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    Poor Man, Rich Man, Big-Man, Chief: Political Types in Melanesia and Polynesia Marshall D. Sahlins Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Apr.. 1963), 285-303. Stable URL: bhtp:sflinks,jstor-org/sici?sici~0010-4175%28196304%295°3A3%3C285%3 APMRMBC%3E2.0,CO®3B2-P Comparative Studies in Society and History is currently published by Cambridge University Press. ‘Your use of the ISTOR archive indicates your acceptance of ISTOR’s Terms and Conditions of Use, available at htp:sseww jstor org/aboutiterms.html. ISTOR’s Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you hhave obtained prior permission, you may aot download an entie issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and ‘you may use content in the ISTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use Please contact the publisher eegarding any Fuster use ofthis work, Publisher contact information ray he abained at fpr jstoronpournal-cup A Each copy of any part ofa JSTOR transenission must contain the same copyright tice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transtnission, ISTOR isan independent not-for-profit organization dedicated to creating and preserving a digital archive ot scholarly journals. For more information regarding ISTOR, please contact suppom@jstor org. hup:thrww.jstor.orgy ‘Tue fun 15 09:17:36 2004 POOR MAN, RICH MAN, BIG-MAN, CHTEF: POLITICAL, ‘TYPES IN MELANESIA AND POLYNESIA * With an eye to their own lite goals, the native peoples of Pacific Islands un- wittingly present to anthropologists a generous scientific gift: an extended series of experiments in cultursl adaptation and evolutionary development. “They bave compressed their institutions within the confines of infertile coral atolls, expanded them on voleanic islands, created with the means history gave them cultures adapted to the deserts of Australi, the mountains and warm coasts of New Guinea, the rain forests of the Solomon Islands. From the Australian Aborigines, whose hunting end gathering existence duplicates in ‘outline the cultural life of the later Paleolithic, to the great chicfdoms of Hawaii, where society approached the formative levels of the old Fertile Cres- ‘cent civitizations, almost every general phase in the progress of primitive cul- ture is exemprified Where culture so experiments, anthropology finds its laboratories ~— makes its comparisons. The present paper i preliminary to a wider and more detailed comparison of Melanesian apd Polvnesian polities and economies. I have merely alstracted here some of the more striking political diferences in the two areas, ‘The full study — ‘which, fncidenttly, wit include more docimentation — fs beer promised the editors of The Journal of the Polynesian Soelety, ard T intend to deliver it to zhem some day. ‘The comparative method! so far followed in this research hs favolved reading the monographs and taking notes. T don't think T originated the method, but T would (a christen it — The Method of Uncontrolled Comparison, The description developed fof two forms of leadership is a mental distillation from the method of unconteolied comparison. The two forms are abstraced sociological types. Anyone conversant with the anthropological literature of the South Pacific knows there are important variants of the types, as well as exceptional political forms nat fully treated here. All would agree that consideration of the variations and exceptions is necessary and desirable. ‘Yet there is pleamre too, and some intelectial reward, in discovering the broad patterns. To (social) scientifically justify my pleasure, I could have ceferced to the pictures drawn of Melanesian big-men and Polynesian chiefs as “models” or as “ideal types’. If that is all that i needed to confer respectabllity on the paper, may the reader have it thit way. T hope all of this has been sufliiendly disarming. Or need it also be said that the bypotbeses are provisional, subject to further research, ete? F Since Rivers" day, the Pacific has provided ethaographie stimulus to vistually every ‘ajar ethnological school and interest From such great landmarks ax Rivers’ Hisvory Of Melanesian Saciery, Radcliffe-Brown's Social Organization of the Australian Tribes, Malinowski’ famous Trobriand, studies, especially Argonauts of the Westem Pactie, Raymond Firh’s pathmaking Primitive Keonovaler of the New Zealand Macri, his 286 MARSHALL D. SABILINS {In the southern and eastern Pacitic two contrasting cultural provinces have Jong evoked anthropological interest: Melanesia, including New Guinea, the Bismarcks, Solomons, and island groups east to Fiji; and Polynesia, consisting fn its main portion of the triangular constellation of lands between New Zea- land, Easter Island, and the Hawaiian Islands, In and around Fiji, Melanesia and Polynesia intergrade culturally, but west and east of their intersection the Ivo provinces pose broad contrasts in several sectors: in religion, art, kinship ‘groupings, economics, political orgenization, The differences are the more notable for the underlying similarities from which they emerge, Melanesia and Polynesia are both agricultural regions in which many of the same crops — such as yams, taro, bréadiruit, bananas, and coconuts — have long been ccaltivated by many similar techniques. Some recantly presented linguistic and archaeological studies indeed suggest thet Polynesian cultures originated from fan eastern Melanesian hearth during the first millenium B.C* Yer in anthra- ppological annals the Polynesians were to become fama for elaborate forms of rank and chieftainship, whereas most Melanesian societies broke off ad- ‘vance on this front at more rudimentary levels, It is obviously imprecise, however, to make out the politicel contrast in broad culture-atea terms, Within Polynesia, certain of the islands, such as Hawaii, the Society Istands and Tonga, developed unparalled political mo- ‘mentum, And not all Melanesian polities, on the other side, were con- strained and truncated in their evolution. In New Guinea and nearby areas of western Melanesia, small and loosely ordered political groupings are numerous, but in castern Melanesia, New Caledonia and Fiji for example, political approximations of the Polynesian condition become common. ‘There is mote of an upward west to east slope in political development in the southern Pacific than a step-like, quantum progression. It is quite reveal hhowever, to compare the extremes of this continuum, the western Metanesian underdevelopment against the greater Polynesian chiefdoms, White such ‘comparison does not exhaust the evolutionary variations, it tairly establishes the scope of averalt political achievement in this Pacific phylum of cultures. ‘Measurable along several dimensions, the contrast between developed Polynesian and underdeveloped Melanesian! polities is immediately striking functionalist clase, We, the Tikopia, and Margaret Mead’s, Comming af Age th Samoa, fone can almost read off the history af ethnologieal theory in the earlier trentiot century. In addition to continuing ta provision all these concerns, the Pacific has been the site of much recent evolutionist work (See, for example, Goldman 1993, 1960: Goodenotpt: 1957; Sablins 1998; Vaydn 1959), There are also the outstanding’ mono- ‘gaphs on special subjects rangicg from tropical agriewltute (Conklin 1957; Freeman 1955) to millenarianism (Warstey 1957). 