Professional Documents
Culture Documents
193707
PERALTA, J.:
The information, which was filed with the RTC-Cebu and raffled to
Branch 20 thereof, states that:
DECISION
If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause
of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any
one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others.
Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application
would work undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the
forum. To give justice is the most important function of law; hence,
a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates the
fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws.48
Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither
enforce a parents obligation to support his child nor penalize the
noncompliance therewith, such obligation is still duly enforceable in
the Philippines because it would be of great injustice to the child to
be denied of financial support when the latter is entitled thereto.
We emphasize, however, that as to petitioner herself, respondent is
no longer liable to support his former wife, in consonance with the
ruling in San Luis v. San Luis,49 to wit:
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled
that she should no longerbe considered marriedto the alien spouse.
Further, she should not be required to perform her marital duties
and obligations. It held:
SO ORDERED.
The Case
The petitioner, the second wife of the late Atty. Juan Luces Luna,
appeals the adverse decision promulgated on November 11,
2005,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed with
modification the decision rendered on August 27, 2001 by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 138, in Makati City.2 The CA
thereby denied her right in the 25/100 pro indiviso share of the
husband in a condominium unit, and in the law books of the
husband acquired during the second marriage.
Antecedents
The antecedent facts were summarized by the CA as follows:
ATTY. LUNA, a practicing lawyer, was at first a name partner in the
prestigious law firm Sycip, Salazar, Luna, Manalo, Hernandez &
Feliciano Law Offices at that time when he was living with his first
wife, herein intervenor-appellant Eugenia Zaballero-Luna
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.5
Decision of the CA
Both parties appealed to the CA.6
On her part, the petitioner assigned the following errors to the
RTC, namely:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
CONDOMINIUM UNIT WAS ACQUIRED THRU THE SOLE
INDUSTRY OF ATTY. JUAN LUCES LUNA;
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT
PLAINTIFFAPPELLANT DID NOT CONTRIBUTE MONEY FOR
THE ACQUISITION OF THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT;
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO
PORTIONS OF THE TESTIMONY OF GREGORIO LUNA, WHO
HAS NO ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE ACQUISITION OF
THE UNIT, BUT IGNORED OTHER PORTIONS OF HIS
TESTIMONY FAVORABLE TO THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT;
IV. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING
SIGNIFICANCE TO THE FACT THAT THE CONJUGAL
PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN LUNA AND INTERVENORAPPELLANT WAS ALREADY DISSOLVED AND LIQUIDATED
PRIOR TO THE UNION OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT AND LUNA;
V. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE
SIGNIFICANCE TO THE ABSENCE OF THE DISPOSITION OF
THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT IN THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL OF
THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT;
VI. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE
SIGNIFICANCE TO THE FACTTHAT THE NAME OF PLAINTIFFAPPELLANT DID NOT APPEAR IN THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE
xxxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed August 27, 2001
Decision of the RTC of MakatiCity, Branch 138, is hereby
MODIFIEDas follows:
(a) The 25/100 pro-indiviso share in the condominium unit
at the SIXTH FLOOR of the KALAW LEDESMA
CONDOMINIUM PROJECT covered by Condominium
Certificate of Title No. 21761 consisting of FIVE HUNDRED
SEVENTEEN (517/100) (sic) SQUARE METERS is hereby
adjudged to defendants-appellants, the heirs of Juan Luces
Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (first marriage), having
been acquired from the sole funds and sole industry of Juan
Luces Luna while marriage of Juan Luces Luna and Eugenia
Zaballero-Luna (first marriage) was still subsisting and
valid;
(b) Plaintiff-appellant Soledad Lavadia has no right as owner
or under any other concept over the condominium unit,
hence the entry in Condominium Certificate of Title No.
21761 of the Registry of Deeds ofMakati with respect to the
civil status of Juan Luces Luna should be changed from
"JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Soledad L. Luna" to "JUAN
LUCES LUNA married to Eugenia Zaballero Luna";
(c) Defendants-appellants, the heirs of Juan Luces Luna and
Eugenia Zaballero-Luna(first marriage) are hereby declared
to be the owner of the books Corpus Juris, Fletcher on
Corporation, American Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme
Court Reports found in the condominium unit.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.11
On March 13, 2006,12 the CA denied the petitioners motion for
reconsideration.13
Issues
The first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, both Filipinos,
was solemnized in the Philippines on September 10, 1947. The law
in force at the time of the solemnization was the Spanish Civil
Code, which adopted the nationality rule. The Civil Codecontinued
to follow the nationality rule, to the effect that Philippine laws
relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and
legal capacity of persons were binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, although living abroad.15 Pursuant to the nationality
rule, Philippine laws governed thiscase by virtue of bothAtty. Luna
and Eugenio having remained Filipinos until the death of Atty. Luna
on July 12, 1997 terminated their marriage.
From the time of the celebration ofthe first marriage on September
10, 1947 until the present, absolute divorce between Filipino
spouses has not been recognized in the Philippines. The nonrecognition of absolute divorce between Filipinos has remained
even under the Family Code,16 even if either or both of the spouses
are residing abroad.17 Indeed, the only two types of defective
marital unions under our laws have beenthe void and the voidable
marriages. As such, the remedies against such defective marriages
have been limited to the declaration of nullity ofthe marriage and
the annulment of the marriage.
It is true that on January 12, 1976, the Court of First Instance
(CFI) of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic issued the Divorce
Decree dissolving the first marriage of Atty. Luna and
Eugenia.18 Conformably with the nationality rule, however, the
divorce, even if voluntarily obtained abroad, did not dissolve the
marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, which subsisted up to
the time of his death on July 12, 1997. This finding conforms to the
Constitution, which characterizes marriage as an inviolable social
institution,19 and regards it as a special contract of permanent
union between a man and a woman for the establishment of a
conjugal and family life.20 The non-recognition of absolute divorce
in the Philippines is a manifestation of the respect for the sanctity
of the marital union especially among Filipino citizens. It affirms
that the extinguishment of a valid marriage must be grounded only
upon the death of either spouse, or upon a ground expressly
provided bylaw. For as long as this public policy on marriage
between Filipinos exists, no divorce decree dissolving the marriage
Considering that Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not entered into any
marriage settlement prior to their marriage on September 10,
1947, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of
gains governed their property relations. This is because the
Spanish Civil Code, the law then in force at the time of their
marriage, did not specify the property regime of the spouses in the
event that they had not entered into any marriage settlement
before or at the time of the marriage. Article 119 of the Civil
Codeclearly so provides, to wit:
approval. All the creditors of the husband and of the wife, as well
as of the conjugal partnership shall be notified of any petition for
judicialapproval or the voluntary dissolution of the conjugal
partnership, so that any such creditors may appear atthe hearing
to safeguard his interests. Upon approval of the petition for
dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the court shall take such
measures as may protect the creditors and other third persons.
But was not the approval of the Agreement by the CFI of Sto.
Domingo in the Dominican Republic sufficient in dissolving and
liquidating the conjugal partnership of gains between the late Atty.
Luna and Eugenia?
The query is answered in the negative. There is no question that
the approval took place only as an incident ofthe action for divorce
instituted by Atty. Luna and Eugenia, for, indeed, the justifications
for their execution of the Agreement were identical to the grounds
raised in the action for divorce.21 With the divorce not being itself
valid and enforceable under Philippine law for being contrary to
Philippine public policy and public law, the approval of the
Agreement was not also legally valid and enforceable under
Philippine law. Consequently, the conjugal partnership of gains of
Atty. Luna and Eugenia subsisted in the lifetime of their marriage.
3. Atty. Lunas marriage with Soledad, being bigamous,
was void; properties acquired during their marriage
were governed by the rules on co-ownership
What law governed the property relations of the second marriage
between Atty. Luna and Soledad?
The CA expressly declared that Atty. Lunas subsequent marriage to
Soledad on January 12, 1976 was void for being bigamous,22 on the
ground that the marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not
been dissolved by the Divorce Decree rendered by the CFI of Sto.
the contributions and purchases; and that Atty. Luna could not
acquire the properties on his own due to the meagerness of the
income derived from his law practice.
Did the petitioner discharge her burden of proof on the coownership?
In resolving the question, the CA entirely debunked the petitioners
assertions on her actual contributions through the following
findings and conclusions, namely:
SOLEDAD was not able to prove by preponderance of evidence that
her own independent funds were used to buy the law office
condominium and the law books subject matter in contentionin this
case proof that was required for Article 144 of the New Civil Code
and Article 148 of the Family Code to apply as to cases where
properties were acquired by a man and a woman living together as
husband and wife but not married, or under a marriage which was
void ab initio. Under Article 144 of the New Civil Code, the rules on
co-ownership would govern. But this was not readily applicable to
many situations and thus it created a void at first because it
applied only if the parties were not in any way incapacitated or
were without impediment to marry each other (for it would be
absurd to create a co-ownership where there still exists a prior
conjugal partnership or absolute community between the man and
his lawful wife). This void was filled upon adoption of the Family
Code. Article 148 provided that: only the property acquired by both
of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money,
property or industry shall be owned in common and in proportion
to their respective contributions. Such contributions and
corresponding shares were prima faciepresumed to be equal.
However, for this presumption to arise, proof of actual contribution
was required. The same rule and presumption was to apply to joint
deposits of money and evidence of credit. If one of the parties was
validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership
accrued to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing
in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith was not
validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the
manner provided in the last paragraph of the Article 147. The rules
on forfeiture applied even if both parties were in bad faith. Coownership was the exception while conjugal partnership of gains
of the Law firm of Atty. Luna. The loans from Allied Banking
Corporation and Far East Bank and Trust Company were loans of
Atty. Luna and his partners and plaintiff does not have evidence to
show that she paid for them fully or partially. x x x"
The fact that CCT No. 4779 and subsequently, CCT No. 21761 were
in the name of "JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna"
was no proof that SOLEDAD was a co-owner of the condominium
unit. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different
acts. It is well settled that registration does not confer title but
merely confirms one already existing. The phrase "married to"
preceding "Soledad L. Luna" is merely descriptive of the civil status
of ATTY. LUNA.
