1

MEMORANDUM ON ELECTORAL
TECHNOLOGY

DISLOCATED BALANCING ACT

Inside Kenyas Electoral Technology

By
Obar Mark Asuelaa

By
Obar Mark Asuelaa

RECOMMENDATIONS ON HOW TO USE

TECHNOLOGY TO ENHANCE TRANSPARENCY
IN KENYAS ELECTORAL SYSTEMS
Develop a Public Electoral Technology Integrity Assessments and Planning Strategy: The
success of a technological implementation will be benched of a rigorous use electoral integrity
assessments and planning strategy which will in turn deter and mitigate election fraud and
malpractice against the system. It will also define the following:
Source of Technology: - No one really knows the source of many technologies which are
used in Kenya and other African countries. Far and wide, these technologies have been
customized to be used in the countries which designed and developed them.
Security: - A single BVR machine can be used to remotely access the entire electoral
commission transmission system. This can be very dangerous since any malicious person
can easily input wrong data without it being identified so easily. The truth is that
machines are as good as the people who operate them, and as such, before new
technologies are introduced, it is important to consult with all of the stakeholders who are
likely to be affected, and members of the commission must be willing to make the
changes.
Public Management Plan: - The first strategy is based on conducting a detailed
assessment so as to identify the required environment, regulations, procedures, and tasks
involved in the electoral process. This should follow a management plan that will outline
the cost of implementing a given technology in an electoral process.
Develop Contingency Measures [Public Document]: - Mitigation mechanisms that will
continuously try and tested systems should be in place before the new technologies are launched
for use. These contingency measures often involve setting up manual back-up systems that can
kick into operation at short notice whenever the technology fails.

Parliament should develop Laws that will describe procedure for Electoral Technology
Implementation and Management: These legislative provisions should eliminate doubts and
sinister motives on an electoral technology by outlining every step of the management of the
technology in use.
All parties involved should do the formulations of the legislative aspects under mutual
agreements. The binding legal resolution will create sensible structures for testing, verification,
and develop backup plans thorough reliable stakes to make sure that the electoral event takes
place without a hitch. Electoral laws should describe the process of acquiring new technology so
as to avoid corruption and purchasing substandard products.

The electoral body should in the first place establish if there is any need of having a new
technology. After which the electoral body will make an assessment of the cost of the
technological solutions, not just for a specific election but also for the long run.
The project management plan will provide detailed specifications of the desired technology so
that anyone working on the project will simply follow step-by-step guidance for the
implementation process. With the project implementation plan, it will not matter whether an
individual has a vested interest or not in the system. The guidance plan will be rigid enough to
stop anyone from any form of malicious actions.
The entire electoral body, including experts should thereafter develop a balanced sheet which
will contain a business case for approval by all stakeholders as well as committees of the
National Assembly, Political Parties and Members of Parliament. The business case will outline
the importance of the process and usefulness of adopting a new technology.

Create Electoral Technology Implementation Joint Committee that will assist in

technological oversight: Based on the electoral demands, the electoral commission should
create a technological checklist which will take care of planning and development strategies,
evaluation and audit, quality assurance, management structure, computer management
administration, staffing and training and management obsolescence.
All stakeholders should be made aware of any material that goes into an electronic voting
system. Detailed analytical information should be provided for approval whenever there is need
to introduce a new software or device into a voting system. This boils down to the mere fact that
if someone can introduce a malicious item into the system, it may cripple the entire process or
steal vital information such as source codes, passwords, user-level breakers, and finally
manipulate the electoral results in favour of a particular candidate.
None-Manual-Mechanics-in-Authentication: The capability to automate recording or counting
of votes cast directly into transmission systems. Other newly introduced technologies have the
ability to verify voter eligibility and voter authentication without involving manual mechanics.
IEBC Chairperson or two of the Commissioners should be Techno-Savvy: But countries
such as Kenya suffered the risks of inappropriate or untimely introduction of technology,
especially when the electoral commissioners were themselves clueless about the capability of the
system which they participated in purchasing. Its more dangerous when all the commissioners
are not techno-savvy whereas the commission has to work on new technological ideals. One of
the major undoing in the 2013 election was the fact that none of the nine IEBC commissioners
were techno-savvy. The entire commission had to heavily rely on the ICT department for every
explanation while many election systems were being used for the first time.

Technology handlers should get training six months before election: The biggest challenge
was that some of the tools that were used by IEBC were so new to the operators, to an extent that
their strengths and weaknesses were not well-known to the users.
National Tallying and electoral Auditing should be done on a Live Television Coverage:
Even without going into details of possible mishaps at the IEBC, its an open knowledge that any
electoral process conducted must be open to public scrutiny, and there is not much room for
errors like the ones that Kenya has witnessed from IEBC.
Gradual introduction of Technology: Its advisable to introduce new technologies gradually
in a way that gives enough time for analysis of every series of electoral events. Every part of the
technology should be defined and approved by Electoral Technology Implementation Joint
Committee. Just before going full scale in the quest to purchase new technology, electoral
commission should consider making an evaluation of local infrastructure and its possible
limitation to achieving the objectives of an upcoming election. This electoral engagement
process will feed into a considerable narrative of suitability that will bring more confidence on
the electoral body.
Conduct Three Capability Tests - Three Months before Election: Thereafter, experts who did
and didnt participate in decision making can come in to test the pilot systems, in reparations for
a full-scale system implementation. This will include a load test which is very vital in
conducting a mock exercise that is as close as possible to the real situation during Election
Day.

Declare Results at the Constituency Level: Adoption of new technology largely depends on
the readiness of the stakeholders to assimilate the technology into customized system objectivity.
In fact, electoral results should be declared from the very basic level of tallying process like the
constituency levels. IEBC Commissioners will only verify the results on a live television
coverage being watched by everyone across the country.

Develop timelines for Technological Implementation and use: Electoral commission should
use agreed timelines for the project implementation to help carry out the project. Normally,
timelines set by stakeholder are structured to outlast the actual period set for implementing a new
technology. This enables stakeholders to identify expected tasks and making necessary
specifications in terms of functionality and technological responses.

Coordinate issuance of National ID and Voter Registration Cards together: By and large,
voters details irregularities will automatically threaten the integrity of an election, and if they
are extensive, it may cause systematic problem that will possibly lead to pre or post-election
chaos.

The most common logistical disadvantage to potential voters is administrative exclusion which is
made up of registration system that does not encourage or facilitate voter registration among
special groups. These administrative barriers can not only torment potential voters in the long
run, they can also cause eventual right to vote, especially in country where voting is mandatory
for adult-citizens.

DISLOCATED BALANCING ACT

Inside Kenyas Electoral Technology
By Obar Mark Asuelaa

Introduction
This policy development paper contains meticulous research on Kenyas electoral technology,
and its precincts as well as successful strides towards offering a credible, free and fair election. It
has also encapsulated conceivable means and modes for electoral malpractices and possible
solutions for each dereliction.
The current Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) voting technology
process involves biometric voter registration which creates a biometric voter registry. On the
voting day, the process will start with voter identification and end with casting of the ballot, but
in essence, technology will be present in all activities related to electoral process including the
theoretical technicalities.
The begging of every technological voting process is often used to compile voter lists, based on
drawn electoral boundaries. This is pegged on software based biometric voter registry that
creates a tabulation and tallying process scheduling that inputs data into the system in terms of
figures which are then transmitted by codes - to the main tallying centre.
Based on the available technology, electoral system should be able to manage and train staff, to
conduct voter education campaigns, to record cast votes, to count and consolidate vote results
and to publish election results.
The appropriate application of technology to elections will crease administrative efficiency in
presidential poll that is likely to be fixed or not fixed on the transmission system with or
without the knowledge of the electoral body and its partners. Categorically, comprehensive
technological application will help reduce long-term costs and enhance political transparency,
but unprocedural electoral technology may open door for menacing individuals to hack the
transmission system and configure larger process scheduling in favour of a particular candidate.

Forward
There are a number of people who did not vote in Kenyas 2013 general election purely because
there were copious of myths that shrouded the introduction of information and communications
technologies (ICT) into the electoral process. Some of the myths were associated with
infringement of privacy or potential future cybercrime activities, which in broader sense were
and are still a concern to date.
Days into the election, former IEBC Chief Executive Office James Oswago doubted the ability
of the technology to perform as per the expectations. The technology later underperformed in
such a way that dented many Kenyans hopes on the use of technology.
But the idea of bringing in technology in an election continues to generate both interest and
concern among voters, politicians and even among practitioners across the globe. A number of
African countries have instituted electoral management bodies (EMBs) which are using new
technologies with the aim of improving the electoral process, but still there are major failures.
Just like Kenyan electoral system, Ghanaian election technology too failed when it was first
employed for use.
African countries are employing technologies that range from the very basic such as office
automation tools such as word processing and spreadsheets to more sophisticated data processing
tools, such as data base management systems, optical scanning and geographic information
systems.
In 2013 General Election, IEBC registered a total of 14,352,533 voters with 85.91% voter
turnout. Out of this number the total number of registered voter, 0.88%, which translates to
108,975 votes, were spoilt. This means that 14.97% comprised of spoilt votes as well as those
who registered but never voted in the 2013 polls. When Uhuru Kenyatta was declared president,
the percentage difference between his votes and those of Raila Odinga was 6.81% which is twice
much less than those of spoilt votes and votes of those who registered but never voted. The
biggest challenge was that some of the tools that were used by IEBC were so new to the
operators, to an extent that their strengths and weaknesses were not well-known to the users.

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What happens during biometric registration?

Currently, the newly introduced world-class voting systems have got the capability to automate
recording or counting of votes cast directly into transmission systems. Other newly introduced
technologies have the ability to verify voter eligibility and voter authentication without involving
manual mechanics.
According to Coalition for Reforms and Democracy (CORD) allegation, the biometric
registration of civil servants and NYS personnel led to a creation of database containing datatype similar to that of IEBC electoral register. In terms of features, this database has got datatype whose format and transmission medium in codes is and will be similar to that of
electorates in the upcoming 2017 poll. It meant that, BVR database and data-type in IEBC and
Ministry of Planning and Devolution are the same in all aspects including on how to remit and
transmit them. Its worth noting that despite CORDs agitation there is no clear evidence linking
IEBC to the governmental operatives with a view of rigging the electoral process.
September, 10th 2016 Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) released over
200 biometric voter registration kits to be used for the registration of 199,921 civil servants. The
exercise that was spearheaded by the Ministry of Planning and Devolution also registered
unknown number of National Youth Service personnel using the same BVR kits. This action
later caused a lot of anxiety among the members of the opposition, CORD with claims that
IEBC and the government were colluding to establish a sinister voter register.
It should be understood that electoral technologies should in particular drive public attention
with focused mainly on those that support electronic voting (E-voting), and the Administration
and Cost of Elections (ACE Project). This way, the aim of the Elections and Technology topic
area is to introduce technologies that have an impact on a variety of activities related to the
administration of elections, and that negates any form of doubts in measure of public confidence.
More developed electoral bodies are carrying out experiments with Internet voting as a way of
facilitating and increasing voter participation in elections so as to ensure that there is no
doubtable credibility of the democratic process, and the reliability of elections results.
These technologies have opened up new frontiers for auditing election results that have often
been at the centre of controversy during vote counting. The technologies also offer unforeseen
new possibilities for the electoral process, especially for voting operations at crucial times. But
countries such as Kenya suffered the risks of inappropriate or untimely introduction of
technology, especially when the electoral commissioners were themselves clueless about the
capability of the system which they participated in purchasing. Sometimes, new electoral
technology may also lead to potential to compromise of transparency, local electoral ownership
or sustainability of the electoral process.

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Currently, advanced electoral technologies provide varied options for elections which may
include familiar and older ones like ball point pens or newer technologies based on logistics of
modern large-scale optical scanners, digital mapping, biometric algorithms and the Internet. The
technology based elections can be a considerable challenge for countries without access to most
recent know-hows or countries that depend of other countries customized technologies.
There are a number of integrated systems that lead to enormously complex level of technologies
as used for the administration of elections around the world. Embedded hackers and the rate of
technological change that is so high that election management bodies (EMBs) must regularly reevaluate their use of technology so as to determine whether they need to bring in new or updated
technology to improve their performance as per the current challenges.
GOD created every human being with unique code known as fingerprint which is not identical
to any other in the entire world. During biometric registration, the biometric kit scans, identify
and records this human code (fingerprint) in a database that can be translated into a persons
name as it appears on National ID.
Example:
Human Code
xieYFB1vTIQ

Photo

Name
George Mungao

When a person shows up to register as a voter [IEBC Centre], they will have fingerprint from
their right hands scanned as well as their thumbprints. Then repeat the same process for their left
hand. In addition, the photograph of the person registering will be taken, and details from ID
card noted down. The data captured by BVR kit will then be transmitted on a network to a
central server database from which IEBC officers will verify this register.
Dimension I: It is possible to remotely transmit similar data from the registry of (a sinister
source) into the central database of the IEBC even without the commissions knowledge.
The Electronic Voter Identification Device is a single fingerprint scanner hooked up to a laptop
that has the registration data of Kenyan polling stations. The EVID will simply scan a persons
fingerprint to verify whether the person registered as a voter or not after which a voter would
be given access to vote. The biometric scanner, BVR used for the biometric registration in
essence could be used to do the same work that EVID did in the 2013 polls.

