Democracy & Its Problems: Saving Ourselves From Platos Democratic Fears

Bu Adrian Rutt

Abstract: Some characterize Plato as a snobbish, elitist, and

anti-democratic thinker. Others contend that this couldnt
be further from the truth. This paper argues that although
Plato criticizes democracy in the Republic, it shouldnt be
thought of us a criticism of democracy

as such, but rather

should be looked at as an extended worry about some of the
dangers a democratic form of government may encounter.
If we treat Platos critique this way, we are able to read the
Republic and the Statesman consistently, and thus take
more seriously Platos worries about democracy and from
where, more precisely, those worries stem.
__________
[Plato] believed that of him to whom ten talents are given more shall be required than of him
who has only two, and he was eager to recognize merit and ability wherever he found it. If that
be undemocratic and snobbish, then we shall have to return to the primitive life where he of the
strongest fist is king. - Stella Lange, Plato and Democracy
__________
I.
To those who spend a meager two undergraduate class days discussing Platos Republic,
it is common to leave with the belief that Plato was, on the whole, an elitist, snobbish, and
avowedly anti-democratic thinker. Even some steeped in Plato literature find themselves singing
this tune. Some scholars contend, however, that this is a misleading characterization regardless
of where ones final judgement ends up with regard to Platos political sympathies. Put another
way, most readers, upset with Platos (almost always tentative) conclusions, tend to ignore the
rich dialogue that got him to said conclusions. Whats alarming, then, is how often Platos
1

supposedly negative picture of democracy in The Republic is glibly set aside with little to no
attention being paid to why he characterized it in this way.1
In other words, Platos pessimism with regards to democracymore specifically toward
the citizens in a democracyis not due to the harboring of elitist attitudes. Rather, Platos
worries should be viewed as stemming from his belief that (1) epistemological foundations, and
thus discriminatory abilities are necessary for a society to function properly, and that (2) people,
whether due to nature or nurture, are better suited for different tasks. Thus his claim that
democracy is a state where nothing can be discriminated from anything else and everything is
ready to burst with liberty and full of diversity, is also nearly always on the edge of unraveling
into tyranny.2
Thus, as Arlene Saxonhouse points out, Plato's response to democracy is far more
theoretically interesting than simple disdain for the unenlightened masses, and to brush aside
Plato as merely an ancient political theorist with regards to democracy is to miss both the larger
reasons for his negativity as well as potential solutions to problems currently plaguing
democratic theory and democratic citizenship.3
To better map out how to approach Book VIII of The Republic in a much more
sympathetic light, it will be useful to note some of the ways in which this book and the
discussion of the regimes has been previously interpreted. Two of the most popular
interpretations of the political regime discussion in Book VIII are: (1) that Plato was literally
praising and criticizing each individual political framework, determining whether they were

Saxonhouse, Arlene. (1998). Democracy, Equality, and Eide: A Radical View from Book 8 of Platos Republic.
The American Political Science Review, Vol. 92(2) pp. 273-283
2
The Republic, 563d
3
Saxonhouse, pp. 273

desirable or undesirable, or (2) that the frameworks were largely irrelevant or incidental to the
discussion, and Platos focus was on the the kinds of people in each individual framework; the
souls of the citizens in each particular government. A third interpretation (3) finds itself over
and against these two by arguing that the critique of democracy in The Republic is largely a
discussion aiming to show the inherent or potential weaknesses within a democratic regime
regardless of whether democracy is possible, desirable, or logically the safest form of
government. Put another way, this third interpretation sets aside the first and modifies the second
so that we may get to reasons (and thus warnings) for why he regarded democracy as so
dangerous and unprofitable in The Republic.

