THE LAWYER AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION

CASE COMPILATION
A.C. No. 6732, October 22, 2013
ATTY. OSCAR L. EMBIDO, REGIONAL DIRECTOR,
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, WESTERN
VISAYAS, REGIONAL OFFICE (NBI-WEVRO), FOR
SAN PEDRO, ILOILO CITY, Complainant, v. ATTY.
SALVADOR N. PE, JR., ASSISTANT PROVINCIAL
PROSECUTOR, SAN JOSE, ANTIQUE, Respondent.
BERSAMIN, J.:
A lawyer who forges a court decision and represents it as that
of a court of law is guilty of the gravest misconduct and
deserves the supreme penalty of disbarment.
The Case
Before this Court is the complaint for disbarment against
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Atty. Salvador N. Pe, Jr.
(respondent) of San Jose, Antique for his having allegedly
falsified an inexistent decision of Branch 64 of the Regional
Trial Court stationed in Bugasong, Antique (RTC) instituted
by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Western
Visayas Regional Office, represented by Regional Director
Atty. Oscar L. Embido.
Antecedent
On July 7, 2004, Atty. Ronel F. Sustituya, Clerk of Court of
the RTC, received a written communication from Mr. Ballam
Delaney Hunt, a Solicitor in the United Kingdom (UK). The
letter requested a copy of the decision dated February 12, 1997
rendered by Judge Rafael O. Penuela in Special Proceedings
Case No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of
Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna, whose petitioner was one
Shirley Quioyo.1
On September 9, 2004, the RTC received another letter from
Mr. Hunt, reiterating the request for a copy of the decision in
Special Proceedings Case No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the
Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna.2
Judge Penuela instructed the civil docket clerk to retrieve the
records of Special Proceedings Case No. 084 entitled In the
Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rey
Laserna. It was then discovered that the RTC had no record of
Special Proceedings No. 084 wherein Shirley Quioyo was the
petitioner. Instead, the court files revealed that Judge Penuela
had decided Special Proceedings No. 084 entitled In the
Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rolando
Austria, whose petitioner was one Serena Catin Austria.
Informed that the requested decision and case records did not
exist,3 Mr. Hunt sent a letter dated October 12, 2004 attaching
a machine copy of the purported decision in Special
Proceedings No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration
of Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna that had been presented
by Shirley Quioyo in court proceedings in the UK.4
After comparing the two documents and ascertaining that the
document attached to the October 12, 2004 letter was a
falsified court document, Judge Penuela wrote Mr. Hunt to
apprise him of the situation.5
The discovery of the falsified decision prompted the Clerk of
Court to communicate on the situation in writing to the NBI,
triggering the investigation of the falsification.6

In the meanwhile, Dy Quioyo, a brother of Shirley Quioyo,

executed an affidavit on March 4, 2005,7wherein he stated that
it was the respondent who had facilitated the issuance of the
falsified decision in Special Proceedings No. 084 entitled In
the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rey
Laserna for a fee of P60,000.00. The allegations against the
respondent were substantially corroborated by Mary Rose
Quioyo, a sister of Shirley Quioyo, in an affidavit dated March
20, 2005.8
The NBI invited the respondent to explain his side,9 but he
invoked his constitutional right to remain silent. The NBI also
issued subpoenas to Shirley Quioyo and Dy Quioyo but only
the latter appeared and gave his sworn statement.
After conducting its investigation, the NBI forwarded to the
Office of the Ombudsman for Visayas the records of the
investigation, with a recommendation that the respondent be
prosecuted for falsification of public document under Article
171, 1 and 2, of the Revised Penal Code, and for violation of
Section 3(a) of Republic Act 3019 (The Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act).10 The NBI likewise recommended to
the Office of the Court Administrator that disbarment
proceedings be commenced against the respondent.11Then
Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (now a Member
of the Court) officially endorsed the recommendation to the
Office of the Bar Confidant.12
Upon being required by the Court, the respondent submitted
his counter-affidavit,13 whereby he denied any participation in
the falsification. He insisted that Dy Quioyo had sought his
opinion on Shirleys petition for the annulment of her
marriage; that he had given advice on the pertinent laws
involved and the different grounds for the annulment of
marriage; that in June 2004, Dy Quioyo had gone back to him
to present a copy of what appeared to be a court
decision;14 that Dy Quioyo had then admitted to him that he
had caused the falsification of the decision; that he had
advised Dy Quioyo that the falsified decision would not hold
up in an investigation; that Dy Quioyo, an overseas Filipino
worker (OFW), had previously resorted to people on Recto
Avenue in Manila to solve his documentation problems as an
OFW; and that he had also learned from Atty. Angeles Orquia,
Jr. that one Mrs. Florencia Jalipa, a resident of Igbalangao,
Bugasong, Antique, had executed a sworn statement before
Police Investigator Herminio Dayrit with the assistance of
Atty. Orquia, Jr. to the effect that her late husband, Manuel
Jalipa, had been responsible for making the falsified document
at the instance of Dy Quioyo.15
Thereafter, the Court issued its resolution16 treating the
respondents counter-affidavit as his comment, and referred
the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.
The IBPs Report and Recommendation
In a report and recommendation dated June 14, 2006,17 Atty.
Lolita A. Quisumbing, the IBP Investigating Commissioner,
found the respondent guilty of serious misconduct and
violations of the Attorneys Oath and Code of Professional
Responsibility, and recommended his suspension from the
practice of law for one year. She concluded that the respondent
had forged the purported decision of Judge Penuela by making
it appear that Special Proceedings No. 084 concerned a
petition for declaration of presumptive death of Rey Laserna,
with Shirley Quioyo as the petitioner, when in truth and in fact
the proceedings related to the petition for declaration of
presumptive death of Rolando Austria, with Serena Catin
Austria as the petitioner;18 and that the respondent had
received P60,000.00 from Dy Quioyo for the falsified

decision. She rationalized her conclusions

thusly:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Respondents denials are not worthy of merit. Respondent
contends that it was one Manuel Jalipa (deceased) who
facilitated the issuance and as proof thereof, he presented the
sworn statement of the widow of Florencia Jalipa (sic). Such a
contention is hard to believe. In the first place, if the decision
was obtained in Recto, Manila, why was it an almost verbatim
reproduction of the authentic decision on file in Judge
Penuelas branch except for the names and dates? Respondent
failed to explain this. Secondly, respondent did not attend the
NBI investigation and merely invoked his right to remain
silent. If his side of the story were true, he should have made
this known in the investigation. His story therefore appears to
have been a mere afterthought. Finally, there is no plausible
reason why Dy Quioyo and his sister, Mary Rose Quioyo
would falsely implicate him in this incident.19
In its Resolution No. XVII-2007-063 dated February 1,
2007,20 the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved,
with modification, the report and recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner by suspending the respondent
from the practice of law for six years.
On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors passed
Resolution No. XVIII-2008-70921 denying the respondents
motion for reconsideration and affirming Resolution No.
XVII-2007-063. The IBP Board of Governors then forwarded
the case to the Court in accordance with Section 12(b), Rule
139-B22 of the Rules of Court.
On January 11, 2011, the Court resolved: (1) to treat the
respondents comment/opposition as his appeal by petition for
review; (2) to consider the complainants reply as his comment
on the petition for review; (3) to require the respondent to file
a reply to the complainants comment within 10 days from
notice; and (4) to direct the IBP to transmit the original
records of the case within 15 days from notice.
Ruling
We affirm the findings of the IBP Board of Governors. Indeed,
the respondent was guilty of grave misconduct for falsifying a
court decision in consideration of a sum of money.
The respondents main defense consisted in blanket denial of
the imputation. He insisted that he had had no hand in the
falsification, and claimed that the falsification had been the
handiwork of Dy Quioyo. He implied that Dy Quioyo had
resorted to the shady characters in Recto Avenue in Manila to
resolve the problems he had encountered as an OFW, hinting
that Dy Quioyo had a history of employing unscrupulous
means to achieve his ends.
However, the respondents denial and his implication against
Dy Quioyo in the illicit generation of the falsified decision are
not persuasive. Dy Quioyos categorical declaration on the
respondents personal responsibility for the falsified decision,
which by nature was positive evidence, was not overcome by
the respondents blanket denial, which by nature was negative
evidence.23 Also, the imputation of wrongdoing against Dy
Quioyo lacked credible specifics and did not command
credence. It is worthy to note, too, that the respondent filed his
counter-affidavit only after the Court, through the en
banc resolution of May 10, 2005, had required him to
comment.24 The belatedness of his response exposed his
blanket denial as nothing more than an afterthought.
The respondent relied on the sworn statement supposedly
executed by Mrs. Jalipa that declared that her deceased
husband had been instrumental in the falsification of the
forged decision. But such reliance was outrightly worthless,
for the sworn statement of the wife was rendered unreliable
due to its patently hearsay character. In addition, the

unworthiness of the sworn statement as proof of authorship of

the falsification by the husband is immediately exposed and
betrayed by the falsified decision being an almost verbatim
reproduction of the authentic decision penned by Judge
Penuela in the real Special Proceedings Case No. 084.
In light of the established circumstances, the respondent was
guilty of grave misconduct for having authored the
falsification of the decision in a non-existent court proceeding.
Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility demands
that all lawyers should uphold at all times the dignity and
integrity of the Legal Profession. Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility states that a lawyer shall not
engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor shall he whether in public or private life,
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession. Lawyers are further required by Rule 1.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility not to engage in any
unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct.
Gross immorality, conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or fraudulent transactions can justify a lawyers
disbarment or suspension from the practice of
law.25 Specifically, the deliberate falsification of the court
decision by the respondent was an act that reflected a high
degree of moral turpitude on his part. Worse, the act made a
mockery of the administration of justice in this country, given
the purpose of the falsification, which was to mislead a foreign
tribunal on the personal status of a person. He thereby became
unworthy of continuing as a member of the Bar.
It then becomes timely to remind all members of the
Philippine Bar that they should do nothing that may in any
way or degree lessen the confidence of the public in their
professional fidelity and integrity.26 The Court will not hesitate
to wield its heavy hand of discipline on those among them
who wittingly and willingly fail to meet the enduring demands
of their Attorneys Oath for them
to:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
x x x support [the] Constitution and obey the laws as well as
the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; xxx
do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; x x x
not wittingly or willingly promote or sue on groundless, false
or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same; x x x
delay no man for money or malice, and x x x conduct
[themselves as lawyers] according to the best of [their]
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the
courts as to [their] clients x x x.
No lawyer should ever lose sight of the verity that the practice
of the legal profession is always a privilege that the Court
extends only to the deserving, and that the Court may
withdraw or deny the privilege to him who fails to observe and
respect the Lawyers Oath and the canons of ethical conduct in
his professional and private capacities. He may be disbarred or
suspended from the practice of law not only for acts and
omissions of malpractice and for dishonesty in his
professional dealings, but also for gross misconduct not
directly connected with his professional duties that reveal his
unfitness for the office and his unworthiness of the principles
that the privilege to practice law confers upon him.27 Verily, no
lawyer is immune from the disciplinary authority of the Court
whose duty and obligation are to investigate and punish
lawyer misconduct committed either in a professional or
private capacity.28 The test is whether the conduct shows the
lawyer to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and
good demeanor, and whether the conduct renders the lawyer
unworthy to continue as an officer of the
Court.29ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS AND PRONOUNCES
ASST. PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR SALVADOR N. PE,
JR. guilty of violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, and Rule 7.03 of
Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,

and DISBARS him effective upon receipt of this decision.

The Court DIRECTS the Bar Confidant to remove the name
of ASST. PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR SALVADOR N.
PE, JR. from the Roll of Attorneys.
This decision is without prejudice to any pending or
contemplated proceedings to be initiated against ASST.
PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR SALVADOR N. PE, JR.
Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of the
Bar Confidant, the Office of the Court Administrator for
dissemination to all courts of the country, and to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
A.C. No. 8000

August 5, 2014

CHAMELYN A. AGOT, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. LUIS P. RIVERA, Respondent.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
For the Court's resolution is a Complaint-Affidavit1 dated
August 30, 2008 filed by complainant Chamelyn A. Agot
(complainant) against respondent Atty. Luis P. Rivera
(respondent), charging him of violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR) and the lawyer's oath for
misrepresentation, deceit, and failure to account for and return
her money despite several demands.
The Facts
In her Complaint-Affidavit, complainant alleged that she was
invited as maid of honor in her best friends wedding on
December 9, 2007 at the United States of America. To
facilitate the issuance of her United States (US) visa,
complainant sought the services of respondent who
represented himself as an immigration lawyer. Thus, on
November 17, 2007, they entered into a Contract of Legal
Services (Contract),2 whereby respondent undertook to
facilitate and secure the release of a US immigrant visa in
complainants favor prior to the scheduled wedding. In
consideration therefor, complainant paid respondent the
amount of P350,000.00 as downpayment and undertook to pay
the balance of P350,000.00 after the issuance of the US
visa.3 The parties likewise stipulated that should complainants
visa application be denied for any reason other than her
absence on the day of the interview and/or for records of
criminal conviction and/or any court-issued hold departure
order, respondent is obligated to return the said
downpayment.4 However, respondent failed to perform his
undertaking within the agreed period. Worse, complainant was
not even scheduled for interview in the US Embassy. As the
demand for refund of the downpayment was not heeded,
complainant filed a criminal complaint for estafa and the
instant administrative complaint against respondent.5
In his Comment6 dated December 5, 2008, respondent claimed
that his failure to comply with his obligation under the
Contract was due to the false pretenses of a certain Rico
Pineda (Pineda), who he had believed to be a consul for the
US Embassy and to whom he delivered the amount given by
the complainant. Respondent elaborated that he had a business
relationship with Pineda on the matter of facilitating the
issuance of US visas to his friends and family, including
himself. He happened to disclose this to a certain Joseph

