Gunpowder Weaponry and the

Rise of the Early Modern

State
Kelly DeVries

ince the 1988 publication of Geoffrey Parkers The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 15001800, the term
Military Revolution has become common parlance and accepted
scholarship among military historians.1 Recent books and collections
of articles by Brian M. Downing, Weston F. Cook Jr, David Eltis, Clifford J. Rogers, and Andrew Ayton and J.L. Price have even incorporated the term in their titles.2 All these works agreed that a revolution
in military tactics and strategy had been effected by the innovation of
gunpowder weaponry. And while it is true that the Military Revolution
thesis has had its critics, these, like Jeremy Black, John A. Lynn, Bert
S. Hall and myself, have specifically targeted Parkers ideas of technological determinism.3

G. Parker, The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500
1800 (Cambridge, 1988). The idea of the Military Revolution originated with Michael
Robertss 1955 lecture at Queens University, which was printed the next year as a
pamphlet under the title The Military Revolution, 15601660 (Belfast, 1956) and later
reprinted in a collection of Robertss articles, Essays in Swedish History (London,
1967), pp. 195225. Roberts, however, does not discuss the aspect of the Military
Revolution at issue in this article.
B.M. Downing, The Military Revolution and Political Change in Early Modern Europe
(Princeton, NJ, 1992); W.F. Cook, Jr, The Hundred Years War for Morocco: Gunpowder
and the Military Revolution in the Early Modern Muslim World (Boulder, CO, 1994); D.
Eltis, The Military Revolution in Sixteenth-Century Europe (London, 1995); C.J. Rogers,
ed., The Military Revolution Debate: Readings on the Military Transformation of Early
Modern Europe (Boulder, CO, 1995); and A. Ayton and J.L. Price, eds, The Medieval
Military Revolution: State, Society and Military Change in Medieval and Early Modern Europe
(London, 1995). See also C. Storrs and H.M. Scott, The Military Revolution and the
European Nobility, c. 16001800, War in History III (1996), pp. 141.
J. Black, A Military Revolution? Military Change and European Society, 15501800
(Atlantic Highlands, NJ, 1991); J.A. Lynn, The Trace Italienne and the Growth of
Armies: The French Case, Journal of Military History LV (1991), pp. 297330; B.S.
Hall, The Changing Face of Siege Warfare: Technology and Tactics in Transition,
in I.A. Corfis and M. Wolfe, eds, The Medieval City Under Siege (Woodbridge, Suffolk,
1995), pp. 25775; and K. DeVries, Catapults Are Not Atomic Bombs: Towards a
Redefinition of Effectiveness in Premodern Military Technology, War in History IV
(1997), pp. 45470. See also B.S. Hall and K.R. DeVries, Essay Review: The Military
Revolution Revisited, Technology and Culture XXX (1990), pp. 14754.

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One of Parkers noted changes wrought by the Military Revolution

not discussed by his critics in fact one that proves that the Military
Revolution was indeed revolutionary was that the increased use of
gunpowder weaponry in Europe between 1500 and 1800 brought
about the rise of the modern state. His argument seems quite logical:
because gunpowder weapons were expensive to produce, maintain and
supply, only the most wealthy and prosperous political entities were
able to afford a gunpowder train large enough both to defend their
lands and to attack their enemies. Smaller political entities, duchies,
counties, earldoms and other smaller baronies, simply were not wealthy
enough to compete with the centralized governments of kings and
emperors, and thus this led to the rise of the early modern state.4
This is but one of the many points which Parker uses to support his
thesis, and yet those adhering to the idea of the Military Revolution
that he proposed have accepted it without question. Some have even
used it to support their own early modern political paradigms. Note,
for example, the following from Bruce D. Porters War and the Rise of
the State: The Military Foundations of Modern Politics:
The crux of the matter as far as state formation was concerned was
this: artillery was generally too expensive for the nobility to purchase, and hence tended to become a monopoly of the Crown. The
superior military technology of the day both gravitated to and
reinforced the political center.5
And Clifford J. Rogers has written:
The great cost of artillery, and the larger armies engendered by the
growing importance of open battle, put a premium on the ability
to produce and manage large amounts of cash. This created a selfreinforcing cycle, which continued to spiral upwards at least until
the advent of the Artillery Fortress Revolution of the early sixteenth
century. It went something like this: central governments of large
states could afford artillery trains and large armies. The artillery
trains counter-acted centrifugal forces and enabled the central
governments to increase their control over outlying areas of their
realms, or to expand at the expense of their weaker neighbors. This
increased their tax revenues, enabling them to support bigger artillery trains and armies, enabling them to increase their centralization
of control and their tax revenues still further, and so on.6
4
5

Parker, Military Revolution, pp. 6769.

B.D. Porter, War and the Rise of the State: The Military Foundations of Modern Politics
(New York, 1994), p. 31.
C.J. Rogers, The Military Revolutions of the Hundred Years War, in Rogers, The
Military Revolution Debate, p. 75. (This essay was originally published in Journal of
Military History LVII (1993), pp. 24178, but was updated for inclusion in The Military
Revolution Debate.) The same sentiment is indicated in several of the other articles in
The Military Revolution Debate. See also J. Cornette, La revolution militaire et letat
moderne, Revue dHistoire Moderne et Contemporaine XLI (1994), pp. 696709; L.M.
Dudley, The Word and the Sword: How Techniques of Information and Violence Have Shaped
Our World (Oxford, 1991), p. 118. It should be noted that this idea is not original to

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Indeed, only one historian has disagreed with this technologically

determined rise of the early modern state, Sir J.R. Hale. In War and
Society in Renaissance Europe, 14501620, he notes:
The case for the suggestion that artillery was an instrument centralizing power is . . . feeble. Governments, as a result of regalian
rights over metals and their heavy investment in having guns made,
insisted on making the manufacture of artillery a monopoly. But
though an occasional rebellious magnate may have been brought
to heel by royal cannon (but never just because of cannon) the
complex shifts towards more effectively centralized forms of government began before cannon were effective or readily transportable
and can be explained without reference to gunpowder weapons.7
In support of Hales dissent on this issue, this article will investigate
the political control of gunpowder weaponry in Burgundy, France, and
England during the last two centuries of the Middle Ages. This is the
point at which political historians mark the beginning of the decline
and eventual demise of feudalism in western Europe, with the rise of
the central state in its stead.8 During this time, all three of these political entities fit this feudalistic decline/central state rise pattern almost
perfectly, with England and France rising at the end of the fifteenth
century to near-absolutism under the Tudors and Valois respectively,
and with Burgundy, despite losing its lord, Charles the Bold, in 1477
at the battle of Nancy, becoming part of the inheritance package
passed on to Charles V at his ascension to the imperial throne in 1519.
To fit Parkers Military Revolution thesis, then, we should expect to
find each of these states during this time, in terms of gunpowder weaponry, transforming from a locally owned and controlled technology
to that of a state-run, state-used and state-restricted technology. And
in fact that is almost precisely what we find in researching the history
of gunpowder weapons in France and Burgundy. Each of these rising
states recognized the effectiveness of gunpowder weapons as used by
local entities, seized this technology by whatever means they could and
then turned it against these same local entities to force their submission to the increasingly more powerful state. However, this model
is not followed in England, which begins with an extremely effective
state-controlled gunpowder weaponry arsenal, only to lose both cen-

Parkers Military Revolution, but can be found earlier in R. Bean, War and the Birth
of the Nation State, Journal of Economic History XXXIII (1973), pp. 20324; B.
Guenee, States and Rulers in Later Medieval Europe, trans. J. Vale (Oxford, 1985),
p. 144; J.U. Nef, War and Human Progress: An Essay on the Rise of Industrial Civilization
(New York, 1950), pp. 2341; W.H. McNeill, The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed
Force, and Society since A.D. 1000 (Chicago, 1982), pp. 6595; and E.F. Rice, Jr, The
Foundations of Early Modern Europe, 14601559 (New York, 1970), p. 16.
J.R. Hale, War and Society in Renaissance Europe, 14501620 (London, 1985), pp. 248
51. See also Downing, The Military Revolution and Political Change, pp. 6364, n. 26.
See e.g. Guenee, States and Rulers; J.R. Strayer, On the Medieval Origins of the Modern
State (Princeton, NJ, 1970).
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tralized control and technological expertise after failing to use the weapons against warring local entities in the course of the Wars of the
Roses, thus effecting a virtual dark ages of military technology which
would last for more than a century.

