DAVID HUME (1711-1776)

David Hume nl Britanyal ampiristleri lsnden skoyal olandr. Bilgi kuram zerine
en nemli almalar, nsan Doas zerine Bir ncelemeinin (1739) birinci kitab ile
nsann Anlama Yetisi zerine Bir Soruturmasdr (1748). 1776da Edinburghda lmtr.

delerimizin Kayna
Hume da Locke ve Berkeley gibi zihnimizde bulunan her eyin deneyimden geldii tezine
baldr. Hume algy ikiye ayrr.
1.zlenimler
2. deler
KOPYA LKES
zlenimler duyular yoluyla dorudan alglanr. Eer u anda pencereden baheye bakarsam
onun bir izlenimini alrm. Daha sonra gzlerimi kapatarak baheyi dnrsem bu kez
oluturduum ideler duyumsadm izlenimlerin silik imgeleridir. dealar, izlenimlerin
kopyalardr.
NE BLEBLRZ?
Peki, bunlardan kalkarak neler bilebiliriz? Locke d nesnelerin var olduunu ve onlarn baz
zelliklerini bilebileceimizi dnyordu. Berkeley bu gr eletirerek bunun yerine dier
zihinlerin var oluunu ve idelerimizin nedeni olarak sonsuz zihin olarak Tanrnn
bilinebileceini dyordu. Ya Hume?
Hume ise btn bunlar reddeder. D nesnelerin var olduunu, Tanrnn var olduunu, dier
zihinlerin var olduunu, hatta kendi zihnimizin var olduunu bile kantlayamayz. Bu
durumda akla uygun tek gr, (kantlayabileceimiz tek gr) solipsizmdir. Akl kendi
izlenimlerimden ve idealarmdan baka her ey hakknda topyekn bir phecilie gtrr.
RRASYONALZM
Madem akl bizi solipsizme gtryor, o zaman akl reddetmeliyiz. Yani felsefi adan
dndmzde, kendimizi kendi izlenimlerimiz ve idealarmz tesinde bir eye inanmann
mantkl bir temeli olmadna ikna ederiz. Yani phecilik ve solipsizm akla en uygun
grlerdir ama insan doas (alkanlklar ve igd) bizi felsefenin akli bulmad eylere
inanmaya zorlar. Yani Humea gre insan doas bizi irrasyonel olmaya zorlar.
GENEL EREVE
Descartes ve Lockeu dnelim. kisi de zihinden ve ieriklerinden hareket eder. yleyse
burada zihnin dolayszca bildii eyler zihin ierikleridir ilkesinden hareket ederler. Daha
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sonra bir nedensellik ilkesine dayanan akl yrtmeler vastasyla onlarn dsal
karlklarna, yani bilin akndan d gereklie gei yapmlardr. Peki, bu mmkn
mdr?
Humea gre bu imknszdr. Ona gre, srasyla,
i)biz sadece alglarmzn var oluunun dolaysz bilgisine sahibiz
ii)bir algnn var olmasndan baka herhangi bir eyin var oluuna yaplacak karm rasyonel
deildir (rnein, ideden hareketle d dnyann varln, ya da Tanrnn varln, hatta
benliin varln kantlayamayz)
)alglarn snrn aan karmlar yapan biz insanlar baka trl yapamayan canllarz (yani
irrasyonel varlklarz).
Burada Humeun btn reddiyesine girmeyeceiz. Esas olarak nedensellik ilkesini
eletirmesine ve benlik bilgisi eletirisine bakacaz.
AT ATEE!
Hume nsann Anlama Yetisi zerine Bir Soruturma (An Enquiry concerning
Human Understanding) adl eserini u satrlarla bitirir:
"Bu ilkelere dayanarak kitaplklar gzden geirecek olsak nasl bir ykntya yol aardk kimbilir. Elimize
ister Tanrbilimle ister okul metafiziiyle ilgili bir kitap m geti, kendimize u soruyu soralm: Bu kitapta
nicelik (quantity) ya da say ile ilgili herhangi bir soyut usavrma (abstract reasoning) var m? Yok. Ya olaylarla
ve varlkla ilgili deneysel bir usavurma? O da yok. yleyse at gitsin atee. nk byle bir kitapta safsata
(sophistry) ile kuruntu (illusion) dan baka bir ey olamaz."

Bu szlerle Hume ne demek istiyor? Hume burada uygun bilgiyle bo bilgiyi

ayrmaya alyor. Peki, Humeun kabul ettii bilgi trleri nedir?
BLGMZN TRLER: HUME ATALI
Hume gre inan aklnn inceleyebilecei nesneleri iki gruptaa toplar:
1.deler (fikirler) arasndaki balantlar: Bunlarla geometri, cebir ve aritmetik urar.
rnein, 1+1=2 nermesi bu gruba girer. Sadece akln ilemleriyle elde edilir. zellikleri
unlardr:

1in 1le toplanmas 2 deidir, dersek elikiye deriz (zorunlu nerme)

Doruluklar sadece idelerin anlamlaryla ulalabilir ( analitik nermeler ) (rn.
Tm bekrlar evli deildir).
Bunlarn doruluu deneyime bal deildir. Buna a priori diyoruz.
yleyse bu nermeler analitik a priori nermelerdir.
Bunlar d dnya hakknda bilgi vermezler.
Bunlar sadece baz fikirlerimiz arasndaki balantlar ifade ederler.
Bugnk dille sylerek bunlarn Kara tahta kara tahtadr ya da Bekrlar evli
olmayanlardr eklinde totolojiler olduu sylenebilir.

Demek ki matematik bilginin kesinlii sadece bizdeki say idesinin zmlenmesine

bal olmasndandr.

