Case 1:14-cv-02627-ELH Document 97-3 Filed 12/30/16 Page 1 of 33

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
TAWANDA JONES, et al.

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Civil Action

No.: 1:14-cv-002627-ELH

Plaintiffs,
v.
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OFFICER NICHOLAS DAVID
CHAPMAN, et al.
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Defendants.
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MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF
INDIVIDUALLY NAMED BALTIMORE POLICE DEPARTMENT OFFICER
DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendant Officers Nicholas Chapman, Jorge Bernardez-Ruiz, Matthew Cioffi, Alex

Hashagen, Eric Hinton, Daneille Lewis, Derrick Beasley, and Latreese Lee, by their attorneys,
Michael Marshall, Chaz Ball, and Schlachman, Belsky & Weiner, P.A, and pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 56, submit this Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants Motion
for Summary Judgment.
Introduction
On June 23, 2014, Plaintiffs filed suit in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City in the instant
case against Defendants Officers Nicholas Chapman, Jorge Bernardez-Ruiz, Matthew Cioffi, Alex
Hashagen, Eric Hinton, Danielle Lewis, Derrick Beasley, and Latreese Lee1 based on an incident
that occurred on July 18, 2013 at and around the intersection of Kelway and Kitmore Roads in

Plaintiffs also named Baltimore Police Department Commissioner Anthony W. Batts and Interim Chief Lance
Hatcher and Officer David Lewis of the Morgan State University Police Department as defendants. This motion
only pertains to claims against the above-named officer defendants.

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Baltimore, Maryland. Compl. 12, 15. On August 18, 2014, all named Defendants removed the
case to the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. On August 13, 2015, Plaintiffs
amended their complaint and brought survival actions against the Individually Named Baltimore
Police Defendant Officers for assault and battery (Claim I Count I), false arrest (Claim I Count
II), false imprisonment (Claim I Count III), violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment
under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and Articles 24 and 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights (Claim I
Count IV), in addition to claims for funeral expenses (Claim I Count VI) and wrongful death
(Claim IICount I) (Amend. Compl. 12-84).2 In order to be successful in their claims, the
Plaintiffs must be able to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Individually Named
Baltimore Police Defendant Officers lacked legal justification for their actions and are not
otherwise entitled to qualified immunity. Furthermore, in order to succeed on claims against any
particular officer, the Plaintiff must prove that, that specific officer personally lacked legal
justification for his or her actions, and was not otherwise entitled to qualified immunity. See
Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir. 1977) ([L]iability will only lie where it is
affirmatively shown that the official charged acted personally in the deprivation of rights.) (citing
Bennett v. Gravelle, 323 F.Supp. 203, 214 (D.Md. 1971)) (emphasis added). Based on the
undisputed facts, the Plaintiffs would be unable to meet that burden. Thus, Defendant Baltimore
Police Officers, now move for Summary Judgment on all claims.
Standard of Review
Federal Rule 56 states: The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56 (a). By its very terms, this standard provides that the mere

Claim ICount V only pertains to Commissioner Anthony Batts and Interim Chief Lance Hatcher.

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existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise
properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine
issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (emphasis in
original). The movant supports the motion for summary judgment by citing to particular parts
of materials in the record and by showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence
or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence
to support the fact. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1)(A)(B). In reviewing a motion for summary
judgment, the court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party
only if there is a genuine dispute as to those facts. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007).
Relevant Factual Background
On July 18, 2013, at approximately 7:00 p.m., Baltimore Police Department Officers
Nicholas Chapman and Jorge Bernardez-Ruiz, observed a green Mercedes-Benz, later determined
to be operated by Tyrone West, backing up in to an intersection at Kitmore Road, and turning onto
Kitmore Road. Exhibit C, Ruiz Dep. 14:1718, Sep 13, 2016; 16:1317:12; Exhibit B, Chapman
Dep. 7:3, Sep. 13, 2016; 14:113; Exhibit A, Servance Dep. 31:1232:4. Dec. 20, 2016. Mr. West,
intending on turning onto Kitmore Road, came to an abrupt stop in the intersection at Kitmore,
then subsequently backed up in order to turn onto Kitmore Road. Servance Dep. 30:331:13.3
Prior to backing up and turning on Kitmore Road, Mr. West had stopped with his car actually in
the intersection for more than a minute. Id. at 158:618. Mr. West then began to drive in an
easterly direction on Kitmore Road, below the posted speed limit. Chapman Dep. 15:79;

Ms. Servance was an acquaintance of Mr. West who regularly called Mr. West when she needed a hack (An
informal unlicensed and unregulated taxi service). Servance Dep. 12:1813:11.
3

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Servance Dep. 51:611; 55:1216.4 After being forced to go around Mr. Wests vehicle during
Mr. Wests backing, Officer Bernardez-Ruiz and Officer Chapman made a U-turn and activated
the emergency lights on their unmarked vehicle to effectuate a traffic stop. Ruiz Dep. 16:24;
17:319; Chapman Dep. 10:1620; 12:113:21; Servance Dep. 39:114. After turning onto
Kitmore Road, Officer Chapman and Officer Bernardez-Ruiz followed Mr. Wests vehicle and
observed Mr. West and a passenger, later identified as Ms. Servance, looking back and dipping
their heads and arms down below the view of the officers. Ruiz Dep. 18:1319:13; Chapman Dep.
14:1116:2.5 As such, not only had the officers observed Mr. West sitting in then backing into the
intersection but, this action, along with the slow rate, of speed generated the suspicion that Mr.
West and Ms. Servance may be attempting to conceal a weapon or contraband. Id.
Mr. West eventually came to a stop after turning right onto Kelway Road, pulling next to
the curb. Ruiz Dep. 19:1520:1; Chapman Dep. 15:9; Servance Dep. 66:1867:5. Officers
Chapman and Bernardez-Ruiz stopped behind Mr. Wests vehicle, exited and approached Mr.
Wests vehicle on foot with Officer Bernardez-Ruiz going to the drivers side and Officer
Chapman going to the passenger side. Ruiz Dep. 20:56; Chapman Dep. 16:1014. Mr. West and
Ms. Servance were asked to exit the vehicle. Ruiz Dep. 21:79; Chapman Dep. 16:1617. After
Ms. Servance stepped out of the vehicle, Officer Chapman asked Ms. Servance for consent to
search her, to which she consented. Servance Dep. 72:1473:1. In response, Officer Chapman
radioed for the assistance of a female officer to perform the search. Chapman Dep. 24:1013;
Servance Dep. 72:1473:1. Officer Bernardez-Ruiz asked Mr. West to sit on the curb and to

While Ms. Servance seemed intent on minimizing the fact that Mr. West was driving slow enough that she had
commented on it to him, she ultimately acknowledged that Mr. West was indeed driving slower than normal. See
Servance Dep. 50:251:15; Id. at 55:1216.
5
Ms. Servance implies these actions were due to the two of them eating chicken, Servance Dep. 36:814; 39:19 or
her dealing with her phone and keys. Servance Dep. 67:1768:1.

