Gabriel vs Sec of Labor Page 1 of 3

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 115949. March 16, 2000]
EVANGELINE J. GABRIEL, TERESITA C. LUALHATI, EVELYN SIA, RODOLFO EUGENIO,
ISAGANI MAKISIG, and DEMETRIO SALAS, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE
SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT and SIMEON SARMIENTO, JESUS CARLOS
MARTINEZ III, ALBERT NAPIAL, MARVIN ALMACIN, ROGELIO MATEO, GLENN SIAPNO,
EMILIANO CUETO, SALOME ATIENZA, NORMA V. GO, JUDITH DUDANG, MONINA DIZON,
EUSEBIO ROMERO, ISAGANI MORALES, ELISEO BUENAVENTURA, CLEMENTE
AGCAMARAN, CARMELITA NOLASCO, JOVITA FERI, LULU ACOSTA, CAROL LAZARO,
NIDA ARRIZA, ROMAN BERNARDO, DOMINGO B. MACALDO, EUGENE PIDLAOAN, MA.
SOCORRO T. ANGOB, JOSEPHINE ALVAREZ, LOURDES FERRER, JACQUILINE
BAQUIRAN, GRACIA R. ESCUADRO, KRISTINA HERNANDEZ, LOURDES IBEAS,
MACARIO GARCIA, BILLY TECSON, ALEX RECTO III, LEBRUDO, JOSE RICAFORTE,
RODOLFO MORADA, TERESA AMADO, ROSITA TRINIDAD, JEANETTE ONG, VICTORINO
LAS-AY, RANIEL DAYAO, OSCAR SANTOS, CRISTINA SALAVER, VICTORIA ARINO, A.H.
SAJO, MICHAEL BIETE, RED RP, GLORIA JUAT, ETHELINDA CASILAN, FAMER
DIPASUPIL, MA. HIDELISA POMER, MA. CHARLOTTE TAWATAO, GRACE REYES, ERNIE
COLINA, ZENAIDA MENDOZA, PAULITA ADORABLE, BERNARDO MADUMBA, NESTOR
NAVARRO, EASTER YAP, ALMA LIM, FELISA YU, TIMOTEO GANASTRA, REVELITA
CARTAJENAS, ANGELITO CABUAL, ROBERTA TAN, DOMINADOR TAPO, GRACE LIM,
GADIANE JEMIE, CHRISTHDY DAUD, BENEDICTO ACOSTA, JESUSA ACOSTA, MA.
AVELINA ARYAP, EVELYN BENITEZ, ESTERITA CHU, EVANGELINE CHU, BETTY CINCO,
RICARDO CONNEJO, MANULITO EVALO, FRANCIS LEONIDA, GREGORIO NOBLEZA,
RODOLFO RIVERAL, ELSA SIA, CLARA SUGBO, EDGARDO TABAO, MANUEL VELOSO,
MARLYN YU, ABSALON BUENA, WILFREDO PUERTO, FLORENTINA PINGOL, MARILOU
DAR, FE MORALES, MALEN BELLO, LORENA TAMAYO, CESAR LIM, PAUL BALTAZAR,
ALFREDO GAYAGAS, DUMAGUETE EMPLOYEES, CEBU EMPLOYEES, OZAMIZ
EMPLOYEES, TACLOBAN EMPLOYEES AND ALL OTHER SOLIDBANK UNION MEMBERS,
respondents. C alrsc

