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Davos Dispute PDF
Davos Dispute PDF
Irit Katsur
PhD student at the Center for German Studies, the Hebrew University of
Jerusalem
Contents
Abbreviations.......
Introduction...
14
22
26
29
35
39
40
43
46
4.2 Why Did Cassirer Have Difficulty Integrating Ethics with Symbolic
Forms?......................
52
56
Conclusion................ 60
Bibliography........
63
Abbreviations
For the most frequently cited texts by Cassirer, the following abbreviations are used:
DD
Works by Cassirer
MS
The Myth of the State. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1946.
PSF IIV
Works on Cassirer
CSFH
Works by Heidegger
BT
Being and Time [1927]. Trans. from the German Sein und Zeit (seventh
edition, Tbingen, Neomarius Verlag) by John Macquarrie and Edward
Robinson. New York: Harper & Row, 1962.
KPM
EC
Works by Husserl
I
LI
Works by Kant
CPR
Critique of Pure Reason [1787]. Trans. and ed. Paul Guyer and Allen
W. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the philosophy of Ernst Cassirer and to
clarify some points in the discussion between him and Martin Heidegger, which took
place in Davos in 1929 and subsequently continued in their writings. At the end of the
1920s, Heidegger and Cassirer were the most prominent philosophers in Germany.
Heidegger started his philosophical career as a disciple and assistant of Edmund
Husserl, who began a new philosophical methodology that was called
phenomenology. Heidegger, however, introduced many changes in phenomenological
inquiry. In his famous book BT, Heidegger developed a new hermeneutic approach to
the question of being that many consider the main achievement of twentieth-century
philosophy.
Cassirer began his philosophical career as a disciple of the neo-Kantian
philosopher Hermann Cohen. Heidegger and many others viewed him as a
representative of the neo-Kantian movement, the philosophical school that competed
with phenomenology and was strongly criticized by Heidegger. However, in his threevolume work that was published in the 1920s, Cassirer proposed a new philosophy
that deviated from the neo-Kantian position. It was called the philosophy of symbolic
forms, and its purpose was to reconcile two major philosophical movements:
phenomenology and neo-Kantianism.
In March 1929, at the annual meeting of the II. Davosser Hochshulkurse", the
two philosophers and many other academics from various parts of Europe presented
lectures. 1 The discussion topic was Was ist der Mensch? (What is man?). During
the first week of the conference, Cassirer gave three lectures on the philosophy of
anthropology, and on March 26 the famous encounter between him and Heidegger
took place.
In the debate both Heidegger and Cassirer offered their own way of interpreting
Kant, based on which they justified their respective philosophical positions.
Heidegger maintained that the main goal of philosophy is to find a basis for the
philosophical, cultural, and scientific domains of being, and criticized Cassirer and
other neo-Kantian philosophers for lacking such a basis. Heidegger claimed that all
human values must be bounded within finite existence and cannot presume to go
1
The meeting held at the Grand Hotel and Belvedere, Davos-Platz, lasted from Sunday, March 17, to
Saturday, April 6, 1929.
beyond it. Cassirer, for his part, charged Heidegger with lacking a transcendent
dimension and, hence, being unable to go beyond the given in his existential
extrapolation of being. Cassirer argued that without this dimension, Heidegger was
unable to explain the objective aspects of human being or, what is more important, the
objectivity of ethical values.
Having studied in a theological college, Heidegger had a good acquaintance with
theological tradition and was influenced by religious outlooks even though he
developed a strictly atheist position. 2 Heideggers existential philosophy posited
immanent being, within which every realm of human is structured. This philosophy
can be viewed as the apex of the secular thought that was initiated by Nietzsche,
according to whom all transcendence, not only divine and moral values, but also
every determination of objective significance such as scientific laws should be
discarded as exhausted and speculative. 3 Heidegger also did away with theological
relicts of Self", which he replaced with Dasein, or immanent extension of being.
Heidegger thereby weakened the ties with the dualistic Cartesian tradition of mind
and body, which had dominated European thought. His ideas indeed appeared
revolutionary and provocative and hence attained more support than those of Cassirer,
who wanted to preserve meaning, the ideal, and truth i.e., to animate the God who
had been killed.
Cassirer was, indeed, considered a philosopher of transcendence. He advocated a
universality of values and forms both in the domain of knowledge and of ethics. He
strongly opposed Heideggers ethical relativism, which resulted from the annihilation
of transcendence. The common view is that Cassirer developed a highly rational,
ethical philosophy based on universal principles, but lacked the basis of being. This
one-sided view is, however, disputable. Cassirer did not try to make existence
dependent on transcendence, without roots in the immanence of experience. We shall
see that the originality of Cassirers symbolic doctrine lay in integrating the
immanence of life with the transcendence of form. I will maintain that both Cassirer
and Heidegger broke with the Cartesian dualistic mind-body conception, though
Cassirer did not want to eschew the domain of transcendence. According to Cassirer,
the sphere of the beyond should be discovered in the very immanence of life, not in
2
3
Cf.: Ernst Cassirer, Geist and Life, in PSF IV (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), 200.
Cf.: Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche. 2 Bd. Pfullingen: Neske, 1961.
self-consciousness and not in being to death. This something his contemporaries did
not properly understand was the task of Cassirers philosophy.
Cassirers philosophy, like Heideggers, reveals the ground of being and also
contains an irrational aspect that can lead to the undermining of moral values. Hence,
despite many evident differences between the two philosophies, Cassirers cannot
completely avoid the ethical problems that he discerned in Heideggers thought.
Nevertheless, Cassirer by no means wanted to arrive at ethical relativism. His doctrine
was related to the old endeavor to preserve transcendence by means of practical
philosophy. This endeavor began with Kant, who posited ethics in place of God, was
continued by Hermann Cohen, and was also shared by Cassirer, who desired to
incorporate ethics in his symbolic philosophy though he did not managed to do it.
After the Davos dispute, Heideggers philosophical doctrine received much more
support and had greater success in the philosophical community than Cassirers
position. Cassirer can be called the last advocate of transcendence. Already at the
Davos meeting, the majority of the philosophers followed Heideggers doctrine,
which was considered more promising and original than Cassirers. Moreover, after
World War II the optimistic nineteenth-century belief in the moral and rational
essence of man, shared by Hermann Cohen and Cassirer, nearly collapsed. As a result
of the Nazi period, Heideggers view of finite human existence as filled with fear and
worry and subordinated by destiny appeared much more realistic than Cassirers
claims about the eternity of the good. Hence Heideggers thought strongly influenced
the later continental philosophy; especially postwar French philosophy, as well as
cultural studies and literary criticism. As a result of this influence, Cassirers ideas
were nearly forgotten.
The other reason for the neglect of Cassirers ideas is the difficulty of reading his
works, a difficulty that has several aspects. One is the incompleteness of Cassirers
philosophy. Being in exile since 1933, along with the circumstances of this period,
made it hard for Cassirer to complete his philosophy as he intended.4 He planned to
produce works dealing with ethics as well as with art that must appear in the next
volumes of PSF. He began to develop an ethical and art philosophy of symbolic
forms, but he was only able to compose notes about it. As the researchers of
Cassirers philosophy, John Michael Krois and Donald Phillip Verene remarked:
See J.M. Krois and D.P. Verene, Introduction, in PSF IV (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1996).
4
These were war years, and the explanation for Cassirers not finishing this project
may be the same as the reason he gave later, in the United States, for not producing a
work on art the malice or Ungust, of the times. 5
Another difficulty with Cassirer is the complexity of his philosophical task of
integrating immanence with transcendence and explaining the manifoldness of human
culture. And as Lofts points out, Cassirers main principle, which dominated all his
thought, is that the whole always comes before the parts. The parts do not exist prior
to the whole, and cannot be understood outside their place and function in the
whole. 6 This principle, however, makes it difficult for Cassirer scholars to
characterize his ideas clearly and causes the obvious embarrassment in which
Cassirer scholarship finds itself when it attempts to define a satisfactory frame of
reference for its interpretation of the Cassirerian project. 7
Furthermore, the highly erudite Cassirer tended to stress the unity of his thought
with that of other philosophers. His books are filled with ideas of numerous thinkers
that Cassirer tried to integrate with his philosophy, and this increases the difficulty of
his texts, creates uncertainty about his position, and puts the cogency of his
philosophy in question.
As a result of all these factors, Cassirers doctrines, compared to Heideggers,
were relegated to the sidelines of philosophical development. In my view, the only
partial continuation of Cassirers ideas is the ethical philosophy of Emmanuel
Levinas, though he never said this was the case. Levinas developed an ethical theory
based on the unperceivable expression of the Other, of the Others transcendence a
theory that can be viewed as a kind of extension of Cassirers original, unfinished
project.