The Earliest Gunpowder Weapons

The history of fourteenth-century gunpowder weaponry in continental
Europe is one of almost complete local control. Nearly all the earliest
trustworthy references to gunpowder weapons, such as those mentioning guns at the siege of Metz in 1324, in a Florentine armoury in
1326, and at the siege of Cividale (Friuli) in 1331, and even the less
trustworthy references to guns appearing at the defence of Forli in
1284 and in the armoury of Ghent in 1313, indicate use by local entities, in this case urban militias, and not by royal armies.9 Local ownership is also evident in the earliest extant gunpowder weapons, four
Italian bombardellas, all of which were founded for local use.10 This
would continue to be the case throughout the century, especially in
France and in the Low Countries, the latter area forming by 1400 the
greatest part of the Burgundian lands, bringing both wealth and an
artillery arsenal to its dukes.

France
Despite the need for more research on this, and without explaining
more fully the reasons for these conclusions, it seems from an investigation already undertaken that Frances use of gunpowder weaponry
during the fourteenth century was far less than that of both England
and the Low Countries. Nevertheless, references to Frances use of
guns in this century almost always refer to a local use. For example,
gunpowder weapons appear in accounts of arsenal holdings in Rouen
in 1338, in Bioule Castle in 1347, in Paris in 1351, in Tours in 1358
9, and in Harfleur in 1369.11 And when used in military actions, French
9

10

11

P. Contamine, War in the Middle Ages, trans. M. Jones (London, 1984), p. 139; R.C.
Clephan, The Ordnance of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries, Archaeological
Journal LXVIII (1911), pp. 5657; J.R. Partington, A History of Greek Fire and
Gunpowder (Cambridge, 1960), p. 100; and W.Y. Carman, A History of Firearms from
Earliest Times to 1914 (London, 1955), pp. 1819.
D.C. Nicolle, Arms and Armour of the Crusading Period, 10501350 (White Plains, NY,
1988), pp. 13425. These were founded in Verrua Savoia, Morro, Val di Susa and
Issogne.
For Rouen, see V. Gay, Glossaire archeologique du moyen age et de la renaissance (3 vols,
Paris, 1887) i, p. 76; for Bioule, see Re`glement pour la defense du chateau de
Bioule, 18 mars 1347, Bulletin Archeologique IV (18467), pp. 49095; for Paris, see P.
Contamine, Guerre, etat et societe a` la fin du moyen age: etudes sur les armees des rois de
France, 13371494 ((Paris, 1972), p. 123 n. 185; for Tours, see J. Delaville le Roulx,
ed., Registres des comptes municipaux de la ville de Tours (2 vols, Tours, 1878) i, p. 55;
and for Harfleur, see A. Merlin-Chazelas, ed., Documents relatifs au clos des galees de
Rouen: collection de documents inedits sur lhistoire de France, section de philologie et dhistoire
jusqua` 1610 (2 vols, Paris, 1977) i, p. 205.

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gunpowder weapons continue to retain their almost sole local usage;

for example, at the attack of Southampton in 1338, the employment
of gunpowder weapons comes in a raid of Norman pirates on the
English coastal town; at Poitiers in 1369, the fortress was defended by
local militias using gunpowder and non-gunpowder artillery; and at
the battle of La Rochelle, guns were used on board Spanish ships hired
by the French.12
Further evidence for the local possession of gunpowder weaponry
during the fourteenth century is found in the construction of gunports
in the town wall of Mont-Saint-Michel and at the castles of Blanquefort
and St Malo,13 in the almost continual trade in gunpowder weapons
by merchants and garrison masters seemingly without royal restrictions,14 in the appointment of local masters of cannons (as they are
most often called) at Rouen in 1369 and at Saint-Sauveur-le-Vicomte
in 137075,15 and in the fact that the Duke of Brittany, defending his
duchy against the English after 1375, was almost always forced to rely
on his own gunpowder artillery resources.16
All of this is not to say that the fourteenth-century French kings were
completely unaware of the new gunpowder technology, or that they
did not desire its use in military conflict. Although there seem to be
no references to Philip VIs or John IIs interest in gunpowder weaponry, it is clear from numerous documents that Charles V (136480)
and Charles VI (13801422) were well aware of the military capabilities
of gunpowder weapons and wished to incorporate them into their
arsenals. But it should also be noted that in almost all the references
to French royal use of gunpowder weapons before the beginning of
the fifteenth century, these kings worked with the local owners to
acquire these weapons, and seemed unwilling either to construct or to

12

13

14

15

16

On the attack on Southampton, see K. DeVries, A 1445 Reference to Shipboard

Artillery, Technology and Culture XXXI (1990), pp. 81920; and L. Lacabane, De la
poudre a` canon et de son introduction en France, Bibliothe`que de lEcole de Chartes,
2nd ser., I (1844), pp. 3638. On the defence of Poitiers, see Jean Froissart,
Chroniques, ed. S. Luce (15 vols, Paris, 18691975) vii, pp. 16061. And on the battle
of La Rochelle, see op. cit. viii, pp. 3643.
On the gunports at Mont-Saint-Michel, see Contamine, War in the Middle Ages, p. 202.
On those at St Malo, see M. Jones, The Defence of Medieval Brittany: A Survey of
the Establishment of Fortified Towns, Castles and Frontiers from the Gallo-Roman
Period to the End of the Middle Ages, Archaeological Journal CXXXVIII (1981),
p. 174. And on gunports at Blanquefort Castle, see M.G.A. Vale, Seigneurial
Fortification and Private War in Late Medieval Gascony, in M. Jones, ed., Gentry and
Lesser Nobility in Late Medieval Europe (Gloucester, 1986), p. 141. See also K. DeVries,
The Impact of Gunpowder Weaponry on Siege Warfare in the Hundred Years War,
in Corfis and Wolfe, Medieval City Under Siege, p. 234.
See Merlin-Chazelas, Documents relatifs au clos, pp. 132, 256, 273, 288, 293, 295, 308,
329.
See op. cit., p. 205; L. Delisle, Histoire du chateau et des sires de Saint-Sauveur-le-Vicomte
(2 vols, Paris, 1867) i, p. 185. Saint-Sauveur-le-Vicomte had both a master of
cannons and a master of large cannons.
See M. Jones, Ducal Brittany, 13641369 (Oxford, 1970), pp. 35 n. 2 and 15960.
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obtain their own gunpowder weaponry holdings.17 Even the guns

brought to the royal siege of Saint-Sauveur-le-Vicomte in 13745, which
were used to bring down the walls of the English-controlled castle, were
supplied by the local baillis and operated under the direction of the
local master of artillery.18
Even as late as the composition of Christine de Pizans Le livre des
fais darmes et de chevalerie, written (it is believed) c. 1410, there is no
concerted royal effort towards the acquisition of gunpowder weapons,
for it is one of Christines purposes to convince Charles VI and his
ministers and generals in charge of military acquisitions that they
should direct their efforts towards this goal.19
But if Charles VI was unable to recognize the value of gunpowder
weaponry, his son, who would become Charles VII (142261), did, and
developed a strong programme of gunpowder weapon acquisition and
development. Charles increased the royal budget to procure a larger
number of new guns, and he added heavier new taxes to his kingdoms
inhabitants to pay for this increase. He also took a special interest in
the construction of new and often unworkable inventions related to
his gunpowder weapons.20
But perhaps the most important feature of Charles VIIs gunpowder
artillery train was its intricate organization and superior leadership.
Under masters of artillery Jean and Gaspard Bureau, the French artillery holdings grew in number and efficiency. Duties of cannoneers
were established, officers were appointed, competence was improved
and pay was increased. This allowed Charless military leaders to take
his artillery on every military expedition which led to numerous victories including those at the sieges of Orleans, Jargeau, Meung, and
Beaugency in 1429, at the sieges of Creil, Pontoise, and Harfleur in
1449, at the battle of Formigny and the siege of Caen in 1450, and at
17

