos lleva al esencial debate sobre cmo mantener
la conexin entre los votantes y los cargos electos. Incluso despus de
ms de doscientos aos, estas crticas no han perdido su actualidad y,
como entonces, se discuten los mtodos de participacin y control por
parte de los gobernados sobre los representantes.
Este trabajo analiza la idea propuesta por el Movimiento Cinco
Estrellas, que es un peculiar partido poltico representado tanto en el
Parlamento Italiano, como en el Parlamento Europeo, y que considera la
prohibicin del mandato imperativo como clave de la irresponsabilidad
de los diputados en la vida poltica y por tanto en la lucha contra la
laxitud y la corrupcin.

105

Abstract in italiano
LA DEMOCRAZIA DIRETTA E IL DIVIETO DEL VINCOLO DI MANDATO.
Sulla rappresentanza si costruiscono le fondamenta di partiti e
sindacati. La rappresentanza politica non sempre stata espressa dai
partiti, infatti nellesperienza dei primi parlamenti la regola era quella
della vincolativit del mandato scritto conferito a chi era chiamato a
parteciparvi in rappresentanza di ceti, comunit o parti di territorio.
con la Rivoluzione Francese, che venne stabilita la regola del divieto di
mandato imperativo. Tuttavia durante i lavori per la Costituzione del
1793 Robespierre pose la questione sulla responsabilit dei
rappresentanti e dei funzionari pubblici nei confronti del popolo
sovrano. I giacobini si resero conto per primi che una volta garantita
l'autonomia politica dell'organo rappresentativo veniva meno
l'assolutezza e l'astrattezza del mandato, concentrando l'essenza del
ruolo politico tra rappresentante e rappresentati. Robespierre, al
contrario, sosteneva che la sovranit popolare non potesse essere
rappresentata. Il dominio del popolo dura un giorno solo e, in ogni
caso, i suoi delegati sono corruttibili. Questa presa di coscienza
provoca la caduta dell'illusione che la volont dellassente (il
rappresentato) possa trovare immediata espressione in chi invece
presente (il rappresentante).Ci determina la necessaria riflessione su
come mantenere costante la comunicazione tra elettori ed eletti, infatti
seppure a pi di duecento anni di distanza, tali critiche non hanno
perduto la loro attualit e, come allora, si invocano strumenti di
partecipazione e controllo da parte dei governati nei confronti dei
governanti. In tale contesto questo abstract propone l'idea di analizzare
il contributo costruttivo a siffatto dibattito proposto dal Movimento
Cinque Stelle, peculiare partito politico che esprime rappresentanti sia
nel Parlamento italiano sia nel Parlamento europeo e che considera il
divieto di mandato imperativo come perno dell'irresponsabilit politica e
quindi possibile fautore di lassismo e corruzione.

106

1. Introduction
The Movimento 5 Stelle (Five Star Movement, hereinafter M5S), a new entity
on the Italian political stage, has roots deeper than the last elections could show. In
fact on political election of 24-25 February 2013, M5S gained 25.55% of votes and 163
Members of Parliament (109 deputies and 54 senators); later, at the European election
in 2014 the boom has deflated but remained at 21%, gaining 17 MP, and stabilized as
the second Italian political party, despite the high voters turnout. Everything started on
2005, when Beppe Grillo, a famous comedian, published his blog. Quickly became one
of the most widely followed in the world over the past few years (BRASSEUR, 2014: 37).
Now, Beppe Grillo's blog has become a virtual agora where he disseminates his
political opinions, commented on by hundreds of people (MUELLER, 2008). Indeed, it
hosts several activities, especilly the supporting structure of M5S political
participation.
2. The constitutional prohibition of the binding mandate
Parties and unions are grounded on the concept of representation. However, political
representation has not always been expressed by them. Indeed, the experience of the
first parliaments shows that the rule was the binding of the mandate, i.e. the written
authorisation given to those who were called upon to represent classes, communities
or territories (AZZARITI, 2009: 311), in a feudalistic perspective (SAJ, 1999: 110) such as
France's States-Generales (LEVICO, 2009: 83). The representative's activity was limited
to an oral exposure of the content of the cahiers de dolances prepared by the
constituency that elected him. During the French Revolution the binding mandate was
an issue to discuss. Three days after the Tennis Court Oath Louis XVI tried to manage
the events that caused his fall, and enacted the ordinance of June 23, 1789 declaring
the prohibition of the binding political mandate. This act opened the way to the end of
the feudal system of the political representation characterising the Ancien Rgime.
However, the liability of the agent, a clear fundamental issue, was not regulated.
During the drafting of the Constitution of 1793, Robespierre questioned the liability of
representatives and public officials towards the sovereign people with his famous

