Destined to become a classic! The only comprehensive / manuel avaiable on urban guorrila wartare, Thwf@ have been many books published on rural quorilla lighting, but none on guerrila warfare carried out inthe ei | Fighting in The Streets is a no-nonaense "how-to" | manual for armed resistance in today's urban "coment jungles." it explains proven methods of staat combat tested over the yeers in countless armed sttuggles workdwide Chapters include: Principles of urban guerrilla warfare, The urban base of operations. Improvised explosives and chemicals . . 1= Improvised weapons and munitions, ‘= Ambushes = Counter-Insurgancy operations. = Security and communications. and much more! Fighting In The Streets is the only complete book on urban guerrilla available anywhere, Includes over 63 i orca Ur UR Re4J.FLORES PUBLICATIONS P.0.Box 163001 Miami, FL 33116-3001MIGATHING IV THE STREETS ty Uitno Cepia ©1991 by Uta bite oe ‘Eres Pabeatons ietier Papin so et ar gy ape et on find cenaoene vy pi ey sectors srr parte ascent Sa Seacoast = enctepepen pty mas Sete Por io SS os ceeeiearece es Sri croe ee Sal therfore be wed x ule ol a Sls eetrsieo saecegetaae pian mbeairindsceaas ‘ier implied er express suerte wo Stee Lira of Congress Cuog Card Nur 91-1310 Pine inthe Usd States Armee WARNING! [Neithertheauthornorthe publisher assumes any responsibility for the use or misuse ofthe information contsined inthis book. ‘The author and publisher specifically disclaim any personal liability, loss, o risk incurred a a consequence ofthe use and application, cer direcly or indirectly, of any advice or inor- ‘mation preseme bern “Technical data presented herein, paniculaly technical data on ‘dealing with dangerous chemicals, poisons, explosives, drugs, and salety procedures inevitably reflec the authors individual belie and experience with particular equipment and environ- ‘ments under specific circumstances which the reader cannot ‘duplicate or experience exactly. The information in this book ‘Should therefore be used for guidance only and shouldbe ap- roached with grea caution, ‘Since neither the authornorthe publisher have conto overthe ‘materials used, use of techniques or equipment, o the abilities ‘f the reader, no responsibility, ether implied or expressed is assumed forthe use ormisuse ofthe data or procedures given in thisbook,CONTENTS Introduction. 1. Principles of Urban Guerrilla Warfare. 2. The Urban Base of Operations. 3. Improvised Explosives and Chemicals...ninl9 7. Security and Communications.. Conclusion.INTRODUCTION [Imagine that you aren the following situation: your country has ‘ben invaded by a foreign military power. Foreign oops o2cupy the cites andthe capitol; a puppet goverment rules in the name oftheinvaders.Citizenshave been subjected to mass searches and ness. The invaders confiscate radios, weapons, bares and anything else which may be used to challenge their domination. ‘Spies informers and underoove security agents are everywhere. ‘Those who speak ou, however innocently, against the repression Aisappear without trace. ‘Another situation: your country i nuled by an oppresive and ‘ouliarian dictatorship. The means of communicaion—pres, radio, television —are controled by the regime. The Constitution 's suspended elections are fraudulent of nonexistent. Freedoms are estrcied, Critics ofthe regime vanish nthe night. In these situations, what would you do? Would you simply sccept your position and cary ona best as you can? Would you hope and wish that the situation will somehow change of se? ‘Or will you tke action and fight back, to overtwow the regime ‘orto expel the invaders? ‘Thismanulisfor thes ast persons, who are deteminedio ight for ther freedom. Ii for dose ordinary citizens who, having. decided thatthe regime must go, work 1 remove iin the only ‘way that remains availabe them—armed insumection. ‘This manual i a description ofthe means which canbe wsed 10 ‘arr out that struggle. Since the military force ofthe egime are strong and the military power of the population is weak the resistance neswork must adopt the sategy ofthe gue: ihn ing"it and ran attacks, stking repeatedly and vanishing, lav ing the regime stung, bewildered and demoralized, 78) FIGHTING IN THE STREETS ‘The majority of guerilla wars have been fought in iscated, rugged areas, in mountains or jungles which provide safe Sanctuaries forthe igher. In modem indussalized sates such asthe US, the Soviet Union orEurope, sich arural-based strategy ‘will fa. Since the regime's military, economic and political resources are concertrated inthe cities, the resistance fighters, ‘must be “urban