Epistemic Luck and The Purely Epistemic PDF

North American Philosophical Publications
Epistemic Luck and the Purely Epistemic

Author(s): Richard Foley
Source: American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Apr., 1984), pp. 113-124
Published by: University of Illinois Press on behalf of the North American Philosophical
Publications
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20014037
Accessed: 25-10-2016 16:36 UTC
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted
digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about
JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
http://about.jstor.org/terms
North American Philosophical Publications, University of Illinois Press are collaborating

with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to American Philosophical Quarterly
This content downloaded from 197.255.75.94 on Tue, 25 Oct 2016 16:36:48 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
American Philosophical Quarterly
Volume 21, Number 2, April 1984
EPISTEMIC LUCK AND THE PURELY EPISTEMIC

Richard Foley
detect any difference whatsoever between the two
situations were we somehow able to switch him
instantaneously from one situation to the other. The
TS the history, or origin, of a belief ever important
two situations are in this sense qualitatively indis?

tinguishable for him. Whatever he believes in one
situation, he believes in the other situation as well
^ epistemically? In one sense, the answer is obvi?

ous; since a belief might not have had those charac?
teristics which make it rational had its history been
and with the same degree of confidence; whatever

he experiences in one situation, he experiences in
the other situation and with the same degree of
intensity; whatever he seems to remember in one
situation, he seems to remember in the other and
with the same degree of clarity; and so on. Finally,
suppose that in the second situation the perceptual
process which causes S to believe p is unreliable.
Perhaps there is some malfunction in 5's optical
nerves or perhaps there is an evil demon present.
S, however, knows nothing of this problem, and
there is no reason why he should know anything
of it, since what he believes, seems to remember,
etc. about the reliability of his perceptual processes
is precisely what he believes, seems to remember,
etc. in the first situation. Even so, the above re?
different, its history is important. But many epis

temologists also think that the history of a belief
is important in a stronger sense. They think that it
is impossible for a belief to be rational unless it

has an appropriate history.1
For example, consider so-called "reliabilist" ac?
counts of rational belief. According to such ac?
counts, if a belief is rational, it must be caused by

a reliable process. It must be caused, that is, by a
process which regularly generates true beliefs. If
a belief is caused in this way and if in addition

there is available to the believer no reliable defeat?
ing process? i.e. no reliable process which if used

would have led the person not to have the belief?
then the belief is rational.2
This view is one which in an elegant way implies
liabilist account implies that S in the second situa?

tion does not rationally believe p while in the first
situation he does.
that a belief is rational only if it has an appropriate
history. However, any account of this sort faces a

number of problems. Many of these problems con?
But, there is some sense of rational belief for

which this isn't so. That is, there is some sense of
rational belief such that S's beliefs in the two situ?
cern the proper formulation of the requirement that
rational beliefs be caused by reliable processes.3

But, there is a more fundamental problem as well.
Suppose that a person S is caused to believe p by
a reliable perceptual process (however this is under?
stood) and that there is available to him no reliable
ations above are equally rational. Later, I will say

something more about this sense of rational belief,
but for now it will do simply to claim that there is
such a sense and that in this sense a belief need
defeating process. According to a reliabilist then,
S rationally believes p. Now, imagine a second

situation in which S again is caused to believe p
by a perceptual process, and suppose that in this
second situation 5 thinks, believes, experiences,
seems to remember, etc. exactly what he does in
the first situation. Indeed, suppose that the two
not have an appropriate history in order to be ra?

tional. And the above example helps illustrate why.
The fundamental idea contained in the above
example is that if we imagine a situation in which

S believes, experiences, seems to remember, etc.
exactly what he does in his actual situation and if
in addition he believes, experiences, seems to re?
member, etc. with exactly the same degree of con
situations are such that S would not be able to

113
114 AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

fidence or intensity as in the actual situation, then
in one sense of rational, his belief in the actual

situation is no more and no less rational than it
sense," it is rational for Watson as well as Holmes

to believe that the coachman is guilty. Their evi?
dence supports their believing this. But in another
in turn, is that if there is some factor present in the
sense of rational, what Firth calls "the doxastic

sense," only Holmes rationally believes that the
actual situation which is not present in the hypothet?
coachman is guilty.
would be in the second situation. What this implies,
ical situation, this factor need not be present in

order for the belief to be rational in this sense.
Suppose, for example, that the factor is/. Factor
/, then, whatever it is, need not be included in the
list of factors which in the first situation make it
rational in this sense for the person to believe p.
It need not be included because we can account
for the precise epistemic status of belief p, whatever
that status is, without citing /. We can do so by

citing only factors which the first situation shares
with the second situation, since in the second situ?
ation the person's belief would be precisely as ra?
tional as it is the first situation.4
So, on any occasion where one might be tempted
to think that having an appropriate history is a
necessary condition of it being rational for someone
to believe a proposition, one can treat the history
of the belief in just the way that factor/is treated
above.5
Thus, in this sense of rational belief, having an

appropriate history is never a necessary condition
of a belief being rational. A fortiori, in this sense
of rational belief, having been caused by a reliable
process is never a necessary condition of a belief
being rational.
II
Consider the following example, described by
Roderick Firth.6 Both Holmes and Watson have
surveyed the scene of a murder. Holmes has pointed
out to Watson all the pieces of crucial evidence?