18

19

20

See Merlin-Chazelas, Documents relatifs au clos, pp. 246, 256, 288, 289, 290, 299, 300,
308; L. Delisle, ed., Mandements et actes divers de Charles V (13641380) (Paris, 1874),
nos. 199, 276, 277, 278, 453, 471, 494, 642, 788, 797, 850, 1009, 1057, 1423, 1784,
1862, 1972; D.F. Secousse, ed., Ordonnances des rois de France de la troisie`me race (21
vols, Paris, 17231849) v, pp. 1418, 11112, vi, pp. 18283; and C. Devic and J.
Vaissette, Histoire generale de Languedoc (6 vols, Toulouse, 1885) x, pp. 96768.
C.T. Allmand, The Hundred Years War: England and France at War, c. 1300c. 1450
(Cambridge, 1988), p. 79; E. Perroy, The Hundred Years War, trans. W.B. Wells
(London, 1959), p. 166.
C. de Pizan, The Book of Fayettes of Armes and of Chyvalrye, trans. W. Caxton, ed. A.T.P.
Byles (London, 1932). That Charles VI was not completely ignorant of the value of
gunpowder weaponry can be seen in his interest in building new anti-artillery
fortifications for Paris and Limoges in 1420 (see Secousse, Ordonnances des rois de
France xi, pp. 7980, 8485), the placement of cannoneers under the control of the
Marshals of France in 1411 (see op. cit. v, pp. 58990), and the successful use of
gunpowder artillery by royal forces at the sieges of Fontenay and Dun-le-Roi in 1412
(see L. Bellaguet, ed., Chronique du religieux de Saint-Denis (6 vols, Paris, 183952) iv,
pp. 65254).
An example of this is recorded in 1449/50, when Charles requested the design of a
new carriage for his artillery, the object of which was to create a gun-carriage which
was not drawn by horses. See M.G.A. Vale, Charles VII (Berkeley, CA, 1974),
pp. 127, 141.

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the battle of Castillon in 1452 and ultimately contributed to the

eventual French victory over the English in the Hundred Years War.21
Moreover, after Charles VIIs death the French artillery holdings grew
consistently larger, improving both under Louis XI, who used them
effectively against rebellious lords in the War of the Public Weal (1465
69) and the Franco-Burgundian Wars (146577) and against a futile
invasion of France by Edward IV of England in 1475,22 and under
Charles VIII, who used them to invade and easily conquer Italy in
1494.23

Burgundy
The numbers of gunpowder weapons in the Low Countries during the
fourteenth century were far larger than in France, and they were used
far more frequently, but they too were locally controlled. Gunpowder
weaponry can be found in arsenals in St Omer in 1342, in Bruges in
1346 and 1362, in Lille in 1347/48, 1358, and 1365, in Mons in 1349
and 1378, in Binche in 136264, 1394 and 1396, in Valenciennes in
1363, in Ponthieu in 136869, in Arras in 1369, in Malines in 1372/82,
in Ghent in 1380, in Ypres in 1383 and in Avesnes-le-Comte in 1384.24
21

22

23

24

On the organization of Charles VIIs gunpowder artillery, see H. Dubled, Lartillerie

royale francaise a` lepoque de Charles VII et au debut du re`gne de Louis XI (1437
1469): les fre`res Bureau, Memorial de lArtillerie Francaise L (1976), pp. 555637;
Contamine, Guerre, etat et societe, pp. 230, 23839, 31117, 534. See also the
assessment by Jean Chartier in La chronique latine de Jean Chartier (14221450),
ed. C. Samaran, Annuaire-Bulletin de la Societe de lHistoire de France (1926), p. 272. On
Charless victories using gunpowder weapons, see A.H. Burne, The Agincourt War
(London, 1956), pp. 22932, 235, 29394, 301303, 313, 319, 32425, 33334, 340
41; K. DeVries, The Use of Gunpowder Weaponry By and Against Joan of Arc
During the Hundred Years War, War and Society XIV (1996), pp. 116.
Louis XIs interest in gunpowder weaponry is evidenced by the numerous ordonnances
which he passed concerning gunpowder artillery (see Secousse, Ordonnances des rois
de France XVXVII) and the even more numerous letters in which he referred to the
new technology (see J. Vaesen and E. Charavay, eds, Lettres de Louis XI roi de France
(12 vols, Paris, 18831909). See also E. Perroy, Lartillerie de Louis XI dans la
campagne dArtois, Revue du Nord XXVI (1943), pp. 17196, 293315, and
Lartillerie royale a` la bataille de Montlhery (10 juillet 1465), Revue Historique
CXLIX (1925), pp. 18789; R. Fawtier, ed., Documents inedits sur lorganisation de
lartillerie royale au temps de Louis XI, in A.G. Little and F.M. Powicke, eds, Essays
in Medieval History Presented to Thomas Frederick Tout (Manchester, 1925), pp. 36778.
On the War of the Public Weal, see P.M. Kendall, Louis XI (London, 1974), pp. 179
233. On the Franco-Burgundian Wars, see op. cit., pp. 388410; R. Vaughan, Charles
the Bold: The Last Valois Duke of Burgundy (London, 1973), pp. 4183, 399431. On
Edward IVs invasion, see F.P. Barnard, ed., Edward IVs French Expedition of 1475: The
Leaders and Their Badges, being MS. 2. M. 16. College of Arms (1925; repr. Gloucester,
1975).
On the French artillery train taken by Charles VIII to Italy in 1494, see P.
Contamine, Lartillerie royale francaise a` la veille des guerres dItalie, Annales de
Bretagne lxxi (1964), pp. 22161.
On St Omer, see Partington, History of Greek Fire, p. 100; on Bruges, see Clephan,
The Ordnance, pp. 61, 65; on Lille, see Gay, Glossaire i, pp. 2723; Clephan, The
Ordnance, p. 65; C. Gaier, Lindustrie et le commerce des armes dans les anciennes
principautes belges du XIIIe a` la fin du XVe sie`cle (Paris, 1963), p. 92; on Mons, see G.
Decamps, Lartillerie montoise: ses origines (Mons, 1906), pp. 23, 89; on Binche, see
C. Roland, Lartillerie de la ville de Binche, 13621420, Bulletin de la Societe Royale
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Local masters of cannons can be found at Lille in 1341 and at Malines

in 1365.25 And guns were used by local Low Countries militias at the
sieges of Quesnoy, Mortague, Saint-Amand, Marchiennes and Tournai
in 1340 (in conjunction with English gunpowder artillery), in defence
of Ghent in 1380, at the siege of Oudenaarde in 1382 and Damme in
1385, and at the battles of Bevershoutsveld and Rosebeke in 1382.26
As well, although Philip the Bold, Duke of Burgundy (13631404),
began acquiring parts of the Low Countries in 1384, it is clear that he,
like Charles V and Charles VI of France, also at least initially treated
the local ownership of gunpowder weapons with respect. It is also clear
that he allowed the local Low Countries owners to retain their control
of these weapons at least until the end of the fourteenth century and
perhaps into the fifteenth century and the reign of Philips son, John
the Fearless (140419).27 However, somewhere during these decades
a subtle ownership transformation was effected from local to ducal control. As Claude Gaier notes: To all intents and purposes the dukes
were able, in time of need, to requisition the machines of war and
cannons from the towns.28
Outside the Low Countries before the end of the fourteenth century,
and the total Burgundian kingdom after this, there is no question as
to the interest of Philip the Bold and his successors in gunpowder
technology. In many ways because of this interest it is the Burgundian
dukes who can be credited with causing the rapid evolution of gunpowder weaponry during the last half of the Hundred Years War. The
Burgundian dukes amassed large quantities of gunpowder weapons,
and they used them on almost all their numerous expeditions, during
which they were almost always successful. They also refused to allow
their gunpowder technology to remain stagnant, and they experimented with different sizes of weapons, methods of manufacture,
modes of transportation, metallurgy and powder chemistry. In some

