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I use data on the hiring practices and spatial location of firms in four cities to model the p
cess of interfirm racial segregation. When I control for the spatial location of the firm, the us
employee referrals reduced the probability of hiring a black worker by 75% in firms that are
than 10% black. Among allfirms, the results suggest that employee referrals arejust as importa
the geographic location of the firm in generating employment segregation: both increase the predicted level of interfirm racial segregation among blue-collar workers in the cities studied by about
10%.
Despite declines over the past two decades, the level of black-white residential segregation remains high in large urban areas in the United States (Cutler, Glaeser, and Vigdor
1999; Glaeser and Vigdor 2001). In addition, this residential segregation seems to be paralleled by an equally high degree of racial social segregation-most blacks and whites in
America have friends of the same, rather than a different, race (Jackman and Crane 1986).
The question posed in this article is whether high levels of residential and friendship segregation result in the employment segregation of black and white workers.
Although the level of interfirm racial segregation has been documented using nationally representative firm-level data (Carrington and Troske 1998), there is little empirical
evidence on the causes of employment segregation. One prominent theory attributes employment segregation to the spatial separation of blacks and whites in large urban areas.
According to the "spatial-mismatch" hypothesis, the decentralization of employment,
combined with persistent residential segregation, has resulted in increased distances between black residential areas and regions of rapid job growth-while jobs move from the
city center to the suburbs, residential segregation restricts the mobility of black workers
and results in increased distances to available jobs. If the distance between jobs in the
suburbs and the city center were large enough, then firm-level racial segregation would
be the natural result of the spatial segregation of black and white residential areas.
An alternative theory, however, argues that it is not residential segregation but informal hiring practices, combined with social segregation, that cause employment segregation. The logic behind this theory is simple: about 40%-50% of jobs in the United States
are found through help or information from friends or relatives (Granovetter 1995). In
racially segregated cities, high levels of social segregation among black and white workers mean that information about jobs is transmitted along racially segregated social networks. Consequently, when firms use employee referrals to fill job vacancies, they tend
to attract workers who are the same race as their current workers, thereby maintaining
existing levels of employment segregation.
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physically close to jobs, they were "missing the connection" because they were not part
of the informal networks that employers rely upon to fill vacancies. This exclusion from
job networks suggests that the current policy emphasis on the spatial mismatch between
urban workers and suburban jobs is misguided. Although many empirical studies have
argued for the importance of the physical distance between the urban poor and available
jobs (e.g., Ihlanfeldt 1988; Ihlanfeldt and Sjoquist 1990, 1991; Kain 1968; Raphael, Stoll,
and Holzer 2000), the emphasis on distance neglects the role that social segregation may
play even in the absence of a "spatial mismatch" (Wilson 1987).
In this study, I used the household and employer surveys from the Multi-City Study
of Urban Inequality (MCSUI) to test the relative effect of spatial location and social segregation on employment segregation. I used data on social networks data from the MCSUI
household survey to document the level of social segregation between whites and blacks.
The household survey contains information on the racial segregation of friendships and
job contacts, allowing me to depict the degree to which job information is transmitted
through racially segregated social networks. Next, I used the employer data to model the
LITERATURE REVIEW
Carrington and Troske (1998) used firm-level data to measure the level of racial segregation among firms. In addition to calculating overall levels of interfirm segregation, they
showed that the level of employment segregation seems to be related to both the size of
the city and the level of residential segregation within the metropolitan area. When they
calculated segregation levels on the basis of a subsample of firms located in relatively
integrated cities or small metropolitan areas, they found that the levels of segregation
within industrial classifications dropped substantially. This finding is consistent with the
spatial-mismatch hypothesis, which argues that the residential separation of inner-city
minorities from jobs represents a barrier to equal opportunity.
Why would residential segregation result in employment segregation? The spatialmismatch hypothesis contends that racial employment segregation and high unemployment rates of blacks are the result of residential segregation and job decentralization.
There are three basic conditions for a spatial mismatch to exist: (1) persistent residential
segregation restricts the geographic mobility of black workers, (2) jobs are decentralized
across the metropolitan area, and (3) significant commuting and job-search costs increase
significantly with the distance between the worker's residence and the available job. If
decentralized employment is increasing because jobs are moving from the central city to
the suburbs, then a shortage of jobs near black residential areas may result in an increase
in the unemployment rate of black workers (Kain 1968; see also Ellwood 1986). Most
empirical tests of the spatial-mismatch hypothesis have focused on the effect on black
unemployment rates (see Holzer 1991 for a review). If these three basic conditions hold,
however, the spatial mismatch hypothesis also predicts that employment segregation will
increase. Workers tend to work at "nearby" jobs because of the effect of distance on commuting and job-search costs, resulting in geographic segregation in employment that
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Interfirm
Racial
Segregation
509
reflects the underlying pattern of residential segregation. Moreover, the level of employment segregation also may be affected by residential segregation if employers discriminate on the basis of real or imagined discrimination by customers (Kain 1968).