The Davos dispute immediately attracted attention in intellectual circles and
became almost legendary in the history of twentieth-century philosophy. It seemed a
kind of return of the Socratic living philosophical dialogue, certainly more vivid than
books and papers. By the turn of the last century, many scholars agreed that this
meeting gave a certain sense of the future of German philosophy. 8 Gordon
Ibid., xxiii.
Steve G. Lofts, Introduction, in Ernst Cassirer: A Repetition of Modernity (Foreword by John
Michael Krois) (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2000), 19.
7
Ibid.
8
...bei dem es im gewissen Sinne um die Zukunft der deutschen Philosophie ging ( Raymond
Klibansky, Erinnerung an ein Jahrhundert. Gesprche mit Georges Leroux, Frankfurt/M., 2001, 44) in
6
characterized this dispute as almost the most frequently cited conversation in the
history of modern European thought that conversation was so closely bound with
the fate of European culture. 9
Interest in the political aspect of the Heidegger-Cassirer dispute arose after World
War II and was impelled by Cassirers last published work, The Myth of the State, that
was published in 1946. In it Cassirer inquired into the roots of the new political
mythology that had emerged in Germany in 1933. Among other things, he cited
Heideggers existential philosophy as one that did enfeeble and slowly undermine
the forces that could have resisted the modern political myths. Such philosophy
renounces its own fundamental theoretical and ethical ideals. It can be used, then, as a
pliable instrument in the hands of the political leaders. 10
Hence, what had been considered a purely philosophical dispute between two
thinkers suddenly assumed political-ideological importance. 11 The theoretical
argument about the place of temporality in existence appeared to have a practical
application. If human existence is structured by temporality and is a finite, limited-toitself Dasein, as Heidegger claimed, no objective values are possible, but only values
that are relative to historical situations. Cassirer criticized Heidegger not only for
having initially supported a totalitarian regime, but also because the basis for a
nonhumanistic worldview was already laid down in the philosophical doctrines he
articulated at Davos. In Cassirers view, Heidegger had wrongly characterized human
Dasein as passive and incapable of self-impelled independent action and
responsibility.
However, as we shall see in the last chapter of this paper, a similar claim can be
made about Cassirer. Since 1946, the discussion on the possibility of ethics within
Cassirers philosophy has not come to an end. Some studies have viewed Cassirer as a
liberal humanist whose position is unequivocally opposed to the antihumanistic views
of Heidegger 12 that led him to support the National Socialist regime. Other studies
assert, however, that despite Cassirers proclamations about the importance of ethics,
his own philosophy lacks ethics. 13
Some studies have also seen the opposition between Cassirer and Heidegger in a
nationalistic context. They suggest that Heideggers critique of Cassirer as lacking a
grounding for his theory can be interpreted in terms of the well-known anti-Semitic
claim that Jews are cosmopolitans by nature, living in lands that are not their own and
having no strong link to the soil.
Many studies, however, cast doubt on any ideological opposition between
Heidegger and Cassirer and deny that political or anti-Semitic views were connected
to this dispute. Gordon and Meyer argue that the Davos dispute had only a
philosophical dimension and that linking Heideggers position to his political
engagement with National Socialism is not justified. 14 Meyer claims that the
relationship between Heidegger and Cassirer was friendly, citing the letter Heidegger
wrote to his wife during the Davos conference. In it Heidegger mentioned Cassirer
with sympathy and without any allusions to a quarrel between them, noting that
Cassirer had spoken of inviting him to give a lecture at the Warburg Library
[Cassirer u. andre Prof. die in meinem Vortrag waren, wollen mich im nchsten
Herbst fr eine Vorlesung in der Bibliotek Warburg haben,...]. 15 Therefore Meyer
maintains there was no political aspect to the Davos dispute, and if history had
developed differently the issue would never have arisen. According to this view, the
connection between the participants political and philosophical positions was made
only after the war.
From the perspective of the postwar period, however, the special curiosity about
the Davos dispute is understandable. Even today the interest in this topic has not run
its course; over the past decade it has even increased.
This fact is closely connected to the rising interest in Cassirers whole
philosophical project, which was almost forgotten after his death in 1945. Until the
the existentialist, non-humanistic philosophy of the new era. Both traditions were aware of the presence
and appeal or force of one another. Cassirer in Davos: An Intermezzo on Magic Mountain (1929).
Law and Critique 17 (Springer 2006): 1-26.
13
See below, ch. 4.1.
14
See Peter Eli Gordon, Continental Divide: The Davos Disputation between Cassirer and Heidegger,
1929, Modern Intellectual History (Summer 2003): 1-41. And Thomas Meyer, Am Abgrund
wamdernd, ins Unbekannte gestoen. Das Davoser Treffen von Ernst Cassirer und Martin Heidegger
hat eine bislang unbekannte Vorgeschichte in Hamburg 1923, Frankfurte Allgemeine Zeitung 44
(2006): 45.
15
Ibid., from Heideggers letter to his wife, Elfride Heidegger, Hambg. 19. Dez. 23.
10
1960s, except for the volume devoted to Cassirer in the Library of Living
Philosophers series, 16 only a few critical works about him and his encounter with
Heidegger were published. Since the 1990s, however, more and more new researches
and monographs about Cassirer have appeared, in German as well as English. Why
was this sudden upsurge of interest in Cassirer and Davos after more than half a
century?
The trend began with Kroiss book CSFH, published in 1987. This is the first
thorough book about Cassirer to give a systematic, in-depth account of his
philosophical project and point to its not insignificant influence on many thinkers of
the century, including Heidegger himself and also Merleau-Ponty. Krois noted
regretfully that only five monographs on Cassirer had been published in English.
Moreover, Cassirers thought has been much neglected in the German-speaking
world. Nonetheless, due to the many-faceted nature of Cassirers publications, his
work has influenced thinking in many fields, including linguistics, semiotics,
anthropology, art history, education, psychology and psychoanalysis, and history. 17
Krois attributed this neglect to the common misunderstanding of Cassirers thought.
He also argued against viewing Cassirer as a neo-Kantian philosopher whose main
concern was the scientific epistemology or history of philosophy. Krois entirely
rejected the claim that Cassirer was not a philosopher in his own right, stressing new
motifs in contemporary thought that had their roots in Cassirers work. 18 Kroiss book
illuminated complex aspects of Cassirers thought that subsequently, and quickly,
attracted the attention of scholars.
The next phase of the growing interest in Cassirer came with the publication of
PSF IV, which was called The Metaphysics of Symbolic Forms. The 1995 English
edition of this volume, edited by Krois and Verene, appeared after the publication of
the German edition of PSF IV, which contained Cassirers unpublished texts marked
Symbolic Forms, Volume IV. 19 This volume is important to understanding the
project of the philosophy of symbolic forms, which in some aspects was incomplete.
The newly published PSF IV continued to deal with the phenomenology of
knowledge, which Cassirer had introduced in the third volume of his work. In the
The Philosophy of Ernst Cassirer. (The Library of Living Philosophers, No. 6,) ed. Paul Arthur
Schilpp (Evanston, IL: The Library of living philosophers, 1949.)
17
CSFH, 4.
18
CSFH, 33-38.
19
See Introduction, PSF IV.
16
11
fourth volume Cassirer developed the concept of the basis phenomena, which
elaborated the concept of the original phenomenon of expression from the previous
volume.
Since then many conferences on Cassirer have been held and many papers on him
have been published. The seminar Ernst Cassirer: Symbol, Science and Culture was
held in May 1998 in Jerusalem. In September 1999, a seminar on the Davos dispute
was held in Heidelberg. 20 Friedmans detailed book on the Davos dispute was
published in 2000. 21 More recently, the above-cited article by Gordon and many other
articles, books, and doctoral dissertations on Cassirer have been published.
The revived interest in Cassirer also may reflect the interest in the German
Romantic and humanistic tradition as mainly represented by Goethe. Cassirer was
greatly inspired by Goethe and tried to integrate his ideas with his philosophical
approach.
Other important factors explain the current interest in Cassirer. His philosophy is a
philosophy of culture that aims to describe the spiritual development that embodies
itself in the richness and multiplicity of cultural forms. As Lofts suggests, this twopoled project of seeking the unity of structure in the variety of forms, and the variety
of possibilities in a single structure, accords with todays growing and radical new
awareness of the plurality of cultures. 22 The thoroughgoing study of Cassirers
philosophy can offer a means of investigating and illuminating this plurality.
The interest in Cassirer is also impelled, as Lofts notes, by the growing
awareness that postmodern thought has arrived at an impasse. 23 The postmodernism
that was influenced by Heidegger, and continued his rejection of the transcendent,
seems to be lost in its own labyrinth. 24 Neither postmodernism nor its opponent, the
Anglo-American analytical tradition, has any means to explain the rich spectrum of
human life, culture, and being; hence the turn to Cassirers old-fashioned project of
seeking transcendence within immanent existence. As we shall see, the aim of
See Cassirer-Heidegger: 70 Jahre Davoser Disputation, ed. D. Kaegi and E. Rudolph (Hamburg:
Felix Meiner Verlag, 2002).