SOLEDAD, the second wife, was not even a lawyer. So it is but
logical that SOLEDAD had no participation in the law firm or in the
purchase of books for the law firm. SOLEDAD failed to prove that
she had anything to contribute and that she actually purchased or
paid for the law office amortization and for the law books. It is
more logical to presume that it was ATTY. LUNA who bought the
law office space and the law books from his earnings from his
practice of law rather than embarrassingly beg or ask from
SOLEDAD money for use of the law firm that he headed.30
The Court upholds the foregoing findings and conclusions by the CA
both because they were substantiated by the records and because
we have not been shown any reason to revisit and undo them.
Indeed, the petitioner, as the party claiming the co-ownership, did
not discharge her burden of proof. Her mere allegations on her
contributions, not being evidence,31 did not serve the purpose. In
contrast, given the subsistence of the first marriage between Atty.
Luna and Eugenia, the presumption that Atty. Luna acquired the
properties out of his own personal funds and effort remained. It
should then be justly concluded that the properties in litislegally
pertained to their conjugal partnership of gains as of the time of
his death. Consequently, the sole ownership of the 25/100 pro
indivisoshare of Atty. Luna in the condominium unit, and of the
lawbooks pertained to the respondents as the lawful heirs of Atty.
Luna.
REGALADO, J.:
Petitioner appeals for the reversal of the decision 1 of respondent
Court of Appeals promulgated on May 17, 1991 in CA-G.R. CV No.
07054, entitled "Zenaida B. Cirilo vs. Conrado Bunag, Sr. and
Conrado Bunag, Jr.," which affirmedin toto the decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch XI at Bacoor, Cavite, and, implicitly,
respondent court's resolution of September 3, 1991 2 denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Respondent court having assiduously discussed the salient
antecedents of this case, vis-a-vis the factual findings of the court
below, the evidence of record and the contentions of the parties, it
is appropriate that its findings, which we approve and adopt, be
extensively reproduced hereunder:
Based on the evidence on record, the following facts
are considered indisputable: On the afternoon of
September 8, 1973, defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr.
brought plaintiff-appellant to a motel or hotel where
they had sexual intercourse. Later that evening, said
defendant-appellant brought plaintiff-appellant to the
house of his grandmother Juana de Leon in
Pamplona, Las Pias, Metro Manila, where they lived
together as husband and wife for 21 days, or until
Petitioner would, however, belabor the fact that said damages were
awarded by the trial court on the basis of a finding that he is guilty
of forcible abduction with rape, despite the prior dismissal of the
complaint therefor filed by private respondent with the Pasay City
Fiscal's Office.
Generally, the basis of civil liability from crime is the fundamental
postulate of our law that every person criminally liable for a felony
is also civilly liable. In other words, criminal liability will give rise to
civil liability ex delicto only if the same felonious act or omission
results in damage or injury to another and is the direct and
proximate cause thereof. 11 Hence, extinction of the penal action
does not carry with it the extinction of civil liability unless the
extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the
fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. 12
In the instant case, the dismissal of the complaint for forcible
abduction with rape was by mere resolution of the fiscal at the
preliminary investigation stage. There is no declaration in a final
judgment that the fact from which the civil case might arise did not
exist. Consequently, the dismissal did not in any way affect the
right of herein private respondent to institute a civil action arising
from the offense because such preliminary dismissal of the penal
action did not carry with it the extinction of the civil action.
The reason most often given for this holding is that the two
proceedings involved are not between the same parties.
Furthermore, it has long been emphasized, with continuing validity
up to now, that there are different rules as to the competency of
witnesses and the quantum of evidence in criminal and civil
proceedings. In a criminal action, the State must prove its case by
evidence which shows the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt, while in a civil action it is sufficient for the plaintiff to
sustain his cause by preponderance of evidence only. 13 Thus,
in Rillon, et al. vs. Rillon, 14 we stressed that it is not now
necessary that a criminal prosecution for rape be first instituted
and prosecuted to final judgment before a civil action based on said
offense in favor of the offended woman can likewise be instituted
and prosecuted to final judgment.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
t of Court assailing the September 29, 2011 Decision1 of the Court
of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414, which affirmed the April
25, 2008Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Imus, Cavite (RTC).
declaring the marriage of Daniel Lee Fringer (Fringer) and
respondent Liberty Albios (A/bios) as void from the beginning.
The facts
On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were
married before Judge Ofelia I. Calo of the Metropolitan Trial Court,
Branch59, Mandaluyong City (MeTC), as evidenced by a Certificate
of Marriage with Register No. 2004-1588.3
On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for
declaration of nullity 4 of her marriage with Fringer. She alleged
that immediately after their marriage, they separated and never
lived as husband and wife because they never really had any
intention of entering into a married state or complying with any of
their essential marital obligations. She described their marriage as
one made in jest and, therefore, null and void ab initio .
Summons was served on Fringer but he did not file his answer. On
September 13, 2007, Albios filed a motion to set case for pre-trial
and to admit her pre-trial brief. The RTC ordered the Assistant
xxxx
SO ORDERED.6
The RTC was of the view that the parties married each other for
convenience only. Giving credence to the testimony of Albios, it
stated that she contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage to
enable her to acquire American citizenship; that in consideration
thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum of $2,000.00; that after
the ceremony, the parties went their separate ways; that Fringer
returned to the United States and never again communicated with
her; and that, in turn, she did not pay him the $2,000.00 because
he never processed her petition for citizenship. The RTC, thus,
ruled that when marriage was entered into for a purpose other
than the establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a
farce and should not be recognized from its inception.
The OSG also argues that the present case does not fall within the
concept of a marriage in jest. The parties here intentionally
consented to enter into a real and valid marriage, for if it were
otherwise, the purpose of Albios to acquire American citizenship
would be rendered futile.
On October 29, 2012, Albios filed her Comment9 to the petition,
reiterating her stand that her marriage was similar to a marriage
by way of jest and, therefore, void from the beginning.
On March 22, 2013, the OSG filed its Reply10 reiterating its
arguments in its petition for review on certiorari.
Ruling of the Court
The resolution of this case hinges on this sole question of law: Is a
marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American
citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the
ground of lack of consent?
The Court resolves in the negative.
Before the Court delves into its ruling, It shall first examine the
phenomenon of marriage fraud for the purposes of immigration.
Marriage Fraud in Immigration
The institution of marriage carries with it concomitant benefits. This
has led to the development of marriage fraud for the sole purpose
of availing of particular benefits. In the United States, marriages
where a couple marries only to achieve a particular purpose or
acquire specific benefits, have been referred to as "limited
purpose" marriages.11 A common limited purpose marriage is one
entered into solely for the legitimization of a child.12Another, which
is the subject of the present case, is for immigration purposes.
Immigration law is usually concerned with the intention of the
couple at the time of their marriage,13 and it attempts to filter out
those who use marriage solely to achieve immigration status.14
Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and
Fringer. In fact, there was real consent because it was not vitiated
nor rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their consent was
also conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and
the beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as
nothing impaired their ability to do so. That their consent was
freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of
acquiring American citizenship through marriage. Such plainly
demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately contracted the
marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid
marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of an
application for citizenship. There was a full and complete
understanding of the legal tie that would be created between them,
since it was that precise legal tie which was necessary to
accomplish their goal.
In ruling that Albios marriage was void for lack of consent, the CA
characterized such as akin to a marriage by way of jest. A marriage
Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The
State does not and cannot dictate on the kind of life that a couple
xxxx
In the case at bar, petitioner failed to prove that his wife
(respondent) suffers from psychological incapacity. He presented
the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses who concluded
that respondent is psychologically incapacitated, but the
conclusions of these witnesses were premised on the alleged acts
or behavior of respondent which had not been sufficiently proven.
Petitioners experts heavily relied on petitioners allegations of
respondents constant mahjong sessions, visits to the beauty
parlor, going out with friends, adultery, and neglect of their
children. Petitioners experts opined that respondents alleged
habits, when performed constantly to the detriment of quality and
quantity of time devoted to her duties as mother and wife,
constitute a psychological incapacity in the form of NPD.
But petitioners allegations, which served as the bases or
underlying premises of the conclusions of his experts, were not
actually proven. In fact, respondent presented contrary evidence
refuting these allegations of the petitioner.
For instance, petitioner alleged that respondent constantly played
mahjong and neglected their children as a result. Respondent
admittedly played mahjong, but it was not proven that she
engaged in mahjong so frequently that she neglected her duties as
a mother and a wife. Respondent refuted petitioners allegations
that she played four to five times a week. She maintained it was
only two to three times a week and always with the permission of
her husband and without abandoning her children at home. The
children corroborated this, saying that they were with their mother
when she played mahjong in their relatives home. Petitioner did
not present any proof, other than his own testimony, that the
mahjong sessions were so frequent that respondent neglected her
family. While he intimated that two of his sons repeated the second
grade, he was not able to link this episode to respondents
mahjong-playing. The least that could have been done was to
prove the frequency of respondents mahjong-playing during the
years when these two children were in second grade. This was not
done. Thus, while there is no dispute that respondent played
mahjong, its alleged debilitating frequency and adverse effect on
the children were not proven.