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extend and cross his legs. Ruiz Dep. 23:1015; Chapman Dep. 17:23. Officer Bernardez-Ruiz
also asked Ms. Servance to stand next to Mr. West by the curb. Chapman Dep. 17:23.
After Mr. West sat on the curb and extended his legs, Officer Bernardez-Ruiz observed a
bulge in Mr. Wests sock. Ruiz Dep. 23:1520; Chapman Dep. 19:1819; Servance Dep. 77:27.
Officer Bernardez-Ruiz then bent over to inspect the bulge. Id. As Officer Bernardez-Ruiz
reached down, Mr. West stated that, you got a measly bags of crack cocaine and put his hands
out and pushed Officer Bernardez-Ruiz. Ruiz Dep. 24:2025:13; Servance Dep. 80:68; 82:118.
Officer Bernardez-Ruiz then got on top of Mr. West on the ground to prevent Mr. West from
standing up. Ruiz Dep. 25:1419; Chapman Dep. 20:811. While Officer Bernardez-Ruiz
attempted to restrain Mr. West, Officer Chapman attempted to assist in detaining Mr. West by
grabbing Mr. Wests legs, but was unable to hold on because Mr. West was kicking. Chapman
Dep. 21:212; Ruiz Dep. 25:1926:21. After Mr. West kicked Officer Chapman several times,
Officer Chapman struck Mr. Wests legs with an expandable baton to gain compliance and control.
Chapman Dep. 21:214. Even with Officer Bernardez-Ruiz on Mr. Wests back, and Officer
Chapman attempting to control Mr. Wests legs, Mr. West was able to push-up off of the ground
and stand up. Chapman Dep. 21:1516; Ruiz Dep. 27:214; Servance Dep. 80:1581:3. After
Mr. West stood up, Officer Bernardez-Ruiz held onto Mr. West from behind and repeatedly
ordered Mr. West to stop resisting. Ruiz Dep. 27:1718. Mr. West ignored the orders. Id. While
Officer Bernardez-Ruiz was attempting to control Mr. West, Mr. West reached out and struck
Officer Chapman in the chest, Chapman Dep. 21:2122:3, prompting Officer Chapman to radio a
Signal 13.6 Exhibit F, Chapman Answer to Pls Interrog. p. 14, Interrog. No. 18. As the struggle
continued, Officers Chapman and Bernardez-Ruiz continuously asked Mr. West to put his hands

A Signal 13 is a call for immediate assistance over the departmental radio. See Exhibit N, Joe Key Expert Desig.
Rpt, p. 11.
6

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behind his back, but he refused to comply and continued to physically resist arrest. Ruiz Dep.
27:1718; Chapman Dep. 22:56. Ms. Servance confirms that Mr. West was continually fighting
the police, forcing the Black Officer7 to hit a car, Servance Dep. 103:2105:2; 107: 619, throwing
punches, id. at 111:1520, making a windmill motion with his arms, id. at 120:813, and fighting
for approximately ten minutes. Id. at 149:9150:2. In the course of the struggle, Officer Chapman
struck Mr. Wests cheek with a closed fist, to which Mr. West responded okay you got me.
Chapman Dep. 22:56. At this point, Officer Chapman again ordered Mr. West to put his hands
behind his back, leaned Mr. West on the hood of the patrol car, and was able to grab Mr. Wests
hands. Id. As Officer Chapman attempted to put handcuffs on Mr. West, Mr. West tensed up and
pushed off the car and caused Officer Chapman, Officer Bernardez-Ruiz and Mr. West to fall to
the ground. Chapman Dep. 22:823:6; Ruiz Dep. 27:1728:1. Officer Chapman then attempted
to subdue Mr. West with OC spray,8 but in doing so, sprayed himself, Mr. West and Officer
Bernardez-Ruiz. Chapman Dep. 23:413; Ruiz Dep. 28:114. After being sprayed, Mr. West was
again able to push himself up with Officer Bernardez-Ruiz on his back and break free. Chapman
Dep. 28:611; Ruiz Dep. 29:1430:14. Mr. West then ran across Kitmore Road toward the mouth
of an alley. Id.
As Officers Chapman and Bernardez-Ruiz followed, Mr. West turned around towards
Officers Chapman and Bernardez-Ruiz and assumed a boxing stance with his fists raised and threw
punches at the officers as they attempted to detain him. Chapman Dep. 27:612; Ruiz Dep. 30:15
17; Servance Dep. 110:4111:20. Mr. West swung punches towards Officers Chapman and
Bernardez-Ruiz, and the officers responded with strikes and kicks. Chapman Dep. 27:1928:6;

Officer Bernardez-Ruiz is black and Officer Chapman is white.

Oleoresin Capsicum (OC spray) is used interchangeably with mace and pepper spray. See Joe Key Expert Desig.
Rpt.
8

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Ruiz Dep. 30:2131:2; Servance Dep. 110:4111:20. During the struggle, Mr. West fell to the
ground, got back up and ran back across Kitmore Road where he hid behind a truck parked next
to the curb. Chapman Dep. 28:610; Ruiz Dep. 34:1935:2. At some point during the interaction,
the bulge in Mr. Wests sock was revealed to be a plastic bag containing a controlled dangerous
substance.9 Officers Chapman and Bernardez-Ruiz attempted to reengage Mr. West from both
sides of the vehicle at which point Mr. West charged Officer Chapman, poking him in the eye.
Chapman Dep. 28:1015; Ruiz Dep. 35:78. As Officers Chapman and Bernardez-Ruiz reengaged
Mr. West by the truck, back-up officers began arriving in response to the multiple Signal 13 calls
made. Exhibit G, Lewis Dep. 9:11, September 27, 2016; Lewis Answer to Pls. Interrog., p. 11,
Interrog. No. 15; Ruiz Dep, 35:45; See also Exhibit O, KGA recording 26:1627:18; 52:47;
71:67.
The first car to arrive was a Morgan State University (MSU) police vehicle with MSU
Officer David Lewis driving and BPD Officer Derrick Beasley in the passenger seat.10 Exhibit D,
Lewis Dep. 11:712:16; Chapman Answer to Pls Interrog. p. 11, Interrog. No. 15. Officer David
Lewis parked the vehicle and relayed his information to MSU while Officer Beasley exited and
immediately ran over to where the officers were engaging Mr. West. Lewis Dep. 12:1716:7. A
few seconds later, a BPD marked police vehicle arrived with trainee Danielle Lewis driving,
Officer Latreese Lee in the passenger seat and Officer Matthew Cioffi in the back seat. Lewis
Answer to Pls. Interrog. p.1112, Interrog. No. 15; Exhibit H, Lee Answer to Pls Interrog. p. 12

While Corinthea Servance testified that the bag containing a controlled dangerous substance was recovered when
Officer Bernardez-Ruiz initially inspected the bulge, Servance Dep. 78:182:9, according to Officers BernardezRuiz and Chapman, the bag was recovered at a later time. Ruiz Dep. 31:1232:21. In either instance, the plastic
bag contained 13 green zip-lock baggies with white rock substance which was identified as cocaine. See BPD Lab.
Section Drug Analysis report. Furthermore, Ms. Servance testified Mr. West acknowledged the bag contained drugs.
Servance Dep. 79:1480:13.
10
Officer Derrick Beasley had been on a special detail riding with MSU Officer Lewis since January of 2013. See
Lewis Answer to Pls Interrog. p. 13, Interrog. No. 18.

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13, Interrog. No. 18. As Officers Lee, Cioffi and Danielle Lewis arrived to the scene, Officer
Danielle Lewis rear-ended the MSU police vehicle as a result of the MSU vehicles sudden stop.
Exhibit I, Cioffi Answer to Pls Interrog. p. 13, Interrog. No. 18. Defendant Officers Lee and
Danielle Lewis exited their vehicle immediately, whereas Officer Cioffi was initially locked inside
the vehicle because the back doors only opened from the outside. Lee Answer to Pls Interrog. p.
1214, Interrog. No. 18; Cioffi Answer to Pls Interrog. p. 13, Interrog. No. 18. A few seconds
after Officers Danielle Lewis, Lee and Cioffi arrived, a third BPD patrol marked vehicle arrived
and Officers Eric Hinton and Alex Hashagen got out and ran over to where other officers attempted
to gain compliance from Mr. West. Exhibit J, Hashagen Answers to Pls. Interrog., p. 13., Interrog.
No. 18. Later, after Mr. West was already on the ground, Officer Cioffi was able to exit his vehicle
because he reached up to the front of the vehicle, lowered his window and unlocked the door from
the outside. Cioffi Answer to Pls Interrog. p. 13, Interrog. No. 18. When Officer Cioffi exited
the vehicle, Mr. West was already on the ground with one handcuff on. Id.
Upon arrival, Officer Beasley observed Officers Chapman and Bernardez-Ruiz struggle
with Mr. West, and therefore grabbed Mr. West in an attempt to subdue him. Exhibit K, Beasley
Answer to Pls Interrog. p. 13, Interrog. No. 18. Mr. West resisted arrest and punched Officer
Beasley which led Officer Beasley to punch back. Id. Amidst the struggle, Officer Beasley was
able to get one handcuff on Mr. West, but not the other. Id.11 As other officers arrived to assist in
subduing Mr. West, Officer Beasley spun Mr. West to get the other cuff secured, leading Mr. West
to fall. Beasley Answer to Pls Interrog. p. 13, Interrog. No. 18; Exhibit L, Hinton Answers to Pls
Interrog. p. 13, Interrog. No. 18; Hashagen Answer to Pls Interrog. p. 13, Interrog. No. 18.