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Its however not clear why did IEBC purchase Electronic Voter Identification Devices whose
function was well catered for by the 15,000 Biometric Voter Registration? In fact, IEBC needed
a total of 30,400 BVR kits for the exercise.
The Election and Technology subject area is a unique and unfamiliar scientific terrain which is
still growing under Administration and Cost of Elections (ACE) Project.
It should be well understood that the use of technology in elections is not an end in itself, but its
meant to work together with other aspects for the success of electoral administration. For
example, when Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission, IEBC employed electronic
database management systems that can be used in several components of the election process, it
was meant to create and manage voter lists, material inventories, personnel management,
election results dissemination and statistics.
Once electoral data has been computed into a storage device, it can be verified and transmitted
from any part of the world using any computer complaisant methodology.
NOTE: During transmission of the data, its the human code [xieYFB1vTIQ] that is transmitted
for tallying, while the name and the photo are only used as supportive evidence to identify an
individual.
Requirements for data transmission
a) Coherent data-type
b) Coherent data-format
c) Acceptable transmission modeling format
NOTE: The data within the registry of IEBC and any other source for that matter - meet the
above requirements, and as such can be transmitted into a tallying software for general
consumption by the members of the public.
As for Kenyans and IEBC, the main focus in 2013 was is on practical issues such as the type of
technologies that were in use around the world, and the possible guidelines that would ensure
that the commission made a successful implementation and maintenance of technologies
throughout the election period. But when the technologies failed terribly, it later emerged,
according to opinion polls that IEBC was one of the most hated commission in the country, in
fact, at some point - 62% of Kenyans disapproved of the commissions ability to conduct free,
fair and credible election of course, this also came together with its fair share of endless
political intrigues in Kenya.

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Implementation of Electoral Technology and Growing Vested Interests

There are a few considerations to take into account when implementing specific technologies for
elections administration, and these contemplations are based on some common implementation
processes customised to specific countries or electoral regions.
After performing dismally in 2013 contested general election, IEBC received a lot of criticism
which relatively hampered public confidence in the commission. In fact, by 2016, Coalition for
Reforms and Democracy, CORD tried to physically eject IEBC commissioners out of their
offices at Anniversary Towers in Nairobi. This happened after IEBC rejected Okoa Kenya
Referendum drive based on what they term as lack of requisite number of signatures for the
success of the same.
Even without going into details of possible mishaps at the IEBC, its an open knowledge that any
electoral process conducted must be open to public scrutiny, and there is not much room for
errors like the ones that Kenya has witnessed from IEBC.
Days after telling the media that it used signatures to disqualify those who petitioned for Okoa
Kenya Referendum, IEBC returned to the scene to recant that statement. Probably, the
commissioners realised that it was not appropriate to disqualify petitioners based of the sizes or
nature of their signatures.
The word signature which has been at the centre of logjam between Okoa Kenya team and the
Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission, IEBC. According to Cambridge Dictionary,
a signature is your name written by yourself, always in the same way, usually to show that
something has been written or agreed by you. Its further defined as, a person's name, or a
mark representing it, as signed personally or by deputy, as in subscribing a letter or other
document.
While disputing the Okoa Kenya initiative, the IEBC provided Journalists with some
representations which looked like drawings of cats, dogs, cows and some unknown animals.
According to IEBC, these were fictitious depictions, and as such were not considered to be
signatures. However, going by the definition of signature, these representations are actually
signatures and are valid since a signature can be any unique representation including but not
limited to drawings. As a matter of fact, the whole idea about writing using hands is simply
drawing.
Okoa Kenya Initiative might have been doomed from the very beginning when the drivers
decided to register petitioners on analogue platform such as books. That aside, technically, there
is no way IEBC was successfully going to use signatures to verify the supporters of Okoa Kenya
Initiative supporters. In fact, it is impossible to use signatures to verify voters or supporters of
any initiative. This is because, it will require that IEBC obtains designated signatures for
everyone in the country, digitize and use them for any computerized authentication. Patient
question here: which designated signatures did IEBC use to verify the Okoa Kenya
signatures?

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According to Article 257(4) of the Constitution states that:

The promoters of a popular initiative shall deliver the draft Bill and the supporting signatures to
the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission, which shall verify that the initiative is
supported by at least one million registered voters.
The section quoted above does not require IEBC to verify signatures, it rather requires that, the
people supporting the initiative must undersign to the said support.
This means that the Law only requires IEBC to verify if the people who are said to be supporting
the initiative are registered voters. The only way to verify that one is an eligible voter in Kenya is
by use of Corresponding Identifiers which are unique in every aspect. Currently, IEBC only
has got two corresponding identifiers, the National Identification Numbers and the biometric
fingerprints.
In other words, IEBC was supposed to digitize all ID numbers provided in the hardcopy Okoa
Kenya Initiative lists, and run them on a software that will match the IDs to the designated list of
ID numbers that had been captured during registration of voters. This process will take less than
one minute, and the commission shall have known the genuinely registered voters in the Okoa
Kenya list.
For example, a grandmother did not get formal education and is unable to read or write. She is
however a Kenyan, and an eligible voter. By locking her out of voter process simply because she
cant sign a signature is unethical and unfair. IEBC can however use her ID card number to
verify if my grandmother is a genuine voter.
It was rather baffling to watch IEBC officials define nine steps which they undertook to verify
the list of the supporters of referendum. We verified among other details, the names that were
submitted in the booklets, said IEBC Vice Chairperson, Mrs Lilian B. Mahiri-Zaja. The worst
mistake was to use peoples names as identifiers. This is because there are millions of Kenyans
with the same names across the country, and such a process would lead to serious conflicts in the
system.
Any techno-savvy approach will only require three stages for the entire process to be deemed a
failure or a success. They include digitization of details, reconciliation of facts and verification of
ID numbers to find out if they match those in the voters register. According to IEBC, even after
verifying the ID numbers, they continued with the process which was relatively unnecessary.
On 27th April 2016, Reuters/Ipsos opinion poll revealed that more than half of American voters
believe that U.S. electoral system for political parties - used to pick their candidates for the
White House is "rigged". The voters are also asking for a change of the entire system so as to
ensure that there is justice to the presidential candidates.

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Electoral disputes are not unique to Kenya alone, but they show up in every country whenever
there is an election. The difference is how to solve the existing problems, and the prevailing
political will to solve the problems.
The Reuters/Ipsos opinion poll echoes complaints from Republican front-runner Donald Trump
and Democratic challenger Bernie Sanders who have consistently said that the current system is
stacked against them, and its been doctored to favour their rivals.
Just like in Kenya, United States gives regular voters say in who should make it onto the
presidential ballot right from the nomination process to the actual presidential voting. Elections
in Kenya and US are complex task, whether at primary level or at the national general election.
Nearly every election year in both Kenya and US are historic in nature since the entire system is
driven by parties that are out to flex their muscle ahead of main contest, that is, presidential poll.
Normal technological application follows a smooth administration of systems gradually with
extended testing and implementation schedules. This is never the case in electoral systems,
especially when a new technology is being implemented.
Its more dangerous when all the commissioners are not techno-savvy whereas the
commission has to work on new technological ideals. One of the major undoing in the 2013
election was the fact that none of the nine IEBC commissioners were techno-savvy. The entire
commission had to heavily rely on the ICT department for every explanation while many
election systems were being used for the first time.
As 2017 election approached, the IEBC considered the upgrade of existing technology versus the
introduction of new technology. The commission then brought a number of partners on board
including those where going to establish a backup system to avoid the disastrous breakdown in
the transmission of election results witnessed in 2013.
It may be more appropriate to continue using the existing system rather than conducting
thorough evaluations that are often incurring high costs for relatively minor improvements of a
working technology. As such, its important to consider cost-effectiveness when implementing a
new technology. This can be achieved when EB involves evaluation of costs and savings
associated with introduction of the intended technology.
The electoral body must not only think about the initial costs involved in purchasing equipment
and materials, but also the cost of setting up the new system. This involves the cost of involving
partners such as additional expertise and the need for ongoing maintenance and management.
The management of the system is not on the internal technical part of the administration but also
on the outside one including what happens during voter registration.
On Friday, February 12, 2016 the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission published
the formula used in the distribution of the BVR kits meant for registration of voters. The
allocation was based on the lowest electoral unit, which is the County Assembly Ward (CAW),

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and the number of kits assigned according to size, taking into consideration ease of access to a
BVR kit by potential voters.
While the Commission considered population or number of IDs issued, it was decided that such
criteria would have led to inequitable distribution of kits across the country.
The formula applied was therefore as follows:

Wards with less than 30 sq. Km allocated 2 Kits

Wards with between 31 sq. Km and 500 sq. Km allocated 4 Kits

Wards with between 501 sq. Km and 5,000 sq. Km allocated 6 Kits

Wards with above 5,000 sq. Km allocated 8 Kits.

The outcome of the distribution is shown below:

No.

Criteria

Number
Wards

i.

Wards with less than 30 sq. Km to be

allocated 2 Kits.
Wards with between 31 sq. Km and 500
sq. Km to be allocated 4 Kits.
Wards with between 501 sq. Km and
5,000 sq. KM to be allocated 6 Kits.
Wards with above 5,000 sq. Km to be
allocated 8 Kits
TOTAL

270

540

947

3788

218

1308

15

120

1,450

5,756

ii.
iii.
iv.

of Number of kits
deployed

Since Wards are different in sizes, even within counties, the analysis of distribution at the county
level or regional level would not provide a representation of a fair conclusion on the spread. For
instance, Kilifi County has 35 Wards of varying sizes but three Wards (Ganze - 5,427 sq. km;
Bamba - 1,532.70; Marafa and 686.90 sq. km.) account for 62% of the entire area of Kilifi
County. This means that the three Wards would get between 6-8 kits and yet the majority of the
remaining Wards will receive four kits each.
In the case of Bomet County, the total number of Wards falling within the second category of 31
500 sq. km is 25. This entitles Bomet to a total of 100 kits using the formula. The concerns that
the population of the unregistered issued with IDs is low and therefore Bomet does not deserve

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the number of kits is clearly misleading. Because issuance of IDs is dynamic and the baseline
might change at any given time depending on government policy, the Commission decided it
was prudent to use a more static variable that infuses equity across the country.
The Commission continued to monitor the exercise and responded with appropriate remedies
whenever specific challenges were identified. These technical challenges were brewed on
political pressure and biases that have significantly dented public confidence.
The process of developing a successful election involves obtaining additional commitment of
funds through the relevant government budgetary processes. IEBC has been struggling to get
funds to execute extensive electoral progressions. This has made the IEBC to plan ahead with
technology whose sustainability is challengeable by people with sinister motives. Largely, its by
design not to allow EB to access enough funds.
Sitting governments often know so well that for an election to succeed, the electoral body will
need a lot of money while failure of the same rides on inadequate funds and lack of political will.
Its probably an intension that IEBC technology will be used during extended periods covering
several elections. The problem is that the technology that was adopted will quickly become
obsolete or unusable, hence Kenyas electoral technology as adopted - will become even more
expensive and unsustainable in the long-term.
No one really knows the source of many technologies which are used in Kenya and other African
countries. Far and wide, these technologies have been customised to be used in the countries
which designed and developed them. There is another dimension to these technologies which
many African countries never think about critically. Most of these technologies change at rapid
rates that it is almost impossible to avoid short-term obsolescence. Partly, the technologies also
act as surveillance system that can gather and transmit evidence millions away from the user.
Its no doubt that Electoral Bodies in Africa take no time to study existent technology standards
and trends in order to adopt protective measures that can decrease both the impact of future
versions or systems and technical incompatibilities that are associated with unique circumstances
and situations in the user-countries.
It takes a good amount of time to determine the appropriateness of implementing new systems
with new technologies. This is because other factors such as the local physical environment and
infrastructure need to be considered before making a decision to purchase a given technology. In
2013, some of the laptops that had been purchased by IEBC could not function just because they
were not power-charged. Thats pretty ridiculous and such excuses should not be condoned in a
country like Kenya with an intermittent power supply for implementing a wide area network of
personal computers that require a reliable power source.
Integral part of electronic voter systems used are primarily for recording, tallying and
transmitting voting data. These activities involve a lot of expertise, and the technology in use
must ensure the security of data as well, if not better, integrity of the database which is
equivalent to manual processes that are being replaced.