21
Michael Friedman, A Parting of the Ways: Carnap, Cassirer, and Heidegger (Chicago: Open
Court, 2000). This book includes the bibliographies and a description of the philosophical and political
background of the three philosophers who took part in the discussion: Carnap (a logical positivist from
the Vienna circle), Cassirer, and Heidegger.
22
Steve G. Lofts, Introduction, Ernst Cassirer: A Repetition of Modernity (Albany, NY: State
University of New York Press, 2000), 1-5.
23
Ibid.
24
Ibid.
20
12
13
the
Davos
dispute.
The
disagreement
between
neo-Kantianism
and
principle
of
freedom
from
presuppositions
[Prinzip
der
14
26
15
16
seeing, and the second is incomplete and representative. Husserl explained that
Erlebnis of consciousness is given in the absolute, complete way, but the existence of
things in space is given fragmentarily. The phenomenological method discovers
Erlebnis of consciousness as an immanent occurrence that is given as temporal flow,
where every point is known. Perception of the thing in space, however, is given
partially. We perceive only numerous aspects of the thing, but we cannot see the thing
in its wholeness in three-dimensional space. The characteristic feature of the thing is
that, while it can be perceived by its sides that represent the whole thing, it cannot be
reached directly by all its sides in a single act of actual perception. The multiplicity of
changing aspects fills perception with the living presence of the thing itself. This is
the essential characteristic of all external perception: whereas it is an essential mark
of what is given through appearances that no one of these gives the matter in question
in an absolute form instead of presenting just one side of it, it is an essential mark of
what is immanently given precisely to give an absolute that simply cannot exhibit
aspects and vary them perspectively. 33 Therefore, Husserl distinguished two
different modes of existence: the existence of consciousness and the existence of the
thing in the world. The former is immanent, continuous, complete existence; the latter
is uncompleted, discrete, and represented. The two of these modes is perceived
directly by intuition.
In Husserls view, this essential distinction between two modes of existence led
Kant to think that the incomplete character of the things perception indicates the
limited manner of perception that is peculiar to human beings. Such perception is
unable to provide full, unmediated knowledge of the thing. Hence Kant assumed the
possibility of another kind of consciousness, different from mans. According to him,
human perception has incomplete character and can know the thing only as it appears
to intuition, represented by aspects. Kant wrote that, in contrast to human knowing,
God apprehends things in their entire existence. Husserl, however, considered this
distinction between human and divine modes of perception as an error. This error was
based on the mistaken assumption that the physical thing has to be given to perception
in a way similar to how the immanent object is given to consciousness; Kant did not
see any difference between the inner and outer modes of existence. According to this
assumption, the external thing has to be given in completeness exactly as Erlebnis is
33
I, 44, 139-140.
17
given to consciousness. This mistake, Husserl pointed out, stemmed from the
common comparison between complete existence in consciousness and representation
of the thing in perception. The incompleteness of the spatial thing is considered a
result of the defective manner of human perception, which lacks the capacity to know
the thing directly in its fullness. Hence Husserl maintained that there were no different
modes of being, such as divine and human, but two modes of existence: the thing in
the world and Erlebnis of consciousness. Both are given directly in their own living
mode of existence.
therefore, already in the pure form of sensuous intuition, for it is a spontaneous act of
the power of representation. 34 The chaotic manifold cannot be unified by itself and
constitute the object, since it has no creative power. But the concepts embody creative
capacities of the subject, and can be said to capture the sensory intuition; they unify
the chaos presented by intuition into objects. That, at any rate, was how the Marburg
school interpreted Kant.
According to Kant, the only intuition that is possible for human consciousness is
pure intuition of time and space, but it gives only framework and not content. The
same impossibility of unmediated knowledge applies to the I. The I thought is the
source of all thoughts, and it cannot be apprehended directly by the thought.
Following Kant, Natorp maintained that the self-reflection of consciousness is
impossible. Consciousness apprehends only the empirical I", something that appears
in the world as any other things through the mediation of spatial-temporal intuition.
Hence pure consciousness can only be known by the critical method, which Natorp
called reconstruction. It cannot be discovered directly without mediation, as Husserl
assumed in his main principle of phenomenology. In Kants structure of
consciousness, any datum can be reached only through concepts, which make this
datum understandable to us. Hence Natorp could not agree with Husserls
phenomenology. He claimed that unmediated knowledge of consciousness is
impossible since everything that becomes knowledge is already constructed by
concepts, and these concepts are intersubjective rules that make objective knowledge
possible. In other words, knowledge is mediation, the immediate knowledge of
consciousness is impossible. The retrospection of the process of consciousness is also
perceived through concepts, and hence becomes objectified as any other things.
Natorp maintained, as Luft noted, that Subjectivity is found in the objects it creates,
and critical, transcendental philosophy clarifies solely what is involved in
constructing these objects. 35
CPR, 15.
Sebastian Luft, A Hermeneutic Phenomenology of Subjective and Objective Spirit: Husserl, Natorp,
and Cassirer, New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy IV (2004): 218.
34
35
19
already modify the purity of the reflection. 36 In addition, Natorp pointed out that if
intuition aims to reach the moment of consciousness, it can only be the static moment
of here and now. Therefore, Natorp claimed that the phenomenological description is
static and cannot reflect the dynamic, continuous flow of consciousness, Erlebnis des
Stromes as Husserl called it. 37
Thus Natorp rejected the method of phenomenology, though he did not give up
other attempts to investigate the domain of consciousness. He argued that this domain
cannot be explored by the pure, descriptive, phenomenological method but rather by
the reconstruction method. It is, indeed, a critical method, diverted from objective
knowledge and expressions to the subjective structure of consciousness, that makes
possible the construction of knowledge.
To Natorps and others 38 criticism Husserl responded that the reflection of
Erlebnis is not like knowledge in the world that is perceived in the external manner.
Hence, the claim that initial Erlebnis is modified by the act of introspection is not
justified. However, Erlebnis of consciousness and reflection upon it are the same act;
Erlebnis is the flow of consciousness and is given to consciousness in its
completeness 39 . Moreover, it is also given as one continuous flow stream of
experience and not as a static moment. 40
Nevertheless, as Luft observes, Husserl took Natorps critique seriously and, as a
result of it, added the reconstructive method to phenomenology. 41 Hence Luft
claimed that the two methods, reconstructive and descriptive, cannot really be
separated and one necessarily supplements the other. 42 Cassirer also recognized the
deficiency of both the pure neo-Kantian and pure phenomenological approaches, and
tried to present in his symbolic philosophy a unification of the two. He used Natorps
reconstructive method to rediscover the first principles of knowledge, and he followed
Husserls phenomenological method in describing the first principles of knowledge
and life 43 . Moreover, according to Cassirers new symbolic concept, not only does the
36
Ibid., 226.
Cf.: ibid., 227.
38
See I, 79, 223-225, Husserls discussion with H.J. Watt.
39
Ibid.
40
I, 34,116.
41
Sebastian Luft, A Hermeneutic Phenomenology of Subjective and Objective Spirit: Husserl, Natorp,
and Cassirer, New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy IV (2004): 220233.
42
Ibid., 230.
43
Cassirer used rather the concept of life instead of being, see below.
37
20
21
44
45
DD, 171.
Ibid.
22
See EC.
Ibid., 185
23
The active powers of mind that presume to construct reality in the neo-Kantian
model, according to Heidegger, suppress the passive perceptive level or sensory
intuition, which is the real ground of being. Therefore, he argued, Cassirer could not
find a foundation for the mythical Dasein that he described. As Heidegger put it:
beginning with a chaos of sensation that is formed is not only insufficient for the
philosophical problem of transcendence but already covers over the original
phenomenon of transcendence as the condition for the possibility of any
passivity. 48
In contrast to Cassirer, Heidegger argued that the main point of the Copernican
Revolution was ontology, the question of being. The concepts had no dominant
function in the constitution of reality; they were only servants of the intuition. The
constructive interpretation of reality, as proposed by Cassirer, mediated the Dasein,
which should be clarified through its givenness to intuition. Since Cassirers starting
point was active formation of a passively given chaos of sensations, his project of
the phenomenology of mythical consciousness remained without firm foundation.