25

26

27

28

Paleontologique et Archeologique de lArrondissement Judiciaire de Charleroi XXIII (1954),

pp. 3032; on Valenciennes, see Gay, Glossaire i, p. 171; on Ponthieu, see Contamine,
War in the Middle Ages, p. 146; on Arras, see Clephan, The Ordnance, p. 63; on
Malines, Ghent, Ypres, and Avesnes-le-Comte, see Gaier, Lindustrie, p. 92. On
fourteenth-century Low Countries gunpowder artillery in general, see B. Rathgen,
Feuer- und fernwaffen des 14. Jahrhunderts in Flandern, Zeitschrift fur historisches
Waffenkunde VII (191517), pp. 275306; P. Henrard, Histoire de lartillerie en Belgique
(Brussels, 1865).
On Lilles master of cannon, see Contamine, War in the Middle Ages, p. 139; on that
of Malines, see Clephan, The Ordnance, p. 62.
On these actions, see Froissart, Chroniques ii, pp. 14, 64, iv, pp. 166, 194195, v,
p. 11, viii, p. 244, xi, pp. 61, 24849, xii, pp. 13, 238, xiii, p. 139. On the use of
gunpowder weapons by the Ghentenaars during their 137985 rebellion, see also
Rathgen, Feuer- en fernwaffen, pp. 297300; R. Vaughan, Philip the Bold: The
Formation of the Burgundian State (London, 1962), p. 21.
See Gaier, Lindustrie, pp. 9293; Vaughan, Philip the Bold, p. 170. Local holdings of
gunpowder weapons after the beginning of the fifteenth century are detailed in J.
Garnier, Lartillerie des ducs de Bourgogne dapre`s les documents conserves aux archives de la
Cote-dOr (Paris, 1895).
Gaier, Lindustrie, p. 93.

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instances, Burgundian guns were even painted different colours,

although the reason for this is unclear.
It was also during the reign of these dukes that gunpowder artillery
became an official part of the military organization. They accompanied
nearly every ducal conquest. Philip the Bold used his gunpowder weapons at the sieges of Rochefort-sur-le-Doubs in 1372 and of Odruik in
1377, the walls of the latter being successfully breached by cannonfire.29 He also supervised the construction and testing of guns, and
organized their use in war under the leadership of an artilleur.30 In
particular, in 1377 Philip brought into his employ two fondeurs de
canon reputes, Jacques and Rolant Mayorque, commissioning them
to build seven new cannons for use at the siege of Ardre. One was a
very large weapon, which could discharge a stone cannonball of 450 lb,
although this gun eventually and without explanation failed to work.
The Mayorques were later commissioned to build six more cannons
for use against the invasion of the Bishop of Norwich in 1383 and still
more, this time an indeterminate number, for use against the Duke of
Berry in 1386.31
John the Fearless further increased the number and quality of the
Burgundian gunpowder weapons which he constantly used in military
engagements: at Calais in 1406, at Tongres, Othee and Maastricht in
1408, at Rougemont and Ham in 1411, at Bourges in 1412, at Arras
in 1414 and at Paris in 1417 and 1418.32 Moreover, John appointed
Germain de Givery as the first ducal master of artillery, and ordered
him to bring all the gunpowder weapons of the duchy which were not
actually in use in his castles together at a special arsenal in Dijon, the
duchys capital. Also during Johns reign artillery operators were even
given separate and distinctive uniforms, including a blue hat, for use
in ducal processions.33
Philip the Good (141967) continued the artillery programmes of
his father and grandfather, adding even more gunpowder weapons to
29

30

31
32

33

On Rochefort-sur-le-Doubs, see Garnier, Lartillerie, pp. 67. On Odruik, see Froissart,

Chroniques viii, pp. 24850.
Vaughan, Philip the Bold, pp. 124, 204. On Philips interest in gunpowder weapons,
see Garnier, Lartillerie, pp. 615.
Op. cit., p. 15.
For Calais, see Jehan de Waurin, Recueil des croniques et anchiennes istories de la Grant
Bretaigne, ed. W. and E.L.C.P. Hardy (5 vols, London, 186491) ii, pp. 105106;
Euguerran de Monstrelet, Chronique, ed. L. Douet-dArcq (6 vols, Paris, 185762) i,
p. 136. For Tongres, Othee and Maastricht, see Waurin, Recueil des croniques ii, p. 119;
Monstrelet, Chronique ii, pp. 35159; E. Fairon, ed., Regestes de la cite de Lie`ge (4 vols,
Lie`ge, 193340) i, p. 108. See also E. Wille, Die Schlacht von Othee, 23 September 1408
(Berlin, 1908). For Rougemont and Ham, see Monstrelet, Chronique ii, pp. 17275; Le
livre des trahisons de France envers la maison de Bourgogne, in K. de Lettenhove, ed.,
Chroniques relatives a` lhistoire de la Belgique sous la domination des ducs de Bourgogne
(textes francais) (Brussels, 1873), p. 96. For Bourges, see Bellaquet, Chronique du
religieux iv, p. 652. For Arras, see op. cit., v, p. 372. And for Paris, see op. cit., vi,
pp. 85, 12729; Monstrelet, Chronique iii, p. 216.
R. Vaughan, John the Fearless: The Growth of Burgundian Power (London, 1966),
pp. 151, 168; C. Brusten, Larmee bourguignonne de 1465 a` 1468 (Brussels, 1953),
p. 108. On Johns gunpowder weaponry holdings, see Garnier, Lartillerie, pp. 1633.
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the Burgundian artillery stores.34 Philip fought against the French,

English and Germans, and he was also involved in putting down several
insurrections in his ducal holdings, principally in the southern Low
Countries. Philip in 1420, in the company of Henry V and the English
army, with a great number of bombards, powder and other
implements of war, besieged Melun, where the French dauphin was
then living.35 In 1421 Philip bombarded and then took the town of
Saint-Riquier.36 In 1423 his artillery appeared on the battlefield of
Cravant.37 In 1424, using several large bombards including Griette,
Katherine, Cambray and lEcluse, he recaptured the Burgundian holdings
in the Maconnais which had been lost to the Armagnac supporters of
the dauphin by his father.38 In 1425 he besieged the castle of Brainele-Comte, assailing the walls with artillery without number.39 And in
1426 his bombardment of the town of Zevenbergen caused its
surrender.40
The 1430s also were years of constant battles and sieges as Philips
conquests added substantial holdings to the duchy of Burgundy.
Among the large number of battles fought by the Burgundian Duke
a few are particularly noteworthy for his use of gunpowder weapons.
In 1430 Philip, allied with Jean, the Duke of Luxemburg, used five
large bombards, two veuglaires, one large and one small, and two
engins to take the town of Compie`gne.41 The following year he
besieged Sancenay in Auxerre using the large bombard Prusse among
other cannons, and he also won the battle of Bulgneville making use
of his guns on the battlefield.42 As well, in 1433, the castle of MussylEveque fell to Philip, who used only his smaller weapons to bring
about its submission, while that same year the castle of Fortepice also
fell to the Burgundians, flattened, it is said, by only a single large bombard, the Bourgoigne.43 Finally, in 1434 Philip besieged the town of
Belleville, a town whose walls he breached easily.44
34