11

Ms. Servance states that not only was one cuff attached, but Mr. West was swinging his arms in a windmill
motion at this time. Servance Dep. 126:14127:12; 129:715.

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After Mr. West fell to the ground, at least one of the officers instructed Mr. West to put his
hands behind his back so he could be handcuffed, but Mr. West continued to resist, refusing to put
his arms behind his back and kicking the officers. Lee Answer to Pls. Interrog., p. 13, Interrog.
No. 18; Hashagen Answer to Pls Interrog. p. 13, Interrog. No. 18. Officers attempted to grasp
Mr. Wests legs and struck him with their batons, but this had no effect in gaining compliance.
Officer Lees Answer to Pls Interrog. p. 13, Interrog. No. 18. At some point, with the help of
Officer Cioffi, Officer Hinton was able to place Mr. Wests other hand into the handcuff. Cioffi
Answer to Pls Interrog. p. 13, Interrog. No. 18; Hinton Answer to Pls Interrog. p. 13, Interrog.
No. 18. MSU Officer Lewis placed his knee on Mr. Wests back in an attempt to hold Mr. West
in place. Id. Officer Hinton standing near Mr. Wests head, believed Mr. West had stopped
breathing so asked Officer Beasley to turn Mr. West over. Hinton Answer to Pls Interrog. p. 13,
Interrog. No. 18. At the same time, Officer Hnatyshyn arrived and made efforts to resuscitate Mr.
West by performing CPR and chest compressions. Lewis Dep. 39:1640:1; Cioffi Answer to Pls
Interrog. p. 14, Interrog. No. 18; Beasley Answer to Pls Interrog. p. 14, Interrog. 18. As Officer
Hnatyshyn was performing CPR, Sgt. Harris arrived and called once again for the paramedics.
Hinton Answer to Pls Interrog. p. 11, Interrog. No. 15; KGA, 28:2.12
Argument
Plaintiffs claims against Individually Named Baltimore Police Defendant Officers are
premised on the allegation that those officers unlawfully detained and arrested Tyrone West, used
excessive force in the course of that detention and arrest, and were ultimately the cause of the death
of Mr. West. However, even if all of the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the
Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs are not entitled to relief because they cannot satisfy the necessary elements of

12

KGA is the Baltimore Police Departments radio dispatch system.

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their claims as a matter of law. The following discussion illustrates that (i) Defendant Officers
Chapman and Bernardez-Ruiz had the reasonable suspicion necessary to conduct the initial traffic
stop on Mr. West, (ii) Defendant Officers Chapman and Bernardez-Ruiz had a right to have Mr.
West exit his vehicle, (iii) Defendant Officers Chapman and Bernardez-Ruiz had probable cause
to arrest Mr. West, (iv) Defendant Officers Chapman and Bernardez-Ruizs did not use
unreasonable force on Mr. West in the course of that arrest, (v) Defendant Officers Cioffi,
Hashagen, Hinton, Lewis, Beasley and Lee lawfully detained Tyrone West, (vi) Defendant
Officers Cioffi, Hashagen, Hinton, Lewis, Beasley and Lees contact with Tyrone West in the
course of that detention did not constitute an excessive use of force, (vii) and none of the
Individually Named Baltimore Police Department Defendant Officers actions caused the death of
Mr. Tyrone West.
I.

DEFENDANT OFFICERS NICHOLAS CHAPMAN AND JORGE BERNARDEZRUIZ HAD THE REASONABLE SUSPICION OF A TRAFFIC VIOLATION
NECESSARY TO STOP MR. WESTS VEHICLE.
A. Officers Chapman and Bernardez-Ruiz had a reasonable suspicion necessary to stop Mr.
Wests vehicle.
A traffic stop is justified under the Fourth Amendment where the police have a

reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity is afoot. Lewis v. State,
398 Md. 349, 361 (Md. 2007). Clearly, under the observed activity factor, the police have the
right to stop and detain the operator of a vehicle when they witness a violation of a traffic law. Id.
at 363.

Additionally, while the law requires more than an inchoate and unparticularized

suspicion or hunch, Cartnail v. State, 359 Md. 272, 287 (Md. 2000), a particularized and
objective basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing is sufficient. Lewis, 398 Md. at 362 (internal
quotations omitted). Mr. West violated Md. Code. Ann., Transp. 21-309(b), 21-604, 21-804 and
21-1102 in the presence of Officers Chapman and Bernardez-Ruiz, justifying his stop.
10

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Under Md. Code. Ann., Transp. 21-309(b), A vehicle shall be driven as nearly as
practicable entirely within a single lane and may not be moved from that lane or moved from a
shoulder or bikeway into a lane until the driver has determined that it is safe to do so.
Additionally, under Md. Code. Ann., Transp. 21-604, [a] person may not turn a vehicle to enter
a private road or driveway or otherwise turn a vehicle from a direct course or move it right or left
on a roadway or from a shoulder or bikeway onto a roadway, unless the movement can be made
with reasonable safety. According to Md. Code. Ann., Transp. 21-804, Unless reduced speed
is necessary for the safe operation of the vehicle or otherwise is in compliance with law, a person
may not willfully drive a motor vehicle at such a slow speed as to impede the normal and
reasonable movement of traffic. Finally, according to under Md. Code. Ann., Transp. 21-1102,
The driver of a vehicle may not back it unless the movement can be made safely and without
interfering with other traffic.
Prior to conducting a car stop on Mr. Wests vehicle, Officer Bernardez-Ruiz and Officer
Chapman observed Mr. West violate Md. Code. 21-804 because Mr. West, while traveling east
on Kitmore Road, slowed down and made an abrupt stop after slightly passing an intersection at
Kitmore Road. Ruiz Dep. 16:1317:12; Chapman Dep. 7:3; Id. at 15:79; Servance Dep. 31:11
12. Mr. West impeded the normal and reasonable movement of traffic because as a result of the
stop, Officer Bernardez-Ruiz was forced to change his lane and go around Mr. Wests car. Ruiz
Dep. 17:319; Chapman Dep. 10:1610:19. Additionally, Mr. Wests reduction of speed was not
necessary for the safe operation of the vehicle making that reduction of speed a violation of Md.
Code. 21-804. After coming to a full stop, Mr. West violated Md. Code. 21-1102 because he
reversed his vehicle and turned, forcing Officer Bernardez-Ruiz to change his lane and go around
Mr. Wests car. Ruiz Dep. 17:319; Chapman Dep. 10:1610:19; 12:1413. The reverse was done