Peralta, who in turn referred his friend, the complainant,

whose previous US visa application had been denied, resulting
in the execution of the Contract. Respondent claimed that
Pineda reneged on his commitments and could no longer be
located but, nonetheless, assumed the responsibility to return
the said amount to complainant.7 To buttress his claims,
respondent attached pictures supposedly of his friends and
family with Pineda as well as electronic mail messages (emails) purportedly coming from the latter.8
The IBPs Report and Recommendation
In a Report and Recommendation9 dated April 17, 2010, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Investigating
Commissioner found respondent administratively liable, and
accordingly, recommended that he be meted the penalty of
suspension for a period of four (4) months, with a warning that
a repetition of the same would invite a stiffer penalty.10
The Investigating Commissioner found respondent guilty of
engaging in deceitful conduct for: (a) misrepresenting himself
as an immigration lawyer; (b) failing to deliver the services he
contracted; and (c) being remiss in returning complainants
downpayment of P350,000.00. The Investigating
Commissioner did not lend credence to respondents defense
anent his purported transactions with Pineda considering that
the latters identity was not proven and in light of respondents
self-serving evidence, i.e., photographs and e-mails, which
were bereft of any probative value.11
In a Resolution dated December 14, 2012, the IBP Board of
Governors unanimously adopted and approved the aforesaid
report and recommendation with the modification increasing
the period of suspension to six (6) months and ordering
respondent to return the amount of P350,000.0012 to
complainant within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice,
with legal interest from the date of demand.13
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent
should be held administratively liable for violating the CPR.
The Courts Ruling
After a judicious perusal of the records, the Court concurs
with the IBPs findings, subject to the modification of the
recommended penalty to be imposed upon respondent.
As officers of the court, lawyers are bound to maintain not
only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality,
honesty, integrity, and fair dealing.14 In this regard, Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 of the CPR, provides:
CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE
CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LANDAND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL
PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
In the instant case, respondent misrepresented himself as an
immigration lawyer, which resulted to complainant seeking his

assistance to facilitate the issuance of her US visa and paying

him the amount of P350,000.00 as downpayment for his legal
services. In truth, however, respondent has no specialization in
immigration law but merely had a contact allegedly with
Pineda, a purported US consul, who supposedly processes US
visa applications for him. However, respondent failed to prove
Pinedas identity considering that the photographs and e-mails
he submitted were all self-serving and thus, as correctly
observed by the Investigating Commissioner, bereft of any
probative value and consequently cannot be given any
credence. Undoubtedly, respondents deception is not only
unacceptable, disgraceful, and dishonorable to the legal
profession; it reveals a basic moral flaw that makes him unfit
to practice law.15
Corollary to such deception, respondent likewise failed to
perform his obligations under the Contract, which is to
facilitate and secure the issuance of a US visa in favor of
complainant. This constitutes a flagrant violation of Rule
18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR, to wit:
CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT
WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE. Rule 18.03 A
lawyer shall not neglecta legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
Under Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR, once a lawyer takes
up the cause of his client, he is duty-bound to serve the latter
with competence, and to attend to such clients cause with
diligence, care, and devotion whether he accepts it for a fee or
for free. He owes fidelity to such cause and must always be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed upon
him.16 Therefore, a lawyers neglect of a legal matter entrusted
to him by his client constitutes inexcusable negligence for
which he must be held administratively liable,17 as in this case.
Furthermore, respondent violated Rules 16.01 and 16.03,
Canon 16 of the CPR when he failed to refund the amount
of P350,000.00 that complainant paid him, viz.:
CANON 16 A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL
MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENTTHAT MAY
COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or property
collected or received for or from the client.
xxxx
Rule 16.03 A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of
his client when due or upon demand. x x x.
Verily, the relationship between a lawyer and his client is
highly fiduciary and prescribes on a lawyer a great fidelity and
good faith.18 The highly fiduciary nature of this relationship
imposes upon the lawyer the duty to account for the money or
property collected or received for or from his client.19 Thus, a
lawyers failure to return upon demand the funds held by him
on behalf of his client, as in this case, gives rise to the
presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use
in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such act
is a gross violation of general morality as well as of
professional ethics.20

Anent the proper penalty for respondents acts, jurisprudence

provides that in similar cases where lawyers neglected their
clients affairs and, at the same time, failed to return the
latters money and/or property despite demand, the Court
imposed upon them the penalty of suspension from the
practice of law. In Segovia-Ribaya v. Lawsin,21 the Court
suspended the lawyer for a period of one (1) year for his
failure to perform his undertaking under his retainership
agreement with his client and to return the money given to him
by the latter. Also, in Jinon v. Jiz,22 the Court suspended the
lawyer for a period of two (2) years for his failure to return the
amount his client gave him for his legal services which he
never performed. In this case, not only did respondent fail to
facilitate the issuance of complainants US visa and return her
money, he likewise committed deceitful acts in
misrepresenting himself as an immigration lawyer, resulting in
undue prejudice to his client. Under these circumstances, a
graver penalty should be imposed upon him. In view of the
foregoing, the Court deems it appropriate to increase the
period of suspension from the practice of law of respondent
from six (6) months, as recommended by the IBP, to two (2)
years.
Finally, the Court sustains the IBP's recommendation ordering
respondent to return the amount of P350,000.00 he received
from complainant as downpayment. It is well to note that
"while the Court has previously held that disciplinary
proceedings should only revolve around the determination of
the respondent-lawyer's administrative and not his civil
liability, it must be clarified that this rule remains applicable
only to claimed liabilities which are purely civil in nature - for
instance, when the claim involves moneys received by the
lawyer from his client in a transaction separate and distinct
[from] and not intrinsically linked to his professional
engagement."23 Hence, since respondent received the aforesaid
amount as part of his legal fees, the Court finds the return
thereof to be in order.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Luis P. Rivera (respondent)
is found guilty of violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, Rules 16.01
and 16.03 of Canon 16, and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2)
years, effective upon the finality of this Decision, with a stem
warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be
dealt with more severely.1wphi1
Furthermore, respondent is ORDERED to return to
complainant Chamelyn A. Agot the legal fees he received
from the latter in the amount of P350,000.00 within ninety
(90) days from the finality of this Decision. Failure to comply
with the foregoing directive will warrant the imposition of a
more severe penalty.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent's record
in this Court as attorney. Further, let copies of this Decision be
furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the
Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to
circulate them to all the courts in the country for their
information and guidance.
A.C. No. 8313

July 14, 2015

PILAR IBANA-ANDRADE and CLARE SINFOROSA

ANDRADE-CASILIHAN, Complainants,

vs.
ATTY. EVA PAITA-MOYA, Respondent.
SERENO, CJ:
This is an administrative case filed against Atty. Eva PaitaMoya by Pilar Ibana-Andrade and Clare Sinforosa AndradeCasilihan. On 7 December 2009, this Court, through the First
Division, issued a Resolution1 referring the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation or decision within ninety (90)
days from the receipt of records.
After the proceedings, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
transmitted to the Supreme Court on 18 November 2013 its
Notice of Resolution,2 alongside the Records of the case. The
IBP Board of Governors also passed a Resolution3 on 13
February 2013 adopting and approving the Report and
Recommendation4 of the Investigating Commissioner for this
case.
The Report and Recommendation summarizes the facts of this
case as follows:
Here is complainants version. On October 3, 2007,
complainant Pilar Andrade, stockholder and Treasurer of
Mabini College Inc. filed Civil Case No. 7617 for Injunction,
Mandamus and Damages before the Regional Trial Court of
Daet, Camarines Norte when she was illegally suspended by
Luz Ibana-Garcia, Marcel Lukban and respondent Atty. Eva
Paita-Moya. In the said case then pending before the
Honorable Executive Judge Arniel Dating, respondent Atty.
Eva Paita-Moya appeared as counsel for all respondents.
Complainant Clare Sinforosa I. Andrade-Casilihan likewise
filed an illegal dismissal case against Mabini College Inc. and
now pending before the Honorable Court of Appeals. In the
said labor case, respondent stood as counsel for Mabini
College, Inc. and co-respondent Luz I. Garcia and Marcel
Lukban.
In another illegal dismissal case filed by Alven Bernardo I.
Andrade on September 28, 2005 currently pending before the
Court of Appeals, respondent acted as counsel for Mabini
College, Inc. Luz I. Garcia and Marcel Lukban.
After the aforementioned cases were filed, complainants had
found out that on June 27, 2008, the Honorable Supreme
Court promulgated a resolution in the case entitled Wilson
Cham versus Atty. Eva Paita-Moya docketed as A.C. No. 7484
suspending respondent from the practice of law for one month.
Complainants were surprised. They later got a copy of the
Office of the Bar Confidants certification confirming that
until date (apparently May 6, 2009, the dare [sic] OR No.
0304748 was issued) respondents suspension order has not
yet been lifted.
On June 2, 2009, complainants were able to obtain a copy of
the Supreme Court Circular No. 51-2009 informing all courts
that respondent was suspended from the practice of law for
one month and said suspension was received by respondent on
June 15, 2008.

However, despite of the subject June 27, 2009 Resolution on

July 15, 2008 and despite knowledge of her suspension from
the practice of law, the said resolution having been further
posted in the website of the Supreme Court and is available in
CD Asias Lex Libris, respondent continued to practice law in
wilful disobedience of the Supreme Courts suspension order
in A.C. No. 7494.
In fact from June 27, 2008 until May 2009, respondent filed
the following papers and pleadings as counsel in Civil Case
No. 7617, to wit:
Comment to Motion for Voluntary Inhibition dated July 15,
2008.
Motion to Admit Answer which was undated but submitted on
November 12, 2008.
An undated Comments/Opposition to the Petitioners Formal
Offer of Evidence in Support of the Application for Writ of
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction which was received by
petitioners counsel on November 26, 2008.Motion to Admit
Amended Motion for Reconsideration dated February 9, 2009
which was received by petitioners counsel on February 12,
2009.
Motion for Reconsideration dated January 23, 2009.
Motion to File Position Paper dated April 13, 2009; and
Pre-Trial Brief for Respondents dated May 13, 2009.
Also in connection with complainant Casahilans Petition for
Certiorari with the Court of Appeals, respondent never
withdrew her appearance. The same is true in the case of
Alven Bernardo Andrade. Respondent never withdrew her
appearance therein.
Likewise and notwithstanding such suspension, respondent
continued to practice law and respondent clients in other cases
before the four (4) branches of the Regional Trial Court in
Daet, Camarines Norte. Supporting this truthful assertion are
the following:
CERTIFICATION dated May 29, 2009 issued by Atty.
Michael Angelo S. Rieo, Branch Clerk of Court, Branch 38,
Regional Trial Court, Daet, Camarines Norte.
CERTIFICATION dated November 24, 2009 issued by Atty.
Elaine Gay R. Belen, Branch Clerk of Court, Branch 39,
Regional Trial Court, Daet, Camarines Norte.
CERTIFICATION dated November 19, 2009 issued by Mr.
Eddie E. Balonzo, Acting Clerk of Court, Branch 40, Regional
Trial Court, Daet, Camarines Norte; and
CERTIFICATION dated November 5, 2009 issued by Mr.
Chito B. Pacao, OIC/Legal Researcher II, Branch 41, Regional
Trial Court, Daet, Camarines Norte.
And per the November 5, 2009 letter of Atty. Michael
Mortimer G. Pajarillo, Chapter President, Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, Camarines Norte Chapter, Daet, Camarines Norte,
respondent "xxx Atty. Eva Paita-Moya has not complied with

the order of the Supreme Court relative to her suspension from

the practice of law from June 27, 2008 up to the present.5

lifting of an order suspending a lawyer from the practice of

law:

Respondents version, as stated in the Report,6 is that she

started serving the suspension order on 20 May 2009. This
was also her position in her Manifestation and Motion to
Suspend Proceedings7 dated 30 September 2010. She likewise
alleged therein that she had filed with the Supreme Court in
December 2009 an Urgent Motion to Lift Order of Suspension
with the Supreme Court, which was unresolved as of the date
of her Manifestation.8Additionally, she argued that the
resolution of the initial administrative case docketed as A.M.
No. 7464 was material to her position in this particular case.9

1) After a finding that respondent lawyer must be

suspended from the practice of law, the Court shall
render a decision imposing the penalty;

The issue in this case falls solely on the question of whether

Respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law, that
is, the practice of law despite the clear language of this Courts
suspension order.
The Report and Recommendation recommended that
Respondent be found liable. We adopt the same, with
modification.
The suspension order was received by Respondent on July 15,
2008.10 Despite this, she continued to practice law in various
cases, as shown by the pleadings she filed and the
certifications noted by the Report.11 In fact, she continued
receiving various fees for her services throughout the duration
of her suspension.12
It is important to note that her defense consists of an
admission that she was indeed suspended, and allegedly
served her suspension.13 She claimed that she never received
the resolution that had allegedly suspended her.14By logical
inference therefore, her sole defense is ignorance of the
resolution that suspended her.
However, the records of this very Court belie her statements.
Office of the Court Administrator Circular No. 51-2009 stated
the following:
For your information and guidance, quoted hereunder is the
dispositive portion of the Resolution of the Third Division
dated 27 June 2008, in Administrative Case No. 7494 entitled,
"Wilson Cham vs. Atty. Eva Paita-Moya", to wit:
WHEREFORE, Atty. Eva Paita-Moya is found guilty of gross
misconduct and hereby SUSPENDED for one month from the
practice of law, effective upon her receipt of this Decision. She
is warned that a repetition of the same or a similar act will be
dealt with more severely.
On 15 July 2008, Atty. Moya received the said resolution as
per Registry Return Receipt No. 2320. (Emphases supplied)15
Moreover, the Office of the Bar Confidant issued a
Certification dated 8 May 2009 that the suspension of Atty.
Paita-Moya in A.C. No. 7494 had not yet been lifted.16
We had laid down guidelines in Maniago v. De Dios,
IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, it is hereby RESOLVED
that the following guidelines be observed in the matter of the

2) Unless the Court explicitly states that the decision

is immediately executory upon receipt thereof,
respondent has 15 days within which to file a motion
for reconsideration thereof. The denial of said motion
shall render the decision final and executory;
3) Upon the expiration of the period of suspension,
respondent shall file a Sworn Statement with the
Court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant,
stating therein that he or she has desisted from the
practice of law and has not appeared in any court
during the period of his or her suspension;
4) Copies of the Sworn Statement shall be furnished
to the Local Chapter of the IBP and to the Executive
Judge of the courts where respondent has pending
cases handled by him or her, and/or where he or she
has appeared as counsel;
5) The Sworn Statement shall be considered as proof
of respondents compliance with the order of
suspension;
6) Any finding or report contrary to the statements
made by the lawyer under oath shall be a ground for
the imposition of a more severe punishment, or
disbarment, as may be warranted.17
This case is not without precedent.18 Previously, we had
already stated the standard for discipline upon erring lawyers
who continue practicing despite being suspended by the Court,
viz: Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, willful
disobedience to any lawful order of a superior court is a
ground for disbarment or suspension from the practice of law:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme
Court; grounds therefor. A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude,
or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of
any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or
willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for
the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice.
In Molina v. Atty. Magat, this court suspended further Atty.
Ceferino R. Magat from the practice of law for six months for
practicing his profession despite this court's previous order of
suspension.1wphi1 We impose the same penalty on Atty.
Baliga for holding his position as Regional Director despite
lack of authority to practice law.19

The Commissioner recommended the suspension of

respondent from the active practice of law for six ( 6) months
with stem warning that any similar infraction in the future
would be dealt with more severely.20 In light of this and the
jurisprudence already cited, we adopt the recommendation.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, ATTY. EVA PAITAMOYA is found GUILTY of violating Section 27, Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court, and is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for an additional period of six (6) months from
her one (1) month suspension, totaling seven (7) months from
service of this resolution, with a WARNING that a repetition
of the same or similar offense will warrant a more severe
penalty.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, the Office
of the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
for their information and guidance. The Office of the Bar
Confidant is DIRECTED to append a copy of this Decision to
respondent's record as member of the Bar.
Atty. Paita-Moya is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the
date of her receipt of this Decision, to determine the reckoning
point when her suspension shall take effect.
This Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice
THIRD DIVISION
A.C. No. 7593, March 11, 2015
ALVIN S. FELICIANO, Complainant, v. ATTY.
CARMELITA BAUTISTA-LOZADA, Respondents.
PERALTA, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Disbarment1 dated August 2, 2007
filed by Alvin S. Feliciano (complainant) against respondent
Atty. Carmelita Bautista-Lozada (Atty. Lozada) for violation of
Section 27,2 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
The facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
On December 13, 2005, the Court en banc promulgated a
Resolution in A.C. No. 6656 entitled Bobie Rose V. Frias vs.
Atty. Carmencita Bautista Lozada3 suspending Atty. Lozada
for violation of Rules 15.03 and 16.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, the dispositive portion of which
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Carmencita Bautista
Lozada is hereby found guilty of violating Rules 15.03 and
16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and of
willfully disobeying a final and executory decision of the
Court of Appeals. She is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of two (2) years from notice, with
a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar
acts will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished all courts of the
land, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, as well as the
Office of the Bar Confidant, for their information and
guidance, and let it be entered in respondent's personal
records.