35

36
37
38
39
40
41

42

43
44

On Philips artillery holdings, see op. cit., pp. 34177, and the numerous references
in M. Mollat, ed., Comptes generaux de letat bourguignon entre 1416 et 1420 (3 vols,
Paris, 196569).
Waurin, Recueil des croniques ii, p. 327; Monstrelet, Chronique iii, p. 410; and Georges
Chastellain, uvres, ed. K. de Lettenhove (8 vols, 1863; repr. Brussels, 1971) i,
pp. 15356.
Waurin, Recueil des croniques ii, p. 371; Chastellain, uvres i, pp. 25051.
Waurin, Recueil des croniques iii, p. 55; Le livre des trahisons, pp. 16970.
Garnier, Lartillerie, p. 93.
Waurin, Recueil des croniques iii, p. 165.
Op. cit., p. 210.
Op. cit., p. 362; Monstrelet, Chronique iv, pp. 41819; Chastellain, uvres ii, p. 53; and
Antonio Morosini, Chronique: extraits relatifs a` lhistoire de France, ed. G. LefevrePontalis and L. Dorez (3 vols, Paris, 189899) iii, pp. 31923. See also Gaier,
Lindustrie, p. 111; DeVries, The Use of Gunpowder Weaponry, pp. 1314.
Garnier, Lartillerie, p. 52; R. Vaughan, Philip the Good: The Apogee of Burgundy
(London, 1970), p. 26.
Garnier, Lartillerie, pp. 9899.
Liber de virtutibus sui genitoris Philippi Burgundiae ducis in Kervyn de Letetenhove, ed.,
Chroniques relatives a` lhistoire de la Belgique sous la domination des ducs de Bourgogne (texts
latins) (Brussels, 1876), pp. 3536.

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In 1435 Philip changed sides in the Hundred Years War, abandoning

the English and allying with the French king, Charles VII, the man
whom he had so often attacked in the past. Initially, this policy brought
some defeats. For example, Philip failed to captured Calais in 1435
36 despite having a large number of guns present at the siege,45 and
in 1437, at the siege of Crotoy, he lost not only the conflict but also
most of his artillery to Lord John Talbot of England.46 In 1443, however, Philip rebounded from these defeats, attacking the pretenders to
the throne of Luxemburg, the King of Bohemia and the Duke of
Saxony, by besieging and eventually capturing the castle of Villy. Here
he took as booty more than 10 000 lb of bronze which served to found
new gunpowder weapons.47
Finally, there were several years of external peace for the duchy.
Although some internal fighting continued, and Philip always used his
artillery in these affairs,48 it was not until 1465 and the War of the
Public Weal that Philip, together with his son and heir, Charles the
Bold, again began to attack fortresses outside his duchy. In May 1465,
allied with Louis, the count of St Pol, Philips artillery assembled outside the walls of Honnecourt, for 236 carts loaded with bombards,
mortars, veuglaires, serpentines and other cannon had been brought
from the Low Countries for this engagement.49 In July, Philips artillery
was used unsuccessfully at the battle of Montlhery where, although his
guns were positioned strongly on the battlefield, he was unable to fire
more than ten salvos at the French army.50 However, a few weeks later
his guns were again used, this time to defeat the same French army
by bombarding them across the Seine near Paris.51 From August to
September of that same year Philip besieged Paris itself, but the guns
of the French defenders eventually caused him to retreat after what
may have been the most fearsome artillery duel of the century. As eye-

45

46

47
48

49

50

51

Waurin, Recueil des croniques iv, pp. 16089; Monstrelet, Chronique v, pp. 24045; Jean
Chartier, Chronique de Charles VII, ed. V. de Viriville (3 vols, Paris, 1858) i, p. 242;
Thomas Basin, Histoire de Charles VII, ed. C. Samaran (2 vols, Paris, 1933) i, pp. 241
43; F.W.D. Brie, ed., The Brut, or the Chronicles of England (2 vols, London, 1906
1908) ii, pp. 469, 505, 57383; Oliver van Dixmude, Merkwaerdige gebeurtenissen vooral
in Vlaenderen en Brabant van 1377 tot 1443, ed. J.J. Lambin (Ypres, 1835), pp. 15055;
R.A. Klinefelter, ed., The Siege of Calais: A New Text, Publications of the Modern
Language Association LXVII (1952), pp. 88895.
Waurin, Recueil des croniques iv, pp. 22730. See Garnier, Lartillerie, pp. 13940, for an
inventory of the artillery pieces lost by Philip at the siege of Crotoy.
Op. cit., pp. 12324.
These were primarily protracted fights against his rebellious subjects in Flanders and
Lie`ge.
Jacques de Clercq, Memoires, ed. J.A.C. Buchon (Paris, 1875), p. 263. See also Waurin,
Recueil des croniques v, p. 473.
Op. cit., pp. 48283; Jean de Haynin, Memoires, ed. R. Chalon (2 vols, Mons, 1842) i,
pp. 2937; and B. de Mandrot and C. Samaran, eds, Depeches des ambassadeurs milanais
en France sous Louis XI et Francois Sforza (4 vols, Paris, 191634) iii, pp. 23656.
Vaughan, Philip the Good, pp. 38789.
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witness Philippe de Commynes wrote: I have never seen so much

shooting in such a few days.52
Nor did Philip stop in 1465. Two years later, at the age of 71, he
successfully besieged Bouvignes, Brusthem and Dinant using his gunpowder weapons.53 In all these conquests he used a large and elaborate
artillery train. He also recognized the threat of an enemys artillery,
and is reported to have kept a spy in England solely for the purpose
of assessing the strength of the English gunpowder artillery holdings.54
During his reign, Philip also formed an army of crusade around his
gunpowder artillery train. In January 1456, with relative peace in the
duchy, the Duke planned to avenge the conquest made by the Ottoman Turks against the Byzantines. In this army he included 500600
gunners, carpenters, masons, smiths, pioneers, miners and workmen,
all under the command of his master of artillery.55
Philips son, Charles the Bold (146777), could not follow in the
footsteps of his ducal ancestors, for he possessed none of their military
or diplomatic skills, nor was he able to defend successfully the lands
which he inherited. Yet he was still interested in continuing the now
traditional Burgundian gunpowder artillery plan.56 Philippe de Commynes describes Charless artillery as very large and powerful and
good and beautiful,57 and Oliver de la Marche reports that the Duke
had more than 300 carts of guns, not counting his culverins or haquebusses which were without number.58 Charles also continued to use
these weapons in many conquests. At the siege of Neuss, for example,
one eyewitness recounted: It was pitiful how culverins were fired at
[the people of Neuss] thicker than rain . . .59
52