11

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in an unsafe manner because if Officer Bernardez-Ruiz did not go around Mr. West, he may have
collided with Mr. Wests vehicle. Additionally, after coming to a full stop in the middle of the
intersection, Mr. West maintained his position in the middle of the intersection for over a minute
or two, impeding the movement of traffic. Servance Dep. 157:310.13 Lastly, Mr. West violated
21-309(b) because after Mr. West made an abrupt stop, sitting for a minute in the intersection,
Mr. West reversed towards Kitmore Road, partly crossing over to the opposing travel lane and
forcing Officer Bernardez-Ruiz to go around Mr. West into the opposing travel lane. Ruiz Dep.
16:24; Chapman Dep. 12:1413.
Therefore, because Officer Chapman and Officer Bernardez-Ruiz objectively observed Mr.
West commit several traffic violations, the officers had the necessary reasonable suspicion to
conduct a traffic stop.
B. Defendants Officers Chapman and Bernardez-Ruiz had a reasonable belief that Mr. West
violated the Vehicular Code.
Even if Defendant officers Chapman and Bernardez-Ruiz were incorrect in their belief that
Plaintiffs action constituted a violation of the traffic code, the Defendant officers had reasonable
suspicion because the mistake of law would be reasonable. In Heien v. North Carolina., 574 U.S.
___,___, 135 S. Ct. 530, 540 (2014), the Supreme Court determined that the Fourth Amendment
is not violated when a police officer makes a mistake of law, as long as such an error is objectively
reasonable. In Heien, a sergeant in North Carolina stopped a vehicle after observing that one of
the vehicles two brake lights was not working properly. Id. at 534. During a consent search of the
vehicle, a bag of cocaine was recovered. Id. The vehicles owner was charged under North Carolina
law with attempted cocaine trafficking. Id. at 535. The owner moved to suppress the evidence

13

Ms. Servance was unaware of where any police vehicle was until after Mr. West had been driving slowly.
Servance Dep. 56:710. Officers Chapman and Bernardez-Ruiz were in an unmarked vehicle. Chapman Dep.
10:1620.

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seized from the car, contending that the stop violated the Fourth Amendment. Id. The trial court
denied the suppression motion, concluding that the faulty brake light had given the officer
reasonable suspicion to initiate the stop. Id. The car owner pleaded guilty but reserved his right to
appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. Id. On appeal, the North Carolina Court of Appeals
determined that driving with a single brake light was not illegal under North Carolina law and
concluded that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to initiate the stop in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. Id. The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed. Id. It concluded that the officer
who initiated the stop could have reasonably, even if mistakenly, interpreted the statute to
require that both brake lights be operational. Id. The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari to consider whether [an officers] mistake of law can nonetheless give rise to the
reasonable suspicion necessary to [stop a vehicle and] uphold the seizure under the Fourth
Amendment. Id. at 534.
The Court held that just as mistakes of fact can establish reasonable suspicion, so too can
mistakes of law. It explained,
[R]easonable men make mistakes of law, too, and such mistakes are no less compatible
with the concept of reasonable suspicion. Reasonable suspicion arises from the
combination of an officers understanding of the facts and his understanding of the relevant
law. The officer may be reasonably mistaken on either ground. Whether the facts turn out
to be not what was thought, or the law turns out to be not what was thought, the result is
the same: the facts are outside the scope of the law. There is no reason, under the text of
the Fourth Amendment or our precedents, why this same result should be acceptable when
reached by way of a reasonable mistake of fact, but not when reached by way of a similarly
reasonable mistake of law.
Id. at 536. Moreover, the Court highlighted the reality that an officer may suddenly confront a
situation in the field as to which the application of a statute is unclearhowever clear it may later
become. Id. at 539 (internal quotation marks omitted). An officer may have to make a quick
decision on the law . . . . Id. Accordingly, the Heien Court concluded that as long as such a

13

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decision is objectively reasonable, it may give rise to reasonable suspicion. Id. at 540. To be
reasonable is not to be perfect, and so the Fourth Amendment allows for some mistakes on the part
of government officials, giving them fair leeway for enforcing the law in the communitys
protection. Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 536 citing Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949).
In the instant case, even if Officers Chapman and Bernardez-Ruiz made a mistake of law,
the error was objectively reasonable. As discussed above, Officers Chapman and Bernardez-Ruiz
observed Mr. West violate Md. Transp. Code Ann. 21-309(b), Md. Transp. Code Ann. 21-604,
Md. Transp. Code Ann., 21-804 and Md. Transp. Code Ann., 21-1102. Supra I.
Even if Officers Chapman and Bernardez-Ruiz were mistaken in their determination that a
traffic violation took place, since an objective reasonable officer would likely believe Mr. West
violated at least one traffic law, Officer Chapman and Bernardez-Ruiz had a reasonable suspicion
to effectuate a traffic stop.
II.

DEFENDANT OFFICERS NICHOLAS CHAPMAN AND JORGE BERNARDEZRUIZ HAD LEGAL AUTHORITY TO HAVE MR. WEST AND MS. SERVANCE
EXIT VEHICLE.
[A] reasonable and articulable suspicion that [a suspect] was engaged in criminal activity

justif[ies] his detention and removal from the vehicle. See United States v. Barnes, 153 F. Appx
232, 234 (4th Cir. 2005) (holding that since the defendant appeared to be reaching under the front
seat of a car during a traffic stop, the officers had reasonable and articulable suspicion that
defendant was engaged in criminal activity, therefore justifying the detention and removal of the
defendant from the car) (citing Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 411 (1997). Additionally, in
United States v. Holmes, the Fourth Circuit held:
Where a suspect is an occupant or recent occupant of a vehicle at the initiation of a
Terry stop, and where the police reasonably believe the suspect may be dangerous
and that there may be readily-accessible weapons in his vehicle, the officer is
authorized to conduct a protective search of the vehicle for weapons, provided the
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police harbor a reasonable belief that the suspect may gain access to the vehicle at
a time when that access would endanger the safety of the officers conducting the
stop or of others nearby -- including the reasonable belief that the suspect will return
to the vehicle following the conclusion of the Terry stop.
376 F.3d 270, 280 (4th Cir. 2004).14 An officers subjective state of mind does not invalidate an
action taken as long as the circumstances viewed objectively justified that action. See Ohio v.
Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 3839 (1996) (holding that the officer was objectively justified in asking
the defendant to step out of the vehicle, despite his subjective thoughts, because the defendant was
speeding) (citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, (1996). The Supreme Court has held that
ordering a driver to exit the vehicle is a de minimis intrusion and does not rise to the level of petty
indignity, therefore the mere inconvenience cannot prevail when balanced against legitimate
concerns for officer safety. Pa. v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977) (holding that when the officer
discovered a gun in the defendants jacket after the defendant was asked to get out of his car during
a routine traffic stop, there was no Fourth Amendment violation because the interest in the officers
safety outweighs the inconvenience to the driver).
Because of the dangers associated with a traffic stop, An officer conducting a lawful
traffic stop may, as a safety measure, order any passenger to exit the vehicle as a matter of course.
United States v. Rumley, 588 F.3d 202, 206 (4th Cir. 2009) (citing Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S.
408, 414-15 (1997)); see also United States v. Sakyi, 160 F.3d 164, 168 (4th Cir. 1998).15

See also Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 104951 (1983); United States v. General, 237 F. Appx 808, 81011
(4th Cir. 2007) (holding that the Officer possessed reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity when he
observed the defendant, seemingly unconscious in a parked car in front of a house known for drug activity, and
therefore did not violate the Fourth Amendment when he asked defendant to step out the vehicle); United States v.
Hampton, 628 F.3d 654, 658 (4th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Deputys order to the driver to exit the vehicle was
constitutionally permissible).
14

15

See also Md v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 41415 (1997) (holding that a danger to an officer from a traffic stop is
likely to be greater when there are passengers in addition to the driver in the stopped car, therefore an officer making
a traffic stop may order passengers to exit the car pending completion of the stop).