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Coalition for Reforms and Democracy (CORD) [Kenya] is not supporting IEBC just because
they believe that the electoral commission doesnt mean well for them. In fact, the coalition has
promised never to participate in any election if the same commission remains as it is into
election. On the other hand, Jubilee Coalition has been supporting the electoral body which they
believe is credible and ready to conduct elections.
IEBC has been accused of taking orders from State House as well as reporting directly to the
president. Of course, these allegations cannot be substantiated, but when a key political player
doubts the neutrality of an election commission, that in itself, is a recipe for violence. By and
large, when there is no political will, technological implementations are as good as nothing. It
should be understood that commissioners should be neutral individuals whose integrity cannot be
questioned by anyone.
Its one thing to develop and implement an electoral system, its quite another to ensure free, fair
and credible election. The truth is that machines are as good as the people who operate them, and
as such, before new technologies are introduced, it is important to consult with all of the
stakeholders who are likely to be affected, and members of the commission must be willing to
make the changes.
Governments across the world tend to think that participants in an election process are only
political parties, candidates, members of parliament and the media, but there is need to consult
widely including members of the public, Churches and technocrats.
New technology often come with many challenges including those that touch deeply into the
legal circles, and therefore, there is need to make changes to the relevant electoral laws and rules.
This means that these changes will have to be negotiated and guaranteed before a commitment to
the new technology is made.
It is common for an electoral commission to play public relations games and try to underestimate
amount of time it takes to implement a new electoral system. As a matter of fact, its possible to
put in place a new electoral technology even within four months. However, the implementation
process must be well thought out, with enough experts to carry out the activities involved. If the
system is not given enough time for the implementation or if implementation is rushed, there is
an increased risk that one of its crucial steps will fail. Of course, if it does fail, it will be difficult
to recover considering the fact that there are huge amounts of data transmission whose flow
can be jammed with a simple error.
Just months to 2013 general election, IEBC was advised to prepare for a massive failure if the
commission did not take drastic measures to rectify technological mishaps. It later turned out
that the commission may have set itself up for failure by not adhering to experts advices.
The same position was reiterated through internal memo by IEBC ICT Director Dismas
Ongondi on December 6, 2012, to then CEO James Oswago which later kicked off the
storm by putting a caveat that Face Technologies Ltd, a company that was poised to get the

19

contract to supply the electronic polling kits, had no capacity to provide technology that would
save Kenya from technological mishaps.
According to Mr Ongondi explained that, the devices could not have network connectivity to
transmit provisional results and periodic voting progress reports from polling stations. But his
advice was washed away by commissioners who allegedly had vested interests in the tenders.
Later, on December 10, the same year, country director of the International Foundation of
Electoral Systems (IFES) Mr Michael Yard, who had been contracted by the Commission,
wrote to IEBC Chairman Mr Issack Hassan validating Mr Ongondis advice on why the
tender award to Face firm ought to be terminated. Once again, this advice was turned down by
the commission that was entrusted with running the countrys election.
While rejecting computer technology experts warning that the electronic kits they were planning
to use were bound to fail, Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) seemingly
prepared to woo the country in believing that everything was going on well. Of course, the
country believed in nearly everything IEBC told the people but correspondence between IEBC
Chairman Issack Hassan and information communication technology (ICT) experts both from
the commission and externally shows that he repeated ignored their warning that the
electronic voter kits were bound to fail unless a different concept was pursued.
Unless the electoral technology was designed to fail from onset, there shouldnt be an excuse for
not adhering to experts advices. At times, elections may even be postponed so as to create time
for doing the right thing. Kenya is an emotive nation especially when it comes to electoral
mistrust, and creating chances for failures is such a sad state of affair.
Driven by seriousness of handling credible election, in the late 90s a Latin American country
cancelled elections on the day of elections because the new voting system was not ready. Even
though voting was delayed, the cancellation was later seen as the best thing to do since it gave
the electoral body humble time to make adjustment that would ensure that there was a free, fair
and credible election.
There is always potential pitfall in trying to do too much too quickly when it comes to electoral
technological implementation. Its advisable to introduce new technologies gradually in a ways
that gives enough time for analysis of every series of electoral events.
Thereafter, experts who did and didnt participate in decision making can come in to test the
pilot systems, in reparations for a full-scale system implementation. This will include a load
test which is very vital in conducting a mock exercise that is as close as possible to the real
situation during Election Day.
Presiding over elections in Kenya is a very difficult task, IEBC Chairman, Issack Hassan. Mr
Hassan was very right since nearly all Kenyan political factions have got vested interests in the
presidency, and are ready to do anything and everything to get the presidency.

20

KTNs award winning investigative team of Mohammed Ali and John Allan Namu exclusively
secured the recording by an ODM insider of a very senior election official casting doubts on
the integrity of the results transmitted by the Independent Electoral and Boundaries
Commission (IEBC), which he still serves.
KTN says IEBC Chief Executive Officer James Oswago denied that he is the election official
who claims (in the recording) that the National Intelligence Service (NIS) and President
Uhuru Kenyattas party, The National Alliance (TNA), hacked into the commissions servers
prior to IEBC transmitting the election results.
The claims are in a one-hour telephone recording with an ODM insider (Mr X on the night
of 5th March 2013 when the presidential results were being transmitted. The technology IEBC
had deployed for the transmission failed on the Election Day. Even though IEBC official
claimed that an employee of the commission overseeing the results transmission was working
for the National Intelligence Service and TNA, there is no further investigation or evidence
that can adequately substantiate the claims.
Here is part of the transcription:
IEBC Official: So their strategy began at a very early stage the other thing is that they also
infiltrated this system we were using of electronic transmission.
Mr X: You mean they infiltrated the system to influence the whole thing in their favour?
IEBC Official: Yes, the only thing I dont know and cant understand is how the results can
be so constant in an election where the results are coming in randomly, you expect that one
person would be leading and maybe the other catches up and they are overtaken again and so
forth, isnt it. It cannot be that everything is so constant especially in such a closely fought
election. How can it be that results coming in from 32,400 stations, come in almost
simultaneously and the performance is so regularit is impossible, even if you use random
theory of any other method, it cant work.
Mr X: It cant work, that is why we are also shocked. IEBC official: That is why I am
convinced they infiltrated our system.
Mr X: So did they do that before or when you began?
IEBC Official: Must have been before. I am told they had their guy in there. It is possible. In
fact, it is not just possible it is highly probable.
Mr X: It is highly what? IEBC Official: Probable! In the recording, the IEBC official says he
suspects that the Green Book (the manual register used by IEBC on the Election Day) was
different from the one it released to the public. The KTN expose unearthed numerous cases of
missing Forms 36A, which were used to announce the results in various tallying centres
across the country. The forms also had varying results from what was announced at the IEBC

21

tallying centre in Bomas of Kenya. The IEBC official encourages ODM to challenge the
results in the Supreme Court.
Mr X: So in summary, you are saying there is a problem but you will still declare someone a
winner so the only thing is for us is to go to the Supreme Court. IEBC Official: No. I am
saying that there are things, many things that were not done properly. One, when your guys
came to the tallying centre, they were kicked out
Mr X: You mean where you were doing the verification? IEBC Official: Yes. You see how can
you kick out someone who is simply observing what you are doing and not interfering with
your work? You cannot do that, unless you can demonstrate that the person is interfering with
the process, and that was not the caseOkay, the third one is this: when we produced our
register, we were supposed to have 33,400 (polling stations) but this was reduced to 32,000 and
something. But in doing that we never told the country.
Mr X: You just did it internally?
IEBC Official: We just did it internally and that should not have been the case.
Mr X: What did you say about the register?
IEBC Official: That you cannot produce a register and then just because it has a problem, you
publish a different one.
Mr X: So does this mean the register you published was not the real one?
IEBC Official: The register we used is not the one we published, which is why in some cases
you have different numbers from what we have.
Mr X: So you are saying that this should not have happened but it is simply not in the public
domain?
IEBC Official: Yesand now just looking back, it is occurring to me that this confusion is
because the register you guys (ODM) have is very different from what we are using.
In Thika town, our tally from all the forms 34 shows that Uhuru Kenyatta garnered 54,337
votes, while Raila Odinga got 11,207 votes. In the Form 36A for the constituency, announced
as the final result of the election, Uhuru Kenyatta had 71,358 votes, 17,021 votes more than
our count from the Form 34s.
In Alego Usonga, Siaya County, the variance is also quite wide. In our tally of the principal
election document from that constituency, Form 34, Raila Odinga garnered 29,764 as opposed
to Uhuru Kenyattas 42 votes.

22

But, in the Form 36 tally of results that were announced as final results at Bomas, Raila
Odingas tally had grown to 66,380, a variance of 36,616 votes. Publicly, IEBC said there were
33,400 polling stations, but by the end of the elections, this had shrunk to 31,025, according to
the election official in the recording.
Former IEBC CEO James Oswago says that he listened to the recording but could not recognise
the voice, because the person he is alleged to have been speaking to was so distorted while IEBC
commissioner Thomas Letangula also told KTN that the commissions servers were not
infiltrated.
Few important facts here;
a) There is need for complete investigations into every allegation that has been made against
IEBC and those who were involved.
b) There is need to do the right thing, and do things right in Kenya.
The question of who is going to use the system and in what capacity is a very essential step for
the successful implementation of a system using new technologies since it will help to determine
a number of factors including the most appropriate training for the technology handlers like the
clerks.
As much there is need to nominate and appoint lawyers to the position of electoral
commissioners, it will be appropriate to have at least two techno-savvy individuals as members
of the commission. In fact, if possible, the person who will be the Chief Executive Officer or the
Chairman of the commission should be techno-savvy with extensive knowledge in electronic
electoral management. These are individuals who possess high moral standards and proven
record in judgment and decision-making.

23

Then Come the Risks: Any Technology, New or Old, can fail or can be failed
During voting process, the data captured by BVR kit will be transmitted on a network to a central
server database from which IEBC officers will verify this register.
Whenever data is registered into a computer, the computer system records traceable links to that
data using programmatic codes. These codes can be used to recover the data even after deletion
as well as help link the computer to another computer or a system.
A single BVR machine can be used to remotely access the entire electoral commission
transmission system. This can be very dangerous since any malicious person can easily input
wrong data without it being identified so easily. If a malicious contestant manages to access
the transmission capacity of an electoral commission, the opponent can easily add numbers
that are not factual. The problem is, its more difficult to detect such processes since they are
done remotely without anchoring in local servers.
There are a number of ways to hack a transmission system without traceability.
Dimension I: Round robbing algorithms: - Today, data can discreetly be transmitted from
thousands of miles away without the knowledge of the first hand user or operator. Its possible
to develop round robbing algorithms with overpass capability that can add or subtract virtual
votes from or to a candidate before tallying display.
IEBC claims to be having a tamper-proof system on their transmission network, but how best
does this tamper-proof work? These must be tested and satisfied by all concerned parties.
Dimension II: Synthetic aperture radar:- With a simple cyber command centre and IP address
to local server, its possible to develop or rent synthetic aperture radar capability that can
remotely outfox information as well as make alteration to information that is on transmission.
These are very difficult to detect or even to trace.
Dimension IV: Enemy within IEBC
Alleged phone call evidence between former IEBC CEO, James Oswago and unnamed person
revealed that the government ensured that a member of National Security Intelligence got
employed in the IT department of the IEBC prior to 2013 polls. This is the person (as alleged)
who was responsible for manipulation of electoral results on transmission.
This is the best way of ensuring that sinister tasks are accomplished within an electoral system
since the person will be able to conduct such operations without any struggle. The person can as
well install unidentified malwares that can discreetly fetch data and control the system from a
long distance.

24

If the government allegedly ensured that NIS officer got employed at the IEBC in 2013, then it
should be understood that the same could be going on even right now. Some of these actions can
be done without IEBC Commissioners knowledge since none of the commissioners have the
right amount of technological knowhow to detect malice. The need to know who is doing what in
the commission goes far beyond appointments. Its about knowledge, wisdom, integrity, passion
and love for the country.
Factors to consider in Comprehensive Technical Electoral Strategy
Comprehensive Technical Electoral Strategy is meant to get hold of voter register as well as
getting hold of vote transmission system what is known as Results Transmission System
(RTS).
One of the most vital keystones of legitimacy of an election is driven by public confidence in the
resulting structures of democratic governance. These factors largely depend on the actual and
perceived integrity of the electoral process that must be accepted by all parties involved.
Citizens and candidates may not accept the outcome if believe that an election was unfair or
poorly-administered. The process of conducting credible election begins with establishing
electoral phases that are made up of the entire electoral cycle, including long-term institutional
capacity building.
Kenya for instance does not have an electoral integrity portfolio with key principles which can
technologically solving election disputes, fraud and malpractice. Neither does Kenyan electoral
commission have technological support systems which can effectively and fairly investigate and
arbitration processes so as to ensure the compliance of electoral justice systems with
international public law.
The success of a technological implementation will be benched of a rigorous use electoral
integrity assessments and planning strategy which will in turn deter and mitigate election fraud
and malpractice against the system.
This will follow a bolster enforcement of political finance regulations to enhance transparency
and deter non-compliance, corruption, and misuse of state resources for narrowed interests.
By design, technological applications by IEBC has made the upcoming 2017 Presidential
Election in terms of probability, to become a plausible failure or success depending on the
following:
i) Voter Register
ii) Results Transmission System (RTS)

25

Results Transmission System (RTS)

RTS is a system for transmitting provisional results electronically to an observation centre. At
the end of voting and when votes have been counted and tallied, the Presiding Officers (POs)
enter the data on the signed results sheet (Form 35) into a specially configured mobile phones
and transmits the results simultaneous to the election results centres at the constituency, county
and national level. RTS is used to:

Enhance transparency through electronic transmission of provisional results from the

polling stations
Display and visualize provisional results at the tally centers
Provide access to provisional elections data to media and other stakeholders in real time

If you read the above points, as a commission, you will notice a great deal of need to be able to
have a finger on the system as well as monitor and control it from the very beginning. This is
where the real struggle will be since there are a number of darkroom technocrats who will be
fighting to test the system or maliciously manipulate the system for selfish gains.
Potential threat of rigging lies in the Results Transmission System. This is where opponents may
hijack the system without the knowledge of commission, and create round robbing algorithms
which can alter the results in favour of a particular candidate.
There are only two options:
Monitor and control this system
Let it be controlled by vested interests
More than 24 hours after closure of official voting in the 2013 General Elections, Kenyans got a
special treat from IEBC electronic voter transmission system that gave very unclear stands on
presidential poll.
IEBC opened voting process way after 6am after delays due to machine failures, but later
extended by the same margin of time after the closing hour, 5pm. Kenyan election laws demand
that polling stations be closed at 5pm, however, those within polling stations should be allowed
to vote even if its past the closing time.
Fourteen hours after the voting, election results started trickling in, and by midnight of Tuesday,
only presidential results from about 10,000 polling stations of a total of about 31,981 stations had
been received. Shockingly, the results transmission systems screen remained largely unchanged
through Tuesday leading to anxiety among Kenyans who were concerned about possible
electoral malpractice.