Here, the findings and evaluation by the RTC as the trial court
deserved credence because it was in the better position to view
and examine the demeanor of the witnesses while they were
testifying.16 The position and role of the trial judge in the
appreciation of the evidence showing the psychological incapacity
were not to be downplayed but should be accorded due importance
and respect.
Yet, in the September 19, 2011 decision, the Court brushed aside
the opinions tendered by Dr. Cristina Gates,a psychologist, and Fr.
Gerard Healy on the ground that their conclusions were solely
based on the petitioners version of the events.
After a long and hard second look, we consider it improper and
unwarranted to give to such expert opinions a merely generalized
consideration and treatment, least of all to dismiss their value as
inadequate basis for the declaration of the nullity of the marriage.
Instead, we hold that said experts sufficiently and competently
described the psychological incapacity of the respondent within the
standards of Article 36 of the Family Code. We uphold the
conclusions reached by the two expert witnesses because they
were largely drawn from the case records and affidavits, and
should not anymore be disputed after the RTC itself had accepted
the veracity of the petitioners factual premises.17
Admittedly, Dr. Gates based her findings on the transcript of the
petitioners testimony, as well as on her interviews of the petitioner,
his sister Trinidad, and his son Miguel. Although her findings would
seem to be unilateral under such circumstances, it was not right to
disregard the findings on that basis alone. After all, her expert
opinion took into consideration other factors extant in the records,
including the own opinions of another expert who had analyzed the
issue from the side of the respondent herself. Moreover, it is
already settled that the courts must accord weight to expert
testimony on the psychological and mental state of the parties in
cases for the declaration of the nullityof marriages, for by the very
Verily, the totality of the evidence must show a link, medical or the
like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and
the psychological disorder itself. If other evidence showing that a
certain condition could possibly result from an assumed state of
facts existed in the record, the expert opinion should be admissible
and be weighed as an aid for the court in interpreting such other
evidence on the causation.21 Indeed, an expert opinion on
psychological incapacity should be considered as conjectural or
speculative and without any probative value only in the absence of
other evidence to establish causation. The experts findings under
such circumstances would not constitute hearsay that would justify
their exclusion as evidence.22 This is so, considering that any ruling
that brands the scientific and technical procedure adopted by Dr.
Gates as weakened by bias should be eschewed if it was clear that
her psychiatric evaluation had been based on the parties
upbringing and psychodynamics.23 In that context, Dr. Gates
expertopinion should be considered not in isolation but along with
the other evidence presented here.
Moreover, in its determination of the issue of psychological
incapacity, the trial court was expectedto compare the expert
A : Also the same thing. It just did notfit in to her lifestyle to fulfill
her obligation to her husband and toher children. She had her own
priorities, her beauty and her going out and her mahjong and
associating with friends. They were the priorities of her life.
A : I would say its grave from the actual cases of neglect of her
family and that causes serious obligations which she has ignored
and not properly esteemed because she is so concern[ed] with
herself in her own lifestyle. Very serious.
Q : And what you are saying is that, her family was merely
secondary?
A : Secondary.
xxxx
Q : And how does that relate to psychological incapacity?
A : That she could not appreciate or absorb or fulfill the obligations
of marriage which everybody takes for granted. The concentration
on the husband and the children before everything else would be
subordinated to the marriage withher. Its the other way around.
Her beauty, her going out, her beauty parlor and her mahjong,
they were their priorities in her life.
Q : And in medical or clinical parlance, what specifically do you call
this?
A : That is narcissism where the person falls in love with himself is
from a myt[h]ical case in Roman history.
Q : Could you please define tous what narcissism is?
A : Its a self-love, falling in love with oneself to make up for the
loss of a dear friend as in the case of Narcissus, the myth, and
then that became known in clinical terminology as narcissism.
When a person is so concern[ed] with her own beauty and
prolonging and protecting it, then it becomes the top priority in her
life.
xxxx
Q : And you stated that circumstances that prove this narcissism.
How do you consider this narcissism afflicting respondent, it is
grave, slight or .?
A : Lets say, it was manifested for so many years in her life. It was
found in her family background situation. Say, almost for sure
would be incurable now.
Article 209. Pursuant to the natural right and duty of parents over
the person and property of their unemancipated children, parental
authority and responsibility shall includethe caring for and rearing
of such children for civic consciousness and efficiency and the
development of their moral, mental and physical character and
well-being.
Article 220. The parents and those exercising parental authority
shall have with respect to their unemancipated children or wards
the following rights and duties:
(1) To keep them in their company, to support, educate and
instruct them by right precept and good example, and to
provide for their upbringing in keeping with their means;
(2) x x x x
The September 19, 2011 decision did not properly take into
consideration the findings of the RTC to the effect that both the
petitioner and the respondent had been psychologically
incapacitated, and thus could not assume the essential obligations
of marriage. The RTC would not have found so without the
allegation to that effect by the respondent in her answer,39 whereby
she averred that it was not she but the petitioner who had suffered
from psychological incapacity.
The allegation of the petitionerspsychological incapacity was
substantiated by Dr. Dayan, as follows:
ATTY. BRETAA:
Q : You stated earlier that both parties were behaviorally
immature?
A : Yes, sir.
A : Sir, for the reason that even before the marriage Malyn had
noticed already some of those short temper of the petitioner but
she was very much in love and so she lived-in with him and even
the time that they were together, that they were living in, she also
had noticed some of his psychological deficits if we may say so. But
as I said, because she is also dependent and she was one who
determined to make the relationship work, she was denying even
those kinds of problems that she had seen.
(6) x x x x
(7) x x x x
(8) x x x x
(9) x x x x (emphasis supplied)
A : Sir, it would impair his ability to have sexual integrity and also
to be fully committed to the role of husband to Malyn.
Q : Madam Witness, you never directly answered my question on
whether the petitioner was psychologically incapacitated to perform
his duty as a husband. You only said that the petitioner was
behaviorally immature and that the marriage was a mistake. Now,
may I asked [sic] you that question again and request you to
answer that directly?
A : Sir, he is psychologically incapacitated.40
Although the petitioner, as the plaintiff, carried the burden to prove
the nullity of the marriage, the respondent, as the defendant
spouse, could establish the psychological incapacity of her husband
because she raised the matter in her answer. The courts are
justified in declaring a marriage null and void under Article 36 of
the Family Code regardless of whether it is the petitioner or the
respondent who imputes the psychological incapacity to the other
as long as the imputation is fully substantiated with proof. Indeed,
psychological incapacity may exist in one party alone or in both of
them, and if psychological incapacity of either or both is
established, the marriage has to be deemed null and void.
More than twenty (20) years had passed since the parties parted
ways. By now, they must have already accepted and come to terms
with the awful truth that their marriage, assuming it existed in the
eyes of the law, was already beyond repair. Both parties had
inflicted so much damage not only to themselves, but also to the
lives and psyche of their own children. It would be a greater
injustice should we insist on still recognizing their void marriage,
and then force them and their children to endure some more
damage. This was the very same injustice that Justice Romero
decried in her erudite dissenting opinion in Santos v. Court of
Appeals:41
It would be great injustice, I believe, to petitioner for this Court to
give a much too restrictive interpretation of the law and compel the
petitioner to continue to be married to a wife who for purposes of
fulfilling her marital duties has, for all practical purposes, ceased to
exist.
Besides, there are public policy considerations involved in the ruling
the Court makes today.1wphi1 It is not, in effect, directly or
indirectly, facilitating the transformation of petitioner into a
"habitual tryster" or one forced to maintain illicit relations with
another woman or women with emerging problems of illegitimate
children, simply because he is denied by private respondent, his
wife, the companionship and conjugal love which he has sought
from her and towhich he is legally entitled?
I do not go as far as to suggest that Art. 36 of the Family Code is a
sanction for absolute divorce but I submit that we should not
constrict it to non-recognition of its evident purpose and thus deny
to one like petitioner, an opportunity to turn a new leaf in his life by
declaring his marriage a nullity by reason of his wifes psychological
incapacity to perform an essential marital obligation. In this case,
the marriage never existed from the beginning because the
respondent was afflicted with psychological incapacity at and prior
to the time of the marriage. Hence, the Court should not hesitate
to declare the nullity of the marriage between the parties.
To stress, our mandate to protect the inviolability of marriage as
the basic foundation of our society does not preclude striking down
a marital union that is "ill-equipped to promote family life," thus:
Now is also the opportune time to comment on another common
legal guide utilized in the adjudication of petitions for declaration of
nullity in the adjudication of petitions for declaration of nullity
under Article 36. All too frequently, this Court and lower courts, in
denying petitions of the kind, have favorably cited Sections 1 and
2, Article XV of the Constitution, which respectively state that
"[t]he State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the
nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively
promote its total development[t]," and that [m]arriage, as an
inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall
be protected by the State." These provisions highlight the
importance of the family and the constitutional protection accorded
to the institution of marriage.
In 1986, Ciprianos wife left for the United States bringing along
their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his
wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.
SO ORDERED.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one
party is later naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid
divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the Filipino
spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law?
Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to
make a definite ruling on this apparently novel question, presented
as a pure question of law.
In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails
the Decision1 dated May 15, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of
Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and its Resolution2 dated
July 4, 2002 denying the motion for reconsideration. The court a
quo had declared that herein respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is
capacitated to remarry. The fallo of the impugned Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph of
Art. 26 of the Family Code and by reason of the divorce decree
obtained against him by his American wife, the petitioner is given
the capacity to remarry under the Philippine Law.
IT IS SO ORDERED.3
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had
obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent
Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently live at 5566 A.
Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority
to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code.
No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court
granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it
was denied.