Heidegger concluded: the interpretation of the essence of myth as a possibility of
human Dasein remains random and directionless as long as it cannot be grounded in a
radical ontology of Dasein in light of the problem of Being in general. 49 Cassirers
mistake was that he put active powers before intuition. Consequently he had no access
to being, which, according to Heidegger, originates in passive intuition. Heidegger
suggested that until Cassirer gave up his ideas about the spontaneous capacity of
thinking that dominates receptivity, his point of departure would remain problematic
and his interpretation of Kant would be unsatisfactory. Therefore, Heidegger argued
in Davos that Cassirers problem was the lack of a starting point. 50 He spoke of forms
and values but could not bring them down to earth. It was like the joke, told by Plato,
about the philosopher who while observing the heavens fell into the hole. This
philosopher observed great things, such as eternity or remote stars, but did not see
what was going on under his feet. So Cassirer also aimed to reach the domain of
transcendence, but it was suspended in air. Heidegger argued that Cassirer could not
discover the domain of transcendence without rooting it in existence. He was left,
EC, 189.
Ibid., 187.
50
DD.
48
49
24
instead, with relicts of theological dogmas of the past, shades of God in the words
of Nietzsche. Heidegger and many of his young followers saw Cassirer in this light.
According to Heidegger, intuition is primary to constructive knowledge, and
concepts of understanding serve the intuition. 51 Thus, Heidegger thought
reconstruction in the neo-Kantian sense was impossible, since intuition is not
constructed. Hermeneutics, he maintained, should replace the critical reconstructive
method.
Because of their preference for construction, Heidegger argued, neo-Kantians
missed the true metaphysical core of Kants philosophy. Although Kant himself
wanted to present his philosophy only as a justification of experience, Heidegger
claimed that nevertheless, despite Kants own intentions, his philosophy revealed the
new domain of metaphysics and ontology. According to Heidegger, the fundamental
point of Kantian metaphysic was the distinction he made between the finite and the
infinite divine mode of perception. Heidegger based his original interpretation of Kant
on this distinction. Whereas Gods knowledge identifies itself with its object, 52 not
requiring experience or, therefore, sensory intuition in order to perceive, the finite
consciousness bases knowledge on experience, which is given by sensory intuition.
Heidegger pointed out that mans finite consciousness defines and discovers the
ontology that is unique to mortal beings. The finitude of mans being is the starting
point for the revelation of the ground of being. From this point Heidegger developed
his interpretation of being, that is, Dasein. Finite being is characterized by its
necessarily temporal structure, which Kant described according to a transcendental
scheme. This scheme combines temporal intuition with the concepts of the
understanding. If the concepts of the understanding were prior to the receptivity of
intuition, our perception would be as spontaneous as Gods and could not be based on
sensory intuition. Hence finite intuition, unlike infinite divine intuition, has to be
receptive: it cannot give the object from out of itself. 53 Since the concepts of the
understanding are not characterized by receptivity, they do not determine the structure
of finite human being. Heideggers main argument against the neo-Kantians, and in
particular Cassirer, was that they neglected the finite mode of mans being and gave
preference to construction over intuition, making man into a sort of God. For
KPM, 17-25.
Ibid.
53
Ibid.
51
52
25
Heidegger, intuition was primary to thinking, since intuition defined the structure of
existence for finite being, and discovered the foundation of this kind of being.
26
hand to the present-at-hand, from bare data to real objectivity. 56 The ready-to-hand,
according to Cassirer, stays close to itself and cannot be linked to the public world,
since it has no bridge to objectivity. Cassirer claimed that Heideggers
phenomenology reduced everything to the idea of deficiency and could not give an
account of objectivity.
Whereas Heidegger maintained that the ready-to-hand is primordial compared to
the present-at-hand, Cassirer in his lecture compared this assertion to perceptual
disorders. Cassirer adduced examples from the pathology of the perception called
Aphasia. 57 Cassirer described the situation where the patient of Aphasia was able to
use objects as tools, such as a fork and knife for eating, but unable to recognize the
objects by their names. The patient named the tools indirectly by their function. He
identified a knife with cutting and a pencil with writing. Cassirer wrote that
although the patient used the knife and fork correctly during the meal, after the meal
he did not know what to do with them. 58 Likewise, Cassirer claimed that Heidegger
could not reach the level of objective knowledge that is constituted by all normal
perception just from his ready-in-hand description of the being of entities, which
dealt only with their use as tools. Perhaps Cassirers most decisive criticism of
Heidegger, wrote Gordon, took aim at the deepest and most troublesome moment
of conceptual tension in Heideggers own philosophy, between its claim to objectivephenomenological description (the ontological inquiry into Daseins apparently
constitutive existential-structure) and its concession to non-objective hermeneutics
(the doctrine that even phenomenological description occurs within local-subjective
bounds). 59 In other words, the problem with Heideggers philosophy is that it could
not explain objectivity and transcendence, and this is Cassirers most serious criticism
of it.
I described above some central aspects of the Davos dispute. Many researchers
concluded that Cassirers weakness in the controversy was his starting point, since his
56
27
28
Alles Vergngliche
Ist nur ein Gleichnis;
Das Unzulngliche
Hier wirds Ereignis;
Das Unbeschreibliche
Hier ist es getan;
J.W. Goethe, Faust
Following
Natorps
critique,
Cassirer
also
doubted
the
phenomenological project, asking: How can we penetrate to this pure inner world of
consciousness, this ultimate concentration of all spiritual life, if in exploring and
describing it we must avoid all the concepts and criteria which were created for the
exposition of objective reality?61 In other words, the description of pure
60
Despite Cassirers remarks in the introduction to this volume that he uses phenomenology in the
Hegelian rather than the modern usage of the term (PSF III), I, as Luft, see a similarity between
Cassirers and Husserls usage of this term. Cf.: Sebastian Luft, A Hermeneutic Phenomenology of
Subjective and Objective Spirit: Husserl, Natorp, and Cassirer, in New Yearbook for Phenomenology
and Phenomenological Philosophy IV (2004): 209: the sense of phenomenology of Cassirer need
not be so different from what Cassirer terms the modern usage. Cf. also: Christian Mckel,
Symboliche Prgnanz ein phnomenologischer Begriff? in Deutsche Zeitschrift fr Philosophie 40
(1992).
61
PSF I, 53.
29
Thus -philosophy cannot turn directly to pure consciousness, but should first turn
to the multiplicity of cultural forms in which the spirit of mankind is expressed. Only
after investigating the objective side can one try to understand the domain of pure
consciousness, which is the origin of any objective cultural achievement. The aim of
this method is to investigate the cultural manifestations of spirit that Cassirer called
symbolic forms; from there he diverted to the conditions that enable these forms.
Pursuing this reconstructive direction, the first volume of PSF investigates language
and the second, myth. Cassirer considered both of these to be forms of different
symbolic expressions of the spirit. The investigation of the original concepts of
knowledge comes after the inquiry into language and myth. Apparently, in order to
pursue this critical method, Cassirer needed to regard all cultural forms as
constructions of consciousness, which, consequently, stems from active power and
not from receptiveness. Therefore, the pure experience that can be given through
receptiveness is not possible. That is how many contemporary philosophers, including
Heidegger, understood Cassirers philosophy, but they missed the main point.
Although Cassirers philosophy began with the critical method, it deviated from
the doctrine that Heidegger considered to be the central doctrine of neo-Kantianism.
Cassirer did not agree that the origin of knowledge is primary spontaneous action,
maintaining instead that the origin of knowledge is symbolic. This matter needs
further explanation.
One of the major dilemmas of philosophy that Cassirer intended to solve in PSF
III, and to which he returned many times in his subsequent works, was the gap
between life [Leben] and culture.
63
Ibid.
See PSF I, 110-114; PSF III, 1-40; PSF IV, 131-136.
30
but different terms referring to one and the same fundamental fact. They are to be
understood as names of a process. 64 Life, in a broad significance, is a sense and
intuition of lifes process; it is unmediated knowledge and perception of existence. In
contrast, culture along with spirit and intelligence can be understood in a broad sense
as a creative, conceptual, and meaning-giving aspect of mans being.
Cassirer thought this dilemma had emerged at the beginning of philosophy
together with the separation of philosophy from the world of myth. If the mythical
worldview was based on the immediacy of life impressions, philosophy moved away
from this to the clearness of concepts. Philosophy begins as the explanation of
something, a direct experience, by something else, abstract words. The immediacy of
life is understood according to concepts, something very different from life itself,
whereas myth did not know the distinction between existence and meaning. But the
decisive characteristic of the new thinking was the awareness of the difference
between immediacy and symbols, which are the representation of reality. Cassirer
pointed out that this distinction could already be found in Plato who had distinguished
between sign and idea, between something that appears real but in fact only represents
reality, and the reality itself.
Hence the concept is the only instrument of philosophy, and philosophy has no
means to reach the immediacy of intuition without it. Philosophy knows only one way
to investigate reality: by means of concepts. Cassirer wrote: To philosophy, which
finds its fulfillment only in the sharpness of the concept and in the clarity of
discursive thought, the paradise of mysticism, the paradise of pure immediacy, is
closed. 65 Thus Cassirer distinguished between pure immediacy and philosophy, since
he denied to philosophy any means to reach the immediacy of life. Philosophy as well
as human culture on the whole mediates the pure immediacy of life by theoretical,
symbolical, and conceptual knowledge. Philosophy, then, created a gap between life
and culture.
