Wills Case Doctrines

Art. 774
Estate of K. H. Hemady v. Luzon Surety (1956) [6]
The responsibility of the heirs for the debts of their decedent cannot exceed the value of
the inheritance they receive from him. Heirs succeed not only to the rights of the
deceased but also to his obligations.
General rule: a partys contractual rights and obligations are transmissible to the
successors.
Exceptions under Art. 1311:
1) Nature of the obligation
2) Intransmissibility by stipulation of the parties
3) Obligation is not transmissible by operation of law
Art. 777
Unson v. Del Rosario (1953) [12]
The law in force at the time of the decedents death will determine who the heirs should
be.
Art. 2253 provides that rights which are declared for the first time by the new Civil Code
shall have retroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to them may have
occurred under the former legislation, but this is so only when the new rights do not
prejudice any vested or acquired right of the same origin. In instant case, Ms right of
ownership over the lands became vested in 1945 upon the death of her husband. The
new right in favor of the illegitimate children by the deceased cannot be asserted to the
impairment of the vested right of M over the lands in dispute.
De Borja v. Vda de Borja (1972) [14]
Ownership passes to the heir at the very moment of death, who therefore, from that
moment acquires the right to dispose of his share
Hereditary share in a decedents estate is transmitted or vested immediately from the
moment of the death of such causante or predecessor in interest. Thus, there is no legal
bar to a successor (with requisite contracting capacity) disposing his hereditary share
immediately after such death, even if the actual extent of such share is not determined
until the subsequent liquidation of the estate.
Bonilla v. Barcena (1976) [16]
The heirs have the right to be substituted for the deceased as party on an action that
survives.
While it is true that a person who is dead cannot sue in court, yet he can be substituted

by his heirs in pursuing the case up to its completion.

The moment of death is the determining factor when the heirs acquire a definite right to
the inheritance whether such right be pure or contingent. Thus, when F died, her claim or
right to the parcel s of land in litigation was not extinguished by her death but was
transmitted to her heirs upon her death. Her heirs have thus acquired interest in the
properties in litigation and became parties-in-interest in the case.
The question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of the
action and the damage sued for.
1) Survive: wrong complained of affects primarily and principally property and property
rights, the injuries to the person being merely incidental
2) Not survive: injury complained of is to the person, the property and rights of property
affected being incidental.
In instant case, an action to quiet title over land in litigation affects primarily and
principally property and property rights, and therefore is one that survives even after Fs
death.
Art. 804
Suroza v. Honrado (1981) [41]
Art. 804 provisions are mandatory. Consequently, failure to comply with the two
requirements nullifies the will.
The will on its face is void because it is written in English, a language not known to the
illiterate testatrix, and which is probably a forged will because she and the attesting
witnesses did not appear before the notary as admitted by the notary himself.
A judge who admits to probate such a will should face disciplinary action. In the
absence of opposition, the judge should have personally conducted the hearing on the
probate of the will so that he could have ascertained whether the will was validly
executed.
Abangan v. Abangan (1919) [46]
It may sometimes be presumed that the testator knew the language in which the will was
written.
The circumstance appearing in the will itself that the same was executed in Cebu and in
the dialect of this locality where the testatrix was a neighbor [sic] is enough, in the
absence of any proof to the contrary, to presume that she knew this dialect in which the
will was written.
RFB: same ruling in Gonzales v. Laurel (1923). On the authority of these cases it seems
that, in order for the presumption to apply, the following must appear:
1) The will must be in language or dialect generally spoken in the place of execution; and
2) The testator must be a native or resident of said locality

Art. 806
Payad v. Tolentino (1936) [49]
Thumb mark as signature.
Testatrix, assisted by counsel, placed her thumb mark on each and every page of the
questioned will and that said counsel merely wrote her name to indicate the place where
she placed said thumb mark. In other words, counsel did not sign for the testatrix. She
signed by placing her thumb mark on each and every page thereof. A statute requiring a
will to be signed is satisfied if the signature is made by the testators mark. It is clear,
therefore, that it was not necessary that the attestation clause in question should state
that the testatrix requested her counsel to sign her name inasmuch as the testatrix
signed the will in question in accordance with law.
Matias v. Salud (1958) [50]
The legal requisite that the will should be signed by testator is satisfied by a thumbprint
or other mark affixed by him; and that where such mark is affixed by the decedent, it is
unnecessary to state in the attestation clause that another person wrote the testators
name at his request.
In the instant case, it was shown that the herpes zoster that afflicted the right arm and
shoulder of the testatrix made writing a difficult and painful act, to the extent that, after
writing one signature on the second page, she dropped the pen because of an attack of
pain that lasted many minutes, and evidently discouraged attempts to sign.
It is to be conceded that where a testator employs an unfamiliar way of signing, and
both the attestation clause and the will are silent on the matter, such silence is a factor to
be considered against the authenticity of the testament; but the failure to describe the
unusual signature by itself alone is not sufficient to refuse probate when the evidence for
the proponent fully satisfies the court that the will was executed and witnessed as
required by law.
Garcia v. Lacuesta (1951) [54]
A cross as signature.
It is not here presented that the cross appearing on the will is the usual signature of the
testator or even one of the ways by which he signed his name. The mere sing of a cross
cannot be likened to a thumbmark, because the cross cannot and does not have the
trustworthiness of a thumbmark.
Barut v. Cabacungan (1912) [56]
When agent must write.
As regards the validity of the will, it is unimportant whether the person who writes the
name of the testatrix signs his own or not. The important thing is that it clearly appears
that the name of the testatrix was signed at her express direction in the presence of the
three witnesses and that they attested and subscribed it in her presence and in the

presence of each other.