SO ORDERED.4
On May 4, 2006, the Court denied with finality Atty. Lozada's
motion for reconsideration.5chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
However, on June 5, 2007, in an action for injunction with
prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or
writ of preliminary injunction docketed as Civil Case no. 101V-07 entitled Edilberto Lozada, et.al. vs. Alvin S. Feliciano,
et al., where complainant was one of the respondents,
complainant lamented that Atty. Lozada appeared as counsel
for the plaintiff and her husband, Edilberto Lozada, and
actively participated in the proceedings of the case before
Branch 75 of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City. To
prove his allegation, complainant submitted certified true
copies of the minutes of the hearings, dated June 12, 2007,
July 3, 2007 and July 6, 2007, wherein Atty. Lozada signed
her name as one of the counsels,6 as well as the transcript of
stenographic notes showing that Atty. Lozada conducted direct
examination and cross-examination of the witnesses during the
trial proceedings.7chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Complainant argued that the act of Atty. Lozada in appearing
as counsel while still suspended from the practice of law
constitutes willfull disobedience to the resolutions of the Court
which suspended her from the practice of law for two (2)
years.
On September 12, 2007, the Court resolved to require Atty.
Lozada to comment on the complaint against
him.8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In her Comment9 dated November 19, 2007, Atty. Lozada
explained that she was forced by circumstances and her desire
to defend the rights of her husband who is embroiled in a legal
dispute. She claimed that she believed in good faith that her
appearance as wife of Edilberto Lozada is not within the
prohibition to practice law, considering that she is defending
her husband and not a client. She insisted that her husband is a
victim of grave injustice, and his reputation and honor are at
stake; thus, she has no choice but to give him legal
assistance.10chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On January 30, 2008, the Court referred the instant case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and
recommendation.11chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In its Report and Recommendation12 dated March 9, 2009, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar
Discipline (IBP-CBD) found Atty. Lozada guilty of violating
Rule 1.01 & 1.02, Rule 18.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the terms of her suspension from the
practice of law as imposed by the Court. Thus, the IBP-CBD
recommended the disbarment of Atty. Lozada.
On May 14, 2011, however, the IBP-Board of Governors
resolved to adopt and approve with modification the report
and recommendation of the IBP-CBD such that it
recommended instead that Atty. Lozada be suspended from the
practice of law for three (3) months.
RULING
We adopt the ruling of the IBP-Board of Governors with
modification.
Indeed, this Court has the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the
practice of law. When this Court orders a lawyer suspended
from the practice of law, as in the instant case, the lawyer must
desist from performing all functions requiring the application
of legal knowledge within the period of
suspension.13chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Suffice it to say that practice of law embraces "any activity, in
or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal

procedure, knowledge, training and experience." It includes

"[performing] acts which are characteristics of the [legal]
profession" or "[rendering any kind of] service [which]
requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or
skill.14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In the instant case, Atty. Lozada's guilt is undisputed. Based on
the records, there is no doubt that Atty. Lozada's actuations,
that is, in appearing and signing as counsel for and in behalf of
her husband, conducting or offering stipulation/admission of
facts, conducting direct and cross-examination, all constitute
practice of law. Furthermore, the findings of the IBP would
disclose that such actuations of Atty. Lozada of actively
engaging in the practice of law in June-July 2007 were done
within the period of her two (2)-year suspension considering
that she was suspended from the practice of law by this Court
in May 4, 2006. It would then appear that, at the very least,
Atty. Lozada cannot practice law from 2006 to 2008. Thus, it
is clear that when Atty. Lozada appeared for and in behalf of
her husband in Civil Case No. 101-V-07 and actively
participated in the proceedings therein in June-July 2007, or
within the two (2)-year suspension, she, therefore, engaged in
the unauthorized practice of law.
Atty. Lozada's defense of good faith fails to convince. She
knew very well that at the time she represented her husband,
she is still serving her two (2)-year suspension order. Yet, she
failed to inform the court about it. Neither did she seek any
clearance or clarification from the Court if she can represent
her husband. While we understand her devotion and desire to
defend her husband whom she believed has suffered grave
injustice, Atty. Lozada should not forget that she is first and
foremost, an officer of the court who is bound to obey the
lawful order of the Court.
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, as
amended, willful disobedience to any lawful order of a
superior court is a ground for disbarment or suspension from
the practice of law:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme
Court; grounds therefor. - A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude,
or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of
any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or
willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at
law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid
agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.15
Atty. Lozada would have deserved a harsher penalty, but this
Court recognizes the fact that it is part of the Filipino culture
that amid an adversity, families will always look out and
extend a helping hand to a family member, more so, in this
case, to a spouse. Thus, considering that Atty. Lozada's
actuation was prompted by her affection to her husband and
that in essence, she was not representing a client but rather a
spouse, we deem it proper to mitigate the severeness of her
penalty.
Following the recent case of Victor C. Lingan v. Atty. Romeo
Calubaquib and Jimmy P. Baliga,16 citing Molina v. Atty.
Magat,17 where this Court suspended further respondents from
the practice of law for six (6) months for practicing their
profession despite this court's previous order of suspension,
we, thus, impose the same penalty on Atty. Lozada for
representing her husband as counsel despite lack of authority
to practice law.
Disbarment of lawyers is a proceeding that aims to purge the
law profession of unworthy members of the bar. It is intended
to preserve the nobility and honor of the legal profession.
While the Supreme Court has the plenary power to discipline

erring lawyers through this kind of proceedings, it does so in

the most vigilant manner so as not to frustrate its preservative
principle. The Court, in the exercise of its sound judicial
discretion, is inclined to impose a less severe punishment if,
through it, the end desire of reforming the errant lawyer is
possible.18chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Atty. Carmelita S.
Bautista-Lozada is found GUILTY of violating Section
27,19 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, and is
hereby SUSPENDED for a period of six (6) months from the
practice of law, with a WARNING that a repetition of the
same or similar offense will warrant a more severe penalty.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, the Office
of the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
for their information and guidance. The Office of the Bar
Confidant is DIRECTED to append a copy of this Decision to
respondents record as member of the Bar.
Atty. Lozada is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of
her receipt of this Decision, so that we can determine the
reckoning point when her suspension shall take effect.
This Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Villarama, Jr., Reyes,
and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.cralawlawlibrary

FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 10628, July 01, 2015
MAXIMINO NOBLE III, Complainant, v. ATTY.
ORLANDO O. AILES, Respondent.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This instant administrative case arose from a verified
Complaint1 for disbarment dated April 16, 2012 filed by
complainant Maximino Noble III (Maximino) against
respondent Atty. Orlando O. Ailes (Orlando) before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
The Facts
Maximino alleged that on August 18, 2010, Orlando, a lawyer,
filed a complaint2 for damages against his own brother,
Marcelo O. Ailes, Jr. (Marcelo), whom Maximino represented,
together with other defendants, therein. In the said complaint,
Orlando stated the following data: "IBP-774058-12/07/09-QC
x x x MCLE Compliance No. II-00086893/Issued on March
10, 2008."4 Maximino claimed that at the time of the filing of
the said complaint, Orlando's IBP O.R. number should have
already reflected payment of his IBP annual dues for the year
2010, not 2009, and that he should have finished his third
Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) Compliance,
not just the second.
Sometime in December 2011, Maximino learned from
Marcelo that the latter had filed a separate case for grave
threats and estafa5 against Orlando. When Maximino was
furnished a copy of the complaint, he discovered that, through
text messages, Orlando had been maligning him and
dissuading Marcelo from retaining his services as counsel,
claiming that he was incompetent and that he charged
exorbitant fees, saying, among others: "x x x Better dismiss
[your] hi-track lawyer who will impoverish [you] with his
unconscionable [professional] fee. Max Noble, as shown in
court records, never appeared even once, that's why you lost in
the pre-trial stage, x x x get rid of [Noble] as [your] lawyer. He

is out to squeeze a lot of money from [you], x x x daig mo nga

mismong abogado mong polpol."6 Records show that Orlando
even prepared a Notice to Terminate Services of Counsel7 in
the complaint for damages, which stated that Maximino "x x x
has never done anything to protect the interests of the
defendants in a manner not befitting his representation as a
seasoned law practitioner and, aside from charging enormous
amount of professional fees and questionable expenses, said
counsel's contracted services reached as far only in preparing
and filing uncalled for motions to dismiss x x x" as well as a
Compromise Agreement,8 both of which he sent to Marcelo
for his signature. Affronted, Maximino filed the instant
complaint charging Orlando with violation of Rule 7.03 of
Canon 7, the entire Canon 8 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR), Bar Matter (BM) Nos. 8509 and 192210,
and prayed for the disbarment of respondent as well as the
award of damages.
In his defense,11 Orlando denied the charges against him and
claimed that his late submission of the third MCLE
compliance is not a ground for disbarment and that the Notice
to Terminate Services of Counsel and Compromise Agreement
were all made upon the request of Marcelo when the latter was
declared in default in the aforementioned civil case. Moreover,
he insisted that the allegedly offensive language in his text
messages sent to Marcelo was used in a "brother-to-brother
communication" and were uttered in good
faith.12ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Meanwhile, the criminal case for grave threats and estafa filed
by Marcelo against Orlando was downgraded to unjust
vexation13 and, on June 19, 2012, after voluntarily entering a
plea of guilty, Orlando was convicted of the crime of unjust
vexation, consisting in his act of vexing or annoying Marcelo
by "texting insulting, threatening and persuading words to
drop his lawyer over a case x x
x."14ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
IBP Report and Recommendation
In a Report and Recommendation15 dated April 30, 2013, the
IBP Commissioner recommended the dismissal of the case
against Orlando, finding that a transgression of the MCLE
compliance requirement is not a ground for disbarment as in
fact, failure to disclose the required information would merely
cause the dismissal of the case and the expunction of the
pleadings from the records. Neither did the IBP Commissioner
find any violation of the CPR so gross or grave as to warrant
any administrative liability on the part of Orlando, considering
that the communication between Orlando and Marcelo, who
are brothers, was done privately and not directly addressed to
Maximino nor intended to be published and known by third
persons.
In a Resolution16 dated May 11, 2013, the IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved the IBP Commissioner's
Report and Recommendation and dismissed the case against
Orlando, warning him to be more circumspect in his dealings.
Maximino moved for reconsideration17 which was however
denied in a Resolution18 dated May 3, 2014 with modification
deleting the warning.
Aggrieved, Maximino filed the present petition for review
on certioranri.19ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The Issue Before the Court
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the IBP
correctly dismissed the complaint against Orlando.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is partly meritorious.
The practice of law is a privilege bestowed on lawyers who

meet high standards of legal proficiency and morality.20 It is a

special privilege burdened with conditions before the legal
profession, the courts, their clients and the society such that a
lawyer has the duty to comport himself in a manner as to
uphold integrity and promote the public's faith in the
profession.21 Consequently, a lawyer must at all times,
whether in public or private life, act in a manner beyond
reproach especially when dealing with fellow
lawyers.22ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In this relation, Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 as well as Canon 8 of
the CPR provides:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he,
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Canon 8 A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy,
fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues, and
shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings,
use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise
improper.
Rule 8.02 - A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach
upon the professional employment of another lawyer;
however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to
give proper advice and assistance to those seeking relief
against unfaithful or neglectful counsel.
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Though a lawyer's language may be forceful and emphatic, it
should always be dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity
of the legal profession. The use of intemperate language and
unkind ascriptions has no place in the dignity of the judicial
forum.23 In Buatis Jr. v. People,24 the Court treated a lawyer's
use of the words "lousy," "inutile," "carabao English,"
"stupidity," and "satan" in a letter addressed to another
colleague as defamatory and injurious which effectively
maligned his integrity. Similarly, the hurling of insulting
language to describe the opposing counsel is considered
conduct unbecoming of the legal
profession.25ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In this case, the IBP found the text messages that Orlando sent
to his brother Marcelo as casual communications considering
that they were conveyed privately. To the Court's mind,
however, the tenor of the messages cannot be treated lightly.
The text messages were clearly intended to malign and annoy
Maximino, as evident from the use of the word "polpol"
(stupid). Likewise, Orlando's insistence that Marcelo
immediately terminate the services of Maximino indicates
Orlando's offensive conduct against his colleague, in violation
of the above-quoted rules. Moreover, Orlando's voluntary plea
of guilty to the crime of unjust vexation in the criminal case
filed against him by Marcelo was, for all intents and purposes,
an admission that he spoke ill, insulted, and disrespected
Maximino - a departure from the judicial decorum which
exposes the lawyer to administrative liability.
On this score, it must be emphasized that membership in the
bar is a privilege burdened with conditions such that a lawyer's
words and actions directly affect the public's opinion of the
legal profession. Lawyers are expected to observe such
conduct of nobility and uprightness which should remain with
them, whether in their public or private lives, and may be
disciplined in the event their conduct falls short of the
standards imposed upon them.26 Thus, in this case, it is
inconsequential that the statements were merely relayed to
Orlando's brother in private. As a member of the bar, Orlando
should have been more circumspect in his words, being fully
aware that they pertain to another lawyer to whom fairness as
well as candor is owed. It was highly improper for Orlando to
interfere and insult Maximino to his client.

Indulging in offensive personalities in the course of judicial

proceedings, as in this case, constitutes unprofessional conduct
which subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.27 While a
lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage,
such enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and
abusive language.28 The Court has consistently reminded the
members of the bar to abstain from all offensive personality
and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor and reputation
of a party. Considering the circumstances, it is glaringly clear
how Orlando transgressed the CPR when he maligned
Maximino to his client.29ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
With regard to Orlando's alleged violation of BM No. 1922,
the Court agrees with the IBP that his failure to disclose the
required information for MCLE compliance in the complaint
for damages he had filed against his brother Marcelo is not a
ground for disbarment. At most, his violation shall only be
cause for the dismissal of the complaint as well as the
expunction thereof from the
records.30ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Orlando O.
Ailes GUILTY of violating Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 as well as
the entire Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
He is hereby ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in
dealing with his professional colleagues and STERNLY
WARNED that a commission of the same or similar acts in
the future shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
Sereno, C.J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin,
and Perez, JJ., concur.chanrobleslaw
LINCO VS LACEBAL

Toledo was not only violative of her and her children's rights
but also in violation of the law. Respondent's lack of honesty
and candor is unbecoming of a member of the Philippine Bar.
In his Answer,6 respondent admitted having notarized and
acknowledged a deed of donation executed by the donor,
Atty. Linco, in favor of his son, Alexander David T. Linco, as
represented by Lina P. Toledo.
Respondent narrated that on July 8, 2003, he was invited by
Atty. Linco, through an emissary in the person of Claire JueleAlgodon (Algodon), to see him at his residence located
at Guenventille II D-31-B, Libertad Street, Mandaluyong City.
Respondent was then informed that Atty. Linco was sick and
wanted to discuss something with him.
Respondent pointed out that Atty. Linco appeared to be
physically weak and sickly, but was articulate and in full
control of his faculties. Atty. Linco showed him a deed of
donation and the TCT of the property subject of the donation.
Respondent claimed that Atty. Linco asked him a favor of
notarizing the deed of donation in his presence along with the
witnesses.
However, respondent explained that since he had no idea that
he would be notarizing a document, he did not bring
his notarial book and seal with him. Thus, he instead
told Algodonand Toledo to bring to his office the signed deed
of donation anytime at their convenience so that he could
formally notarize and acknowledge the same.
On July 30, 2003, respondent claimed that Toledo
and Algodon went to his law office and informed him that
Atty. Linco had passed away on July 29, 2003. Respondent
was then asked to notarize the deed of donation. Respondent
admitted to have consented as he found it to be his
commitment to a fellow lawyer. Thus, he notarized the subject
deed of donation, which was actually signed in his presence on
July 8, 2003.

DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
The instant case stemmed from an Administrative
Complaint1 dated June 6, 2005 filed by
Atty. Florita S. Linco (complainant) before the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) against Atty. Jimmy D. Lacebal for
disciplinary action for his failure to perform his duty as a
notary public, which resulted in the violation of their rights
over their property.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Complainant claimed that she is the widow of the late Atty.
Alberto Linco (Atty. Linco), the registered owner of a parcel
of land with improvements, consisting of 126 square meters,
located at No. 8, Macopa St., Phase I-A, B, C & D, Valley
View Executive Village, Cainta, Rizal and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 259001.
Complainant alleged that Atty. Jimmy
D. Lacebal (respondent), a notary public
for Mandaluyong City, notarized a deed of donation2 allegedly
executed by her husband in favor of Alexander David
T. Linco, a minor. The notarial acknowledgment thereof also
stated that Atty. Linco and Lina P. Toledo (Toledo), mother of
the donee, allegedly personally appeared before respondent on
July 30, 2003, despite the fact that complainants husband died
on July 29, 2003.3
Consequently, by virtue of the purported deed of donation, the
Register of Deeds of Antipolo City cancelled TCT No. 259001
on March 28, 20054 and issued a new TCT No. 292515 in the
name of Alexander David T. Linco.
Aggrieved, complainant filed the instant complaint. She
claimed that respondent's reprehensible act in connivance with

During the mandatory conference/hearing on September 7,

2005, it was established that indeed the deed of donation was
presented to respondent on July 8, 2003.7 Respondent,
likewise, admitted that while he was not the one who prepared
the deed of donation, he, however, performed the notarization
of the deed of donation only on July 30, 2003, a day after
Atty. Linco died.8
On November 23, 2005, in its Report and
Recommendation,9 the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline
(IBP-CBD) found respondent guilty of violating
the Notarial Law and the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The IBP-CBD observed that respondent wanted it to appear
that because the donor appeared before him and signed the
deed of donation on July 8, 2003, it was just ministerial duty
on his part to notarize the deed of donation on July 30, 2003, a
day after Atty. Linco died. The IBP-CBD pointed out that
respondent should know that the parties who signed the deed
of donation on July 8, 2003, binds only the signatories to the
deed and it was not yet a public instrument. Moreover, since
the deed of donation was notarized only on July 30, 2003, a
day after Atty. Linco died, the acknowledgement portion of the
said deed of donation where respondent acknowledged that
Atty. Linco personally came and appeared before me is false.
This act of respondent is also violative of the Attorney's Oath
to obey the laws and do no falsehood.
The IBP-CBD, thus, recommended that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1)
year, and that his notarial commission be revoked and he be
disqualified from re-appointment as notary public for a period
of two (2) years.

On April 27, 2006, in Resolution No. XVII-2006-215,10 the

IBP-Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve the
report and recommendation of the IBP-CBD.

is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts,
administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to
rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public
and appended to a private instrument.16

Respondent moved for reconsideration, but was denied.11

On July 29, 2009, considering respondent's petition for review
dated May 19, 2009 of IBP Resolution No. XVII-2006-215
dated April 27, 2006 and IBP Resolution No. XVIII-2008-678
dated December 11, 2008, denying complainant's motion for
reconsideration and affirming the assailed resolution, the
Court resolved to require complainant to file her comment.12
In her Compliance,13 complainant maintained that respondent
has not stated anything new in his motion for reconsideration
that would warrant the reversal of the recommendation of the
IBP. She maintained that respondent violated the Notarial Law
and is unfit to continue being commissioned as notary public;
thus, should be sanctioned for his infractions.
On August 16, 2011, in view of the denial of
respondent's motion for reconsideration, the Office of the Bar
Confidant, Supreme Court, recommended that the instant
complaint is now ripe for judicial adjudication.
RULING
The findings and recommendations of the IBP are well taken.
There is no question as to respondent's guilt. The records
sufficiently established that Atty. Linco was already dead
when respondent notarized the deed of donation on July 30,
2003. Respondent likewise admitted that he knew that
Atty. Linco died a day before he notarized the deed of
donation. We take note that respondent notarized the document
after the lapse of more than 20 days from July 8, 2003, when
he was allegedly asked to notarize the deed of donation. The
sufficient lapse of time from the time he last saw
Atty. Linco should have put him on guard and deterred him
from proceeding with the notarization of the deed of donation.
However, respondent chose to ignore the basics
of notarial procedure in order to accommodate the alleged
need of a colleague. The fact that respondent previously
appeared before him in person does not justify his act of
notarizing the deed of donation, considering the affiant's
absence on the very day the document was notarized. In
the notarial acknowledgment of the deed of donation,
respondent attested that Atty. Linco personally came and
appeared before him on July 30, 2003. Yet obviously,
Atty. Linco could not have appeared before him on July 30,
2003, because the latter died on July 29, 2003. Clearly,
respondent made a false statement and violated Rule 10.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility and his oath as a
lawyer.
We will reiterate that faithful observance and utmost respect of
the legal solemnity of the oath in an acknowledgment
or jurat is sacrosanct.14 Respondent should not notarize a
document unless the persons who signed the same are the very
same persons who executed and personally appeared before
him to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated
therein.15
Time and again, we have repeatedly reminded notaries public
of the importance attached to the act of notarization.
Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is
invested with substantive public interest, such that only those
who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public.
Notarization converts a private document into a public
document; thus, making that document admissible in evidence
without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document

For this reason, notaries public must observe with utmost care
the basic requirements in the performance of their duties.
Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of this
form of conveyance would be undermined.17 Hence, again, a
notary public should not notarize a document unless the
persons who signed the same are the very same persons who
executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the
contents and truth of what are stated therein.
This responsibility is more pronounced when the notary public
is a lawyer. A graver responsibility is placed upon him by
reason of his solemn oath to obey the laws and to do no
falsehood or consent to the doing of any. He is mandated to
the sacred duties appertaining to his office, such duties, being
dictated by public policy and impressed with public
interest.18Respondent's failure to perform his duty as a notary
public resulted not only in damaging complainant's rights over
the property subject of the donation but also in undermining
the integrity of a notary public. He should, therefore, be held
liable for his acts, not only as a notary public but also as a
lawyer.
In Lanuzo v. Atty. Bongon,19 respondent having failed to
discharge his duties as a notary public, the revocation of
his notarial commission,
disqualification
from
being
commissioned as a notary public for a period of two years and
suspension from the practice of law for one year were
imposed. We deem it proper to impose the same penalty.
WHEREFORE, for breach of the Notarial Law and Code of
Professional Responsibility, the notarial commission of
respondent ATTY. JIMMY D. LACEBAL, is REVOKED.
He is DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as Notary Public
for a period of two years. He is also SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of one year, effective immediately.
He is further WARNED that a repetition of the same or
similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. He
is DIRECTED to report the date of receipt of this Decision in
order to determine when his suspension shall take effect.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts
all over the country. Let a copy of this Decision likewise be
attached to the personal records of the respondent.
SO ORDERED.DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

A.C. No. 6622

July 10, 2012

MIGUEL G. VILLATUYA, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. BEDE S. TABALINGCOS, Respondent.
PER CURIAM:
In this Complaint for disbarment filed on 06 December 2004
with the Office or the Bar Confidant, complainant Manuel G.
Villatuya (complainant) charges Atty. Bcde S. 'L1halingcos
(resrondent) with unlawful solicitation of cases, violation of
the ('ode or Professional Responsibility for nonpayment of
fees to complainant, and gross immorality for marrying two
other women while respondents first marriage was
subsisting.1

In a Resolution2 dated 26 January 2005, the Second Division

of this Court required respondent to file a Comment, which he
did on 21 March 2005.3 The Complaint was referred to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation within sixty (60) days from
receipt of the record.4
On 23 June 2005, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
IBP (Commission) issued a Notice5 setting the mandatory
conference of the administrative case on 05 July 2005. During
the conference, complainant appeared, accompanied by his
counsel and respondent. They submitted for resolution three
issues to be resolved by the Commission as follows:
1. Whether respondent violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility by nonpayment of fees to
complainant
2. Whether respondent violated the rule against
unlawful solicitation, and
3. Whether respondent is guilty of gross immoral
conduct for having married thrice.6
The Commission ordered the parties to submit their respective
verified Position Papers. Respondent filed his verified Position
Paper,7 on 15 July 2005 while complainant submitted his on
01 August 2005.8
Complainants Accusations
Complainant averred that on February 2002, he was employed
by respondent as a financial consultant to assist the latter on
technical and financial matters in the latters numerous
petitions for corporate rehabilitation filed with different courts.
Complainant claimed that they had a verbal agreement
whereby he would be entitled to P 50,000 for every Stay Order
issued by the court in the cases they would handle, in addition
to ten percent (10%) of the fees paid by their clients. He
alleged that, from February to December 2002, respondent
was able to rake in millions of pesos from the corporate
rehabilitation cases they were working on together.
Complainant also claimed that he was entitled to the amount
of P 900,000 for the 18 Stay Orders issued by the courts as a
result of his work with respondent, and a total of P 4,539,000
from the fees paid by their clients.9 Complainant appended to
his Complaint several annexes supporting the computation of
the fees he believes are due him.
Complainant alleged that respondent engaged in unlawful
solicitation of cases in violation of Section 27 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Allegedly respondent set up two
financial consultancy firms, Jesi and Jane Management, Inc.
and Christmel Business Link, Inc., and used them as fronts to
advertise his legal services and solicit cases. Complainant
supported his allegations by attaching to his Position Paper the
Articles of Incorporation of Jesi and Jane,10 letter-proposals to
clients signed by respondent on various dates11 and proofs of
payment made to the latter by their clients.12
On the third charge of gross immorality, complainant accused
respondent of committing two counts of bigamy for having
married two other women while his first marriage was
subsisting. He submitted a Certification dated 13 July 2005
issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar General-National

Statistics Office (NSO) certifying that Bede S. Tabalingcos,

herein respondent, contracted marriage thrice: first, on 15 July
1980 with Pilar M. Lozano, which took place in Dasmarinas,
Cavite; the second time on 28 September 1987 with Ma.
Rowena Garcia Pion in the City of Manila; and the third on
07 September 1989 with Mary Jane Elgincolin Paraiso in
Ermita, Manila.13
Respondents Defense
In his defense, respondent denied the charges against him. He
asserted that complainant was not an employee of his law firm
Tabalingcos and Associates Law Office14 but of Jesi and
Jane Management, Inc., where the former is a major
stockholder.15 Respondent alleged that complainant was
unprofessional and incompetent in performing his job as a
financial consultant, resulting in the latters dismissal of many
rehabilitation plans they presented in their court
cases.16 Respondent also alleged that there was no verbal
agreement between them regarding the payment of fees and
the sharing of professional fees paid by his clients. He
proffered documents showing that the salary of complainant
had been paid.17
As to the charge of unlawful solicitation, respondent denied
committing any. He contended that his law firm had an
agreement with Jesi and Jane Management, Inc., whereby the
firm would handle the legal aspect of the corporate
rehabilitation case; and that the latter would attend to the
financial aspect of the case such as the preparation of the
rehabilitation plans to be presented in court. To support this
contention, respondent attached to his Position Paper a Joint
Venture Agreement dated 10 December 2005 entered into by
Tabalingcos and Associates Law Offices and Jesi and Jane
Management, Inc.;18 and an Affidavit executed by Leoncio
Balena, Vice-President for Operations of the said company.19
On the charge of gross immorality, respondent assailed the
Affidavit submitted by William Genesis, a dismissed
messenger of Jesi and Jane Management, Inc., as having no
probative value, since it had been retracted by the affiant
himself.20 Respondent did not specifically address the
allegations regarding his alleged bigamous marriages with two
other women.
On 09 January 2006, complainant filed a Motion to Admit
Copies of 3 Marriage Contracts.21 To the said Motion, he
attached the certified true copies of the Marriage Contracts
referred to in the Certification issued by the NSO.22 The
appended Marriage Contracts matched the dates, places and
names of the contracting parties indicated in the earlier
submitted NSO Certification of the three marriages entered
into by respondent. The first marriage contract submitted was
a marriage that took place between respondent and Pilar M.
Lozano in Dasmarinas, Cavite, on 15 July 1980.23 The second
marriage contract was between respondent and Ma. Rowena
G. Pion, and it took place at the Metropolitan Trial Court
Compound of Manila on 28 September 1987.24 The third
Marriage Contract referred to a marriage between respondent
and Mary Jane E. Paraiso, and it took place on 7 September
1989 in Ermita, Manila. In the second and third Marriage
Contracts, respondent was described as single under the entry
for civil status.

On 16 January 2006, respondent submitted his Opposition to

the Motion to Admit filed by complainant, claiming that the
document was not marked during the mandatory conference or
submitted during the hearing of the case.25 Thus, respondent
was supposedly deprived of the opportunity to controvert
those documents.26 He disclosed that criminal cases for
bigamy were filed against him by the complainant before the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila. Respondent further
informed the Commission that he had filed a Petition to
Declare Null and Void the Marriage Contract with Rowena
Pion at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bian, Laguna,
where it was docketed as Civil Case No. B-3270.27 He also
filed another Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
Contract with Pilar Lozano at the RTC-Calamba, where it was
docketed as Civil Case No. B-3271.28 In both petitions, he
claimed that he had recently discovered that there were
Marriage Contracts in the records of the NSO bearing his
name and allegedly executed with Rowena Pion and Pilar
Lozano on different occasions. He prayed for their annulment,
because they were purportedly null and void.
On 17 September 2007, in view of its reorganization, the
Commission scheduled a clarificatory hearing on 20
November 2007.29 While complainant manifested to the
Commission that he would not attend the hearing,30respondent
manifested his willingness to attend and moved for the
suspension of the resolution of the administrative case against
the latter. Respondent cited two Petitions he had filed with the
RTC, Laguna, seeking the nullification of the Marriage
Contracts he discovered to be bearing his name.31
On 10 November 2007, complainant submitted to the
Commission duplicate original copies of two (2) Informations
filed with the RTC of Manila against respondent, entitled
"People of the Philippines vs. Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos."32The
first criminal case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 07-257125,
was for bigamy for the marriage contracted by respondent
with Ma. Rowena Garcia Pion while his marriage with Pilar
Lozano was still valid.33 The other one, docketed as Criminal
Case No. 07-257126, charged respondent with having
committed bigamy for contracting marriage with Mary Jane
Elgincolin Paraiso while his marriage with Pilar Lozano was
still subsisting.34 Each of the Informations recommended bail
in the amount of P24,000 for his provisional liberty as accused
in the criminal cases.35
On 20 November 2007, only respondent attended the
clarificatory hearing. In the same proceeding, the Commission
denied his Motion to suspend the proceedings pending the
outcome of the petitions for nullification he had filed with the
RTCLaguna. Thus, the Commission resolved that the
administrative case against him be submitted for resolution.36
IBPs Report and Recommendation
On 27 February 2008, the Commission promulgated its Report
and
Recommendation addressing the specific charges against
respondent.37 The first charge, for dishonesty for the
nonpayment of certain shares in the fees, was dismissed for
lack of merit. The Commission ruled that the charge should
have been filed with the proper courts since it was only
empowered to determine respondents administrative liability.
On this matter, complainant failed to prove dishonesty on the

part of respondent.38 On the second charge, the Commission

found respondent to have violated the rule on the solicitation
of client for having advertised his legal services and
unlawfully solicited cases. It recommended that he be
reprimanded for the violation. It failed, though, to point out
exactly the specific provision he violated.39
As for the third charge, the Commission found respondent to
be guilty of gross immorality for violating Rules 1.01 and 7.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 27 of
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. It found that complainant was
able to prove through documentary evidence that respondent
committed bigamy twice by marrying two other women while
the latters first marriage was subsisting.40 Due to the gravity
of the acts of respondent, the Commission recommended that
he be disbarred, and that his name be stricken off the roll of
attorneys.41
On 15 April 2008, the IBP Board of Governors, through its
Resolution No. XVIII-2008-154, adopted and approved the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner.42 On 01 August 2008, respondent filed a
Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that the recommendation
to disbar him was premature. He contends that the
Commission should have suspended the disbarment
proceedings pending the resolution of the separate cases he
had filed for the annulment of the marriage contracts bearing
his name as having entered into those contracts with other
women. He further contends that the evidence proffered by
complainant to establish that the latter committed bigamy was
not substantial to merit the punishment of disbarment. Thus,
respondent moved for the reconsideration of the resolution to
disbar him and likewise moved to archive the administrative
proceedings pending the outcome of the Petitions he
separately filed with the RTC of Laguna for the annulment of
Marriage Contracts.43
On 26 June 2011, the IBP Board of Governors denied the
Motions for Reconsideration and affirmed their Resolution
dated 15 April 2008 recommending respondents disbarment.44
The Courts Ruling
The Court affirms the recommendations of the IBP.
First Charge:
Dishonesty for nonpayment of share in the fees
While we affirm the IBPs dismissal of the first charge against
respondent, we do not concur with the rationale behind it.
The first charge of complainant against respondent for the
nonpayment of the formers share in the fees, if proven to be
true is based on an agreement that is violative of Rule 9.0245 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. A lawyer is
proscribed by the Code to divide or agree to divide the fees for
legal services rendered with a person not licensed to practice
law. Based on the allegations, respondent had agreed to share
with complainant the legal fees paid by clients that
complainant solicited for the respondent. Complainant,
however, failed to proffer convincing evidence to prove the
existence of that agreement.