107

speech On the constitution and representative government of May 10, 1793. The
Jacobins realized that once the political autonomy of the representatives has been
guaranteed, the accountability of the mandate was lacking and the political essence of
the connection between the representative and the represented should be enhanced.
Following Rousseau's theories, Robespierre argued that popular sovereignity could not
be represented: "The domain of the people only lasts a day" and, in any case, "its
delegates are corruptible" (AZZARITI, 2009: 311). This awareness causes the fall of the
illusion that the will of the absent (the represented) can find immediate expression in
those who are present (the representative). This leads to the necessary debate on how
to maintain communication between voters and elected officials. Even more than two
hundred years later, these criticisms have not lost their relevance and, as then,
methods of participation and control of the representatives by the governed must still
be provided in many legal systems. In Italy, the prohibition of binding mandate is
stated by art. 67 of the Italian Constitution. It states that Each Member of Parliament
represents the Nation and carries out his duties without a binding mandate. According
to scholars (LEVICO, 2011: 83) the ban of binding mandate, leading to a freedom of
action of the deputies after their election, shows an ideological component. However,
it moved it to the side of the candidate. The voters can join it or not through their vote
at elections. Nevertheless, if the ideological element was shifted to the voters, there
should be a situation similar to the Ancien Rgime: voters should chose a very specific
program with a referendum and then choose people responsible for making it happen
in the Parliament. So, the voters have to follow them day-to-day in fulfilling their tasks
and eventually replace them, just representatives according private to law rules if they
does not comply, but this is precisely what Article 67 of the Italian Constitution
intended to prohibit. The main problem breaching it is related to serious scandals from
the inability to govern (AZZARITI, 2010; 108) to the bribery of Members of Parliament
happened in 2008 (BACCHI, 2013) and 2010 (AINIS, 2010). The scandals were
compounded by the fact that the electoral law did not provide for the direct choice of
the candidates by electors but only on the list already formed by the secretariat of the
parties. This law has been declared unconstitutional by the judgment No. 1/2014 of

108

the Constitutional Court for violation of the right of citizens to choose their own
political representatives (SGR, 2010). Currently, responses are quite varied, for
instance, the overcoming of the traditional parties as a bureaucratic and selfreferential bodies, no longer involved in the effective defense of the interests of their
constituency ot of the citizens. This kind of representative politics could be replaced by
more liquid organizations, such as new forms of political movements (A LGOSTINO, 2007;
653), or with increased use of direct democracy, despite the difficult experiences of
referenda in Italy, or participatory democracy (ALLEGRETTI, 2008; 175). The politic
proposal of M5S would fit in this scenario.
3. M5S' proposal on political choices and direct democracy.
M5S' proposal on political representation issues is a hybrid between direct democracy
and participatory democracy with the underlying goal of overcoming the prohibition of
the binding mandate. Direct democracy is designed to allow interested citizens to draft
legislation and constitutional amendments for the approval of voters (the power of
initiative) and to ask that laws adopted by legislative bodies be referred to voters for
approval or rejection (the power of popular referendum) (ECKSTEIN, 2012: 33). The
exercise of direct democracy is common mainly in the United States (C ARTER, 2011: 306;
EULE, 1990: 1510) and Switzerland (AUBERT, 1978). However, it is difficult to balance
direct democracy with the fundamental human rights. The question is: if a right is
inviolable, could it be submitted to a referendum on its existence, whose its result is
reserved to the majority of the voters? Examples of such kind of problems could be
observed during the debates, for instance, about the well-known Proposition 8 ballot
on the constitutional prohibition of same-sex marriage in California (BURNETT,
MCCUBBINS, 2012: 1); and the referendum initiative introducing a constitutional
prohibition on the construction of minarets adopted by Swiss voters in 2009 (MOECKLI,
2011: 774). Otherwise, participatory democracy consents to interested citizens to take
part to public decisions where it is allowed. This kind of participation knows various
degrees of presence of citizens in the public institutions, most of which show
subordination of this presence in the mechanisms of political and administrative
powers (ALLEGRETTI 2011: 2). For instance, among many examples of participatory