In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE
26 OF THE FAMILY CODE4
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family
Code is not applicable to the instant case because it only applies to
a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between a
Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper remedy, according to the
OSG, is to file a petition for annulment or for legal
separation.5 Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law that
governs respondents situation. The OSG posits that this is a
matter of legislation and not of judicial determination.6
parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is one
where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were
two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an
American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her
capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried an American citizen
while residing in the U.S.A.
Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings9 on the Family
Code, the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines (CBCP)
registered the following objections to Paragraph 2 of Article 26:
1. The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those whose
spouses are Filipinos who divorce them abroad. These spouses who
are divorced will not be able to re-marry, while the spouses of
foreigners who validly divorce them abroad can.
2. This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of divorce
even for Filipino citizens. For those whose foreign spouses validly
divorce them abroad will also be considered to be validly divorced
here and can re-marry. We propose that this be deleted and made
into law only after more widespread consultation. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations
showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to
Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision
Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a
divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985
case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.10 The Van Dorn case involved a
marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held
therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is
valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is
capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.
Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but
later on, one of them obtains a foreign citizenship by
naturalization?
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v.
Court of Appeals.11 In Quita, the parties were, as in this case,
Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife became a
naturalized American citizen in 1954 and obtained a divorce in the
same year. The Court therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that
a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer
married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying
the rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be
interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of
the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on,
one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a
divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to
remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the
solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to
sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of a
statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to
mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the
legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and
reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A
statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal
meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or
intent.12
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the
absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the
alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to
the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as
coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the
application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
After their quarrel, Jerry left their conjugal dwelling and this was
the last time that the respondent ever saw him. Since then, she
had not seen, communicated nor heard anything from Jerry or
about his whereabouts.
On May 21, 2002, or more than four (4) years from the time of
Jerrys disappearance, the respondent filed before the RTC a
petition4for her husbands declaration of presumptive death,
docketed as SP Proc. Case No. 313-25. She claimed that she had a
well-founded belief that Jerry was already dead. She alleged that
she had inquired from her mother-in-law, her brothers-in-law, her
sisters-in-law, as well as her neighbors and friends, but to no avail.
In the hopes of finding Jerry, she also allegedly made it a point to
check the patients directory whenever she went to a hospital. All
these earnest efforts, the respondent claimed, proved futile,
prompting her to file the petition in court.
The petitioner brought the matter via a Rule 45 petition before this
Court. The Petition The petitioner contends that certiorari lies to
challenge the decisions, judgments or final orders of trial courts in
petitions for declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse
under Rule 41 of the Family Code. It maintains that although
judgments of trial courts in summary judicial proceedings,
including presumptive death cases, are deemed immediately final
and executory (hence, not appeal able under Article 247 of the
Family Code), this rule does not mean that they are not subject to
review on certiorari.
The petitioner also posits that the respondent did not have a wellfounded belief to justify the declaration of her husbands
presumptive death. It claims that the respondent failed to conduct
the requisite diligent search for her missing husband. Likewise, the
petitioner invites this Courts attention to the attendant
circumstances surrounding the case, particularly, the degree of
search conducted and the respondents resultant failure to meet
the strict standard under Article 41 of the Family Code.
The Issues
Art. 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and
executory. [underscores ours]
With the judgment being final, it necessarily follows that it is no
longer subject to an appeal, the dispositions and conclusions
therein having become immutable and unalterable not only as
against the parties but even as against the courts.8 Modification of
the courts ruling, no matter how erroneous is no longer
permissible. The final and executory nature of this summary
proceeding thus prohibits the resort to appeal. As explained
in Republic of the Phils. v. Bermudez-Lorino,9 the right to appeal is
not granted to parties because of the express mandate of Article
247 of the Family Code, to wit:
In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code, there is
no reglementary period within which to perfect an appeal, precisely
because judgments rendered thereunder, by express provision of
[Article] 247, Family Code, supra, are "immediately final and
executory." It was erroneous, therefore, on the part of the RTCto
give due course to the Republics appeal and order the transmittal
of the entire records of the case to the Court of Appeals.
An appellate court acquires no jurisdiction to review a judgment
which, by express provision of law, is immediately final and
executory. As we have said in Veloria vs. Comelec, "the right to
appeal is not a natural right nor is it a part of due process, for it is
merely a statutory privilege." Since, by express mandate of Article
247 of the Family Code, all judgments rendered in summary
judicial proceedings in Family Law are "immediately final and
executory," the right to appeal was not granted to any of the
parties therein. The Republic of the Philippines, as oppositor in the
petition for declaration of presumptive death, should not be treated
differently. It had no right to appeal the RTC decision of November
7, 2001. [emphases ours; italics supplied]
Certiorari Lies to Challenge the
Decisions, Judgments or Final
Orders of Trial Courts in a Summary
Proceeding for the Declaration of Presumptive
Death Under the Family Code
Article 238 of the Family Code, under Title XI: SUMMARY JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS IN THE FAMILY LAW, establishes the rules that
govern summary court proceedings in the Family Code:
In turn, Article 253 of the Family Code specifies the cases covered
by the rules in chapters two and three of the same title. It states:
"ART. 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2and 3 hereof shall
likewise govern summary proceedings filed under Articles 41, 51,
69, 73, 96, 124 and 217, insofar as they are applicable."(Emphasis
supplied.)
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive
years, or two consecutive years if the disappearance occurred
where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down
in Article 391, Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
Thus, mere absence of the spouse (even for such period required
by the law), lack of any news that such absentee is still alive,
failure to communicate or general presumption of absence under
the Civil Code would not suffice. This conclusion proceeds from the
premise that Article 41 of the Family Code places upon the present
spouse the burden of proving the additional and more stringent
requirement of "well-founded belief" which can only be discharged
upon a showing of proper and honest-to-goodness inquiries and
efforts to ascertain not only the absent spouses whereabouts but,
more importantly, that the absent spouse is still alive or is already
dead.15
The Requirement of Well-Founded Belief
The law did not define what is meant by "well-founded belief." It
depends upon the circumstances of each particular case. Its
determination, so to speak, remains on a case-to-case basis. To be
able to comply with this requirement, the present spouse must
prove that his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable
efforts and inquiries to locate the absent spouse and that based on
these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the
circumstances, the absent spouseis already dead. It requires
exertion of active effort (not a mere passive one).
To illustrate this degree of "diligent and reasonable search"
required by the law, an analysis of the following relevant cases is
warranted:
i. Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals (Tenth Div.)16
Under Article 41, the time required for the presumption to arise
has been shortened to four (4) years; however, there is need for a
judicial declaration of presumptive death to enable the spouse
present to remarry. Also, Article 41 of the Family Code imposes a
stricter standard than the Civil Code: Article 83 of the Civil Code
merely requires either that there be no news that such absentee is
still alive; or the absentee is generally considered to be dead and
believed to be so by the spouse present, or is presumed dead
under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code. The Family Code,
upon the other hand, prescribes as "well founded belief" that the
absentee is already dead before a petition for declaration of
presumptive death can be granted.
First, the respondent did not actively look for her missing husband.
It can be inferred from the records that her hospital visits and her
consequent checking of the patients directory therein were
unintentional. She did not purposely undertake a diligent search for
her husband as her hospital visits were not planned nor primarily
directed to look for him. This Court thus considers these attempts
insufficient to engender a belief that her husband is dead.
Second, she did not report Jerrys absence to the police nor did she
seek the aid of the authorities to look for him. While a finding of
well-founded belief varies with the nature of the situation in which
the present spouse is placed, under present conditions, we find it
proper and prudent for a present spouse, whose spouse had been
missing, to seek the aid of the authorities or, at the very least,
report his/her absence to the police.
Third, she did not present as witnesses Jerrys relatives or their
neighbors and friends, who can corroborate her efforts to locate
Jerry. Worse, these persons, from whom she allegedly made
inquiries, were not even named. As held in Nolasco, the present
spouses bare assertion that he inquired from his friends about his
absent spouses whereabouts is insufficient as the names of the
friends from whom he made inquiries were not identified in the
testimony nor presented as witnesses.
Lastly, there was no other corroborative evidence to support the
respondents claim that she conducted a diligent search. Neither
was there supporting evidence proving that she had a well-founded
belief other than her bare claims that she inquired from her friends
and in-laws about her husbands whereabouts. In sum, the Court is
of the view that the respondent merely engaged in a "passive
search" where she relied on uncorroborated inquiries from her inlaws, neighbors and friends. She failed to conduct a diligent search
because her alleged efforts are insufficient to form a well-founded
belief that her husband was already dead. As held in Republic of
the Philippines v. Court of Appeals (Tenth Div.),22 "[w]hether or not
the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of death of the
absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a
great many circumstances occurring before and after the
disappearance of the absent spouse and the natureand extent of
the inquiries made by [the] present spouse."
The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect
and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution.
Strict Standard Prescribed Under
Article 41 of the Family Code
Is for the Present Spouses Benefit
The requisite judicial declaration of presumptive death of the
absent spouse (and consequently, the application of a stringent
standard for its issuance) is also for the present spouse's benefit. It
is intended to protect him/her from a criminal prosecution of
bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code which might
come into play if he/she would prematurely remarry sans the
court's declaration.
Upon the issuance of the decision declaring his/her absent spouse
presumptively dead, the present spouse's good faith in contracting
a second marriage is effectively established. The decision of the
competent court constitutes sufficient proof of his/her good faith
and his/her criminal intent in case of remarriage is effectively
negated.28 Thus, for purposes of remarriage, it is necessary to
strictly comply with the stringent standard and have the absent
spouse judicially declared presumptively dead.