2. Olgu durumlar: Bunlarn doruluuna deneyimle (ampirik yolla) karar

verilir. Bu nedenle,

Bu bilgilerin ztlar mmkndr; byle nermeleri reddetmek eliki dourmaz

(olumsal)
Bu nermeler deneyle elde edilir. (a posteriori)
Bunlar dnya hakkmzdaki bilgimizi artrrlar .
Doruluk ya da yanllna deneyle karar verilir (sentetik nermeler, rn. Dnya
dnyor)
Bunlar sentetik a posteriori nermelerdir.
rnek, Yarn gne doacak nermesinin kart eliki dourmaz.

Btn bilgilerimiz ya idealarn bantsnn ya da olgu durumlar bilgileridir. Buna Hume

atal denir. Baka bir deyile btn bilgilerimiz ya analitik a prioridir ya da sentetik a
posterioridir.

imdi Hume un dediini anlayabiliriz. yle formle edelim:

1)
2)
3)
4)

Bilgimizin tek kayna duyumlardr, idelerdir.

Tm bilgi deneyime dayanr
Bilgilerimiz ya ide bantlarn ya da olgu durumlarn nesne olarak alr.
Bunlarn dnda kalan nermeler bilgi deildir; bo safsatadr.

imdi sorumuzu soralm: Matematiksel bilgiler kesindir, ama dnya hakknda bilgi vermezler,
olgu durumlarna dair nermeler dnya hakknda bilgi verirler, peki onlar kesin midir?
OLGU DURUMLARI: NEDENSELLK LKES
Olgu bilgileri kesin deildir. Peki, olgu bilgisini nasl elde ederiz? Olgu bilgileri (doa
bilimlerinin nermeleri gibi) genellikle o anda gzlemlediklerimizden daha fazlasn sylerler.
rnein, Btn madenler stlnca genleir nermesindeki akl yrtme neye dayanyor.
Elbette deneyime. Peki deneyimden elde ettiimiz bu tr nermelerin altnda hangi ilkeler
yatyor. Madenleri gzlemliyorum. Diyelim ki,
. A madeni stlyor, sonra genleiyor
2.B madeni stlyor, sonra geniliyor
3.C madeni stlyor, sonra geniliyor
.
.
.
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Bu durumu belli sayda durumda bunun btn madenler iin geerli olduunu sylyoruz.
Bylece tmevarm ilkesini kullanyoruz.
Yani, ncl :Gzlenen tm Fler Gdir Sonu: Tm Fler Gdir.
Ayrca, madenin stlmasyla genlemesi arasnda nedensel balant kuruyoruz.
Baka bir rnek: imek aktnda gk grler.
Belli sayda gzlemden tmevarmla bu bilgiye ulayoruz. Buradan tahminde bulabiliyoruz.
imke aktnda gk grleyeceini ylyoruz.
yleyse genel olgu durumu nermeler nedensellik ilkesine dayanyorlar.
Peki imdi unu soralm: Tmevarm ve nedensellik ilkelerini aklla ya da deneyimle
temellendirebilir miyiz?
Humea gre : HAYIR!
TMEVARIM LKES?
Yarn gne doacak. Bir olgu durumu bilgisi. Peki nereden biliyorsunuz? nk bugne
kadar dodu. Ama bugne kadar domu olmas yarn da doacan zorunlu olarak
gerektirmez. O zaman tmevarmla ulatmz sonular zorunlu deildir. Yani ztlar da
mmkn olan sonulardr.
Tmevarm gzlenmi olan olaylardan gzlenmemi olaylara karmda bulunuyor. Humea
gre bunu yapamayz. nk gzlemlenmi olaylardan gzlemlenmemi olaylara karm
yapabilmek iin bir varsaymda bulunuyoruz: Hereyin olduu gibi devam edeceini, doann
dzenliliini srdreceini varsayyoruz.
Bu varsaym bilimin de temelidir. Yani gelecein de gemi gibi olacan varsayyoruz.
O zaman tekrar syleyelim:
ncl 1: Gzlemlenen tm Fler Gdir. ncl 2: Doann dzenlilii: Eer deneyimim bir
tekrara iaret ediyorsa (Tm Fler Gdir) bu tekrar btn doa iin geerlidir. Sonu: Tm
Fler Gdir.
DOANIN DZENLL?
Peki, ama ikinci ncl (doann dzenlilii) de olgu durumu bilgisi deil mi? Onun zttn
dnmek eliki iermediine gre olgu bilgisi. Peki, o zaman neye dayanarak bu bilgiye
sahibiz? Tabii ki deneyime
yle diyebiliriz: Doann gemite dzenli olduunu gzlemledik, o zaman gelecekte de
dzenli olacak.

Ama imdi dngsel bir kant sunduk. Tmevarml akl yrtmeyi dorulamak iin doann
dzenlliliini varsaydk doann dzenliliini kantlamak iinse tmevarml akl yrtmeyi
doru varsaydk.
ALITIRMA:
Acaba yle diyemez miyiz? Bu dgsellie dmek yerine tmevarm ilkesini ispatlarz.
1.ncl: Bugne kadar tm tmevarml akl yrtme baarl oldu. Sonu: Tm tmevarml
akl yrtmeler dorudur.
Hume buna hayr diyecektir. Peki, neden?

HUMEUN PHEC SONUCU

Hume'un skeptik zm: Tmevarml karm yapmamz salayan ey alkanlk veya
gelenekten fazlas ya da az deildir: Demek ki, deneyimden yaplan tm karmlar akl
yrtmeden deil gelenekten kaynaklanr. Bu haliyle gelenek (alkanlk) insan hayatnn
byk rehberi haline gelir. Sadece bu prensip sayesindedir ki deneyimlerimiz kullanl hale
gelir ve gemite ahit olduumuz benzer olay dizilerinin benzerinin gelecekte tekrarn
bekleyebiliriz.
Yoksa olgu bilgilerinin temelini ne aklla ne de deneyimle temellendirebiliriz.
NEDENSELLK LKES-ZORUNLU BALANTI
Hem Descartes hem de Locke hem de doa bilimleri nedensellik ilkesini kullanr. Ksaca bu
ilke Hereyin bir nedeni vardr. der.