Sometime in October 1991, the unions Executive Board decided to retain anew the service of
Atty. Ignacio P. Lacsina (now deceased) as union counsel in connection with the negotiations for
a new Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). Accordingly, on October 19, 1991, the board
called a general membership meeting for the purpose. At the said meeting, the majority of all
union members approved and signed a resolution confirming the decision of the executive board
to engage the services of Atty. Lacsina as union counsel.
As approved, the resolution provided that ten percent (10%) of the total economic benefits that
may be secured through the negotiations be given to Atty. Lacsina as attorneys fees. It also
contained an authorization for SolidBank Corporation to check-off said attorneys fees from the
first lump sum payment of benefits to the employees under the new CBA and to turn over said
amount to Atty. Lacsina and/or his duly authorized representative.2[2]
The new CBA was signed on February 21, 1992. The bank then, on request of the union, made
payroll deductions for attorneys fees from the CBA benefits paid to the union members in
accordance with the abovementioned resolution.
On October 2, 1992, private respondents instituted a complaint against the petitioners and the
union counsel before the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) for illegal deduction of
attorneys fees as well as for quantification of the benefits in the 1992 CBA.3[3] Petitioners, in
response, moved for the dismissal of the complaint citing litis pendentia, forum shopping and
failure to state a cause of action as their grounds.4[4]Sccal r
On April 22, 1993, Med-Arbiter Paterno Adap of the DOLE- NCR issued the following Order:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Respondents Union Officers and
Counsel are hereby directed to immediately return or refund to the
Complainants the illegally deducted amount of attorneys fees from the
package of benefits due herein complainants under the aforesaid new CBA.
"Furthermore, Complainants are directed to pay five percent (5%) of the
total amount to be refunded or returned by the Respondent Union Officers
and Counsel to them in favor of Atty. Armando D. Morales, as attorneys
fees, in accordance with Section II, Rule VIII of Book II (sic) of the Omnibus
Rules Implementing the Labor Code."5[5]

DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Before us is a special civil action for certiorari seeking to reverse partially the Order1[1] of public
respondent dated June 3, 1994, in Case No. OS-MA-A-8-170-92, which ruled that the workers
through their union should be made to shoulder the expenses incurred for the professional
services of a lawyer in connection with the collective bargaining negotiations and that the
reimbursement for the deductions from the workers should be charged to the unions general
fund or account.

On appeal, the Secretary of Labor rendered a Resolution6[6] dated December 27, 1993, stating:

The records show the following factual antecedents:

Petitioners comprise the Executive Board of the SolidBank Union, the duly recognized collective
bargaining agent for the rank and file employees of Solid Bank Corporation. Private respondents
are members of said union.

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"WHEREFORE, the appeal of respondents Evangeline Gabriel, et. al., is

hereby partially granted and the Order of the Med-Arbiter dated 22 April
1993 is hereby modified as follows: (1) that the ordered refund shall be
limited to those union members who have not signified their conformity to
the check-off of attorneys fees; and (2) the directive on the payment of 5%
attorneys fees should be deleted for lack of basis.

Gabriel vs Sec of Labor Page 2 of 3

The pertinent legal provisions on check-offs are found in Article 222 (b) and Article 241 (o) of the
Labor Code.
Article 222 (b) states:
"No attorneys fees, negotiation fees or similar charges of any kind arising
from any collective bargaining negotiations or conclusions of the collective
agreement shall be imposed on any individual member of the contracting
union: Provided, however, that attorneys fees may be charged against
union funds in an amount to be agreed upon by the parties. Any contract,
agreement or arrangement of any sort to the contrary shall be null and
void." (Underscoring ours)

SO ORDERED."7[7]
On Motion for Reconsideration, public respondent affirmed the said Order with modification that
the unions counsel be dropped as a party litigant and that the workers through their union should
be made to shoulder the expenses incurred for the attorneys services. Accordingly, the
reimbursement should be charged to the unions general fund/account.8[8]

Article 241 (o) provides:

Hence, the present petition seeking to partially annul the above-cited order of the public
respondent for being allegedly tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.

"Other than for mandatory activities under the Code, no special

assessment, attorneys fees, negotiation fees or any other extraordinary fees
may be checked off from any amount due to an employee without an
individual written authorization duly signed by the employee. The
authorization should specifically state the amount, purpose and
beneficiary of the deduction." (Emphasis ours.)