It may be wise, as a practical matter that the one who signs the testators name signs
also hi own; but that is not essential to the validity of the will.
Nera v. Raymundo (1911) [61]
Signing in the presence of witnesses
Jaboneta v. Gustilo: The true test of presence of the testator and the witnesses in the
execution of a will is not whether they actually saw each other sign, but whether they
might have seen each other sign, had they chosen to do so, considering their mental and
physical position with relation to each other at the moment of inscription of each
signature.
The position of the parties with relation to each other at the moment of the subscription
of each signature must be such that they may see each other sign if they choose to do
so. Jaboneta doctrine: the question whether the testator and the subscribing witnesses
to an alleged will sign the instrument in the presence of each other does not depend
upon proof of the fact that their eyes were actually cast upon the paper at the moment of
its subscription by each of them, but that at that moment existing conditions and their
position with relation to each other were such that by merely casting their eyes in the
proper direction they could have seen each other sign.
Icasiano v. Icasiano (1964) [64]
The inadvertent failure of one witness to affix his signature to one page of a testament,
due to the simultaneous lifting of two pages in the course of signing, is not per se
sufficient to justify denial of probate. That the failure of the witness to sign page three
was entirely through pure oversight is shown by his own testimony as well as by the
duplicate copy of the will, which bears a complete set of signatures in every page.
RFB: The Icasiano holding cannot, and should not, be taken as a departure from the rule
that the will should be signed by the witnesses on every page. The carbon duplicate was
regular in all aspects. A cavalier disregard of the formal requirements of wills in reliance
on Icasiano is not recommended.
Cagro v. Cagro (1953) [68]
The signatures of the witnesses must be at the bottom of the attestation clause.
Fact: signature of the three witnesses do not appear on the bottom of the attestation
clause, but the page containing the clause is signed by the witnesses on the left-hand
margin.
The attestation clause is a memorandum of the facts attending the execution of the
will required by law to be made by the attesting witnesses, and it must necessarily bear
their signature. An unsigned attestation clause cannot be considered as an act of the
witnesses, since the omission of their signature at the bottom thereof negatives their
participation.

 The signatures on the left-hand margin cannot be deemed as their signature to the
clause because said signatures are in compliance with the legal mandate that the will be
signed on the left-hand margin of all its pages. If an attestation clause not signed by the
witnesses at the bottom thereof, be admitted as sufficient, it would be easy to add such
clause to a will on a subsequent occasion and in the absence of the testator and any or
all of the witnesses.
Dissenting opinion of Bautista Angelo: (a) substantial compliance; (b) the
uncontradicted testimony of the witnesses that the clause was already written in the will
when the same was signed obviates fear of the majority that the clause may have been
only added on a subsequent occasion and not at the signing of the will.
Javellana v. Ledesma (1955) [70]
Acknowledgement before a notary public.
Fact: Codicil signed by testatrix and witnesses at the hospital; the notary public brought
the codicil to his office, and signed and sealed it there.
Whether or not the notary signed the certification of acknowledgement in the presence
of the testatrix and the witnesses does not affect the validity of the codicil. The Civil Code
does not require that the signing of the testator, witnesses and notary should be
accomplished in one single act.
The subsequent signing and sealing by the notary of his certification that the testament
was duly acknowledged by the participants therein is not part of the acknowledgement
itself nor of the testamentary act.
RFB: (a) ratio: The certification of acknowledgement need not be signed in the presence
of the testator and the witnesses; (b) obiter: Art. 806 does not require that the testator
and the witnesses must acknowledge on the same day that it was executed.
Cruz v. Villasor (1973) [72]
The notary public cannot be counted as one of the attesting witnesses.
The notary public before whom the will was acknowledged cannot be considered as the
third instrumental witness since he cannot acknowledge before himself his having signed
the will. If the third witness were the notary public himself, he would have to avow,
assent, or admit his having signed the will in front of himself. This cannot be done
because he cannot split his personality into two so that one will appear before the other
to acknowledge his participation in the making of the will.
Furthermore, the function of the notary public is, among others, to guard against any
illegal or immoral arrangement. That function would be defeated if the notary public were
one of the attesting or instrumental witnesses. For then he would be interested in
sustaining the validity of his own act.
To allow the notary public to act as third witness, or one of the attesting and
acknowledging witnesses, would have the effect of having only two attesting witnesses to
the will which would be in contravention of the Article 805 requiring at least three credible