Final Word
As a final word, it has not escaped this Court's attention that the
strict standard required in petitions for declaration of presumptive
death has not been fully observed by the lower courts. We need
only to cite the instances when this Court, on review, has
consistently ruled on the sanctity of marriage and reiterated that
anything less than the use of the strict standard necessitates a
denial. To rectify this situation, lower courts are now expressly put
on notice of the strict standard this Court requires in cases under
Article 41 of the Family Code.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the assailed decision dated
August 27, 2008 of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the order
dated December 15, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 25,
Koronadal City, South Cotabato, declaring Jerry F. Cantor
presumptively dead is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
MARTINEZ, J.:
Under Article 161 of the Civil Code, what debts and obligations
contracted by the husband alone are considered "for the benefit of
the conjugal partnership" which are chargeable against the
conjugal partnership? Is a surety agreement or an accommodation
contract entered into by the husband in favor of his employer
within the contemplation of the said provision?
These are the issues which we will resolve in this petition for
review.
The petitioner assails the decision dated April 14, 1994 of the
respondent Court of Appeals in "Spouses Alfredo and
Encarnacion Ching vs. Ayala Investment and Development
Corporation, et. al.," docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
29632, 1 upholding the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig,
Branch 168, which ruled that the conjugal partnership of gains of
respondents-spouses Alfredo and Encarnacion Ching is not liable
for the payment of the debts secured by respondent-husband
Alfredo Ching.
A chronology of the essential antecedent facts is necessary for a
clear understanding of the case at bar.
Philippine Blooming Mills (hereinafter referred to as PBM) obtained
a P50,300,000.00 loan from petitioner Ayala Investment and
Development Corporation (hereinafter referred to as AIDC). As
added security for the credit line extended to PBM, respondent
Alfredo Ching, Executive Vice President of PBM, executed security
In the cases of Javier vs. Osmea, 10 Abella de Diaz vs. Erlanger &
Galinger, Inc., 11 Cobb-Perez vs. Lantin 12 and G-Tractors,
Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 13 cited by the petitioners, we held that:
The debts contracted by the husband during the
marriage relation, for and in the exercise of the
industry or profession by which he contributes
toward the support of his family, are not his personal
and private debts, and the products or income from
the wife's own property, which, like those of her
husband's, are liable for the payment of the marriage
expenses, cannot be excepted from the payment of
such debts. (Javier)
The husband, as the manager of the partnership
(Article 1412, Civil Code), has a right to embark the
partnership in an ordinary commercial enterprise for
gain, and the fact that the wife may not approve of a
venture does not make it a private and personal one
of the husband. (Abella de Diaz)
Debts contracted by the husband for and in the
exercise of the industry or profession by which he
contributes to the support of the family, cannot be
deemed to be his exclusive and private debts. (CobbPerez).
. . . if he incurs an indebtedness in the legitimate
pursuit of his career or profession or suffers losses in
a legitimate business, the conjugal partnership must
equally bear the indebtedness and the losses, unless
he deliberately acted to the prejudice of his family.
(G-Tractors)
However, in the cases of Ansaldo vs. Sheriff of Manila, Fidelity
Insurance & Luzon Insurance Co., 14 Liberty Insurance Corporation
vs. Banuelos, 15 and Luzon Surety Inc. vs. De Garcia, 16 cited by
the respondents, we ruled that:
Article 105 of the Family Code explicitly mandates that the Family
Code shall apply to conjugal partnerships established before the
Family Code without prejudice to vested rights already acquired
under the Civil Code or other laws. Thus, under the Family Code, if
the properties are acquired during the marriage, the presumption
is that they are conjugal. Hence, the burden of proof is on the
party claiming that they are not conjugal. This is counter-balanced
by the requirement that the properties must first be proven to have
been acquired during the marriage before they are presumed
conjugal.7redarclaw
The applicable law, however, in so far as the liquidation of the
conjugal partnership assets and liability is concerned, is Article
1298 of the Family Code in relation to Article 147 of the Family
Code.9redarclaw
The Court held that in a void marriage, as in those declared void
under Article 3610 of the Family Code, the property relations of the
parties during the period of cohabitation is governed either by
Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.11 Article 147 of the
Family Code applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated
and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose
marriage is nonetheless void, as in this case. Article 147 of the
Family Code provides:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Article 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to
marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and
wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their
wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the
property acquired by both of them through their work or industry
shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired
while they lived together shall be presumed to have been
obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall
be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this
Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by
the other party of any property shall be deemed to have
contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the formers
efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family
and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or
The RTC, ruling that a sabbatical leave is not a right but a privilege,
held that petitioner Diaz was entitled to such privilege and found
that the delay in the_resolution of her application was
unreasonable and unconscionable.
5. Costs of suit.
5. Costs of suit.
The Court of Appeals found neither negligence nor bad faith on the
part of the respondents in their denial of petitioner Diaz's
sabbatical leave application and in withholding her salaries.
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due,
and observe honesty and good faith.
The Court does not find any reason to disregard those findings,
especially when our own perusal of the evidence showed no traces
of bad faith or malice in the respondents' denial of petitioner Diaz's
application for sabbatical leave. They processed her application in
accordance with their usual procedure - with more leeway, in fact,
since petitioner Diaz was given the chance to support her
application when she was asked to submit a historical background;
and the denial was based on the recommendation of respondent
Encanto, who was in the best position to know whether petitioner
Diaz's application should be granted or not.
While the RTC declared that petitioner Diaz should have been
granted a sabbatical leave, it is important to note that the RTC
awarded damages to petitioner Diaz merely for the
unreasonable and unconscionable delay in the resolution of
her sabbatical leave application,39 and not its denial per
se. Thus, petitioner Diaz's entitlement to a sabbatical leave should
no longer be an issue in this case. This is supported by petitioner
Diaz's own action when she did not move for the reconsideration of
the April 17, 1996 Decision of the RTC for awarding her damages
due only to the delay in the resolution of her sabbatical leave
application and not for its denial; and more so by the prayer in her
petition to this Court wherein she asked that the April 17, 1996
Decision of the RTC be "reinstated and affirmed in toto."40
Nevertheless, on the question of whether or not there was bad
faith in the delay of the resolution of petitioner Diaz's sabbatical
leave application, the Court still rules in the negative. "It is an
elementary rule in this jurisdiction that good faith is presumed and
that the burden of proving bad faith rests upon the party alleging
the same."41Petitioner Diaz has failed to prove bad faith on the part
of the respondents. There is nothing in the records to show that
the respondents purposely delayed the resolution of her application
to prejudice and injure her. She has not even shown that the delay
of six months in resolving a sabbatical leave application has never
happened prior to her case. On the contrary, any delay that
occurred was due to the fact that petitioner Diaz's application for
sabbatical leave did not follow the usual procedure; hence, the
processing of said application took time.42
school year where three (3) weeks into classes she filed for a sick
leave and did not teach, based on that experience, I did not include
her name in the class list because the same thing could happen
again.46
While petitioner Diaz was not consulted about the removal of her
name from the class schedule, she did not contest such upon the
belief that her application for sabbatical leave would be approved,
as in fact, she was given her salary in June 1988. As such, this
Court believes, in the interest of equity and fairness, that petitioner
Diaz should be entitled to her salary during the semester when her
name was dropped from the final list of schedule of classes,
without her knowledge and consent, and while action on her
application for sabbatical leave was still pending.47
On the matter of her salaries from the second semester of A Y
1988-89 up until A Y 1989-1990, the respondents legally withheld
such, as found by the Ombudsman and the Court of Appeals for
petitioner Diaz's own refusal to comply with the documentary
requirements of U.P. Even the RTC, in its Omnibus Order of January
12, 1990, denied petitioner Diaz's petition for mandatory injunction
upon the finding that the Report for Duty Form required of her is a
basic and standard requirement that is asked from all employees of
U.P. The RTC held:
It is therefore clear that the acts sought to be enjoined [by Diaz]
are in fact pursuant to the proper observance of administrative or
internal rules of the University. This Court sympathizes with [Diaz]
for not being able to receive her salaries after July 15, 1989.
However, such predicament cannot be outrightly attributable to the
defendants, as their withholding of her salaries appears to be in
accordance with existing University regulations.
Apart from such reasons, this Court believes that petitioner Diaz
failed to show why she should be spared from the Report for Duty
requirement, which remains a standard practice even in other
offices or institutions. To be entitled to an injunctive writ, one must
show an unquestionable right and/or blatant violation of said right
to be entitled to its issuance.48
periods when she was refused payment of her salaries for not
accomplishing a Report for Duty Form - will be from the time
petitioner Diaz submits the required Report for Duty Form up to the
full satisfaction thereof, is 6% per annum.
Given the foregoing, petitioner Diaz should be paid, as the RTC had
computed, her salaries from July l, 1988 to October 1988, the
semester when petitioner Diaz's name was dropped from the final
list of schedule of classes, without her prior knowledge and
consent; and for the periods of November 1, 1988 to May 31, 1989
and July 16, 1989 to May 31, 1990, for the work she rendered
during said periods, but upon petitioner Diaz's submission
of the documents required by U.P.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 198994, February 03, 2016
IRIS MORALES, Petitioners, v. ANA MARIA OLONDRIZ,
ALFONSO JUAN OLONDRIZ, JR., ALEJANDRO MORENO
OLONDRIZ, ISABEL ROSA OLONDRIZ AND FRANCISCO
JAVIER MARIA OLONDRIZ, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Iris Morales from
the May 27, 2011 decision and October 12, 2011 resolution of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 102358.1 The CA denied
Morales' petition for certiorari from the Regional Trial Court's (RTC)
July 12, 2007 and October 30, 2007 orders in SP. Proc. No. 030060 and SP. Proc. No. 03-0069.2chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Antecedents
xxx
xxx
xxx
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12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my wellbeloved daughter, the said MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN
DANEY (Mrs. Bernard Daney) now residing, as aforesaid, at
xxx
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point of course was not and could hardly have been squarely raised
as an issue inasmuch as the substitute heirs are not parties in this
case. We have nevertheless called attention "to the limitations
imposed by law upon this kind of substitution," because in the brief
for oppositor-appellant, at page 45, she makes the conclusion "that
the Last Will and Testament of Edward E. Christensen are valid
under Philippine Law and must be given full force and effect;" and
to give them full force and effect would precisely affect the legitime
of oppositor-appellant.