We ruled in Tan Tek Beng v. David46 that an agreement

between a lawyer and a layperson to share the fees collected
from clients secured by the layperson is null and void, and that
the lawyer involved may be disciplined for unethical conduct.
Considering that complainants allegations in this case had not
been proven, the IBP correctly dismissed the charge against
respondent on this matter.

Considering, however, that complainant has not proven the

degree of prevalence of this practice by respondent, we affirm
the recommendation to reprimand the latter for violating Rules
2.03 and 15.08 of the Code.
Third Charge:
Bigamy

Second Charge:
Unlawful solicitation of clients
Complainant charged respondent with unlawfully soliciting
clients and advertising legal services through various business
entities. Complainant submitted documentary evidence to
prove that Jesi & Jane Management Inc. and Christmel
Business Link, Inc. were owned and used as fronts by
respondent to advertise the latters legal services and to solicit
clients. In its Report, the IBP established the truth of these
allegations and ruled that respondent had violated the rule on
the solicitation of clients, but it failed to point out the specific
provision that was breached.
A review of the records reveals that respondent indeed used
the business entities mentioned in the report to solicit clients
and to advertise his legal services, purporting to be specialized
in corporate rehabilitation cases. Based on the facts of the
case, he violated Rule 2.0347 of the Code, which prohibits
lawyers from soliciting cases for the purpose of profit.
A lawyer is not prohibited from engaging in business or other
lawful occupation. Impropriety arises, though, when the
business is of such a nature or is conducted in such a manner
as to be inconsistent with the lawyers duties as a member of
the bar. This inconsistency arises when the business is one that
can readily lend itself to the procurement of professional
employment for the lawyer; or that can be used as a cloak for
indirect solicitation on the lawyers behalf; or is of a nature
that, if handled by a lawyer, would be regarded as the practice
of law.48
It is clear from the documentary evidence submitted by
complainant that Jesi & Jane Management, Inc., which
purports to be a financial and legal consultant, was indeed a
vehicle used by respondent as a means to procure professional
employment; specifically for corporate rehabilitation cases.
Annex "C"49 of the Complaint is a letterhead of Jesi & Jane
Management, Inc., which proposed an agreement for the
engagement of legal services. The letter clearly states that,
should the prospective client agree to the proposed fees,
respondent would render legal services related to the formers
loan obligation with a bank. This circumvention is considered
objectionable and violates the Code, because the letter is
signed by respondent as President of Jesi & Jane Management,
Inc., and not as partner or associate of a law firm.

The third charge that respondent committed bigamy twice is a

serious accusation. To substantiate this allegation, complainant
submitted NSO-certified copies of the Marriage Contracts
entered into by respondent with three (3) different women.
The latter objected to the introduction of these documents,
claiming that they were submitted after the administrative case
had been submitted for resolution, thus giving him no
opportunity to controvert them.52 We are not persuaded by his
argument.
We have consistently held that a disbarment case is sui
generis. Its focus is on the qualification and fitness of a lawyer
to continue membership in the bar and not the procedural
technicalities in filing the case. Thus, we explained in Garrido
v. Garrido:53
Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure such
as the verification of pleadings and prejudicial questions, or in
this case, prescription of offenses or the filing of affidavits of
desistance by the complainant do not apply in the
determination of a lawyer's qualifications and fitness for
membership in the Bar. We have so ruled in the past and we
see no reason to depart from this ruling. First, admission to the
practice of law is a component of the administration of justice
and is a matter of public interest because it involves service to
the public. The admission qualifications are also qualifications
for the continued enjoyment of the privilege to practice law.
Second, lack of qualifications or the violation of the standards
for the practice of law, like criminal cases, is a matter of
public concern that the State may inquire into through this
Court.
In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the
complainant.1wphi1 For the court to exercise its disciplinary
powers, the case against the respondent must be established by
convincing and satisfactory proof.54In this case, complainant
submitted NSO-certified true copies to prove that respondent
entered into two marriages while the latters first marriage was
still subsisting. While respondent denied entering into the
second and the third marriages, he resorted to vague assertions
tantamount to a negative pregnant. He did not dispute the
authenticity of the NSO documents, but denied that he
contracted those two other marriages. He submitted copies of
the two Petitions he had filed separately with the RTC of
Laguna one in Bian and the other in Calamba to declare
the second and the third Marriage Contracts null and void.55
We find him guilty of gross immorality under the Code.

50

Rule 15.08 of the Code mandates that the lawyer is mandated

to inform the client whether the former is acting as a lawyer or
in another capacity. This duty is a must in those occupations
related to the practice of law. The reason is that certain ethical
considerations governing the attorney-client relationship may
be operative in one and not in the other.51 In this case, it is
confusing for the client if it is not clear whether respondent is
offering consultancy or legal services.

We cannot give credence to the defense proffered by

respondent. He has not disputed the authenticity or impugned
the genuineness of the NSO-certified copies of the Marriage
Contracts presented by complainant to prove the formers
marriages to two other women aside from his wife. For
purposes of this disbarment proceeding, these Marriage
Contracts bearing the name of respondent are competent and

convincing evidence proving that he committed bigamy,

which renders him unfit to continue as a member of the bar.
The documents were certified by the NSO, which is the
official repository of civil registry records pertaining to the
birth, marriage and death of a person. Having been issued by a
government agency, the NSO certification is accorded much
evidentiary weight and carries with it a presumption of
regularity. In this case, respondent has not presented any
competent evidence to rebut those documents.
According to the respondent, after the discovery of the second
and the third marriages, he filed civil actions to annul the
Marriage Contracts. We perused the attached Petitions for
Annulment and found that his allegations therein treated the
second and the third marriage contracts as ordinary
agreements, rather than as special contracts contemplated
under the then Civil Code provisions on marriage. He did not
invoke any grounds in the Civil Code provisions on marriage,
prior to its amendment by the Family Code. Respondents
regard for marriage contracts as ordinary agreements indicates
either his wanton disregard of the sanctity of marriage or his
gross ignorance of the law on what course of action to take to
annul a marriage under the old Civil Code provisions.
What has been clearly established here is the fact that
respondent entered into marriage twice while his first marriage
was still subsisting. In Bustamante-Alejandro v.
Alejandro,56 we held thus:
We have in a number of cases disciplined members of the Bar
whom we found guilty of misconduct which demonstrated a
lack of that good moral character required of them not only as
a condition precedent for their admission to the Bar but,
likewise, for their continued membership therein. No
distinction has been made as to whether the misconduct was
committed in the lawyers professional capacity or in his
private life. This is because a lawyer may not divide his
personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere
citizen at another. He is expected to be competent, honorable
and reliable at all times since he who cannot apply and abide
by the laws in his private affairs, can hardly be expected to do
so in his professional dealings nor lead others in doing so.
Professional honesty and honor are not to be expected as the
accompaniment of dishonesty and dishonor in other relations.
The administration of justice, in which the lawyer plays an
important role being an officer of the court, demands a high
degree of intellectual and moral competency on his part so that
the courts and clients may rightly repose confidence in him.
Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of
morality required of him as a member of the bar. He made a
mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect
and dignity.57 His acts of committing bigamy twice constituted
grossly immoral conduct and are grounds for disbarment
under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.58
Thus, we adopt the recommendation of the IBP to disbar
respondent and order that his name be stricken from the Roll
of Attorneys.
WHEREFORE, this Court resolves the following charges
against Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos as follows:
1. The charge of dishonesty is DISMISSED for lack
of merit.

2. Respondent is REPRIMANDED for acts of illegal

advertisement and solicitation.
3. Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos is DISBARRED for
engaging in bigamy, a grossly immoral conduct.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal records
of Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos in the Office of the Bar
Confidant, and another copy furnished to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines.
The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out the name of Bede
S. Tabalingcos from the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.
KELD STEMMERIK VS MAS
Per Curiam:
Complainant Keld Stemmerik is a citizen and resident of
Denmark. In one of his trips to the Philippines, he was
introduced to respondent Atty. Leonuel N. Mas. That was his
misfortune.
In one visit to the Philippines, complainant marveled
at the beauty of the country and expressed his interest in
acquiring real property in the Philippines. He consulted
respondent who advised him that he could legally acquire and
own real property in the Philippines. Respondent even
suggested an 86,998 sq.m. property in Quarry, Agusuin,
Cawag, Subic, Zambales with the assurance that the property
was alienable.
Trusting respondent, complainant agreed to purchase
the property through respondent as his representative or
attorney-in-fact. Complainant also engaged the services of
respondent for the preparation of the necessary documents.
For this purpose, respondent demanded and received
a P400,000 fee.
Confident that respondent would faithfully carry out his task,
complainant returned to Denmark, entrusting the processing of
the necessary paperwork to respondent.
Thereafter, respondent prepared a contract to sell the property
between complainant, represented by respondent, and a certain
Bonifacio de Mesa, the purported owner of the property.
[1]
Subsequently, respondent prepared and notarized a deed of
sale in which de Mesa sold and conveyed the property to a
certain Ailyn Gonzales for P3.8 million.[2]Respondent also
drafted and notarized an agreement between complainant and
Gonzales stating that it was complainant who provided the
funds for the purchase of the property.[3] Complainant then
gave respondent the full amount of the purchase price (P3.8
million) for which respondent issued an acknowledgment
receipt.[4]
After the various contracts and agreements were executed,
complainant tried to get in touch with respondent to inquire
about when the property could be registered in his name.
However, respondent suddenly became scarce and refused to
answer complainants calls and e-mail messages.
When complainant visited the Philippines again in January
2005, he engaged the services of the Jimenez Gonzales
Liwanag Bello Valdez Caluya & Fernandez Law Office to
ascertain the status of the property he supposedly bought. He
was devastated to learn that aliens could not own land under
Philippine laws. Moreover, verification at the Community
Environment & Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources in
Olongapo City revealed that the property was inalienable as it

was situated within the former US Military Reservation. [5] The

CENRO also stated that the property was not subject to
disposition or acquisition under Republic Act No. 141.[6]
Thereafter, complainant, through his attorneys-in-fact,
[7]
exerted diligent efforts to locate respondent for purposes of
holding him accountable for his fraudulent acts. Inquiry with
the Olongapo Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) disclosed that respondent was in arrears in his annual
dues and that he had already abandoned his law office in
Olongapo City.[8] Search of court records of cases handled by
respondent only yielded his abandoned office address in
Olongapo City.
Complainant filed a complaint for disbarment against
respondent in the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the
IBP.[9] He deplored respondents acts of serious misconduct. In
particular, he sought the expulsion of respondent from the
legal profession for gravely misrepresenting that a foreigner
could legally acquire land in the Philippines and for
maliciously absconding with complainants P3.8 million.[10]
Respondent failed to file his answer and position paper despite
service of notice at his last known address. Neither did he
appear in the scheduled mandatory conference. In this
connection, the CBD found that respondent abandoned his law
practice in Olongapo City after his transaction with
complainant and that he did not see it fit to contest the charges
against him.[11]
The CBD ruled that respondent used his position as a lawyer
to mislead complainant on the matter of land ownership by a
foreigner.[12] He even went through the motion of preparing
falsified and fictitious contracts, deeds and agreements. And
for all these shameless acts, he collected P400,000 from
complainant. Worse, he pocketed the P3.8 million and
absconded with it.[13]
The CBD found respondent to be nothing more than
an embezzler who misused his professional status as an
attorney as a tool for deceiving complainant and absconding
with complainants money.[14] Respondent was dishonest and
deceitful. He abused the trust and confidence reposed by
complainant in him. The CBD recommended the disbarment
of respondent.[15]
The Board of Governors of the IBP adopted the findings and
recommendation of the CBD with the modification that
respondent was further required to return the amount of P4.2
million to respondent.[16]
We agree with the IBP.
SUFFICIENCY
OF NOTICE OF
THE
DISBARMENT
PROCEEDING
S
We shall first address a threshold issue: was respondent
properly given notice of the disbarment proceedings against
him? Yes.
The respondent did not file any answer or position
paper, nor did he appear during the scheduled mandatory
conference. Respondent in fact abandoned his last known
address, his law office in Olongapo City, after he committed
the embezzlement.
Respondent should not be allowed to benefit from his
disappearing act. He can neither defeat this Courts jurisdiction
over him as a member of the bar nor evade administrative
liability by the mere ruse of concealing his whereabouts. Thus,

service of the complaint and other orders and processes on

respondents office was sufficient notice to him.
Indeed, since he himself rendered the service of
notice on him impossible, the notice requirement cannot apply
to him and he is thus considered to have waived it. The law
does not require that the impossible be done. Nemo tenetur ad
impossibile.[17] The law obliges no one to perform an
impossibility. Laws and rules must be interpreted in a way that
they are in accordance with logic, common sense, reason and
practicality.[18]
In this connection, lawyers must update their records with the
IBP by informing the IBP National Office or their respective
chapters[19] of any change in office or residential address and
other contact details.[20] In case such change is not duly
updated, service of notice on the office or residential address
appearing in the records of the IBP National Office shall
constitute sufficient notice to a lawyer for purposes of
administrative proceedings against him.
RESPONDENT
S
ADMINISTRAT
IVE
INFRACTIONS
AND HIS LIABI
LITY THEREF
OR
Lawyers, as members of a noble profession, have the
duty to promote respect for the law and uphold the integrity of
the bar. As men and women entrusted with the law, they must
ensure that the law functions to protect liberty and not as an
instrument of oppression or deception.
Respondent has been weighed by the exacting
standards of the legal profession and has been found wanting.
Respondent committed a serious breach of his oath as a
lawyer. He is also guilty of culpable violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, the code of ethics of the legal
profession.
All lawyers take an oath to support the Constitution, to obey
the laws and to do no falsehood. [21] That oath is neither mere
formal ceremony nor hollow words. It is a sacred trust that
should be upheld and kept inviolable at all times.[22]
Lawyers are servants of the law [23] and the law is their
master. They should not simply obey the laws, they should
also inspire respect for and obedience thereto by serving as
exemplars worthy of emulation. Indeed, that is the first precept
of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD
THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE
LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE
RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL
PROCESSES.
Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution provides:
SEC. 7. Save in cases of hereditary
succession, no private lands shall be
transferred or conveyed except to
individuals, corporations, or associations
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the
public domain.
This Court has interpreted this provision, as early as
the 1947 case Krivenko v. Register of Deeds,[24] to mean that
under the Constitution, aliens may not acquire private or

agricultural lands, including residential lands. The provision is

a declaration of imperative constitutional policy.[25]

integrity and dignity of the legal profession, he also betrays

everything that the legal profession stands for.

