PEOPLE

v. BAYOTAS
FACTS:
1. Bayotas was charged and convicted of rape.
2. Pending appeal, he died
3. SC dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal
a. asked OSG to comment on civil liability
b. OSG stated that death of the accused does not exDnguish the
civil liability
c. cited People v. Sendaydiego appeal should sDll be resolved
for the purpose of reviewing his convicDon by the lower court
on which the civil liability is based
4. Counsel of Bayotas argued that death of the accused while judgment of
is pending appeal exDnguishes both his criminal and civil penalDes
a. cited People v. CasDllo and Ocfemia civil obligaDon in a
criminal case takes root in the criminal liability and, therefore,
civil liability is exDnguished if accused should die before nal
judgment is rendered
ISSUE: Whether the death of the accused pending appeal exDnguishes both
civil and criminal liability

HELD:
CRIMINAL LIABILITY YES. exDnguished upon death of the accused
ART. 89. How criminal liability is totally exDnguished.Criminal liability is
totally exDnguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalDes; and as
to the pecuniary penalDes liability therefor is exDnguished only when the
death of the oender occurs before nal judgment
CIVIL LIABILITY
The term nal judgment employed in the Revised Penal Code means
judgment beyond recall. Really, as long as a judgment has not become
executory, it cannot be truthfully said that defendant is denitely guilty of
the felony charged against him.

In People v. Cas6llo, SC held that:

CasDllos criminal liability is out. His civil liability is sought to be
enforced by reason of that criminal liability. But then, if we dismiss, as we
must, the criminal acDon and let the civil aspect remain, we will be faced
with the anomalous situaDon whereby we will be called upon to clamp civil
liability in a case where the source thereofcriminal liabilitydoes not
exist.
NOTE: no criminal liability upon which the civil liability will be based.
The SC claried the rule in the case of Lamberto Torrijos v. The Honorable
Court of Appeals, wherein the survival of the civil liability depends on
whether the same can be predicated on sources of obligaDons other than
delict. Stated dierently, the claim for civil liability is also exDnguished
together with the criminal acDon if it were solely based thereon.
HOWEVER, the SC overturned the rules in Cas6llo and Torrijos Cases and
ruled in People v. Sendaydiego The resoluDon of the civil acDon impliedly
insDtuted in the criminal acDon can proceed irrespecDve of the la\ers
exDncDon due to death of the accused pending appeal of his convicDon,
pursuant to ArDcle 30 of the Civil Code and SecDon 21, Rule 3 of the Revised
Rules of Court
ArDcle 30 of the Civil Code provides:
When a separate civil acDon is brought to demand civil liability
arising from a criminal oense, and no criminal proceedings are insDtuted
during the pendency of the civil case, a preponderance of evidence shall
likewise be sucient to prove the act complained of.
CASE AT BAR:
SC overturned the rule in Sendaydiego and went back to the old rule stated
in Cas6llo and Torrijos Cases.
Current rule:
in pursuing recovery of civil liability arising from crime, the nal
determinaDon of the criminal liability is a condiDon precedent to the
prosecuDon of the civil acDon, such that when the criminal acDon is
exDnguished by the demise of accused-appellant pending appeal
thereof, said civil acDon cannot survive

claim for civil liability springs out of and is dependent upon facts which,
if true, would consDtute a crime
such civil liability is an inevitable consequence of the criminal liability
and is to be declared and enforced in the criminal proceeding
if the private oended party, upon exDncDon of the civil liability ex
delicto desires to recover damages from the same act or omission
complained of, he must subject to SecDon 1, Rule 111
le a separate civil acDon, this Dme predicated not on the
felony previously charged but on other sources of obligaDon
if the same act or omission complained of also arises from quasi-delict
or may, by provision of law, result in an injury to person or property
(real or personal), the separate civil acDon must be led against the
executor or administrator of the estate of the accused pursuant to Sec.
1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court
if the same act or omission complained of also arises from contract, the
separate civil acDon must be led against the estate of the accused,
pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 86 of shall be paid by the oended party upon
the ling thereof in court for trial

SUMMARY OF THE RULING: (may ganito pala. nagpakahirap ako. hahaha)

Death of the accused pending appeal of his convicDon exDnguishes
1.
his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon.
the death of the accused prior to nal judgment terminates
1.
his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising
from and based solely on the oense commi\ed
Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the
2.
death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of
obligaDon other than delict. ArDcle 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates
these other sources of obligaDon from which the civil liability may
arise as a result of the same act or omission:
Law
1.
Contracts
2.
Quasi-contracts
3.
Quaso-delicts
4.
Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an
3.
acDon for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of ling a
separate civil acDon and subject to SecDon 1, Rule 111 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil acDon
may be enforced either against the executor/ administrator or the

4.

estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligaDon upon

which the same is based as explained above.
Finally, the private oended party need not fear a forfeiture of his
right to le this separate civil acDon by prescripDon, in cases where
during the prosecuDon of the criminal acDon and prior to its
exDncDon, the private-oended party insDtuted together therewith
the civil acDon. In such case, the statute of limitaDons on the civil
liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal
case, conformably with provisions of ArDcle 1155 of the Civil Code,
that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privaDon of
right by prescripDon.

Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that the death of
appellant Bayotas exGnguished his criminal liability and the civil liability
based solely on the act complained of, i.e., rape. Consequently, the
appeal is hereby dismissed without qualicaGon.