the footprints, the ripped piece of cloth, the position
of the body, etc. Holmes recognizes how all this

evidence points to the guilt of the coachman. On
the other hand, although Watson has all the evi?
dence that Holmes does, he doesn't see how it

indicates that the coachman is the murderer. Thus,
says Firth, even if Watson in fact believes the

coachman committed the crime, Watson lacks a
kind of rational belief which Holmes has. In one
sense of rational, what Firth calls "the propositional
Moreover, says Firth, only Holmes' belief is
rational in this latter sense because only he bases

his belief on his evidence. Firth goes on to claim
that a person bases a belief on his evidence only
if there is a causal relationship between the person's
"evidential states" and his beliefs. The exact nature
of this relationship Firth leaves open, saying only

that Holmes' belief is caused "in a way that corres?
ponds in the appropriate way to the evidential re?
lationships in virtue of which the belief is propos
itionally warranted for him."7 Thus, according to
Firth, the explanation for why Holmes in the doxas?
tic sense rationally believes that the coachman is

guilty while Watson does not is that Watson's belief
lacks an appropriate causal history.
Anyone familiar with contemporary epistemol
ogy will have no trouble citing cases similar to
Firth's Holmes-Watson case. John Pollock talks of

a man who has strong evidence that his wife has
been unfaithful but who discounts this evidence
and instead regards the testimony of his mother as

convincing evidence of his wife's infidelity even
though his mother in the past has been noticably
untrustworthy about these sorts of matters.8 Mar?
shall Swain talks of a bank teller who has good
evidence that she will be promoted for her compe?

tence but who nonetheless believes she will be pro?
moted only because she believes that her employers
will favor her for her good looks.9 Hilary Kornblith
talks of a man who rationally believes p and ration?
ally believes if p then q but who distrusts modus

ponens and who is caused to believe q only because
the sound of the sentence expressing q is attractive
to him.10
Each of these philosophers claim that the person
they describe lacks an important kind of rational
belief. They further claim that these people lack
this kind of rational belief because their beliefs are
not based on their evidence. And since each of

them claims that the basing relation is to be under?
stood causally, each of them is also claiming that

the person they describe lacks an important kind
EPISTEMIC LUCK AND THE PURELY EPISTEMIC 115
of rational belief because the belief in question

lacks an appropriate causal history.
As was the case with reliabilist views, there are
a number of problems to be overcome in formulat?
ing a causal-historical view of this sort. The most
obvious of these problems is that it is not at all
clear how the notion of an appropriate causal history
is to be explicated, since a person can be caused

to believe p by his evidence e in a wayward manner.
Suppose that a person has good evidence for/? but

that his having this evidence makes him nervous
and his nervousness causes him to trip and to hit
his head which in turn somehow causes him to

believe p. This is a case where Firth and like
minded epistemologists would want to deny that

the person's belief is based on his evidence. But
if so, they need to provide an explication of "ap?
propriate causal history" which rules out this and
other similar cases. And of course, this explication
may be none too easy to provide.11
But again like reliabilist views, there is a more
fundamental problem as well. Even if it is granted
that in each of the above cases the person lacks an
important kind of rational belief, it need not be
granted that the explanation for this lies in the his?
tory of the beliefs in question. Indeed, in each of

the above cases, there is something about the per?
son's present situation which taints his belief. Wat?
son at the time of his belief does not understand

how his evidence indicates that it is the coachman
who is guilty. In Pollock's case, the man either

doesn't recognize the good evidence he has for his
wife's infidelity or if he does recognize it he takes
his mother's testimony to be better evidence.
Swain's teller in a similar way does not appreciate

the force of the real evidence she has for thinking
she will be promoted. And in Kornblith's case, the
man distrusts modus ponens. He doesn't think it
is a reliable inference pattern.
Once these failings are noticed, a suspicion

arises; if the present belief systems of the people
involved in these cases were not inadequate in the
ways mentioned, we would be less inclined to claim
that the beliefs in question, regardless of their
causal histories, are not rational. Notice in particu?
lar that in each of the above cases the person had
adequate evidence for the proposition he believes
(and thus, in Firth's terms, it is propositionally
rational for him to believe that proposition), but

he fails to appreciate how this evidence supports
the proposition in question. Thus, something like
Firth's distinction between propositionally and

doxastically rational beliefs can be introduced with?
out employing any causal or historical notion.

Roughly, we could say that a person's belief p is
doxastically rational in this non-historical sense
only if it is propositionally rational for him to be?
lieve p (i.e. only if he has adequate evidence for
p) and only if in addition he understands why p is
propositionally rational for him (i.e. only if he ap?
preciates how his evidence supports/?). Moreover,
even in this non-historical sense of doxastic ration?
ality, we still can say, if we so wish, that a belief
is rational only if the person's belief is based on
his evidence. We merely need to add that a person
S's belief p is based on his evidence just if he

understands how his evidence supports p. We
merely need to add, in other words, that the basing
relation need not be a causal relation.
Of course, there being this non-historical sense

of rational belief is compatible with there being yet
some other sense of rational belief for which having
an appropriate causal history is a prerequisite. Even

so, the need to introduce a causal-historical notion
of rational belief cannot be illustrated simply by

introducing cases of the sort that Firth, Pollock,
Swain and others have described. For in those cases
the irrationality of the beliefs involved can be ac?
counted for in terms of a non-historical kind of
rational belief? viz., a kind of rational belief which
requires a person not only to have adequate evi?
dence for his belief but also to appreciate how this
evidence indicates that his belief is true.
But isn't it easy enough to redescribe any of the

above cases in such a way that these requirements
are met but the person's belief/? is not caused by
his having evidence for /?? For example, isn't it
easy enough to imagine Holmes in a situation where
he has good evidence for believing that the
coachman is guilty and where he also appreciates

how this evidence indicates the coachman's guilt
but where his belief is not caused by his having
this evidence? The answer, obviously, is yes.
Nevertheless, such situations do not illustrate that
causal-historical considerations are important in

some epistemic sense any more than do the original

situations described by Firth, Pollock, etc. For in
such situations it's not at all clear that there is any
sense in which Holmes' belief is not epistemically
rational. In other words, insofar as Holmes has

adequate evidence for his belief and insofar as he
appreciates how this evidence indicates that his

belief is true, it's no longer clear that his belief
properly is subject to any kind of epistemic criti?
cism, even if it was caused in some peculiar way.
Similarly, if a person who rationally believes both
/? and if /? then q and who regards modus ponens
as reliable is nonetheless caused to believe q in