The effect of residential segregation on employment segregation depends on the spa-
central city surrounded by white suburbs (Farley et al. 1978), high levels of residential
segregation may be sufficient to generate geographic employment segregation. In his
study of employment in Detroit and Chicago, Kain (1968) found that the geographic segregation between white and black workers was strongly associated with patterns of residential segregation in these two cities.
Nonetheless, although geographic location makes sense as an explanation for blackwhite employment segregation, it is possible to criticize the spatial-mismatch hypothesis
by arguing that the effect of spatial distance on commuting and job-search costs is overstated. Cohn and Fossett (1996) and Ellwood (1986) argued that commuting distances per
se cannot explain the black-white gap in unemployment rates. In a study of the location
of jobs and workers in Boston and Houston, Cohn and Fossett contended that many jobs
still exist within reasonable commuting distances of inner-city black neighborhoods (however, their critique did not take into account the number of competing workers; see Mouw
2000). Similarly, Ellwood (1986) studied the pattern of white and black commuters in
Chicago and found that most workers commuted to jobs that were far from their neighborhoods anyway. Slight racial differences in commuting time to work, he claimed, are
insufficient to explain black-white differences in labor market outcomes. Ellwood noted
that large black-white differences in employment persist even within the same geographic
areas and argued that "race not space" is the key explanatory variable. Nevertheless, other
studies have claimed that commuting distance is a key explanation for racial differences
in employment (Ihlanfeldt and Sjoquist 1990, 1991), but the evidence is still in dispute
(Jencks and Mayer 1990).
If commuting distance itself does not explain black-white differences in the labor
market, what about the role of distance on the costs of job searches? Spatial models of job
search have often assumed that individuals search for work by physically looking for
openings (i.e., Holzer, Ihlanfeldt, and Sjoquist 1994; Seater 1979; Simpson 1992) and
that the costs of job searching increase monotonically with the distance between the
worker and the job. As a result, most studies of the spatial-mismatch hypothesis have
used the physical distance between workers and jobs to measure the combined effect of
commuting and job-search costs. In a study of the geographic component of job-search
behavior in Los Angeles, Stoll (2001) found that black workers tend to search for work
over larger distances than do white workers, suggesting that differences in search costs
may explain some of the black-white gap in unemployment rates. However, because the
effect of distance on the dissemination of job information may vary significantly with
recruitment method, one should be cautious about using distance as a proxy for access to
information about jobs. Although one may expect that distance is more important for job
searches when firms use posted help-wanted signs or hire walk-in applicants, it may be
less important when the information about the job openings is advertised in a newspaper
or is transmitted through networks of workers and friends. In the case of newspaper advertisements, the cost of finding out about job openings is simply the price of a newspaper. In the case of employee referrals, job information is contingent on being part of the
right networks of job contacts. Indeed, if the high job-search costs for black workers are
due instead to their exclusion from racially segregated job networks, then it is incorrect to
attribute their low employment rates entirely to spatial factors.
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regation. Wilson (1987) argued that social networks, not the physical distance to jobs, are
the problem. He contended that urban blacks are socially isolated from job networks be-
cause of the lack of friends who are employed in steady jobs who can serve as "role
models" and give them information about available job openings. Furthermore, Wilson
stated, even when job openings in the inner city become available, inner-city workers
may have trouble hearing about them if they are not tied into the job network. In other
words, if black workers are routinely excluded from jobs because of employers' recruit-
ment practices, then bringing jobs closer to the inner city will not improve their employment prospects.
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Interfirm
Racial
Segregation
511
that referrals do not affect the percentage of recent applicants to the firm who are black.' In
general, the empirical results of the studies that have used data on employers seem to
suggest that employee referrals do not affect racial employment patterns.
In this article, I argue that the primary consequence of the using employee referrals is
that they increase interfirm racial segregation. In contrast to Braddock and McPartland
(1987) and Holzer and Reaser (2000), I contend that the importance of employee referrals
for equal opportunity depends on the current racial composition of the firm. Because of
high levels of social segregation between black and white workers, the use of employee
referrals in firms that are predominately white (or black) tends to result in predominately
white (or black) applicants. In this sense, employee referrals maintain interfirm segregation by reproducing the current demographic makeup of the firm. Therefore, one should
look at the effect of referrals conditional upon the racial composition of the firm's workers.
HYPOTHESES
On the basis of the foregoing discussion, I can distinguish between the following two
competing explanations of interfirm segregation:
1. Residential segregation and spatial mismatch: The pattern of residential segregation in large urban areas results in spatial separation between white and black workers.
Because job-search and commuting costs increase with distance, workers are more likely
to work close to home, resulting in interfirm racial segregation.