53

54

55

56

57
58
59

Philippe de Commynes, Memoires, ed. J. Calmette and G. Durville (3 vols, Paris, 1924)
i, p. 62. See also Jean de Roye, Chroniques, in M. Petitot, ed., Collection comple`te des
memoires relatifs a` lhistoire de France, 1314 (Paris, 1820) xiii, pp. 30212.
Commynes, Memoires i, p. 94; Waurin, Recueil de croniques v, pp. 52631; Haynin,
Memoires i, p. 69; Fairon, Regestes de la cite de Lie`ge iv, pp. 23441; Thomas Basin,
Histoire de Louis XI, ed. C. Samaran (3 vols, Paris, 196372) i, pp. 2746; Oliver de la
Marche, Memoires, in Petitot, Collection comple`te x, pp. 25758.
M.-R. Thielemans, Bourgogne et Angleterre: relations politiques et economiques entre les PaysBas bourguignonnes et lAngleterre, 14351467 (Brussels, 1966), p. 17.
Vaughan, Philip the Good, p. 361. The entire plan for this crusade is translated and
printed on pp. 36065.
On Charless extensive gunpowder holdings, see Garnier, Lartillerie, pp. 17789; J.
Finot, ed., Inventaire sommaire des archives departementales anterieures a` 1790. Nord:
Archives civiles, serie B (Lille, 1895) viii, pp. 228301; C. Brusten, Larmee; Brusten,
Les compagnies dordonnance dans larmee bourguignonne, Revue Internationale
dHistoire Militaire XL (1978), pp. 11269; C. Brusten, La fin des compagnies
dordonnance de Charles le Temeraire, in Cinq-centie`me anniversaire de la bataille de
Nancy (1477) (Nancy, 1979), pp. 36375; and E. Heer, Armes et armures au temps
des guerres de Bourgogne, in Grandson 1476, Centre dHistoire et de Prospectives
Militaires, Serie Recherches de Sciences Comparees, II (Lausanne, 1976).
Commynes, Memoires i, p. 16 and ii, p. 10.
La Marche, Memoires x, pp. 55354.
Quoted from a letter sent by Jehan Baugey to the mayors and echevins of Dijon on
16 Sept. 1475. See Vaughan, Charles the Bold, pp. 3223. See also Chastellain, uvres
viii, pp. 2623; Haynin, Memoires i, p. 251; La Marche, Memoires x, pp. 2956; Roye,
Chroniques ii, p. 7; de Mandrot and Samaran, Depeches des ambassadeurs i, p. 107; and
Jean de Margny, Laventurier, ed. J.R. de Chevanne (Paris, 1938), pp. 59, 8384. For
an inventory of Charless gunpowder weapons at this siege, see Garnier, Lartillerie,

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139

But Charless enemies, the Germans, Swiss, French and Lie`geois,

had also increased the numbers of their artillery pieces, equalling the
quality and quantity of the Burgundian gunpowder weapons. Eventually, they used these weapons to aid in their defeat of the Burgundian
forces and to end Burgundian power.60

England
While France and the Low Countries both had local control over fourteenth-century gunpowder artillery holdings, Englands gunpowder
weaponry never fell under local control, but was always exclusively a
royal possession. It is perhaps fitting, although undoubtedly only a
coincidence, that the first trustworthy source for an English gunpowder weapon, a manuscript illumination painted in London c. 1326,
is found in Walter de Milemetes De notabilibus, sapientiis et prudentiis
regum (Concerning the majesty, wisdom and prudence of kings).61 But
it is really to King Edward III (132877) that credit for the royal domination of gunpowder weapons in England should be given, for it is he
who, it appears, was the first sovereign to see the future uses of guns,
stockpiling a number of the relatively new weapons at the Tower of
London, at Dover, and at the recently constructed castle of Queenborough.62 Edward also used these weapons in his frequent conquests of
the Low Countries and France during the early part of the Hundred
Years War. They appeared at the sieges of Cambrai in 1338, of Tournai,
Quesnoy, Mortague, Saint-Amand and Marchiennes in 1340, of Rennes
and Hennebout in 1342, of Calais in 134647, of Carcassonne in 1355,
of Saint-Valery in 1359, and of Bourdeilles in 1369;63 they also

60

61

62

63

pp. 17887.
On Charless wars in general, see J.R. de Chevanne, Les guerres en Bourgogne de 1470 a`
1475 (Paris, 1934). On the wars against Germany, see Vaughan, Charles the Bold,
pp. 31258. On the wars against Switzerland, see op. cit., pp. 35998; and A. Schnegg,
ed., Entreprises du duc de Bourgogne contre les suisses (Basel, 1948). On the wars against
Lie`ge, see Vaughan, Charles the Bold, pp. 140; A. Lallemand, La lutte des etats de Lie`ge
contre la maison de Bourgogne, 13901492 (Brussels, 1910); C. Brusten, Les campagnes
lie`geoises de Charles le Temeraire, in Lie`ge et Bourgogne: actes de colloque tenu a` Lie`ge
les 28, 29 et 30 octobre 1968 (Lie`ge, 1972), pp. 8199; C. Gaier, Le role des armes a`
feu dans les batailles lie`geoises au XVe sie`cle, Le musee dArmes LI(1986), pp. 112
and Publications du Centre Europeen dEtudes Bourguignonnes (XIV eXVIe s.) XXVI
(1986), pp. 3137.
M.R. James, ed., The Treatise of Walter de Milemete: De notabilibus, sapientiis, et prudentiis
regum (London, 1913), p. 140. See also Nicolle, Arms and Armour, no. 976;
Contamine, War in the Middle Ages, p. 139; Clephan, The Ordnance, p. 57;
Partington, History of Greek Fire, pp. 98100; Carman, History of Firearms, pp. 1718;
and K. DeVries, A Reassessment of the Gun Illustrated in the Walter de Milemete
Manuscript (forthcoming).
Clephan, The Ordnance, p. 66; T.F. Tout, Firearms in England in the Fourteenth
Century, English Historical Review XXVI (1911), pp. 666702.
On the sieges of Cambrai, Tournai, Quesnoy, Mortague, Saint-Amand, and
Marchiennes, see Froissart, Chroniques ii, pp. 14, 64. On Rennes and Hennebout, see
op. cit., p. 144. On Calais, see Tout, Firearms in England, pp. 67374, 68889. On
Carcassonne, see Froissart, Chroniques iv, p. 168. On St Valery, see op. cit., v, p. 356.
And on Bourdeilles, see op. cit., vi, p. 338.
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undoubtedly were used by Edward at the battle of Crecy in 1340.64

Edward also felt that it was important to keep his possessions on the
Continent, once obtained, well outfitted with gunpowder weapons. He
even appointed a royal receiver for the duchy of Brittany to oversee the
procurement and placement of guns throughout the duchy.65 Finally,
Edward also set about converting several vulnerable fortifications of
England to more effective defence against gunshot by piercing them
with gunports, a practice continued by his grandson, Richard II; Quarr
Abbey on the Isle of Wight, Queenborough Castle, Assetons Tower at
Portchester, Carisbrooke Castle, Canterbury town wall, Cooling Castle,
Southampton Castle and town wall, Saltwood Castle, Norwich town
wall, Dover Castle, Bodiam Castle and Winchester town wall had all
received gunports by 1390.66
Richard II (137799), despite a reputed dislike for the military arts,
also carried on other gunpowder weaponry programmes begun by his
grandfather, continuing to increase the stores of gunpowder weapons
available in England and in English possessions on the Continent.67
Richard is also credited with the first royal appointment of a master
of cannons in England in 1386, although Edward III, unknown to us,
may have preceded him with such an appointment.68 Finally, it is Richard who may have outfitted his army with the first handguns.69
Richards overthrow by his cousin, Henry IV (13991413), brought
about the initial phase of the Wars of the Roses, and yet surprisingly
Henry seems not to have used his gunpowder artillery stores, which
still appear to have remained intact after Richard IIs demise, on rebel
Englishmen. Only in the campaign against York, Warworth, and
Berwick in 14051406 did Henry take gunpowder weapons, and then
they were not numerous or particularly decisive.70 Instead, records of
Henrys guns show that he was only interested in using these weapons
to protect his marches in England, both Scottish and Welsh, and in
ensuring the continued guardianship of English possessions in France.
He also seems to have been unable to increase his gunpowder weapon

64

65
66
67

68

69

70

On the disputed reports of cannons at Crecy, see A.H. Burne, The Crecy War
(London, 1955), pp. 192202.
See Jones, The Defence of Medieval Brittany, pp. 151 n. 1, 15455, 163.
See DeVries, The Impact of Gunpowder Weaponry, pp. 2336.
Tout, Firearms in England, pp. 6768, 6813; Thomas Rymer, ed., Foedera,
conventiones, litterae, et cujuscunque generis acta publica inter reges Angliae et alios quosvis
imperatores, reges, pontifices, principes, vel communitates (11011654) (20 vols, London,
170435) vii, p. 622.
Calendar of Close Rolls, Richard II 138589 (London, 1921), pp. 16263. On Edwards
artillerymen, see Tout, Firearms in England, pp. 67980.
PRO Enrolled Accounts E101/400/23. This document would bear more study. See
also Tout, Firearms in England, pp. 678, 68486.
On the campaign against York, Warworth and Berwick in 14056, see J.H. Wylie, The
History of England under Henry IV (4 vols, 18941929; repr. New York, 1969) ii,
pp. 24673.