II.
Taking the first interpretation by the horns, it is argued that Plato was being quite literal
when speaking of the transitions from one form of government to the next. From the most
desirable to the least, Plato lists the regimes as aristocracy, timocracy, oligarchy, democracy, and
tyranny as the natural degeneration of governments. Degeneration - and thus desirability - is
implied when Plato describes how the first two aristocracy and timocracy are generally
applauded, and describes tyranny by saying that it is the fourth and worst disorder of a State.4
It is this literal interpretation that fuels the Plato-as-anti-democratic fire. However, this
interpretation is simplistic in the sense that none of these setups are claimed to be bad as such,
but rather their desirability or undesirability is reinforced by discussions about the souls of the
citizens and leaders in each particular government. For we cannot suppose, Plato says, that

The Republic, 544c

States are made of 'oak and rock.5 In other words, to argue plainly that Plato harbors
anti-democratic sympathies is to miss the greater reason for why he characterized democracy so
low on the list in the first place. Regimes are not just empty things; they grow out of human
characters.6 They are filled and fulfilled by human beings.
It is the (1) first interpretation of democracy that ushers in the conflict between treatment
of democracy in The Republic versus in The Statesman. When taken as a literal condemnation of
democracy as such (since it is second worst to tyranny and degenerates into tyranny), Plato finds
himself in a contradiction when he claims in The Statesman that democracy is, essentially, the
safest form of government. Perhaps, the safest bet. If they are all without the restraints of law,
Plato says democracy is the form in which to live is best.7 This is not only in stark contrast to
democracy in The Republic, but it is presents a problem of criteria: laws are what the dialogue
circles around in The Statesman whereas in The Republic they are not.
The discussion surrounding democracy in The Statesman is not at all unlike an
investment strategy or Pascals Wager applied to types of regimes: in the first case, you can have
a lawful monarchy which is the absolute best or an unlawful monarchy which is the absolute
worst (high-risk, high-reward); there can be lawful aristocracy which is merely good or unlawful
aristocracy which is bad (moderate-risk, moderate reward); and lastly lawful democracy which is
bad or unlawful democracy which is worse (low-risk, low-reward). In other words, Plato
suggests in The Statesman, we need to look at the unlawful side of all these governments to
deduce what would be the safest bet to make; not the positive benefits the ideal forms of each
would give us. In reality democracy is the best because it will produce neither any great good
5

Ibid., 544d
Ibid., 544e
7
The Statesman, 303a
6

[n]or any great evil.8 It is this reading of democracy in The Statesman that lends credence to the
simplicity and thus somewhat imperceptive first interpretation.
Where the first interpretation of Book VIII leaves us is precisely where the (2) second
interpretation comes in: the idea that Plato isnt condemning any particular regime necessarily,
but rather is suggesting that some are more or less desirable based on the types of souls or people
in each regime. The water is muddied somewhat by Platos - perhaps purposeful - evasion of the
chicken or the egg argument: he never argues explicitly whether certain governmental setups fail
because they bring out in peoples souls certain bad qualities, or whether the bad qualities force
the inevitable degeneration process from one system to another; from aristocracy to tyranny.
Evidence of this confusion is found in the way Plato expresses this degeneration: he
claims, rather abstractly but nonetheless rightly, that everything which has a beginning has also
an end.9 From here Plato goes on to describe how the guardians are ignorant of the law of
births, thus implying that from this point all things spiral out of control, producing less
cultivated citizens and beginning this degeneration process.10 Platos use of the future tense
word will in reference to what the citizens will do or become makes it difficult to distinguish
whether they are becoming this or that because of the framework, because of this inevitable
degenerative process, or because of something deep down inside themselves.
In any case, the second interpretation regarding the souls of the citizens in their
respective governments can be read as consistent with the readings in The Statesman insofar as
an addendum to the second interpretation claims that the first interpretation is nearly all bunk. In
other words, we cannot join interpretation (1) and (2) while keeping a consistent reading with
8

Ibid.
The Republic, 546a
10
Ibid. 546d
9

The Statesman. We will have to ditch interpretation (1) and modify interpretation (2) to find
more fruitful discoveries.

III.
Democracys treatment by Plato in Book VIII, I contend, can be read as consistent with
The Statesman by ditching the literal first interpretation and modifying the second. In other
words, a third way of approaching democracy between Book VIII of The Republic and The
Statesman argues that (3) the question Is democracy desirable? is almost entirely incidental (if
not irrelevant) to Platos deeper ruminations on the subject, and shifts the focus unnecessarily to
the oak and rock of the regime rather than the inner workings and warnings that Plato presents
the reader. Put another way, the reasons as to why Plato lists democracy so low on this regime
list in The Republic gives us not reasons to classify him as anti-democratic, but rather things to
watch out for when, per The Statesman, we inevitably determine democracy is the safest of all
the regimes.
Plato begins his discussion of democracy by demonstrating how the democratic regime
comes into being. He says it comes into being as a result of the insatiable character of the good
that oligarchy proposes for itselfthe necessity of becoming as rich as possible."11 In other
words, democracy arrives on the scene when the poor become jealous of the rich and the life
theyve made for themselves; it comes into being whenever the poor, not weakened by the
overindulgence and the laziness of the rich, are victorious.12

11
12

The Republic, 555b.