2. Social segregation and employee referrals: Because social networks are highly segregated by race-a fact that I document later in this article-asking for referrals from
current employees reproduces the racial composition of the firm's workforce. Therefore,
employee referrals increase interfirm racial segregation. Compared with jobs filled via
public announcements in newspaper advertisements, employee referrals reduce the chance
of a black hire in predominately white firms and the chance of a white hire in predominately black firms.
DATA AND METHODS
The data used in this article came from the household and employer surveys of the
MCSUI. The MCSUI household data is a representative sample of households in four
large urban areas: Atlanta, Boston, Detroit, and Los Angeles. Data on the social networks
of workers and detailed information on job contacts were collected in Atlanta, Boston,
and Los Angeles. I used the MCSUI data from these three cities for all the black or white
respondents for whom there was information on social networks (683 whites and 852
blacks), as well as those for whom there was information on the use of contacts to find
their most recent jobs (883 whites and 1,101 blacks). The MCSUI employer sample consisted of 3,200 employers in four metropolitan areas: Atlanta, Boston, Detroit, and Los
Angeles. The survey was conducted by telephone between June 1992 and May 1994 with
the individual at each establishment who was responsible for hiring for noncollege (bluecollar) positions (for a discussion of the survey, see Holzer 1996). In addition to the demographic composition of the firm, the respondents were asked an extensive number of
questions about the recruitment process for the last employee hired. I used all the firms
that hired most recently for a noncollege position and for which there were data on their
racial composition (2,413 cases).2
1. He used the personnel managers' self-reports of the percentage of applicants over the past year who
were black as the measure of the racial composition of the applicant pool.
2. A total of 811 cases were dropped: 294 because the last hire was for a position requiring a college
degree, 424 because of missing information on the racial composition of the firm's blue-collar workers, 48
because the last worker hired was the only noncollege worker in the firm, and 45 because the occupation of the
last worker hired was missing.
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Whites
Blacks
Composition
Proportion
of
Variables
network
members
(883) (1,101)
(409) (553)
Contact worked at the hiring firma 0.657 0.662
(411) (553)
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Interfirm
Racial
Segregation
513
majority of job networks are short-that is, job information is disseminated through relatively short networks. Therefore, although I do not have complete information on the
networks that linked workers to jobs in situations in which there was more than one
intermediary between the job seeker and the job, I contend that the combined evidence
in Table 1 on friendship and job-contact segregation indicates that much of the informal
information about job openings in these cities is transmitted along racially segregated
social networks. Of course, this assertion is tested later when I assess the impact of
informal hiring procedures on job segregation.
employer data. Table 2 shows the distribution of firms in the sample by the percentage of
black workers in noncollege jobs. This percentage was calculated by excluding the race
of the most recent hire to reflect the demographic makeup of the company before the last
person was hired. The division of the firms into five categories based on the percentage
black in the firm (0%-0.5% "all white"; 0.5%-10% "predominately white"; and
10%-25%, 25%-50%, and 50%-100% "predominately black") was done carefully to
provide the sharpest results without sacrificing the clarity of presentation. The greater
detail of an 11-category racial-composition variable based on dividing the firms by 10%
intervals of percentage black does not affect the results (results not shown but available
on request). In Table 2, the firms are weighted by employment size, so the percentages in
the rows reflect the overall distribution of jobs across different levels of racial integration. In all four cities, this table shows, a large number of firms are almost entirely white
(and/or Hispanic). Similarly, there are a significant number of firms whose blue-collar
workforce is over 50% black.
How does the spatial distribution and racial composition of the firms in the data relate to the underlying pattern of residential segregation? Map 1 depicts the relationship
between residential and workplace segregation in the Detroit metropolitan area (Wayne,
Oakland, and Macomb counties). Each circle represents a firm in the MCSUI data set,
shaded according to the racial composition of its workforce. The firms are superimposed
over a census-tract map of the percentage black in each neighborhood. Similarly, Map 2
shows the race of the last person hired in the firm. These maps indicate a clear spatial
relationship between residential segregation and hiring patterns. Firms that are close to
black residential areas are more likely both to hire black workers and to have a higher
proportion of their current workers who are black. As was discussed earlier, however, the
question remains as to whether the relationship between residential and workplace
Table 2. Distribution of Firms by Percentage Black in Noncollege Jobs for Each City
(Row Percentage)
Percentage Black in Firm
38.1
18.7
Atlanta
22.9
10.9
15.5
12.7
18.9
23.0
15.1
100
24.4
100
566
615
Total
46.1
36.0
24.8
20.9
14.1
17.4
9.8
13.5
5.2
12.2
100
100
611
2,413
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1?~~~~~~~~~~~ 0
t d fi g _ t S ~ Racial Composition of the Firm's
.~.