26

On the transmission screen, the two leading candidates were relatively close in votes cast, with
Uhuru Kenyatta gaining 2,771,097 votes against Raila Odingas 2,179,833 in the 5,188,355 votes
received by the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) by end of Tuesday.
Through most of the following day, Raila and Uhuru maintained a constant gap of about 600,000
votes between them. It was a very tight contest bearing in mind that for either of them to be
declared president elect, they needed to garner 50 percent of the popular vote plus one additional
vote for a simple majority. In addition the winner of the presidential poll needed to have gotten
25 percent of the votes cast in 24 of 47 counties. This was the only way out to avoid possible
electoral rerun. The rerun would be done between the top two contestants, Raila and Uhuru, on
11th April 2013.
Ahead of 2013 poll, IEBC developed an Application Programming Interface (API) which was
meant to accurately present real-time results of all the presidential candidates. As day three came
to an end, the top two candidates had majority of the votes, but there was the third presidential
candidate whose name was never on the ballot papers, that is, spoilt votes. By end of the day,
rejected or spoilt votes (330, 760) were higher than votes cast for a number of presidential
candidates. IEBC could not and is still not able to explain how they got so many spoilt or
rejected votes. But there could be a simple explanation to it, in terms of irresponsible nature of
the 2013 election which had massive loopholes.
Just months before the election, IEBC released voter registration database which indicated that
14.3 million people had registered as voters for the 2013 general elections. On the voting day,
between 70 and 80 percent of the registered voters turned out, which amount to about 10 million
cast votes.
While vote counting was still going on, IEBC started transmitting provisional results from the
polls that had completed tallying. IEBC would later come to the press conference and inform
members of the public that electronic transmission of votes had stalled due to technical failure.
According to IEBC, stalled system was the reason as to why there was no change in the number
of votes cast. The commissioners also claimed that IEBC officers from most of the polling
stations were not able to submit provisional results into the system because there was no data
path. These claims by IEBC have never been quantified nor substantiated as it is not clear at
what exact point the transmission system failed.
While consoling members of the public from possible repeat of 2007 post-election violence,
IEBC chairperson Isaack Hassan promised to give results in the next 48 hours, but also made it
clear that the law allows him to give final results seven days after voting. Hassan went ahead and
made it clear that provision results which they were feeding members of the public with are not
official results, and as such, people should have expected changes.
The law requires that returning officers would physically present final results at the national
tallying station in Nairobi. The country was calm as IEBC Chairperson continuously updated the
nation, but there were chaos inside the commission since many constituencies had delayed
submitting their manual results to the County tallying centres.

27

For better part of the third day of vote transmission, blame-games rented the air with Safaricom
coming up to absolve themselves from any delay, stating that they are only involved in
transmission of results from Nokia handsets in use by IEBC returning officers to the national
tallying centre. According to Safaricom, their duty of transmitting results was on course and
couldnt have caused any delays in vote transmission.
As all the confusion was going on, one thing was clear in the minds of Kenyans. Issack Hassan
led commission was presiding over the first election after disputed elections in 2007, which led
to deaths of more than 1,000 Kenyans in about 2 months of bloodshed.
Partly, 2007 chaos began due to what was a close election, whose manual transmission of vote
results from the then Juja and Nithi constituencies was delayed, and later disputed on grounds of
exceptionally high voter turnouts.
In any election, commissioners are often the decision makers - that is why its indeterminate to
have electoral commissioners who are unable to troubleshoot and diagnose a technological
trouble on an electoral system. At least, one or two members of the commission should be able to
fully understand the technology involved in an election. Many are the times when results are
manipulated on the transmission systems even without the knowledge of the commissioners, just
because they literally know very little about the system in use.

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Responsible steward of Information Intelligence on Election

There is need to put in place automated electronic scanners that will put a strict surveillance on
system conversations especially during elections. These electronic surveillance systems will be
customised to the technology, and may conduct phishing scam scans on the transmission system
so as to identify any foreign invasions and malware that may outfox information throughout the
election time.
To succeed in this exercise, the commission will collect device-specific information based on the
hardware model of the system, operating system version, unique device identifiers and mobile
network information including phone numbers of anyone who intubate certain phone numbers to
the DB with a view of hacking or planning to hijack or rig the system.
The commission should also be able to collect [in real-time] Results Transmission System (RTS)
information on processes for actual location of the various servers using IP addresses, GPS and
coding sensors that may provide information on nearby devices including cell towers connected
to the same system so that the technicians may arrest any attempt to hijack the system. This will
be done in tight coordination between the commission and the police who will help in
apprehending the suspect. These offensive and defensive mechanics will be able to collect
information on personalities including password, usernames on local device mechanisms and on
browser web storage, HTMLs and application data caches so as to fully and automatically
identify a threat.
The risk of failure is always higher when new technologies are first implemented to an electoral
process. Mitigation mechanisms that will continuously try and tested systems should be in place
before the new technologies are launched for use. These contingency measures often involve
setting up manual back-up systems that can kick into operation at short notice whenever the
technology fails.
The mitigation plans will follow a review of technologies used within specific electoral
administration, such as, where ballots are being counted electronically, plans should be in place
to enable a switch to a manual count whenever the electronic system fails. However, modern
computer systems host appropriate back-up systems, such as the use of mirrored servers,
automation of back-up copies of data and off-site facilities to regularly store copies of data and
help in making decisions during crisis moments.

29

Technologies and Electoral Applications

Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) has been considering use of the latest
technology for election the following areas (below), even though its budget does not meet the
desires.

Technology for Boundary Administration

Technology for Voting Operations
Technology for Voter Registration
Technology for Regulation of Party and Candidates
Technology for Reaching Voters

A vital component of election technology is telecommunication system which should be made up

of transmitter, a device that originates communication; atmosphere or cables, the medium over
which the transmission takes place and the receiver, the end point of the transmission.
The work of the transmitter is to encode data or message that should in turn be converted into a
signal. The signal is what will be transmitted to one or more receivers that decode it to make it
understandable to the user, a person or a computer or other piece of hardware depending on the
features of the electoral technology involved.
This transmission can be bi-directional, that is when at the end of the transmission path there is a
combination of transmitter and receiver attached to the system. In other electoral cases, the
transmission goes only from one transmitter to many receivers in a broadcast broadcast signal
pattern.
There is a possibility of degradation when a signal travels through the transmission medium from
the transmitter to the receiver. This degradation may be caused by a number of factors but not
limited to hacking so as to modify other signals to fit in the match up for designed sinister
motives. Degradation will make it difficult for the decoding mechanism to recovering messages
thereby leading to misunderstanding of the final results.
There are a number of security issues associated with the use of telecommunications systems,
which may lead to undesired or unauthorized modification of the transmitted signal or message.
This particular form of interference takes place between the transmitter and the receivers,
sometimes, without the knowledge of the operators. There are times when conversations from
the transmitter can be tapped and heard by third parties without the knowledge of the receiver on
a transmission path. When this happens, rich data can be intercepted and modified during its
transmission by interfering with the radio frequency emissions that carry the data.
There are so many people in the world who take a lot of interest in experimenting with their skill
to cause security breach when data such as the results of vote counting, voter data registration or
even payments to third parties are transmitted from one place to another. Sometimes its not out
of malice but just being experimental in nature.

30

During voting, electoral commission officials regularly use mobile, telephones and facsimile to
coordinate and communicate throughout the exercise. Satellite phones and facsimiles can be used
to communicate between places where no standard mobile phone service is available. Satellite
technology is very vital in creating a safe environment during voter registration and vote casting
as it can solve serious problems of communications in remote areas, especially those without
access to proper telecommunications infrastructure.
Over 60% of Kenyan media consumers use radios to get information, thus making it one of the
best methods for promoting voter participation in elections and disseminating information. On
the 5th May 2015, IEBC Chairman Issack Hassan said that his team will not resign, and asked
CORD leaders to table evidence of graft against commissioners. This came after various
organisations and individuals spoken about the commission and preparedness for the next
general elections.
IEBC maintained that there was no time left as elections were only 14 months away. While
responding to the nations misgivings on their electoral technology, Issack Hassan had this to
say; concerns have also been raised about the technology that failed in the last elections. Yes,
we are doing something about it. First the whole IT department has been restructured as part of
wide ranging institutional reform and capacity building. A new data centre is being set up to
insure against failure among other technology upgrades, which will be tested for stress, readiness
and resilience at least six months before elections. We will bring on board all stakeholders to
ascertain the functionality and efficiency of the technology. What IEBC did not explain is
what exactly they are doing about the technology.

Election based Networks

Telecommunications technology based on computers can integrate many other systems which
can either be connected to Local Area Networks (LANs) and Wide Area Networks (WANs).
These networks are vital in communication and data sharing among concerned parties. But these
networks may not perform so well without specialised software that will allow computer around
the world to communicate via intranets, extranets and the Internet (World Wide Web) in the
process of transmitting voice, images and data.
Its no doubt that electoral commission and its workers will have to share database and
information throughout the election time on computer networks. These networks, as described
below, will enable computers to communicate with each other based on commands from
software operations. The networking connection can be done through cabling, modem systems,
radio waves or even combination of all these options.

A local area network (LAN) covers a local area, like an office or a small group of
buildings. A LAN has widely been used by organizations in order to connect computers,
workstations and other devices such as printers and scanners within a small geographic

31

area of an office setup. Local area network may also be used to connect several office
buildings through a common communications line that acts as a wireless link. While
connecting a LAN, each computer will typically correspond to a node in a LAN which
can execute programs and share the resources of a single computer processor or server.
The users will then be able to share devices as well as data located away from them.

A metropolitan area network (MAN) usually spans a city or a large area like a university
campus. A MAN typically uses wireless infrastructure or optical fibre connections to link
their sites.

A wide area network (WAN) covers a wide geographical area, involving a vast array of
computers and LANs. A WAN is the Internet. When several LANs are connected and
interconnected, they may create a Wide Area Network (WAN) which allow
geographically dispersed computers to communicate with each other and to share data
with users across the covered areas. Wide Area Network is often connected using optical
fibres, microwave links, radio links - using ground-bases or satellite transmitters and
cable to link computers with access to appropriate telecommunications from anywhere in
the world.

Governments networks can be combined in a collection of links to form the largest WAN, which
is the Internet used for linking millions of computer users around the world. The Internet
allows various applications to send and receive services such as e-mails, file sharing and World
Wide Web.
The fact is that there are complex physical interconnectivities infrastructures involved in Internet
system across the world. Internet Service Providers activities are bound by multilateral
agreements and by technical specifications. These specifications have created standards such as
Internet Protocols that describe how to exchange data over the networks across the globe.
Electoral bodies such as IEBC should use specific networks with high security levels,
authentication and encryption technologies which limit the access to their information by the
general public or unauthrosed persons. The process of securing electoral networks should take
collaborative approach by its users.
During Presidential Election Petition in 2013, IEBC was accused by the CORD coalition for
sharing a server with their opponents, the TNA Party. Even though CORD coalition was
seemingly not able to convince the Supreme Court that IEBC and TNA were in collusion for
electoral malpractices, the facts about the allegation remains a mystery. Its difficult to rate the
success of use of Internet by IEBC to communicate information to voters, parties and
commissions electoral operators during elections.
Another option that electoral bodies have often explored is the use of intranet, that is basically a
LAN or even a WAN that uses internally installed mechanisms in an organisation to facilitate
communication and access to information that is only restricted to its staff and authorised users.