some unusual way (perhaps due to some recent
neurological malfunction about which he knows
nothing), then it's no longer clear that his belief is

irrational in any epistemic sense.
As an illustration of this, consider a pair of situ?
ations of the sort discussed in Section I. In the first
situation, imagine that Holmes has very strong evi?
dence for believing that the coachman is guilty, he
appreciates how this evidence indicates that the

coachman is guilty and his having such evidence
causes him in an appropriate way to believe the

coachman is guilty. Now, imagine Holmes in a
second situation which from his viewpoint is indis?
tinguishable from the first situations but in which
his belief has not been caused by his evidence. He
thinks, believes, experiences, seems to remember,
etc. exactly what he does in the first situation. He
discerns just as well how his evidence indicates

that the coachman is guilty. We can even suppose
that in both situations Holmes believes, and with
as much evidence, that his belief about the

coachman is caused by his evidence. But in the
second situation, he is wrong. His belief has a
wholly non-evidential cause, although he neither
knows nor could be expected to know anything of
this cause. There is nothing in his situation, which
from his point of view is indistinguishable from
the first situation, to indicate that his evidence has
not caused him to believe that the coachman is

guilty.
Given these assumptions, my suggestion is that

we draw a conclusion analogous to the one drawn
in Section I. We should conclude that if in any
in that same sense his belief is equally rational in

the second situation. But, to conclude this is just
to conclude that there is no epistemic sense of ra?
tional belief such that a necessary condition of S
's rationally believing p is that his belief be caused
in an appropriate way by his evidence for/?. Indeed,
since for any proposed causal-historical require?

ment it is possible to imagine pairs of situations of
the above sort, such that in only one is the purported
requirement met even though what the person in?
volved thinks, believes, experiences, etc. is the

same in both, a more general conclusion also fol?
lows. Namely, there is no epistemic sense of ra?
tional belief in which a necessary condition of S's
rationally believing /? is that his belief have an
appropriate causal history.
Ill
Why do so many philosophers resist the above
conclusion? Why, that is, are so many philosophers
tempted to insist that there must be some sense of
rational belief which makes the causal history of a
belief epistemically important?
Part of the temptation may arise from the view
that a belief cannot be an instance of knowledge
unless it has an appropriate history. If one then

also thought that a belief cannot be an instance of
knowledge unless it is rational, one might be temp?
ted to think that a belief is rational in the sense
required for knowledge only if it has an appropriate
history. But insofar as the temptation does arise

from these two claims, it is a temptation which
ought to be resisted. For one, the conclusion doesn't
follow from the two claims. That is, even if it is
granted that a belief is an instance of knowledge
only if it both has an appropriate history and is
rational, it in no way follows that a belief has to
have an appropriate history in order for it to be
rational in the sense required for knowledge. From
the fact that a is necessary for c and b is necessary
for c, it in no way follows that a is necessary for
b. Second, it is not at all clear that either of the
two above claims is true. The claim that being

rational is a prerequisite of a belief being an instance
given epistemic sense Holmes in the first situation
of knowledge has been denied by a good many
rationally believes that the coachman is guilty (and,
philosophers,12 and the claim that having an approp?
of course, Firth, Pollock, etc. all grant this), then
riate history is a prerequisite of a belief being an

instance of knowledge is especially suspicious in
the present context. It is especially suspicious be?
cause one may be inclined to think it is true only
because one also thinks that a belief cannot be an
instance of knowledge unless it is rational and that
it cannot be rational unless it has an appropriate
history. But of course, this latter claim is precisely
what is at issue at here.
Is there, then, any other consideration which

might prompt one to think that there must be some
sense of rational belief which makes the causal
history of a belief epistemically important? I think

so, but it perhaps is best to approach it indirectly.
Consider an extreme voluntarist conception of be?
lief?a conception which implies that we regularly
choose not only what to believe but also the reasons
for which we believe it. So, Holmes in believing

that the coachman is guilty has chosen to believe
this and also has chosen the reasons for which he
believes it. Let us continue to assume that Holmes
here has good evidence for his belief and that he
realizes he has this evidence. Nevertheless, given
the above voluntarist conception of belief, what
motivated Holmes to acquire his belief may have
had nothing to do with his having this evidence.
Indeed, he might have chosen to acquire his belief
adequate evidence, but in this case it just happened

to lead to this consequence. And given that this is
so, it can be tempting to conclude that there must
be a sense in which Holmes' belief about the

coachman is irrational, despite the fact that he has
good evidence for his belief and he realizes he has
such evidence. The belief must be irrational in some
sense, it can be tempting to think, just because the

manner in which Holmes chose the belief is prop?
erly subject to criticism.
Similarly, given this extreme voluntarist concep?
tion of belief, a person who rationally believes both
/? and if p then q and who also regards modus
ponens as a reliable kind of inference nonetheless

might choose to believe q only because the sound
of the sentence expressing q is pleasing to him. In
such a case, it again can be tempting to conclude
that although the person has good evidence for his
belief q and he realizes he has such evidence, in

some important sense his belief is not rational. And
as in the Holmes' case, this conclusion is tempting
because the person in choosing to believe q for the
reason he did is properly subject to criticism. His
choice had nothing to do with acquiring a belief
for which he has good evidence. This, by sheer

luck, happened to be a consequence of his choice,
for straight-forward self-interested reasons.
but it is not what motivated him. And thus, it might
Perhaps Holmes stands to gain financially if the

coachman is found guilty and Holmes knows that
he will be able to convince others of the coachman's
epistemically rational, in at least one important

sense. He, as an individual, cannot be regrded as
guilt only if he himself believes the coachman is
guilty.
be claimed, neither he nor his belief can be deemed
epistemically rational since the considerations
which prompted him to acquire his belief are epis?
But notice, if Holmes did choose to acquire his

belief for self-interested reasons, it can be tempting
to conclude that although Holmes has adequate evi?

dence for what he believes and recognizes that he
has this evidence, in some sense his belief is far
from rational. After all, Holmes here has not been
as good an epistemic agent as he could have been.
He did not choose to acquire his belief because he
has good evidence for it. His having a belief which
is adequately supported by his evidence is just a
fortuitous consequence of his choice. He chose to
acquire the belief simply for self-interested reasons.
So, in this way, he's been epistemically lucky. The
kind of self-interested considerations which

prompted him to acquire his belief would not very
often lead him to acquire beliefs for which he has
temically indefensible, and his belief cannot be

regarded as epistemically ratonal, since it is the
result of his epistemically indefensible choice.