witnesses to act as such and of Article 806 which requires that the testator and the
required number of witnesses must appear before the notary public to acknowledge the
will.
Art. 808
Garcia v. Vasquez (1970) [75]
Provision of Article 808 mandatory.
Fact: testatrixs vision was mainly for viewing distant objects and not for reading print.
For all intents and purposes of the rules on probate, the testatrix was not unlike a blind
testator, and the due execution of her will would have required observance of Article 808.
The rationale behind the requirement of reading the will to the testator if he is blind or
incapable of reading the will himself (as when he is illiterate) , is to make the provisions
thereof known to him, so that he may be able to object if they are not in accordance with
his wishes.
Alvarado v. Gaviola (1993) [80]
The requirement has been liberally applied, the SC declaring substantial compliance to
be sufficient.
Facts: The lawyer who drafted the will and subsequent codicil read them aloud in the
presence of the testator, the three instrumental witnesses and the notary public. The
latter four followed the reading with their own respective copies previously furnished
them.
Substantial compliance is acceptable where the purpose of the law has been satisfied,
because the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills are intended to protect the
testator from all kinds of fraud and trickery but are never intended to be so rigid and
inflexible as to destroy testamentary privilege.
It was not only the lawyer who read the documents. The notary public and the three
instrumental witnesses likewise read the will and codicil, albeit silently. With four persons
following the reading word with their own copies, it can be safely concluded that the
testator was reasonably assured that what was read to him (those which he affirmed
were in accordance with his instructions), were the terms actually appearing in the
typewritten documents.
Art. 809
Caneda v. CA (1993) [87]
Fact: petitioners aver that the attestation clause is fatally defective since it fails to
specifically state that the instrumental witnesses to the will witnessed the testator signing
the will in their presence and that they also signed the will and all the pages thereof in
the presence of the testator and of one another.
SC agrees with petitioners. The absence of a statement that the witnesses signed the
will and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another is a fatal

defect which must necessarily result in the disallowance of the will. Such defect in the
attestation clause cannot be characterized as merely involving form of the will or the
language used therein which would warrant the application of the substantial compliance
rule contemplated in Art. 809. The defect is not only in the form or the language of the
attestation clause but the total absence of a specific element required by Art. 805 to be
specifically stated in the attestation clause.
Proper interpretation of the substantial compliance rule in Art. 809: Omission which can
be supplied by an examination of the will itself, without the need of resorting to extrinsic
evidence, will not be fatal and, correspondingly, would not obstruct the allowance to
probate of the will being assailed. However, those omissions which cannot be supplied
except by evidence aliunde (from another source, from elsewhere, from outside source)
would result in the invalidation of the attestation clause and ultimately, of the will itself.

Art. 810
Roxas v. De Jesus (1985) [103]
Issue: whether FEB./61 appearing in the holographic will is a valid compliance with
Art. 810.
A complete date is required to provide against such contingencies as that of two
competing wills executed on the same day, or of a testator becoming insane on the day
on which a will was executed. There is no contingency in this case.
As a general rule, the date in a holographic will should include the day, month, and
year of its execution. However, when, as in the case at bar, there is no appearance of
fraud, bad faith, undue influence and pressure and the authenticity of the will is
established and the only issue is whether or not the date FEB./91 is a valid compliance
with Art. 810, probate of the holographic will should be allowed under the principle of
substantial compliance.
Labrador v. CA (1990) [105]
Fact: date appears in the body of the holographic will.
The law does not specify a particular location where the date should be placed in the
will. The only requirements are that the date be in the will itself and executed in the hand
of the testator. Both requirements are present in the subject will.
Art. 811
Azaola v. Singson (1960) [110]
The three-witness provision in case of contested holographic wills is directory, not
mandatory.
Since the authenticity of the will was not contested, proponent was not required to
produce more than one witness; but even if the genuineness of the holographic will were

contested, Art. 811 cannot be interpreted as to require the compulsory presentation of

three witnesses to identify the handwriting of the testator, under the penalty of having the
probate denied.
Since no witness may have been present at the execution of a holographic will, none
being required by law, it becomes obvious that the existence of witnesses possessing
the requisite qualifications is a matter beyond the control of the proponent.
Art. 811 foresees the possibility that no qualified witness may be found (or what
amounts to the same thing, that no competent witness may be willing to testify to the
authenticity of the will, and provides for resort to expert evidence to supply the
deficiency. Such resort to expert evidence is conditioned by if the Court deem it
necessary, which reveal that what the law deems essential is that the Court should be
convinced of the wills authenticity. Since the law leaves it to the trial court to decide if
experts are still needed, no unfavorable inference can be drawn from a partys failure to
offer expert evidence, until and unless the court expresses dissatisfaction with the
testimony of the lay witnesses.
SCs conclusion: the rule of Art. 811, par. 1, is merely directory and is not mandatory.
Codoy v.Calugay (1999)
Fact: holographic will challenged for forgery. 6 witnesses of proponent did not
categorically state that they know the handwriting and signature of the testatrix; whereas,
2 did so.
Issue: whether the provisions of Art. 811 is mandatory, i.e., for probate of contested
holographic will at least three witnesses explicitly declare the signature in the will is the
genuine signature of the testator.
SC (Pardo): We are convinced, based on the language used, that Article 811is
mandatory. We have ruled that shall in a statute commonly denotes an imperative
obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion and that the presumption is that
the word shall when used in a statute is mandatory. Case remanded because the Court
found that the testimony of the aforesaid 2 witnesses was not convincing.
Query: has this ruling reversed Azaola, supra.?
1) Azaola is not on all fours with this case. Here, the will was contested (ground: forgery),
in Azaola the will was not contested.
2) RFBs personal view: No, because the basis of the remandthat the Court did not
find the testimony of the 2 witnesses satisfactoryis perfectly consistent with Azaola
that quality of the testimony, not the quantity of the witnesses, is the criterion. Thus, SCs
statement that three-witness rule is mandatory is an obiter. We can read Azaola and
Godoy together.
Gan v. Yap (1958) [114]
In the probate of a holographic will, the document itself must be produced. Therefore, a
lost holographic will cannot be probated.