A, Bnin nedenidir dediimizde ne diyoruz? A bilardo topu Bye arpp hareket

ettiinde Bnin hareket etmesinin nedeni Anin arpmasdr. Nedensellik balants bir
nesne ve olaydan baka bir nesne veya olay karmamz da salyor. rnein imek
akmasnn gk grlemesinin nedeni olduunu sylyoruz. Ama Ann Bye neden
olduunu sylediimizde ne diyoruz?

A, Bnin nedenidir demek: A, Byi meydana getirir, eer A olursa B olmak zorundadr, ve
A Byi meydana getirme gcne sahiptir demektir. Yani A ile B arasnda zorunlu balant var
demektir.
Peki, bu balanty nasl biliyoruz? Nedensellik yasas Ann olmasn zorunlu olarak Bnin
olmas izler der. Yani imek akmasyla gk grlemesi arasnda zorunlu balant olduunu
syler. Peki, bu nedensellik ilkesi bilgisine aklla m deneyimle mi ulayoruz?

AKILLA TEMELLENMEZ
Humea gre ikisi de temelsizdir. Aklla dersek A ideasn zmleyerek B ideasn
bulabilmemiz gerekirdi. Ama neden idesi (A) etki idesinden (B) bamszdr. O zaman Ay
zmleyerek Byi bulamayz. rnein, imek kavram ayn zamanda gk grlts
kavramn iermez. yleyse nedensellik ilkesinin bilgisine, yani A ile B arasnda zorunlu
balant olduu fikrine aklla ( a priori) ulaamayz.
yleyse, bunun deneyden kmas gerekir. Ama kmaz!
DENEYLE TEMELLENMEZ
Bir bilardo topu dierine arptnda biz ikinci bilardo topunun hareketinin birici bilardo
topunun hareketini takip ettiini grrz. Ama bu ikisini arasnda var olduu sylenen
herhangi bir zorunlu balant grmeyiz. Deney sadece bize Ann nce B!nin sonra olduunu
syler, ama bunlar arasnda zorunlu bir balant olduunu sylemez.
Metallerin veya buzlarn stlmas olaynn, genleme veya svlama olayna neden olduunu
syleyebiliriz. Ama duruma yakndan baktmzda tek grdmz ey Ann Byi
izlediidir. Bunlar arasnda gzlemlediimiz nc bir ey, yani zorunlu nedensel bant
yoktur.
Nedensel Bant Nedir? nan?
Nedensellik balants aklla ya da deneyimden tremiyorsa nereden gelir? Hume'a gre,
"A, B nin nedenidir, demek "A imdiye kadar hep B ile birlikte grlmtr" demektir. Biz
bu "hep birlikte-olma" dan fazlasn bilemeyiz. Bu birlikte olutan felsefi adan temelsiz bir
inan olutururuz. Bu inancmz Hume a 1 k a n 1 k la aklyor. Gemite A nm hep B
ile birlikte ortaya ktn grmzdr, onun iin A nm her yeni izlenimi bizde B fikrini
uyandrr, bu ekilde her A yi algladmzda B nin de onunla birlikte ortaya kacana
inanrz. yleyse B ye inancmz aslnda artlandrlm bir refleks'den baka bir ey deildir.
HUME buna ksaca alkanlk (custom, habit) diyor. Bu alkanlk ta psikolojik bir olaydr.
Demek ki, bizim nesneler arasnda varln kabul ettiimiz zorunlu balant (nedensellik)
aslnda bu nesnelerin bizdeki fikirleri arasndaki psikolojik bir badan ibaret.
Daha dorusu, ona gre, A ile B olaylarnn sk sk birlikte ya da ardarda ortaya kmas bizde
yle bir psikolojik alkanlk meydana getirir ki, her A y algladmzda A nm izlenimi bizde
B fikrinin domasna sebep olur. Baka bir deyimle, gemite A nm hep B ile birlikte ortaya
kmas bizde A mn B nin nedeni olduu i n a n c n 'n dourur. Aslnda biz hi bir zaman
A nm B yi dourduunu gmemiizdir, grmemize de imkn yoktur; bizim btn
grdmz A nm B ile birlikte ortaya ktdr. yleyse nedensellik ba diye bir ey
yoktur, ancak bizde byle bir ba olduu inanc vardr; bu inan ta bir alkanlk, hem de kt
bir alkanlk eseridir. Geri bu inan bizdeki bu fikrin varln aklamaa yeter, ama onun
gerekten varolan bir balant, ya da zorunlu bir balant olduunu gstermee yetmez.

Hume on the soul

Hume ruha benlik/kendilik der. Tpk nedensellikte olduu gibi benlik teriminin
anlaml olup olmad the soul the self
Tpk nedensellikte olduu gibi benlik teriminin anlaml olup olmadn
aratrr.
Yani, benlik idesinin bir izlenime kadar izinin srlp srlemeyeceine bakar.

Bylece Hume sorar: Acaba benlik/kendilik anlamsz bir ses midir.

Hume bunun anlamsz olduunu syler.

Humes argument that the term self is meaningless:

1. The term self is supposed to represent an idea of something that continues

unchanged throughout a persons life.
2. The idea of self is simple, not complex.
3. Without an impression, there is no idea.
4. So there must be an impression of self. (from 2&3)
This impression must be one that resembles our idea of self. Our idea
is of substance that remains throughout the course of our lives;
unchanging constant and invariable.
5. There is no such simple impression of self.
6. So the term self is meaningless and we have no idea of self. (from 3 & 5)

Humes proof that there is no

simple impression of self
Humes proof that there is no simple impression of self:
For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always
stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade,
love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a
perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception. When my
perceptions are removd for any time, as by a sound sleep; so long am I
insensible of myself, and may truly be said not to exist. And were all my
perceptions removd by death, and coud I neither think, nor feel, nor see, nor
love, nor hate after the dissolution of my body, I shoud be entirely annihilated,
nor do I conceive what is farther requisite to make me a perfect non-entity.
(Treatise, I, 4, 6)
So Hume simply looks in himself.
He finds no impression of a simple, unchanging, single substance
underlying all our particular impressions.
What Hume thinks we do find in ourselves:
Nothing but fleeting perceptions: ideas, sensations, feelings and
emotions.