_50-100%
seg
me
Tab
pap
rec
tha
cou
bin
(th
cat
per
sul
Table 3 shows that there is no evidence that all-white firms (O%-O.5% black) are
more likely than other firms to use employee referrals to generate new workers. If referrals were a deliberate strategy of discriminatory firms to avoid black applicants, one
should observe that employee referrals are more prevalent among white firms because
these firms are likely to be all white. This does not seem to be the case. Nonetheless, it is
also true that almost 16% of hires in all-white firms were obtained through the catchall
category of referrals, "'acquaintances and other." This percentage is significantly larger
than any other category of firm.
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Interfirm
Racial
Segregation
515
'
l4o
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~lac
Weighted) ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ wit
Weighted)it
Posted
Sign
Newspaper
Walk-in
Other
5.2
26.1
11.5
3.6
28.9
12.7
Method
1.4
31.0
11.0
6.0
4.8
4.7
25.9
14.5
5.3
5.2
4.2
21.7
16.6
5.4
27.0
12.7
5.2
5.5
Referrals
Employee
23.2
Institutional
24.0
11.7
24.9
16.1
28.2
15.7
31.9
13.9
12.4
25.4
13.7
100
825
100
476
100
434
100
327
100
351
100
2,413
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Table 4 depicts the relationship between recruitment methods and minority hiring by
showing the proportion of recent hires who were black according to the racial composition of the firm and the recruitment method used. Three important facts are suggested by
this table. First, compared with newspaper advertisements, the use of employee referrals
reduces the chance of a black worker being hired in a predominately white firm (between
0.5 and 10% black) by about 72%, from .116 to .033. Therefore, there is descriptive evi-
dence that predominately white firms tend to remain segregated because of referrals.
Moreover, in firms with larger black workforces, the black hire rate is larger for employee referrals than for newspaper advertisements. This finding also suggests support
for the hypothesis that the effect of referrals depends on the demographic composition of
the firm's current workers. In contrast, however, the overall chance of a black hire (.179
at the bottom of column 6) does not seem to be any different from when employee referrals are used (.179). Second, the black hiring rate for employee referrals is actually higher
than the rate for jobs that were filled using newspaper advertisements. This finding sug-
gests that the overall black employment rate is not adversely affected by the use of employee referrals. Instead, one should look for the effect of referrals on minority hiring
rates conditional on the racial composition of the firm's workers.
A third consideration suggested by Table 4 is that employee referrals are not associated with substantially lower rates of hiring blacks in all-white firms (.036 black versus
.043 overall and .049 using newspaper advertisements). Nonetheless, "acquaintance and
other" referrals, which are significantly more prevalent in this category of firm, result in
almost no black hires (.017 black). This evidence suggests that racial targeting could be
operating through acquaintance referrals rather than employee referrals. The use of acquaintance referrals may represent cases in which the job in question was never advertised broadly. Although this sort of hiring practice may be impractical for large firms
because of its informality and inability to generate a large number of applicants, it may
represent a means by which small discriminatory firms could target white job candidates.
Because the "acquaintance and other" category is an ambiguously defined catchall category, however, one should hesitate to draw any definitive conclusions about its affect on
racial hiring patterns. Overall, although the descriptive results of Table 4 are provocative,
it is necessary to determine whether these differences hold up once controls for heterogeneity in the type of job offered, the location of the firm, and other relevant characteristics
of the selection process are introduced.
To begin with, there do not appear to be significant differences in employees' and
customers' racial preferences, racial targeting in hiring, screening processes, and skills
needed by the different types of firms in these data that would explain the observed level
of interfirm segregation.3 First, the firm's personnel manager was asked whether he or she
thought that the firm's employees and customers had a preference for interacting with
workers of the same race. There do not seem to be large differences in this self-reported
measure of racial preference across firms with different racial compositions.4 The respondent was also asked whether the firm frequently targeted certain neighborhoods when
looking for workers. Neighborhood targeting was used by about a quarter of the firms in
the sample. However, in contrast to the qualitative results reported in Kirschenman and
Neckerman (1991), who reported that white employers tend to use racial targeting to avoid
hiring blacks, I found no evidence that the (self-reported) use of neighborhood targeting
is any higher in all-white firms than in integrated firms: 24.2% of all-white firms versus
27.0% of firms that are 100/o-25% black and 28.8% of firms that are 25%-50% black.