32

In many applications, intranets may be connected to the Internet itself, especially where there is
no firewall software as a gateway for accessing all to data. The firewall software is used to filter
and monitored those accessing the systems involved. The danger is that, if just one person can
illegally go past the firewall software, a lot of damages would be caused to the entire process
of course, that is when electoral rigging is done.
Another option for securely sharing information is by use of an extranet, which is a private
computer network that uses Internet technology and the public telecommunication system, as
prescribed by authorised persons.
No electoral body should underestimate the importance of security the network in use, especially
the on-line transactions which are based on alteration of web pages or redirection of users to offsite URLs. The security management of an electoral network is a complicated issue that is
constantly evolving as the Internet develops. Internet and Computer hackers are becoming
smarter by the day with new ways of attacking websites and servers. But simple strategies such
as data encryptions are vital in securing information from being hacked by outsiders.
Managing election based Information Technology
Generally, there are acceptable assessment strategies that are normally used by Information
Scientists in order to electoral objectives of the nation. The first strategy is based on conducting a
detailed assessment so as to identify the required environment, regulations, procedures, and tasks
involved in the electoral process. This should follow a management plan that will outline the cost
of implementing a given technology in an electoral process.
The rush to adopt new technology sometimes makes electoral bodies to lose integral focus on the
importance of Even-management for the entire process. As a result, a number of complications
may be created while trying to solve a problem in the management of a new technology. Partly,
an electoral body should seek legislative approvals and stipulations in order to solve some
problems. The same legislative provisions should place heavy penalties and consequences on the
electoral commissioners who deliberately misuse technology for skewed interest in an election.
These legislative provisions should eliminate doubts and sinister motives on an electoral
technology by outlining every step of the management of the technology in use. All parties
involved should do the formulations of the legislative aspects under mutual agreements. The
binding legal resolution will create sensible structures for testing, verification, and develop
backup plans thorough reliable stakes to make sure that the electoral event takes place without a
hitch.
It is needless to conduct an election that has already been disputed even before anyone casts a
ballot. Electoral disputes are a recipe for chaos and violence that might break the country into
pieces. Therefore, the need to conduct accurate, secure and transparent election with proper
technological standards cannot be underestimated.

33

Based on the electoral demands, the electoral commission should create a technological checklist
which will take care of planning and development strategies, evaluation and audit, quality
assurance, management structure, computer management administration, staffing and training
and management obsolescence.
Electoral laws should describe the process of acquiring new technology so as to avoid corruption
and purchasing substandard products. The electoral body should in the first place establish if
there is any need of having a new technology. After which the electoral body will make an
assessment of the cost of the technological solutions, not just for a specific election but also for
the long run.
Just before going full scale in the quest to purchase new technology, electoral commission
should consider making an evaluation of local infrastructure and its possible limitation to
achieving the objectives of an upcoming election. This electoral engagement process will feed
into a considerable narrative of suitability that will bring more confidence on the electoral body.
The biggest challenge in implementing a new electoral technology is the possibility that personal
interests and outside influence may prevail over the real need for a technology.
Normally, whether in developing or developed worlds, serving governments will do all that is
humanly possible to remain in power. The influence of serving governments may significantly
overflow on the real need to have an objective electoral process and environment.
Political influences are special circumstances, but they should not be allowed to interfere with
the suitability to adopt a technology that will keep the country united and at peace with itself.
As much as technological approaches are key in conducting elections in modern world, its
important to understate that manual or non-technological processes may still have a place in
electoral administration, especially in areas that they are most preferable.
Non-technological approaches may depend on the availability and unavailability of environment
and infrastructures that may accommodate or not accommodate manual processes. In some
instances, non-technological approaches may be more transparent and less likely to fail than
technological ones.
In a country like Kenya where access to technology is not widely available or is unreliable it can
create an unequal situation among users and voters. In other cases, a technological solution might
not be sustainable in the long term due to many factors ranging from lack of political will to
voters trepidation. To avoid ambiguity, there should be legislative process that will eliminate
barriers that may prevent the adoption of a reliable technology.
Part of the consideration for an adoption of a technological or non-technological electoral
process should be the physical infrastructure and socio-political environment of a country before
choosing which way to go. These factors may limit the appropriateness of some technologies,
regardless of the need or the investments placed in the processes.

34

These considerations will encapsulate simple features such as available network for use. For
instance, a wide area computer network that requires a reliable power source may not be good
for usage in an area with possible interruptible power system. Other factors may include
humidity, dust or sand that may restrict the choice of technology.
Adoption of new technology largely depends on the readiness of the stakeholders to assimilate
the technology into customized system objectivity. As usual, citizens often expect more from
technology than what may realistically be achievable. The best time to implement a new
technology is when there is a realistic expectation of the said technology.
On the other hand, unrealistic expectations can result in new technology that is not capable of
delivering on the intended functions of the electoral process. Its therefore important to develop
clear support mechanisms for the technology that has been chosen by the stakeholders.
At any stage of technological implementation, there is a possibility of encountering bureaucratic
opposition to the process by vested interests. Its normal for a political party or cocoon to first
think about how the new technology will help them win an election rather than how the
technology will serve the nation.
There should an open expectation of significant negative change in work systems and perception
about a new electoral technology. To counter such electoral expectation, electoral commission
should continuously think about how to modify management strategy so as to avoid possible
biases. One approach is to keep all stakeholders in the know through consultations since
stakeholders who are well informed are likely to support a good move. On the other hand,
stakeholders who feel left out of vital processes may be resistant to technological changes due to
political panics and fear of possible lose.
Implementation of new technology is a perfect opportunity for meaningful contributions to
transparent, fair and credible election. There are many people in political circles who are
generally opposed to change, and as such there is every possibility that a new technology will be
viewed with certain amount of trepidation due to its impact in voting patterns. The best way to
handle doubts is to be as transparent as possible at early stages of the technological
implementation process.
Make no mistake, political support and will are very essential for the implementation of a new
technological process. As much as IEBC tried to ignore Coalition for Reforms and Democracy,
Amani National Congress and Kenyan Church leadership on the need to reform certain aspects
of the commission, it was no doubt that the electoral commissions approval rates and public
confidence worsen by the day. To regain deteriorating public confidence and get the attention of
the stakeholder, the electoral commission reshuffled senior staff, and changed their titles.
While announcing the changes on 9th May 2016, Independent Electoral and Boundaries
Commission Chief Executive Officer, Ezra Chiloba said that the changes were meant to create

35

sense of stability ahead of 2017 election. As part of the continuous alignment of our
institutional capacity to the strategic priorities of the commission, further staff changes have been
undertaken, he said.
The changes meant that Moses Kipkopey was the new manager in the CEOs office while
Elizabath Omolo was appointed to the position of the Deputy Commission Secretary/Quality
Assurance, Reuben Chirchir was named the Manager, Auditing and Agatha Wahome the
Manager, Finance.
But just minutes after the announcement, Gatundu South MP Moses Kuria faulted IEBC saying
that the commission should be investigated, claiming it had recruited a large number of
consultants funded by the United Nations Development Programme and that some of them were
partisan.
In particular, there are no election laws in Kenya which are outlining how to handle electoral
technology processes, therefore, living every implementation approach at the discretion of the
electoral commission and commissioners. In cases where new technology will have significant
implications not only for a particular election period but also for posterity, there will be need to
develop a technological institution that will constantly research and develop electoral technology
that is customized to changing circumstances in Kenya. Of course trust will often need to be
earned by conducting thorough, transparent evaluations of the proposed system that are, ideally,
independently verified to avoid any biases and possible riggings.
At the centre of any technological inclusion are the members of the public who equally need to
be included, not just as voters but also as critical stakeholders. The best way to include members
of the public is by rolling out a large-scale communications campaign to inform the target
population of the proposed changes, and how the changes may affect their lives both negatively
and positively. It should however be clear that the positively impact of an electoral technology
should outweigh the negative bearings.
Public reaction is vital in making decision on possible changes, like the introduction of new
voting methods and equipment which are basically a subject of public scrutiny and inquiry. A
parliamentary committee inquiry would be better placed to steer the drive of getting the most
needed information.
During these public inquiries, the electoral commission should take the opportunity to gauge
public reaction through public submissions. The media will also play a critical role in mobilizing
members of the public for an interest generated by the conduct of the inquiries. If will conducted,
the public inquiries will promote trust and understanding of the technology that is yet to be
implemented.
The facts if that this process requires maturity of the political environment that will have an
impact on the acceptance of new technology, not just among primary stakeholders but also
among the secondary stakeholders such as friendly nations.

36

There are a lot of conversed expectations when an electoral technology is implemented for the
first time in a society that facing a transitional phase. The possibility of an elevated distrust
should be the biggest factor of consideration for commissioners and the entire electoral body. Its
important for an electoral commission to anticipate possible issues in the electoral, and to be
prepared to work with them or solve them along the way.
Lack of proper deliberations will result into a resistance to innovation on the basis that the
current system works in a mature political environment. Every electoral commission should
think of how to manage over-expectation from members of the public. Over-expectation and
unrealistic ambitions are a reality among countries which have never had such electoral
technological exposure before. Generally, unrealistic expectations will make members of the
public to distrust any electoral technology, and that is why its important to get it right from the
onset. The presiding electoral commission should find a way of lowering expectations from
members of the public, but still be able to conduct a credible election.
In the face of implementing technological processes, there are possibilities that electoral
technology will appear to be expensive at the implementation stage, but may save money in the
long-term, particularly where a low-cost technological solution can be found to replace a highcost. Therefore, electoral body together with all stakeholders should make an assessment of cost
effectiveness of the technology being developed.

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Planning and Developing Electoral Technological Strategies

The first step towards implementing a new technology is to draw a plan based on research and
inquiries which have been gathered from both primary and secondary stakeholder. The plan will
accommodate goals, and possible ways of achieving the goals but there must be a political will.
For the longest time, Coalition for Reforms and Democracy (CORD) has made the wildest
allegations against IEBC, most of which have some sense of truth but often denied by the
commission. On the 9th of May, 2016, CORD Co-principal, Kalonzo Musyoka claimed that the
election chiefs were working with a Korean institution to rig next years polls in favour of the
ruling Jubilee coalition.
Kalonzo Musyoka in his claims said that a commissioner (Letangule) had visited Korea to seek
help on programming the Biometric Voting Registers (BVRs) in readiness for rigging elections
in 2017. He spoke during their second public demonstration in Nairobi demanding the removal
of IEBC commissioners before next years vote.
In a rejoinder, IEBC sort to scathingly make clarifications on the ongoing between the
commission and the said visit to Korea. Here is the letter sent to Newsrooms.
NAIROBI, KENYA: Tuesday, May 10, 2016 Reference is made to reports appearing on the
front page of todays edition of the Standard. The commission has noted the reckless allegation
by Kalonzo Musyoka that IEBC has hired Koreans to rig the 2017 General Elections.
This is part of CORD's systematic but unfounded misinformation and propaganda to discredit
the Commission and preparations for the next General Elections. It is also simply irresponsible
and carefree journalism by The Standard newspaper that headlined the allegation. The
Commissions response to the story was not sought. Commissioner Thomas Letangule, who is
alleged to have taken the BVR kits to Korea for tampering in readiness for elections, traveled
to Seoul to observe Korean parliamentary elections under the auspices of the Association of
World Election Bodies (A-WEB).
IEBC is a member of A-WEB, with which it has signed a memorandum of understanding on
training and capacity building in election management. IEBC staff have benefited from training
and collaboration with 160 other electoral management bodies worldwide that A-WEB brings
together.Mr. Musyokas remarks not only hurt the relationship we have nurtured with A-WEB
for over two years, but also runs against the CORD Coalitions' own calls for improvement of the
IEBC capacity to manage elections. We urge the media to exercise restraint and uphold ethics in
reporting on outlandish and alarmist claims that could jeopardize cohesion and the national
interest. The commission is open to answer all inquiries and clarify matters relating to its
activities especially with regards to preparations for the next General Elections.
Andrew Limo,
Manager, Communication and Public Affairs.

38

Its crystal clear that IEBC has persistently remained on both defensive and offensive since
steering the disputed 2013 general election. The tone of the commissions language is very
unfriendly to the dissenting groups, including name-calling. However, it worth noting continuous
provocation by interest groups that have been demanding the resignation of IEBC
commissioners has resulted into complete disrespect to the commission. Even as the tomfooleries
continue, IEBC should not forget that its a relative symbol of national unity that can only
perform when it holds stakeholders confidence.
Back and forth among commissioners will certainly humper commissions activities including
the planning process that requires an extensive assessments. Its not easy to take a decision to
introduce new technology or update existing technology if there are constant wrangles within
and without the commission. A detailed plan for securing stakeholder agreement, obtaining funds
and implementing the chosen technology will need a common format of consensus.
Stakeholders views are important, not only during the purchase of a new technology but also
during deployment of the technology.
Electoral commission should therefore develop an extensive information technology strategy or a
strategic information systems plan that will provide overall management features of every step
involved throughout implementation process. This should be a public document that details any
sort of information concerning the vision of implementing a new technology.
Every stakeholder will obviously realise that jurisdictions for the implementation of a new
technology will require all governmental agencies to participate in drawing and publishing a
strategic information systems plan.
An electoral management strategy will provide a mapping outlook that will justify in the light
of laid down procedures the terms that will serve to identify opportunities for obtaining the
intended technology. The same strategy can as well be used in implementing an upgraded
version of technology for multiple uses.
Electoral commission should use agreed timelines for the project implementation to help carry
out the project. Normally, timelines set by stakeholder are structured to outlast the actual
period set for implementing a new technology. This enables stakeholders to identify expected
tasks and making necessary specifications in terms of functionality and technological
responses.
When going into the implementation of a new technology, electoral commissions experts should
be able to determine that the proposed technology is affordable, and is achievable within a
specified timelines and details of the budget.
Matters concerning electoral implementations should gain approval by all relevant internal and
external stakeholders so as to secure an amendment of relevant legislation whenever necessary.
The project management plan will provide detailed specifications of the desired technology
so that anyone working on the project will simply follow step-by-step guidance for the
implementation process. With the project implementation plan, it will not matter whether an

39

individual has a vested interest or not in the system. The guidance plan will be rigid enough to
stop anyone from any form of malicious actions.
As the progression commences, experts should conduct an environmental scan for the
development and management of a desired technology. The assessment plan will start with an
analysis of the existing process to identify any shortcomings and make changes where
necessary as debate continues on how to make technology as reliable as possible.
This follows an evaluation of available solutions so as to conduct an appraisal of the desired
technology in terms of testability and progressive sustainability that allows experts to follow
several strands in a simultaneous implementation of the stages.
Electoral commissions technical advisors should be able to determine the sustainability of the
technological solutions that the desired technology will be offering. This will factor in the
financial cost of the solution so as to determine ability of the government to purchase or develop
it.
Concerned experts should critically think about preferred options against the available options
when carrying out an assessment of the implementation process. There is need to explore and
determine the best practices for technological implementation. Information obtained from the
assessment process will be vital in creating platform for the next stage of the business case.
The entire electoral body, including experts should thereafter develop a balanced sheet which
will contain a business case for approval by all stakeholders as well as committees of the
National Assembly, Political Parties and Members of Parliament. The business case will
outline the importance of the process and usefulness of adopting a new technology.
This paper should be simple enough for every stakeholder to understand, and should clearly
demonstrate a logical cost benefits throughout the expected lifetime. As well, the experts should
also outline the counterproductive features that should be expected in the technology, and make a
description on how to mitigate or eliminate them.
New technologies often invite a lot of skeptics, and as such, electoral body should make a clear
distinction between possible success and possible failure through a clear statement of needs for
the desired technology. An elaborate statement of proposal can go a long way towards providing
the basis for a business case to sell the idea to stakeholders and make a conviction.
Another vital part of implementation of a new technology is the non-monetary costs and benefits
of the proposed options. All stakeholders should be made aware of the possible non-monetary
costs that will have to be factored in the implementation process.
Before any steps are made towards approval of the business case of the desired technology, the
electoral body should ensure that issues such as enabling legislations by parliament are made
ready for scrutiny as per the legislative proceedings.