Of course, relatively few philosophers today are
prepared to endorse an account of belief which

implies that people can choose to believe a propos?
ition simply because the sound of the sentence ex?
pressing it is pleasing to them or simply because
believing it would produce useful results. On the
contrary, some philosophers even suggest that the
nature of belief precludes the possibility of our ever
choosing what to believe.13 Nevertheless, extreme

voluntarist conceptions of belief are instructive,
since the way they can make it tempting to claim
that having an appropriate history is a prerequisite
of a belief being epistemically rational has its

analogue for less voluntaristic conceptions of be?
lief?conceptions, for example, of the sort implicit
in the accounts of rational belief defended by Firth
and Goldman.
evidence, is not doxastically rational because in

such a case S's cognitive equipment is not working
in a proper manner. In particular, in order for S's
belief to be rational, S's cognitive equipment must
Consider, for instance, that both Firth and the

above described voluntarist would agree that the
reason 5's belief/? might not be rational even if S
has good evidence for /? and even if he recognizes
that he has this evidence is because it could lack
be working in such a way that there is an appropriate
an appropriate history. In addition, they would
would strip the conception of epistemic luck of any
agree that a belief has an appropriate history, and

thus is rational, only if the belief is based on the
person's evidence. The above described voluntarist
thinks people choose to base their beliefs on their
evidence; it is an action on their part. So, a belief
is rational for the voluntarist only if the believer
chooses to acquire his belief and moreover chooses
this not simply for self-interested reasons or for
any other non-epistemic reasons, but rather because
he has good evidence for thinking that what he
believes is true. On the other hand, Firth shows no
overtones of agency. For the voluntarist, it is simply
voluntarist view of belief and the account of rational
inclination to accept an extreme voluntarist concep?
belief it encourages to something like the view I
tion of belief. So, for him, a person's belief can
am attributing to Firth and others, it is not hard to
be based on his evidence without the person choos?

ing to acquire the belief at all and a fortiori without
his choosing to acquire it for adequate epistemic

reasons. Rather, S's belief/? is based on his evi?
causal connection between S's having evidence for

/? and S's believing /?. Otherwise, it simply would
be a matter of luck that S's belief conforms to his
evidence, although once again Firth presumably
a matter of luck that S has adequate evidence for

/? if his having such evidence didn't motivate him
to acquire the belief. For Firth, it is simply a matter
of luck that S has adequte evidence for p if his

having such evidence did not in an appropriate way
cause him to believe p. Under these conditions, it
is a happy coincidence that S has belief for which
he has adequate evidence.
Moreover, once one has moved from an extreme
see how it can become tempting to adopt more

radical views about the epistemic importance of
causal-historical considerations. In particular, once
one has adopted a view which implies that a belief
dence just if 5' s having that evidence in the approp?
is doxastically rational if it is the product of properly
riate way causes 5 to believe /?.
functioning cognitive equipment, where this is un?

derstood in terms of the person being cognitively
temologists were pressed to explain why beliefs

which are not based on the person's evidence are
equipped in such a way that his having evidence
Moreover, if Firth or like-minded epis
not rational, their explantion presumably would be

analogous to that given by the voluntarist. Accord?
ing to the voluntarist, if 5 is not motivated to believe
/? for acceptable epistemic reasons, then his choice

and the resulting belief is properly subject to criti?
cism. So, even if S both has adequate evidence for
his belief and realizes that he has this evidence, he
is not being as good an epistemic agent as can be
expected. His having adequate evidence for his

belief is just a matter of luck. It was not something
he was concerned to bring about.
For Firth and like-minded epistemologists, the
explanation would be similar, only it would be

stripped of any emphasis on agency. It would be
in terms of the person's cognitive equipment not
working properly. S's belief/?, if not based on S's
for /? causes him to believe /?, one might begin to

wonder, as does Goldman, what's so special about
having cognitive equipment such that one's beliefs
are caused by one's having evidence for those be?
liefs. Goldman admits that we sometimes do ac?
quire beliefs by an explicit process of reasoning,

and for these cases there may very well be some
causal relation between our having evidence for a
claim and our believing the claim. But in many

cases, he wants to insist, nothing like an explicit
process of reasoning takes place. This need not

suggest, Goldman argues, that it is mistaken to
understand rational beliefs as beliefs which are the

products of properly functioning cognitive equip?
ment. It only shows that the idea of properly fimc
tioning cognitive equipment should not be con?

strued too narrowly. In particular, one's cognitive

equipment can be functioning properly even if one
is not caused to acquire a belief by having evidence
for that belief. After all, Goldman suggests, our
real interests are to acquire true beliefs and to avoid
false beliefs. So, it is enough if the process which

causes a belief is one which usually produces true
process which causes S to believe p is reliable.