Wherefore, the last paragraph before the dispositive part of our
decision quoted above is amended by eliminating the following
phrase in the first sentence: "although no reference to it has been
made in the brief for oppositor-appellant."
G.R. No. L-62952 October 9, 1985
SOFIA J. NEPOMUCENO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, RUFINA GOMEZ,
OSCAR JUGO ANG, CARMELITA JUGO,respondents.
In the said Will, the testator named and appointed herein petitioner
Sofia J. Nepomuceno as his sole and only executor of his estate. It
is clearly stated in the Will that the testator was legally married to
a certain Rufina Gomez by whom he had two legitimate children,
Oscar and Carmelita, but since 1952, he had been estranged from
his lawfully wedded wife and had been living with petitioner as
husband and wife. In fact, on December 5, 1952, the testator
Martin Jugo and the petitioner herein, Sofia J. Nepomuceno were
married in Victoria, Tarlac before the Justice of the Peace. The
testator devised to his forced heirs, namely, his legal wife Rufina
Gomez and his children Oscar and Carmelita his entire estate and
the free portion thereof to herein petitioner. The Will reads in part:
Art. III. That I have the following legal heirs,
namely: my aforementioned legal wife, Rufina
Gomez, and our son, Oscar, and daughter Carmelita,
both surnamed Jugo, whom I declare and admit to
be legally and properly entitled to inherit from me;
that while I have been estranged from my abovenamed wife for so many years, I cannot deny that I
was legally married to her or that we have been
separated up to the present for reasons and
justifications known fully well by them:
Art. IV. That since 1952, 1 have been living, as man
and wife with one Sofia J. Nepomuceno, whom I
declare and avow to be entitled to my love and
affection, for all the things which she has done for
me, now and in the past; that while Sofia J.
Nepomuceno has with my full knowledge and
consent, did comport and represent myself as her
own husband, in truth and in fact, as well as in the
eyes of the law, I could not bind her to me in the
holy bonds of matrimony because of my
aforementioned previous marriage;
On August 21, 1974, the petitioner filed a petition for the probate
of the last Will and Testament of the deceased Martin Jugo in the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXXIV, Caloocan City and
asked for the issuance to her of letters testamentary.
On May 13, 1975, the legal wife of the testator, Rufina Gomez and
her children filed an opposition alleging inter alia that the execution
Jugo was executed with all the formalities required by law and that
the testator had the mental capacity to execute his Will. The
petitioner states that she completely agrees with the respondent
court when in resolving the question of whether or not the probate
court correctly denied the probate of Martin Jugo's last Will and
Testament, it ruled:
This being so, the will is declared validly drawn.
(Page 4, Decision, Annex A of Petition.)
On the other hand the respondents pray for the affirmance of the
Court of Appeals' decision in toto.
The only issue, therefore, is the jurisdiction of the respondent court
to declare the testamentary provision in favor of the petitioner as
null and void.
We sustain the respondent court's jurisdiction. As stated in Nuguid
v. Nuguid, (supra):
of Victoria, Tarlac. The man was then 51 years old while the woman
was 48. Nepomuceno now contends that she acted in good faith for
22 years in the belief that she was legally married to the testator.
receive. The very wordings of the Will invalidate the legacy because
the testator admitted he was disposing the properties to a person
with whom he had been living in concubinage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
decision of the Court of Appeals, now Intermediate Appellate Court,
is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 176422
MARIA MENDOZA, in her own capacity and as Attorney-infact of DEOGRACIAS, MARCELA, DIONISIA, ADORA CION, all
surnamed MENDOZA, REMEDIOS MONTILLA, FELY
BAUTISTA, JULIANA GUILALAS and ELVIRA
MENDOZA, Petitioners,
vs.
JULIA POLl CARPIO DELOS SANTOS, substituted by her
heirs, CARMEN P. DELOS SANTOS, ROSA BUENA VENTURA,
ZENAIDA P. DELOS SANTOS VDA. DE MATEO, LEONILA P.
DELOS SANTOS, ELVIRA P. DELOS SANTOS VDA. DE JOSE,
TERESITA P. DELOS SANTOS-CABUHAT, MERCEDITA P.
DELOS SANTOS, LYDIA P. DELOS SANTOS VDA. DE HILARIO,
PERFECTO P. DELOS SANTOS, JR., and CECILIA M.
MENDOZA, Respondents.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
Reserva troncal is a special rule designed primarily to assure the
return of a reservable property to the third degree relatives
belonging to the line from which the property originally came, and
avoid its being dissipated into and by the relatives of the inheriting
ascendant.1
The Facts
The properties subject in the instant case are three parcels of land
located in Sta. Maria, Bulacan: (1) Lot 1681-B, with an area of
7,749 square meters;2 (2) Lot 1684, with an area of 5,667 sq
m;3 and (3) Lot No. 1646-B, with an area of 880 sq m.4 Lot Nos.
A.
Article 891 provides that the person obliged to reserve the property
should be an ascendant (also known as the reservor/reservista) of
the descendant/prepositus. Julia, however, is not Gregorias
ascendant; rather, she is Gregorias collateral relative.
Article 964 of the Civil Code provides for the series of degrees
among ascendants and descendants, and those who are not
ascendants and descendants but come from a common ancestor,
viz:
Art. 964. A series of degrees forms a line, which may be either
direct or collateral.1wphi1 A direct line is that constituted by the
series of degrees among ascendants and descendants.
A collateral line is that constituted by the series of degrees among
persons who are not ascendants and descendants, but who come
from a common ancestor. (Emphasis and italics ours)
Gregorias ascendants are her parents, Exequiel and Leonor, her
grandparents, great-grandparents and so on. On the other hand,
Gregorias descendants, if she had one, would be her children,
grandchildren and great-grandchildren. Not being Gregorias
ascendants, both petitioners and Julia, therefore, are her collateral
relatives. In determining the collateral line of relationship, ascent is
made to the common ancestor and then descent to the relative
from whom the computation is made. In the case of Julias
collateral relationship with Gregoria, ascent is to be made from
Gregoria to her mother Leonor (one line/degree), then to the
common ancestor, that is, Julia and Leonors parents (second
line/degree), and then descent to Julia, her aunt (third
line/degree). Thus, Julia is Gregorias collateral relative within the
third degree and not her ascendant.
First cousins of the
descendant/prepositus are fourth
degree relatives and cannot be
considered reservees/reservatarios
Moreover, petitioners cannot be considered reservees/reservatarios
as they are not relatives within the third degree of Gregoria from
whom the properties came. The person from whom the degree
should be reckoned is the descendant/prepositusthe one at the
end of the line from which the property came and upon whom the
The reservor has the legal title and dominion to the reservable
property but subject to the resolutory condition that such title is
extinguished if the reservor predeceased the reservee. The
reservor is a usufructuary of the reservable property. He may
alienate it subject to the reservation. The transferee gets the
revocable and conditional ownership of the reservor. The
transferees rights are revoked upon the survival of the reservees
at the time of the death of the reservor but become indefeasible
when the reservees predecease the reservor.26(Citations omitted)
It is when the reservation takes place or is extinguished,27 that a
reservatario becomes, by operation of law, the owner of the
reservable property.28 In any event, the foregoing discussion does
not detract from the fact that petitioners are not entitled to a
reservation of the properties in dispute.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated November
16, 2006 and Resolution dated January 17, 2007 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 77694 insofar as it dismissed the Third
Amended Complaint in Civil Case No. 609-M-92 are AFFIRMED.
This Decision is without prejudice to any civil action that the heirs
of Gregoria
Mendoza may file for the settlement of her estate or for the
determination of ownership of the properties in question.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-14856
TORRES, J.:
That, in the partition of the said testator's estate, there was given
to Apolonio Florentino III, his posthumos son, the property marked
with the letters A, B, C, D, E, and F in the complaint, a gold rosary,
pieces of gold, of silver and of table service, livestock, palay, some
personal property and other objects mentioned in the complaint.
That Apolonio Florentino III, the posthumos son of the second
marriage, died in 1891; that his mother, Severina Faz de Leon,
succeeded to all his property described in the complaint; that the
widow, Severina Faz de Leon died on November 18, 1908, leaving
a will instituting as her universal heiress her only living daughter,
Mercedes Florentino; that, as such heir, said daughter took
possession of all the property left at the death of her mother,
Severina Faz de Leon; that among same is included the property,
described in the complaint, which the said Severina Faz de Leon
inherited from her deceased son, the posthumos Apolonio, as
reservable property; that, as a reservist, the heir of the said
Mercedes Florentino deceased had been gathering for herself alone
the fruits of lands described in the complaint; that each and every
one of the parties mentioned in said complaint is entitled to oneseventh of the fruits of the reservable property described therein,
either by direct participation or by representation, in the manner
mentioned in paragraph 9 of the complaint.