What the mind is

So when Hume looks for an impression of self that remains constant and
unchanging he finds only fleeting perceptions.
So for Hume the self is

nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with
an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perceptual flux and movementthe mind is a kind of
theatre, where several perceptions successively make their appearance; pass, re-pass, glide
away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations. There is properly no
simplicity in it at any one time, nor identity in different; whatever natural propensity we may
have to imagine that simplicity and identity. The comparison of the theatre must not mislead
us. They are the successive perceptions only, that constitute the mind; nor have we the most
distant notion of the place, where these scenes are represented, or of the materials, of which it
is composd. (Treatise,I,
Hume on the mind

Hume on the self:

So the idea of self, like the idea of cause, is a fiction or human construct.
As a self, we are nothing but a bundle of perceptions.
The mind is no single substance.
The mind is like a theatre.
In the theatre an amazingly complex play performs.
The players are the perceptions.
The theatre is just the performance of the play
So Descartes was wrong after all!
Thought doesnt entail a thinker!

LECTURE
What is a self, an identity, a mind, and where does the idea of such a thing even come from?
Locke believed in the existence of minds, and so did Berkeley. Now Hume is going to wonder
what a mind, or self, is.
This question was not new even in Hume's time. The ancients had raised the question in the
following way:.

In ancient Greece there was a famous ship tied up in the harbor so that people could
come see it and could bring their children to walk on its decks (much like today people want
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to walk on the USS Missouri, or on the ship on which their father fought in WWII, etc). This
ship was famous because it had fought in an important battle. Over the years, however, as the
ship aged, its rigging had to be replaced, and then its masts had to be replaced. Through the
years it's deck and hull planking had all been replaced too, so that eventually every single
item on the entire ship had been replaced. There was nothing left from the original ship. And
yet during all those years and afterwards the sign on the dock still said "This is the ship that
fought in the famous battle," and all the parents still brought their children and told them
"This is the ship that fought in the famous battle."

Here's the question: Is it actually the same ship or not? Are the parents telling their children
the truth or not? If there is not one molecule of material from the original ship remaining
because everything has been slowly replaced, should the sign in front of it still say "This is the
famous ship," or should it say "This is a replica of the famous ship?"
Which would you say?

If you say that it is the same ship even though all the physical materials have been replaced,
then the question becomes: What is it that has persisted throughout all the physical changes?
You would perhaps say that the ship's "identity" has persisted, that it is the self-same ship in
its "essence," or its soul.

And that is a bit like the question of self, or mind, or identity. In actuality, of course, all the
molecules in our bodies are changing all the time. Biologists tell us that all the molecules in
our bodies are completely replaced every seven years. So are we the same "self" that we were
seven years ago? When we say "I remember when I was nine years old," we are expressing
the belief that we are essentially the same self that we were at age nine. We have changed a
lot, and have had many new experiences, but we are still essentially the same person. I have
the same parents that that nine-year-old had, have some of the same history that that nineyear-old had, etc. We believe we are the same person, but the question then becomes what is
the self or mind or soul that has persisted through all the physical changes?

Hume again asks whether this concept of self or mind is a purely theoretical construct
which has no basis in actual reality, or if it is an idea based on experience. Hume believes that
ideas not based on experience are pure fluff, have no basis in reality, and ought to be thrown
out. So is the idea of self based on experience or not? I.e., when we turn inward to experience
our own self, or mind, do we actually experience something in there or not?

Hume's conclusion is that when we turn inward what we experience in there are sensations,
ideas, perceptions, feelings, etc, but that we do not experience a "mind" or "self" in which
those ideas and perceptions reside. Here's the way he says it.

There are some philosophers. who imagine we are every moment intimately conscious of
what we call our SELF; that we feel its existence and its continuance in existence; and are
certain, beyond the evidence of a demonstration, both of its perfect identity and simplicity....
from what impression cou'd this idea be deriv'd?....

For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on
some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or
pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe
any thing but the perception. When my perceptions are remov'd for any time, as by sound
sleep; so long am I insensible of myself, and may truly be said not to exist. And were all my
perceptions remov'd by death, and cou'd I neither think, nor feel, nor see, nor love, nor hate
after the dissolution of my body, I shou'd be entirely annihilated. (A Treatise of Human
Nature, Bk I, part vi)

Hume says that since we never have any experience of self, there is no justification for
claiming that there is any such thing.

If any one, upon serious and unprejudic'd reflection thinks he has a different notion of
himself, I must confess I can reason no longer with him. All I can allow him is, that he may be
in the right as well as I, and that we are essentially different in this particular. He may,
perhaps, perceive something simple and continu'd, which he calls himself; tho' I am certain
there is no such principle in me. ... (A Treatise of Human Nature, Bk I, part vi)

So then what is actually the case, according to Hume. What are we?

I may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind, that they are nothing but a bundle or
collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity,
and in a perpetual flux and movement....

They are the successive perceptions only, that constitute the mind; nor have we the most
distant notion of the place, where these scenes are represented.
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All we are our sensations and perceptions, says Hume. You will recall that Locke believed
in four different kinds of existents (things, perceptions, minds, and God) and that Berkeley
believed in two different kinds of existents (perceptions and minds, God being an infinite
mind). Hume believes in only one kind of existent, namely perceptions. We usually think of
perceptions as existing somehow "inside" minds, much like furniture exists inside a living
room or beans exist inside a jar. But Hume says that what we have done here is just made up
the concept of a mind, or self, so that we would have something for our sensations and
perceptions to exist in.