guerillas," carrying out her fight inthe cement jungles ofthe whanized areas. tis through urban warfare thatthe ‘epime canbe topple. — PRINCIPLES OF URBAN GUERRILLA WARFARE Guerrilla warfare is the natural method of straggle against a powerful enemy. It s obvious that the forces of the eccupied ‘opuation are not, atlas nll, able o standin face-to-face ‘comiat against the professional armed forces ofthe regime or against she occupation forces of the invader. For this reason, the ‘guerilla adopsthe strategy of nibbling atthe edges ofthe enemy, of harassing and ring him rather than confronting him drei. Guerilla warfare is above all he streay of “hit and ru,” of, “fighting and runing away wo live w fight ansher day." It is a warfare of deception an illusion, of surprise and the unexpected. In undeveloped agricultural nations such as China, Cuba, El Salvador the Philippines, Afghanistan orthe cetral Asian Soviet Republics, the primary focus of the guerilla fight is in the counuyside. These natons have conditions in the rural areas which ae sited fora prourated guerilla war. ough inaccessible tera, few avenues of transportation, thin population distibu- tion and ite or no system of communication. In these types of terior, rural guerilla warfare isthe most effective method of Fighting the regime, Tn the indusralized urban nations of Non Aineica, Europe oF the Soviet Union, suchastraegy isunvorkable-Inthese societies, ‘guerillas must operate i the urban nerve centers to atack the ‘ecunying regime Te primary characteris ofa succesful rural guerilla war are: mobility, surprise, load superiority in forces, inmate ‘knowledge of he eran, and the suppor ofthe poplaton. These tactics have been described in numerous texts on rural guerrila 910 ) FIGHTING IN THE STREETS warfare. ‘Onthe whole, urban guerilla warfare tactics donot ifferin any significa way from those used by rural guerrils. The resistance fighter who combats an. industialized, urban oppressor must ‘epententhe same guersliapriniples of mobility, surprise, local fuperionty, knowledge of the terrain and the support of the population. Nevertheless, the urban guerila faces problems which is ural ‘counterpart does no. The urban fighter operatesin the very center ‘ofthe regime's power. The rural guerilla can slip away from a fight knowing it may take days or even weeks for reinforcements to arrive onthe scene: the urban guerilla may be located and, suounded by the regime's police and troops in a mater of ‘minutes. The reral fighters operate in mountains ad jones far away from prying eyes: the urban guenila lives and operates in the midst of large crowds of peep, any one of whom may be an informer or collaborstor. Thus the security problems ofthe urban {ightr are compounded tremendovy. “Theurban fighter docs, however, possess some advantages. His sciions and successes cannot be hid from the people by the regime's censorship, since they are immediatly visibe. This fives hope tothe papalaion and demonstrates thatthe regime is fot unbeatable. More concretely, the urban fighter wil find that ‘esources sich a f004, thelr, clathing, weapons and ammuni- tion are much more readily availble in the city than they would tein the moursains or jungle. Alo, the urban resistance fighter ‘wl find thatthe masses of people provide a shield into which he ‘an el allowing him a remain anonymous uni hestrkes. “The targets ofthe urban guerilla differ somewhat fom those of ‘he rr fighters. While he rural units attack the enemy’ troop ‘apes and supply Conoys, the urban guerilla attacks such ‘eralized targets 8 hanks and financial centers, commnica- ‘ions hubs, power stations, military and police stations, arsenals, {ovemment offices and officials ofthe regime. ‘Mobility i an important weapon for dhe urban eversil,since he can beso easily and rapidly surounded by the sate security force. Such an encirclement can prove faa 0 the fahters. For Principles OF Usben Goerila Warfare [11 this reason, the urban guerilla’s actions must be meticulously ‘planned so the guerila eam is able o sip away before te tate Security forces arrive. ‘The automobile san invaluable aid w the urban guerilla, and ‘every fighter must be fair with methods of cemmandeering ‘or expopriting cas, van, and trucks. Often, single operation vill involve the procurement of several diferent vehicles. ‘The uiban guerila must cary the concept of “hit and run to the extreme, The fighters rive athe target, launch their attack, and vanish into the stret, ll in & mater of minutes. ‘Since the vehicles used inthe operation may be described othe state security Fores, the resistance fighters