3. I discuss these results here. A complete table is available on request or by following the links for "pa-
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Interfirm
Racial
Segregation
517
Table 4. Proportion of the Most Recent Hires Who Were Black, by Recruitment Method
(Weighted)
Percentage Black in Firm
Recruitment Method 0-0.5% 0.5-10% 10-25% 25-50% 50-100% Total
Posted
Sign
Newspaper
Walk-in
Other
.026
.043
.072
Method
.055
.116
.065
.044
.343
.107
.198
.038
.225
.306
.411
.227
.506
.493
.776
.217
.154
.150
.254
.608
.162
Referrals
Employee
.033
Institutional
.033
.051
.181
.156
.233
.281
.479
.626
.179
.644
.247
Total
.041
825
.088
476
.176
434
.299
327
.618
351
.179
2,413
As I discussed earlier, some authors (e.g., Moss and Tilly 1995) have stressed the
ways in which the applicant screening process affects minority-hiring rates. To get a picture of the job requirements and screens used in the last recruiting process, I tabulated the
use of specific requirements and screens by the firm's racial composition. Overall, one
striking finding is that despite their importance in the theoretical literature, there seems to
be little systematic variation in these variables by the racial composition of the firm.5
Moreover, in the statistical models that follow, I found little evidence of a significant
effect for any of these variables on the probability that the last employee hired was black
(with the exception of daily math skills). For the sake of presenting concise regression
results, I omitted these variables from the regression models discussed here (full results
are available on request or at http://www.unc.edultedmouw/papers).
central city or the suburbs, but as Maps 1 and 2 indicate, this measure would have missed
much of the geographic variation in proximity to black residential areas. With similar
data, Holzer and Ihlanfeldt (1996) used the ratio of the distance of the firm to the centroid
of the black and white residential populations as a proxy for the effect of distance on
hiring patterns. If a circle of white suburbs surrounds a predominately black city center,
however, this approach may be misleading (in an extreme case, the centroids would both
be at the city center).
To take the spatial location of the firm into account with more precision, I calculated
a spatial measure of the racial composition of "nearby" workers for each firm. In essence, what this spatial measure does is find the proportion of workers who are black
5. For the categories of percentage black in the firm (0%-0.5%, 0.5%-10%, 10%-25%, 25%-50%, and
50%-100%) the requirement of a high school diploma is .302, .358, .378, .308, and .341; that of specific expe-
rience is .269, .263, .276, .264, and .228; that of checks on criminal records is .222, .286, .325, .363, and .404;
and that of the use of checks on education and training is .216, .223, .269, .337, and .341. Complete results are
available on request.
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within different-size concentric circles around each firm and then add up these proportions to a single measure, weighting nearby workers more than distant workers according
to actual commuting patterns. I calculated this racial composition measure in several
steps. First, using geographic information on the location of each firm, I identified the
census tract that the firm is located in. Next, I modeled actual commuting patterns. To
take into account the effect of distance on where individuals work, I estimated a "gravity
equation" of commuting behavior in the form of a negative binomial count model (see
Raphael 1998):
Tmp
where
kLa0E1pexp(ydmp),
Tm,
is
the
number
of
(1)
workers
spatial
segregatinm
())
(2)
7. Geographic identifiers are missing for 9.2% of the sample. These cases are coded to 0, and a "missing"
dummy variable is included.
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Interfirm
Racial
Segregation
519
firm size, and industry. Holzer (1998) showed that small firms are less likely to hire
black workers, possibly because they are exempt from governmental monitoring by the
Equal Employment Opportunities Commission (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
prohibits racial discrimination among employers with 15 or more employees). A significant number of the available positions are in firms with 1-10 employees (27.3%).
RESULTS
Statistical Models
Table 5 shows the results from probit models of whether a black worker was the last
worker hired by the firms in the sample. In all the models, newspaper recruitment was the
omitted recruitment category. As a result, I was testing whether there is any evidence that
other recruitment methods are associated with a higher or lower probability of hiring a
black worker than a newspaper advertisement. Newspaper advertisements are publicly
available announcements of job openings, and of all of the recruitment methods in Table
3 they are the closest approximation of what would happen if job openings were advertised in a manner that made them equally accessible across a metropolitan area, without
regard for space or word-of-mouth social networks.8
Model 1 uses only the recruitment method and racial composition of the firm as explanatory variables. In this model, there is no association between a black worker being
hired and employee referrals. Taken at face value, this finding suggests that there is no
evidence that employee referrals affect the overall probability of a black worker being
hired. These results are similar to those of Holzer and Reaser (2000), who found (also
using the MCSUI data) that employee referrals do not affect the number of black applicants to the firm, and suggest that the overall black employment rate is not reduced by the
use of employee referrals. In contrast, the racial composition of the firm's workers has a
significant effect on the probability of a black hire. Again, however, Model 1 does not
indicate whether this association represents the effect of discrimination, distance, or hiring practices.