2” Thin question, However, és presently in debate, See Grace 1955, 1959; Dyen 1960; Suggs 1960; Golson 1961, # "There are notable bumps {a the geographical gradient. The Trobriand chieftanships off eastern New Guinea will come to mind. BUC the Trobriand potitial development ie clearly exceptional for western Melanesia. POLITICAL TYPES, 287 for differences in scale. H. Tan Hoghin and Camilla Wedgwood concluded from a survey of Melancsian (mostly western Melanesian) societies that or- dered, independent political bodies in the region typically include seventy (0 tree huadred persons; more recent work in the New Guinea Highlands suggests political groupings of up to a thousand, occasionally a few thousand, people. But in Polynesia sovercigaties of two thousand or three thousand are run-of-the-mill, and the most advanced chiefdoms, as in Tonga or Hawai ‘might claim ten thousand, even tens of thousands? Varying step by step with such differences in size of the polity arc differences in territorial extent: from a few square miles in western Melanesia to tens or even hundzeds of square miles in Polynesia. ‘The Polynesian advance in political scale was supported by advance over ‘Melanesia in politcal structure, Melanesia presents a great array of social- political forms: here political organization is based upon patrilineal descent ‘groups, there on cognatic groups, or men’s club-houses recruiting neighbor- hhood memberships, on a secret ceremonial society, or perhaps on some com- bination of these structural principles, Yet 2 general plas can be discerned. ‘The characteristic western Melanesian “tribe,” that is, the ethnic-cultural entity, consists of many autonomous kinship-residential groups. Amounting con the ground to a small village or a lncal cluster of hasnlets, each of these is a copy of the others in organization, each tends to be economically self- governing, and each is the equal of the others in political status, ‘The tribal plan is one of politically unintegrated segments — segmental. But the political geometry in Polynesia is pyramidal. Local groups of the otder of self governing Melanesian communities appear in Polynesia as subdivisions of a more inclusive political body. Smaller units are integrated into larger through a system of intergroup ranking, and the network of representative chiefs of the subdivisions amounts to a coordinating political structure. So instead of the Melanesian scheme of small, separate, and equal political blocs, the Poly- nesian polity is an extensive pyramid of groups capped by the family and following of a paramount chief. (This Polynesian political upshot is often. although not always, facilitated by the development of ranked lineages. Call- ed conical clan by Kirchhoff, at one time ramage by Firth and status lineage by Goldman, the Polynesian ranked lineage is the same in principle as the so-called obok system widely distributed in Central Asia, and it is at least analogous to the Scottish clan, the Chinese clan, certain Centeal African Bantu lineage systems, the house-groups of Northwest Coast Indians, perhaps even the “tribes” of the Israelites. Genealogical rankiag is its distinctive feature: members of the same descent unit are ranked by genealogical distance « Hosbin an€ Wedgwood 1952-53, 1953-54, On New Guinea Highland poles! swale see among others, Paula Brown 1960. 5° See the summary aecount in Sshling 1958, especially pp. (32-33 + Kinchhoff 1955; Fieth 1957; Goldean 1957; Bacon 1958; Fried 1957 288 MARSHALL D. SABLINS. from the common ancestor; lines of the same group become senior and cadet bbranches on this principle; related corporate lineages are relatively ranked, again by genealogical priority.) Here is another criterion of Polynesian political advance: historical per- formance, Almost all of the native peoples of the South Pacific were brought up against intense European cultural pressure in the late eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries. Yet only the Hawaiians, Tahitians, Tongans, and to a Tesser extent the Fijlans, successfully defended themselves by evolving coun- tervailing, native-controlled states, Complete with public governments and public law, monarchs and taxes, ministers and minions, these nineteenth ces- tury states ate testimony to the native Polynesian political genius, to the level and the potential of indigenous political accomplishments, Embedded within the grand differences in political scale, structure and performance is a more personal contrast, one in quality of leadership. An historically particular type of leader-figure, the “big-man" as he is often locally styled, appears in the underdeveloped settings of Melanesia. Another type. 4a chief properly so-called, is associated with the Polynesian advance.” Now these are distinet sociological types, that is to say, differences in the powers, privileges, rights, duties, and obligations of Melanesian big-men and Poly- nesian chiefs are given by the divergont societal contexts in which they ‘operate, Yet the institutional distinctions cannot help but be manifest also in differences in hearing and character, appearance and manner — in a word, personality. It may be @ good way to begin the more rigorous sociological ‘comparison of leadership with a more impressionistic sketch of the contrast in the human dimension. Here I find it useful to apply characterizations — or 1 The big-man patie js very widespread in western Melanesia, although its complete dissibution is not yet clear to me. Anthropologiest descriptions of big-man leadership vary from mere hists of its exisienes, as among the Oroksiva (Williams 1930), Lesu owdermaker 1953) or the interior’ peoples of northeastern Guadalcanal Ciogbin 1947-19380), to excellent, closely grained analyses, such as Douslas Oliver's account of the Siua? of Bougsizvile (Oliver 1955). Big-man leadership has been more or less extonsively described for the Manus of the Admiralty Ilands (Mead 1934, 1932); the ‘Toambaite of northern Malaita (Hoghin 1939, 1943-44); the Tangu of northeastern [New Guines (Burridge 1960); the Kapavku of Netherlands New Guinea (Pospisil 1958, 1959-60; the Keoka of Guadalcanal (Hoghia 1933-34, 1937-38); the Seniang District ‘of Malekula (Deacon 1934); the Caw’ of the Huon Gulf area, New Guinea (ogtin 