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    74 ANARCHY AND TS CONSEQUENCES would only accentuate its relative-gains concerns. Thus, a state worried about rel- tative gains might respond to greater certainty that partners would keep their promises with a lower, rather than a higher, willingness to cooperate. NOTES 1, See Robert Assrod, The Eeolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984); Axel roel and Robert O. Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation under Anarly: Strategies and In- stitutions,” World Polis 38 (October 195), pp. 226-54; Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Foitical Economy (Priceton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1958), Charles Lipson, “Intemational Cooperation in Economie and Security Aas,” Word Potics 7 (October 198), pp. 1-23; and Arthur Stein, “Coor- dination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarie World” in Stephen D. Krasner, ed International Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Unversity Press, 1883), p. 115-40. 2, See Keohane, After Hegemony p. 7; Axelrod and Keohane, “Achieving Cooperation, ‘pp. 234-38. Fora demonstration, sce Lipson, Bankers’ Dilemmas” Keohane, After Hegemony, . 97 Averod and Keohane, “Achieving Cooperation,” p. 250 Lipson, “International Cooperation,” p.6. ‘Stein, “Coomlination snd Collaboration,” p. 128, Keohane, After Hogemony,p. 246, Axelrod, Eeolution of Cooperation, pp. 6,14. Stein acknowledges that he employs an sbsolute-gains assumption and tha the later "is wery much a iberal, not mercntilst, view of self-interest t suggest that ators focus on theie own retms and compare dif- ferent outcomes with an eye to maximizing ther own guns.” See Sten, "Coondinstion and Collaboration,” p, 194. Its difficult see how Stein can employ a “uberal” a- ‘sumption of state interest an acer that hie theory of regimes, as noted earlier in note 34, isbased on the “casi [realist] characterization” of international polit, 9, Lipson, “International Cooperation,” pp. 2,5 10, Raymond Aron, Intentional Relations: Theory of Peace and War, tans, Richard Howard and Annette Baker For (Garden City, N.J Doubleday, 1973), p. 7 also se pp. 64-65. [Robert Gilpin, “The Richness ofthe Tradition of Poltical Realist,” in Robest O, Keo hhane ed, Neorealism and Its Crtes (New York: Columbia University Press, 186), p 305, Similarly, Waltz indicates that “in anarchy, security is the highest end. Only if sur- vival i ssured can states safely seok such other goals as tranquility, profit, and power” See Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Poiics (Reading, Mass; Addison-Wesley, 1979), p. 126. Also see pp. 91-62, and Waltz, “Reflections on Theory of Inteational Polts: A Response to My Cres" in Keohane, ed, Neorealism and Its Cris, p34, 12, F, H. Carr, Tcenty Years Crs, 1019-1959: An Introduction tothe Study of Intema- tonal Relations (London end New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1964), . 1, emphasis added 18, Robert Gilpin, War end Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 198), pp. 87-58, Waltz, Theory of International Fates, p. 126; ee also Waltz, “Reflections” p. 334 On the tendency of states to compare performance levels, see Oran Young, “Interas- tional Regimes: Toward a New Theory of Institutions,” World Politics 39 (October 1986), p18. 1 | | | | ' Faculty of Arts & Social Sciences Anarchy Is What States Make of It Alexander Wendt Cail eats such a Thana Hobbe, eid Nib and Reihld Nib and Hs J Nor sewn atte gas an poe pls rinary haga oa fom frat trenton ae rns a important for both In a the Str: ad Wa, Ke dane a tes wari of possibility for or “permissive® cause of war, anguing that “wars oscur becauee ‘here is nothing to prevent them.” Its the human nature or domestic politics of rfl whch eco neo pea ee ee ee help and power polis as necessary features of world polities? thse, amr of fee eh Pre tuts By da eo athe di ores na pee vcr stew "ut more generally, without assumptions about the structure of identities anc interests in th tem, lr defen of ste cae esa fwd Wht it Mal The So Contr of oe oe Wench from International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2 ( ee es Sone tl 4, Ne gD oe a 4410 Fouitin ate Masa lteter ae on nad can Wl Tonle aos ete emi 1% 78 ANARCHY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES of “structure of identity and interest” and show that no particular one follows log- ically from anarchy. ‘A fundamental principle of constructivist social theory is that people act to ward objects, including other actors, onthe basis ofthe meanings thatthe objects have for them. States act differently toward enemies than they do toward friends because enemies are threatening