109

democracy there are the participatory budgeting experienced in some South America
towns such as Porto Alegre, some kinds of public participation in public debate in
urban or environmental matters (ALLEGRETTI, 2008: 175).
Participatory democracy of M5S is conducted in two ways: on the one hand through
the Sistema Operativo (Operating System, hereinafter S. O.), the online debating
and consultation application on Beppe Grillo's blog about the draft of the bills
proposed in Parliament by M5S representatives. Indeed, in July 2015 it has been
announced that S. O. will be replaced by a more complete IT platform called
"Rosseau"1. On the other hand through the direct involvement of citizens in working
groups on specific issues treated by M5S municipal and regional councilors and
members of parliament. The participant must register himself or herself on this blog
giving the number and a scanned copy of his or her ID document. Then, it has to be
certified by the staff of the blog. Consequently, the registered participant can take
part in both the voting and discussing processes.
The role of Beppe Grillo's blog in M5S political activities is fundamental because
it is considered its main political head office. Even if the S. O. should be the core of
M5S' political debate and an effective instrument to access participatory democracy, it
presents a strong limit to participation because it is accessible only to persons
registered and "verified" before January 1st 20142. This circumstance allows de facto
the formation of an elite, whose consistence is not clear, since registered participants'
personal data are not available to the public, because of obvious privacy reasons. This
is a huge element of controversy: can a minority be involved in the MPs' commitment,
when each MP represents the whole nation?
4. Direct democracy, proportionality and accountability to the voters.
Participatory democracy may be useful for sharing knowledge, skills and experiences,
but the solution proposed for the implementation of direct democracy through a

1 http://www.beppegrillo.it/2015/07/rousseau.html, accessed July 18, 2015.

2 https://sistemaoperativom5s.beppegrillo.it/, accessed July 18, 2015.

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privately owned blog could have some problems that it could be interesting to
investigate.
Primarly, a question has to be answered: <<Who are the People?>> (A RONEY, 2006:
11) More than 9 million voters chose M5S at the 2013 elections, and how many of
them are involved in voting through the blog? The most relevant experience, the
expulsion of 4 senators from the M5S parlamentarian group, saw only few tens of
thousands of registered subscribers participating to the online vote. According to
Beppe Grillo's declaration disseminated by himself through Twitter, 43,368 certified
subscribers were involved in the online votation: 29,883 in favour of expulsion and
13,485 contrary to it. Are they a relevant sample that can constrain senators and
deputies to the will of the majority among them? What kind of problems does it
presents? Matematically, they represent 0.003% of the votes gained by M5S in the
election of February 2013. It does not seem to be a reliable vote, because it lacks
representativeness of M5S voters, since it does not pursue the principle of
proportionality between the aim pursued (the accountability of the representative in
front of the represented) and the tool used to achieve it (S WEET, MATHEWS, 2006: 116),
especially the online voting system. Moreover, the reasons that were grounded the
online vote on their expulsion seemed more linked to personal opinions on M5S
political strategy than a specific assignment of criminal offenses (MUMELTER, 2014). The
lack of debate between representatives and the subscribers throught the online
platform, and the online vote on the representatives themselves about their stay in
the parliamentary group, infringed the dignity (RUGGERI, 2011: 14) of the Parliament
and of the MPs themselves. According to Article 67 of the Italian Constitution, the
representative sits on the benches of the House or Senate and represents the whole
Nation, and not just the small part of voters that took part in the online voting.
Furthermore, the certification of each subscriber, as well as the registration of access
to the platform of online voting, does not guarantee anonymity, and so the freedom of
the vote. Besides, the managers and the owners of the platform will always know
subscriber's vote or preference. Subscribers' votes are data closely linked to personal
ones because of the registration of the ID documents of the voters. Such circumstance

111

enables the profiling of each user according to his or her vote and opinion, and limiting
his or her freedom in terms of the right to be forgotten: how long are these data
related to votes and opinions expressed kept by the managers and owners of the
online voting system? Nobody knows for sure (D'ELIA, 2014). Indeed, such kind of vote
apparently can give a sense of gratification to voters exasperated by '"politicians'
impunity". However, this system prevents discussion and debate, therefore, is likely to
turn into a referendum on the person of the MP, regardless of the reasons why she or
he chose to dissent from the group or rules thereof.
The approach proposed by M5S forgets that the prohibition of the binding mandate
passes on to elected politicians a task not reflecting the reality represented by
themselves, as the M5S model would like to bring about. Instead, politicians have to
perform a function of representation, in the sense that they must represent a certain
idea of society, not merely their voters (ZAGREBELSKY, 2009: 76). So, the model
proposed by M5S could risk to legitimize its grass-roots voters as well as economic and
technocratic lobbies (ZAGREBELSKY, 2009: 76), as a new form of feudalism, fragmenting
general interests.
How is it possible to claim the accountability of the representatives in front their
constituents without taking away their free independence? A comparative analysis of
this issue could suggest a solution designed under the principle of proportionality: the
recall procedure. As suggested by its name, the "recall is a way to remove an elected
official before the end of the official's normal term in office (FEENEY, 2007; 37). Even if
it is scarcely investigated by scholars, the recall procedure has a fruitful constitutional
tradition in American history (ZICK, 1999: 571; OSBORNE-KLEIN, 2004: 145) proving to be
an important monitoring device that should be available to the people (ZICK, 1999:
570). It has a strict connection with popular sovereignty and the republican model.
However, a constitutional monarchy of long tradition like the British one has been
developing its introduction since the expenses crisis during the last Parliament.
(HOUSE OF COMMONS, 2012: 1). Indeed, it has been taken as a model in 26 legal systems
worldwide. As well as in the United States, it was adopted, for instance, in Argentina,
Canada (British Columbia), Philippines, South Korea, Switzerland, and Taiwan. The