1951}; the Abelam (Raborry 1960-41, 1943-42) and the Arapesh (Mesd 1937, 1938, 1947) of the Sepik District, New Guinea; The Pema, Orokolo Bay, New Guinea (Willams 1940); the Ngarawazum of the Markham Valley, New Guinea (Read 1946-47, 1949-50}; the Kiwal of the Fly estuary, New Guinea (Landtman 1927); and a number of other societies, including, in New Guinea Highlands, the Kuma (Reay 1959), the Gahwka-Gama Read 1982-83, 1959), the Kyaka (Bulmer 1940-61), the Ege (Meggitt 1957, 1987-58), and others. (Far an overview af the stroctural position of New Guinea Highlands’ leaders see Barnes 1962} A partial bibliography on Polynesia chieftainship can be found in Sahlins 1958. The outstanding ethaographie description of Polynesian chieitainship i, of course, Firth’s for Tikopia (1950, 1957) — Tikopia, however, is not typical of the more advanced Polynesian ehiefdons with which we are principally conegmned here, POLITICAL TYPES, 289 is it caricature? — from our own history to bigemen and chiefs, however uch injustice this does to the historically incomparable backgrounds of the Mclanesians and Polynesians, ‘The Melanesian big-man seems so thoroughly bourgeois, so reminiscent of the free enterprising rugged individual of our own heritage. He combines with an ostensible interest in the general welfare ‘a more profound measure of self-interested cunning and economic calculation. His gaze, as Veblen might have put it, is fixed unswervingly to the main chance, His every public action is designed to make a competitive and invi- ious comparison with others, 10 show a standing above the masses that is product of his own personal manufacture. The historical caricature of the Polynesian chief, however, is feudal rather than capitalist. His appearance, his bearing is almost regal; very likely he just is a big man — “*‘Can't you see he is a chief? See how big he is?""* In his every public action is a play of the refinements of breeding, in his manner always that noblesse oblige of true pedigree and an incontestable right of rule, With his standing not s0 ‘much a personal achievement as a just social due, he can afford to be, and he is, every inch a chief. Tn the several Melanesian tribes in which big-men have come under anthro- pological serutiny, local cultural differences modify the expression of their personal powers.? But the indicative quality of big-man authority is every- ‘where the same: itis personal power, Big-men do not come to office; they da not succeed to, nor are they installed in, existing positions of leadership over political groups. The attainment of big-man status is rather the outcome of a sesies of acts which elevate a person above the common herd and attract about him « coterie of loyal, lesser men. tis not accurate to speak of “big- maa” as a political tile, for i¢ is but an acknowledged standing in inter- personal relations — a “prince among men” so to speak as opposed to “The Prince of Danes”. In particular Melanesian tribes the phrase might be “man ‘of importance” or “man of renown”, “generous rich-man”, or “center-man”, as well as “big-man”. A kind of two-sidedaess in authority is implied in this series of phrases, 2 © Gifford 1929:124 © Thus the erelavement of the big-man pattern within a seemented lineage organization in the New Guinea Highlands appears to limit the leader's political role and authority ‘in comparkon, say, with the Siual. In the Highlands, intergroup relations are regutated fn part by the sepmented ‘ineage structure; among the Siual Intergroup relations depend ‘more on contractual arrangements between big-men, which throws these figures more ‘nto prominence. (Notable im this connection haa been the greater vietly of the Siuai bigman than the native Highlands leader in ihe face of colonial control) Rares (1962) comparison of Highland social stricture with the clastie segmentacy lineage rystems of Africa suggests an inverse relation between the formality of the lineage system and the polities significance of individial setion. Naw, if instances such as the Stuai be taeKed on to the comparison, the generalization may be forher supported and extended: among societies of the tribal level (ef. Sablins 1961, Service in pres), the ‘realer the selfregulation of the political process through 2 lineage avstem, the less Tunction that remains to bigsmen, and the less significant their political authority. 290 MARSHALL D, SAHLINS division of the big-man’s field of influence into two distinct sectors, "“Center- ‘man” particularly connotes a cluster of followers gathered about an influen- tial pivot. It socially implies the division of the tribe into politcal in-groups dominated by outstanding personalities, To the in-group, the big-man presents this sort of picture: ‘The place of the leader in the district group {in northern Malaita] ia well summed Lip by his ttle, which might be translated as “centre-man"... He was like a banyan, the natives explain, which, though the biggest and tallest in the forest, is stil a tee like the rest. But, just becanse it exceeds all others, tne banyan, ‘support to moze Tianas and creepers, provides more food for the birds, and better protection against sun and rain. But “man of renown” connotes a broader tribal field in which @ man is not so much a leader as he is some sort of hero. ‘This is the side of the big-man facing outward from his own faction, his stetus among some or all of the ‘other political lusters of the tribe, The political sphere of the big-man divides itself into 2 small internal sector composed of his personal satellites — rarely over eighty men — and a much larger extemal sector, the tribal galaxy con- sisting of many similar constellations, As it crosses over from the internal into the external sector, a big-man's power undergoes qualitative change, Within his faction a Melanesian leader hag true command ability, outside of it only fame and indirect influence. It is not that the center-man rules bis faction by physical force, but his followers do feel obliged to obey hint, and he can usually get what he wants by haran- ‘guing them — public verbel suasion is indeed so often employed by center- ‘men that they have been styled “harangue-utans”. The orbits of outsiders, however, arc set by their own centersmen, ‘Do it yourself. I'm not your fool" would be the characteristic response to an order issued by a center- ‘man to an outsider among the Siu." "This fragmentation of true authority presents special political difficulties, particularly in organizing large masses ‘of people for the prosecution of such collective ends as warfare ar ceremony. Big-men do instigate mass action, but only by establishing both extensive re- ‘nown and special personal relations of compulsion or reciprocity with other ‘center-men. Politic isin the main personal politiking in these Melanesian societies, and the size of 2 leader's faction as well as the extent of his renown are normally set by competition with other ambitious men. Little or no authority is given bby social ascription: leadership is a creation — a creation of followership, “Followers”, as itis written of the Kapauku of New Guinea, “stand ia various relations to the leader, Their obedience to the headman's decisions is caused by motivations which reflect their particular relations to the leader.” ® So © Hogbin 1545-44258, Oliver 1955:408. Compare with the parallel statement for the Kaoks of Quadale canal in Hogbin 1937-38:305. 