Model 2 adds the number of employees and the spatial segregation measure. Notice
that the coefficients on the dummy variables for city decrease substantially in significance after the spatial segregation measure is included. This result reflects the fact that
much of the intercity difference in the racial composition of the labor force is included in
the spatial segregation measure. The magnitude of the coefficient on the spatial segregation variable suggests the importance of Hypothesis 1 ("residential segregation and spa-
tial mismatch") in explaining the hiring rate of black workers. Next, Model 3 adds the
variable measuring the proportion black in the three-digit census occupation in each metropolitan area. This variable controls for differences in the size of the available black
labor force working in that occupation in each city. As a result, Model 3 models interfirm
segregation by controlling for intracity occupational segregation. The inclusion of this
variable, however, has little substantive affect on the other variables in the model.
To test Hypothesis 2 (that social segregation and employee referrals help to reproduce
the current racial composition of the firm), I needed to test for the effect of referrals
conditional on the racial composition of the firm. I did so in Model 4 by including interaction terms between the recruitment method and the racial composition variable. These
interaction terms test whether other recruitment methods have statistically different black
hiring rates than do newspaper advertisements for each of the different categories of per8. This is not to deny the possibility that some employers may advertise in suburban or ethnic newspapers
that target specific ethnic and racial groups. If a substantial number of discriminatory employers used selective
newspaper advertising to avoid attracting minority applicants, the estimated effect of employee referrals on
segregation would appear to be smaller than it really is because newspaper advertisements are being used as a
proxy for what would happen if job openings were publicly displayed.
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Table 5. Probit Models of the Probability That the Last Employee Hired Was Black
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4a
Walk-in
0.268**
0.245*
0.234*
Employee
0.030
0.055
0.050
Atlanta
0.019
-0.010
-0.150
-0.137
-0.439
-0.066
0.072
0.083
-0.020
-0.001
-0.018
0.150
0.137
0.159
-0.183*
-0.158
-0.159
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Interfirm
(Table
5,
Racial
Segregation
521
continued)
centage black in the firm. If Hypothesis 2 is correct, then the use of referrals from current
employees in predominately white firms will tend to attract white applicants, with the
converse being true in predominately black firms. Table 5 shows the results for the control
variables for Model 4, and Table 6 shows the results for the interaction terms. Rather than
show each of the interaction terms separately (which would be 6 x 4 = 24 interaction terms
in addition to all the variables in Model 2), Table 6 presents a linear combination of terms
testing the hypothesis that the effects of other recruitment categories are different from
newspaper advertisements. For each column (i.e., racial composition of the firm) in Table
6, the comparison category is newspaper advertisements. For example, among firms that
are 0%-0.5% black, posted help-wanted signs have a negative effect compared with newspapers (-0.350), but the result is not statistically significant because the standard error is
high (0.443).9 For employee referrals, the sign of the effect compared with newspapers is
consistent with the social segregation hypothesis: a negative effect on black hiring rates in
predominately white firms (-0.690, p < .01) and a positive effect in predominately black
firms (0.564, p < .01). I also found a significant positive effect on black hiring rates for
institutional referrals compared with newspaper advertisements in firms that are more than
10% black and a positive effect for walk-ins in predominately black firms.
To clarify the substantive interpretation of the results from Model 3, Table 7 presents
the predicted probabilities (and 95% confidence intervals) of hiring a black worker based
on the results from the interaction terms in Model 4. The table sets all the other variables
used in the analysis to their population means, so that only the recruitment method and
the racial composition of the firm vary across the table. The asterisks indicate the statistical significance of other methods compared with newspaper advertisements identical to
the results in Table 6. The primary result in this table is that when the control variables
are held constant, the use of employee referrals, rather than newspaper advertisements, in
predominately white firms (0.5%-i 0% black) reduces the probability of a black hire from
.129 to .034, a 74% reduction. Similarly, employee referrals increase the black hiring rate
from .328 to .547 in predominately black firms (50%-100% black). As I indicated earlier,
both these results suggest support for the role of social segregation and employee referrals in interfirm racial segregation. Next, one can see that there is little evidence that
recruitment methods affect racial hiring patterns among all-white firms: acquaintance referrals, which substantially reduced black hire rates in all white firms in the descriptive
9. The coefficient is the sum of the baseline effect for help-wanted signs in the omitted percentage black
category (0.5%-10% black), -0.553, plus the interaction term between signs and 0%-0.5% black, 0.203.
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Table 6. Interaction Terms Between Recruitment Method and the Racial Composition of the
Firm for Model 3 (See Notes Below)
Percentage Black in Firm
-0.350
-0.553
0.587
-0.296
0.109
0.245
-0.379
0.135
0.260
0.835**
-0.117
-0.784
0.436
-0.210
0.536
10% black." The cells in this table test the hypothesis that the ef
(the effect of recruitment for the "0.5-10% black" and the inte
text for details. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
results in Table 4, are not statistically significant in Table 7. As a result, even though allwhite firms (0%-0.5% black) are more likely to use acquaintance referrals to fill vacancies (see Table 3), this likelihood does not appear to affect the hiring of blacks.