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In this matter, the observations of Officers Chapman and Bernardez-Ruiz justified Mr.
Wests removal from the vehicle because: (1) Mr. West was observed committing several traffic
violations; (2) Mr. West and Ms. Servance continued to drive a short distance at a low rate of speed
turning around and looking at the officers; and (3) Mr. West and Ms. Servance were observed
dipping their heads and arms down below the view of the officers as if to conceal a weapon or
contraband. Similar to United States v. Barnes, F. Appx 232, 234 (4th Cir. 2005), where the Court
held that the officers had reasonable suspicion to remove the suspect from the car because the
suspect appeared to be reaching under the front seat of the car, Officers Chapmans and BernardezRuizs observation of Mr. West and Ms. Servance acting in a manner consistent with attempting
to conceal something gave rise to a reasonable suspicion to ask Mr. West to exit the vehicle.
Similar to United States v. Holmes, 376 F.3d 270, 280 (4th Cir. 2004), where the court held that
during a traffic stop, if an officer reasonably believes the suspect may present a danger and that
there may be readily-accessible weapons in the vehicle, the officer may conduct a protective search
of the vehicle for weapons, Officers Chapman and Bernardez-Ruiz reasonably believed that Mr.
West and Ms. Servance in their actions immediately prior to the stop may have concealed weapons,
and they therefore were reasonable requesting Mr. West exit the vehicle.
III.

DEFENDANT OFFICERS NICHOLAS CHAPMAN AND JORGE BERNARDEZRUIZ HAD PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST MR. WEST.
Probable cause exists if the facts and circumstances known to the officer, and of which he

or she had reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient to warrant a prudent person in
believing that the suspect probably has committed a crime. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S.
160, 175-76 (1949); Doering v. State, 313 Md. 384 (1988); Edwardsen v. State, 243 Md. 131
(1966). With respect to the warrantless arrest of individuals, Maryland law provides, in pertinent
part, as follows:
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(a) A police officer may arrest without a warrant a person who commits or attempts to
commit a felony or misdemeanor in the presence or within the view of the police officer.

(b) A police officer who has probable cause to believe that a felony or misdemeanor is
being committed in the presence or within the view of the police officer may arrest without
a warrant any person whom the police officer reasonably believes to have committed the
crime.
Md. Crime Proc. Code Ann. 2-202 (2002). Thus, in the State of Maryland when there is a
warrantless arrest, that seizure is legally justified when the officer has probable cause to believe,
among other things, that a misdemeanor is being committed in the officers presence.
The rule of probable cause is a non-technical conception of a reasonable ground for belief
of guilt, requiring less evidence for such belief than would justify conviction but more evidence
than that which would arouse a mere suspicion. Doering v. State, 313 Md. 384, 403 (1988). In
dealing with probable cause, however, as the very name implies, we deal with probabilities. Id.
These are not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which
reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act. Id.
In Maryland, the term of art assault may connote any of three distinct ideas: (1) a
consummated battery or the combination of a consummated battery and its antecedent assault; (2)
an attempted battery; and (3) a placing of a victim in reasonable apprehension of an imminent
battery. Snyder v. State, 210 Md. App. 370, 382 (2013). The elements of assault by the battery
variety under Maryland law are: (1) defendant caused offensive physical contact with, or harm to,
victim; (2) contact was result of intentional or reckless act of defendant and was not accidental;
and (3) contact was not consented to by victim or was not legally justified. U.S. v. Royal, 731 F.3d
333, 341 (4th Cir. 2013).
In this case, Officers Bernardez-Ruiz and Chapman were justified in attempting to arrest
Mr. West under Md. Crime Proc. Code Ann. 2-202 (2002) because Mr. West committed an
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assault on Officer Bernardez-Ruiz in the presence of both Officers Bernardez-Ruiz and Chapman.
After Officer Bernardez Ruiz asked Mr. West to sit on the curb and extend his legs, Officer
Bernardez-Ruiz observed a bulge in Mr. Wests sock to which Officer Bernardez-Ruiz believed
was illegal contraband. Ruiz Dep. 23:1520; Chapman Dep. 19:1819. As Officer BernardezRuiz reached down to inspect the bulge, Mr. West stood up and pushed Officer Bernardez-Ruiz to
prevent the inspection. Ruiz Dep. 24:2025:13. Mr. Wests contact with Officer Bernardez-Ruizs
body was an intentional offensive contact to which Officer Bernardez-Ruiz did not consent and
which was not otherwise legally justified. Hence, because this assault was in the presence of
Officers Chapman and Bernardez-Ruiz, the officers were warranted to arrest Mr. West at that
point.
Additionally, the Supreme Court in California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 629 (1991),
held that contraband abandoned while the suspect ran away from an officer attempting to seize
the suspect was not the fruit of a seizure. Here, Officer Chapman and Officer Bernardez-Ruiz
had probable cause to arrest Mr. West because Officer Bernardez-Ruiz reasonably believed Mr.
West was in possession of illegal contraband. After asking Mr. West to sit on the curb, Officer
Bernardez-Ruiz observed a suspicious bulge in Mr. Wests socks. After reaching down to
inspect the bulge, Mr. West stated the bulge was only, four measly grams. Servance Dep.
79:1721. While Ms. Servance testified that the bag containing a controlled dangerous
substance was recovered when Officer Bernardez-Ruiz initially inspected the bulge, Servance
Dep. 78:182:9, according to Officers Bernardez-Ruiz and Chapman, the bag was recovered at a
later time. Ruiz Dep. 31:1232:21. In either instance, the plastic bag contained 13 green ziplock baggies with white rock substance which was identified as cocaine. See Exhibit Q, BPD
Lab. Section Drug Analysis report. In looking at the totality of the circumstances, Officers

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Bernardez-Ruiz and Chapman had probable cause to arrest Mr. West for the possession of drugs
because: (1) Mr. West acted suspiciously when he dipped down below the windows and
appeared to conceal something illegal; (2) Officer Bernardez-Ruiz noticed a bulge in Mr. Wests
sock to which Mr. West admitted to being illegal contraband; (3) Mr. West assaulted Officer
Bernardez-Ruiz; and (4) The bag was tossed during the altercation.
IV.

DEFENDANT OFFICERS NICHOLAS CHAPMAN AND JORGE BERNARDEZRUIZ USED REASONABLE FORCE IN ARRESTING MR. WEST.
The U.S. Supreme Court held that claims of excessive force in the course of an arrest or

seizure are analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its objective reasonableness standard.
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395, (1989) (remanding a directed verdict because excessive
force should be analyzed by the objective reasonableness standard). Whether the force used was
reasonable or not requires a careful balancing of the nature and quality of the intrusion Id. at
396. The reasonableness standard is judged from an objective perspective of the circumstances
surrounding the officer on the scene, not with 20/20 vision hindsight.

Id.

The test of

reasonableness cannot be applied precisely or mechanically. Id. Proper application requires

careful attention to the facts and circumstances of the case. Id. Three factors to be considered are:
(1) whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of others; (2) the severity of the
crime at issue; and (3) whether suspect actively resisted arrest or attempted to evade arrest. Id.
Claims that a law enforcement officer used excessive force in the course of a seizure are analyzed
under the objective reasonableness standard of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 388. The standard
against which police officers are judged is not that of a reasonable civilian in the same situation,
but that of a reasonable police officer similarly situated. Pagotto v. State, 127 Md. App. 271, 297
(1999) (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. Furthermore, if there is objective justification and the
officer uses pepper spray to incapacitate the suspect, it does not generally constitute excessive
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force. Gaddis ex rel. Gaddis v. Redford Twp., 364 F.3d 763 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that the
officers were justified in using pepper spray to incapacitate an armed defendant because the
purpose of the use of non-lethal force is to aid officers to take custody of a suspect who refuses to
be lawfully arrested or detained).
In applying the first Graham factor, Mr. West posed an immediate threat to the officers
because after Officer Bernardez-Ruiz initially noticed the bulge in Mr. Wests sock and reached
for it, Mr. West immediately became assaultive and was willing to resist Officers Chapman and
Bernardez Ruizs attempts to subdue him with the use of pushes, kicks, punches and wrestling.
Ruiz Dep. 25:1525:10; Chapman Dep. 21:212; 21:1516. Furthermore, Mr. West not only
resisted, but posed an immediate danger to the officers because of his willingness to engage into a
fight. Chapman Dep. 27:612. Furthermore, Mr. Wests size, strength and ability to hold off both
Officers Chapman and Bernardez-Ruiz even after being directly sprayed in the face with OC spray
demonstrate the immediate threat Mr. West posed to the officers. Mr. West was 60 tall, weighed
237 pounds and regularly worked out. Exhibit M, Pls Answer to Def. Interrog. P. 3, Interrog. No.
9; Servance Dep. 147:9149:8.16 Under the second Graham factor, although the initial traffic stop
violations were not severe, Mr. Wests assault of Officer Bernardez-Ruiz, a law enforcement
officer was. Under the third Graham factor, Mr. West resisted arrest as soon as Officer BernardezRuiz attempted to restrain Mr. West after noticing the bulge in his sock. Mr. West fought back,
punched the officers and ran away to avoid arrest. Chapman Dep. 27:612; Chapman Dep. 28:6
11. Mr. West resisted arrest the entire time Officers Chapman and Bernardez-Ruiz attempted to
subdue him. Mr. Wests resistance even required the use of OC spray and the assistance of
additional officers, both of which Mr. West was still able to fight through. Under the Graham