mast make provisions twcevade pursuers and roadblocks which wil hinder th escape. A switch of vehicles shortly aller te operation will confuse pur- ‘ers. Monitoring the radio frequencies used bythe state secuity services wlltel the fightersof roadblocks or other obstacles, The turban fighter must take every stp to avoid being encicled and forced int a firefig “The uban guerilla must also be thoroughly familar withthe tena in which be operates. He must know every set, every alley, the location of empty or alf- built structure, and even the Iayout of sewers and subierranean tunnel systems. The resistance fighters must be able to make their way quickly through a maze of obstacles while the state security forces stumble blindly behind ‘hem, eady to fll nto a fatal tap or ambush, Parsuers must be slowed with mines, grenades, altrops or snipers stationed along the escape route. Because the urban guerilla forces are so small compared tothe repressive fores available othe dictator or invader, the tactic of suprise isan urgent necessity in urban operations. Most opera- tons wl take place so quickly thatthe enemy wil have no ime to react. Guards an state security forces which are found inthe arcaof the operation must be quickly disammedorcliminate. The guerilla attack must be swift, sodden and unexpected. Tor this reas, the ambush a the raid are the urban guerilla figer’s stock in trade Rater than attacking the regime's forces ‘head-onand falling this superior repower, the puerillachooses12] FIGHTING IN THE STREETS ‘moments when he has sn unbeatable advantage before swiftly ppouncing on the enemy, wiping him out and vanishing before reinforcement can ave Because the guerilla force asa whole is hopekessly outnum- ‘ered no battles shouldbe accepted by the fighters unl they have ‘asuperiosty of fore in the aea of confit. Tiss accomplished by forcing the enemy to divide his forces among many dispersed targets. By atacking at various places, the resistance network flores the enemy 10 gain oops a al such potential targets as ‘supply depots, bridges, power stations ee, ands to spread his oyes to thinly ‘Aguerillaforceaf forty fighters, forinstanceishelpless against ‘av army ofa thousand, But if these thousand men ae divided ‘among Tity potential targets, the guerilla force nced face only ‘wenky men at each target, giving them local superiority of force "The enemy is never abl to concentrate his forces since he never Jinows when oF where the guerillas will strike next He is thus forced to guard all pointal targets or else leave a number of ‘anges unguarded and vulnerable. “The support ofthe population i the most important weapon of the guema, People who suppor and sympathize withthe resis- tance provide the logsical ad thatthe guerillas nee, including ood, sanctuary for wounded fighters, new recruits and scouts in unfamiliar eran. "The local population is also vital wo the resistance fiers in providing intelligence conceming the movements of enemy fo- es, Local civilians serve as the eyes and ears of the gueril forces informing thea of enemy roop movements in te area, ‘etal of potential tags for gull rads, and other peinent {nformation, At the sane time, 2 syimputeii population serves ‘asa sie fore essunce network by refusing o give infonms- tion about the movement tothe enemy, or by giving false infor- ‘mation which actually aids the resistance. The enemy is thus ‘constanly waiched by thousanis of eyes and his every move ‘known to the guerrils, while the guerillas hemseves remain invisible tothe regime's armed frees ‘Ate same time, theurban guerilla must realize hates very Plncpee OC Urban Guerila Warfare (13 ‘vulnerable fo infitradon or betrayal, and tata single civilian ‘could cripple the resistance network great by passing informa tionto the authorities, The urban guerilla must be selective inhis dealings withcivilins, and his security system must be leakproof ie to survive. Th wan guerillas, like any other guerila, still mst swim like fishes, bot now thelr water amounts oa mere puddle. "The most common operations carried out by urban guerilas are raids on arsenals and medical supply houses to obtain needed ‘weapons and materials, raids 1 release imprisoned guerila, kidnappings or executions of occupation authors, and rads on Iman uch asa, mila po ve, pone and factories which aeimpotanto the regime (weapons {ecto heevy india plans, power son). Oe actions Snclde the ame suppor and protection of civilian rallies and ass demonstrations against the regime andthe use of armedraids and sabotage asa tactical adjunct 0 srkes, boycotts and work Slowdowns which ciple the repime, ‘ily