Religion, like philosophy, aimed to free culture from the mythical world of
immediate life. Religion takes the decisive step that is essentially alien to myth: in its
use of sensuous images and signs it recognized them as such a means of expression
which, though they reveal a determinate meaning, must necessarily remain inadequate
Ernst Cassirer, Language and Art II, in Symbol, Myth and Culture: Essays and Lectures of Ernst
Cassirer 1935-1945, ed. Donald Philip Verene (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), 194.
65
Ibid., 113.
64
31
to it, which point to this meaning but never wholly exhaust it. 66 Or as Lofts
explained it: Religious consciousness thus constitutes itself through the recognition
of the opposition between meaning and existence, between the Ur-Bild and the UrSache that is essentially alien to mythical consciousness. 67 Religion deepened the
gap between life, or existence, and spirit.
Cassirer noted 68 that the medieval mystics revived the opposition between
unmediated life and knowledge, which can be viewed as a longing for immediate
mythical perception. Mystical thought assumes that culture, the whole world of forms
and words, hides the reality from mans eyes. Forms and words in themselves are only
means, an illusive veil that covers the immediacy of real being, or God. From
Cassirers standpoint, this doctrine represented a kind of reminiscence of the break
that occurred in the past between the immediacy of life and the symbol. Mystical
thought of this kind gave rise to the distinction between mans and Gods mode of
understanding, which was frequently made in medieval theology. Man perceives by
means of senses; he does not have Gods intellectual intuition. In contrast to the
human discursive mode of thinking, Gods understanding is immediate. He does not
need any tools in order to know, because he knows directly.
Understanding of this kind became the paradigm of intuitive, unmediated
knowledge and influenced Kants position on mans structure of knowledge. Hence
Heidegger thought Kants main idea in CPR was the distinction between infinite and
finite knowledge. In Heideggers view, the sense-limited structure of human
knowledge is the essential mark of mortal being. This was Kants most important
discovery, and on this basis Heidegger developed his own ontology. Although, as an
atheist, Heidegger did not believe in the divine mode of understanding, he considered
the finitude of human knowledge to be the principal feature of being in general, since
he thought there was no other kind of knowledge. However, Cassirer saw the
distinction between Gods creative type of knowledge and the human, sense-limited
type of knowledge as a presupposition of the tradition that was inherited from
mystical religious thought. From this point of view, both Heidegger and Kant were
influenced by mysticism.
32
Cassirer emphasized that the conflict between intuitive and conceptual knowledge,
which arose in mystical thought, was renewed and reinforced by Romanticism and
had become the main problem of philosophy over the past 150 years. Although
Cassirer believed this problem should be solved, apparently he was not sure how it
could be done completely. He asked:
How can we do justice to the Goethean demand for the recognition of primary
phenomena and to the Cartesian-Kantian demand for reflection in knowledge
and philosophy? How can we uphold that form of certainty and immediateness",
which Goethe attributes to primary phenomena and at the same time grant the no
less unassailable right of thought", which wants to bring everything before its
bench for investigation and accreditation? Is there still some sort of synthesis
possible here? 69
Cassirer suggested that this contradiction gave rise to the opposition between the
unmediated knowledge of phenomenology and the mediated knowledge of neoKantianism, as well as between Romanticism and positivism, irrationalism and
rationalism, and between mysticism and physicalism. 70 He continued: This conflict,
this antinomy, has been set forth again and again, and has left an indelible mark in
particular on the present-day philosophical combatants. The intellect is hated,
denigrated, and rejected in the name of another deeper, more original substance that
might be called soul, life, or whatever. 71
This dilemma is reflected in all the volumes of PSF. Cassirer began PSF I with an
introduction to this conflict: The cleavage between these two antitheses [concept and
intuition] it would seem cannot be bridged by any effort of mediating thought
which itself remains entirely on one side of the antithesis: the farther we advance in
the direction of the symbolic, the merely figurative, the farther we go from the primal
source of pure intuition 72 (emphasis added). The phrase it would seem emphasizes
Cassirers ambiguous attitude toward this issue. I argue that one of his main purposes
in PSF was to show that symbols do not necessarily oppose immediacy, that symbolic
functions are already found at the primordial level of perception. At first Cassirer
aimed to resolve the conflict, though he always hesitated or perhaps had a kind of
unease about denying the old philosophical conception. He asked:
33
34
75
76
BT, 7, 51-55.
Ibid.
35
symbol. But this interpretation stems from the identification of symbol with
mediation.
According to Cassirer, however, the symbol is not a mere medium. Although
symbols are indeed useful in scientific theories where they have a function of
representation and signification, Cassirer claimed that symbols are not a prerogative
of scientific thinking and significations.
Cassirer asserted that the function of the symbol is to unify mediation and
immediacy. According to Cassirer, the symbol is not something different from reality;
rather, it integrates certain aspects of reality. The very structure of reality is symbolic;
it includes something that necessarily goes beyond or transcends its material limits.
Reality includes both concreteness and transcendence. Cassirer identified the concept
of symbol with every kind of phenomenon in which sensory content is unified with
meaning. This primordial phenomenon is also called the phenomenon [Urphnomen]
of expression [Ausdruck]. Cassirer affirmed that sense data embody meaning, or fill
themselves with meaning. Cassirer like Hegel played on the German word Sinn",
which means sense and meaning", Bedeutung.
77
word Sinn points to the original unity of sense data and meaning. Only theoretical
philosophical thought distinguished between these two components; they are unified
in the phenomenon of expression, which is the first Erlebnis and the origin of
perception. Hence Cassirer maintained that the symbol was a necessary structure of
reality. Primordial reality is not given as something completely defined; it is, rather,
symbolic. It does not know any distinction between an image and a thing or between a
mark and what is marked. The symbolic structure of life points beyond its content; it
points to something that gives meaning and life to strictly material content. This
symbolic structure is the expressive moment of life.
Cassirer developed his concept of the symbol from his analysis of mythical
thought that reveals the primordial level of perception. His inquiry into mythical
consciousness and language brought Cassirer to conclude that the symbol had not
always been understood as a medium, and in the mythical world no strict distinction
existed between symbol and reality. In myth, the symbol does not have a mediating
function; it is not something that substitutes for reality. Thus it is a mistake, said
77
36
Cassirer, to restrict the symbolic function to the theoretical framework, in which the
symbol represents abstract contents. 78
If it is the symbolic concept which actually opens up the realm of theoretical and
exact science, it would seem to be confined to this realm and unable to pass
beyond it. The analysis of language and myth has granted us an insight into
fundamental forms of symbolic apprehension and formation, which by no means
coincide with the form of conceptual abstract thinking but possess and preserve an
entirely different character. 79
Mythical thought does not distinguish between thing and image, sign and what is
signified, dream and reality. Cassirer wrote: Where we see mere representation,
myth, insofar as it has not yet deviated from its fundamental and original form, sees
real identity. The image does not represent the thing; it is the thing. 80 In mythical
consciousness the role of the symbol is not representative but real. The word or image
do not represent something different from themselves; they are not only appearance
but also the exposition of reality. The symbol is identified with the thing that it
represents. This identification is evident from the examples of magic spells and
witchcraft, which were widespread in the mythical world. To harm someone, adepts
of magic cults would destroy his image since they assumed that the image and the
actual person were interconnected. 81 Another example is language magic, which
presupposes a connection between real persons and their names. Adepts of these cults
regarded a persons name as his inner essence.82 Therefore, the unity between symbol
and the immediacy of life, which appears strange from the theoretical viewpoint, is
very natural in the mythical worldview, which is closer to the concreteness of original
natural perception.
Cassirers concept of symbol is close to the concept of scheme, which, in Kants
CPR, is responsible for the power of imagination. The function of the symbol as the
function of scheme is to unify sensory content with categories of understanding.
Therefore Cassirer remarked: for me as well [as for Heidegger] the productive
power of imagination appears in fact to have a central meaning for Kant. From there I
81
82
37
was led through my work on the symbolic. 83 Cassirer considered the unity between
categories and intuition to be primary to distinction. Since the symbol presents the
unity of receptive and spontaneous aspects, to speak of the priority of one of the
components over the other does not make sense.