 When the will itself is not submitted, the means of opposition and of assessing the
evidence, are not available. And then, the only guaranty of authenticitythe testators
handwritinghas disappeared.
The execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be
proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read such will.
Ordinary vs. holographic wills. The difference lies in the nature of wills. In holographic
wills, the only guarantee of authenticity is the handwriting itself; in ordinary wills, the
testimony of the subscribing or instrumental witnesses and of the notary. The loss of the
holographic will entails the loss of the only medium of proof; if the ordinary will is lost, the
subscribing witnesses are available to authenticate.
Rodelas v. Aranza (1982) [122]
Exception to the Gan ruling.
Issue: whether a lost holographic will can be proved by means of a photostatic copy.
Evidently, the photostatic or xerox copy of the lost or destroyed holographic will may be
admitted because the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased can be determined
by the probate court (i.e., comparison can be made with the standard writings of the
testator.
Art. 814
Kalaw v. Relova (1984) [125]
Effect of non-compliance.
Issue: whether the original unaltered text after subsequent alterations and insertions
were voided by the Trial Court for lack of authentication by full signature of the testatrix,
should be probated or not.
Velasco v. Lopez: when a number of erasures, corrections, and interlineations made by
the testator in a holographic will have not been noted under his signature, the will is not
thereby invalidated as a whole, but at most only as respects the particular words, erased,
or interlined.
However, when as in this case, the holographic will in dispute had only one substantial
provision, which was altered by substituting the original heir with another, but which
alteration did not carry the requisite of full authentication by the full signature of the
testator, the effect must be that the entire will is voided or revoked for the simple reason
that nothing remains in the will after that which could remain valid. To state that the will
as first written should be given efficacy is to disregard the seeming change of mind of the
testatrix. But that change of mind can neither be given effect because she failed to
authenticate it in the manner required by lay by affixing her full signature.
Velasco ruling must be held confined to such insertions, cancellations, erasures or
alterations in a holographic will, which affect only the efficacy of the altered words
themselves but not the essence and validity of the will itself.

Subsection 4-Witnesses to Wills

Article 821
Gonzales vs. CA
Under the law, there is no mandatory requirement that the witness testify initially or at
any time during the trial as to his good standing in the community, his reputation for
trustworthiness and reliableness, his honesty and uprightness in order that his testimony
may be believed and accepted by the trial court. It is enough that the qualifications
enumerated in Article 820 of the Civil Code are complied with, such that the soundness
of his mind can be shown by or deduced from his answers to the questions propounded
to him, that his age (18 years or more) is shown from his appearance, testimony, or
competently proved otherwise, as well as the fact that he is not blind, deaf or dumb and
that he is able to read and write to the satisfaction of the Court, and that he has none of
the disqualifications under Article 821 of the Civil Code. The attributes of the good
standing of the witness in the community, his reputation for trustworthiness and
reliableness, his honesty and uprightness are presumed of the witness unless the
contrary is proved otherwise by the opposing party.
In probate proceedings, the instrumental witnesses are not character witnesses for they
merely attest the execution of a will or testament and affirm the formalities attendant to
said execution.
Credible witnesses' mean competent witnesses and not those who testify to facts from
or upon hearsay.

Subsection 6
Article 830
Maloto vs. CA
It is clear that the physical act of destruction of a will, like burning in this case, does not
per se constitute an effective revocation, unless the destruction is coupled with animus
revocandi on the part of the testator. It is not imperative that the physical destruction be
done by the testator himself. It may be performed by another person but under the
express direction and in the presence of the testator. Of course, it goes without saying
that the document destroyed must be the will itself."Animus revocandi is only one of the
necessary elements for the effective revocation of a last will and testament. The intention
to revoke must be accompanied by the overt physical act of burning, tearing, obliterating,
or cancelling the will carried out by the testator or by another person in his presence and
under his express direction.

Gago vs. Mamuyac

The law does not require any evidence of the revocation or cancellation of the will to be
preserved. It therefore becomes difficult at times to prove the cancellation or revocation
of wills. The fact that such cancellation or revocation has taken place must either remain
unproved or be inferred from evidence showing that after due search the original will
cannot be found. Where a will which cannot be found is shown to have been in the
possession of the testator, when last seen, the presumption is in the absence of other
competent evidence, that the same was cancelled or destroyed. The same presumption
arises where it is shown that the testator had ready access to the will and it cannot be
found after his death. It will not be presumed that such will has been destroyed by any
other person without the knowledge or authority of the testator.