Otherwise, the fact that S has a true belief/?, given
that it in fact is true, is an unlikely accident, and
hence in this sense yet again a matter of luck.
IV
beliefs. According to Goldman, if the process
which produces a belief is reliable and if there is

available to the believer no other reliable process
which if used would have led him not to have the
Is epistemic luck in any of the above senses
belief, then with respect to that belief the person's

cognitive equipment has functioned properly. Ac?
really impossible? I think not. In particular, I think

that in any case where there is a temptation to use
the impossibility of epistemic luck to claim that S
in some important sense doesn't rationally believe
cordingly, the belief is rational. On the other hand,
/?, although he both has good evidence for believing
if a belief is not so produced, then given Goldman's
views it is not rational. And it is not rational even

if it is true. For even if the belief is true, it is not
the product of a process which usually generates

true beliefs. In this sense then, the person in acquir?
ing a true belief has been epistemically lucky. He
has acquired his belief through a process which

doesn't usually generate true beliefs, but in this
case, by good chance, it happened to.
So, to return to the question posed earlier, why
are so many philosophers tempted to think that
there must be some sense of rational belief which
implies that the causal history of a belief is epistem?
ically important? The above discussion suggests

that the temptation may arise from the view that
epistemic luck is impossible. It may arise, in other
words, from the view that there is some sense of
rational belief such that a necessary condition of
S's rationally believing/? is that his believing/? not
be just a matter of luck. For the voluntarist, the
implication of this view is that in order for S to
rationally believe /? in the required sense, S must
choose to believe /? not for self-interested reasons
or any other non-epistemic reasons but rather be?
cause he has good evidence for/?. Otherwise, the
fact that he has adequate evidence for /? would be
an unintended, and hence lucky, consequence of

his choice. For Firth, the implication is that S's
cognitive equipment must be operating in such a
way that S's having evidence for /? causes him to
believe /?. Otherwise, the fact that S has adequate
evidence for his belief would be a happy coinci?
dence, and hence once again a matter of luck. And
for Goldman, the implication is that S's cognitive
equipment must be working in such a way that the
/? and realizes that he has this evicence, is a case
where this temptation can be explained away by

insisting that the evaluation of a belief be distin?
guished from the evaluation of whatever produced
the belief. And, it does not matter whether what
produced the belief is a voluntary act of the be?

liever, which reflects upon his intellectual charac?
ter, or some involuntary process, which reflects
upon how well his cognitive equipment is operat?
ing. Epistemically desirable intellectual charac?

teristics, and epistemically desirable cognitive
equipment?i.e. characteristics or equipment

which ordinarily produce beliefs for which the be?
liever has adequate evidence?at times can produce
beliefs which are epistemically unfavorable. But,
the fact that such beliefs are produced in a way
which usually does not produce epistemic howlers
does not make the beliefs any less howlers. The
reverse is also true: epistemically unfavorable ways

of producing beliefs at times can result in epistem?
ically favorable beliefs and one should not pretend
these beliefs are epistemic howlers just because the
process which produced them usually produces

howlers.
These points may be obvious when stated

abstractly, but when particular cases arise, espe?
cially cases involving a history of faulty reasoning,
it is easier to become confused. Suppose, for exam?

ple, that Watson yesterday on the basis of some
obviously faulty reasoning came to believe irration?
ally that the coachman is the murderer. (Again, it

does not matter whether the reasoning process is
construed as a voluntary process or not). Moreover,
suppose that as a result of his irrationally believing
this, Watson comes today to acquire additional evi
dence in favor of his belief. The maid, knowing
what we believe to be true. So, it is possible for
and wanting to please Watson, lies to him; she tells

him that she saw the coachman commit the crime.
an irrational belief to shape our investigations is

such a way that we find additional support for /?
and fail to find available defeating evidence. And
that Watson believes the coachman is the murderer
So, Watson, let us assume, now has overwhelming

evidence that the coachman is guilty and moreover
he understands how this current evidence supports
his belief. Unfortunately, his irrational belief of
yesterday has caused him to be sloppy in his inves?
once in possession of this additional supporting

evidence, we may very well come to believe p
rationally. Thus, it is possible for us now to believe
/? only because we earlier believed /? irrationally.
In such cases, the way in which we come to acquire
tigation of other suspects. In particular, he has
our belief and our evidence may be rightfully
have found the murder weapon and other in?
criticized (since it involved our irrationally believ?

ing /?) even though the present belief is perfectly
failed to search the butler's room, where he would
criminating evidence?evidence, let us finally as?
rational.
sume, that would make it rational for him to believe
Of course, in most cases where a person reasons
that the butler is guilty, despite the maid's tes?
badly in arriving at a belief, unwelcome conse?
timony to the contrary.
quences show up in the person's present belief sys?

tem. The fact that this usually happens is another
factor which can make it tempting to think a belief
In cases of this sort, it is tempting to confuse

the evaluation of the reasoning processes which led
the person to his belief about the coachman with
an evaluation of the belief itself. It is tempting,
that is, to note that there is much about the way
Watson acquired the belief which can be rightfully
criticized and to conclude from this that the belief
itself is not rational. But this temptation is one to
be resisted. After all, there is nothing wrong with
Watson's belief now.14 Yesterday, of course, his

belief was irrational, but today he has adequate
evidence for his belief, he recognizes that he has
this evidence, and so on. The mistakes in reasoning
he made yesterday resulted in his having an irra?
tional belief at that time about the murderer and it
also resulted in his now lacking evidence which

would defeat the evidence for his present belief.
But, neither of these facts indicate that his present
belief is not rational. A person may lack evidence
about /? , even relevant available, defeating evi?
dence about/?, and still rationally believe/?. Indeed,
is rational only if it has an appropriate history. But
once again, the temptation is one to be resisted. If
Watson has come to believe that the coachman is

guilty as a result of a reasoning process which uses
the irrational assumption that in murder cases it is
almost always the coachman who is guilty and if
he still has this irrational general belief about
coachmen, then presumably his present belief that

the coachman is guilty is irrational. But his belief
is not epistemically irrational just in virtue of its
being the product of a faulty process of reasoning.
The problem lies in the present rather than in the
past. Watson's belief about the coachman is irra?
tional either because it is not now adequately sup?
ported by Watson's evidence (since the general

belief is not adequately supported). Had Watson's
faulty process of reasoning somehow caused him
to have adequate evidence for his belief and caused
him also to see how this evidence supports his
would find defeating evidence in the butler's room
belief, then regardless of how many mistakes led

him to such a state, he would now rationally believe
that the coachman is guilty.
coachman is not rational, especially since his pre?