1 Pospisil 195861. POLITICAL r¥PES 298 a man must be prepared to demonstrate that he possesses the kinds of skills that command respect — magical powers, gardening prowess, mastery of oratorical style, perhaps bravery in war and feud."* Typically decisive is the deployment of one's skills and efforts in a certain direction: towards amassing ‘goods, most often pigs, shell monies and vegetable foods, and distributing them in ways which build a name for cavalier generosity, if not for com- passion. A faction is developed by informal private assistance to people of a locale, ‘Tribal rank and renowa are developed by great public giveaways sponsored by the rising big-man, often on behalf of his faction as well as hhimself, Tn different Melanesian tribes, the renown-making public distribution ‘may appear as one side of a delayed exchange of pigs between corporate kin- ship groups; a marital consideration given a bride's kinfolk; a set of feasts connected with the erection of a big-man's dwelling, or of a clubhouse for hhimself and his faction, or with the purchase of higher grades of tank in secret sovities; the sponsorship of 4 religious ceremony; a payment of sub- sidies and blood compensations to military allies; or perhaps the giveaway is ‘a ceremonial challenge bestowed on another leader in the attempt to outgive and thus outrank him (a potlatch), ‘The making of the faction, however, is the teue making of the Melanesian big-man. It is essential to establish relations of loyalty and obligation on the ‘part of a number of people such that their production can be mobilized for Tenownbuilding external distribution, ‘The bigger the faction the greater the renown; once momentum. in external distribution has been generated the ‘opposite can also be true. Any ambitious man who can gather a following ‘ean launch a societal career. ‘The rising big-man necessarily depends initially on a small core of followers, principally his own household and his closest relatives. Upon these people he can prevail economically: he capitalizes in the first instance on kinship ducs and by finessing the relation of reciprocity appropriate among close kinsmen. Often it becomes necessary at an early phase to enlarge one's household. The rising leader goes out of his way fo incorporate within his family "strays" of various sorts, people without familial support themselves, such as widows and orphans, Additional wives are especially useful. The more wives a man has the more pigs he has. ‘The relation here is functional, not identical: with more wornen gardening there will be mote food for pigs and more swineherds, A Kiwai Papuan pictures- quely put to aa anthropologist in pidgin the advantages, economic and poli tical, of polygamy: “Another woman go garden, another womati go take firewood, another woman go catch fish, another woman cook him—husband he sing out plenty people come kaikai {ie., come to eat]?”™ Fach new It is eifient to say just how important the military qualifications of leadership have beet in Melanesia, since the ethnographic researches have typically been under taken after pacification, sometimes long after, T miay uadecextimate this factor. Com pare Bromiey 1960. 1 Landeman 1927-168. 292 MARSHALL D. SABLINS marriage, incidentally, creates for the big-man an additional set of in-laws from whom he can exact economic favors, Finally, a leader's career sustains its upward elim when he is able to link other men. and their families to his faction, harnessing their production to his ambition, This is done by eafcu- lated generosities, by placing others in gratitude and obligation through help- jing them in some big way. A common tecknique is payment of bridewealth ‘on behalf of young men seeking wives, ‘The great Malinowski used a phrase in analyzing primitive political eco- rnomy that felicitously describes just what the big-man is doing: amassing a “fund of power”, A big-tan is one who can create and use social relations which give him leverage on others’ production and the ability to siphon off ‘an excess product — or sometimes he can cut down their consumption in the interest of the siphon, Now although his attention may be given primarily to short-totm personal interests, from an objective standpoint the leader acts to promote long-term societal interests. The fund of power provisions activities that involve other groups of the society at latge. In the greater perspective of that society at large, big-men ate indispensable means of creating supralocal ‘organization: in thibes notmally fragntented into small independent groups, big-men at least temporarily widen the sphere of ceremony, recreation and art, economic collaboration, of war too. Yet always this greater societal ‘organization depends on the lesser factional organization, particularly on the ceilings on economie mobilization set by relations between center-men and followers, The limits and the weaknesses of the political order in genetal are the limits and weaknesses of the factional in-groups. ‘And the personal quality of subordination to a center-man is a serious ‘weakness in factional structure, A personal loyalty has to be made and ‘continually reinforced; if there is discontent it may well be severed. Merely to creste a faction takes time and effort, and to hole it, sil more effort. The potential rupture of personal links in the factional chain is at the heatt of two ‘broad evolutionary shortcomings of western Melanesian political orders. First, a comparative instability. Shifting dispositions and magnetisms of am- bitious men ina region may induce fluctuations in factions, perhaps some overlapping of them, and fluctuations also in the extent of different renowns. ‘The death of a center-man can become a regional political trauma: the death undermines the personally comented faction, the group dissolves in whole or in part, and the people re-group finally around rising pivotal big-men. Al- though particular tribal structures in places cushion the disorganization, the big-man political system is generally unstable over short terms: in its super- structure it is a flux of rising and falling leaders, in its substructure of en laging and contracting factions. Secondly, the personal palitical bond contri- ‘butes to the containment of evolutionary advance. The