Herein lies the main disagreement between Cassirer and Heidegger. As already
mentioned, Heidegger argued that intuition is primary to knowledge and that the
concepts of understanding serve intuition. Heidegger criticized Cassirers position on
the constructive character of knowledge. Cassirer, for his part, clearly rejected
Heideggers position on the priority of intuition. He also did not accept Heideggers
theological assumption that the human being is characterized by a finitude of
receptivity. But he also did not agree that construction or concepts of understanding
are prior to intuition. Heidegger and others, however, misunderstood Cassirers
concept of the symbol, which constitutes the core of his philosophy. Cassirer did not
give priority to the concepts of understanding as set forth in Kants scheme. In his
new concept of the symbol, the sensory and conceptual aspects were unified. The
receptive or intuitive aspect together with the conceptual or constructive aspect
represent, in their unity, the very ground of knowledge and being.
According to the phenomenology of knowledge, the symbolic function lies at the
first level of perception, which includes the sensory and meaningful aspects. This first
level is not constructed by the spontaneous power of mind but rather is given together
with this power. Thus, the original phenomenon of perception is not constructed but
given. Cassirer pointed to the receptive character of the original phenomenon,
remarking: For all experience and expression are at first a mere passivity, a beingacted-upon rather than an acting and this receptivity stands in evident contrast to
that kind of spontaneity in which all self-consciousness as such is grounded. 84
The spontaneous power that is able to construct objective knowledge emerges
from the symbolic function of the phenomenon of perception. This power, however,
does not appear at the first level but with the further development of perception, in the
functions of representation and signification. 85 Only at these next levels does the
differentiation between various cultural forms and science emerge. The primordial
level of perception, however, lacks construction and accordingly self-consciousness,
DD, 172.
PSF III, 75.
85
PSF III, 105-205.
83
84
38
that is the spontaneous act of consciousness. This primordial level is the ground of
Cassirers philosophy, which Heidegger did not appreciate when he claimed
Cassirers philosophy had no ground. 86 This is the reason for Cassirers difficulty in
incorporating ethics in his philosophy of symbolic forms. That problem will be
discussed in the last chapter.
86
87
See EC.
PSF III, 81.
39
newborns, they concluded that the infant recognizes the familiar face and reacts
differently to different expressions, before he knows anything about the world. 88
Erlebnis of the original phenomenon of expression is the unmediated source of life
and perception. It discovers life as it is, as pure expression. It is the origin of life as
well as the ground [Grund] of symbolic forms. Therefore, Cassirer not only
investigated objective cultural formations, as evident from only the first two volumes
of PSF; he also offered a description of pure Erlebnis, the original phenomenon of
life. Cassirer, like Husserl and Heidegger, aimed to reveal the ground of being and
knowledge. Hence all of them are philosophers of Grundlichkeit. Each found his
own way to the original source of life: Husserl calls it original givenness [Originr
gebende]; Heidegger, Dasein, or Being-here; and Cassirer, rphenomenon, the
original phenomenon of expression.
Ibid., 58-67.
See PSF III, 22-35.
40
structured and carries meaning within itself. The moment of meaning is a symbolic
moment that points beyond the given; it brings the transcendent dimension to the bare
concreteness of life. This moment, Cassirer argued, was absent in Heideggers
hermeneutic philosophy, which was unable to go beyond immanent existence.
To clarify his claim that without meaning the perception of the objective is
impossible, Cassirer turned to pathological theories.90 Using examples from
pathology he pointed to the difference between the symbolic unity of normal
perception and the discursive character of defective perception. He was referring to a
kind of defectiveness that is not caused by local damage to the organs of perception
but concerns the inability to perceive the whole, to identify the meaning. Such
defectiveness is called agnosia or aphasia, both of which are kinds of a single
pathological phenomenon that comprises a number of disturbances whose common
characteristic is a grave impairment of the perceptual knowledge of objects. 91 A
patient with this syndrome can recognize an object only when he perceives some parts
of it, which are known to him, and through which he tries to guess about the whole
thing. For example, a patient can touch the object and recognize different qualities of
it, but not the object itself. The collection of qualities does not unite in his perception
into a single object. Cassirer suggested that such a patient lacks the symbolic function
of perception, which is essential for objective knowledge. For example, one patient
could recognize different colors but not the objects: where he is dependent on
optical data alone, he gains no knowledge of objects and of what they objectively are
and signify. 92 It is only through the symbolic function, Cassirer asserted, that we can
make a distinction between true perceptual pregnance and merely discursive
knowledge of objects, based on pointers. 93 By these examples Cassirer showed that
without the symbolic function of perception, all our perceptions function similarly to
cases of agnosia or aphasia. He claimed that only in symbolic perception we have a
unity of view by virtue of which the diverse aspects appear as different perspectives
of an object which in them is intuitively intended as. 94
Cassirer defined the moment of transcendence in the given content as symbolic
pregnance [symbolische Prgnance]. This was a phenomenon in which a
PSF III, 205-279.
Ibid., 233.
92
Ibid.
93
Ibid., 240.
94
Ibid.
90
91
41
95
Ibid., 202.
CSFH, 57.
97
Ibid., 58:
96
In his examination of the body-subject in The Phenomenology of Perception, Maurice MerleauPonty refers again and again to Cassirers analysis of meaning in the Phenomenology of Knowledge
and particularly to the key idea of symbolic pregnance. Cassirers thesis that the relationship
between the body and sensitive nature (soul) constitutes the prototype of all symbolic relations,
that is, that the expressive meaning perceived in the world has its original seat in the body, is
Merleau-Pontys starting point in his phenomenology.
42
43
source and foundation of the origin of myth, and in it we shall find the causes,
elements, and action by which such a genesis is effected. 101
101
Ibid., 116.
44
45
tension of the ethical problem is: if, in Davos, Cassirer defended the universality of
moral values versus the ethical relativism of Heideggers Dasein, and argued that
through the symbolic forms he had demonstrated the universality of these values, why
did he not develop an extensive moral philosophy? The next and final chapter is
devoted to this issue.
46
47
from the world resulted from the long process of development from primitive cults to
monotheistic religion. The cult of sacrifice led to the appearance of the first clear
distinction between the inner domain of man and the outer world. Cassirer suggests
that the central function of sacrifice is the limitation of mans desires. Sacrifice
defines the world as something completely alien to man. Through the sacrifice, the
awareness of the gap between I and the other emerged. When performing sacrificial
rituals, man learned to recognize the will of others (i.e., the gods) and to limit his
desire according to it. Cassirer asserted: ...every sacrifice implies a negative factor: a
limitation of sensory desire, a renunciation which the I imposes on itself. 107 In
sacrifice, trying to make contact with gods and to secure their assistance, man
perceived himself and his will as different from them and their will; he began to
identify himself with his own will. The growing independence of the gods is the
condition for mans discovery in himself of a fixed centre, a unity of will, over against
the dispersal and diversity of his sensory drives. 108
The crucial point in the development of a personality that is independent of the
world is the identification of a person with its action. Hence personality emerged
coterminously with the emergence of ethics: they mutually condition each other.
Cassirers view of the emergence of ethics was influenced by the philosophy of his
teacher Hermann Cohen, who linked the individual I responsible for his sins with
the transcendent God of monotheism. 109 However, in contrast to Cohen, Cassirer
pointed out that the idea of mans responsibility already appeared in myth before the
development of monotheism. He referred to Aeschyluss Oresteia, in which Orestes is
judged for killing his mother. 110 Cassirer also mentioned the Egyptian Book of the
Dead, where a dead person is judged by the god, Osiris, for his own deeds and
punished or rewarded accordingly. In the Book of Gates [part of the Book of the
Dead] the dead man appears before Osiris to confess his sins and justify himself. 111
Thus the emergence of the individual was bound up with the gradual separation of
religion from the world of myth. Monotheistic religion regarded man as a free agent
who is able to act in a wrong or a right way. Hence myth and religion are the
symbolic forms that condition the possibility of ethical symbolic form. In his book
PSF II, 221.
Ibid., 223.
109
See Herman Cohen, Religion of Reason: out of the Sources of Judaism [1918], trans. Simon Kaplan
(New York: F. Ungar, 1972).
110
See CSFH, 144-148.
111
See PSF II, 167.
107
108
48
Krois noted that Cassirer had discussed the conditions for ethics and how these
conditions had developed. Krois asserted: Moral action depends upon the agents
standards or criteria of moral judgment and personal sense of self. 112 However, this
is not enough to prove that morality is necessarily integrated with human existence.
Even if Cassirer described the essential phases that produced morality, this did not
make morality the core of his symbolic philosophy. On the contrary, Cassirers
philosophy showed that morality depends on myth and religion and could not have
emerged at the early stages of human civilization. From this standpoint, morality is
linked to a certain epoch and is not essentially integrated with human being.
Krois, however, remarked that What Strauss did not realize, and what is still
unrecognized today, is that Cassirers thought had taken that very [moral] turn.
Following the publication of The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, the center of his
work becomes moral philosophy. 113 Krois claimed he had discovered that during the
exile years, 1933-1945, Cassirer had developed an original ethical theory at the core
of the philosophy of symbolic forms. This claim, however, appears strange because
symbolic philosophy deals with theoretical areas of philosophy that are not applied to
the practical philosophy of ethics.