the guersillamovemient wil oonsistof scattered detach- ‘ments which operate in a single city or area. As the resistance _rows these link upand combine operations. Coordinate strikes ‘wll paralyze the enemy's coriol over a region or area of the ‘counlry. These regional struggles grow ia time to assume the character ofa full-scale wa, withthe guerilla forces operating ‘more and more asa regular army. ‘While this amy begins a general offensive agains! dhe enemy, the civilian population fiphis with actions such as mass demonstrations ad general sks, which ripple and weaken the regime. The final stepisthemass uprising which sweeps the fated rege away.2 ‘THE URBAN BASE OF OPERATIONS ‘onder forthe guerilla force o elude pursuers and survive to ‘carry Out new attacks, it must mainain a base of operations in ‘which o maintain equipment, tend to wounded, and rest between ‘operations. Forthe urban guerilla fightr, this base takes the fm, ‘ofthe urban “sufehouse.” TNote that this base of operations is not by any means a “rear ‘rea or “safe ereat"Even in an area which relatively secure, to remain encamped inthe same spot fr longer than a few days ‘st invite a fatal encirclement by the sae security fores. Even ‘ating periods between operations, the guerilla safebouse is ‘moved constanly, eading the regime's efforts 10 locate and estoy it I must be, lke the puerrils themselves, small and highly mobile. "Two types of safetouse are required by the wan resistance ‘network, the "barack andthe “operations center" The baracks serve a temporary shelters for guerillas, where they can eat and Sleep in safety. The operations centers ie temporary arenas, ‘weapons factories or other clanfestine centers where the asks of ‘the resistance ean be carried cat without interference fom the state ‘Guerrillas who are unknown the police can live undercover in “normal” houses, and have no need of a guerilla barack. Fighters and networkmembers who have been identified by the state security force, hough, mest carry on ther work compleiely underground,” with 9 known addresses or fixed places where they canbe captured, These clandestine fighters mustbe provided with secure safehoues which ae completely unknown 10 the 4 ‘he Uiban Base Of Opens 15 shoriies, where they can safely stay between guerilla opera~ jons. They must be billet in barracks which are placed a the Aisposal of he resistance network by sympathetic members ofthe population Operations such as anms factories, arsenals or supply depots ‘must also be located in urban safehouses which are unknown to the suthortes and are untraceable. These secure areas ar also provided by sympathetic supporers ofthe resistance. ‘The security needs of box types of safehouses are similar ‘Safehouses must be nondescript and unobirusve, indistinguish- able from neighboring houses. Nothing about the house ‘ceupants should hint or remotely sugges that its anything other ‘tna typical neighborhood ome. To allay suspicions, the oc- cupans of the house must not appear 10 depart from normal routine Urban guersilas should do nothing to suggest that they are anything her shan ordinary “law-abiding citizens.” The des, Ibis, actions, language and lifestyles ofthe guerillas should ‘conform completely tothe area in which the hous is located. {he safehousefsina poor working class area, forexample,it would be suicidal forthe guerillas 10 wear business suits and drive ‘expensive cars, Similarly, guerrillas bileted in middleclass sub- ‘ua areas must nt draw unnecessary atlertonto themselves by eating old clots, having long hair, driving ok car, ct. Urban veri and heir safebouses must melt inconspicuous ino the local population ‘The urban safehouse must aye a good view ofthe surounding area and provide good fields of fire over approaching stcets and alleys, Window shades or blinds should have slits eat inp thea for inconspicuous observaticn, A. lookout must be constantly ‘mainiained to prevent the security forces from surounding the ‘urban camp unnoticed. Houses which are isolated or surrounded by open areas are ‘unsuitable for unban bass, since they can be easily surrounded and covered by afew armed security forces. Row homes are best, since the security forces must occupy the whole block in order to suround the hous. The security forces wil ao be forced toenter16) FIGHTING IV THE STREETS land search every house in the area for escaped guerillas and stragglers a time-consuming and dangerous process which ex- Poses them to snipers and guerilla rads. “The safehouse should be surrounded bya security net to prevent ‘anencitelement by the police nd also 1 watch for enemy agents ‘who will try to surveil the suspected hideout. Resistance agents Posing as sree workers, people in restaurans, people at aphone ‘oth, or people going cut fr a walk will ice the area ofthe Ssafehouse, watching for enemy agenis or police forces. If a ‘suspected agent approaches, the security netimmeitey comacts the safehouse using coded clandestine communications, giving the illegal cccupans time wo hide or escape and allowing the legal “fron o reassure the police agen. If the security forces ap- roach in force, the security network wams te safehouse so shat Htean he evacuated quickly, Jeaving the police with nothing, ‘When the safchouse is first occupied, atleast two emergency ‘scape routes should be reconoiteed ad rehearsed. Inthe event ‘of Tad, the urban guerilla sek to hold of the enemy a long, 1s possible, allowing resistance members to remove equipment ‘nd supplies ane melt away singly ori pairs to evade the police ‘el and disappear inthe crowds of bystanders and passers. At Teast one member ofthe safebouse should be armed wit a rifle ‘or submachine gun, positioned so he can cover the escape of his flows. If the safehouse carint be defended and important materials ‘must be eft behind, he guerillas should arm apre-et booby trap ‘which willbe detenated when the security forces emtrthe build ing, destroying the supplies to prevent the enemy from gaining Intelligence from them, A booby inp atthe houses errance will {lay the potice, allowing more tine forthe guerillas’ escape. ‘The urban guersils must also take gret care in entering oF leaving the urban ase, Any excurion outside the sfehouse, for however short period, must be considered as a military oper tin, and must be planted and theught-out. Before leaving the safehouse, vate carefully for suspicious perensor vehicles who might be state security agemts. Once on the set, be as incon spicuous as possible. Keep a sharpeye out for sate security men SR ee “Tne Urtan Base OF Opezations (17 ‘who may be following you, Plie tals must be lost. The easiest ‘way to do this iso use public wansportaton during peak trafic ‘hours, when i is easy © became swallowed up in the faceless ‘crowd of people. Underground resistance fighters should spend ‘as lite time as possible in public, leaving the safehouse only to ‘arry outa ask o operation Tasks such as baying food, collecting mal, ad so on, mist be performed by the legal “font person” who occupies the safehowse. "Whenever possible, resistance fighters should appear lead ‘normal life, with a family, jb, ex, wo avold drawing suspicion from the police. Safehouses and barracks ae only for those ‘guemilas who have becn identified by the sae security forces fd ae forced io operate underground. A few ofthese “wanted fighters may choose to operate with te rural guerillas, where they ean remain out of he reach ofthe police rather than continue to sk capture inthe city Forthose who decide 1 continue uiban ‘work, secure sufehouses ae a necessity. “The legal “font” people who obtain he resistance’ssafehowses should be above suspicion and with no known connections tthe ‘guerilla movement Safehouses shouldbe obtained by members fof the population who are completly unknown othe police, with ‘ known rebel sympathies and no suspicious political comme: tions If Ui police raid the safehouse, this “egal” fron most be ‘capable of answering he police's questions ina manne that wil ‘isfy tbem and remove the house from suspicion. ‘Urban afehouses shouldbe loaned from these font people, not nied, No guerilla or guerilla sympahizer should rent ‘ifehouse, either under a egal identity or an illegal oe. This is ‘one 10 avoid the possiblity ofthe state security forces tracing this paper tal fo & member ofthe resiance network. Urban ‘camps must be borrowed of loaned from legal “aboveground” ‘people withnoknownconections tothe guerillas. Ifatemporary ‘ase is needed forte purpose ofa specific operation (or instance 8 vantage point from which to provide fre suppor fora raid on ‘an arenal or police station the guerillas must occupy a suitable building snd prevent bystanders ftom interfering uni the opera- tion comple‘The urban safehouse must also be, lke the urban guerillas themscives,free-loaing and motile. No urban base should be ‘occupied forlonge than a week or two, to prevent security forces ‘ofthe regime frm tracking down the goers and aiding them “To depend on a small number of fixed sfehoasesis to hinder the ‘mobility and flexibility ofthe fighters, and (o establish a fixed fronts to make the jb of the poice easier. No fixed urban bases should be maintained or defended. Rather, the guerillas should