40

Depending on the size, cost and complexity of the project, the definitive set of specifications of
the required technology should be identified so that they may be developed separately if need
be. Normally, specifications are meant to help the technical team to recognize possible
mismatch or duplication of mechanical roles of the desired technology. Elaborate and clear
specifications will help avoid wastage of funds as well as ambiguity in the implementation
process.
The general rule of thumb concerning specifications will provide details on intended purpose of
the desired technology with a clear statement of any other relevant background information that
can help technical team to make appropriate decisions on the technology. Its also necessary for
those involved to make an indication on the projected timeline for the implementation process
with regards to description of various specified requirements as either mandatory or optional.
Documents such as technical manuals, users manuals or contractors' reports are vital in key
decision making since they will provide the essential information for approval, and even for
mitigation possibilities in relation to required levels of security applications to the project.
These documents will also provide the electoral body with information on possible evaluations
on the handlers of the technology. There are some technologies which can only be handled by
specialists, trained for the very task at hand. But these elements are no means exhaustive, and
other considerations may be applicable to a particular cases depending on the advice of the
manufacturers, stakeholders and technical teams.
Information regarding specifications details of the desired technology is one of the most
important minutiae of the implantation process. One of the ways of getting this information is
through use of RFP (request for proposal) documents which will anticipate all likely variations of
the technology as designed and developed by inventors or innovators.
Projects apropos to implementation of new technologies often encounter cost-over-runs when
specifications are altered after the initial stipulations have been prepared by all the stakeholders.
Its very difficult to thereafter make an accurate consideration at the specification stage, but
technocrats understand this so well, and they should be able to prevent any possible running over
budgetary applications.
Under normal stakes of acquiring new technology, development of the same follows the need for
assessment and approval process that results in testing and drawing of enactment of
technological phases.
A complex technology will obviously invite multifaceted development processes, unless the
desired technology is categorized under a standard off-the-shelf product.
A off-the-shelf technology will not involve too much of agonizing thoughts since standard
products may have been customized and adapted or modified to perform tasks that are required
in the intended election. It means that stakeholder will go for a readymade technology other than
those for which the products were designed and built to meet a specific electoral need.

41

Computing Malice: Hacking Democracy

There are a number of challenges that come with a standard off-the-shelf technologies like the
one purchased by IEBC for the 2013 general election. These challenges include but not
limited to lack of proper customisation into the intended environment, lack of requisite
amount of training for the technology handlers and possible mischief for vested interests
through developers who can easily be bribed to leak essential details concerning the security
of the technology.
Between the year 2000 and 2004, the United States of America went through one of the most
embarrassing moments in the world when US citizens discovered massive anomalies and
irregularities in electronic voting (e-voting). The irregularities were so evident in Volusia County
in Florida whose voters were a key determinants of and to the election.
The electronic machines which were used for voting had flawed integrity on electronic voting
capability. In particular, the machines that exposed unknown backdoors and computing secretes
were made by Diebold Election Systems. The discovery culminated dramatically in hacking of
the in-use computer systems that had been employed in over thirty states in the US. Its largely
believed that the hacked computer system gave power to the wrong people.
Of course to date, there are some people who are still wondering if its possible to hack and
control voting systems such as memory encoding tats.
In the case of the United States, the electronic voting machines were allegedly programmed by
lots of software experts to ensure that certain candidate voters were reversed. The malicious
manipulation of the program affected the integrity of the election results, and it wasnt due to
machine failure since it only affected the presidential votes.
The origin of negative votes was never proved but some engineers thought it might have an
attempted to employ skewed techniques on memory cards to tempter with electronic voting and
transmission. Computers count and transmit over 80 percent of all American votes right from
the counties to the national tallying centre, especially when it comes to presidential voting.
Its rare to get documentary evidence of machines miscounting or miss-transmitting since the
actual voting and transmission is a private affair, reserved to the handlers.
Normally, the votes themselves are stored in a memory card which will then be taken to central
computer known as the master tabulator that sums up the votes and transmit them to the
members of the public. The problem is you cant see a computer adding up the votes, and its
normally very difficult to know if the votes have been counted correctly.
In electronic electoral process, there are a lot of people who are involved in writing the voting
or transmission software, and as such, the entire process remains at their mercy. If one of the
people involve puts something malicious in the software and its distributed to all the other

42

machines, then that one person could be responsible for changes of millions of votes across
the country.
The fact is that its possible to hack into an election without even knowing how the system works
to count or transmit result. Malicious electronic surveillance devices and programs can be used
to create a hole in electronic voting system in a way that will be very difficult to detect or
repair. It will take one smart person and simple log in credentials such as internet protocols,
usernames and passwords to start breaking the wall of electoral secrecy.
In 2003, the state of Maryland spent $55 Million on the electronic machines. They later asked a
different computer consulting company, Robert Technologies Inc to test the machines, and they
company managed to break into the computer system in less than ten seconds. Its a standard
practice that voting machines be tested by independent consulting company in collaboration with
all stakeholders.
All stakeholders should be made aware of any material that goes into an electronic voting
system. Detailed analytical information should be provided for approval whenever there is
need to introduce a new software or device into a voting system. This boils down to the mere
fact that if someone can introduce a malicious item into the system, it may cripple the entire
process or steal vital information such as source codes, passwords, user-level breakers, and
finally manipulate the electoral results in favour of a particular candidate.
There are many people who are capable of changing votes in a system without being caught by
the system or the operators. Some of hacking activities may be conducted in such a way that
there will be no traces of evidence of fraud. As long as an individual can bypass system
checkpoints such as firewalls, user-levels or credentials using a different direction, electoral
fraud may be conducted without any form of trace.
The fact that all votes are stored in a memory card before they are finally transmitted to the
members of the public for consumption can leave a loophole. If a malicious individual can hack
the memory card, the entire voting process can be controlled and rigged at will. Most of the
election machine memory cards not only hold votes but they also have embedded executable
codes and programs. These executable codes can be modified by computer hackers to reprogram the readership or transmission of votes against or in favour of a particular candidate.
However, its not only the memory cards that can be used to alter results on transmission
systems. Chances are that even malware can be used to fetch information discreetly and transmit
it to the intended persons without leaving any traces. As a matter of fact, a single malware
installed in an electoral machine can be distributed to all machines across the country, and may
tech information including credentials of the system and submit it to various persons.
In some instances, executable codes in memory cards can be reprogramed to allow negative
votes. It means that, for any positive vote for a particular contender, the system will transmit a
programmed native vote in nearly equal measure for a certain amount of time.

43

When an individual manages to modifies one executable code in the system, it will allow the
rewrite-program to redirect scanning system to favour or disfavour a contender. But this
approach is always suspicious since the hackers will end up with more votes than the number
of voters. However, if the hackers can use matching negative votes to correspond to the
intended favored-votes, it may easily succeed. As people cast their votes, the total number of
votes cast will always be equal to the total number of votes or slightly below the total number
of registered votes. This will make the favoured-contestant carry the day, and it will be done
without leaving any traces of fraud and malpractices.
In essence, carrying out an election is more complex than just queuing on the line to tick a paper
or press a button then count the results. Carrying out an election is also far much more than just
having highly educated people manning a system. Its also not about having an electoral body
with certain number of commissioners.
In the 2013 general election, some 15, 000 biometric voter registration scanners had been
procured by the Kenyan government, meaning that the government further needed to
purchase another 15, 400 electronic voter identification devices (EVIDs) for the purposes of
identifying voters on the election day. The IEBC would later procure 33, 400 electronic voter
identification devices and laptops for Ksh. 1.3 Billion. That some of the electronic voter
identification devices (EVIDs) were brought in the country on 26th February 2013 is a very
important fact to note, and understanding their failure just six days later here is why;
Voting during the 2013 general election would have to take place in some 33,000 poling
stations across the country. That means that every single poling station would need one EVID
machine. Deploying the machines to these polling stations aside, the real challenge would be
in ensuring that these machines would work.
You can imagine, using 25,000 registration stations, and downloading information on
registered voters to a single central server. The 25, 000 registration station corresponded to 33,
400 polling stations, and the information had to be segmented to match the number of voters
within the voting setting. The 33, 400 poling stations corresponded to 140, 050 wards, and the
140, 050 wards corresponded to 290 constituencies that then corresponded to 47 counties.
Processing such huge amount of data to match the various compartments of categories and
devices was simply impossible within sixteen days if it was done manually as claimed by
IEBC.
If it took at least five minutes for employees of IEBC (working nonstop) to upload the data
from one polling station on to a memory card, it would take the people who are segmenting the
data a total of 115.9 days. If the entire process took just one minute, it would have taken
employees of IEBC a total of 23 days to do so when working without any form of break. That
is eleven more days than they had if they started working on the data immediately on the
arrival of the devices, and when they announced that they had principle register on the 20 th
February 2013. Technologically, it makes no sense at all to purchase a system that is skewed
to fail.

44

The development process of an election largely involves the election management body that will
be working with the suppliers or developers of the products or services to ensure that the desired
technologies are fit for intended electoral purposes.
Contention and lack of proper tamper-proof systems are often the main reasons for failure of the
electoral technological developments. For instance, CORD coalition was demonstrating against
IEBC that was largely viewed by opinion polls to be a biased commission. On 19th of May 2016,
Coalition for Reforms and Democracy, CORD made the first legal step to have the
commissioners who had been accused of benefiting from proceeds of corrupt dealings face
prosecution. Below is the statement that Cord sent to Newsrooms:
Coalition for Reforms and Democracy (CORD)
Case of the Sovereign People of Kenya Against Independent Electoral and Boundaries
Commission (IEBC)
Prosperity of the country is directly linked to well functioning, accountable and democratic
institutions. The Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) does not meet
measure to this threshold. It is the single major source of uncertainty and conflict. IEBC has no
heritage of rights. It exists to the service of the people of Kenya. It derives its legitimacy and
authority from the people.
The Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission has full constitutional powers, authority
and control on all matters touching on elections and referenda. It has constitutional functional
autonomy and insulation to ensure it meets high degree of integrity, credibility, transparency
and accountability in its electoral management work in accordance with the recommendations of
the Kriegler Commission and Constitution.
The IEBC falls under widespread independent model of electoral management bodies. It is
neither government nor hybrid. It has to exercise and enforce its unbiased structural,
operational and funding independence to avoid influence and or interference. It must uphold and
posses a culture and attitude which promotes integrity. In reference to the 2013 General
Elections, IEBC operated outside this stipulated constitutional framework that created it; and
that it grossly contravened laws and regulations that govern it and its operations.
There exists the following solid evidence and reasons why IEBC currently constituted is
untenable;
There exists overwhelming evidence that IEBC had a predetermined 2 Million votes (so far
unaccounted for) that it used to electronically manipulate and subvert the popular will of the
people and influence the outcome for the Presidential elections in 2013. The evidence clearly
shows the figure was used to cover up the predetermined outcome. This is patently revealed
when votes between 12.2 million presidential votes against the average 10.2 million votes casted
for Governors, Senators, and Women Representative.