Nevertheless, Krois maintained that Cassirer had succeeded to integrate theory
[Denken/Erkenntnis] with practice/action [Tun/Handel]. From their junction, ethical
philosophy emerged. 114 Krois noted that for Cassirer, practice is not distinct from
knowledge; they remain in correlation. The link between them is made by language;
Krois called this the linguistic turn of Cassirers philosophy. 115 In fact, Cassirer
already spoke of the phenomenon of language at the Davos meeting. Although he
defined the language form as a bridge between one individual and another, 116 in his
Davos lectures he did not clarify this issue. Krois explained that for Cassirer language
has two functions: a representative, descriptive one and a performative one, which is
presented in the act of promising.
117
became a medium between the theoretical and practical aspects of existence and
ethics were integrated with the philosophy of symbolic forms. In language, meaning
and expressions can be used in the act of promising, which presupposes ethical
CSPH, 151.
CSFH, 152.
114
Ibid., 142-172
115
Ibid.,156.
116
DD, 183.
117
CSFH, 156.
112
113
49
relations between persons. As Krois noted, the act of promising and then keeping
ones word bears directly on a persons humanity and personality in an ethical
sense. For Cassirer, the ability to enter into agreement with others, the ability to
promise and to recognize the ensuing legality of this promise, is constitutive for man,
a necessary precondition for the humanitas ipsa.118
According to Krois, Cassirer discovered the immanent ethical structure of human
perception through the reconstruction of language. The linguistic form of expression
is united with the original phenomenon of expression, which is the root of practical as
well as theoretical activities. Further reconstruction of this form could reveal the
primordial prelinguistic level, where the perception of the other is given directly in the
expression. Krois wrote:
Even prelinguistic understanding of others is based upon the understanding of
(expressive) meaning. In Cassirers reconstruction of the development of
consciousness of the ego, he shows that understanding of the other is present
from the beginning. Language permits giving this feeling of generality a
conceptual form; it permits conceiving actions in a way that transcends
immediate expediency. 119
As noted in the previous chapter, an evident example of expression is facial
expression. Perception of a face is an action that points immediately beyond the
physical content of what is perceived. Perception of a face discovers expression,
which is expressed by the other. Therefore, Cassirer not only demonstrated how ethics
developed, but also that ethics is integrated with mans being.
This mode of thought reemerged in Levinass ethical philosophy. 120 Levinas
maintained that ethical relations originated in face-to-face meetings with ones fellow
man, whom he called the Other. He differentiated between the perception of the
object and the discovery of the Other. The face of the Other, claimed Levinas,
discloses an eternity that cannot be limited to the perception of the physical content of
the face; the face of the Other points beyond its content. Here Levinas is close to the
thought of Cassirer, though for Cassirer every perception has a transcendent feature,
not only the face of the other person. 121
118
Ibid., 157.
Ibid., 167.
120
See Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, trans. Alphonso Lingis (The
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1979).
121
This issue needs special investigation.
119
50
Brigit Recki, Kultur ohne Moral? Warum Ernst Cassirer trotz der Einsicht in den Primat des
Praktischen keine Ethik schreiben konnte [1997], in Kultur als Praxis: Eine Einfhrung in Ernst
Cassirers Philosophie der symbolischen Formen (Akademie Verlag, Deutsche Zeitschrift fr
Philosophie, Sonderband, 6, 2003), 151-171.
123
Ibid., 164.
124
Ibid., 167: Die zentrale Stelle der Moralphilosophie ist damit bereits besetzt.
51
Ibid., 169.
Cf.: Thomas Meyer, Einige berlegungen zur Ethik Ernst Cassirers, Simon Dubnow Institute
Yearbook VII (2008): 93-111.
126
52
not be subordinated to sensory intuition. Thus he criticized Heidegger 127 for putting
intuition before construction and calling spontaneity of thinking only a servant of the
intuition. 128 Cassirer maintained that receptivity denies spontaneous powers in the
domain of knowledge and consequently in the domain of practice. Receptivity
subordinates mans thinking as well as actions to destiny and makes ethics
impossible. This clarifies the phrase from MS that was partly quoted in the
introduction:
But the new [Heideggers] philosophy did enfeeble and slowly undermine the
forces that could have resisted the modern political myths. a theory that sees
in the Geworfenheit [the being-thrown] of man one of his principle characters
have given up all hopes of an active share in the construction and
reconstruction of mans cultural life. Such philosophy renounces its own
fundamental theoretical and ethical ideals. It can be used, then, as a pliable
instrument in the hands of the political leaders. 129
127
Ernst Cassirer, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics: Remarks on Martin Heideggers
Interpretation of Kant, in Kant: Disputed Questions, ed. and trans. Molte S. Gram (Chicago:
Quadrangle Books, 1967), 131- 157.
128
See Martin Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics [1929], 4th ed., enlarged, trans.
Richard Taft (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990).
129
MS, 293.
53
CPR, 150.
Cf.: DD, 180.
54
Cassirer aimed to dissolve the Cartesian opposition between the outer world and
the inner domain of consciousness through the phenomenon of expression. As he
asserted: In expression there is no cleavage between the mere sensuous existence of
a phenomenon and a spiritual-psychic meaning which it mediately divulges. It is
essentially an utterance yet an utterance which remains entirely within itself. Here
there is neither kernel nor shell; there is no first and second, no one and other. 132 He
also stated: For the question of the nature of the relationship between body and soul
is raised for us by the phenomenon, which shows us the two never separate but always
in their mutual relation. 133 According to Cassirer, then, in expression the distinction
between inner consciousness and external life disappears. Consciousness is no longer
identified with pure thinking activity. Husserls distinction between the inner
experience of consciousness and the outer perception of things has no place in
Cassirers philosophy. In Cassirers view, perception is not directed from the inside
outward, but is an immediate experience of expression.
The symbolic function of the phenomenon of expression is that it integrates
sensory intuition with meaning. Cassirer extended the term meaning to encompass
expressive meaning, in which sensory intuition is unified with thought. There is no
such thing as meaning without body. For Cassirer, expressive meaning is not a
function of the I think. The identification between consciousness and thinking, or
any meaningful activity, does not exist in his philosophy. Meaning is not a
prerogative of mental activity; it is expressed by life and not by pure consciousness,
since no pure consciousness exists. Instead of a process that is associated with
consciousness, Cassirer spoke of spiritual powers that are expressed by symbolic
forms. Spiritual powers are self-creative powers of life and not functions of mind.
To know what this consciousness-spirit-life is, one needs to investigate how it
expresses itself in the multiplicity of forms; that is, one turns to the philosophy of
culture. The experience of the phenomenon of expression reveals the immediacy of
life and not the inner structure of consciousness. Therefore, Cassirer began his
investigation of Being with symbolic forms and not with a description of
consciousness, as Husserl did. Thus Cassirer denied the accessibility of subjectivity or
of pure consciousness. This was not because of the neo-Kantian assumption that
immediate knowledge is impossible, but because no consciousness exists in isolation
132
133
55
from its objectification in spiritual forms. Cassirer did not agree that Husserlian
phenomenology describes the living experience of consciousness, because he did not
accept the dualistic tradition in general. He did, however, accept phenomenology as a
science that describes the experience of life-spirit processes.
Luft claimed that Cassirer denies any direct access to subjectivity he remains
bound to the neo-Kantian dogma of the inaccessibility of subjectivity. 134 I maintain
instead that Cassirer did not accept access to subjectivity because he denied that
subjectivity, or consciousness, exists without objectivity. For him What is
experienced in every simple phenomenon of expression is an indissoluble correlation,
a thoroughly concrete synthesis of the physical and the psychic. 135 Cassirer saw
the solution of the soul-body problem in a return to the primary phenomenon of
expression. 136 There is no pure mental subjective activity; instead the experience of
expression includes both subjective and objective modes. Therefore, to obtain access
to spirit, one needs access to its expression the objective formation of spirit. Hence,
whereas Luft asserted that because experience can only be symbolic any analysis
of subjectivity can only be indirect as well", 137 I clarify that because experience
discovers the symbolic character of life, we can approach the immediate experience of
life through the whole expression of life. Thus I disagree with Lufts conclusion that
Cassirers account only deals with the structures that are needed to clarify the
functioning of cognition, not subjectivity itself, that is, the concrete dynamic life of
the subject. The dynamic vivacity of the subject remains untouched. 138 Luft denied
Cassirer access to the living, dynamic experience of subjectivity. This claim of Luft
resembles Heideggers criticism that Cassirers philosophy lacks a foundation.
Cassirers philosophy, however, did apprehend concrete, dynamic life the
primordial expressive character of life in its various forms.