possibility of their desertion, itis clear, often inhibits a leader's ability to forceably push up his followers output, thereby placing constraints on higher political organization, POLITICAL TYPES 293 bbut there is mote to it than that. If itis to generate great momentum, a big- ‘man's quest for the summits of renown is likely (0 bring out a contradiction in his relations to followers, so that he finds himself encouraging detection — ‘or worse, an egalitarian rebellion — by encouraging production ‘One side of the Melanesian contradiction is the initial economic reciprocity between @ center-man and his followers. For his help they give their help, ‘and for goods going out throngh his hands other goods (often from outside factions) Hlow back to his followers by the same path, ‘The other side is that ‘2 cumplative build-up of renown forces centet-men into economic extortion of the faction, Here it is important that not merely his own status, but the standing and peshaps the military security of his people depend on the big: ‘man’s achievements in public distribution. Established at the head of a size- able faction, a center-man comes under increasing pressure to extract goods from his followers, to delay reciprocities owing them, and to deflect incoming ‘goods back into extemal circulation. Success in competition with other big- ‘men particularly undermines internal-factional reciprocities: such success is precisely measurable by the ability to give outsiders more than they ean pas- sibly reciprocate. In well delineated big-man polities, we find leaders ae- gating the reciprocal obligations upon which their following had. been pre- dicated. Substituting extraction for reciprocity, they must compel their people to “eat the leader's renown,” as one Solomon Island group puts it, in return for productive efforts. Some center-men appear more able than others to dam the inevitable tide of discontent that mounts within their factions, per- hhaps because of charismatic personalities, pethaps because of the particular social orgenizations in which they operate.!® But paradoxically the ultimate defense of the center-man’s position is some slackening of his drive to enlarge the funds of power. The alternative is much worse, In the anthropological record there are not merely instances of bigeman chicanery and of material deprivation of the faction in the interests of renown, but some also of over- loading of sociel relations with followers: the generation of antagonisms, defections, and in extreme cases the violent liquidation of the center-man.\* Developing internal constraints, the Melanesian big-man political order brakes 3 nded itis dhe same people, the Siusi, wta so explicily discover chesseives eati her leaders renawn whe ‘also seem able to absorb a great deal of deprivation witho violezt reaction, at least Until the leader's wave of fame has already crested (seo Oliver 1955:362, 368, 387, 394), “In the Paniai Lake cesion (of Netheriands New Guinea), the people go so far as to kill selfish rich man because of his “immorality. His own sons or brothers are induced by the rest of the members of che community to digpatch the first deadly arrow. ‘Aki to tonne! bet, tt Ldikima enadani koda 10 nian (you should not be the ‘only rich man, we should all be she same, therefore you only sisy equal with us) was the reason given by the Paniai people for killing Mote Juwopiin of Madi, a zonowi [Kapaskar for ‘bigsman'] who was sot generous enough". (Pospisil 1958:80, cf. pp. 108-110}, On another egalitarian. conspiracy, see Hogbin 1951-145, and for other aspects of the Melanesian contradiction note, for example, Haghin 193981; Burridge 1960; 18-19; and Reay 1959110, 129-30. 294 MARSBALL D, SAHLINS evolutionary advance at a certain level. It sets ceilings on the intensification of political authority, on the intensification of household production by po- itical means, and on the diversion of household outputs in support of wider political organization, But in Polynesia these constraints were breached, and although Polynesian chiefdoms also found their developmental plateau, it was not before political evolution had been cattied above the Melanesian ceilings, ‘The fundamental defects of the Melanesian plan were overcame in Polynesia. ‘The division between small internal and larger external political sectors, upon which all big-man politics hinged, was suppressed in Polynesia by the growth of an enclaving chiefdom-2t-large. A chain of command subordinating lesser chiefs and groups to greater, on the basis of inherent societal rank, made local blocs oF personal followings (such as were independent in Melanesia) merely dependent parts of the larger Polynesian chiefdom. So the nexus of the Polynesian chiefdom became an extensive set of offices, a pyramid of higher and lower chiefs holding sway over latyer and smaller sections of the polity. Indeed the system of ranked and subdivided lineages (conical clan system), upon which the pyramid was characteristically established, might build up throngh several orders of inclusion and encompass the whole af an island or group of islands. While the island or the archipelago would nor- mally be divided into several independent chiefdoms, high-order lineage con- rections between them, as well as kinship ties between their paramount chiefs, provided structural avenues for at least temporary expansion of political scale, for consolidation of great into even greater chiefdoms.” ‘The pivotal paramount chief as well as the chieftains controlling parts of a chieédom were true office holders and title holders. "They were not, like ‘Melanesian big-men, fishers of men: they held positions of authority over permanent groups. The honorifics of Polynesian chiefs likewise did not refer to a standing in interpersonal relations, but to their leadership of political divisions — here “The Prince of Danes” not “the prince among men", In western Melanesia the personal superiorities and inferiorities arising in the Aside from, the transitions developments in eastern Melanesia, several westera Molanesisn societies advanced ro & stricta! position intermediate between under Aevelopes Melanesian polities and Polynesian chiefdoms. In these western Mefanesian protochiedoms, an ascribed division of Kinship groups (or segments thereof) into Cchifly and nonchiefly ranks emerges —~ as in Sa’a (Ivens 1927), around Buka passage Glackwood 1935}, in Manam Island (Wedgwood 1933-34, 1988-50), Waropen (Held 1957), perhaps Mafulu (Wlliemson 1912), and several others, The tank system doet fot #9 beyond the broad dal division of groups into chiefly and nonchiefly: ao py= amid of ranked social-political divisions along Polynesian lines is developed. ‘The palitical unit remains near the average size of the Western Melanesian aulonomous Community. Sway over the kin groups of such a loesl body