But perhaps a self, or mind, is actually much more like a galaxy than like a living room. A
galaxy, as you know, is not a thing inside of which there are stars, planets and other bodies. It
is the swirling stars and bodies alone which make up the galaxy. Without the stars and bodies
there would be no galaxy. Hume is saying that the same kind of thing is true of minds. A mind
is not like a room which has perceptions inside it (even though we may loosely speak as if
that were the case). Actually, a mind is nothing more than those perceptions simply swirling
around together in a kind of cohesive mass. That is all we are: our swirling and successive
perceptions. And "where" all this swirling is taking place, says Hume, is a complete mystery.

If David Hume is correct about these two fundamental concepts on which we base our
worldviews, the concepts of cause and effect and self, then much of our human thinking is
based on ideas that are purely made up and have no basis in actual experienced fact.

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Hume on the soul

Hume calls the soul the self
As he did with the notion of causation, he wants to consider
whether the self is a meaningful term
So Hume considers whether we can trace the idea of self
back to some impression

So the question Hume asks: is the term self

meaningless noise?
From what impression coud this idea be derived? This
question tis impossible to answer without a manifest
contradiction and absurdity; and yet tis a question, which
must necessarily be answerd, if we woud have the idea of
self pass for clear and intelligible. It must be some one
impression, that gives rise to every real idea. But self or
person is not any one impression, but that to which our
several impressions and ideas are supposd to have a
reference. If any impression gives rise to the idea of self, that
impression must continue invariably the same, thro the whole
course of our lives; since self is supposd to exist after that
manner. But there is no impression constant and variable.
(Treatise, I, 4, 6)

Humes argument
Humes argument that the term self is meaningless:
1. The term self is supposed to represent an idea of
something that continues unchanged throughout a persons
life.
2. The idea of self is simple, not complex.
3. Without an impression, there is no idea.
4. So there must be an impression of self. (from 2&3)

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This impression must be one that resembles our idea of self.

Our idea is of substance that remains throughout the course of
our lives; unchanging constant and invariable.

5. There is no such simple impression of self.

6. So the term self is meaningless and we have no idea of
self. (from 3 & 5)

Humes proof that there is no

simple impression of self

Humes proof that there is no simple impression of self:

For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I
always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold,
light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch
myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe any
thing but the perception. When my perceptions are removd for any
time, as by a sound sleep; so long am I insensible of myself, and may
truly be said not to exist. And were all my perceptions removd by
death, and coud I neither think, nor feel, nor see, nor love, nor hate
after the dissolution of my body, I shoud be entirely annihilated, nor do I
conceive what is farther requisite to make me a perfect non-entity.
(Treatise, I, 4, 6)

So Hume simply looks in himself.

He finds no impression of a simple, unchanging, single

substance underlying all our particular impressions.

What Hume thinks we do find in ourselves:

Nothing but fleeting perceptions: ideas, sensations, feelings and

emotions.

What the mind is

So when Hume looks for an impression of self that
remains constant and unchanging he finds only
fleeting perceptions.
So for Hume the self is

nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which

succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a
perceptual flux and movementthe mind is a kind of theatre, where
several perceptions successively make their appearance; pass, re-pass,
glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations.
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There is properly no simplicity in it at any one time, nor identity in

different; whatever natural propensity we may have to imagine that
simplicity and identity. The comparison of the theatre must not mislead
us. They are the successive perceptions only, that constitute the mind;
nor have we the most distant notion of the place, where these scenes
are represented, or of the materials, of which it is composd. (Treatise,I,

Hume on the mind

Hume on the self:
So the idea of self, like the idea of cause, is a fiction
or human construct.
As a self, we are nothing but a bundle of
perceptions.
The mind is no single substance.
The mind is like a theatre.
In the theatre an amazingly complex play performs.
The players are the perceptions.
The theatre is just the performance of the play

So Descartes was wrong after all!

Thought doesnt entail a thinker!

Hume on God
Hume on God:

Hume is taken by many to be an atheist for Hume

shows that we have no good reason to believe in
God.
Hume sets out to show that several key arguments
for Gods existence are unsound.
First, he disproves the ontological argument
Remember the ontological argument assumes:
You cannot think of God without thinking God exists

For Hume, it may be that thinking of God entails

thinking that he exists but this concerns only relations
of ideas not matters of fact.

So pointing out that the thought of God includes in it the

thought of existence doesnt entail the truth of the
matter of fact that God exists.

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 A relation among ideas, even one that is necessary,

gets no traction and can have no causal power on how
things are in the world.

Descartes first argument for Gods existence:

1. I have an idea of God
2. This idea must have a cause
3. The cause must be equal in formal reality to the
subjective reality of the idea
4. I myself could not possibly be the cause
5. So God must be the cause of my idea

Hume wants to deny premise 3.

But Hume thinks that our idea of God as perfect
entity comes from reflecting on our own
imperfections:
The idea of God, as meaning infinitely intelligent, wise, and good Being,
arises from reflecting on the operations of our own mind, and
augmenting, without limit, those qualities of goodness and wisdom.
(Enquiry, 97-98)

The idea of God in ourselves

So for Hume, the origin of our idea of God is in
impressions of our imperfect selves.
We reflect on ourselves and find impressions of imperfect
intelligence and goodness.
From our impressions we can gain the idea of more and less.
But then we can add our idea of more with our ideas of
intelligence or goodness.
In this way we get the idea of a being more intelligent and
good than we are.
We can then reiterate this inference until we get perfection

Thus, the idea of perfect entity can come from an

object with less than perfect formal reality, for the
ideas of perfection can be formed from the ideas of
imperfection!
What would Descartes say in response?