Saxonhouse, pp. 278

This insatiable character of wanting wealth - material or otherwise - is what brings an

oligarchy to its knees. Notice, however, that it isnt merely the poor or unwealthy who cause this
strife-turned-democracy, but those who are wealthy as well: not only are they greedy, they are
unwilling to control those among the youth who become licentious by a law forbidding them to
spend and waste what belongs to them.13
From this point Plato draws a much larger moral and perhaps the problem from which all
of democracys further problems stem. He claims that it is by now plain that it's not possible to
honor wealth in a city and at the same time adequately to maintain moderation among the
citizens14 An obsession with material wealth, status, and purely physical comfort are what
makes democracy so dangerousnot, as it were, that a democracy forms these tendencies or that
they come in once the regime shifts into a democracy.
For Plato, it is entirely possible for a democracy to be functioning regime (though it
wont produce all that much good): he preempts the discussion of lawful democracy versus
unlawful democracy in The Statesman when he says (as quoted above) the wealthy are
unwilling to control those among the youth who become licentious by a law In other words,
this insatiable want of wealth and material comfort is and should be curbed by law, making
democracy at the very least, a minimally functioning regime as it is presented in The Statesman.
It seems as if, far from being an optimist with regard to law-following, Plato was simply
pessimistic about the chances that a populus could hold moderate views with regard to wealth
and material circumstance.

13
14

Ibid., 555c
Ibid., 555d

Wealth continues to be a main theme for Plato when he claims that the poor win, killing
some of the others and casting out some, and share the regime and the ruling offices with those
who are left on an equal basis; and, for the most part, the offices in it are given by lot."15 Here
Plato alludes to one of his biggest concerns: the idea that in a democracy everyone believes that
have what it takes to rule so it makes sense to simply dole out ruling positions by lot. This
frustration with democracy for Plato stems from the fact that, as Stella Lange argues, he believed
(or perhaps knew) that not all men are fit to govern, and that if the unfit govern, the state is
sick.16 Far from being aristocratic snobbishness, Lange argues that this goes hand-in-hand with
Platos view that people, on the whole, just want to be satisfied, undisturbed, and not dealt with
harshly regardless of who is doing the rulingthe key insight here being a warning to the rulers
in a democracy. The dysfunctional sort of democracy comes into being when the ruling class
disregards the poor and the poor decide to swing to the other extreme, believing that since the
rulers couldnt give them what they wanted perhaps we all can give us what we want - or, more
likely, what the oligarchy had.
Platos intimation that rulers will be chosen by lot leads into a discussion about the soul
of the democratic man, thus making the why of the lot choosing mechanism more clear. He
says that there will be plenty of freedom and all will get to order and organize his life according
to his own will.17 It will also be the fairest of all the regimes without rulers anddispensing a
certain equality to equals and unequals alike."18 It is clear to any reader of Platos other works or
even earlier in The Republic that this is already beginning to repulse Plato. Even the phrase

15

Ibid., 557a
Lang, Stella. (1939). Plato and Democracy. The Classical Journal. Vol. 34(8) pp. 480-486
17
Ibid., 557b
18
Ibid. 558c
16

dispensing a certain equality to equals and unequals alike, should raise the concerns of most at
this point.
If we could roughly say that Platos entire corpus is about getting to the Truth of
thingswhether in actual fact or Formsthen it is clear that to dispense equality to things both
equal and unequal is an absurd notion. Citizens who are unable to distinguish this from that
much less detect the nuance of a situation or hold a sustained dialectic about any given topic are
what worried Plato most.
The democratic outlook does not see everyone as equals, but this, contrary to mainstream
interpretations, isnt cause for alarm or anti-democratic criticism. As Gerasimos Santas says,

