Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Listed The Grounds Relied Upon in This Petition As Follows
Listed The Grounds Relied Upon in This Petition As Follows
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 71977 February 27, 1987
DEMETRIO G. DEMETRIA, M.P., AUGUSTO S. SANCHEZ, M.P., ORLANDO S. MERCADO, M.P., HONORATO Y.
AQUINO, M.P., ZAFIRO L. RESPICIO, M.P., DOUGLAS R. CAGAS, M.P., OSCAR F. SANTOS, M.P., ALBERTO G.
ROMULO, M.P., CIRIACO R. ALFELOR, M.P., ISIDORO E. REAL, M.P., EMIGDIO L. LINGAD, M.P., ROLANDO C.
MARCIAL, M.P., PEDRO M. MARCELLANA, M.P., VICTOR S. ZIGA, M.P., and ROGELIO V. GARCIA.
M.P., petitioners,
vs.
HON. MANUEL ALBA in his capacity as the MINISTER OF THE BUDGET and VICTOR MACALINGCAG in his
capacity as the TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FERNAN, J.:
Assailed in this petition for prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction is the constitutionality of the first
paragraph of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177, otherwise known as the "Budget Reform Decree of 1977."
Petitioners, who filed the instant petition as concerned citizens of this country, as members of the National
Assembly/Batasan Pambansa representing their millions of constituents, as parties with general interest common to
all the people of the Philippines, and as taxpayers whose vital interests may be affected by the outcome of the reliefs
prayed for" 1 listed the grounds relied upon in this petition as follows:
A. SECTION 44 OF THE 'BUDGET REFORM DECREE OF 1977' INFRINGES UPON THE
FUNDAMENTAL LAW BY AUTHORIZING THE ILLEGAL TRANSFER OF PUBLIC MONEYS.
B. SECTION 44 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1177 IS REPUGNANT TO THE
CONSTITUTION AS IT FAILS TO SPECIFY THE OBJECTIVES AND PURPOSES FOR WHICH
THE PROPOSED TRANSFER OF FUNDS ARE TO BE MADE.
C. SECTION 44 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1177 ALLOWS THE PRESIDENT TO
OVERRIDE THE SAFEGUARDS, FORM AND PROCEDURE PRESCRIBED BY THE
CONSTITUTION IN APPROVING APPROPRIATIONS.
D. SECTION 44 OF THE SAME DECREE AMOUNTS TO AN UNDUE DELEGATION OF
LEGISLATIVE POWERS TO THE EXECUTIVE.
E. THE THREATENED AND CONTINUING TRANSFER OF FUNDS BY THE PRESIDENT AND
THE IMPLEMENTATION THEREOF BY THE BUDGET MINISTER AND THE TREASURER OF
THE PHILIPPINES ARE WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF THEIR AUTHORITY AND
JURISDICTION. 2
Commenting on the petition in compliance with the Court resolution dated September 19, 1985, the Solicitor General,
for the public respondents, questioned the legal standing of petitioners, who were allegedly merely begging an
advisory opinion from the Court, there being no justiciable controversy fit for resolution or determination. He further
contended that the provision under consideration was enacted pursuant to Section 16[5], Article VIII of the 1973
Constitution; and that at any rate, prohibition will not lie from one branch of the government to a coordinate branch to
enjoin the performance of duties within the latter's sphere of responsibility.
On February 27, 1986, the Court required the petitioners to file a Reply to the Comment. This, they did, stating,
among others, that as a result of the change in the administration, there is a need to hold the resolution of the present
case in abeyance "until developments arise to enable the parties to concretize their respective stands." 3
Thereafter, We required public respondents to file a rejoinder. The Solicitor General filed a rejoinder with a motion to
dismiss, setting forth as grounds therefor the abrogation of Section 16[5], Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution by the
Freedom Constitution of March 25, 1986, which has allegedly rendered the instant petition moot and academic. He
likewise cited the "seven pillars" enunciated by Justice Brandeis in Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288 (1936) 4 as
basis of development priorities but on political and personal expediency." 5 The contention of public respondents
that paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. 1177 was enacted pursuant to Section 16(5) of Article VIII of the
1973 Constitution must perforce fall flat on its face.
Another theory advanced by public respondents is that prohibition will not lie from one branch of the government
against a coordinate branch to enjoin the performance of duties within the latter's sphere of responsibility.
Thomas M. Cooley in his "A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations," Vol. 1, Eight Edition, Little, Brown and
Company, Boston, explained:
... The legislative and judicial are coordinate departments of the government, of equal dignity; each
is alike supreme in the exercise of its proper functions, and cannot directly or indirectly, while acting
within the limits of its authority, be subjected to the control or supervision of the other, without an
unwarrantable assumption by that other of power which, by the Constitution, is not conferred upon
it. The Constitution apportions the powers of government, but it does not make any one of the three
departments subordinate to another, when exercising the trust committed to it. The courts may
declare legislative enactments unconstitutional and void in some cases, but not because the
judicial power is superior in degree or dignity to the legislative. Being required to declare what the
law is in the cases which come before them, they must enforce the Constitution, as the paramount
law, whenever a legislative enactment comes in conflict with it. But the courts sit, not to review or
revise the legislative action, but to enforce the legislative will, and it is only where they find that the
legislature has failed to keep within its constitutional limits, that they are at liberty to disregard its
action; and in doing so, they only do what every private citizen may do in respect to the mandates
of the courts when the judges assumed to act and to render judgments or decrees without
jurisdiction. "In exercising this high authority, the judges claim no judicial supremacy; they are only
the administrators of the public will. If an act of the legislature is held void, it is not because the
judges have any control over the legislative power, but because the act is forbidden by the
Constitution, and because the will of the people, which is therein declared, is paramount to that of
their representatives expressed in any law." [Lindsay v. Commissioners, & c., 2 Bay, 38, 61; People
v. Rucker, 5 Col. 5; Russ v. Com., 210 Pa. St. 544; 60 Atl. 169, 1 L.R.A. [N.S.] 409, 105 Am. St.
Rep. 825] (pp. 332-334).
Indeed, where the legislature or the executive branch is acting within the limits of its authority, the judiciary cannot
and ought not to interfere with the former. But where the legislature or the executive acts beyond the scope of its
constitutional powers, it becomes the duty of the judiciary to declare what the other branches of the government had
assumed to do as void. This is the essence of judicial power conferred by the Constitution "in one Supreme Court and
in such lower courts as may be established by law" [Art. VIII, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution; Art. X, Section 1 of
the 1973 Constitution and which was adopted as part of the Freedom Constitution, and Art. VIII, Section 1 of the 1987
Constitution] and which power this Court has exercised in many instances. *
Public respondents are being enjoined from acting under a provision of law which We have earlier mentioned to be
constitutionally infirm. The general principle relied upon cannot therefore accord them the protection sought as they
are not acting within their "sphere of responsibility" but without it.
The nation has not recovered from the shock, and worst, the economic destitution brought about by the plundering of
the Treasury by the deposed dictator and his cohorts. A provision which allows even the slightest possibility of a
repetition of this sad experience cannot remain written in our statute books.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is granted. Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177 is hereby
declared null and void for being unconstitutional.
SO ORDER RED.
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco,
Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.