112

constituents could claim the accountability of the MPs in specific cases stated by the
law, such as crime serious enough to receive a sentence, taking bribery, making racist
or offensive comments, claiming expenses that they are not entitled to, switching to a
different political party, breaking a promise in their election leaflet (HOUSE OF COMMONS,
2012: 13). Indeed, specific rules has to be provided to petition for recall by the
constituents (WEINSTEIN, 2005: 138). Recall statutes can vary from state to state,
however, they follow a general three-step model. First, voters have to circulate a
petition to collect a sufficient number of signatures. Second, election officials have to
determine if the recall petition contains the requisites stated by the law and the
number of valid signatures. Third, if both elements are accomplished the recall can be
held (WEINSTEIN, 2005: 139).
In Italy recall does not exist. However, M5S published the new rules for applying to the
2014 election to the European Parliament 3 and among the few rules proposed a very
original idea of recall was. It is stated that:
The elected representative must resign if he or she is convicted of a criminal offense,
even if under appeal. In the case that he or she should be accused of a criminal offense,
he or she will be entitled to decide whether to leave office or not. The deputy must also
resign if he or she should breach the code of conduct and the commitment to
compliance with its rules subscribed at the time of submission of his or her application
in respect of subscribers to the M5S. The deputy will be considered in serious breach
where, according to the principle of direct democracy known as "recall", as already
applied in the United States: i) at least 500 members of the M5S as of 31/12/2012
residing in the jurisdiction in which the deputy was elected justifiably have proposed to
declare a serious breach; ii ) the proposal has been approved by a majority vote in the
M5S network by the subscribers to the M5S by 30/06/2013 residing in the jurisdiction in
which the Member was elected.
Once again it is proposed exclusively to the registered members to platform before 31
December 2012, so the voters that actually chose the European MPs are excluded,

3 http://www.beppegrillo.it/movimento/codice_comportamento_europee.php

113

both from claiming the recall itself and voting on it. However, the online voting is
extended to subcribers registered before 30 June 2013. That seems to mean that not
every subscriber has the same weight and it seems that only people registered by the
end of 2012 have a full enjoyment of voting rights. Also, it should be noted that only
500 subscribers residing in the constituency can claim the recall procedure. It is a
very small number, related to the voters, that could increase the uncertainty of the
MP's political activity, subjecting him or her to undue pressure.
Political debate among M5S supporters, critics, and MPs has been developed on social
network such as Facebook and Twitter, especially on political representatives' personal
pages provoking its extreme fragmentation. This circumstance is encouraged by the
use of massive social network by M5S activists. This kind of choice would seem to
confirm the M5S propensity for audience democracy, as described by Bernard Manin
(MANIN, 1997: 220) and emphasized through Internet use. In this model, political
parties concede wide space and opportunities to personalization and communication
that, in whichever way made, take over traditional parties organization. The
consequences are that on the one hand collective entities, such as parties, which are
the traditional garantors of participation, are weakened. On the other hand the
relationships among political party, civil society and voters pass almost exclusively
through the media and political marketing (GALLO, 2013: 3).
5.- Conclusion
Scholars suggest that the M5S critical proposal of the prohibition of binding mandate
makes a revival of the pioneer days of its birth in the continental Europe during that
pluriennial workshop of Constitutional Law established in France between 1789 and
1793 (ZANON, 2014). For those who so strictly refer to the Jacobin tradition, also
assuming the attribute of "citizens" to indicate the MPs, the concept of
"representation" is almost inadmissible. In fact, the M5S approachrejects the very idea
of "representation", that means "giving presence to those who are absent (ZANON,
2014), and the notion of decision-making in the name and on behalf of the people
represented, as the result of the independent evaluation of the representative. The

114

revolutionary sans-culottes participation during the sessions of the French

Revolutionary Convention are replaced in modern form by flash-mobs, plenary
meetings, streaming, through the web people exercise their constant control and
with a online click approve and support or contradict and delegitimize (ZANON, 2014).
Indeed, digital democracy, rather than representative democracy, should require the
abolition of the prohibition of binding mandate as the cornerstone (GALLO, 2013: 3),
of the Italian constitutional system. Furthermore, the M5S theory on the political
mandate is certainly compatible with Internet, but it is surely incompatible (GALLO,
2013: 3) with the representative parliamentary model. Thus, there is a high risk of
transforming the means into the ends. In other words, by using technological
instruments to reach certain objectives, politicians tend to impose their own choices
onto citizenship while adopting an apparently neutral technique.

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