and friends are not. Anarchy andthe distribution of power are insufficient to tell us which s which. U.S, military power has a differ: ent significance for Canada than for Guba, despite their similar “structural” posi- tions, justas British missiles have a different significance forthe United States than do Soviet missiles, The distribution of power may akvays affect states’ calculations, bout how it does so depends on the intersubjective understandings and expecta. tions, an the “distribution of knowledge,” that constitute thee conceptions of sel eM society “Torts” what «univers is, the powers and practices Of pro- fessor and student cease to exist: if the United States and Soviet Union decide that thoy are no longer enemies, “the Cold Waris over” Its collective meanings that constitute the structures which organize our actions. ‘Actors acquire identities relatively stable, role-speciic understandings and ex pectations about self—by participating in such collective meanings. Kentties are in herently relational: "Identity, with ts appropriate attachments of psychological real iy, abvays identity within a specifi, sockally constructed world” Peter Berger tangues. Each person has many identities inked to institutional roles, such as brother, son, teacher, and citizen. Silay, a state may have multiple identities as “sover- efgn,” “leader ofthe free world, “imperial poe” and #6 of. The commitment to and the salience of particular identities vary but each identity is an iaherenty social Aefinition ofthe actor grounded in the theories which actors collectively hold about themselves and one another and which constitute the structure ofthe soil word Tdlentiies are the bai of interests. Actors donot have “portfolio” oF iterests that they carry around independent of socal context; instead, they define these in- terests on the process of defining situations... Sometimes situations are wn- precedented in our experience, and in these cases we have to construct their ‘meaning, and thus our interests, by analogy or invent them de novo. More often they have routine qualities in which we assign meanings on the bass of nstittion- ally defined roles. When we say that professors have an “interest in teaching, re- search, or going on leave, we ae saying that to function in the role identity of “pro- fessor” they have to define certain situations as calling for certain actions. This _ does not mean that they will necessarily do so (expectations and competence do not equal performance), but if they do not, they will not get tenure. The absence or failure of roles makes defining situations and interests more dificult, and iden tity confusion may resulé This seems to be happening today inthe United States ‘and the former Soviet Union: Without the cold war's mutual attributions of threat and hostility to define their identities, these states seem unsure of what their "in- teress" should be. An institution isa relatively stale set or “structure” of identities and interests. Such siructures are often codified in formal rues and norms, but these have moti- ‘ational force only in virtue of actors’ socialization to and participation in colletive Jnowledge. Institutions are fundamentally cognitive entities that do not exist apart ' ANARCHY IS WHAT STATES MAKE OF IT 77 from actory ideas about how the world works. This doesnot mean that institutions Sage then iets, that they are “nothing but” belie. As callie lng ii; they are experienced as having an existence “over and shove the invideas Tmahappen to emabody them atthe moment.” In this wi, institutions come cen font individuals as more or less coercive social fact, but they are stil « function of ch collective cognitions do not exist. andloses At the limt—in the Hobbesian war of ll against al-colleaie eae ‘nearly impossible in such a system because Snel imposible system because each actor must constantly fear being (though sil subject to free riding b E ce riding because states contin to he “egoist sas emetic tenn ae oth sel aac ca bucnae te Sont pote eh sect of lw oa eat security asthe individual esponsibility ofeach Given the al epoee oe etdastnen elas alec Ne Eres alts thin such systems will cessation of efits o maniulate ert tel reuting ineets contrast with the “cooperative” secuty system, in which states dentfy Yostvely wih one atthe st he ean ocak pea ae tlt ofall hiss not selEhep in any interesting sense ae the ele of which interests ae defined isthe communiyy nao nterant 78 ANARCHY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES seen in “collective security” arrangements, Depending on bow well developed the collective selfs, it wil produce security practioes that arin varying degrees altra- {ste or prosocial. This miakes collective