Luft, however, also made an important, accurate observation that the omission of
subjectivity made it systematically impossible for Cassirer to draft an ethics. Where
there can be no access to subjectivity, any talk of moral agency, ought, volition, and
134
Sebastian Luft, A
Natorp, and Cassirer,
(2004): 240.
135
PSF III, 94.
136
Ibid.
137
Sebastian Luft, A
Natorp, and Cassirer,
(2004): 240.
138
Ibid.
56
personal responsibility is meaningless. 139 This remains the main problem of Cassirer,
who presumed to include ethical philosophy in the philosophy of symbolic forms. On
the one hand, he united meaningful and bodily aspects; on the other, he needed an
agent who was independent of the receptiveness of body. The phenomenological
principle of Cassirers philosophy does not accord with his ethical intention.
This was the main reason, I assume, that Cassirer did not suggest further
elaboration of the promising phenomenological-ontological ideas he introduced in
The Phenomenology of Knowledge. He hesitated about the possibility of integrating
ethical philosophy with his phenomenology. That is apparently why Cassirer did not
provide a thorough explanation of his phenomenology during the Davos dispute.
Thus Krois and Verene, in mentioning the Davos meeting in the introduction to
the fourth volume, again raised the question about the ground of Cassirers symbolic
forms. They wrote: Perhaps the strongest critical point persistently raised in relation
to Cassirers thought is: How are his symbolic forms, which are forms of culture,
metaphysically or ontologically grounded? 140 Thus Krois and Verene at least
partially accepted Heideggers claim that Cassirers philosophy has no firm starting
point. They asserted that Cassirers conception of symbolic forms in PSF I-III is
strongly epistemological orientated and is non- or even antimetaphysical. 141 I
claim, however, that Cassirer already discovered a ground for a new ontology and
metaphysics in the third volume. There, however, he did not ground ethics, even
though he claimed this was the main goal of philosophy; he did so only in the fourth
volume. Krois and Verene wrote: As to the grounds of the various symbolic
formsthe unpublished texts of the fourth volume of The Philosophy of Symbolic
Forms remained Cassirers fullest answer. I add, however, that in PSF IV Cassirer
rather provided the ground for ethics that was lacking in the previous volumes.
Ibid., 246.
J.M. Krois and D.P. Verene, Introduction, in PSF IV (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996),
xxiv.
141
Cf.: ibid.
142
See PSF IV, 127.
140
57
demonstrated how ethics is related to the Basis phenomena. These phenomena are
composed of three aspects, each of which Cassirer named the primary phenomenon
[Urphaenomen]. Cassirer modified the impersonal, lacking-I-center original
phenomenon of expression from The Phenomenology of Knowledge into the primary,
whose first aspect is I. This is the important difference between the third and the
fourth volume of PSF.
Cassirer took the concept of the primary phenomenon [rphenomen] from
Goethes Maxims. This phenomenon is the rotating movement of the monad about
itself, knowing neither pause nor rest. 143 This primary phenomenon has three
aspects, for which Cassirer gave only preliminary explanations because he was not yet
sure how and according to which philosophical approach this phenomenon should be
defined. The first aspect is the phenomenon of I [Ich-Phnomen], which is also the
monad and life itself. Thus Cassirer proposed several options. He suggested that the Iphenomenon
could be described in a biological and vitalistic way (Bergsons
intuition..),psychologically (as the phenomenon of self-consciousnessas it
was originally intended by Descartes), or in the transcendental sense. For the
present we will ignore all these differences. We take the monas 144 in the sense that
Goethe gave to it. 145
Here Cassirers explanations were not sufficiently elaborate. What is evident,
however, is that Cassirer again approached the Cartesian position on selfconsciousness that he had earlier rejected. However, Cassirer clearly was not prepared
to make a complete identification between I-consciousness and thinking activity. He
pointed to Cartesian self-consciousness but also associated the I-phenomenon with
life, which includes physical and biological features. Cassirers intention to return
even partially to the I-consciousness paradigm in Descartes sense means that he
decided to develop ethics at the phenomenological level and searched for a way to
resolve the difficulties of this task.
The second aspect of the basis phenomena is the phenomenon of action
[Wirkens-Phnomen]. It is here that awareness emerges of the interconnection
between the monad and the other; the monad cannot remain limited to itself. Cassirer
Maxims 391-393, from Maximen und Reflexionen, Schriften der Goethe-Gesellschaft, cited in PSF
IV, 127.
144
Sometimes Cassirer uses the Greek term monas instead of monad.
145
PSF IV, 138.
143
58
Ibid., 139.
Ibid., 141.
59
all the texts that were included in it. These texts are only working papers, drafts. If
Cassirer had been sure about them, he would have continued to work on them and
publish them. Since he did not do so, we can regard these texts only as his unfinished
attempts to renew his philosophy and give it an ethical foundation. These texts do,
however, offer various possibilities of interpretation and extension of his thoughts and
ideas. In this investigation I have confined myself to a brief discussion of the text of
On Basis Phenomena, which is valuable for my previous arguments about ethics in
Cassirers philosophy. A more thorough discussion and research of this text requires a
special investigation.
60
Conclusion
The point of departure for this investigation was the debate between Husserls
phenomenology and neo-Kantianism, which dominated the philosophical discourse of
the first decades of the twentieth century but subsequently was almost forgotten. This
debate centered on the question of the origin of knowledge; specifically, whether
knowledge originated from intuition or from construction.
My investigation then turned to the Davos dispute between Cassirer and
Heidegger. I presented this dispute as a kind of continuation of the older debate
between neo-Kantianism and phenomenology, in light of which many aspects of the
Davos dispute become understandable. These include Heideggers charge that
Cassirer was a neo-Kantian philosopher who employed a critical reconstructive
method of investigation and therefore could not accept intuition as the basis for
human being.
The next part of my research offered a systematic exposition of Cassirers
philosophy, whose center is the concept of symbol. This new symbolic philosophy
proposed to solve the problem of Heideggers hermeneutics and to reconcile neoKantianism and phenomenology. From this symbolic perspective, Cassirers
philosophy differs from neo-Kantianism in Heideggers sense. Cassirer did not base
his theory of knowledge exclusively on construction; nor did he deny that intuition is
the basis for epistemology and ontology.
For Cassirer the controversy between intuition and construction was the outcome
of a very old conflict between life and culture, or, in other words, between the
immediacy of given life and culture as an artificial construction of knowledge.
Cassirer aimed to resolve this traditional conflict by proposing the new concept of the
symbol, according to which the symbol is not a medium that can be employed only as
a representation of reality. Instead, reality discloses itself to be primary symbolic.
Cassirer defined the symbol as a function that integrates immanence and
transcendence within itself. The symbol manifests transcendence, which is given in
immanence.
Life is symbolic and is given as symbolic at the primordial level of perception.
Cassirer characterized the immediate givenness of life in perception with the term
phenomenon of expression. Expression has a symbolic character where sensory
61
content extends beyond its limits and discovers more than it contains. For Cassirer,
expression is living experience [Erlebnis] where the distinction between
consciousness and world, meaning and sense, subject and object disappears.
Expression reveals the organic form of life.
This organic form is manifested already in the mythological consciousness, in
which life is given as filled with expressive physiognomic features. Cassirer tried to
describe and analyze the mythical world thoroughly. Reconstructing this world was of
great importance to him because through myth he also discovered the immediate level
of perception.
The last part of my investigation deals with the problem of ethics. The
Phenomenology of Knowledge presents an organic picture of life in which there is no
place for the free subject of action. At the same time, Cassirer maintains that the
possibility of ethics depends on the possibility of the existence of the agent of action;
hence he had difficulty developing an ethical philosophy within his phenomenology.
For Cassirer, however, the need for practical philosophy was critical since he rejected
any separation between ethics and knowledge. His main critique of Heidegger is that
Heideggers philosophy denies universal ethical values. Yet, if Cassirer himself had
not developed an extensive moral philosophy, did he have any right to criticize
Heidegger? In order to answer this question, I reviewed the postwar German and
English philosophical literature on the problem of ethics in Cassirers philosophy,
analyzing different approaches and arguments concerning this problem.
The monistic, organic structure of the life excludes the possibility of free action of
the self. The possibility of the concept of the individual as different from the
wholeness of lifes circumstances depends on the concept of the subject as different
from the world.
Thus, I maintain that the inconsistency between the phenomenology of ethics and
moral intentions caused Cassirer to modify some of his positions. Cassirer attempted
to solve the problem of ethics in his text On Basis Phenomena, which was
posthumously published in PSF IV. In this text he introduced the concept of the
primary phenomenon as a basis for theoretical as well as practical knowledge. The
first moment of the primary phenomenon is the I aspect from which both perception
and action emerge. However, the development of the concept of the primary
phenomenon remained incomplete and the reconstruction of it requires separate
research.
62
63
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