falls automatically 10 a ‘chiefly unit, but chiefs do not hold office tile With stipulated rights over corporate fections of society, and further extension of chiefly authority, if any, must be achieved ‘The Trobriand, which carry this line of chiefly development to ite highest goiat, remain under the same limitations, although # was ordinarily possiole for powerful chlels 10 incograte setlements of tho external sector within dheit domains (e/. Powell 1960). POLITICAL TYPES 295 intercourse of particular men Jargely defined the political bodies. In Polynesia there emerged suprapersonal structutes of leadership and followetship, or- ganizations that continued independently of the particular men who occupied positions in them for brief mortal spans, ‘And these Polynesian chiefs did not make their positions in society — they ‘were installed in societal positions. In several of the islands, men did struggle to office against the will and stratagems of rival aspirants, But then they came fo power. Power resided in the office; it was not made by the demon- stration of personal superiority. In other islands, Tahiti was famous for it, succession to chieftainship was tightly controlled by inherent rank. The chiefly lineage ruled by virtue of its genealogical connections with divinity, and chiefs were succeeded by first sons, who carried “in the blood” the attri- butes of leadership, ‘The important comparative point is this: the qualitics of command that had to reside in men in Melanesia, that had to be personally demonstrated in order to attract loyal followers, were in Polynesia socially assigned to office and rank, In Polynesia, people of high rank and office ipso facto were leaders, and by the same token the qualities of leadership ‘were automatically lacking — theirs was not to question why — among the umderlying population. Magical powers such as a Melanesian big-man might acquire to sustain his position, Polynesian high chief inherited by divine descent as the mana which sanctified his rule and protected his person against the hands of the commonalty, The productive ability the big-man laboriously had to demonstrate was effortlessly given Polynesian chiefs as religious con teol over agricultural fertility, and upon the ceremonial implementation of it the rest of the people were conceived dependent. Where a Melanesian leader had to master the compelling oratorieal style, Polynesian paramounts often had trained “talking chiefs" whose voice was the chiefly command. In the Polynesian view, a chiefly personage was in the nature of things powerful. But this merely implies the objective observation that his power was of the group rather thas of himself, His authority came from the organi- zation, from an organized acquiescence in his privileges and organized means of sustaining them, A kind of paradox resides in evolutionary developments which detach the exercise of authority from the necessity to demonstrate per- sonal superiority: organizational power actually extends the role of personal decision and conscious planning, gives it greater scope, impact, and effeetive- ness. The growth of 4 political system such as the Polynesian constitutes advance over Melanesian orders of interpersonal dominance in the human control of human affairs. Especially significant for society at large were privileges accorded Polynesian chiefs which made them greater architects of funds of power than ever was any Melanesian big-man, Masters of their people and “owners” in a titular sense of group resources, Polynesian chiefs had rights of call upon the fabor and agricultural produce of households withia their domains. Economic mobilization did not depend 296 (MARSHALL D, SAHLINS con, as it necessarily had for Melanesian big-men, the de novo création by the leader of personal loyalties and economic obligations. A. chief need nat stoop to obligate this man of that man, need not by a series of individual acts of generosity induce others to support him, for economic leverage over a ‘group was the inherent chiefly due. Consider the implications for the fund ‘of power of the widespread chiefly privilege, related to titular “ownership” of land, of placing an interdiction, a tabu, on the harvest of some crop by way of reserving its use for a collective project. By means of the tabu the chief directs the course of production in a general way: households of his domain must turn (0 some other means of subsistence, He delivers a stimulus to household production: in the absence of the tabu further labors would not have been accessary. Most significantly, he has generated a politically utili- 2zable agriculture! surplus. A subsequent call on this surplus floats chiefunin- ship as a going concern, capitalizes the fund of power. In ceftain islands, Polynesian chiefs controlled great storehouses which held the goods congealed by chiefly pressures on the commonalty, David Malo, one of the great native ‘custodians of old Hawaiian lore, felicitously catches the political significance of the chiefly magazine in his well-known Hawaiian Antiquities: 1 was the practice for kings [ie., paramount chiefs of individual islands to build siore-houses in which to collect fo0d, fish, tapas [bark cloth), malos {men's loin cloths}, pa-us (women's Join akiris], and all sorts af goods. "These store-houses were designed by the Kalaimoku [the chief's principal executive) as 2 means. of keeping the peogle contented, so they would not desert the king. They were like the baskets that were used to entrap the hivalea fish. ‘The kinalea thought there was something good within the basket, and he hung round the outside of it- In the same way the people thought there was food in ihe store-houses, and they kept their eyes on the king. As the rat will not desert the pantry... where he thinks food is, so the peaple will nt desert the king while they think there is Food ia his store-house.