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141

holdings in the manner of Richard II and Edward III, although why

this was so for the moment remains a mystery.71
Henry V (141322) made up for his fathers gunpowder weaponry
shortcomings almost immediately after his ascension to the throne.
Preparing for two years for an invasion of France, the new English
king constructed and gathered together an impressive artillery train.72
There is no extant account of how many guns actually accompanied
Henry on his attack on France in 1415, but their presence was certainly
felt at Harfleur, as that fortified town fell with relative ease to the
English King;73 other gunpowder weapons accompanied Henry to the
battlefield of Agincourt, although their presence was less decisive
there.74 Henry continued to construct and use gunpowder weapons
even after the victory at Agincourt, and this undoubtedly made a difference in the victories against Boulogne in 1416, Caen in 1417, Falaise,
Domfort, Cherbourg, Louviers and Rouen in 1418, Montereau and
Melun in 1420, Alencon, Chartres and Saint-Riquier in 1422, and
Meaux and Saint-Valery-sur-Somme in 1422.75
During the early part of Henry VIs reign (142261), the gunpowder
artillery policies of Henry V were continued. Evidence of the construction of gunpowder weapons in England and their transportation to the
Continent, as well as an extensive English artillery organization in
France, affirms the continued belief of Henry VIs court that gunpowder weaponry was needed to preserve the foreign holdings of the
crown.76 But soon this royal interest in gunpowder technology began
71

72

73

74
75

76

See op. cit., ii, pp. 7, 101; iii, pp. 5758, 64, 1067, 112; iv, p. 254; Richard Brooke,
Visits to Fields of Battle, in England of the Fifteenth Century (London, 1857), pp. 22123.
Burne, The Agincourt War, p. 34; Brooke, Visits to Fields of Battle, pp. 22324; Rymer,
Foedera ix, p. 160; Calendar of Patent Rolls, Henry V 141316 (London, n.d.), pp. 92,
292; J.H. Wylie, The Reign of Henry the Fifth (3 vols, Cambridge, 191429) i, pp. 4478,
480; C.T. Allmand, Henry V (Berkeley, CA, 1992), p. 216.
Burne, The Agincourt War, pp. 4246; Wylie, Reign of Henry V ii, pp. 3338; Allmand,
Henry V, p. 216; Brooke, Visits to Fields of Battle, pp. 22425; M.G.A. Vale, English
Gascony, 13991453: A Study of War, Government and Politics during the Later Stages of the
Hundred Years War (Oxford, 1970), p. 75 n. 3; C.T. Allmand, Lancastrian Normandy,
14151450: The History of a Medieval Occupation (Oxford, 1983), p. 9.
Wylie, Reign of Henry V ii, pp. 15960; Allmand, Henry V, p. 212.
On Henrys conquest of Normandy in 141622, see R.A. Newhall, The English
Conquest of Normandy, 14161424: A Study in Fifteenth-Century Warfare (New Haven, CT,
1924); Burne, The Agincourt War, pp. 10774; Wylie, Reign of Henry V ii, pp. 32930;
iii, pp. 5859, 7071, 10710, 113, 11935, 209, 212, 313, 317, 334, 34050, 412;
Brooke, Visits to Fields of Battle, pp. 2267. Allmand (Henry V, p. 215) writes about the
use of the gun by Henry: Apart from the bow at Agincourt, the weapon which made
the biggest impact on the war was the cannon . . . Henry, as the aggressor, had the
full weight of cannon behind him, and both he and his brother, Gloucester, were to
use it to good effect.
Brooke, Visits to Fields of Battle, pp. 22832; Calendar of Patent Rolls, Henry VI, 14229,
pp. 49394; Henry VI, 142936, p. 44; C.T. Allmand, Lartillerie de larmee anglaise
et son organisation a` lepoque de Jeanne dArc, in Jeanne dArc: une epoque, un
rayonnement (Paris, 1982), pp. 7383; P. Le Cacheux, ed., Rouen au temps de Jeanne
dArc et pendant loccupation anglaise (14191449) Rouen, 1931), pp. 13246, 34748; A.
Goodman, The Wars of the Roses: Military Activity and English Society, 145297 (London,
1981), pp. 16465. Two recently discovered documents should assist in
understanding the artillery programme in the early years of Henry VIs reign. One,
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to wane. For the most part this can be attributed to the losses of
English lands in France and with them the losses of gunpowder weapons. After 1435, too, when Philip the Good of Burgundy broke his
alliance with England and started to support the French in the war, it
was to be expected that the English could not hold on to their continental possessions for too much longer. In fact, they were effectively
off the Continent by 1453 (although they hung on to Calais for
another 100 years).
But England would not be at peace for more than 30 years after the
loss of the Hundred Years War, for even before they had left France,
the next phase of the Wars of the Roses had begun with the revolt of
Richard, Duke of York and cousin to Henry VI. And before these wars
were completed, two dynastic families, the Lancasters and the Yorks,
had given way to the Tudors. What is so interesting about these wars
from a military technology perspective is how few gunpowder weapons
were used during them a fact which has been remarked by several
historians77 especially when compared to the almost early modern
use of gunpowder weapons on the Continent during the War of Public
Weal and the SwissBurgundian Wars being fought at the same time.
Historically this is certainly a problem, but one which lies outside
the scope of this article and must await further study. Suffice it to say
that, after nearly a century and a half of strong royal control over gunpowder weaponry in England, such weaponry had almost completely
disappeared by the middle of the fifteenth century and would not
reappear until the middle of the sixteenth century.
This is not to say that the English kings during the Wars of the Roses
had no gunpowder weapons. In fact these kings, whether Lancastrian,
such as Henry VI, Yorkist, such as Edward IV (146183) or Richard III
(148385), or Tudor, such as Henry VII (14851509), tried diligently
to strengthen their gunpowder weaponry stores and administration.
But they simply never had strong royal control over these weapons
similar to that held by their continental counterparts.
For example, on several occasions during his reign, Henry VI
ordered gunpowder artillery to be constructed at his own expense, and
all during the first period of the Wars of the Roses he continued the
royal ordnance department and constantly named individuals to the
office of chief cannoneer.78 In 1450 guns were even used effectively to

77

78

PRO Enrolled Accounts E101/51/27, dated 6 May 1428, instructs John Parker of
Cheshunt to construct cannons and gather stone, iron and other materials for the
repair of cannons beyond the sea, and the second, PRO Enrolled Accounts
E101/52/3, dated 1429, is written from France by the same John Parker, indicating
where he had taken these weapons.
This lack of gunpowder weaponry use is commented on by Goodman, Wars of the
Roses, pp. 1735; C. Ross, The Wars of the Roses (London, 1976), p. 112; and J.
Gillingham, The Wars of the Roses (Baton Rouge, LA, 1981), pp. 2728.
On Henry VIs domestic use of gunpowder weapons, see Goodman, Wars of the Roses,
pp. 16061; R.L. Storey, The End of the House of Lancaster (London, 1966), p. 181; and
Calendar of Patent Rolls, Henry VI (London, 1910) vi, pp. 342, 605, 659.