sent evidence overwhelmingly indicates that he
would not find such evidence in the butler's room.
sorts of cases can be generalized. Any case in which
this happens all the time.15 So, the fact that Watson
does not indicate that Watson's belief about the
Likewise, a person may now lack defeating evi?

dence about /? just because he earlier irrationally
believed /? and yet still now rationally believe p.
This too may not be unusual. Our investigations,
scientific and otherwise, are ordinarily guided by
Moreover, the point I am making about these

causal-historical considerations make it at all tempt?
ing to conclude that a belief is irrational in some

epistemic sense despite the fact that the believer
has adequate evidence for his belief and despite

the fact that he sees how the evidence supports his
belief is a case where what is really bothering us

is some flaw in the believer's intellectual character
or in his cognitive equipment. Thus, what troubles

the voluntarist in cases where a person chooses to
acquire a belief for self-interested reasons is that
this choice may reflect a tendency on the part of
the person to believe claims even if he has no good
reason to think them true. It may reflect, in other
words, a faulty intellectual character, which in the
long run is likely to prompt the person to have
many beliefs for which he lacks adquate evidence.
Analogously, what troubles Firth in cases where a
person's belief has not been caused by his having
evidence for the truth of the belief is that this may
reflect a tendency of the person's cognitive equip?

ment to generate beliefs for which the person lacks
adequate evidence. It may reflect, that is, faulty

cognitive equipment, which again in the long run
is likely to result in the person having many beliefs
for which he lacks adequate evidence. And, what

troubles Goldman in cases where a person's belief
has not been caused by a reliable process is that
this reflects a tendency of the person's cognitive
equipment to generate beliefs which are false. It
S to believe p even if he doesn't in fact belie

Indeed, it can be rational for S to believe /
if he believes not-/?. On the other hand, in a r
sense of "epistemically rational," analog
Firth's doxastic sense, S rationally believes

if he believes /?, he has adequate evidence f
lieving /? and he appreciates how this eviden
dicates that p is true. In neither of these
and, I have claimed, in no other sense of epi
ically rational is having an appropriate hist
prerequisite of a belief being rational. To ill
this claim, I have considered pairs of situ
which are indistinguishable from the viewpo
the person involved. The person believes ex
the same things in both situations and wit
same amount of confidence, he has the sam
of experiences and with the same vividn
seems to remember exactly the same thing

with the same degree of clarity, etc. Situat
this sort are epistemic twins. If it is epistem
rational (or irrational) in either of the above
for the person to believe /? in one situation
equally rational (or irrational) for him to bel
may reflect, in other words, faulty cognitive equip?
in the other. And this is so regardless of any d
ment, which in the long run is likely to result in

the person having many false beliefs.
But, the fact that there is a flaw of one of these
kinds in the believer's intellectual character or in
ences there might be in the histories of the

in the two situations.
his cognitive equipment does not imply that there

is something substandard about a belief which is
the product of that character or equipment. We can
criticize the person's intellectual character, or his
cognitive equipment, without criticizing everything
which is a product of that character or equipment.
A belief can be rational even though what prompts
the believer to choose his belief or what cognitive
equipment causes him to have the belief regularly
produces epistemic howlers. In such cases, we
should admit just what those with causal-historical

sympathies are so reluctant to admit; we should
admit that the believer has been epistemically

lucky.
Of course, there may very well be perfect

ceptable senses of rational belief with respe
which situations of the above sort need not be
Consider, for example, a pragmatic sense
tional belief which implies that it is rationa

to believe /? just if S's believing /? would re
sufficiently valuable pragmatic consequenc
analogous sense of rational belief, it mi
claimed, can be defined in terms of consequ
which are truth related, so that it is rational in

sense for S to believe /? just if his believing p
promote in the long-run the acquisition of t

by S himself or by his community or by ye
other group. Yet another sense of rational
it might be suggested, is social, such tha
rational for S to believe p just if the total ev

possessed by S's community indicates that/? is
In any of these senses, it could be more rat
for S to believe/? in one situation that it is in a
In what Firth calls "the propositional

sense," even
it
situation
though the two situations are
is rational for S to believe /? just if he has
adequate
tinguishable
from his viewpoint. Likewise,
evidence for/?. In this sense, it can beof

rational
for
these senses,
S's belief/? might not be r

even if S has good evidence for p and realizes that
he has this evidence.
However, even granting that there are all these

different kinds of rational beliefs, none of them are
purely epistemic kinds of rational belief. To put

the matter in what may be an overly metaphoric
way, considerations which at a time t make a belief
rational in a purely epistemic sense are considera?
tions which from the believer's perspective aim at
his having at that time t true beliefs and at his not
having at that time t false beliefs. Pragmatic consid?
erations and long-term truth considerations do not

aim at this. Rather, they aim at future advantages
which will be brought about by the psychological
state of believing. In one case the future advantages
concern the acquisition of pragmatically desirable
state of affairs and in the other case they concern
the acquisition of truths. But in neither case do the
considerations which make a belief rational aim at
the person at that time having true beliefs. This is
illustrated by the fact that it is easy to imagine
situations in which from the believer's perpective
at that time a proposition is obviously false even
though the advantages which would be brought

about by believing it make it rational in either or
both of the above senses.
Likewise, social considerations of the above de?
scribed sort are not considerations which from the
believer's perspective aim at his now having true
beliefs. And again, this is illustrated by the fact
that it is easy to imagine situations in which from
the believer's perspective a proposition is obviously
false even though the total evidence possessed by
the believer's community indicates the proposition
is true. At most, such social considerations are
considerations which describe what should be be?