The argument from design

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 The argument from design:

Look around the world: Contemplate the whole and every
part of it: You will find it to be nothing but one great machine,
subdivided into an infinite number of lesser machines, which
again admit of subdivisions to a degree beyond what human
senses and faculties can trace and explain.The curious
adapting of means to ends, throughout all nature, resembles
exactly, though it much exceeds, the productions of human
contrivance; of human design, thought, wisdom, and
intelligence. Since therefore the effects resemble each other,
we are led to infer, by all the rules of analogy, that the causes
also resemble, and that the Author of Nature is somewhat
similar to the mind of man, though possessed of much larger
faculties, proportioned to the grandeur of the work which he
has executed. By this argument a posteriori, and by this
argument alone, do we prove at once the existence of a Deity
and his similarity to human mind and intelligence.
(Dialogues, II, 45)

The argument from design:

formalized
The argument from design:

1. A machine is the effect of intelligence

For every clock

2. The world is like a machine

It is an ordered whole. Newtonian mechanics tells us

so.
So the world is like a clock

3. Thus, the world is the effect of some intelligence

An argument a posteriori:

it is an argument that depends upon experience and

matters of fact

An argument by analogy:

Since worlds are like machines and machines have

designers so too does the world have a designer.

A causal argument:

The first premise and conclusion

Humes response to the argument from

design
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 Hume raises many questions about the argument from

design:
1. A posteriori arguments are never valid and can never entail
their conclusions. Thus, the most the argument from design
can give us is probability
2. Causal arguments follow this principle: the cause must be
proportioned to the effect.

If the cause be known only by the effect, we never ought to

ascribe to it any qualities, beyond what are precisely requisite to
produce the effect. (Enquiry, 190)
But if you look around the world it certainly isnt perfectly good,
intelligent or wise. It seems to have none of the qualities we
attribute to God and so cannot prove the existence of a perfect
God

Hume the skeptic:

Causation is mere constant conjunction

There is no good reason to believe in God, the self,
the objectivity of morals or an external world.
Humes skepticism isnt Descartes though. Descartes
skepticism, which Hume calls antecedent skepticism:
recommends an universal doubt, not only of all our
former opinions and principles, but also of our very
faculties; of whose veracity, say they, we must assure
ourselves, by a chain of reasoning, deduced from some
original principle, which cannot possibly be fallacious or
deceitful. But neither is there any such original
principle, which has a prerogative above others, that
are self-evident and convincing: Or if there were, could
we advance a step beyond it, but by the use of those
very faculties, of which we are supposed to be already
diffident. (Enquiry, 199)
So if you could doubt everything, there would be no
way back to rational belief
For to get back you would have to use the very
reasoning faculties you doubt

Humes mitigated skepticism

Humes mitigated skepticism:

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The greater part of mankind are naturally apt to be affirmative and

dogmatical in their opinionsBut could such dogmatical reasoners
become sensible of the strange infirmities of human understanding,
even in its most perfect state, and when most accurate and cautious in
its determinations; such a reflection would naturally inspire them with

more modesty and reserve, and diminish their fond opinion of

themselves, and their prejudice against antagonistsIn general there is
a degree of doubt, and caution, and modesty, which, in all kinds of
scrutiny and decision, ought for ever to accompany a just reasoner.
(Enquiry, 207-8)

An attempt to keep in mind the strange infirmities of human

understanding
Makes for modesty and caution
It will teach us the limitations of our human capacities
It will encourage us to devote our understanding to the
problems of common life

The perils of skeptical doubt

Hume:

ready to reject all belief and reasoning, and [to] look upon no opinion
even as more probably or likely than another. Where am I, or what?
From what causes do I derive my existenceI am counfounded with all
these questions, and begin to fancy myself in the most deplorable
condition imaginable, invirond with the deepest darkness, and utterly
deprivd of the use of every member and faculty. (Treatise, I, 4, 7)

So the skeptical conclusions of his philosophy have lead

Hume into depression and utter paralysis.

It is a kind of philosophical melancholy and delirium, a shivering

terror at our lack of certainty

Escaping the perils of skeptical doubt:

Most fortunately it happens, that since reason is incapable of
dispelling these clouds, nature herself suffices to that
purpose, and cures me of this philosophical melancholy and
delirium, either by relaxing this bent of mind, or by some
avocation, and lively impression of my senses, which
obliterate all these chimeras. I dine, I play a game of backgammon, I converse, and am merry with my friends; and
when after three or four hours amusement, I woud return to
these speculations, they appear so cold, and straind, and
ridiculous, that I cannot find in my heart to enter into them
any farther. (Treatise, I, 4, 7)

We cant escape the depression through reason

Nature is always too strong for principle.
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 Custom and habit ensure that we dont sit shivering in

terror at our lack of certainty.
Maybe it takes one lively impression of the senses
Activities of every day life

Final thoughts on Hume

If philosophy has lead us into such drastic doubts about
our nature, where can it take us:
The value of the science of human nature has provided us
with the limits and scope of our understanding.
It frees us from the dogmatism and superstition that plagues
man

Hume's analysis of the notion of cause and effect was so central to his
thought that it is dealt with in both his books, but the concept of self
which was dealt with in the Treatise was not carried over into the
Enquiry. Hume apparently believed that people would find that idea so
unpalatable that it would be best if he just left it where it was, in the
Treatise.

For our purposes here we will deal first with Hume's analysis of
cause and effect, and secondly with his notion of self.
I. Cause and effect

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The idea that events are caused, i.e., that they do not just happen
randomly, is one of the cornerstones of our worldview. We believe that
events do not "just happen," but that some set of causes has brought
each event about. We believe that even if we do not know what the
causes are for a given event, still some cause or causes must have
brought this event into being. Every time we ask "Why?" the
appropriate response is "Because" When we ask why something
happened, we are asking for its causes, and the reason we even ask
about causes is because we have an implicit belief that nothing
happens without being caused.