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Interfirm
Table
7.
Racial
Segregation
Predicted
523
Probability
of
.023
.046
.252
.151
.368
[.002, .118] [.004, .228] [.040, .660] [.039, .379] [.161, .624]
Newspaper
.050
.129
.105
.230
.328
[.025, .092] [.080, .197] [.061, .169] [.150, .330] [.216, .457]
Walk-in
.080
.066
.131
.316
.651
**
[.036, .156] [.023, .155] [.060, .246] [.198, .458] [.488, .791]
Other
.039
.028
.206
.171
.536
Employee
.042
.034**
.188
.205
.547**
.064
.190
.290**
.410*
.548*
[.026, .136] [.110, .297] [.185, .415] [.271, .561] [.377, .711]
Acquaintance
.024
.102
.140
.058
.518
Notes: 95% confidence intervals are shown in parentheses. The results are predicted
The asterisks indicate that the predicted probability that a black worker is hired usin
significantly different from the predicted probability that a black worker is hired usi
the specified racial composition at *p < .05 or **p <.01 (see Table 6).
is the same for all firms of the same racial composition.'0 To do so, I recoded the recruitment method variables to the group averages by the racial-composition category as depicted in Table 3 (for example, among firms that are 0.5%-10% black, newspapers are
used 28.9% of the time and employee referrals are used 24% of the time). For the first
scenario, I generated the predicted probability of hiring a black worker leaving all the
other variables unchanged from the results in Model 4 of Table 5. Using the predicted
values of hiring a black worker in firm m, Pmb, I could calculate the Theil measure of
10. In other words, rather than assume the firm used the recruitment method it used to hire its last worker
also to hire all its other workers, I assumed that recruitment methods are similar across categories of racial
composition. Assuming otherwise did not affect the magnitude of the predicted segregation indices presented in
Table 8, although the standard errors for Scenario 1 are smaller, resulting in higher levels of statistical significance.
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Y.
m=lr=b,w Pmr
b,
Wmr
XP
Pm
(3)
where
m
r
Pmb);
Wmr
probability
the average predicted hiring by race, respectively." For Scenario 2, I eliminated informal
recruitment by substituting newspaper recruitment for employee referrals (as a result, for
example, firms that are 0.5-10% black are then assumed to use newspaper advertisements
28.9% + 24% of the time). Everything else stays the same as in Scenario 1. For Scenario
3, I modified Scenario 1 by eliminating residential segregation by recoding the spatialsegregation measure to the mean for each metropolitan area to simulate the effect of eliminating racial residential segregation because each firm draws workers form a spatially
integrated labor force. Finally, Scenario 4 presents the combined effect of eliminating
informal recruitment and residential segregation.
Table 8 presents these results. In Panel A, the first column is the average proportion
of black workers in the firms, and the second column is the Theil index of segregation
under these various conditions. Because there is no analytically derived formula for the
standard error for the Theil index (as is the case for the other popular measures of segregation), I used a bootstrap resampling method to generate the standard errors (Efron and
Tibshirani 1993). I replicated the results by drawing 500 samples of 2,413 cases with
replacement from the data, reestimated Model 4, calculated the segregation index, and
used the distribution of results to calculate the standard errors. Because I wanted to test
whether eliminating employee referrals and/or residential segregation reduces employment segregation, Panel B presents significance tests of the comparison between the effects of Scenarios 2-4 to the baseline effect in Scenario 1.
The first row of Table 8 shows the actual proportion black and segregation level
among blue-collar employees for the firms in the data. In the actual data, .199 of the
workers are black, and the Theil index of segregation is .423. The "baseline" model shows
the results for Scenario 1, predicting the level of interfirm segregation on the basis of the
results in Model 4 (i.e., with the existing levels of social and residential segregation).
Notice that while the overall proportion black in the baseline model is virtually identical
to the actual level, the predicted segregation index is substantially lower (.236 versus
.423). This finding indicates that Model 4-and consequently Scenario 1-explains only
about 55% of the interfirm segregation in the actual data. The predicted levels of interfirm segregation presented here will be lower than the actual level of segregation if there
are other factors that affect segregation that are not included in the model (obviously,
employers' discrimination is one such factor).'2 However, as long as these factors are not
systematically correlated with the variables in Model 4, the magnitude of the effect of
spatial location and employee referrals on interfirm segregation should be unaffected.
Scenario 2 depicts what would happen if employee referrals were replaced by newspaper advertisements. Arguably, newspaper advertisements better represent the effect of
publicly available job information. On the basis of the results in Model 4 of Tables 5 and
11. Because the survey's sampling weights give a representative sample of firms weighted by employment, I used the sampling weight as the measure of wmr.
12. In addition, the actual level of interfirm segregation reported in Table 8 is not directly comparable to
the baseline model because the dependent variable in Model 4 is the race of the last worker hired, not the racial
composition of all the firm's blue-collar workers.