16

Ms. Servance described Mr. West as a strong dude with muscles. Servance Dep. 148:7; 149:6.

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analysis, the Court should look at the objective reasonableness of Officer Chapman and Officer
Bernardez-Ruiz under the circumstances of the fight which ensued after the traffic stop. Here, in
looking at the totality of the circumstances, Mr. West resisted arrest by pushing the officers, then
continued to be aggressive and assaultive by wrestling with the officers, ignoring commands to
put his hands behind his back and even assuming a boxing stance before punching and kicking.
Furthermore, Mr. West posed an immediate danger to the officers when he began to fight back
because of his size and insistence of continually engaging in a fight with the officers. Officer
Chapman and Officer Bernardez-Ruiz did not have the luxury of 20/20 hindsight and had to make
a split-second decision at the time of the event.
Therefore, given the danger posed by Mr. West, Officer Chapman and Officer BernardezRuiz were justified in their use of force in order to bring Mr. West into custody.
V.

DEFENDANT OFFICERS CIOFFI, HASHAGEN, HINTON, DANIELLE LEWIS,

BEASLEY AND LEE WERE REASONABLE IN THEIR BELIEF THAT THERE
WAS LEGAL JUSTIFICATION FOR MR. WESTS ARREST.
The Supreme Court in Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560 (1971) addressed the argument

that to prevent arresting officers from acting on the assumption that fellow officers who call upon
them to make an arrest have probable cause for believing the arrestees are perpetrators of a crime
would unduly hamper law enforcement. Id. at 568. In determining the lawfulness of a
warrantless arrest as to an assisting officer, the inquiry turns not on events that occurred before the
officers arrival of which the officer was unaware, but on whether the officers decision to assist
in the arrest was objectively reasonable in light of the circumstancesi.e., the circumstances
known to the assisting officer at the time of the arrestand existing law. Jackson v. City of
Hyattsville, Civil Action No. 10-cv-00946-AW, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36544, at 10-11 (D. Md.
Mar. 19, 2012) quoting Carter v. Jess, 179 F. Supp. 2d 534, 544 (D. Md. 2001). When an
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assisting officer arrives late to the scene, the lawfulness of his or her arrest can be predicated on
information relayed by officers already at the scene. Jackson, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36544, at
11 citing Ware v. James City Cnty., 652 F. Supp. 2d 693, 703 (E.D. Va. 2009) (assisting officers
not required to conduct an independent investigation to establish probable cause prior to making
arrest where they were told by officer already at the scene that probable cause existed, as [s]uch
a requirement would be unworkable in the environments in which the police operate.); see also
Guerrero v. Deane, 750 F. Supp. 2d 631, 652-53 (E.D. Va. 2010). In Swagler v. Sheridan, a matter
in which the Court found that a reasonable police officer would not have realized that the arrest
of the Plaintiffs had been or could have been illegal, the Maryland United States District Court
addressed the issue of the assisting officer liability. Civil Action No. RDB-08-2289, 2011 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 71766, at *43 (D. Md. July 5, 2011). The Court in Swagler reasoned that an assisting
officer would only be concerned with the rationale for the arrest itself; he would not anticipate that
he would be held responsible for the mistakes of law enforcement agents that had previously
occurred and in which he had not participated. Id. In coming to that opinion, the Swagler Court
surveyed other federal decisions in which the issue was addressed:
In fact, other courts have held that assisting officers are not automatically liable for the
mistakes of the primary officer even if those mistakes are mistakes of law. Liu v. Phillips,
234 F.3d 55 (1st Cir. 2000) (noting that an officer is immune from suit when the agent
who directs or authorizes the arrest has made a mistake [41] of law . . . invisible to the
assisting officer); see also Bilida v. McCleod, 211 F.3d 166, 174-75 (1st Cir. 2000)
(Plausible instructions from a superior or fellow officer support qualified immunity
where, viewed objectively in light of the surrounding circumstances, they could lead a
reasonable officer to conclude that the necessary legal justification for his actions exists
(e.g. a warrant, probable cause, exigent circumstances); Moore v. Marketplace
Restaurant, Inc., 754 F.2d 1336, 1348-49 (7th Cir. 1985) (suggesting that extraordinary
circumstances might exist where officers acted upon instructions from superior officers
who were removed from the scene but seemingly made the decision to arrest).
Id. at 40-41.
In this matter, Defendant Officer Cioffi, Hashagen, Hinton, Danielle Lewis, Beasley and
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Lee, as assisting officers, acted in reasonable reliance that Officer Bernardez-Ruiz and Officer
Chapman had legal authority to arrest Mr. West. Officer Chapman and Officer Bernardez-Ruiz
were responsible for Mr. Wests initial detention prior to the altercation that ensued between
Mr. West and the officers, whereas the assisting officers were responsible for Mr. Wests
eventual arrest. Chapman Answer to Pls Interrog., p. 1415, Interrog. No. 18. In the course of
the altercation, three Signal 13 calls were made which notified all officers to assist Officer
Chapman and Officer Bernardez-Ruiz. Lewis Dep. 9:11; Lewis Answer to Pls. Interrog., p. 11,
Interog. No. 15. Officer Cioffi, Hashagen, Hinton, Danielle Lewis, Beasley and Lee all arrived
to the scene at different times, Beasley Answer to Pls Interrog. p. 11, Interrog. No. 15; Hashagen
Answer to Pls Interrog. p. 11, Interrog. No. 15, knowing there were officers who needed
assistance and immediately noticed the altercation between Officer Chapman, Officer
Bernardez-Ruiz and Mr. West. Given the fact the officers witnessed Mr. Wests fighting with
Officers Bernardez-Ruiz and Officer Chapman, the assisting officers were objectively
reasonable in not stopping to inquire about the probable cause to arrest Mr. West. The assisting
officers realized the apparent exigency of the circumstances and attempted to subdue Mr. West
immediately.
Therefore, a reasonable officer in the position of the assisting officers knowing only the
information of the Signal 13 and the observance of the altercation between Mr. West and other
officers, would have believed they had legal authority to subdue and arrest Mr. West.
VI.

OFFICER CIOFFI, HASHAGEN, HINTON, DANIELLE LEWIS, BEASLEY

AND LEES DETENTION AND ARREST OF MR. WEST DID NOT
CONSTITUTE AN EXCESSIVE USE OF FORCE.
Here, after receiving the Signal 13 call, when the assisting officers arrived to the scene,

they observed Officer Chapman and Officer Bernardez-Ruiz struggle in an altercation with Mr.