This belief is one of the absolutely essential fundamental

underpinnings of our entire worldview. So fundamental is this belief
that if it were to be somehow undermined, much of our entire
worldview could suddenly become highly doubtful.

John Locke wrote about the external world's qualities causing our
sensations and perceptions, and Berkeley wrote about God being the
cause of our perceptions, so it was natural for Hume to ask what it
meant to say that one thing causes another.

When we say that one event causes another - for example, flipping
the light switch causes the light to go on - we are, according to Hume,
claiming that there is some "necessary connection" between flipping
the light switch and the light going on. When we say that event A
"causes" event B, we are saying that event A and event B are not just
accidentally occurring next to each other in time, but that the two
events are connected with each other in some necessary way.

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If one moment I absent-mindedly scratch my ear and the next

moment a bird smashes into my window, I'm not likely to think those
two events are causally connected. I would probably not say that one
event caused the other. I am more likely to say that the two events first scratching my ear and then immediately afterwards a bird hitting
the window - just happened to be immediately contiguous with each
other. We would likely say that those two events are simply
contiguous events, not necessarily connected (or causally connected)
events.

What Hume wants us to consider here is where our idea of cause

and effect comes from. He suspects that it may simply be an inherited
idea that we've accepted without examination, and he proposes that we
examine it closely. We should look to see if we ever actually
experience cause and effect, or if it's just an idea that was made up
somewhere and we've just accepted it ever since. So Hume asks us to
look very closely at our experience to see if we truly do experience
causing going on. If we don't, that is, if the idea has absolutely no
basis in direct experience, then it should be thrown out, as should all
ideas that have no basis in experience.

Perhaps a story can help us here, a story that is true (as best as I
remember it) and is in any case highly illustrative.

Thirty-five or forty years ago there was a major power failure in

New York City and all the lights in the entire city went out. It
happened late on an autumn afternoon just about dusk, and the power
failure lasted for many hours. (Exactly nine months later all the local
hospitals were literally overwhelmed with OB admissions.) On the
afternoon in question, a little four year old boy was playing out in his
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front yard. On this particular afternoon, the boy was testing his limits
by venturing out toward the telephone pole at the far edge of the front
yard. His mother had always told him to never go near the telephone
pole (perhaps it was so that he would not go outside the yard). But
what he had always heard his mother say was "Never touch the
telephone pole," so of course he never had. But on this particular
afternoon his mother was not watching him quite as closely as she
normally did, and he was slowly sneaking over toward the pole to see
if maybe he could get away with touching the forbidden pole. He
finally noticed a moment when his mother was not watching and he
went over and touched the pole. And at that instant all the lights in
New York City went out.

The boy then "knew," of course, why his mother had told him to
never touch the pole. Touching the pole had obviously caused all the
lights in the city to go out. As much as his parents consoled him later,
and as much as they assured him that his touching the pole had not
caused all the lights to go out, still he "knew" and believed that his
touching the pole had caused all the lights go out.

Now this association of two events (touching the pole and all the
lights going out) is actually much like every other case in which we
associate two events and believe that one caused the other. What
Hume would want us to do, however, is to closely examine whether
we just theorize and then believe that event A caused event B (like the
little boy did), or whether we actually experience event A causing
event B.

Hume's claim is that, like the little boy, we do not actually

experience the causing going on. All we ever experience is that first
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one event occurs (touching the pole) and then immediately following
it another event occurs (the lights go out). We never experience the
first event actually doing the causing. We never experience the
"necessary connection" between the two events. Instead, no matter
how many times the two events occur contiguously with each other,
we still never directly experience any actual causing. All we actually
ever experience is events that are "regularly contiguous" with each
other. Even though we may want to believe that one event makes
another event happen, still we never experience the making going on
between the first event and the second.

Now suppose we extend our story just a bit further: The little boy
grows up with an enormous sense of guilt for having touched the pole,
for having caused all the city's lights to go out, and for having caused
all those thousands of new births, etc. He is distressed by this memory
for years, and eventually has to go into therapy for it. His therapist
works with him for years, all to no avail. Finally the therapist tells the
young man that he will never get over this guilt and anxiety until he
again goes out to that same telephone pole and physically touches it
one more time. Then he will see that touching the pole does not cause
the lights to go out. So he and the therapist go out to the old
neighborhood, find the exact same telephone pole, and with much fear
and trembling the young man slowly walks toward the pole. When he
finally gets close to it, with much anxiety he slowly reaches out
touches the pole.

And again all the lights in New York City go out. (The lights did
actually go out a second time years later, but I've fabricated the stuff
about the boy and his therapist.) So now the boy is absolutely
convinced that touching the pole makes the lights go out, and again he
is overcome with anxiety and guilt. We can only guess what becomes
29

of him in the rest of his life, but we can be sure that he never lets go of
his belief that touching the pole caused the lights to go out, no matter
what rational people tell him.

Hume believes that we are all the same way. We continue to go on

believing in the existence of cause and effect even though no one has
ever experienced causing happening, and even though rational people
(like Hume, Kant, Schopenhauer, etc) continue to show us that the
whole idea of cause and effect is merely a theoretical construct made
up in human minds. It has, these Philosophers assure us, absolutely no
basis in experience.

Now this is only a very skeletal summary of Hume's position. The

arguments which provide the foundation for this position are spelled
out very clearly in his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding,
and are readily accessible to anyone interested in reading them. But if
Hume is correct in this assessment of the idea of cause and effect, this
is significant indeed. Many of the sciences, for example, which have
seen their primary work as "the search for causes," would find
themselves in need of re-definition if Hume is correct.