action less dependent on the presence of ative threat and less prone to free nding, Moreover it restructures efforts to ad- vance one objectives, or “power polis,” in terms of shared norms rather than relative power 7 ‘On this view the tendency in international relations scholarship to view power and institutions as two opposing explanations of foreign pole is therefore mis- leading, stave anarchy and the distribution of power only have meaning f action ia virtue of the understandings and expectations that constitute institutional deities and interests. Sel-help is one such institution, constituting one kind of ‘narchy but oe th-only kind. Waltz’ three-part definition of strucre therefore seems underspecifed. In order la go ion stture to ation, we need to ade a fourth: the intersubjectively constituted structure of identities tnd interests inthe system, ~~ This hasan important implication forthe way in which we conceive of states In the state of nature before their frst encounter with each other Because states donot have conceptions of self and other, an thus secu interests, apart from of prior to interaction, we assume t6o much about the state of nature sf we concur ‘with Waltz tha, in virtue of anarchy, “international political systems, like economic markets are formed by the coaction of self regarding units." We also assume too uch if we argue that, in virtue of anarchy, states in the state of nature necessarily face a “stag hunt” or “security dilemma.” These claims presuppose a history of in- teraction in which actors have acquired “selfish” identities and interests; before in- teraction (and stllin abstraction from frst- and seconchimage factors) they would hhave-no experience upon which to base such definitions ofselfand-other. To as- sume.otherwise isto atrbute to states in the state of nature qualities that they can only possess in society. Self-help is an institution, not a. constitutive featireof an- arghy. ~~ ‘What, then, sa constitutive feature of the state of nature before interaction? ‘wo things are left if we strip away those properties of the self which presuppose interaction with others. The Grst isthe material substrate of agency, including ts intrinsic capabilities. For human beings, thi isthe body; for stale, tis an organi- zational apparatus of governance. In effect, Lam suggesting for rhetorical purposes ‘thatthe raw material out of which members of the state system are constituted is ‘reated by domestic society before states enter the constitutive process of interna- tional society, although this process implies nether stable territoriality nor sover- ity, which are internationally negotiated terms-of tadividuality (as discussed farther below). The second Is a desire to preserve this material substrate, to sur- vive. This does not ental “self-regardingness.” however, since actors do not have & self prior to interaction with another; how they view the meaning and require- ‘ments of this survival therefore depends on the Prooeses by hich concept i | | f ANARCHY IS WHAT STATES MAKE OFT 79 ‘theory for which rationalism is ate; olen aan pproprit:the ter isthe answer of fully soi ems to offer the latter and proposes two tiechenie by which structure condtlon sate eons Tin condoning however, presippoie seh consti feature of anarcy. As James Morro pak i ms condition behavior, not identity and interest. Wseltbelp i not a constitutive Feature of anor el cit ms emi caus fom css n wich anu ploy ony apoio od prep of eonstrictsm: eat the nets ei onan gsi terms of which ation i os ine A480 and henson ah herr he survive and has certain material rapablites, bet ie SeoE slides oc domestic impernsfor por gory orang ee eis history of security o insecty between the So Whe Realts would probably ange that each should art on the eso? tmptos abou the other intentions, using ih i ocean ‘orate post of death om making mistake, Socha poste ‘sev in cl society: however ety ould benno cisions purely onthe sical somtaseeies pe ele mae de- aud should be made onthe basis of pra ‘ction, by what actors do, In the beginning is ego’ gestate, which ure, which may consist, for example, ofan ade vance aretet a nnshing of ams lying lows of aca a part conve by goand whi leds eee bers and immediate consequences ofthe gesture. The Cem: wht alter wold ned by such quinone sel alter may make an atebtional err” ins nore tent be ers ago mason es cat Atume npr ifore the ate eae then ne oe tog st of ging eng So ad obs feng gene acm Sen ee Consider anerample, Would we assume, ‘80 ANARCHY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES ‘New York, we will define the situation as threatening and respond accordingly. But if they appear with one spaceship, saying wat seems to be “we come in peace," we