Platos ideal city is usually thought to be antidemocratic and elitist with respect
to knowledge. But this clearly does not include all knowledge: not knowledge of
the crafts, or in the arts and sciences generally, but knowledge required for ruling
the city well, wisdom of what is good for the city as a whole in its internal and
external relations.19

In other words, Plato was more specific with regards to the different types of knowledgesome
are better at things than others and vice versa. An unvigilant democracy tends to destroy this
outlook, and even though it may be the safest form, it tends to get nothing done because
everyone thinks that they know the right thing to do in any given situation. Though again, this

Santas, Gerasimos. (2007). Platos Criticisms of Democracy in The Republic. Social Philosophy and Policy,
Vol. 24(2); pp. 70-89
19

doesnt have to be the case. In contradistinction, Rawls claims that there is a certain nobility in
concession or knowing when someone knows more than than you:

Government is assumed to aim at the common good...To the extent that this
presumption holds, and some men can be identified as having superior wisdom
and judgement, others are willing to trust them and to concede to their opinion
greater weight There is both an identity of interests and a noticeably greater
skill and judgement in realizing it. 20

In other words, Rawls somewhat tempers Platos problem of not being able to actually
know the person who has superior knowledge by arguing, essentially, that the citizens could be
astute enough to know who at the very least knows more than them. This, I think, lines up well
with Platos condemnation of the ideal of extreme equality and how combined with the
concomitant lack of moderation on part of the citizenry is a recipe for democratic disaster.
The worst democracy has to offer in Platos mind might well be the very situation we are
inhabiting today, where people will cheerfully confess ignorance of a topic and reject
indignantly the suggestion that it might debar them from an opinion.21 Platos somewhat
moderate hope was that people would cheerfully confess ignorance of a topic and, per Rawls, use
their best judgement and skill to discern who or what group will either satisfy their interests or
make the best decisions overall. After all, leaders ideally wouldnt confess to know anything
about basket weaving.

20
21

Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice, pp. 205

Haspel, Aaron. (2015). Everything. Good Books Publishing, pp. 12

10

From here, Plato takes a slight digressionwhich isnt to say irrelevant or unnecessary
digressionto talk about necessary and unnecessary desires. Implicit within this discussion are
two things: on the one hand it is implied that as long as citizens can distinguish between
necessary and unnecessary desires (and act on that ability) there is a hope for a functioning
democracy; on the other is Platos perpetual fear that the citizens will not be able to distinguish
between these two concepts and thus lack any sense of proportion. The further distinction here is
made between spendthrifty goods and money making ones.22
Here Plato is essentially making the point that if a democracy is to function properly,
people must have some self-awareness as to those things they desire in terms of that objects
further utility: Plato wants those in a democracy to ask the question, Will this object of my
desire further a pursuit I am actively and mindfully seeking or is this merely an instant
gratification for my lower level desires? Plato is dubious about the ability for citizens to make
this sort of reflection by claiming that the democratic man has already descended from the
oligarchic one, and that because he has tasted the drones' honey and has had intercourse with
fiery, clever beasts who are able to purvey manifold and subtle pleasures with every sort of
variety, that there is very little hope for honest reflection with regard to necessary and
unnecessary desires.23 But if we merely interpret Platos musings here as a warning, we see that
for a democracy to function it is not only required that people are constantly urged to reflect
upon their choices and desires in this manner, but that they engage in an open dialectic and
dialogue with other citizens on these matters as well.

22
23

The Republic, 559c

Ibid., 559e

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Another of Platos warnings comes when he begins to talk about how people will laud
negative attributes as positive ones. They will call moderation cowardliness and spattering it
with mud, they banish it.24 Sticking to ones principles and convictions no matter what, Plato
seems to intimate, is, in reality, the cowardly thing to do. Democracy cannot flourish or even
function if everyone not only thinks they have the right way ahead but wont budge an inch when
coming together as a group to decide what to do. It is in this light that Lang says we will end up
returning to the primitive life where he of the strongest fist is king.25 A democratic citizenry
that is unable to compromise might be the harbinger of worse times.
In a particularly trenchant observation about the perils of democracy, Plato goes on to
warn us more about calling things by their improper names:

Now, once they have emptied and purged these from the soul of the man whom
they are seizing and initiating in great rites, they proceed to return insolence,
anarchy, wastefulness, and shamelessness from exile, in a blaze of light,
crowned and accompanied by a numerous chorus, extolling and flattering them
by calling insolence good education; anarchy, freedom; wastefulness,
magnificence; and shamelessness, courage.26

Shamelessness will be viewed as courage. Anthony Daniels, the thought provoking

psychiatrist and essayist remarks of this rather recent phenomenonalbeit sometimes a bit to
frankly. He says, speaking of Princess Dianas disclosure that she suffered from bulimia:
24

Ibid., 560d
Lang, pp. 486
26
Ibid., 560e-561a
25

12

In age when strength of character consists in being able to flaunt ones

weaknesses to the prurient gaze of millions of idle onlookers, nothing could
establish

her

bona

fides

better

so

universally

accepted

has

the

pathologico-therapeutic approach to life become that the Archbishop of

Canterbury offered up thanks to God at the funeral service for Princess Dianas
vulnerability, as if an appointment with a psychiatrist were mans highest possible
moral and cultural aspiration.27

One ought to be careful not to draw undue conclusions here: Daniels does not think that
Princess Diana should have felt shame for her bulimiathats similarly unhelpfulbut he
laments the fact that one merely has to reveal something supposedly shameful or
suffering-related to the masses to be deemed courageous. In other words, Daniels laments that
shame and courage are now codeterminative and thus confused concepts. Adjusting for
macho-masculinity and chauvinism, one could argue for a sort of middle ground. Although there
may be a place for courage-as-divulging vulnerabilities, it is hard to imagine Plato resting
content with this definition or even being a part of his definition of courage as such.
Indeed, in a democracy this type of analysis or exploration about the nature of courage is
happily shrugged off. If the people think something is courageous, and so does the one doing the
act then it is! Who are you to say it isnt? is the reply from the person who shakes his head at

27

Daniels, Anthony. (2005) The Goddess of Domestic Tribulations. Our Culture, Whats Left of It, pp. 201-211

13

all this and says that all are alike and must be honored on an equal basis.28 Having no ability to
discriminate or differentiate will hurl democracy into paralysis or, more likely, tyranny.
Concerning what we moderns call freedom of speech, Plato says:

Do you notice how tender they make the citizens' soul, so that if someone
proposes anything that smacks in any way of slavery, they are irritated and can't
stand it? And they end up, as you well know, by paying no attention to the laws,
written or unwritten, in order that they may avoid having any master at all.29

Having no one to answer to meant one can say whatever they feel, whenever they want to, to
whomever.30 And this further leads to, again in modern parlance, a disgust with any authority
whatsoever, thus every individual becomes an authority unto themselves. Democracy,
Saxonhouse says, is the private regime in which we act as individuals, not as parts of a common
enterprise.31 A citizenry sown with hatred toward other citizens is, no matter the justification, an
unprofitable situation.32

IV.

The Republic, 561c

Ibid., 563d
30
Saxonhouse, pp. 281
31
Ibid, pp. 278
32
This idea is reminiscent of Herbert Butterfields comment that the biggest danger facing our world today is
conflict between giant organized systems of self-righteousness - each only too delighted to find that the other is
wicked - each only too glad that the sins of the other give it pretext for still deeper hatred.
See also Benjamin Barber: Adversaries who no longer find in their disagreements a basis for common norms are
transformed from adversaries into enemies.
28
29

14

Interpreting Plato as literally condemning the democratic infrastructure misses most if not
all of the important points he was attempting to make. For one, it disregards almost entirely the
fact that it is the people in any given regime that tend to give the framework a bad name. The
democratic man is thus the reason why democracy is the second worst type of regime. But this
interpretation too doesnt seem to do justice to the fact that Plato thought democracy the safest.
I hoped to show that if we read Platos detailed account of the democratic man, how he
comes to be, and how he turns to tyranny, as a warning, we can transform the democracy that
doesnt produce much good or much bad from The Statesman into something better than what
Plato envisioned. What holds democracy back, for Plato, isnt the framework; it is the people.
Democracy isnt necessarily bad, its just that weve ignored his musings and thus fulfilled
nearly every single one of his fears.

15