Respondent, in giving advice that directly

contradicted a fundamental constitutional policy, showed
disrespect for the Constitution and gross ignorance of basic
law. Worse, he prepared spurious documents that he knew
were void and illegal.

It is respondent and his kind that give lawyering a

bad name and make laymen support Dick the Butchers call,
Kill all lawyers![27] A disgrace to their professional brethren,
they must be purged from the bar.

By making it appear that de Mesa undertook to sell

the property to complainant and that de Mesa thereafter sold
the property to Gonzales who made the purchase for and in
behalf of complainant, he falsified public documents and
knowingly violated the Anti-Dummy Law.[26]
Respondents misconduct did not end there. By
advising complainant that a foreigner could legally and validly
acquire real estate in the Philippines and by assuring
complainant that the property was alienable, respondent
deliberately foisted a falsehood on his client. He did not give
due regard to the trust and confidence reposed in him by
complainant. Instead, he deceived complainant and misled him
into parting with P400,000 for services that were both illegal
and unprofessional. Moreover, by pocketing and
misappropriating the P3.8 million given by complainant for
the purchase of the property, respondent committed a
fraudulent act that was criminal in nature.
Respondent spun an intricate web of lies. In the
process, he committed unethical act after unethical act,
wantonly violating laws and professional standards.
For all this, respondent violated not only the lawyers
oath and Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
He also transgressed the following provisions of the Code of
Professional Responsibility:

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Leonuel N. Mas is

hereby DISBARRED. The Clerk of Court is directed to
immediately strike out the name of respondent from the Roll
of Attorneys.
Respondent is hereby ORDERED to return to
complainant Keld Stemmerik the total amount of P4.2 million
with interest at 12% per annum from the date of promulgation
of this resolution until full payment. Respondent is
further DIRECTED to submit to the Court proof of payment
of the amount within ten days from payment.
The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
is ORDERED to locate Atty. Mas and file the appropriate
criminal
charges
against
him. The
NBI
is
further DIRECTED to regularly report the progress of its
action in this case to this Court through the Bar Confidant.
Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Bar
Confidant who shall forthwith record it in the personal file of
respondent, the Court Administrator who shall inform all
courts of the Philippines, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
which shall disseminate copies to all its chapters and members
and all administrative and quasi-judicial agencies of the
Republic of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.

Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in

unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.

A.C 7940: RE:DECISION OF THE SC DATED MAY 20

2008IN G.R NO. 161455UNDER RULE 139-B OF THE
RULES OF COURT VS ATTY. RODOLFO PACTOLIN

Rule 1.02. A lawyer shall not counsel or

abet activities aimed at defiance of the
law or at lessening confidence in the legal
system.

PER CURIAM:

CANON 7 A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL

TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY
AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE
ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED
BAR.
CANON 15 A LAWYER SHALL
OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND
LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS
AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS
CLIENT.
CANON 16 A LAWYER SHALL HOLD
IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND
PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT
MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
CANON
17 A
LAWYER OWES
FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS
CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL
OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE
REPOSED IN HIM. (emphasis supplied)
A lawyer who resorts to nefarious schemes to
circumvent the law and uses his legal knowledge to further his
selfish ends to the great prejudice of others, poses a clear and
present danger to the rule of law and to the legal system. He
does not only tarnish the image of the bar and degrade the

This case resolves the question of whether or not the

conviction of a lawyer for a crime involving moral turpitude
constitutes sufficient ground for his disbarment from the
practice of law under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court.

The Facts and the Case

In May 1996, Elmer Abastillas, the playing coach of
the Ozamis City volleyball team, wrote Mayor Benjamin A.
Fuentes of Ozamis City, requesting financial assistance for his
team. Mayor Fuentes approved the request and sent Abastillas
letter to the City Treasurer for processing. Mayor Fuentes also
designated Mario R. Ferraren, a city council member, as
Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of the city while Mayor Fuentes was
away. Abastillas eventually got the P10,000.00 assistance for
his volleyball team.
Meanwhile, respondent lawyer, Atty. Rodolfo D.
Pactolin, then a Sangguniang Panlalawigan member of
Misamis Occidental, got a photocopy of Abastillas letter and,
using it, filed on June 24, 1996 a complaint with the Office of
the Deputy Ombudsman-Mindanao against Ferraren for
alleged illegal disbursement of P10,000.00 in public
funds. Atty. Pactolin attached to the complaint a copy of what
he claimed was a falsified letter of Abastillas, which showed
that it was Ferraren, not Mayor Fuentes, who approved the
disbursement.
Aggrieved, Ferraren filed with the Sandiganbayan in
Criminal Case 25665 a complaint against Atty. Pactolin for

falsification of public document.[1] On November 12, 2003 the

Sandiganbayan found Atty. Pactolin guilty of falsification
under Article 172 and sentenced him to the indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment of 2 years and 4 months
of prision correccional as minimum to 4 years, 9 months and
10 days of prision correccional as maximum, to suffer all the
accessory penalties of prision correccional, and to pay a fine
of P5,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.
Atty. Pactolin appealed to this Court but on May 20,
2008 it affirmed his conviction. [2] Since the Court treated the
matter as an administrative complaint against him as well
under Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, it referred the case to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for appropriate
action.
Because complainant Ferraren neither appeared nor
submitted any pleading during the administrative proceedings
before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, on October 9,
2010 the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution XIX2010-632, adopting and approving the Investigating
Commissioners Report and Recommendation that the case
against Atty. Pactolin be dismissed for insufficiency of
evidence.
The Issue Presented
The only issue presented in this case is whether or
not Atty. Pactolin should be disbarred after conviction by final
judgment of the crime of falsification.
The Courts Ruling
In his pleadings before the Commission on Bar
Discipline, Atty. Pactolin reiterated the defenses he raised
before the Sandiganbayan and this Court in the falsification
case. He claims that the Court glossed over the facts, that its
decision and referral to the IBP was factually infirmed [3] and
contained factual exaggerations and patently erroneous
observation,[4] and was too adventurous.[5]
To recapitulate, this Court upheld the finding of the
Sandiganbayan that the copy of Abastillas letter which Atty.
Pactolin attached to his complaint was spurious. Given the
clear absence of a satisfactory explanation regarding his
possession and use of the falsified Abastillas letter, this Court
held that the Sandiganbayan did not err in concluding that it
was Atty. Pactolin who falsified the letter. This Court relied on
the settled rule that in the absence of satisfactory explanation,
one found in possession of and who used a forged document is
the forger and therefore guilty of falsification.[6]
This Courts decision in said falsification case had
long become final and executory. In In Re: Disbarment of
Rodolfo Pajo,[7] the Court held that in disbarment cases, it is
no longer called upon to review the judgment of conviction
which has become final. The review of the conviction no
longer rests upon this Court.
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a
lawyer may be removed or suspended on the following
grounds: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross misconduct in
office; (4) grossly immoral conduct; (5) conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude; (6) violation of the lawyers oath;
(7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court; and (8) corruptly or willfully appearing as a lawyer for a
party to a case without authority so to do.
This Court has ruled that the crime of falsification of
public document is contrary to justice, honesty, and good
morals and, therefore, involves moral turpitude.[8] Moral
turpitude includes everything which is done contrary to
justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. It involves an act of
baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a
man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to

the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between

man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty,
modesty, or good morals.[9]
Having said that, what penalty should be imposed
then on Atty. Pactolin?
As a rule, this Court exercises the power to disbar
with great caution. Being the most severe form of disciplinary
sanction, it is imposed only for the most imperative reasons
and in clear cases of misconduct affecting the standing and
moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a
member of the bar.[10] Yet this Court has also consistently
pronounced that disbarment is the appropriate penalty for
conviction by final judgment for a crime involving moral
turpitude.[11]
Here, Atty. Pactolins disbarment is warranted. The
Sandiganbayan has confirmed that although his culpability for
falsification has been indubitably established, he has not yet
served his sentence. His conduct only exacerbates his offense
and shows that he falls short of the exacting standards
expected of him as a vanguard of the legal profession.[12]
This Court once again reminds all lawyers that they,
of all classes and professions, are most sacredly bound to
uphold the law.[13] The privilege to practice law is bestowed
only upon individuals who are competent intellectually,
academically and, equally important, morally. As such,
lawyers must at all times conduct themselves, especially in
their dealings with their clients and the public at large, with
honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach.[14]
WHEREFORE, Atty. Rodolfo D. Pactolin is
hereby DISBARRED and his name REMOVED from the
Rolls of Attorney. Let a copy of this decision be attached to his
personal records and furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant, Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of
the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the
country.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 8330, March 16, 2015
TERESITA B. ENRIQUEZ, Complainant, v. ATTY. TRINA
DE VERA, Respondent.
LEONEN, J.:
For resolution is an administrative complaint for disbarment or
suspension filed by complainant Teresita B. Enriquez against
Atty. Trina De Vera. We resolve whether Atty. Trina De Vera
committed serious misconduct and should be held
administratively liable for the issuance and dishonor of several
post-dated checks.
Teresita B. Enriquez (Teresita) filed her ComplaintAffidavit1 on June 26, 2009 before this court. The Complaint
prayed for Atty. Trina De Vera's (Atty. De Vera) disbarment or
suspension in relation to the latter's issuance of worthless
checks and non-payment of a loan.2cralawred
According to Teresita, she is a businesswoman involved in
building cell site towers. She is acquainted with Atty. De Vera
through the business by subcontracting the cell site acquisition
to Atty. De Vera.3cralawred
Sometime in April 2006, Atty. De Vera borrowed P500,000.00
from Teresita with interest of P20,000.00 per month until fully
paid.4 Hbwever, Teresita did not have the full amount. Atty. De
Vera persuaded her to borrow the amount from a common

friend, Mary Jane D. Luzon (Mary Jane), by mortgaging her

property located in Lucena City.5 Atty. De Vera issued
IBank6 Check No. 310571 post-dated July 31, 2006 for
P500,000.00. Atty. De Vera also issued at least two more
checks to cover the interest agreed upon.7cralawred
Teresita alleges that in June 2006, Atty. De Vera obtained
another loan from Teresita's sister in the amount of
P100,000.00. Teresita guaranteed the loan. Atty.De Vera issued
IBank Check No. 317689 post-dated July 14, 2006 for
P100,000.00 to Teresita. Teresita claimed that she paid her
sister the amount borrowed by Atty. De Vera.8cralawred
Upon maturity of the checks, Teresita presented the checks for
payment. However, the checks "bounced" for being drawn
against insufficient funds. Teresita attempted to encash the
checks for a second time. However, the checks were
dishonored because the account was closed.9cralawred
Teresita demanded payment from Atty. De Vera. However, she
failed to settle her obligations, prompting Teresita to file
complaints against Atty. De Vera for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 and estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d)
of the Revised Penal Code.10cralawred
The Quezon City Prosecutor's Office issued the Resolution
dated March 4, 2008 finding probable cause for violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the
Revised Penal Code. On the same day, an Information for
estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal
Code was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City. Subsequently, a warrant of arrest was issued by the trial
court.11cralawred
In her administrative complaint, Teresita prays that Atty. De
Vera be disbarred or suspended for violation of her oath under
Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court.12cralawred

to be deposited.23cralawred
Furthermore, Atty. De Vera claims that the present
administrative case is baseless. She points out that the
proceedings before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office were
under reinvestigation since she' did not have the opportunity to
answer the criminal complaint.24cralawred
Moreover, "nowhere in both the affidavit-complaint for
Estafa/BP 22 and the administrative complaint was there any
proof that . . . [Atty. De Vera] had in any manner breached her
oath as a lawyer [or] abused her position against the interests
of the complainant."25cralawred
Atty. De Vera alleges that she was the one who was
abused.26 In addition, "[a] 11 the bare allegations that [Atty. De
Vera] was the one who enticed [Teresita] to mortgage her
property and that the checks issued by [Atty. De Vera] will be
honored upon maturity do not constitute deceitful conduct on
the part of [Atty. De Vera]."27cralawred
On August 25, 2010, this court noted Atty. De Vera's Answer
and referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
for "investigation, report and recommendation or decision
within ninety (90) days from receipt of [the]
records[.]"28cralawred
The Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines scheduled mandatory conferences where the
parties defined the issues, stipulated on facts, and marked
exhibits.29 Upon the termination of the mandatory conferences,
the parties were "directed to submit their respective verified
position papers within a period of thirty (30) days from receipt
of the Order."30.
Both parties failed to file their position papers.31cralawred

Atty. De Vera filed her Answer14 dated June 24, 2010. She
presented her version of the facts.

The Investigating Commissioner of the Commission on Bar

Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines found Atty.
De Vera administratively liable for serious misconduct and
recommended the penalty of suspension for one (1) year from
the practice of law.32 The Investigating Commissioner
ruled:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

According to Atty. De Vera, in February 2006, Teresita

awarded a Site Acquisition and Permitting Project to Atty. De
Vera's group. The project involved twenty-nine (29) Globe'
Telecom sites across Northern and Southern Luzon.15cralawred

Respondent's assertion that the checks she issued to

complainant were not security for the loans she obtained but
mere guaranty checks and not for deposit deserves no
credence; it is contrary to the ordinary experience.

Atty. De Vera alleges that Teresita could not pay the required
15% downpayment per site. Thus, they agreed that Atty. De
Vera would advance the costs for mobilization and survey,
while Teresita would cover the costs for application of
building permits. Teresita, thus, owed her P195,000.00 per
site.16cralawred

...

Teresita had not paid Atty. De Vera the downpayment by

March 2006.17 At that time, Teresita had to deliver at least five
(5) cell sites to Globe Telecom.18 However, Teresita did not
have the funds required for the application of building permits
that costs around P10,000.00 for each cell site.19cralawred

Assuming . . . that respondent's version of facts were [sic]

true, she is still guilty of serious misconduct.

On July 29, 2009, this court required Atty. De Vera to

comment on the Complaint.13cralawred

Teresita was constrained to borrow P500,000.00 from Mary

Jane. Subsequently, Teresita approached Atty. De Vera and
asked that the latter lend Teresita checks to guaranty the loan.
The main reason Teresita gave was that she had been
frequently arguing with her husband regarding the
loan.20cralawred
Atty. De Vera denies the P100,000.00 loan from Teresita's
sister.21 She only lent Teresita another check as "additional
guaranty for the five sites[.]"22cralawred
Atty. De Vera argues that the checks were not drawn, issued,
and delivered to Teresita for value. The checks were not meant

. . . [T]he pieces of evidenc[e] on reco[r]d substantially shows

[sic] that indeed respondent incurred monetary obligations
from complainant, and she issued postdated checks to 'the
latter as security for the payment of the loans.

The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the

act of making and issuing . . . worthless check[s]; that is, a
check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment.
The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay
his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of
penal sanctions, the making and circulation of worthless
checks. . . . A check issued as an evidence of debt though
not intended to be presented for payment has the same
effect as an ordinary check and would fall within the ambit of
B.P. Blg. 22.
As a lawyer, respondent is deemed to know the law, especially
B.P. Blg. 22. By issuing checks in violation of the provisions
of the law, respondent is guilty of serious misconduct.
...