*# Redistribution of the fund of power was the supteme art of Polynesian politics. By well-planned noblesse oblige the large domain of a paramount chief was held together, organized at times for massive projects, protected against other chiefdoms, even further enriched. Uses of the chiefly fund included lavish hospitality and entertainments for outside chiefs and for the chict’s owa people, and succor of individuals or the underlying population at large in times of scarcities — bread and circuses. Chiefs subsidized craft production, promoting in Polynesia a division of technical labor unparalleled in extent and expertise in most of the Pacific. They supported also great technical construction, as of irrigation complexes, the further retums fo which swelled the chiefly fund. They initiated large-scale religious construction too, sub- sidized the great ceremonies, and organized logistic support for extensive military campaigns. Larger and more easily replenished than their west- ern Melanesian counterparts, Polynesian funds of power permitted greater Mato 1903:257-58, POLITICAL T¥PES 297 political regulation of a greater range of social activities on greater scale. In the most advanced Polynesian chiefdoms, as in Hawaii and Tahiti, a significant part of the chiefly fund was deflected away ftom general redistri- bution towatds the upkeep of the institution of chieftainship. The fund was siphoned for the support of a permanent administrative establishment, In some measure, goods and services contributed by the people precipitated out as the grand houses, assembly places, and temple platforms of chiefly pre- cincts. In another measure, they were appropriated for the livelihood of circles of retainers, many of them close Kinsmen of the chief, who clustered about the powerful paramounts. These were not all useless hangers-on. ‘They ‘were political cadres: supervisors of the stores, talking chiefs, ceremonial at- tendants, high priests who were intimately involved in political rule, envoys to transmit directives through the chiefdom. There were men in these chiefly retinues — in Tahiti and pethaps Hawaii, specialized warcior corps -— whose force could be directed internally as a buttress against fragmenting ‘or rebellious elements of the chiefdom, A Tahitian or Hawaiian high chief hhad more compelling sanctions than the harangue. He controlled a ready physical force, an armed body of executioners, which gave him mastery particularly over the lesser people of the community. While it looks a lot Hike the big-man’s faction again, the differences in functioning of the great Poly- nesian chief's retinue are more significant than the superficial similacities in appearance. The chief's coterie, for onc thing, is economically dependent upon him rather than he upon them. And in deploying the cadres politically various sections of the chiefdom, or against the lower orders, the great Polynesian chiefs sustained command where the Melanesian big-man, in his external sector, had at best renown This is not to say that the advanced Polynesian chiefdoms were free of internal defect, of potential or actual malfunctioning. ‘The large politcal- military apparatus indicates something of the opposite. So does the recent work of Irving Goldman ® on the intensity of “status rivalry” in Polynesia, especially when it is considered that much of the status rivalry in developed chiefdoms, as the Hawaiian, amounted to popular rebetlion against chiefly despotism rather than mere contest for position within the ruling-stratum. ‘This suggests that Polynesian chiefdoms, just as Melanesian big man orders, generate along with evolutionary development countervailing anti-authority pressures, and that the weight of the latter may ultimately impede further development. The Polynesian contradiction seems clear enough. On one side, chieftain- ship is never detached from kinship moorings and kinship economic cthics Even the greatest Polynesian chiefs were conceived superior kinsmen 10 the masses, fathers of their people, and generosity was morally ineumbent upoa them, On the other side, the major Polynesian paramounts seemed inctined Goldman 1985; 197; 1960, 298 (MARSHALL D. SABLINS to “eat the power of the government too much,” as the Tahitians put it, 10 divert an undue proportion of the general wealth toward the chiefly estab- lishment. The diversion could be accomplished by lowering the customary level of general redistribution, tessening the material returns of chieftainship fo the community at large-—tradition attributes the great rebellion of Man garevan commoners to such cause.*" Or the diversion might — and I suspect ‘more commonly did — consist in greater and more forceful exactions from lesser chiefs and people, increasing returns to the chiefly apparatus without necessarily affecting the level of general redistribution. In either case, the well developed chiefdom creates for itself the dampening paradox of stoking rebellion by funding its authority.** In Hawaii and other islands cycles of political centralization and decen~ tralization may be abstracted from traditional histories. That is, larger ehief- dons periodically fragmented into smaller and then were later reconstituted. % The great Tetitian chiefs were tradivionaly enjoined not to eat the power of government co much, as well as to Practice openchandedness towards the people (Handy 1930:41). Havailan Bigh chiefs were given presisely the same advice by coun selors (Maio 1903:255). Buck 1938:70-77, 160, 165. 4 The Hawaiian taditions are very clear on the encouragement given rebellion by chiefly exactions — although one of our greatest squtezs of Hawaiian tadition, David ‘Malo, provides the most sober caveat reguiding this kind of evidence. “I do not sup pose, he wrate in the preface to Hawallan Aniiguiis, “ihe following history to be free from ‘mistakes, in teat material for ft hus come from oral traditions; consequently it i= marred by errors of human jadement and does not appraach the accuracy of thy word ‘at God. ‘Malo (2903:258) noted that “Many ings have been put to death by the people because of their oppression of the makacinana (ie., commoners)” He goes on (0 list several Who “Jost their lives on account of their eral exactions", and follows the list With the statement “It was for this reason that some of the ancient kings had a whole- ome fear of the people” ‘The propensity of Hawalian high chiefs for undue appro priation from commonets is a point made over and over again by Malo (see gp. 85, 87-86, 258, 267-68). In Fornander’s reconstruction of Hawailan history (from eraditions and genealogies) internal rebellions ae [aid frequently, almost axiomatically, to tiefly extortion and siggardiness (Fornander 1880:40-1, 76.78, 88, 149-130, 270-271). In ‘addition, Fornander at (imes links xppropation of wealth and ensuing rebellion fo the provisioning of the chiefly establishment, asin the following passage: "Scarcity of food, after a while, obliged Kalaniapwx (paramount chiet of dhe island of Hawaii and halt ‘erother of Kamehameha T's fazer) to remove his court (from the Kona district) into the Kohala district, where his headguariers were fited at Kapsas. Here the same extravagant, laises-falve, eat ani be metry policy continsed chat had been commenced at Kona, and much grumbling and discontent began to manifest itself among the Fesldent chiefs and cultivators of the land, the Makasinans’. Zmakakaloc, a great chief in the Puna diitret, and Nuwampaoku, 2 chiet of Nealehu in the Kau dstit, became the heads and rallying-points of the discontented, The former resided on his lands in Puna fin the southeast actots the island from Kohala ia the northwest), and openly resisted the orders of Kaleniopuis and his extravagant éemands for contributions of all Kinds of property; te later was in attendance sith