45

IEBC had a tailor made computer programming system that subtracted and or added these 2
Million votes in order to systematically achieve the already intended presidential outcome
without raising initial suspicion. Samples exist in a number of Counties.
IEBC commissioners and staff did not only procure obsolete elections equipment but also
awarded tenders and contracts to suppliers without following the laws and regulations
procedures. The tendering, evaluation, verification and due diligence were never done in
accordance with the law leading to purchase of substandard and faulty equipment at highly
inflated costs. Some suppliers were paid for no work done or supplying air.
IEBC deliberately delayed and mismanaged the process of sending Biometric Voters
Registration (BVR) kits and Electronic Voters Identification Devices (EVID) specifications
within the set timelines to intentionally create avenue for costly government to government single
sourcing procurement where one of the interested parties attended the Commissions decisionmaking meeting with invitation of the IEBC Chairman. This cost the taxpayer an unnecessary
KShs.4B.
A credible and verifiable voters registration is key pre-requisite step for peaceful, democratic
and credible elections. IEBC failed to maintain credible, verifiable and clean voters registers.
Evidence show that IEBC Commissioners and ICT staff were fully aware of the faulty Electronic
Voters Identification Devices (EVID) and their high risk of failure. Further, all the EVID
deliveries were done outside the agreed delivery schedule; inspection and acceptance exercise
was not done; IEBC officers were never trained on how to use new devices; and that some
devices remained unused. The Billions of tax payers money that was used for EVID did not play
any role whatever in improving credibility of 2013 general elections. It also caused elections
candidates to incur huge costs in court/legal fees arising from electoral disputes.
The need for Electronic Results Transmission System (ERTS) arose from failure by IEBC to plan
for the procurement of EVID in time. If the EVID had worked, it was not necessary for IEBC to
have procured ERTS.
Universal Polling Kits delivery was made way after general elections. The kits were low quality;
and that they were not factored in the IEBC annual procurement plan.
There is substantial reported evidence that IEBC Commissioners working together with certain
staff members influenced procurements, tendering and distribution of voting kits in a certain
pattern.
There is uncontestable evidence of systematic deliberate compromise and failure of ICT system
with intention of not only disfranchising electorate and elections candidates but also subverting
the popular will of the people of Kenya for all the elective positions in 2013.
IEBC deliberately used non-statutory documents to aid and facilitate achieving of the
predetermined results of not only the presidential elections but also for other elective positions.

46

There is overwhelming evidence of doctored results documents with list of forged agents
signatures to alter the election results.
To date, the IEBC has been unable and unwilling to provide a comprehensive forensic audit
report of the 2013 General elections with the supporting materials such as complete forms 34, 35
and 36. This has disfranchised political parties and violated the constitutional right of Kenyans
to access accurate, timely and verifiable information that is of national importance.
The IEBC Chairman is not only adversely involved in malpractices of the IEBC internal
electoral management processes but also openly bias and contemptuous of some presidential
candidates. He is explicitly implicated in corruption/criminal case for which co-perpetrators are
in jail in Britain and their assets recovered. Government of Kenya is laying claim to some of the
recovered assets. Integrity does not require case to meet criminal attribute. The Nancy Baraza
Judicial Tribunal set this threshold.
IEBC COMMISSIONERS AND ACCOMPLICE
SURCHARGED AND BE PROSECUTED

STAFF

MUST

STEP

DOWN,

BE

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KEDS: Creed for Credible Electoral Technology

KEDS (Kenya Decides) is technological concept and system in six parts that describe an
electronic electoral format that is befitting Kenyan voting situation, circumstance and legal
patterns.
This concept was written by the author of this book, Obar Mark Asuelaa who endeavored to
elucidate how electronic electoral technology can be a curse or a blessing to any nation like
Kenya.
This concept is a standard component of an electoral certification process by all election
stakeholders.
This model is not just about Kenyan election system, whereas it is a concept that can be
deciphered into any other political environment, irrespective of the country involved.
Throughout worlds electoral process, Kenyan situation is inimitable and embodies peculiar
electoral environment that should act as a case study for both failure and success.
KEDS is a simple electoral system that encapsulates Voter Registration, Data Management,
Vote Tabulation, Digital and Physical Ballot Counting and Vote Transmission and display. All
these features are anchored within six parts of the system to ensure credibility, free, fair and
transparent general election.
KEDS Electronic Voter System Model
The current electronic voter system that is used by IEBC has a got a lot of loopholes which can
be filled by sinister actions to rig an election in favour of a particular candidate. To bridge the
gaps in the current system, its important to use an electoral system model like KEDS that has
been customised to serve Kenyan electorates.
KEDS should thoroughly be interrogated, and hard questions must be asked with regards to
ascertaining its safety, credibility, fairness, freeness and transparency level.
(a) EVI Technology: Voter Registration and Register
EVI stands for Electronic Voter Identification system that allows electoral body to use EVI
devices to identify, register voters by computing voters details into a computer software to
store voter identities in (code form) that are transferable and readable by software.
EVI devices are used to register voters from various stations from across the country,
after connecting them to a laptop computer. The voters details include name, National
Identification number, photograph and most importantly, the digitised biometric
fingerprints.

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GOD created every human being with unique identification numbers known as
fingerprints. When these fingerprints are captured in digital forms, they can be used to
identify individuals as well as being used to vote electronically.
When an individual shows up to register as a voter, the registration officers will compute
their name(s), national identification numbers, and take his or her photograph that will
correspond to the other details.
The registration officer will go ahead and biometrically capture the fingerprints of both
hands. The fingerprints from both hands will be saved as an image under corresponding
codes that are as unique as themselves. These corresponding codes are in other words the
voters themselves.
During registration, details of voter will be transferred manually (carrying memory cards
to national servers) or on a network to Electoral Commissions Server where database
management software will be used to segment the voters details as per the lowest voting
level, that is, at the County Ward.
All these details will be compiled in a Principle Register at the National Electoral
Commission Servers.
Any time the same person shows up to vote in future, he or she will only use her
fingerprints to vote for his or her preferred candidates. Voting will be done on a Station
Ballot Tabulator, which will provide pictures and names of the contesting candidates on
screen-pages for biometrics selection [explained below].
(b) Station Ballot Tabulator [SBT]: The voting machine
(i) Station Ballot Tabulators are the machines designed and assembled for usage within
polling stations to help registered voters biometrically select (vote) for preferred
candidates.
(ii) Station Ballot Tabulators will be fitted with screen-pages that describe selectable pages
for: Presidential candidates page, gubernatorial candidates page, Senatorial candidates
page, Member of Parliament candidates page, Woman Representative Candidates
page and Ward Representative candidates page.
(iii) Station Ballot Tabulator will be connected (on network) to the National Principle
Registers database software that will provide segmented list of registered voters in a
particular polling station.

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(iv) On the voting day, any registered voter will be allowed to electronically vote for the
preferred candidates by biometrically using fingerprints to select the candidate to vote
for on a screen-page. This system will allow registered voters to vote at any polling
station, that is, a voter will no longer have to go to the station where he or she
registered as voter so that they may vote. This is because the National Principle
Register shall have been configured to individual Station Ballot Tabulators (SBT) in
specific voting centres. This will allow easier auditing of a voting process as per
every voting machine, the SBTs.
(v) After using fingerprint to select a given candidate on a Presidential candidates page, a
new page (Gubernatorial candidates page) will appear on the screen, and the same
process will continue until a voter votes or skips the rest of the pages.

(vi) After biometrically selecting all preferred candidates, SBT will print out ballot papers
that will match the biometric selection. The ballot papers will be deposited in a
transparent ballot container while the digital counting will be accumulated on the
SBT machine memory card. These are programmatic memory cards that contain
executable codes that will safeguard the votes therein since no external votes can be
added into it.
(vii)

After the end of voting process, Election Presiding Officers and Party Agents will
come together to count the physical ballot papers casted in the transparent ballot box,
then evaluate if the number of physical votes are in tandem with the digital votes.

(viii) To assess and access the digital votes after voting, the Election Presiding officers
together with Party Agents will press Result Display button on the machine
which will generate the six contested positions in form of pages containing the
photos and names of the contestants and the number of votes they have garnered from
the election. After the confirmation, the Electoral officers and Party Agents will sign
necessary forms, then press send button to allow the votes to be transferred on a
network to the National Tallying Centre.
(ix) If there is a network problem, the election officers and Party Agents will remove the
memory cards and carry them to the Constituency or National Tallying Centres where
the results will be confirmed then added to respective candidates. Its however
important to declare results are the constituency level, especially if there is no
contention over results.
(x) The National Tallying Centres will then relay the results for Presidential candidates to the
members of the public as they come from polling stations.
(xi) The electoral body can hire the services of satellite companies for the transmission of
results from Station Ballot Tabulators to National Results Tallying Centres.

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(xii)

The Electoral body should be able to provide all concerned parties with digital
election results, six hours after the announcement of the results for the presidential
candidates. The electoral body should also be able to provide hard-copied ballot
papers with unique machine generated serial numbers on the papers. The serial
number should be able to identify the vote, the machine on which it was cast, the time
it was cast and sometimes even the person who casted the ballot paper.

(xiii) Machine generated ballot papers after selection of the preferred candidate will
eliminate chances of having spoilt votes.

Factors of effect in KEDS

a) Transfer of Voter identities through Manual or Networked system
There is a tight and delicate reckoning when transferring voter details such as National
Identification numbers, photographs, biometric fingerprints and names of the voters on a network
from electronic voter identification register to Principle Register at the Electoral Commissions
server systems.
The safety of voters details is paramount, considering the fact that if unauthorised person can
intercept the information, there is a possibility that he or she can create a database that might be
used electronically to configure electoral results in a certain sinister pattern.
A closer examination can reveal how voters details are transferred to recount a system that can
be used to settle dispute through enhancement of privacy, security and authenticity. But the
challenges faced during the transfer process also demonstrates that the details can be used
malicious to extraordinarily tilt electoral circumstances in which accepted international standards
can be outwitted through rigging.
There are no perfect elections or electoral systems, but clear guidelines on how to transfer voters
details from registration centres to principle register may help solve inevitable irregularities
which will threaten elections credibility or integrity.
By and large, voters details irregularities will automatically threaten the integrity of an election,
and if they are extensive, it may cause systematic problem that will possibly lead to pre or postelection chaos.
To mitigate this threat, appropriate preventative measures should be put in place to spell out how
data is transferred either manually or on a following comprehensive scenario mapping that will
ensure that data is safe and secured from any intruder.
This means that the electoral body will have to draw an electoral integrity management plan with
effective and timely remedial measures to stop any computer or human threats.

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b) National Principle Voters Register

The very basic process and level of voter registration is to verify identity of potential voters, and
enter those identities such as names, fingerprints, photos and corresponding codes as a
substantive information on a voters list, also referred to as Principal Voters Register.
This requires that potential voters be aware of the registration process and have reasonable
opportunities and relatively easy access to complete the registration process that in many
country demand that an individual has to physically present him or herself to the registration
centres.
This means that, for registration to be fair, comprehensive, and inclusive, electoral bodies have to
conduct serious voter education campaigns which are focused on creating necessary awareness
by emphasizing on the importance of registration as well as the importance of participating in
voting or electoral process.
In 2016, voter registration became too serious to a point that it took CORD leader Raila Odinga
to ask the coalitions MPs to skip parliamentary sessions and lead voter registration in their
respective constituencies and counties.
Raila said this after coming face-to-face with the grim reality that majority of his supporters in
Western and Eastern Kenya had not registered as voters. According to data from immigration
offices, over nine million Kenyans from Cord strongholds had new Identification Cards but
hadnt obtained voters cards.
During the first face of voter registration, many registration centres remained idle without
potential voters. According to Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission staff, just a
paltry 10 to 20 people came to register as voters per day in some wards.
Its also reported that a number of the people who applied for IDs have not collected their
National Identity Cards while some are not aware of the ongoing voter registration.
Generally, voter registration process must use a formula that is accessible to all groups and
categories of eligible citizens, and such factors like distance and disability should also form the
basis of discussion before the launch.
Voter Registration process is often hampered by narrowed interests from politicians as well as
residents of rural areas, low literacy levels, incarceration or displaced communities with people
who have lost their crucial registration documents like passports or National Identification Cards.
To break down these barriers, electoral body will have to draw a formula that is open to all
groups of persons through formal and informal mechanisms.
The most common logistical disadvantage to potential voters is administrative exclusion which is
made up of registration system that does not encourage or facilitate voter registration among

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special groups. These administrative barriers can not only torment potential voters in the long
run, they can also cause eventual right to vote, especially in country where voting is mandatory
for adult-citizens.
Electoral psychology reveals that there is always low interest to register as a voter during the
initial stages of an electoral process. Many people are more enthusiastic to register as voter after
identifying their preferred political candidates. Its vital that voter registration deadlines are set
when its just few months to election to allow as many people as possible to register as voters.
Voluntary versus Mandatory Registration
Should voter registration and voting be made an obligation and responsibility of citizenship, or
should it be made a right of citizenship to be exercised at the discretion of an individual citizen?
The answer to these two questions will define the administrative procedures that should
legislatively be put in place to guide and govern voter registration and the actual voting. In
countries like Australia and Indonesia, there is a prevailing view that voting in itself is an
obligation and responsibility that must be exercised by every individual in the country.
The parliament in these countries have created legislations which require the government to
inform every citizen about his constitutional right to vote, as well as informing them of possible
consequences for not voting. If voting is viewed as a right rather than an obligation, individual
citizen reserve the discretion to register as a voter and vote or to stay at home and ignore any
electoral process.
In some countries, voter registration is entirely the initiative of the individual voter, and the
government is under no obligation to conduct civic education on voter registration.
In practice however, the responsibility of conducting a free, fair and credible election is often
shared between the state and individual. Whereas the electoral body is expected to make voter
registration accessible by establishing thousands of voter registration centres, including mobile
units, the individual citizens also have the responsibility of turning up for the process.
State-initiation or intervention has always received criticism of a system that might be more
unsuitable to opposition as it would only increase the level of registration of voters in areas
where the government supporters dominate. However, state intervention is normally crucial in
facilitating voter registration among people with special needs such as the illiterate, the
homeless, prisoners, voters in hospitals and those with disabilities.
In a country like Kenya, there are no two ways about it, the state must assume the greatest
responsibility for ensuring that registration is not an administrative barrier to citizens
participation in democratic elections, but ensure that every individual is accorded the right to
register as a voter and vote willingly.