[A] lawyer may be disciplined not only for malpractice in

connection with his profession, but also for gross misconduct
outside of his professional capacity[.]33 (Citation
omitted)cralawlawlibrary
In issuing the worthless checks, Atty. De Vera did not only
violate the law, but she also broke her oath as a lawyer and
transgressed the Canons in the Code of Professional
Responsibility.34 The Investigating Commissioner found that
Atty. De Vera violated the following
provisions:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Cannon [sic] 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey
the laws of the land and promote respect for the law and legal
processes.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
Canon 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the
Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he,
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.35cralawlawlibrary
The dispositive portion of the Investigating Commissioner's
Report and
Recommendation36 reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent is guilty of
serious misconduct and it is recommended that she be
suspended for a period of one (1) year from the practice of
law.37cralawred
cralawlawlibrary
In the Notice of Resolution No. XX-2013-61238 dated May 11,
2013, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of
Governors resolved to adopt the Investigating Commissioner's
recommendation:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the
above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as
Annex "A", and finding the recommendation fully supported
by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules
and considering that Respondent violated the B.P. 22 by
issuing a worthless check, the Attorney's Oath and Canon 1,
Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, Atty. Trina De Vera is hereby SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for one (1) year.39 (Emphasis in the
original)cralawlawlibrary
40

Teresita filed the Partial Motion for Reconsideration dated

September 17, 2013 of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Board of Governors' Resolution. Atty. De Vera filed the
Motion for Reconsideration41 dated September 21, 2013.
In the Notice of Resolution No. XXI-2014-24142 dated May 3,
2014, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of
Governors denied the parties' respective
motions:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
RESOLVED to DENY respective Motions for Reconsideration
of Complainant and Respondent, there being no cogent reason
to reverse the findings of the Commission and the resolution
.subject of the motion, they being a mere reiteration of the
matters which had already been threshed out and taken into
consideration. Moreover, respondent's Motion for

Reconsideration was filed out of time pursuant to his Motion

for Extension of Time which is a prohibited pleading under
Rule 139-B of the Rules and resorted to by lawyers at times to
delay proceeding. Thus, Resolution No. XX-2013-612 dated
May 11, 2013 is hereby AFFIRMED.43 (Emphasis in the
original)
cralawlawlibrary
The main issue is whether Atty. De Vera committed serious
misconduct and should be held administratively liable for the
issuance and dishonor of worthless checks in violation of the
Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.
After considering the parties' arguments and the records of this
case, we resolve to adopt and approve the recommendations of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors.
Atty. De Vera tries to free herself from liability by arguing that
she did not incur the loans alleged by Teresita, and the checks
were issued merely as a guaranty and not as payment for the
loan. She also raises the prematurity of the administrative
complaint in view of the pendency of the criminal proceedings
considering that "the allegations of deceitful conduct [are]
intimately intertwined with the criminal acts complained
of."44cralawred
This is not a case of first impression. This court has ruled that
the lawyer's act of issuing worthless checks, punishable under
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, constitutes serious misconduct.
In De Jesus v. Collado,45 this court found respondent lawyer
guilty of serious misconduct for issuing post-dated checks that
were dishonored upon presentment for
payment:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In the case at bar, no conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22
has as yet been obtained against respondent Collado.. We do
not, however, believe that conviction of the criminal charges
raised against her is essential, so far as either the
administrative or civil service case or the disbarment charge
against her is concerned. Since she had admitted issuing the
checks when she did not have enough money in her bank
account to cover the total amount thereof, it cannot be gainsaid
that the acts with which she was charged would constitute a
crime penalized by B.P. Blg. 22. We consider that issuance of
checks in violation of the provisions of B.P. Blg. 22 constitutes
serious misconduct on the part of a member of the
Bar.46 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)cralawlawlibrary
Misconduct involves "wrongful intention and not a mere error
of judgment";47 it is serious or gross when it is
flagrant.48cralawred
We recently reiterated the purpose and nature of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 in relation to an administrative case against
a member of the bar:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 has been enacted in order to
safeguard the interest of the banking system and the legitimate
public checking account users. The gravamen of the offense
defined and punished by Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 . . . is the act
of making and issuing a worthless check, or any check that is
dishonored upon its presentment for payment and putting it in
circulation; the law is designed to prohibit and altogether
eliminate the deleterious and pernicious practice of issuing
checks with insufficient funds, or with no credit, because the
practice is deemed a public nuisance, a crime against public
order to be abated.
...
Being a lawyer, [respondent] was well aware of the objectives
and coverage of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. If he did not, he was
nonetheless presumed to know them, for. the law was penal in
character and application. His issuance of the unfunded check

involved herein knowingly violated Batas Pambansa Blg. 22,

and exhibited his indifference towards the pernicious effect of
his illegal act to public interest and public order. He thereby
swept aside his Lawyer's Oath that enjoined him to support the
Constitution and obey the laws.49 (Citations
omitted)cralawlawlibrary
A lawyer is required to observe the law and be mindful of his
or her actions whether acting in a public or private capacity.50
The Code of Professional Responsibility
provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
CANON A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE
1CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE
LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW
AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule
A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
1.01 - immoral or deceitful conduct.
....
CANON A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD
7THE INTEGRITY- AND DIGNITY OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE
ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
....
Rule
A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely
7.03 - reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he,
whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
cralawlawlibrary
The Investigating Commissioner found that Atty. De Vera
incurred monetary obligations from Teresita. Atty. De Vera
admitted issuing the checks to Teresita. She refused to answer
for her liabilities by denying the existence of the loan and
claiming that the checks were mere "show
checks."51 However, she failed to present evidence to prove
those allegations.
The Decision52 wherein the trial court found Teresita civilly
liable to Mary Jane for P540,000.00,53 and on which Atty. De
Vera relies upon, is not sufficient evidence to hold that there
was no separate transaction between Teresita and Atty. De
Vera. The Decision involved the post-dated checks issued by
Teresita to Mary Jane only.54 Mary Jane merely claimed that
she had no personal knowledge of any transaction between
Teresita and Atty. De Vera.55cralawred
The Investigating Commissioner correctly pointed out that
Atty. De Vera's allegation of "lending" her checks to Teresita is
contrary to ordinary human experience. As a lawyer, Atty. De
Vera is presumed to know the consequences of her acts. She
issued several post-dated checks for value that were
dishonored upon presentation for payment.
Membership in the bar requires a high degree of fidelity to the
laws whether in a private or professional capacity. "Any
transgression of this duty on his part would not only diminish
his reputation as a lawyer but would also erode the public's
faith in the Legal Profession as a whole."56 A lawyer "may be
removed or otherwise disciplined 'not only for malpractice and
dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct not
connected with his professional duties, which showed him to
be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his
license and the law confer to him.'"57cralawred
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Trina De Vera
is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year. Let
a copy of this Resolution be entered in Atty. De Vera's
personal record with the Office of the Bar Confidant, and a
copy be served to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the
Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the
courts in the land.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary

A.C. No. 7269

November 23, 2011

ATTY. EDITA NOE-LACSAMANA, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a complaint for disbarment filed by Atty.
Edita Noe-Lacsamana (Noe-Lacsamana) against Atty. Yolando
F. Busmente (Busmente) before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP).
The Antecedent Facts
Noe-Lacsamana alleged in her complaint that she was the
counsel for Irene Bides, the plaintiff in Civil Case No. SCA2481 before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch
167, while Busmente was the counsel for the defendant Imelda
B. Ulaso (Ulaso). Noe-Lacsamana alleged that Ulasos deed of
sale over the property subject of Civil Case No. SCA-2481
was annulled, which resulted in the filing of an ejectment case
before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), San Juan,
docketed as Civil Case No. 9284, where Busmente appeared
as counsel. Another case for falsification was filed against
Ulaso where Busmente also appeared as counsel. NoeLacsamana alleged that one Atty. Elizabeth Dela Rosa or Atty.
Liza Dela Rosa (Dela Rosa) would accompany Ulaso in court,
projecting herself as Busmentes collaborating counsel. Dela
Rosa signed the minutes of the court proceedings in Civil Case
No. 9284 nine times from 25 November 2003 to 8 February
2005. Noe-Lacsamana further alleged that the court orders and
notices specified Dela Rosa as Busmentes collaborating
counsel. Noe-Lacsamana alleged that upon verification with
this Court and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, she
discovered that Dela Rosa was not a lawyer.
Busmente alleged that Dela Rosa was a law graduate and was
his paralegal assistant for a few years. Busmente alleged that
Dela Rosas employment with him ended in 2000 but Dela
Rosa was able to continue misrepresenting herself as a lawyer
with the help of Regine Macasieb (Macasieb), Busmentes
former secretary. Busmente alleged that he did not represent
Ulaso in Civil Case No. 9284 and that his signature in the
Answer1 presented as proof by Noe-Lacsamana was forged.
The Decision of the Commission on Bar Discipline
In its Report and Recommendation,2 the IBP Commission on
Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) found that Dela Rosa was not a
lawyer and that she represented Ulaso as Busmentes
collaborating counsel in Civil Case No. 9284. The IBP-CBD
noted that while Busmente claimed that Dela Rosa no longer
worked for him since 2000, there was no proof of her
separation from employment. The IBP-CBD found that
notices from the MTC San Juan, as well as the pleadings of
the case, were all sent to Busmentes designated office

address. The IBP-CBD stated that Busmentes only excuse

was that Dela Rosa connived with his former secretary
Macasieb so that the notices and pleadings would not reach
him.

associating oneself as a partner of a law office for the general

practice of law.6

The IBP-CBD rejected the affidavit submitted by Judy M.

Ortalez (Ortalez), Busmentes staff, alleging Macasiebs
failure to endorse pleadings and notices of Civil Case No.
9284 to Busmente. The IBP-CBD noted that Ortalez did not
exactly refer to Ulasos case in her affidavit and that there was
no mention that she actually witnessed Macasieb withholding
pleadings and notices from Busmente. The IBP-CBD also
noted that Macasieb was still working at Busmentes office in
November 2003 as shown by the affidavit attached to a
Motion to Lift Order of Default that she signed. However,
even if Macasieb resigned in November 2003, Dela Rosa
continued to represent Ulaso until 2005, which belied
Busmentes allegation that Dela Rosa was able to illegally
practice law using his office address without his knowledge
and only due to Dela Rosas connivance with Macasieb. As
regards Busmentes allegation that his signature on the Answer
was forged, the IBP-CBD gave Busmente the opportunity to
coordinate with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to
prove that his signature was forged but he failed to submit any
report from the NBI despite the lapse of four months from the
time he reserved his right to submit the report.

The lawyers duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist

in, the unauthorized practice of law is founded on public
interest and policy. Public policy requires that the practice of
law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in
education and character. The permissive right conferred on the
lawyer is an individual and limited privilege subject to
withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral
and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public,
the court, the client, and the bar from the incompetence or
dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject
to the disciplinary control of the Court. It devolves upon a
lawyer to see that this purpose is attained. Thus, the canons
and ethics of the profession enjoin him not to permit his
professional services or his name to be used in aid of, or to
make possible the unauthorized practice of law by, any
agency, personal or corporate. And, the law makes it a
misbehavior on his part, subject to disciplinary action, to aid a
layman in the unauthorized practice of law.7

The IBP-CBD recommended Busmentes suspension from the

practice of law for not less than five years. On 26 May 2006,
in its Resolution No. XVII-2006-271,3 the IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved the recommendation of the
IBP-CBD, with modification by reducing the period of
Busmentes suspension to six months.
Busmente filed a motion for reconsideration and submitted a
report4 from the NBI stating that the signature in the Answer,
when compared with standard/sample signatures submitted to
its office, showed that they were not written by one and the
same person. In its 14 May 2011 Resolution No. XIX-2011168, the IBP Board of Governors denied Busmentes motion
for reconsideration.
The Issue
The issue in this case is whether Busmente is guilty of directly
or indirectly assisting Dela Rosa in her illegal practice of law
that warrants his suspension from the practice of law.
The Ruling of this Court
We agree with the IBP.
Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:
Canon 9. A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the
unauthorized practice of law.
The Court ruled that the term "practice of law" implies
customarily or habitually holding oneself out to the public as a
lawyer for compensation as a source of livelihood or in
consideration of his services.5 The Court further ruled that
holding ones self out as a lawyer may be shown by acts
indicative of that purpose, such as identifying oneself as
attorney, appearing in court in representation of a client, or

The Court explained:

In this case, it has been established that Dela Rosa, who is not
a member of the Bar, misrepresented herself as Busmentes
collaborating counsel in Civil Case No. 9284. The only
question is whether Busmente indirectly or directly assisted
Dela Rosa in her illegal practice of law.
Busmente alleged that Dela Rosas employment in his office
ended in 2000 and that Dela Rosa was able to continue with
her illegal practice of law through connivance with Macasieb,
another member of Busmentes staff. As pointed out by the
IBP-CBD, Busmente claimed that Macasieb resigned from his
office in 2003. Yet, Dela Rosa continued to represent Ulaso
until 2005. Pleadings and court notices were still sent to
Busmentes office until 2005. The IBP-CBD noted that Dela
Rosas practice should have ended in 2003 when Macasieb
left.
We agree. Busmentes office continued to receive all the
notices of Civil Case No. 9284. The 7 December 2004
Order8 of Judge Elvira DC. Panganiban (Judge Panganiban) in
Civil Case No. 9284 showed that Atty. Elizabeth Dela Rosa
was still representing Ulaso in the case. In that Order, Judge
Panganiban set the preliminary conference of Civil Case No.
9284 on 8 February 2005. It would have been impossible for
Dela Rosa to continue representing Ulaso in the case,
considering Busmentes claim that Macasieb already resigned,
if Dela Rosa had no access to the files in Busmentes office.
Busmente, in his motion for reconsideration of Resolution No.
XVII-2006-271, submitted a copy of the NBI report stating
that the signature on the Answer submitted in Civil Case No.
9284 and the specimen signatures submitted by Busmente
were not written by one and the same person. The report
shows that Busmente only submitted to the NBI the
questioned signature in the Answer. The IBP-CBD report,
however, showed that there were other documents signed by
Busmente, including the Pre-Trial Brief dated 14 November
2003 and Motion to Lift Order of Default dated 22 November
2003. Noe-Lacsamana also submitted a letter dated 14 August
2003 addressed to her as well as three letters dated 29 August
2003 addressed to the occupants of the disputed property, all

signed by Busmente. Busmente failed to impugn his signatures

in these other documents.

and attend our hearings in short, she gave us paralegal

assistance[.] (Emphasis supplied)

Finally, Busmente claimed that he was totally unaware of

Civil Case No. 9284 and he only came to know about the case
when Ulaso went to his office to inquire about its status.
Busmentes allegation contradicted the Joint CounterAffidavit9 submitted by Ulaso and Eddie B. Bides stating that:

The counter-affidavit clearly showed that Busmente was the

legal counsel in Civil Case No. 9284 and that he allowed Dela
Rosa to give legal assistance to Ulaso.

a. That our legal counsel is Atty. YOLANDO F.