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Interfirm
Table
8.
Racial
Segregation
Predicted
525
Effect
of
Ref
(.269)
Predicted segregation based on Model 4
in Table 7
Scenario
1.
Baseline
.203
(.221)
.272
(.025)
(.026)
(.025)
(.193) (.025)
Panel B: Significance Tests: Null Hypothesis SEC
6, one knows that replacing employee referrals by newspaper advertisements would significantly affect the hiring of black workers in predominately white firms (0.5% to 10%
black) and predominately black firms (50% to 100% black). Table 8 confirms this by
showing that the effect of eliminating employee referrals is a 13% decline in the predicted segregation index, from .272 to .236. In Panel B, there is evidence that Scenario 2
results in a statistically significant reduction in the segregation index, but the reader
should also note that the bootstrap standard errors indicate that it is marginally significant
at the .05 level (3 = -0.0362, SE = 0.0182,p = .048).
Next, Scenario 3 indicates what would happen if residential segregation were eliminated. By recoding the spatial segregation measure to its mean for each city, I simulated a
situation in which the racial composition of the nearby labor force is the same for each
firm. This simulation results in a Theil segregation index of .246, which is 10% lower
than the baseline model but slightly higher than Scenario 2. Panel B shows that although
the effect of Scenario 3 (Hno spatial segregation) results in a smaller reduction in segregation than
does Scenario 2 (Hno employee referrals)' the standard errors are smaller (3 = -0.0263, SE =
0.0076, p < .001). Scenario 4 predicts the combined effect of removing employee referrals and residential segregation (a 23% decline in H).
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Finally, the last row of Panel B tests whether the effect of Scenarios 1 (no referrals)
and 2 (no spatial segregation) are equal. Despite the fact that the predicted effect of Scenario 1 is slightly lower than Scenario 2, I cannot reject the hypothesis that they have the
same effect on interfirm segregation. In other words, the evidence indicates that employee
referrals and residential segregation have similar effects on employment segregation.
Although Table 8 in some sense merely restates the results of Model 4 of Tables 5
and 6, it is useful to translate the regression coefficients into actual segregation levels. Of
course, the predicted segregation levels are only as good or as accurate as the underlying
statistical model that is used to generate them-and using the actual level of segregation
among these firms as a guide, the model explains only about half the overall level of
interfirm segregation. Nonetheless, the results show that employee referrals have a statistically significant effect on the level of interfirm segregation and that the effect of referrals seems to be roughly equivalent to the effect of the spatial location of the firm within
the metropolitan area."3
complete information is lacking on the networks of the workers who were hired through
employee referrals and of those who were not hired (or did not even hear about the jobs
because of their isolation from job networks). If a large number of black workers are
isolated from job networks as a whole, then the results in Models 1 and 2 suggest that some
black workers are hurt and other black workers are aided by the use of employee referrals
to fill vacancies. However, in the aggregate, what seems to be the most salient is not the
lack of job contacts, but the segregation of job networks. Evidence on the social networks
13. An anonymous reviewer suggested that a dynamic model of the effect of referrals on segregation,
where the probability of hiring a black worker in a given period is an increasing function of the proportion of
black workers in the firm at the start of the period, might result in complete segregation in equilibrium. A
mathematical depiction of such a dynamic model, however, indicates that complete firm-level segregation is
possible only if friendships are perfectly segregated. Details are available on my web site (http://www.unc.edu/
-tedmouw/papers) or by request.
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Interfirm
Racial
Segregation
527
of black and white workers in Atlanta, Boston, and Los Angeles was presented in Table 1.
It seems that black workers in the MCSUI data are just as likely as white workers to use
contacts to find work (about 50% of both black and white workers used contacts)-the key
difference is that 86.9% of the job contacts of white workers are white, whereas 86.1% of
the contacts of black workers are black. In other words, it is not that black workers as a
whole lack job contacts, but that job contacts in these urban areas are highly racially
segregated.
In conclusion, I have presented the first empirical evidence of the effect of employee
referrals on interfirm segregation. In the metropolitan areas in the study, the combination
of high levels of racial social segregation and the informal organization of the labor market results in the transmission of a substantial amount of job information along segregated social networks. As a result, when employers hire through employee referrals, they
tend to reproduce the current racial composition of their workforce. The results presented
here suggest that employee referrals in predominately white firms reduce the chance of a
black worker being hired by about 75% in these four cities. Moreover, despite the attention that has been paid to the role of residential segregation and the decentralization of
employment in creating black-white labor market inequalities, this article has shown that
the effect of social segregation is also important. The role of employee referrals and segregated job networks is just as important as is spatial segregation in causing employment
segregation between white and black workers-both increase the predicted level of interfirm segregation by about 10%-i 3%.
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