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West. Lewis Dep. 11:712:16. After realizing that two officers could not subdue Mr. West, the
assisting officers collectively attempted to arrest Mr. West. The assisting officers were able to get
Mr. West on the ground and struggled to put one of Mr. Wests hands in handcuffs. Hashagen
Answer to Pls Interrog., p.13, Interrog. No. 18. After Mr. West continued to resist arrest, one of
the officers struck Mr. West with a police issued baton to gain compliance to allow the officer to
grab his arm and handcuff him. Officer Lees Answer to Pls Interrog. p. 13, Interrog. No. 18.
Looking at the totality of the circumstances and the Graham factors, the assisting officers observed
Mr. West resist arrest, successfully fend off two officers and do so after being OC sprayed.
Noteably, once Mr. West was finally handcuffed, no additional force was used. Hashagen Answer
to Pls Interrog. p. 13, Interrog. No. 18; Cioffi Answer to Pls Interrog. p. 14, Interrog. No. 14;
Beasley Answer to Pls Interrog. p. 14; Interrog. No. 18; Hinton Answer to Pls Interog. p. 13,
Interrog. No. 18; Lee Answer to Pls Interrog. p.13, Interrog. No. 18.
Therefore, because an objectively reasonable officer in a similar situation would have
recognized the severity of the issue, the danger posed by Mr. West and that Mr. West was resisting
arrest, the assisting officers did not use excessive force when they collectively tried to subdue Mr.
West and employed the use of Department issued police batons to try to force Mr. West to stop
resisting arrest.
VII.

NONE OF THE INDIVIDUALLY NAMED BALTIMORE POLICE

DEPARTMENT DEFENDANT OFFICERS CAUSED THE DEATH OF MR.
WEST.
According to Dr. Pamela E. Southall, MD, the Assistant Medical Examiner who performed

the autopsy on Mr. West, the cause of death for Mr. West was Cardiac Arrhythmia and Cardiac
Conduction System Abnormality complicated by dehydration during police restraint. See Exhibit
P, Post Mortem Examination, Dr. Pamela Southall, p. 1. The autopsy report states that there were
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abnormalities in the conduction system of the decedants heart and an electrolyte imbalance that
was consistent with dehydration. Id. Dr. Southall found that, [T]he abnormalities found in Mr.
Wests heart and signs of dehydration are certainly causes for sudden cardiac death. Id; Exhibit
E, Southall Dep. 52:1012, Aug. 9, 2016.

But the individually named Baltimore Police

Department Defendant Officers did not cause the dehydration or the conduction system
abnormalities. Southall Dep. 59:518; 63:1219. Dr. Southall stated that another factor that may
have contributed to Mr. Wests death was the extreme environmental temperature which was
reported to be in the high 90s with a heat index in the low 100s. See Post Mortem Examination,
Dr. Pamela Southall, p. 7. According to the report, a cardiac conduction system abnormality is a
predisposing factor for cardiac arrhythmia because the conduction system controls the heart rate
by generating and conducting electrical impulses through the heart muscle, causing the heart to
contract and pump blood through the body. Id. Defects in the system can predispose one to sudden
death. Id. Dr. Southall also stated that any of the factors stated above can, by themselves taken
separately, cause a sudden death, with or without any other factors involved from the altercation
between Mr. West and the officers. Southall Dep. 20:69; 57:1721.
In this case, plaintiffs allege that the officers intentional conduct directly and proximately
caused Mr. Wests death. Amend. Comp. 8084. There is no evidence that any of the officers
on the scene that day had knowledge of Mr. Wests heart conditions prior to engaging and
attempting to subdue Mr. West. Furthermore, according to Dr. Southall, the altercation between
Mr. West and the officers did not cause the Cardiac Arrhythmia: the condition which was the cause
of Mr. Wests death was present prior to the fight. Southall Dep. 59:518; Id. at 63:1219.
According to Dr. Southall, Mr. West was dehydrated and had an electrolyte imbalance prior to the
interaction with officers which may have played a role in his death. The defendant officers in this

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case did not cause Mr. Wests dehydration prior to their altercation with Mr. West. Additionally,
according to Dr. Southall, the extreme temperatures on the day of the incident may have played a
role in Mr. Wests death, but, again, that factor was not caused by the officers actions. Id. at
59:1960:1. Although the officers did employ the use of force in an attempt to apprehend Mr.
West, according to Dr. Southall, the cause of death was not caused by any strikes administered to
Mr. West in the course of that apprehension but was attributed to a pre-existing heart condition
which was exacerbated by the strenuous encounter with the officers at the scene. See Post Mortem
Examination, Dr. Pamela Southall, p. 7.
The individually named Baltimore Police Department defendant officers did not have
knowledge of Mr. Wests prior heart condition or that Mr. West was dehydrated, and the
individually named Baltimore Police Department defendant officers use of force to restrain Mr.
West did not cause Mr. Wests death.
VIII.

THE INDIVIDUALLY NAMED BALTIMORE POLICE DEPARTMENT

DEFENDANT OFFICERS ARE ENTITLED TO ENTRY OF SUMMARY
JUDGMENT IN THEIR FAVOR AND/OR A FINDING OF QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY AS TO ALL OF PLAINTIFFS CLAIMS
A. The Individually Named Baltimore Police Department Defendant Officers are
Entitled to Entry of Summary Judgment in Their Favor, as a Matter Of Law, on
Plaintiffs Claim of Assault and Battery
Police officers, as opposed to citizens, as necessitated by their duties, are permitted to

utilize what would otherwise be an assault or battery in the course of a lawful arrest or detention.
Marylands Court of Special Appeals stated in French v. Hines, 182 Md. App. 201, 265-266
(2008):
The use of reasonable force to effectuate an arrest defeats a battery or an assault
claim. In other words, contact incident to an arrest cannot form the basis of a claim
for battery. Indeed, officers are privileged to commit a battery pursuant to a lawful
arrest, subject to the excessive force limitation....
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Id. (emphasis removed). Even viewed in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, this case fails
to demonstrate that any of the Individually Named Baltimore Police Department Defendant
Officers employed excessive force in the course of detaining Mr. West, an assaultive resistant
suspect.
Accordingly, for reasons stated in greater detail in Sections IV and VI supra., Defendant
Officers Nicholas Chapman, Jorge Bernardez-Ruiz, Matthew Cioffi, Alex Hashagen, Eric Hinton,
Daneille Lewis, Derrick Beasley, and Latreese Lee are entitled to the entry of summary judgment
in their favor on Plaintiffs assault and battery claims set forth in Claim I Count I of Plaintiffs
Amended Complaint.
B. The Individually Named Baltimore Police Department Defendant Officers are
Entitled to Entry of Summary Judgment in Their Favor, as a Matter Of Law, on
Plaintiffs Claims of False Imprisonment and False Arrest
The elements of false imprisonment are the same as the elements for false arrest. Davis
v. Dipino, 121 Md. App. 28, 38 (1998). In order to prevail on either claim the plaintiff must prove
that the defendant deprived him or her of his or her liberty without consent and without legal
justification. Scott v. Jenkins, 345 Md. 21, 29 (1997); See also Ashton v. Brown, 339 Md. 70, 119
(1995); Montgomery Ward v. Wilson, 339 Md. 701, 721 (1995). Legal justification was defined
by Marylands Court of Appeals in Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Paul, 256 Md. 643 (1970). The
Court explained:
When the cases speak of legal justification we read this as equivalent to legal
authority... Whatever technical distinction there may be between an arrest and a
detention the test whether legal justification existed in a particular case has been
judged by the principles applicable to the law of arrest.
Id. at 655 (internal citations omitted).