Subsection 8- Allowance and Disallowance of Wills

Article 838
Guevara vs. Guevara
The proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem, with notice by publication to the
whole world and with personal notice to each of the known heirs, legatees, and devisees
of the testator. Although not contested, the due execution of the will and the fact that the
testator at the time of its execution was of sound and disposing mind and not acting
under duress, menace, and undue influence or fraud, must be proved to the satisfaction
of the court, and only then may the will be legalized and given effect by means of a
certificate of its allowance, signed by the judge and attested by the seal of the court; and
when the will devises real property, attested copies thereof and of the certificate of
allowance must be recorded in the register of deeds of the province in which the land
lies. It will readily be seen from the above provisions of the law that the presentation of a
will to the court for probate is mandatory and its allowance by the court is essential and
indispensable to its efficacy.
The heirs may not disregard the provisions of the will unless those provisions are
contrary to law. Neither may they do away with the presentation of the will to the court for
probate, because such suppression of the will is contrary to law and public policy. The
law enjoins the probate of the will and public policy requires it, because unless the will is
probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of

his property by will may be rendered nugatory,

De la Cerna vs. Potot
In a case where a joint will between husband and wife was executed and the will was
probated when the husband died before the effectivity of the Civil Code, the final decree
of probate has conclusive effect as to the last will and testament, despite the fact that
even then the Civil Code already decreed the invalidity of joint wills. A final judgment
rendered on a petition for the probate of a will is binding upon the whole world and public
policy and sound practice demand that at the risk of occasional errors, judgment of
courts should become final at some definite date fixed by law. The probate decree of the
will of the husband could only affect the share of the deceased husband. It could not
include the disposition of the share of the wife who was then still alive, and over whose
interest in the conjugal properties the probate court acquired no jurisdiction, precisely
because her estate could not then be in issue. It follows that the validity of the joint will,
in so far as the estate of the wife was concerned, must be, on her death, reexamined
and adjudicated de novo, since a joint will is considered a separate will of each testator.
Thus, probate of the wifes will is denied as joint wills are now prohibited by the Civil
Code.

Gallanosa vs. Arcangel

A decree of probate is conclusive as to the due execution or formal validity of a will. That
means that the testator was of sound and disposing mind at the time when he executed
the will and was not acting under duress, menace, fraud, or undue influence; that the will
was signed by him in the presence of the required number of witnesses, and that the will
is genuine and is not a forgery. Accordingly, these facts cannot again be questioned in a
subsequent proceeding, not even in a criminal action for the forgery of the will. After the
finality of the allowance of a will, the issue as to the voluntariness of its execution cannot
be raised anymore.
The following are included in the term formal validity and therefore are conclusively
settled by a final decree of probate:
i. that the testator was of sound and disposing mind
ii. that his consent was not vitiated
iii. that the will was signed by the requisite number of witnesses
iv. that the will is genuine
Nepomuceno vs. CA
The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the court's area of inquiry is limited to an

examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the Will. The rule, however, is not
inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not
powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of
the Will. The probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears
intrinsically void. Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the
will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue.

SECTION 2- Institution of Heir

Article 850
Austria vs. Reyes
Before the institution of heirs may be annulled under article 850 of the Civil Code, the
following requisites must concur: First, the cause for the institution of heirs must be
stated in the will; second, the cause must be shown to be false; and third, it must appear
from the face of the will that the testator would not have made such institution if he had
known the falsity of the cause.

Article 854
Reyes vs. Barretto-Datu
If there is a compulsory heir in the direct line, such heir is instituted in the will, and the
testamentary disposition given to such heir is less than her legitime, there is no
preterition. There is no total omission, inasmuch as the heir received something from the
inheritance. The remedy is for completion of legitime under Articles 906 and 907.
Aznar vs. Duncan
Manresa defines preterition as the omission of the heir in the will, either by not naming
him at all or, while mentioning him as father, son, etc., by not instituting him as heir
without disinheriting him expressly, nor assigning to him some part of the properties. In a
case where the testator left to one who was a forced heir a legacy worth less than the
legitime, but without referring to the legatee as an heir or even as a relative, and willed
the rest of the estate to other persons, it was held that Article 815 applied, and the heir

could not ask that the institution of heirs be annulled entirely, but only that the legitimate
be completed.
Acain vs. IAC
An adopted child, if totally omitted in the inheritance, is preterited and can invoke its
protection and consequences. Since an adopted child is given by law the same rights as
a legitimate child, the adopted child can, in proper cases, invoke Article 854 in the same
manner a legitimate child can.
Nuguid vs. Nuguid
To 'annul' means to abrogate, to make void. The word annul employed in the statute
(Article 854) means that the universal institution of petitioner to the entire inheritance
results in totally abrogating the will. Because, the nullification of such institution of
universal heir without any other testamentary disposition in the will amounts to a
declaration that nothing at all was written. Carefully worded and in clear terms, Article
854 offers no leeway for inferential interpretation. Giving it an expansive meaning will
tear up by the roots the fabric of the statute. (Note that what was involved here was a
universal institution of a sole heir, nothing more. Article 854 annuls his institution, thus no
more heirs are left. Hence, the entire will is void.)

SECTION 3-Substitution of Heirs

Article 863
Palacios vs. Ramirez
What is meant by "one degree" from the first heir is explained by Tolentino as follows:
"Scaevola, Maura, and Traviesas construe 'degree' as designation, substitution, or
transmission. The Supreme Court of Spain has decidedly adopted this construction.
From this point of view, there can be only one transmission or substitution, and the
substitute need not be related to the first heir. Manresa, Morell, and Sanchez Roman,
however, construe the word 'degree' as generation, and the present Code has obviously
followed this interpretation, by providing that the substitution shall not go beyond one
degree 'from the heir originally instituted.' The Code thus clearly indicates that the
second heir must be related to and be one generation from the first heir.