That several times the plaintiffs have, in an amicable manner,
asked the defendants to deliver their corresponding part of the
reservable property; that without any justifiable motive the
defendants have refused and do refuse to deliver said property or
to pay for its value; that for nine years Mercedes Florentino has
been receiving, as rent for the lands mentioned, 360 bundles of
palay at fifty pesos per bundle and 90 bundles of corn at four pesos
per bundle; that thereby the plaintiffs have suffered damages in
the sum of fifteen thousand four hundred and twenty-eight pesos
and fifty-eight centavos, in addition to three hundred and eight
pesos and fifty-eight centavos for the value of the fruits not
gathered, of one thousand pesos (P1,000) for the unjustifiable
retention of the aforementioned reservable property and for the
expenses of this suit. Wherefore they pray it be declared that all
the foregoing property is reservable property; that the plaintiffs
had and do have a right to the same, in the quantity and
proportion mentioned in the aforementioned paragraph 9 of the
complaint; that the defendants Mercedes Florentino and her
husband be ordered to deliver to the plaintiffs their share of the
property in question, of the palay and of the corn above
nature of the line from which such property came) acquire the
ownership of said property in fact and by operation of law in the
same manner as forced heirs (because they are also such) said
property reverts to said line as long as the aforementioned persons
who, from the death of the ascendant-reservists, acquire in fact the
right of reservatarios(person for whom property is reserved), and
are relatives, within the third degree, of the descendant from
whom the reservable property came.
Any ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property,
while there are living, within the third degree, relatives of the
latter, is nothing but a life usufructuary or a fiduciary of the
reservable property received. He is, however, the legitimate owner
of his own property which is not reservable property and which
constitutes his legitime, according to article 809 of the Civil Code.
But if, afterwards, all of the relatives, within the third degree, of
the descendant (from whom came the reservable property) die or
disappear, the said property becomes free property, by operation of
law, and is thereby converted into the legitime of the ascendant
heir who can transmit it at his death to his legitimate successors or
testamentary heirs. This property has now lost its nature of
reservable property, pertaining thereto at the death of the
relatives, called reservatarios, who belonged within the third
degree to the line from which such property came.lawphil.net
Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession,
when there are relatives of the descendant within the third degree,
the right of the nearest relative, called reservatario, over the
property which the reservista(person holding it subject to
reservation) should return to him, excludes that of the one more
remote. The right of representation cannot be alleged when the
one claiming same as a reservatario of the reservable property is
not among the relatives within the third degree belonging to the
line from which such property came, inasmuch as the right granted
by the Civil Code in article 811 is in the highest degree personal
and for the exclusive benefit of designated persons who are the
relatives, within the third degree, of the person from whom the
reservable property came. Therefore, relatives of the fourth and
the succeeding degrees can never be considered asreservatarios,
since the law does not recognize them as such.
In spite of what has been said relative to the right of
representation on the part of one alleging his right
With full right Severina Faz de Leon could have disposed in her will
of all her own property in favor of her only living daughter,
Mercedes Florentino, as forced heiress. But whatever provision
there is in her will concerning the reservable property received
from her son Apolonio III, or rather, whatever provision will reduce
the rights of the other reservatarios, the half brothers and nephews
of her daughter Mercedes, is unlawful, null and void, inasmuch as
said property is not her own and she has only the right of usufruct
or of fiduciary, with the obligation to preserve and to deliver same
to the reservatarios, one of whom is her own daughter, Mercedes
Florentino.
It cannot reasonably be affirmed, founded upon an express
provision of law, that by operation of law all of the reservable
property, received during lifetime by Severina Faz de Leon from her
son, Apolonio III, constitutes or forms parts of the legitime
pertaining to Mercedes Florentino. If said property did not come to
be the legitimate and exclusive property of Severina Faz de Leon,
her only legitimate and forced heiress, the defendant Mercedes,
could not inherit all by operation of law and in accordance with the
order of legitimate succession, because the other relatives of the
deceased Apolonio III, within the third degree, as well as herself
are entitled to such reservable property.
For this reason, in no manner can it be claimed that the legitime of
Mercedes Florentino, coming from the inheritance of her mother
Severina Faz de Leon, has been reduced and impaired; and the
application of article 811 of the Code to the instant case in no way
prejudices the rights of the defendant Mercedes Florentino,
inasmuch as she is entitled to a part only of the reservable
property, there being no lawful or just reason which serves as real
foundation to disregard the right to Apolonio III's other relatives,
within the third degree, to participate in the reservable property in
question. As these relatives are at present living, claiming for it
with an indisputable right, we cannot find any reasonable and
lawful motive why their rights should not be upheld and why they
should not be granted equal participation with the defendant in the
litigated property.
The claim that because of Severina Faz de Leon's forced heiress,
her daughter Mercedes, the property received from the deceased
son Apolonio III lost the character, previously held, of reservable
property; and that the mother, the said Severina, therefore, had no
further obligation to reserve same for the relatives within the third
degree of the deceased Apolonio III, is evidently erroneous for the
reason that, as has been already stated, the reservable property,
left in a will by the aforementioned Severina to her only daughter
Mercedes, does not form part of the inheritance left by her death
nor of the legitimate of the heiress Mercedes. Just because she has
a forced heiress, with a right to her inheritance, does not relieve
Severina of her obligation to reserve the property which she
received from her deceased son, nor did same lose the character of
reservable property, held before the reservatarios received same.
It is true that when Mercedes Florentino, the heiress of the
reservista Severina, took possession of the property in question,
same did not pass into the hands of strangers. But it is likewise
true that the said Mercedes is not the only reservataria. And there
is no reason founded upon law and upon the principle of justice
why the otherreservatarios, the other brothers and nephews,
relatives within the third degree in accordance with the precept of
article 811 of the Civil Code, should be deprived of portions of the
property which, as reservable property, pertain to them.
From the foregoing it has been shown that the doctrine announced
by the Supreme Court of Spain on January 4, 1911, for the
violation of articles 811, 968 and consequently of the Civil Code is
not applicable in the instant case.
Following the provisions of article 813, the Supreme Court of Spain
held that the legitime of the forced heirs cannot be reduced or
impaired and said article is expressly respected in this decision.
However, in spite of the efforts of the appellee to defend their
supposed rights, it has not been shown, upon any legal foundation,
that the reservable property belonged to, and was under the
absolute dominion of, the reservista, there being relatives within
the third degree of the person from whom same came; that said
property, upon passing into the hands of the forced heiress of the
deceased reservista, formed part of the legitime of the former; and
that the said forced heiress, in addition to being a reservataria, had
an exclusive right to receive all of said property and to deprive the
other reservatarios, her relatives within the third degree of certain
portions thereof.
she says only the following, which is quoted from the record: "I do
not refer to the prescription of the right required by law to be
reserved in the property; I refer to the prescription of the right of
action of those who are entitled to the guaranty of that right for
seeking that guaranty, for those who are entitled to that right the
Mortgage Law grants a period of time for recording it in the
property registry, if I remember correctly, ninety days, for seeking
entry in the registry; but as they have not exercised that right of
action, such right of action for seeking here that it be recorded has
prescribed. The right of action for requiring that the property be
reserved has not prescribed, but the right of action for
guaranteeing in the property registry that this property is required
by law to be reserved" (p. 69 of the record).
The appellees reply: It is true that their right of action has
prescribed for requiring the applicant to constitute the mortgage
imposed by the Mortgage Law for guaranteeing the effectiveness of
the required by law to be reserved; but because that right of action
has prescribed, that property has not been divested of its character
of property required by law to be reserved; that it has such
character by virtue of article 8112 of the Civil Code, which went
into effect in the Philippine in December, 1889, and not by virtue of
the Mortgage Law, which only went into effect in the country by
law of July 14, 1893; that from December, 1889, to July, 1893,
property which under article 811 of the Civil Code acquired the
character of property reserved by operation of law was such
independently of the Mortgage Law, which did not yet form part of
the positive legislation of the country; that although the Mortgage
Law has been in effect in the country since July, 1893, still it has in
no way altered the force of article 811 of the Civil Code, but has
operated to reinforce the same merely by granting the right of
action to the persons in whose favor the right is reserved by
operation of law to require of the person holding the property a
guaranty in the form of a mortgage to answer for the enforcement,
in due time, of the right; that to lose the right of action to the
guaranty is not to lose the right itself; that the right reserved is the
The Mortgage Law of Spain and the first law that went into effect in
the Philippines on December 1, 189, do not contain any provision
that can be applied to the right reserved by article 811 of the Civil
Code, for such right is a creation of the Civil Code. In those laws
appear merely the provisions intended to guarantee the
effectiveness of the right in favor of the children of the first
marriage when their father or mother contracts a second marriage.
Nevertheless, the holding of the supreme court of Spain, for the
first time set forth in the decision on appeal of November 8, 1894,
has been reiterated:
That while the provisions of articles 977 and 978 of the Civil
Code that tend to secure the right required to be reserved
in the property refer especially to the spouses who contract
second or later marriages, they do not thereby cease to be
applicable to the right establishes in article 811, because,
aside from the legal reason, which is the same in both
cases, such must be the construction from the important
and conclusive circumstance that said provisions are set
forth in the chapter that deals with inheritances in common,
either testate or intestate, and because article 968, which
heads the section that deals in general with property
required by law to be reserved, makes reference to the
provisions in article 811; and it would consequently be
contradictory to the principle of the law and of the common
nature of said provisions not to hold them applicable to that
right.
Thus it was again stated in a decision on appeal, December 30,
1897, that: "As the supreme court has already declared, the
guaranties that the Code fixes in article 977 and 978 for the rights
required by law to the reserved to which said articles refer, are
applicable to the special right dealt with in article 811, because the
same principle exists and because of the general nature of the
provisions of the chapter in which they are found."