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With regard to an arrest by a law enforcement officer, the officers liability will ordinarily
depend upon whether or not the officer acted within his legal authority to arrest. Montgomery
Ward, 339 Md. at 721. In light of the standards for proving the absence of any legal justification
for Mr. Wests arrest, the question becomes whether, as a matter of law, the Defendants had the
legal authority to detain and arrest the Mr. West.
Accordingly, for reasons stated in greater detail in Sections III and V supra., Defendant
Officers Nicholas Chapman, Jorge Bernardez-Ruiz, Matthew Cioffi, Alex Hashagen, Eric Hinton,
Daneille Lewis, Derrick Beasley, and Latreese Lee are entitled to the entry of summary judgment
in their favor on Plaintiffs false arrest and false imprisonment claims set forth in Claim I - Count
II and Claim I - Count III of Plaintiffs Amended Complaint.
C. The Individually Named Baltimore Police Department Defendant Officers are
Entitled to Entry of Summary Judgment in Their Favor, as a Matter Of Law, on
Plaintiffs Claims of Violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the
United States Constitution and Articles 24 or 26 of the Maryland Declaration of
Rights
Plaintiffs claims that the Individually Named Baltimore Police Department Defendant
Officers violated Mr. Wests rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United
States Constitution and Articles 24 or 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights are based on a
claim that Mr. West was deprived of his rights not to have his person or property unlawfully
searched, seized, detained in an unreasonable manner; not to be deprived of his life or liberty
without due process of law; not to be subjected to excessive force during the course of an alleged
traffic stop or an arrest; and not to be unreasonably denied necessary medical treatment. Compl.
61, 63. Under the United States and Maryland Constitutions, every person has the constitutional
right to be free from the unreasonable search and/or seizure of his or her person by law enforcement
agents. In order to succeed in such a claim that ones rights were violated, a party must prove that
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a defendant officer violated the plaintiffs rights to freedom from unreasonable searches and
seizures, and/or the deprivation of liberty without due process of law. See Okwa v. Harper, 360
Md. 161, 190 (2000). However, liability for such a claim turns on the reasonableness of the actions
of the defendant officers. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989); Tennessee v. Garner, 471
U.S. 1, 7-8 (1985); Branch v. McGeeney, 123 Md.App. 330, 348 (1998). Specifically, if it is shown
that a defendant officer has proper authority and legal grounds to seize an individual and the actions
used to effect the seizure were objectively reasonable, then a plaintiffs constitutional rights are
not violated. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. at 7-8 (1985)
Accordingly, for reasons stated in greater detail in Sections IA and IB and II supra.,
Defendant Officers Nicholas Chapman, Jorge Bernardez-Ruiz, Matthew Cioffi, Alex Hashagen,
Eric Hinton, Daneille Lewis, Derrick Beasley, and Latreese Lee are entitled to the entry of
summary judgment in their favor on Plaintiffs Violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution and Articles 24 or 26 of the Maryland Declaration
of Rights claims set forth in Claim I - Count IV of Plaintiffs Amended Complaint.
D. The Individually Named Baltimore Police Department Defendant Officers are
Entitled to Entry of Summary Judgment in Their Favor, as a Matter Of Law, on
Plaintiffs Claims of Wrongful Death and for Funeral Expenses
MD. CODE ANN, CTS & JUD. PRO. 3-904 establishes liability for a wrongful death. 3902 permits a person to bring an action against someone whose wrongful conduct caused the death
of another. Wrongful act, in turn, is defined under 3-901 as an act, neglect, or default
including a felonious act which would have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and
recover damages if death had not ensued. A wrongful death action is not brought in a derivate
or representative capacity to recover for a loss or injury suffered by that person but, rather, is
brought by a spouse, parent, or child, or a secondary beneficiary who was wholly dependent on
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the decedent, to recover damages for his or her own loss accruing from the decedents death.
Eagan v. Calhoun, 347 Md. 72, 82 (1997) (citing United States v. Streidel, 329 Md. 533, 620
(1993)). To bring a wrongful death claim, the person against whom the claim is brought must have
committed a wrongful act. Grinage v. Mylan Pharmeceuticals, Inc., 840 F.Supp.2d 862, 872 (D.
Md. 2011) (citing GeorgiaPacific Corp. v. Benjamin, 394 Md. 59 n. 6 (2006)).
Plaintiffs cannot maintain a wrongful death action against the Individually Named
Baltimore Police Department Defendant Officers because they cannot show that any of their
actions were wrongful. See Sections IV and V supra., Similarly, Plaintiffs cannot maintain a
wrongful death action against the Individually Named Baltimore Police Department Defendant
Officers because they cannot show that any of their actions caused the death of Mr. West. See
Sections VII supra.
Accordingly, for reasons these reasons, Defendant Officers Nicholas Chapman, Jorge
Bernardez-Ruiz, Matthew Cioffi, Alex Hashagen, Eric Hinton, Daneille Lewis, Derrick Beasley,
and Latreese Lee are entitled to the entry of summary judgment in their favor on Plaintiffs claims
of Wrongful Death and for Funeral Expenses set forth in Claim I - Count VI and Claim II - Count
I of Plaintiffs Amended Complaint.
E. The Individually Named Baltimore Police Department Defendant Officers are
Entitled to a Finding of Qualified Immunity on All of Plaintiffs Claims
Qualified immunity exists when a reasonable officer could have believed [the arrest] to
be lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information the [arresting] officers
possessed. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987). The qualified immunity defense
provides ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the
law. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). Qualified immunity protects government
officials from liability for civil damages to the extent that their conduct does not violate clearly
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established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have

known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Qualified immunity further protects
law enforcement officers from bad guesses in gray areas and ensures that they are liable only for
transgressing bright lines. Willingham v. Crooke, 412 F.3d 553, 558 (4th Cir. 2005) (citations
omitted).
The Supreme Court held that [i]t is inevitable that law enforcement officials will in some
cases reasonably but mistakenly conclude that probable cause is present, and . . . in such cases
those officials . . . should not be held personally liable. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641,
(1987). Even law enforcement officials who reasonably but mistakenly conclude that probable
cause is present are entitled to immunity. Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991). Actual
probable cause is not necessary for an arrest to be objectively reasonable. Brescher v. Von Stein,
904 F.2d 572, 579 (11th Cir. 1990). In determining whether qualified immunity exists, the issue
is not probable cause in fact but arguable probable cause. Gorra v. Hanson, 880 F.2d 95, 97
(8th Cir. 1989) (quoting Floyd v. Farrell, 765 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1985); Moore v. Cease, 2005 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 44888 (E.D.N.C. July 5, 2005) at 39-40 quoting Lea v. Kirby, 171 F. Supp. 2d 579,
583 (M.D.N.C. 2001) (In determining whether or not an officer is entitled to qualified immunity
in the context of a Fourth Amendment claim, the issue is whether arguable probable cause
exists.).
In this matter, for all reasons addressed supra., Defendant Officers Nicholas Chapman,
Jorge Bernardez-Ruiz, Matthew Cioffi, Alex Hashagen, Eric Hinton, Daneille Lewis, Derrick
Beasley, and Latreese Lee are therefore entitled to qualified immunity as to Plaintiffs Section
1983 claims.

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Conclusion
For the reasons advanced above, Defendant Officers Nicholas Chapman, Jorge BernardezRuiz, Matthew Cioffi, Alex Hashagen, Eric Hinton, Daneille Lewis, Derrick Beasley, and Latreese
Lee, request that this Honorable Court grant summary judgment in their favor as to all counts.

Respectfully submitted,

________/s/____________________
Michael Marshall (Bar No. 02587)

_______/s/_____________________
Chaz Ball (Bar No. 30044)
Schlachman, Belsky & Weiner, P.A.
300 E. Lombard St. Suite 1100
Baltimore, MD 21202
Telephone: (410) 685-2022
Fax: (410) 783-4771

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Attorneys for Defendants Chapman,

Bernardez-Ruiz, Cioffi, Hashagen, Hinton,
Lewis, Beasley, and Lee.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this ____ day of December, 2016, a copy of the foregoing Motion
for Summary Judgment and Memorandum of Law In Support of Individually Named Baltimore
Police Department Officer Defendants Motion For Summary Judgment was electronically filed
with the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. All counsel of record are being
served by the Courts electronic filing system or by first-class mail, properly addressed and
postage prepaid.

_/s/ Chaz Ball______________

Chaz Ball

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