"From this, it follows that the fideicommissary can only be either a child or a parent of the
first heir. These are the only relatives who are one generation or degree from the
fiduciary."
PCI Bank vs. Escolin
If there is no absolute obligation imposed upon the first heir to preserve the property and
transmit it to a second heir, there is no fideicomisaria. The institution is not necessarily
void; it may be valid as some other disposition, but it is not a fideicomisaria.

SECTION 5- Legitime
Article 887
Rosales vs. Rosales
The surviving spouse referred to in Article 887 who is entitled to the legitime, is the
spouse of the decedent and not the spouse of a child who has predeceased the
decedent.

Lapuz vs. Eufemio

An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than the bed-and-board
separation of the spouses (there being no absolute divorce in this jurisdiction) is purely
personal. Being personal in character, it follows that the death of one party to the action
causes the death of the action itself actio personalis moritur cum persona. Thus,
death of either party during the pendency of a petition for legal separation results in the
dismissal of the case.
Nial vs. Badayog
May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage after his death? Petitions for the declaration of the voidability of a marriage can
only be brought during the lifetime of the parties and not after the death of either. A void
marriage, on the other hand, can be brought even after the death of either party. The
Code is silent as to who can file a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Any
proper interested party (heirs of the deceased husband) may attack a void marriage.
Baritua vs. CA

Legitimate ascendants (parents of the deceased) succeed only when the descendant
dies without a legitimate ascendant. The surviving spouse concurs with all classes of
heirs. Thus, where an obligation has been paid to the spouse and descendants, the
obligation is extinguished and the legitimate ascendants have no right to claim upon the
obligation.
Article 891
Solivio vs. CA
The reserva troncal only applies to properties inherited by an ascendant or a brother or
sister. It does not apply to property inherited by a descendant from his ascendant, the
reverse of the situation covered by Article 891.
Padura vs. Baldovino
The reserva troncal is a special rule designed primarily to assure the return of the
reservable property to the third degree relatives belonging to the line from which the
property originally came, and avoid its being dissipated into and by the relatives of the
inheriting ascendant.
The reserva merely determines the group of relatives to whom the property should be
returned; but within that group the individual right to the property should be decided by
the applicable rules of ordinary intestate succession, since Article 891 does not specify
otherwise. (RFB: Those reservatarios nearer in degree to the prepositus will exclude the
more remotely related.)
Florentino vs. Florentino
I Any ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property, while there are living,
within the third degree, relatives of the latter, is nothing but a life usufructuary or a
fiduciary of the reservable property received. He is, however, the legitimate owner of his
own property which is not reservable property and which constitutes his legitime,
according to article 809 of the Civil Code. But if, afterwards, all of the relatives, within the
third degree, of the descendant (from whom came the reservable property) die or
disappear, the said property becomes free property, by operation of law, and is thereby
converted into the legitime of the ascendant heir who can transmit it at his death to his
legitimate successors or testamentary heirs. This property has now lost its nature of
reservable property, pertaining thereto at the death of the relatives, called reservatarios,
who belonged within the third degree to the line from which such property came.
The right of representation cannot be alleged when the one claming same as a
reservatario of the reservable property is not among the relatives within the third degree

belonging to the line from which such property came, inasmuch as the right granted by
the Civil Code in article 811 is in the highest degree personal and for the exclusive
benefit of designated persons who are the relatives, within the third degree, of the
person from whom the reservable property came. Therefore, relatives of the fourth and
the succeeding degrees can never be considered as reservatarios, since the law does
not recognize them as such.
(RFB: Actually there will be only one instance of representation among the reservatarios,
i.e., a case of the Prepositus being survived by brothers/sisters and children of a
predeceased or incapacitated brother or sister.)
Edroso vs. Sablan
1. The reservistas right over the reserved property is one of ownership.
2. The ownership is subject to a resolutory condition, i.e. the existence of reservatarios
at the time of the reservistas death.
3. The right of ownership is alienable, but subject to the same resolutory condition.
4. The reservistas right of ownership is registrable.
The conclusion is that the person required by article 811 to reserve the right has, beyond
any doubt at all, the rights of use and usufruct. He has, moreover, for the reasons set
forth, the legal title and dominion, although under a condition subsequent. Clearly he
has, under an express provision of the law, the right to dispose of the property reserved,
and to dispose of is to alienate, although under a condition. He has the right to recover it,
because he is the one who possesses or should possess it and have title to it, although
a limited and revocable one. In a word, the legal title and dominion, even though under a
condition, reside in him while he lives. After the right required by law to be reserved has
been assured, he can do anything that a genuine owner can do.
On the other hand, the relatives within the third degree in whose favor the right is
reserved cannot dispose of the property, first because it is no way, either actually,
constructively or formally, in their possession; and, moreover, because they have no title
of ownership or of fee simple which they can transmit to another, on the hypothesis that
only when the person who must reserve the right should die before them will they
acquire it, thus creating a fee simple, and only then will they take their place in the
succession of the descendant of whom they are relatives within the third degree, that is
to say, a second contingent place in said legitimate succession in the fashion of
aspirants to a possible future legacy.
Sienes vs. Esparcia
1. The reservatarios have a right of expectancy over the property.
2. The right is subject to a suspensive condition, i.e. the expectancy ripens into

ownership if the reservatarios survive the reservista.