From this principle of jurisprudence it is inferred that if from
December, 1889, to July, 1893, a case had occurred of a right
required to be reserved by article 811, the persons entitled to such
right would have been able to institute, against the ascendant who
must make the reservation, proceedings for the assurance and
guaranty that article 977 and 978 grant to the children of a first
marriage against their father or mother who has married again.
things: that the person holding the property will enjoy it and that
he must keep what he enjoys for other persons." (Manresa, VII,
189.)
In another place he says: "We do not believe that the third opinion
can now be maintained that is, that the surviving spouse (the
person obliged by article 968 to make the reservation) can be
regarded as a mere usufructuary and the descendants immediately
as the owner; such theory has no serious foundation in the Code."
(Ibid., 238.)
The ascendants who inherits from a descendants, whether by the
latter's wish or by operation of law, requires the inheritance by
virtue of a title perfectly transferring absolute ownership. All the
attributes of the right of ownership belong to him exclusively
use, enjoyment, disposal and recovery. This absolute ownership,
which is inherent in the hereditary title, is not altered in the least,
if there be no relatives within the third degree in the line whence
the property proceeds or they die before the ascendant heir who is
the possessor and absolute owner of the property. If there should
be relatives within the third degree who belong to the line whence
the property proceeded, then a limitation to that absolute
ownership would arise. The nature and scope of this limitation
must be determined with exactness in order not to vitiate rights
that the law wishes to be effective. The opinion which makes this
limitation consist in reducing the ascendant heir to the condition in
of a mere usufructuary, depriving him of the right of disposal and
recovery, does not seem to have any support in the law, as it does
not have, according to the opinion that he has been expressed in
speaking of the rights of the father or mother who has married
again. There is a marked difference between the case where a
man's wish institutes two persons as his heirs, one as usufructuary
and the other as owner of his property, and the case of the
ascendant in article 811 or of the father or mother in article 968. In
the first case, there is not the slightest doubt that the title to the
hereditary property resides in the hereditary owner and he can
dispose of and recover it, while the usufructuary can in no way
perform any act of disposal of the hereditary property (except that
he may dispose of the right of usufruct in accordance with the
provisions of article 480 of the Civil Code), or any act of recovery
thereof except the limited one in the form prescribed in article 486
of the Code itself, because he totally lacks the fee simple. But the
ascendants who holds the property required by article 811 to be
reserved, and the father of mother required by article 986 to
reserve the right, can dispose of the property they might itself, the
former from his descendant and the latter from his of her child in
first marriage, and recover it from anyone who may unjustly detain
it, while the persons in whose favor the right is required to be
reserved in either case cannot perform any act whatsoever of
disposal or of recovery.
Article 975 states explicitly that the father or mother required by
article 9687 to reserve the right may dispose of the property itself:
Alienation of the property required by law to be reserved
which may be made by the surviving
spouse aftercontracting a second marriage shall be valid
only if at his or her death no legitimate children or
descendants of the first marriage survive, without prejudice
to the provisions of the Mortgage of Law.
It thus appears that the alienation is valid, although not altogether
effective, but under a condition subsequent, to wit: "If at his or her
death no legitimate children or descendants of the first marriage
survive."
If the title did not reside in the person holding the property to be
reserved, his alienation thereof would necessarily be null and void,
as executed without a right to do so and without a right which he
could transmit to the acquirer. The law says that the alienation
subsists (to subject is to continue to exist) "without prejudice to
the provisions of the Mortgage Law." Article 109 of this Law says:
The possessor of property subject to conditions
subsequent that are still pending may mortgage or alienate
it, provided always that he preserve the right of the parties
interested in said conditions by expressly reserving that
right in the registration.
In such case, the child or legitimate descendants of the first
marriage in whose favor the right is reserved cannot impugn the
validity of the alienation so long as the condition subsequent is
pending, that is, so long as the remarried spouse who must reserve
the right is alive, because it might easily happen that the person
who must reserve the right should outlive all the person in whose
favor the right is reserved and then there would be no reason for
the condition subsequent that they survive him, and, the object of
2.
3.
4.
The Matter of the Intestate Estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda.
de Santero," praying among other things, that the corresponding
letters of Administration be issued in her favor and that she be
appointed as special Administratrix of the properties of the
deceased Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
It is undisputed: 1) that Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero who together with Felisa's mother Juliana
were the only legitimate children of the spouses Felipe Pamuti and
Petronila Asuncion; 2) that Juliana married Simon Jardin and out of
their union were born Felisa Pamuti and another child who died
during infancy; 3) that Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero is the
widow of Pascual Santero and the mother of Pablo Santero; 4) that
Pablo Santero was the only legitimate son of his parents Pascual
Santero and Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero; 5) that Pascual
Santero died in 1970; Pablo Santero in 1973 and Simona Santero
in 1976; 6) that Pablo Santero, at the time of his death was
survived by his mother Simona Santero and his six minor natural
children to wit: four minor children with Anselma Diaz and two
minor children with Felixberta Pacursa.
Judge Jose Raval in his Orders dated December 1, 1976 1 and
December 9, 1976 2 declared Felisa Pamuti Jardin as the sole
legitimate heir of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
Before the trial court, there were 4 interrelated cases filed to wit:
a) Sp. Proc. No. B-4 is the Petition for the Letters
of Administration of the intestate Estate of Pablo
Santero;
b) Sp. Proc. No. B-5 is the Petition for the Letters
of Administration of the Intestate Estate of Pascual
Santero;
PARAS, J.:
Private respondent filed a Petition dated January 23, 1976 with the
Court of First Instance of Cavite in Sp. Proc. Case No. B-21, "In
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
The real issue in this case may be briefly stated as follows who
are the legal heirs of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero her niece
Felisa Pamuti Jardin or her grandchildren (the natural children of
Pablo Santero)?
The dispute at bar refers only to the intestate estate of Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero and the issue here is whether oppositorsappellees (petitioners herein) as illegitimate children of Pablo
Santero could inherit from Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, by
right of representation of their father Pablo Santero who is a
legitimate child of Simona Pamuti Vda, de Santero.
Now then what is the appropriate law on the matter? Petitioners
contend in their pleadings that Art. 990 of the New Civil Code is the
applicable law on the case. They contend that said provision of the
New Civil Code modifies the rule in Article 941 (Old Civil Code) and
recognizes the right of representation (Art. 970) to descendants,
whether legitimate or illegitimate and that Art. 941, Spanish Civil
Code denied illegitimate children the right to represent their
deceased parents and inherit from their deceased grandparents,
but that Rule was expressly changed and/or amended by Art. 990
New Civil Code which expressly grants the illegitimate children the
right to represent their deceased father (Pablo Santero) in the
estate of their grandmother Simona Pamuti)." 5
Petitioners' contention holds no water. Since the heridatary conflict
refers solely to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero, who is the legitimate mother of Pablo Santero, the
applicable law is the provision of Art. 992 of the Civil Code which
reads as follows:
ART. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit
ab intestato from the legitimate children and
relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such
children or relatives inherit in the same manner from
the illegitimate child. (943a)
Pablo Santero is a legitimate child, he is not an illegitimate child.
On the other hand, the oppositors (petitioners herein) are the
illegitimate children of Pablo Santero.
Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain
in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the
SARMIENTO, J.:
The principal issue raised in this petition for review on certiorari of
the decision 1 dated May 30, 1986 of the Court of Appeals, 2 which
modified the decision 3 rendered by the Regional Trial Court of
Lapu-Lapu City in Cebu, is whether or not the private respondents
had acquired an easement of right of way, in the form of a
passageway, on the petitioner's property.
It is admitted that the petitioner owns the real estate properties
designated as Lots Nos. 5122 and 5124 of the Opon Cadastre,
situated at Sitio Buyong, Maribago, Lapu-Lapu City, on which it had
constructed a resort and hotel. The private respondents, on the
other hand, are the owners of adjoining properties more
particularly known as Lots Nos. 5123-A and 5123-C of the Opon
Cadastre.
Before the petitioner began the construction of its beach hotel, the
private respondents, in going to and from their respective
properties and the provincial road, passed through a passageway
which traversed the petitioner's property. In 1981, the petitioner
closed the aforementioned passageway when it began the
construction of its hotel, but nonetheless opened another route
across its property through which the private respondents, as in
the past, were allowed to pass. (Later, or sometime in August,
1982, when it undertook the construction of the second phase of
its beach hotel, the petitioner fenced its property thus closing even
the alternative passageway and preventing the private respondents
from traversing any part of it.)
As a direct consequence of these closures, an action for injunction
with damages was filed against the petitioner by the private
respondents on September 2, 1982 before the then Court of First
Instance of Cebu. 4
In their complaint, the private respondents assailed the petitioner's
closure of the original passageway which they (private
respondents) claimed to be an "ancient road right of way" that had
been existing before World War II and since then had been used by
them, the community, and the general public, either as pedestrians
or by means of vehicles, in going to and coming from Lapu-Lapu
City and other parts of the country. The private respondents
averred that by closing the alleged road right of way in question,
the petitioner had deprived them access to their properties and
caused them damages.
In the same complainant, the private respondents likewise alleged
that the petitioner had constructed a dike on the beach fronting the
latter's property without the necessary permit, obstructing the
passage of the residents and local fishermen, and trapping debris
and flotsam on the beach. They also claimed that the debris and
flotsam that had accumulated prevented them from using their
properties for the purpose for which they had acquired them. The
complaint this prayed for the trial court to order the re-opening of
the original passageway across the petitioner's property as well as
the destruction of the dike. 5
In its answer, 6 the petitioner denied the existence of an ancient
road through its property and counter-averred, among others, that
it and its predecessors-in-interest had permitted the temporary,
passageway the property can not be truly said that the property is
isolated. So also, while an existing right of way may have proved
adequate at the start, the dominant owner's need may have
changed since then, for which Article 651 of the Code allows
adjustments as to width. 28