lieved by a hypothetical being who has access to
the evidence possessed by each member of the com?
munity.
So, from a purely epistemic point of view, prag?
matic considerations, long-term truth considera?
tions, and social considerations, like historical con?
siderations, are irrelevant. And, their irrelevance
true and even though were S to believe the propos?

ition his belief would be caused by a process which
regularly produces epistemically desirable beliefs,
the proposition nevertheless from S's perspective
at that time may be obviously false. But then, it is
not epistemically rational for S to believe the prop?
osition.
Of course, if it is epistemically rational for S to

believe that his believing /? would produce future
benefits, whether these benefits be pragmatic or
truth related, and if in addition it is epistemically
rational for him to believe that his believing/? would
not produce such benefits were not p true, then it

also will be epistemically rational for S to believe
/?. In a similar manner, if it is epistemically rational
for S to believe that his belief p was produced by

a reliable process or if it is epistemically rational
for S to believe that the total evidence possessed
by his community indicates /? is true, then it at
least usually it will be epistemically rational for S
to believe p.16 But even in such cases, the future
considerations themselves or the causal-historical
considerations themselves or the social considera?
tions themselves are not in any way prerequisites
of S's rationally believing p. Rather, the relevant
consideration is it being epistemically rational for
S to believe that only true beliefs will produce the
future benefits (or it being epistemically rational
for him to believe that the process which caused
his belief is reliable, or it being epistemically ra?
tional for him to believe that the total evidence
possessed by his community would support/?). And
as is the case with most other rational kinds of
beliefs, it is possible for such rational beliefs to be

false, so that, e.g., the process in question did not
really cause S to believe p, although it is rational
for him to believe that it did, or the process is not
really reliable, although it is rational for him to

believe that it is.
Thus, although it being epistemically rational

for S to believe that his belief/? has an appropriate
past or will help bring about an appropriate future
or conforms appropriately with what the communi?
all can be illustrated in the same way. Namely,
ty's evidence indicates is true sometimes can be
even though the advantages which would be
important in making it epistemically rational for S

to believe p, whether his belief/? actually has these
characteristics is never important. In order for a
belief to be epistemically rational, it need not have
brought about by S's believing some proposition

may be significant and even though S's community
may have good reasons to think the proposition
been caused in an appropriate way, it need not

bring about appropriate effects, and it need not
conform in an appropriate way to the community's
evidence. In this sense, neither past conditions nor
future conditions nor social conditions are epistem?
ically important.
By now it is perhaps becoming clear that the

sort of position I am defending is Cartesian in spirit
what is often claimed by contemporary epis

temologists, I am claiming that the conditions
which make it epistemically rational for me to be?

lieve propositions about the past, the future, and
the external world do not obtain within you or

within Ronald Reagan or in the collection of scien?
tists or in the past or in the future. They obtain
within me now.
if not in letter. Indeed, it is not hard to see how
Of course, it is easy enough to trivialize this
the venerable Cartesian inspired argument, the ar?

gument from illusion, can be recast in my terms.
The fundamental, and sound, idea contained in the
simple maxim. For example, one might try to claim

that even a reliabilist can agree that the conditions
which make my present belief/? rational must obtain
argument from illusion is that even in ordinary
within me now. He might try to do this by pointing
perceptual situations the fact that there is an object
out that given his reliabilist view my present belief

/? is rational just if I am presently in the state of
having a belief/? which was produce by the reliable
workings of my own internal equipment. But, this
only is a ploy. Such a reliabilist position does not
really imply that what makes my present belief p
which the person is perceiving is epistemically in?

significant in determining the rationality of the per?
son's perceptual belief. After all, we can imagine

a second situation which from the viewpoint of the
person is indistinguishable from the actual situation
but in which there is no object corresponding to
his perceptual beliefs and in this second situation
his perceptual belief would be as rational, in a

purely epistemic sense, as in the first situation. But
then, if we want to account for the rationality of

the person's belief in the first situation, we need
rational are conditions which obtain within me now,
since what makes my internal equipment a reliable

indicator of the external world depends not just
upon my internal equipment but also upon the ex?
ternal world. After all, the external world might
very well have been such that my internal equip?
not cite the fact tht there is an object corresponding
ment would not be a reliable indicator of it.
to his perceptual belief in that situation. Rather,
Moreover, my now having a belief /? which was
we can account for the epistemic status of the belief
the future and the external world, then that some?
reliably produced is not strictly a condition which

obtains within me now, since it involves by having
had an appropriate past. It is not, that is, a purely
present state of mine.17
And so, although there may be some difficulties
in explicating with precision the notion of condi?
tions obtaining within me now, I don't want to be
apologetic about this, since the psychological no?
tions of thinking, believing, experiencing, seeming
to remember, etc. can be used to provide a rough
explication of what this means, and since, second,
thing is within me and within the present moment.
many contemporary epistemologists claim epis?
by citing only those characteristics it shares with

the second situation.
A way of summarizing this view of epistemology
is to say that it emphasizes the epistemic priority
of both the present and the first-person. This does
not mean that I am in some sense denying the

reality of the past and the future. All I am claiming
is that if anything makes it epistemically rational

for me now to believe propositions about the past,
It is in this sense that I associate myself with a

Cartesian approach to epistemology. Contrary to
temic significance for a number of considerations

which clearly do not obtain within me now.
University of Notre Dame Received February 15, 1983

NOTES
1. A condition, or set of conditions, can be epistemically important in one of two ways. It can be a necessary condition of a
belief being rational, so that it's just impossible for a belief to be rational (or for it to be rational in some particular sense) if the

condition doesn't obtain, or it can be a necessary part of some set of conditions which is sufficient for a belief being rational.
My discussion, for the sake of simplicity, will focus on the former kind of epistemic importance, although it can be modified in
obvious ways to apply to the latter as well.
2. Alvin Goldman, "What Is Justified Belief?, in Justification and Knowledge, ed. by George Pappas (Dordrecht: D. Reidel,
1979), pp. 1-23.