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Criteria for National principal voters list

Voter utility based upon a clear performance criteria that is meant to develop a flawless voters
lists that is not only accurate but also complete in every aspect. In an electoral process, accuracy
is measured by the rate of error in entering data on individual voters. These errors may arise in
naming, address, gender, age, citizenship and any other variable identities which are used during
voter registration and voting.
The primary concern during development of principal register which by nature is a continuous
voters list, is the level of accuracy in a persistently changing database. The technologically
acceptable suggestion for principal register submits that it should be 90 percent complete, 85
percent current and 97 percent accurate.
This means that for an electoral body to set a professional benchmark of quality, 9 out of 10
eligible citizens on the list, should have their current information on voters - in 8.5 instances out
of 10, whereas in the same register, data entry errors in should only be 3 records out of 100 so as
to calculate the incremental costs for achieving professionalism and quality of transparency.
The electoral body should therefore formulate policies which will ensure that marginal cost of
registering additional voters escalates in proportion to the needs of the voters and all
stakeholders. The principal register should be available on the electoral bodys website and
public portals so that it can be scrutinised all voters and stakeholders. This register should be a
public document that must be made available to everyone who is interested in the electoral
processes.
However, there should be another cost-conscious solution of voter registration system for the
same process but in a different setting all together such as hard copies. The principal register will
be used by contestants to ascertain possible electoral malpractice in an election.
Two things stand out in the push and pull between Cord and IEBC, and they are mistrust and
perceived lack of integrity which are very key in setting standards where the desired technology
has to be designed and manufactured for the electoral purposes.
As a formal Opposition coalition, Cord is a key stakeholder in the development and
identification of the desired technology as well as in determining the functionality of the
intended technology.
From the very beginning of the process, electoral body should understand the need to established
facts about the proposed technology, as with regards to its achievability and appropriateness to
local needs. These facts cannot be satisfied without the participation of key stakeholders such as
the ruling party, the Opposition and other key participants who will help draw a detailed project
management plan that will highlight detailed specifications of the desired technology.

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The secretariat of the electoral body will then consistency update the country of the steps taken
to select suppliers of the desired technology through an appropriate selection process and
contracts.
Blueprints of development methodology will be used as yardsticks against project completion
and competing interests that will then measure a step-by-step success rate. Sketchy and
incoherent specifications make it difficult for the management team to take the right actions.
In the recollection of this project, the technical team that is made up of both internal and external
staff and consults, who will create a timetable for payment schedule as well as installation of the
project. These activities should be handled by liaison mechanism with a clear focus on
consultation across the board so as to set up a proactive user group that is responsible for making
clarifications so as to ensure that specifications are clear and well understood.
The user group will make priorities on when and how to give feedback to suppliers on prototype,
mock-up activities and on draft of products so that testing, evaluation and implementation would
be done as per the set guidelines. The developed technology can be a final copy or that which is
close to final version of the product, which is basically a prototype with necessary complexities
and originalities of the product.
The customised products must be tested by an independent consulting firm that must remain
factual and independent at all times. The firm will test all factors of delivery including capacity
to handle the election, security, performance rate and durability. The testing process if virtually
the third stage in the boarding of electoral technology. It comes after development process where
the technical work is done.
Testing of a desired technology should be an independent affair but the design of evaluation, the
document that is used for testing, should be prepared and agreed upon by all stakeholders and the
internal and external technical teams.
The process of testing is also known as First Electoral Audit which is only meant to justify the
usage of the new technology that has been developed. First Electoral Audit will help gauge the
ability of the machines and the system to perform as per the expectation. There is enormous
complexity when it comes to testing a new technology since the exercise will have to factor in
every process involved in it. However, it is much easier to test an off-the-shelf technology since
it has predetermined and considerable amount of testing.
As with regards to the auditing process, it should be understood that no standard products will be
perfect, however, proper testing will outline limitations of the technology. Its wrong to purchase
a standard technology for an electoral process since many electoral applications of the
technology involve are more than standard products that are available on shelves.
However where applicable, the standard technology on a shelf can be adapted to a system or be
modified so customize itself within the prevailing circumstance and process. Other than those for
which the products were designed - such as meeting a specific electoral need, standard

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technologies have got varied features that if well tested may be satisfied to be fit for not only the
intended purpose, but also for other needs.
For example, instead of purchasing Biometric Voter Registration (BVRs) devices, electoral body
can buy Electronic Voter Identification (EVIDs) devices which are able to serve as voter
identifiers and registers. In fact, an electronic body will not need Biometric Voter Registration
devices if the body already have Electronic Voter Identification devices.
At times, the electoral body may be forced to use technology in large quantities or in highpressure situations involving tight deadlines and large quantities of data or users. In this case, the
consultancy firm must also conduct a load tests to ensure that the technology is capable of
handling the pressure and delivering as per the expectation. Electoral activities involve serious
pressure with strict deadlines on a system
Consulting firms often have technical committees which allocate responsibilities based on the
testability of the prototypes or the production of version of a system within a test environment.
The core responsibility of the test environment is to create a system that allows technical teams
to apply structured tests at every stage of the technology development so as to take note of any
point where the desired technology does not or does meet specifications.
From there, the initial findings are forwarded to a panel of users including external
stakeholders who will be able to test the system in a simulation environment. There are times
when suppliers would be requested to correct any identified problems and resubmit the
technology for further testing by all those involved.
Its at this point that users panel would conduct high-load tests after initial low-load testing
indicates the product is fit for purpose. The high-load tests will simulate as close as possible the
maximum load expected under real conditions of an electoral process.
After testing high-load, another crucial feature to test would be the integrity of source codes and
escrow source codes so as to ascertain the stability of the system as well as understand
synchronization options for the desired technology.
There are three copies of an electoral technology, the prototype, the limited quantity of the
product and the production version of the system. All these copies must be tested for the second
time after installation at the actual electoral environment. The second phase of testing involves
challenging the capacity of the technology, as with regards to product network and geographical
dares.
The second phase of First-Electoral-Audit tends to be much less straightforward than a recount
of every process in the first phase that entails a wider variety of activities. Whereas a recount of
technological processes is intended to confirm the accuracy of the testability, phase two audit is
undertaken to investigate any form of malpractice in parts of the system.

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In the case of high level of suspicion among stakeholders, a full recount maybe ordered so that
other actions can be evaluated to the finest details.

Compatibility and Integration of Electoral Technology

Electoral technology implementation process is the last part of project development that will put
into action the entire system after actionable testing route. Implementation of a new technology
is often one of the most difficult and unpredictable stages of the process as it involves the actual
use of the technology in production mode for actual election.
A complex technology will definitely invite extensive process that is typically homogenous at
every stage of testability. It is however easier to test and implement a readymade technology
since its off-the-shelf features can easily be understood unlike a new technology that
dramatically departs from old realities based on the current electoral situation.
For this exercise to succeed, there is need for an overall project implantation plan that will
outline the strategy, and provide account by account steps that will be followed to test and give
life to the new technology.
The overall project implantation plan will all allocate responsibility for implementation to
appreciate the role played by political parties, internal and external stakeholders and electoral
bodys technical committee. These groups are vital in making final assessments of the project
implementation so as to take note of delivery of the production version of the system in the
event that purchase orders have been cleared by relevant authorities.
The preset conditions for assembling and deploying the system as needed will be cross-checked
within performance framework of the overall project implementation plan. This will allow all
stakeholders to conduct final tests of all elements of the production version of the technology so
as to ascertain its veracity and performance level.
It will also allow the manufacturers or developers to reason together with stakeholders so as to
re-customise the system whenever and wherever necessary as per the approved changed. It
should be noted that for the system to be re-customised, there will be need to approve the
changes, and as such, the necessary documents must be prepared in accordance with technical
manuals or training materials.
Technically, there will be a demand-necessity for recruitment and appointment of staff who will
operate the system. The staff should meet recruitment threshold for the various positions which
are available within the electoral body. Thereafter they can be trained on how to handle the
system before, during and after the election processes. The training will involve demonstration of
how the new system works, and this step should involve stakeholders whose views will be
collected on the state of training.

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At the point, electoral body should prepare to conduct a serious public education campaign
geared towards sensitising people on the importance of the technology and how it will be used
during actual voting. People are more likely to accept a technology which is easier to handle and
very easy to understand.
The overall project implantation plan will also provide details on how the entry of data in the
system will be done, such as polling place details as well as live data in the principal system
registry. This process also includes verification of data by keying all data twice and comparing
the two versions in the system forms.
There are times when a second polling officer will have to check data entered by another officer,
while the third option is to have a computerised logic checks on data that has been entered by
polling officer. Computerised management of data is one of the most logical ways of ensuring
that errors are minimised. Currently, software such as Oracle can be used to integrate multiple
systems in data management.
The data management system should be able to create back up system programs that will provide
alternative source of data appropriateness-checks before the actual electoral episode. Version
control will be put in place to ensure that necessary and relevant equipment are installed in the
right hardware, and the right software versions are installed in the right hardware.
The electoral body should consider instigating maintenance schedule for every part of the
system, right from the very beginning. The maintenance schedule will help identify the most
vulnerable parts of the system and outline the best ways of practice for ensuring that they stay
safe and secured from invasion. Partly, the schedule will create a back-up systems for the
vulnerable parts of the technology so that the entire system may work on alternative manual
structures just in case there is a break down.
The last legs of implantation process should encompass system operations not just at the testing
locations but also at the very electoral centres across the country. Throughout this process,
maintenance crew will be present to make sure that any technical challenge is solved and
resolved amicably. Part of the work of maintenance crew is to back up data as the processes
continue and even after the election.
The technical crew will perform debriefing of the system users to help evaluate the operation
capacity of the system, and allow stakeholders to give their say over the system. Thereafter, the
technical team can decide on preparing a proposal to enhance the system as well as create
modalities for reusing the system in the next electoral event.

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Precinct Electoral Auditing

Currently pre or post-election auditing is not a mandatory affair in Kenya, but there are a number
of countries which have enacted requirements for mandatory manual audit of an electoral
process. Pre-election auditing involves manual verification of the system and those involved to
ensure that the right persons and systems are in place for an electoral process.
On the other hand, post-election auditing is the one that is more complicated due to vested
interests that every election invites. This is because post-election auditing may compel concerned
citizens to go to court with an evidence that may force nullification of electoral results.
Well advanced electoral technology will be easier to analyse and understand its specifications in
terms of electoral activities therein. Customised electoral processes will not cost much when it
comes to electoral auditing since the output of the process will form an integral part of the
verification process. This begins with voter-verified paper records produced by the voting
systems during the voting process.
In many cases, electronic electoral systems are designed to conduct self-auditing as well as
conduct automated verification of voter recording, transmission and counting. At this level,
electoral auditing is based upon finding discrepancies so as to ascertain any malpractice in the
voting process. It is expected that a hand count of the voter-verified paper records should
correspond to the totals reported by the electronic voting system, and any mismatch should be
reported immediately to all stakeholders.
Electoral auditing should be empowered by parliamentary legislation so that the presiding
electoral body would be under obligation to conduct the process and write a report under
overseer of all stakeholders.
The golden standard of electoral audit entails finding out the incorrectness of electoral results
based on the correct position of all stakeholders. Either technologically or manually, risk-limiting
post-election audit should be conducted in such a way that the outcome reflects the true will of
them people. It may involve collection of statistical evidence based on manual vote counting,
such that, the apparent evidence give coherence correlation to the closeness of the race being
audited or otherwise.
To put this into perspective, in an election that involves 100,000 voters where technology based
results indicate that Raila has beaten Kalonzo by 100 votes. It may turn out that a small number
of votes for Kalonzo may have been incorrectly counted for Raila, or some votes might not have
been counted at all.
A large scale audit will be able to reveal even the least amount of discrepancy in an electoral
process. In many cases, if only a relatively small number of votes are audited and manual recount
indicates that the win is very wide, it would be highly likely that a large number of votes were
wrongly recorded.

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Available auditable ballot batches are a key factor in conducting a successful auditing exercise
since fewer ballots will leave the entire process in a very inefficient state. The best way to
mitigate against any possible electoral malpractice is to have a system whose integrity can stand
the test of vested interests and embedded sinister attacks on the system.
If all the necessary procedures are followed in designing, developing and implementation of an
electoral technology, the technology will conduct self-auditing. The only remaining part of
electoral auditing will be verification of the results. Depending on the scope of technology in
use, the verification of results can as well be done during actual vote counting or during national
ballot tallying.

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DISLOCATED BALANCING ACT

Inside Kenyas Electoral Technology

By Obar Mark Asuelaa