the court af Kalanigpux in Kahala, bout was strongly suspected of favouring the growing discontent” (Fornander 1880:200), ‘Aside from the Mangareven nprising mentioned in the text, here & some evidence far Sinlar eevols in Tonea (Mariner 182780, Thomson 1894:294f) and. ia Tahiti (Henry 1928:195-196, 297), POLITICAL TYPES 299 Here would be more evidence of a tendency to overtax the political structure. But how to explain the emergence of a developmental stymie, of an inability to sustain political advance beyond certain level? To point to # chiefly propensity to consume or a Polynesian propensity to rebel is not enough: such propensities are promoted by the very advance of chiefdoms. ‘There is reason to hazard instead that Parkinson's notable law is behind it all: that progees- sive expansion in political scale entailed more-than-proportionate accretion in the ruling apparatus, unbalancing the flow of wealth in favor of the apparatus, ‘The ensuing unrest then curbs the chiefly impositions, sometimes by reducing chiefdom scale to the nadir of the periodic eycle. Comparison of the re- quirements of administeation in small and large Polynesian chiefdoms helps ‘make the point. A lesser chicfdom, confined say as in the Marquesas Islands to a narrow valley, could be almost personally ruled by a headman in frequent contact with the relatively small poptlation. Melville's partly romanticized — also for its etimographic details, partly cribbed —- account in Typee makes this clear enough. But the great Polynesian chiefs had to rule nruch larger, spa- tially dispersed, internally organized populations. Hawaii, an island over four ‘thousand square miles with an aboriginal population approaching one hen- dred thousand, was at times a single chiefdom, at other times divided into (vio to six independent chiefdoms, and at all times each chiefdom was composed of latge subdivisions under powerful subchieis. Sometimes a chiefdom in the Hawaiian group extended beyond the corfines of one of the islands, incorporating part of another through conquest. Now, such extensive chiefdoms would have to be coordinated; they would have to be ceatrally {epped for a fund of power, buttressed against internel disruption, sometimes ‘massed for distant, perhaps overseas, military engagements, All of this to be implemented by means of communication still at the level of word-of- mouth, and means of transportation. consisting of human bodies and canoes. (The extent of certain larger chieftainships, coupled with the limitations of communication end transportation, incidentally suggests anather possible source of political unrest: that the burden of provisioning the governing ap- paratos Would tend to fall disproportionately on. groups within easiest access of the paramount.) A tendency for the developed chiefdom to proliferate in executive cadres, to grow top-heavy, seems in these circumstances altogether functional, even though the ensuing drain on wealth proves the chiefdom's ‘undoing. Functional also, and likewise 2 material drain oa the chiefdom at large, would be widening distinctions between chiefs and people in style of Or see Handy 1923 and Linton 1929, % On the difficaly of provisioning the Hawalian paremount's Iscge establishment see the cilaton from Fornanéer above, and also Fornander 1880: 100-101; Malo 1903:92.83, 4 passim. The Hawaiian grest chiefs developed the practice of the circuit — ike feudal monerchs — often Teaving train of penury behind as they moved in, sate foe district to aintiet of the ehiedars. 300 MARSHALL D, SArILINS Palatial housing, omameotation and luxury, finery and ceremony, in brief, conspicuous consamption, however much it seems mere self-interest always has a more decisive social significance, Tt creates those invidious dis- tinctions between rulers and ruled so conducive to a passive — hence quite economical! — acceptance of authority. Throughout history, inherently more powerful political organizations than the Polynesian, with more assured logis- tics of rule, have turned to it — including in our time some ostensibly re~ volutionary and proletarian governments, despite every pre-revotutionary Protestation of solidarity with the masses and equality for the classes. In Polynesia then, as in Melanesia, political evolution is eventually short- circuited by an overload on the relations between leaders and their people. ‘The Polynesian tragedy, however, was somewhat the opposite of the Melane- sian. In Polynesia, the evolutionary ceiting was set by extraction from the population at large in favor of the chiefly faction, in Melanesia by extraction rom the big-man’s faction in favor of distribution to the population at large. ‘Most importantly, the Polynesian ceiling was higher. Melanesian big-men and Polynesian chiefs not only reflect different vatietics and levels of political evolution, they display in different degrees the capacity to generate and to sustain political progress Especially emerging from theic juxtaposition is the more decisive impact ‘of Polynesian chiefs on the economy, the chiefs’ greater leverage on the aut- put of the several households of society. The success of any primitive political ‘onganization is decided here, in the control that can be developed over house- hold economies. For the household is not merely the principal productive unit in primitive societies, itis often quite capable of autonomous direction of its own production, and it is oriented towards production for its own, not societal consumption. The greater potential of Polynesian chieftainship is precisely the greater pressure it could exert on household output, its capacity doth to generate 2 surplus and to deploy it out of the household towards a broader division of labor, cooperative construction, and massive ceremonial and military action, Polynesian chiefs were the more effective means of societal collaboration on. economic, political, indeed all eultural fronts. Perhaps we have been too Tong accustomted to perceive rank and rule from the standpoint ‘of the individuals involved, rather then from the perspective of the total society, as ifthe secret of the subordination of men to man lay in the personal satisfactions of power. And then the breakdowns too, or the evolutionary limits, have been searched out in men, in “weak” kings or megalomaniacat dictators — always, “who is the matter?” An excursion into the field of primitive polities suggests the more fruitful conception that the gains of political developments accrue more decisively to society than to individuals, and the failings as well ate of structure not men, [MARSHALL D, SAHLIRS University of Michigan POLITICAL TYPES 301 REFERENCES Bacon, Elizabeth E, Obok. (= Viking Fund Publications tn Anthropology No. 25) ‘(New York: The Wenner Gren Foundation, 1958). arnos, J. 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