3. The right is alienable, but subject to the same suspensive condition.
4. The right is registrable.
(Query: Edroso case says reservatarios right is not alienable, Sienes says it is. Resolve.
Personally, I think Sienes is right.)
Gonzales vs. CFI
Can a reservista convey by will, reservable property to relervatarios in the third degree
and by-pass those in the second? NO. Article 891 clearly indicates that the reservable
properties should be inherited by all the nearest relatives within the third degree from the
prepositus. She could not select the reservees to whom the reservable property should
be given and deprive the other reservees of their share therein.
The reservable property does not form part of the reservistas estate and should be
given to all the seven reservatarios or nearest relatives of the prepositus within the third
degree. While it is true that by giving the reservable property to only one reservatario, it
did not pass into the hands of strangers, nevertheless, it is likewise true that the
reservista was only one of the reservatarios and there is no reason founded upon law
and justice why the other reservatarios should be deprived of their shares in the
reservable property. The property passes by strict operation of law.
Cano vs. Director
Upon the death of the reservista, the reservatario nearest to the prepositus becomes,
automatically and by operation of law, the owner of the reservable property. That
property is no part of the estate of the reservista, and does not even answer for the
debts of the latter. Hence, its acquisition by the reservatario may be entered in the
property records without necessity of estate proceedings, since the basic requisites
therefor appear of record. It is equally well settled that the reservable property cannot be
transmitted by a reservista to her or his own successors mortis causa, so long as a
reservatario within the third degree from the prepositus and belonging to the line whence
the property came, is in existence when the reservista dies.

Chapter 3 Legal or Intestate Succession

Article 977
Section 1 General Provisions
Subsection 2 Right of Representation
Teotico vs. Del Val

The relationship established by adoption is limited solely to the adopter and the adopted
does not extend to the relatives of the adopting parents or of the adopted child except
only as expressly provided for by law. Hence, no relationship is created between the
adopted and the collaterals of the adopting parents. As a consequence, the adopted is
an heir of the adopter but not of the relatives of the adopter. Thus, an adopted can
neither represent nor be represented.
Section 2 Order of Intestate Sucession
Subsection 1 Descending Direct Line
Article 979
Sayson vs. CA
The philosophy underlying this article is that a person's love descends first to his children
and grandchildren before it ascends to his parents and thereafter spreads among his
collateral relatives. It is also supposed that one of his purposes in acquiring properties is
to leave them eventually to his children as a token of his love for them and as a provision
for their continued care even after he is gone from this earth.
There is no question that a legitimate daughter of a person who predeceased his
parents, and thus their granddaughter, has a right to represent her deceased father in
the distribution of the intestate estate of her grandparents. Under Article 981, she is
entitled to the share her father would have directly inherited had he survived, which shall
be equal to the shares of her grandparents' other children.
But a different conclusion must be reached for persons to whom the grandparents were
total strangers. While it is true that the adopted child shall be deemed to be a legitimate
child and have the same right as the latter, these rights do not include the right of
representation. The relationship created by the adoption is between only the adopting
parents and the adopted child and does not extend to the blood relatives of either party.
Subsection 3 Illegitimate Children
Article 992
Corpus vs. Administrator
There is a successional barrier between the legitimate and illegitimate relatives of the
deceased. The rule in article 943 is now found in article 992 of the Civil Code which
provides that "an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate
children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in
the same manner from the illegitimate child".
That rule is based on the theory that the illegitimate child is disgracefully looked upon by

the legitimate family while the legitimate family is, in turn, hated by the illegitimate child.
The law does not recognize the blood tie and seeks to avoid further grounds of
resentment
Leonardo vs. CA
An illegitimate cannot, by right of representation, claim a share of the estate left by the
legitimate relatives left by his father considering that, as found again by the Court of
Appeals, he was born outside wedlock as shown by the fact that when he was born on
September 13, 1938, his alleged putative father and mother were not yet married, and
what is more, his alleged father's first marriage was still subsisting. At most, petitioner
would be an illegitimate child who has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate
children and relatives of his father.
Diaz vs. CA
Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits
absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate
children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a
natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of Art. 992.
Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family there is presumed to be an
intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked
down upon by the legitimate family; the family is in turn, hated by the illegitimate child;
the latter considers the privileged condition of the former, and the resources of which it is
thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product
of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more than
recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment. So that while Art, 992
prevents the illegitimate issue of a legitimate child from representing him in the intestate
succession of the grandparent, the illegitimates of an illegitimate child can now do so.
Diaz vs. CA
The right of representation is not available to illegitimate descendants of legitimate
children in the inheritance of a legitimate grandparent. It may be argued, as done by
petitioners, that the illegitimate descendant of a legitimate child is entitled to represent by
virtue of the provisions of Article 982, which provides that "the grandchildren and other
descendants shall inherit by right of representation." Such a conclusion is erroneous. It
would allow intestate succession by an illegitimate child to the legitimate parent of his
father or mother, a situation which would set at naught the provisions of Article 992.
Article 982 is inapplicable to instant case because Article 992 prohibits absolutely a
succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and