3. For example, if a belief-acquisition process is to generate rational beliefs, does the process have to be reliable merely in the
situations which we commonly encounter or does it have to be reliable in the actual long-run or does it have to be reliable in
appropriate counterfactual situations? And for whom does the process have to be reliable?only for the individual himself, or for
his community as well, or for some other group? And what percentage of the beliefs which a process produces have to be true
for the process to be regarded as reliable?
4. This argument assumes that the property of being rational is supervenient. To assume this is at least to assume that two beliefs
cannot differ in rationality, such that e.g., one is rational and the other is not, if there is not some other relevant difference between
them. The assumption, put roughly, is that if two beliefs are different with respect to rationality, there must be some property
which the one has and the other lacks which accounts for this difference and moreover this property cannot simply be the property
of being rational.
5. I am assuming that our beliefs about the past are not infallible. If our beliefs about the past (or certain kinds of our beliefs
about the past) were infallible, then it would not always be possible to imagine a situation which from the believer's viewpoint
would be indistinguishable from his actual situation but which had a different history.
6. Roderick Firth, "Are Epistemic Concepts Reducible to Ethical Ones"?, in Values and Morals, ed. by A. Goldman and J.
Kim (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1978), pp. 215-29.
7. Ibid., p. 220.
8. John Pollock, "A Plethora of Epistemological Theories," in Justification and Knowledge, pp. 93-113.
9. Marshall Swain, "Justification and the Basis of Belief," in Justification and Knowledge, pp. 25-49.
10. Hilary Kornblith, "Beyond Foundationalism and the Coherence Theory," The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 97, (1980), pp.
597-611.
11. The problem here is analogous to the so-called "problem of wayward causation" which has proved so difficult in action
theory. See Roderick Chisholm," The Descriptive Element in the Concept of Action, The Journal of Philosophy Vol. 61 (1964),
P. 616; Richard Foley, "Deliberate Action," The Philosophical Review, Vol. 86 (1977), pp. 58-69. The same kind of problem
also arises in providing a causal account of perception.
12. See, e.g., Roderick Firth, op. cit., and Mark Pastin, 'The Multi-Perspectival Theory of Knowledge," in Midwest Studies in
Philosophy, Vol. V, Studies in Epistemology (Morris: University of Minnesota Press, 1973).
13. For a discussion of this issue, see Bernard Williams, "Deciding to Believe," in Problems of the Self (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1973).
14. Analogously, if a person at time t does something x which results in his being a situation at time t + n in which he can only
do y or z, where both y and z do significant harm to others, and if in that situation he performs the action?say, y?which does
the least harm, theny is precisely what he ought to do at that moment. What he can be criticized for, or course, is his earlier action x.
15. See Richard Foley and Richard Fumerton, "Epistemic Indolence," Mind, vol. 91 (1982), pp. 38-56.
16. There are, however, some exceptions. See Foley and Fumerton, "Epistemic Indolence," especially p. 49.
17. For more on this notion of purely present states, see Alfred Freddoso, "Accidental Necessity and Logical Determinism,"
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 63 (1982), pp. 54-68.

Epistemic Luck and The Purely Epistemic PDF

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Epistemic Luck and The Purely Epistemic PDF

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

North American Philosophical Publications

Epistemic Luck and the Purely Epistemic

North American Philosophical Publications, University of Illinois Press are collaborating

American Philosophical Quarterly

Volume 21, Number 2, April 1984

EPISTEMIC LUCK AND THE PURELY EPISTEMIC

detect any difference whatsoever between the two

situations were we somehow able to switch him

instantaneously from one situation to the other. The

TS the history, or origin, of a belief ever important

two situations are in this sense qualitatively indis?

^ epistemically? In one sense, the answer is obvi?

and with the same degree of confidence; whatever

different, its history is important. But many epis

is impossible for a belief to be rational unless it

counts of rational belief. According to such ac?

counts, if a belief is rational, it must be caused by

a belief is caused in this way and if in addition

ing process? i.e. no reliable process which if used

liabilist account implies that S in the second situa?

that a belief is rational only if it has an appropriate

history. However, any account of this sort faces a

But, there is some sense of rational belief for

cern the proper formulation of the requirement that

rational beliefs be caused by reliable processes.3

ations above are equally rational. Later, I will say

defeating process. According to a reliabilist then,

S rationally believes p. Now, imagine a second

not have an appropriate history in order to be ra?

The fundamental idea contained in the above

example is that if we imagine a situation in which

situations are such that S would not be able to

114 AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

in one sense of rational, his belief in the actual

sense," it is rational for Watson as well as Holmes

in turn, is that if there is some factor present in the

sense of rational, what Firth calls "the doxastic

actual situation which is not present in the hypothet?

would be in the second situation. What this implies,

ical situation, this factor need not be present in

It need not be included because we can account

for the precise epistemic status of belief p, whatever

that status is, without citing /. We can do so by

Thus, in this sense of rational belief, having an

out to Watson all the pieces of crucial evidence?

of the body, etc. Holmes recognizes how all this

dence that Holmes does, he doesn't see how it

says Firth, even if Watson in fact believes the

Moreover, says Firth, only Holmes' belief is

rational in this latter sense because only he bases

"evidential states" and his beliefs. The exact nature

of this relationship Firth leaves open, saying only

tic sense rationally believes that the coachman is

ogy will have no trouble citing cases similar to

Firth's Holmes-Watson case. John Pollock talks of

and instead regards the testimony of his mother as

shall Swain talks of a bank teller who has good

evidence that she will be promoted for her compe?

ally believes if p then q but who distrusts modus

not based on their evidence. And since each of

stood causally, each of them is also claiming that

EPISTEMIC LUCK AND THE PURELY EPISTEMIC 115

of rational belief because the belief in question