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put down Jack Cades rebellion in Kent.79 But when it came to using
these weapons in battle against an equally well-gunned Yorkist army,
at the battle of Northampton in 1460, poor planning and rain put his
guns out of action, and Henry VI suffered an ignoble loss.80
In a nutshell, this was the problem with gunpowder weapons in fifteenth-century England. It was not just the King who controlled their
supply and use. Henrys loss at Northampton was to Edward, the Earl
of March. Edward had inherited his own guns from his well-supplied
father, Richard, the Duke of York, who in turn had used them in
numerous military adventures against English royalist forces: at the
battles of Brent Heath (1452), St Albans (1455), Blore Heath (1459),
Ludford Bridge (1459) and Ludlow (1459).81 Edward himself had fired
gunpowder weapons into the city of London in 1460, an incident
which caused several disturbances among the citizens after he became
King Edward IV the following year.82
Once king, Edward found that he faced the same problem with the
guns of rebellious nobles as Henry VI: he alone did not own or control
the gunpowder weapons of his kingdom. He faced the guns of the
brothers Neville, Sir John, the Earl of Northumberland and Marquis
Montagu, and Richard, the Earl of Warwick, at the sieges of Alnwick,
Bamburgh and Dunstanburgh castles in 146483 and again at the battle
of Barnet in 1471; at Barnet the two brothers lost their lives.84 Later
in 1471, at the battle of Tewkesbury, Edward also faced the guns of
Margaret of Anjou, the wife of the deposed Henry VI.85 Similar circumstances were encountered by Edwards brother, Richard III, at the
battle of Bosworth, in 1485 when, using his own guns, he fought the
usurper-victor, Henry Tudor. Henry had not only gathered his own
gunpowder weaponry on his march through England to Bosworth
field, but had also brought French artillery with him.86 Two years later,
at the battle of Stoke, the now King Henry VII defeated a final Yorkist
79
80

81

82

83

84

85

86

I.M.W. Harvey, Jack Cades Rebellion of 1450 (Oxford, 1991), p. 84.

R.I. Jack, A Quincentenary: The Battle of Northampton, July 10th, 1460,
Northamptonshire Past and Present III (196065), pp. 2125.
On Richard of Yorks artillery, see Goodman, Wars of the Roses, pp. 30, 121, 17071;
Storey, End of the House of Lancaster, p. 189; Brooke, Visits to Fields of Battle, pp. 233
34. In 1459 Henry VI had tried to order the seizure of all Richard of Yorks artillery
(Calendar of Patent Rolls, Henry VI vi, p. 527), but this order could not be fulfilled.
C.L. Scofield, The Life and Reign of Edward IV (2 vols, 1923; repr. New York, 1967) i,
pp. 8992; R.R. Sharpe, London and the Kingdom (3 vols, London, 1895) iii, p. 384.
Goodman, Wars of the Roses, p. 64; Brooke, Visits to Fields of Battle, p. 236; Ross, Wars of
the Roses, p. 66.
Goodman, Wars of the Rosees, p. 172; Brooke, Visits to Fields of Battle, p. 239; Ross, Wars
of the Roses, p. 123; P.W. Hammond, The Battles of Barnet and Tewkesbury (New York,
1990), pp. 7278.
Brooke, Visits to Fields of Battle, p. 239; Ross, Wars of the Roses, pp. 12526; Hammond,
Battles of Barnet and Tewkesbury, pp. 9398.
Jean Molinet, Chroniques, ed. G. Doutrepont and O. Jodogne (4 vols, Brussels, 1935)
i, p. 434; Goodman, Wars of the Roses, p. 93; Brooke, Visits to Fields of Battle, p. 242;
Ross, Wars of the Roses, pp. 131, 135. See also M. Bennett, The Battle of Bosworth (New
York, 1985).
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Kelly DeVries

uprising, ending the Wars of the Roses. Again both sides used gunpowder weapons.87
This was thus the nature of gunpowder weaponry control in England
during most of the fifteenth century: local ownership of gunpowder
weapons almost always equalled if not surpassed that of the central,
royal government. Indeed, so pervasive was this local control that there
are even numerous occasions when these smaller political entities used
their gunpowder weapons against each other without ever involving
the king. Such instances include: the 1443 Norwich riots, when the
citizens of the town used guns to attack an abbey, the prior of which
had, they felt, unjustly arrested two of their number;88 the gunpowder
weaponry assault of Sir Robert Wingfields house at Letheringham by
Sir John Mowbray, the Duke of Norfolk, in an attempt by the latter to
regain the possession of his manor at Hoo;89 the time when Edmund
Fitzwilliam, unbeknown to the King, seized the artillery of the earl of
Shrewsbury, John Talbot, in 1450 to install it in the unarmed royal
castle of Conisbrough;90 also in 1450, when the Esquire Harry Bruyn,
newly appointed lieutenant of the Isle of Wight, was forced to provide
his own guns for the poorly defended island;91 the 1455 siege of Powderhorn, when the guns of Thomas Courtenay, the Earl of Devon, were
used to conquer the castle of William, Lord Bonville;92 the feud
between the Berkeley and Talbot families which ended in 1469 with
gunpowder weaponry bombardments between the two factions at the
battle of Nibley Green;93 the use of guns again by Sir John Mowbray
against Sir John Pastons castle at Caister, also in 1469;94 and the feud
between the Stanleys and the Harringtons which ended with the 1471
siege of Hornby Castle, taken by Sir Thomas Stanley using, among
other artillery pieces, the cannon Mile End.95

Conclusion
Historical revolutions are complicated things, and the Military Revolution is no exception. It is frequently difficult to get all the paradigms
to match exactly, and such certainly is the case in considering the role
of gunpowder weaponry in determining the rise of the early modern
87
88

89
90
91
92
93

94

95

M. Bennett, Lambert Simnel and the Battle of Stoke (New York, 1987), pp. 9192.
Storey, End of the House of Lancaster, p. 223; P.C. Maddern, Violence and Social Order:
East Anglia, 14221442 (Oxford, 1992), p. 198.
Storey, End of the House of Lancaster, p. 227.
P.A. Johnson, Duke Richard of York, 14111460 (Oxford, 1988), p. 223.
Brooke, Visits to Fields of Battle, p. 233.
Storey, End of the House of Lancaster, p. 171.
See the document The Battle of Nibley Green, 1469, in A.R. Myers, ed., English
Historical Documents iv: 13271485 (London, 1969), pp. 112730.
See J, Gardiner, ed., The Paston Letters (7 vols, London, 19001908) ii, pp. 39799; v,
p. 55. The latter indicates that John Paston was forced to surrender his own
gunpowder weapons to the duke of Norfolk once his castle had fallen.
Brooke, Visits to the Fields of Battle, p. 238; M.K. Jones, Richard III and the Stanleys,
in R.E. Horrox, ed., Richard III and the North (Hull, 1986), pp. 3638.

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state. In terms of gunpowder technology during the late Middle Ages,

France and Burgundy do follow a pattern showing the decline of feudalism and the rise of the central state which conforms to that proposed by Geoffrey Parker and others. Local control and ownership of
these weapons was removed by the central state, which would later
return to use the weapons against those who had once owned them.
But in the case of England, the pattern was not followed. While local
control persisted on the Continent, in England the king alone had
control over gunpowder weapons, and he used them in an almost
absolute manner to increase and to protect his kingdoms holdings in
France. He did not, however, use them to control his own subjects;
and after almost fifty years of civil war not only had he lost control over
gunpowder holdings in his kingdom, he had in fact lost his kingdom.
Loyola College

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