Immanuel Kant writes, some years later, that reading David Hume
was a very powerful experience for him, and that reading Hume's
writings "woke me from my dogmatic slumbers." Many others who
read Hume find it to have the same effect on them.
II. Self

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What is a self, an identity, a mind, and where does the idea of such a
thing even come from? Locke believed in the existence of minds, and
so did Berkeley. Now Hume is going to wonder what a mind, or self,
is.

This question was not new even in Hume's time. The ancients had
raised the question in the following way:.

In ancient Greece there was a famous ship tied up in the harbor

so that people could come see it and could bring their children to walk
on its decks (much like today people want to walk on the USS
Missouri, or on the ship on which their father fought in WWII, etc).
This ship was famous because it had fought in an important battle.
Over the years, however, as the ship aged, its rigging had to be
replaced, and then its masts had to be replaced. Through the years it's
deck and hull planking had all been replaced too, so that eventually
every single item on the entire ship had been replaced. There was
nothing left from the original ship. And yet during all those years and
afterwards the sign on the dock still said "This is the ship that fought
in the famous battle," and all the parents still brought their children
and told them "This is the ship that fought in the famous battle."

Here's the question: Is it actually the same ship or not? Are the
parents telling their children the truth or not? If there is not one
molecule of material from the original ship remaining because
everything has been slowly replaced, should the sign in front of it still
say "This is the famous ship," or should it say "This is a replica of the
famous ship?"
Which would you say?
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If you say that it is the same ship even though all the physical
materials have been replaced, then the question becomes: What is it
that has persisted throughout all the physical changes? You would
perhaps say that the ship's "identity" has persisted, that it is the selfsame ship in its "essence," or its soul.

And that is a bit like the question of self, or mind, or identity. In

actuality, of course, all the molecules in our bodies are changing all
the time. Biologists tell us that all the molecules in our bodies are
completely replaced every seven years. So are we the same "self" that
we were seven years ago? When we say "I remember when I was nine
years old," we are expressing the belief that we are essentially the
same self that we were at age nine. We have changed a lot, and have
had many new experiences, but we are still essentially the same
person. I have the same parents that that nine-year-old had, have some
of the same history that that nine-year-old had, etc. We believe we are
the same person, but the question then becomes what is the self or
mind or soul that has persisted through all the physical changes?

Hume again asks whether this concept of self or mind is a purely

theoretical construct which has no basis in actual reality, or if it is an
idea based on experience. Hume believes that ideas not based on
experience are pure fluff, have no basis in reality, and ought to be
thrown out. So is the idea of self based on experience or not? I.e.,
when we turn inward to experience our own self, or mind, do we
actually experience something in there or not?

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Hume's conclusion is that when we turn inward what we experience

in there are sensations, ideas, perceptions, feelings, etc, but that we do
not experience a "mind" or "self" in which those ideas and perceptions
reside. Here's the way he says it.

There are some philosophers. who imagine we are every moment

intimately conscious of what we call our SELF; that we feel its
existence and its continuance in existence; and are certain, beyond the
evidence of a demonstration, both of its perfect identity and
simplicity.... from what impression cou'd this idea be deriv'd?....

For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself,
I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or
cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch
myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe any
thing but the perception. When my perceptions are remov'd for any
time, as by sound sleep; so long am I insensible of myself, and may
truly be said not to exist. And were all my perceptions remov'd by
death, and cou'd I neither think, nor feel, nor see, nor love, nor hate
after the dissolution of my body, I shou'd be entirely annihilated. (A
Treatise of Human Nature, Bk I, part vi)

Hume says that since we never have any experience of self, there is
no justification for claiming that there is any such thing.

If any one, upon serious and unprejudic'd reflection thinks he has

a different notion of himself, I must confess I can reason no longer
with him. All I can allow him is, that he may be in the right as well as
I, and that we are essentially different in this particular. He may,
33

perhaps, perceive something simple and continu'd, which he calls

himself; tho' I am certain there is no such principle in me. ... (A
Treatise of Human Nature, Bk I, part vi)

So then what is actually the case, according to Hume. What are we?

I may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind, that they are

nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which
succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and in a perpetual
flux and movement....

They are the successive perceptions only, that constitute the

mind; nor have we the most distant notion of the place, where these
scenes are represented.

All we are our sensations and perceptions, says Hume. You will
recall that Locke believed in four different kinds of existents (things,
perceptions, minds, and God) and that Berkeley believed in two
different kinds of existents (perceptions and minds, God being an
infinite mind). Hume believes in only one kind of existent, namely
perceptions. We usually think of perceptions as existing somehow
"inside" minds, much like furniture exists inside a living room or
beans exist inside a jar. But Hume says that what we have done here is
just made up the concept of a mind, or self, so that we would have
something for our sensations and perceptions to exist in.

But perhaps a self, or mind, is actually much more like a galaxy

than like a living room. A galaxy, as you know, is not a thing inside of
34

which there are stars, planets and other bodies. It is the swirling stars
and bodies alone which make up the galaxy. Without the stars and
bodies there would be no galaxy. Hume is saying that the same kind of
thing is true of minds. A mind is not like a room which has
perceptions inside it (even though we may loosely speak as if that
were the case). Actually, a mind is nothing more than those
perceptions simply swirling around together in a kind of cohesive
mass. That is all we are: our swirling and successive perceptions. And
"where" all this swirling is taking place, says Hume, is a complete
mystery.

If David Hume is correct about these two fundamental concepts on

which we base our worldviews, the concepts of cause and effect and
self, then much of our human thinking is based on ideas that are
purely made up and have no basis in actual experienced fact.

When Immanuel Kant read David Hume and was waked from his
"dogmatic slumbers," he began his search for a way to understand the
world that could make sense both of Hume's insights and of the ways
in which we normally experience the world. The majestic effort that
issued out of Kant's struggles took form in his The Critique of Pure
Reason, and later in his Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic, work
that is essential for an understanding of philosophical thought ever
afterwards.

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