The sole issue for consideration is, did the public respondent act with grave abuse of discretion
in issuing the challenged order? Calrsp ped
Petitioners argue that the General Membership Resolution authorizing the bank to check-off
attorneys fee from the first lump sum payment of the benefits to the employees under the new
CBA satisfies the legal requirements for such assessment.9[9] Private respondents, on the other
hand, claim that the check-off provision in question is illegal because it was never submitted for
approval at a general membership meeting called for the purpose and that it failed to meet the
formalities mandated by the Labor Code.10[10]
In check-off, the employer, on agreement with the Union, or on prior authorization from
employees, deducts union dues or agency fees from the latters wages and remits them directly
to the union.11[11] It assures continuous funding for the labor organization. As this Court has
acknowledged, the system of check-off is primarily for the benefit of the union and only indirectly
for the individual employees.12[12]

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Article 241 has three (3) requisites for the validity of the special assessment for unions incidental
expenses, attorneys fees and representation expenses. These are: 1) authorization by a written
resolution of the majority of all the members at the general membership meeting called for the
purpose; (2) secretarys record of the minutes of the meeting; and (3) individual written
authorization for check off duly signed by the employees concerned. Sce dp
Clearly, attorneys fees may not be deducted or checked off from any amount due to an
employee without his written consent.
After a thorough review of the records, we find that the General Membership Resolution of
October 19, 1991 of the SolidBank Union did not satisfy the requirements laid down by law and
jurisprudence for the validity of the ten percent (10%) special assessment for unions incidental
expenses, attorneys fees and representation expenses. There were no individual written check
off authorizations by the employees concerned and so the assessment cannot be legally
deducted by their employer.
Even as early as February 1990, in the case of Palacol vs. Ferrer-Calleja13[13] we said that the
express consent of employees is required, and this consent must be obtained in accordance
with the steps outlined by law, which must be followed to the letter. No shortcuts are allowed. In
Stellar Industrial Services, Inc. vs. NLRC14[14] we reiterated that a written individual
authorization duly signed by the employee concerned is a condition sine qua non for such
deduction.

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Gabriel vs Sec of Labor Page 3 of 3

These pronouncements are also in accord with the recent ruling of this Court in the case of
ABS-CBN Supervisors Employees Union Members vs. ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, et.
al.,15[15] which provides:
"Premises studiedly considered, we are of the irresistible conclusion and, so
find that the ruling in BPIEU-ALU vs. NLRC that (1) the prohibition against
attorneys fees in Article 222, paragraph (b) of the Labor Code applies
only when the payment of attorneys fees is effected through forced
contributions from the workers; and (2) that no deduction must be take
from the workers who did not sign the check-off authorization, applies
to the case under consideration." (Emphasis ours.)
We likewise ruled in Bank of the Philippine Island Employees Union-Association Labor Union
(BPIEU-ALU) vs. NLRC,16[16]
" the afore-cited provision (Article 222 (b) of the Labor Code) as prohibiting
the payment of attorneys fees only when it is effected through forced
contributions from workers from their own funds as distinguished from the
union funds. The purpose of the provision is to prevent imposition on the
workers of the duty to individually contribute their respective shares in the
fee to be paid the attorney for his services on behalf of the union in its
negotiations with management. The obligation to pay the attorneys fees
belongs to the union and cannot be shunted to the workers as their
direct responsibility. Neither the lawyer nor the union itself may
require the individual worker to assume the obligation to pay attorneys
fees from their own pockets. So categorical is this intent that the law
makes it clear that any agreement to the contrary shall be null and void ab
initio." (Emphasis ours.) Edp sc
From all the foregoing, we are of the considered view that public respondent did not act with
grave abuse of discretion in ruling that the workers through their union should be made to
shoulder the expenses incurred for the services of a lawyer. And accordingly the reimbursement
should be charged to the unions general fund or account. No deduction can be made from the
salaries of the concerned employees other than those mandated by law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Order dated June 3, 1994, of respondent
Secretary of Labor signed by Undersecretary Bienvenido E. Laguesma is AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

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