wl fel “reassured” and wil probably sespond with a gesture intended to reassure them, even ifthis gesture is not necessarily interpreted by them as such, “This process of signaling, interpreting, and responding completes a "social act” and begins the process of erating intersubjective meanings. It advances the same sway, The first socal at eretes expectations on both sides about each other's ture behavior: potentially mistaken and certainly tentative, but expectations nonethe- less. Based on this tentative knowledge, ego makes anew gesture, again signifying the basis on which i will respond to alter, and again alter responds, adding tothe ‘poo of knowledge each has about the other, and soon overtime. The mechanism here is reinforcement; interaction rewards actors for holding certain ideas about cach other and discourages thom from holding other. IF peated long enough, these “reciprocal typiestions” wil create relatively stable concepts of self and ‘other regarding the isue at stake inthe interaction.” ‘Competitive ystems of interaction are prone to security “lemmas,” in which the efforts of ators to enhance their security unilaterally threatens the security of the others, perpetuating distrast and alienation. The forms of identity and interest that constitute such dilemmas, however, are themselves ongoing effects of, not ‘exogenous to, the interaction; identities are produced in and through “situated sctivity."® We do not begin our relationship with the aliens in a security dilemma; scent dilemmas are not given by anarchy or nature “The mirzor theory of identity formation is a crude account of how the process of creating identities and interests might work, bt it does not tll us why a system of states—such as, arguably, our own—would have ended up with sel-regarding tnd not colletive identities. In this section, T examine an efficient cause, preda- tion, which, in conjunetion with anarchy as a permissive cause, may generate aself- hrlp system. Iu so doing, however, Ishow the key role thatthe structure of identi- ties and interests plays in mediating anarchy’s explanatory role. “The predator argument is straightforward and compelling. For whatever rea sons—biclogy, domestic politics, oF systemic vietimization—some states may be- ‘ome predisposed toward aggression. The aggressive behavior ofthese predators ‘or “bad apples" forces other states to engage in competitive power polis, to meet fire with fite, since failure to do so may degrade or destroy them. One predator will best a hundred pacifists because anarchy provides no guarantees, Ths argument is powerful in part because itis so weake Rather than making the strong assumption ‘that all states are inherently power-seeking (a purely reductionist theory of power politics), it assumes that just one is power-seeking and thatthe others have to fol low suit because anarehy permits the one to exploit them. ‘In making tis argument, itis important to reiterate that the possibilty of pre~ dation does notin tel force states to anticipate it a prior with competitive power politics oftheir own. The possbilty of predation does not mean that “war may at ‘any moment occur’sit may in fat be extremely unlikely. Once a predator emerges, however, it may condition identity and interest formation in the following manner. In an anarchy of two, if ego is predatory alter must either define its security in self-help terms or pay the price... The timing of the emergence of predation ANARCHY IS WHAT STATES MAKE OF Tg th Alte Treaty Org ‘haps, but not if they bi idepe i hrc om ae tan hve reasons independent ofthat tea or unty with one another. Inter and Intereats ae seal oe Intrinsic attributes of a “portfolio” states may be competitive in ores oir ships and solidary in others. oo sn The Sue predation alo mates, ft stems rom nieve canes tht inane ostemic impact (cnc uch a hanan mature nee ens =n in jgolation), then it functions in a manner analogous to a “gene niin the constructed word ofthe tate tem. Even If suc thie Carer ee ties Mant and ch, might be eased by tre soca ton wm of appeasement, reassurances that security needs willbe mel pee a fetson domes polis, ‘and so on, In this case, aa geet that proces can ano aad pple into a goon ce is rss anew the queston of racy how much and what kind of role rtrd gr re as = qeires sn dinitrate tore of Soman poe img te conc by ageing at te alto enti sme of veteg seen a actos by which its prodied and suined. Peer Berger Tinos ae bat define rections fons ha ins Lack aman cy at fey wee etn eta hme proce rere en ear ea aman plies that man is capable of f mngett world, and orgtinghsornctecaa eas Ens tt dl: ron ne ptr a a ross Themen. epee ye Ee bso

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