relatives of the father or mother. It may not be amiss to state that Article 982 is the
general rule and Article 992 the exception.
The word "relative" as used in Article 992 is broad enough to comprehend all the kindred
of the person spoken of. The word "relatives" should be construed in its general
acceptation. Amicus curiae Prof. Ruben Balane has this to say:
According to Prof. Balane, to interpret the term relatives in Article 992 in a more
restrictive sense than it is used and intended is not warranted by any rule of
interpretation. Besides, he further states that when the law intends to use the term in a
more restrictive sense, it qualifies the term with the word collateral, as in Articles 1003
and 1009 of the New Civil Code.
Subsection 4 Surviving Spouse
Article 996
Santillon vs. Miranda
There is a conflict with what the Civil Code provides as legitime of a spouse and what he
or she may receive by way of intestacy. Art. 892 of the New Civil Code falls under the
chapter on Testamentary Succession; whereas Art. 996 comes under the chapter on
Legal or Intestate Succession. Art. 892 merely fixes the legitime of the surviving spouse
and Art. 888 thereof, the legitime of children in testate succession. While it may indicate
the intent of the law with respect to the ideal shares that a child and a spouse should get
when they concur with each other, it does not fix the amount of shares that such child
and spouse are entitled to when intestacy occurs. Thus, upon intestacy, the provisions of
Art. 996 applies.
Chapter 4 Provisions Common to Testate and Intestate Succession
Section 2 Capacity to Succeed by Will or by Intestacy
Article 1025
Parish Priest of Roman Catholic Church vs. Rigor
Where a priest makes a provision in his will that certain legacies shall pass to his nearest
male relative who pursues priesthood, it is said to be limited to those living at the time of
the execution of the will. We hold that the said bequest refers to the testator's nearest
male relative living at the time of his death and not to any indefinite time thereafter. "In
order to be capacitated to inherit, the heir, devisee or legatee must be living at the
moment the succession opens, except in case of representation, when it is proper" (Art.
1025, Civil Code).
Section 5 Collation

Article 1061
Vizconde vs. CA
Collation is the act by virtue of which descendants or other forced heirs who intervene in
the division of the inheritance of an ascendant bring into the common mass, the property
which they received from him, so that the division may be made according to law and the
will of the testator. Collation is only required of compulsory heirs succeeding with other
compulsory heirs and involves property or rights received by donation or gratuitous title
during the lifetime of the decedent. The purpose is to attain equality among the
compulsory heirs in so far as possible for it is presumed that the intention of the testator
or predecessor in interest in making a donation or gratuitous transfer to a forced heir is to
give him something in advance on account of his share in the estate, and that the
predecessors will is to treat all his heirs equally, in the absence of any expression to the
contrary. Collation does not impose any lien on the property or the subject matter of
collationable donation. What is brought to collation is not the property donated itself, but
rather the value of such property at the time it was donated, the rationale being that the
donation is a real alienation which conveys ownership upon its acceptance, hence any
increase in value or any deterioration or loss thereof is for the account of the heir or
donee.
Thus, it is an error to require a son-in-law of the decedent to be included in the collation
as he is not a compulsory heir.
Section 6 Partition and Distribution of the Estate
Subsection 1 Partition
Fajardo vs. Fajardo
There are only two ways in which said partition could have been made: By an act inter
vivos, or by will. In either case there were formalities which must be followed. If the
partition was made by an act inter vivos, it should have been reduced in writing in a
public instrument, because it was a conveyance of real estate. If by last will and
testament, the legal requisites should have been observed.
Chavez vs. IAC
Art. 1080 of the Civil Code clearly gives a person two options in making a partition of his
estate; either by an act inter vivos or by will. When a person makes a partition by will, it is
imperative that such partition must be executed in accordance with the provisions of the
law on wills; however, when a person makes the partition of his estate by an act inter
vivos, such partition may even be oral or written, and need not be in the form of a will,

provided that the partition does not prejudice the legitime of compulsory heirs. (RFB:
This ruling should not be used as it raises eyebrows very high. It gives a partition an
irrevocable character and allows a conveyance of the compulsory heirs of their legitimes
even during their lifetimes.)
Legasto vs. Verzosa
A testator may, by an act inter vivos, partition his property, but he must first make a will
with all the formalities provided for by law. And it could not be otherwise, for without a will
there can be no testator; when the law, therefore, speaks of the partition inter vivos made
by a testator of his property, it necessarily refers to that property which he has devised to
his heirs. A person who disposes of his property gratis inter vivos is not called a testator,
but a donor. In employing the word "testator," the law evidently desired to distinguish
between one who freely donates his property in life and one who disposes of it by will to
take effect after his death.
Article 1082
Tuason vs. Tuason Jr.
Where heirs contracted with a third person to develop their co-owned lot, with the
stipulation that the co-ownership shall subsist until all the lots have been sold, is not a
violation of Art. 400, and is only a mere incident to the main object of the partnership,
which is to dissolve the co-ownership.
Article 1088
Garcia vs. Calaliman
Written notice is required for the period of one month for the other co-heirs to redeem
begins to run. Both the letter and spirit of the new Civil Code argue against any attempt
to widen the scope of the notice specified in Article 1088 by including therein any other
kind of notice, such as verbal or by registration. Written notice is indispensable, actual
knowledge of the sale acquired in some other manners by the redemptioner,
notwithstanding. He or she is still entitled to written notice, as exacted by the Code, to
remove all uncertainty as to the sale, its terms and its validity, and to quiet any doubt that
the alienation is not definitive. The law not having provided for any alternative, the
method of notifications remains exclusive, though the Code does not prescribe any
particular form of written notice nor any distinctive method for written notification of
redemption