BUSMENTE of the YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE AND
ASSOCIATES LAW OFFICES with address at suite 718 BPI
Office Cond. Plaza Cervantes, Binondo Manila.
b. That ELIZABETH DELA ROSA is not our legal counsel in
the case which have been filed by IRENE BIDES and LILIA
VALERA in representation of her sister AMELIA BIDES for
Ejectment docketed as Civil Case No. 9284 before Branch 58
of the Metropolitan Trial ourt of San Juan, Metro Manila.
c. That we never stated in any of the pleadings filed in the
cases mentioned in the Complaint-Affidavit that ELIZABETH
DELA ROSA was our lawyer;
d. That if ever ELIZABETH DELA ROSA had affixed her
signature in the notices or other court records as our legal
counsel the same could not be taken against us for, we
believed in good faith that she was a lawyer; and we are made
to believe that it was so since had referred her to us (sic), she
was handling some cases of Hortaleza and client of Atty.
Yolando F. Busmente;
e. That we know for the fact that ELIZABETH DELA ROSA
did not sign any pleading which she filed in court in
connection with our cases at all of those were signed by Atty.
YOLANDO BUSMENTE as our legal counsel; she just
accompanied us to the court rooms and/or hearings;
f. That we cannot be made liable for violation of Article 171
(for and in relation to Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code)
for the reason that the following elements of the offense are
not present, to wit:
1. That offender has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of
the facts narrated;
2. There must be wrongful intent to injure a 3rd party;
3. Knowledge that the facts narrated by him are absolutely
false;
4. That the offender makes in a document untruthful
statements in the narration of facts.
And furthermore the untruthful narrations of facts must affect
the integrity which is not so in the instant case.
g. That from the start of our acquaintance with ELIZABETH
DELA ROSA we never ask her whether she was a real lawyer
and allowed to practice law in the Philippines; it would have
been unethical and shameful on our part to ask her
qualification; we just presumed that she has legal
qualifications to represent us in our cases because Atty.
YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE allowed her to accompany us

Hence, we agree with the findings of the IBP-CBD that there

was sufficient evidence to prove that Busmente was guilty of
violation of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. We agree with the recommendation of the IBP,
modifying the recommendation of the IBP-CBD, that
Busmente should be suspended from the practice of law for
six months.
WHEREFORE, we SUSPEND Atty. Yolando F. Busmente
from the practice of law for SIX MONTHS.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Busmentes
personal record in the Office of the Bar
Confidant.1wphi1 Let a copy of this Decision be also
furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and to all courts in the land.

A.C. No. 6116

August 1, 2012

ENGR. GILBERT TUMBOKON, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. MARIANO R. PEFIANCO, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is an administrative complaint for disbarment
filed by complainant Engr. Gilbert Tumbokon against
respondent Atty. Mariano R. Pefianco for grave dishonesty,
gross misconduct constituting deceit and grossly immoral
conduct.
In his Complaint,1 complainant narrated that respondent
undertook to give him 20% commission, later reduced to 10%,
of the attorney's fees the latter would receive in representing
Spouses Amable and Rosalinda Yap (Sps. Yap), whom he
referred, in an action for partition of the estate of the late
Benjamin Yap (Civil Case No. 4986 before the Regional Trial
Court of Aklan). Their agreement was reflected in a
letter2 dated August 11, 1995. However, respondent failed to
pay him the agreed commission notwithstanding receipt of
attorney's fees amounting to 17% of the total estate or
about P 40 million. Instead, he was informed through a
letter3 dated July 16, 1997 that Sps. Yap assumed to pay the
same after respondent had agreed to reduce his attorney's fees
from 25% to 17%. He then demanded the payment of his
commission4 which respondent ignored.
Complainant further alleged that respondent has not lived up
to the high moral standards required of his profession for
having abandoned his legal wife, Milagros Hilado, with whom
he has two children, and cohabited with Mae FlorGalido, with
whom he has four children. He also accused respondent of

engaging in money-lending business5 without the required

authorization from the BangkoSentralngPilipinas.

1.01, Canon 1 of the Code which proscribes a lawyer from

engaging in "unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct."

In his defense, respondent explained that he accepted Sps.

Yap's case on a 25% contingent fee basis, and advanced all the
expenses. He disputed the August 11, 1995 letter for being a
forgery and claimed that Sps. Yap assumed to pay
complainant's commission which he clarified in his July 16,
1997 letter. He, thus, prayed for the dismissal of the complaint
and for the corresponding sanction against complainant's
counsel, Atty. Florencio B. Gonzales, for filing a baseless
complaint.6

However, We find the charge of engaging in illegal money

lending not to have been sufficiently established.1wphi1 A
"business" requires some form of investment and a sufficient
number of customers to whom its output can be sold at profit
on a consistent basis.15 The lending of money to a single
person without showing that such service is made available to
other persons on a consistent basis cannot be construed
asindicia that respondent is engaged in the business of lending.

In the Resolution7 dated February 16, 2004, the Court resolved

to refer this administrative case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation. In his Report and Recommendation8dated
October 10, 2008, the Investigating IBP Commissioner
recommended that respondent be suspended for one (1) year
from the active practice of law, for violation of the Lawyer's
Oath, Rule 1.01, Canon 1; Rule 7.03, Canon 7 and Rule 9.02,
Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code).
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the same
in its Resolution No. XIX-2010-4539 dated August

Nonetheless, while We rule that respondent should be

sanctioned for his actions, We are minded that the power to
disbar should be exercised with great caution and only in clear
cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and
character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and as
member of the bar,16 or the misconduct borders on the
criminal, or committed under scandalous
circumstance,17 which do not obtain here. Considering the
circumstances of the case, We deem it appropriate that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period
of one (1) year as recommended.

28, 2010. Respondent moved for reconsideration10 which was

denied in Resolution No. XIX-2011-141 dated October 28,
2011.

WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. MARIANO R.

PEFIANCO is found GUILTY of violation of the Lawyers
Oath, Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the same Code
and SUSPENDED from the active practice of law ONE (1)
YEAR effective upon notice hereof.

After due consideration, We adopt the findings and

recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.
The practice of law is considered a privilege bestowed by the
State on those who show that they possess and continue to
possess the legal qualifications for the profession. As such,
lawyers are expected to maintain at all times a high standard
of legal proficiency, morality, honesty, integrity and fair
dealing, and must perform their four-fold duty to society, the
legal profession, the courts and their clients, in accordance
with the values and norms embodied in the Code.11 Lawyers
may, thus, be disciplined for any conduct that is wanting of the
above standards whether in their professional or in their
private capacity.
In the present case, respondent's defense that forgery had
attended the execution of the August 11, 1995 letter was belied
by his July 16, 1997 letter admitting to have undertaken the
payment of complainant's commission but passing on the
responsibility to Sps. Yap. Clearly, respondent has violated
Rule 9.02,12 Canon 9 of the Code which prohibits a lawyer
from dividing or stipulating to divide a fee for legal services
with persons not licensed to practice law, except in certain
cases which do not obtain in the case at bar.
Furthermore, respondent did not deny the accusation that he
abandoned his legal family to cohabit with his mistress with
whom he begot four children notwithstanding that his moral
character as well as his moral fitness to be retained in the Roll
of Attorneys has been assailed. The settled rule is that betrayal
of the marital vow of fidelity or sexual relations outside
marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it manifests
deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital
vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our
laws.13Consequently, We find no reason to disturb the IBP's
finding that respondent violated the Lawyer's Oath14 and Rule

Let copies of this Resolution be entered in the personal record

of respondent as a member of the Philippine Bar and furnished
the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for
circulation to all courts in the country.
A.C. No. 9604

March 20, 2013

RODRIGO E. TAPAY and ANTHONY J.

RUSTIA, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. CHARLIE L. BANCOLO and ATTY. JANUS T.
JARDER, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This administrative case arose from a Complaint tiled by
Rodrigo E. Tapay (Tapay) and Anthony J. Rustia (Rustia),
both employees of the Sugar Regulatory Administration,
against Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo (Atty. Bancolo) and Atty.
Janus T. larder (Atty. Jarder) for violation of the Canons of
Ethics and Professionalism, Falsification of Public Document,
Gross Dishonesty, and Harassment.
The Facts
Sometime in October 2004, Tapay and Rustia received an
Order dated 14 October 2004 from the Office of the

Ombudsman-Visayas requiring them to file a counter-affidavit

to a complaint for usurpation of authority, falsification of
public document, and graft and corrupt practices filed against
them by Nehimias Divinagracia, Jr. (Divinagracia), a coemployee in the Sugar Regulatory Administration. The
Complaint1 dated 31 August 2004 was allegedly signed on
behalf of Divinagracia by one Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo of the
Jarder Bancolo Law Office based in Bacolod City, Negros
Occidental.
When Atty. Bancolo and Rustia accidentally chanced upon
each other, the latter informed Atty. Bancolo of the case filed
against them before the Office of the Ombudsman. Atty.
Bancolo denied that he represented Divinagracia since he had
yet to meet Divinagracia in person. When Rustia showed him
the Complaint, Atty. Bancolo declared that the signature
appearing above his name as counsel for Divinagracia was not
his. Thus, Rustia convinced Atty. Bancolo to sign an affidavit
to attest to such fact. On 9 December 2004, Atty. Bancolo
signed an affidavit denying his supposed signature appearing
on the Complaint filed with the Office of the Ombudsman and
submitted six specimen signatures for comparison. Using Atty.
Bancolos affidavit and other documentary evidence, Tapay
and Rustia filed a counter-affidavit accusing Divinagracia of
falsifying the signature of his alleged counsel, Atty. Bancolo.
In a Resolution dated 28 March 2005, the Office of the
Ombudsman provisionally dismissed the Complaint since the
falsification of the counsels signature posed a prejudicial
question to the Complaints validity. Also, the Office of the
Ombudsman ordered that separate cases for Falsification of
Public Document2 and Dishonesty3 be filed against
Divinagracia, with Rustia and Atty. Bancolo as complainants.
Thereafter, Divinagracia filed his Counter-Affidavit dated 1
August 2005 denying that he falsified the signature of his
former lawyer, Atty. Bancolo. Divinagracia presented as
evidence an affidavit dated 1 August 2005 by Richard A.
Cordero, the legal assistant of Atty. Bancolo, that the Jarder
Bancolo Law Office accepted Divinagracias case and that the
Complaint filed with the Office of the Ombudsman was signed
by the office secretary per Atty. Bancolos instructions.
Divinagracia asked that the Office of the Ombudsman dismiss
the cases for falsification of public document and dishonesty
filed against him by Rustia and Atty. Bancolo and to revive the
original Complaint for various offenses that he filed against
Tapay and Rustia.
In a Resolution dated 19 September 2005, the Office of the
Ombudsman dismissed the criminal case for falsification of
public document (OMB-V-C-05-0207-E) for insufficiency of
evidence. The dispositive portion states:
WHEREFORE, the instant case is hereby DISMISSED for
insufficiency of evidence, without prejudice to the re-filing by
Divinagracia, Jr. of a proper complaint for violation of RA
3019 and other offenses against Rustia and Tapay.
SO ORDERED.4
The administrative case for dishonesty (OMB-V-A-05-0219E) was also dismissed for lack of substantial evidence in a
Decision dated 19 September 2005.

On 29 November 2005, Tapay and Rustia filed with the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) a complaint5 to disbar
Atty. Bancolo and Atty. Jarder, Atty. Bancolos law partner.
The complainants alleged that they were subjected to a
harassment Complaint filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman with the forged signature of Atty. Bancolo.
Complainants stated further that the signature of Atty. Bancolo
in the Complaint was not the only one that was forged.
Complainants attached a Report6 dated 1 July 2005 by the
Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory 6 which
examined three other letter-complaints signed by Atty.
Bancolo for other clients, allegedly close friends of Atty.
Jarder. The report concluded that the questioned signatures in
the letter-complaints and the submitted standard signatures of
Atty. Bancolo were not written by one and the same person.
Thus, complainants maintained that not only were respondents
engaging in unprofessional and unethical practices, they were
also involved in falsification of documents used to harass and
persecute innocent people.
On 9 January 2006, complainants filed a Supplement to the
Disbarment Complaint Due to Additional Information. They
alleged that a certain Mary Jane Gentugao, the secretary of the
Jarder Bancolo Law Office, forged the signature of Atty.
Bancolo.
In their Answer dated 26 January 2006 to the disbarment
complaint, respondents admitted that the criminal and
administrative cases filed by Divinagracia against
complainants before the Office of the Ombudsman were
accepted by the Jarder Bancolo Law Office. The cases were
assigned to Atty. Bancolo. Atty. Bancolo alleged that after
being informed of the assignment of the cases, he ordered his
staff to prepare and draft all the necessary pleadings and
documents. However, due to some minor lapses, Atty. Bancolo
permitted that the pleadings and communications be signed in
his name by the secretary of the law office. Respondents
added that complainants filed the disbarment complaint to
retaliate against them since the cases filed before the Office of
the Ombudsman were meritorious and strongly supported by
testimonial and documentary evidence. Respondents also
denied that Mary Jane Gentugao was employed as secretary of
their law office.
Tapay and Rustia filed a Reply to the Answer dated 2 March
2006. Thereafter, the parties were directed by the Commission
on Bar Discipline to attend a mandatory conference scheduled
on 5 May 2006. The conference was reset to 10 August 2006.
On the said date, complainants were present but respondents
failed to appear. The conference was reset to 25 September
2006 for the last time. Again, respondents failed to appear
despite receiving notice of the conference. Complainants
manifested that they were submitting their disbarment
complaint based on the documents submitted to the IBP.
Respondents were also deemed to have waived their right to
participate in the mandatory conference. Further, both parties
were directed to submit their respective position papers. On 27
October 2006, the IBP received complainants position paper
dated 18 October 2006 and respondents position paper dated
23 October 2006.
The IBPs Report and Recommendation
On 11 April 2007, Atty. Lolita A. Quisumbing, the
Investigating Commissioner of the Commission on Bar

Discipline of the IBP, submitted her Report. Atty. Quisumbing

found that Atty. Bancolo violated Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility while Atty. Jarder
violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the same Code. The
Investigating
Commissioner recommended that Atty. Bancolo be suspended
for two years from the practice of law and Atty. Jarder be
admonished for his failure to exercise certain responsibilities
in their law firm.
In her Report and Recommendation, the Investigating
Commissioner opined:
x x x. In his answer, respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo
admitted that his signature appearing in the complaint filed
against complainants Rodrigo E. Tapay and Anthony J. Rustia
with the Ombudsman were signed by the secretary. He did not
refute the findings that his signatures appearing in the various
documents released from his office were found not to be his.
Such pattern of malpratice by respondent clearly breached his
obligation under Rule 9.01 of Canon 9, for a lawyer who
allows a non-member to represent him is guilty of violating
the aforementioned Canon. The fact that respondent was busy
cannot serve as an excuse for him from signing personally.
After all respondent is a member of a law firm composed of
not just one (1) lawyer. The Supreme Court has ruled that this
practice constitute negligence and undersigned finds the act a
sign of indolence and ineptitude. Moreover, respondents
ignored the notices sent by undersigned. That showed patent
lack of respect to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Commission on Bar Discipline and its proceedings. It betrays
lack of courtesy and irresponsibility as lawyers.
On the other hand, Atty. Janus T. Jarder, a senior partner of the
law firm Jarder Bancolo and Associates Law Office, failed to
exercise certain responsibilities over matters under the charge
of his law firm. As a senior partner[,] he failed to abide to the
principle of "command responsibility". x x x.
xxxx
Respondent Atty. Janus Jarder after all is a seasoned
practitioner, having passed the bar in 1995 and practicing law
up to the present. He holds himself out to the public as a law
firm designated as Jarder Bancolo and Associates Law Office.
It behooves Atty. Janus T. Jarder to exert ordinary diligence to
find out what is going on in his law firm, to ensure that all
lawyers in his firm act in conformity to the Code of
Professional Responsibility. As a partner, it is his
responsibility to provide efficacious control of court pleadings
and other documents that carry the name of the law firm. Had
he done that, he could have known the unethical practice of
his law partner Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo. Respondent Atty.
Janus T. Jarder failed to perform this task and is
administratively liable under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.7
On 19 September 2007, in Resolution No. XVIII-2007-97, the
Board of Governors of the IBP approved with modification the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner. The Resolution states:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report

and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of

the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as
Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported
by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules,
and considering Respondent Atty. Bancolos violation of Rule
9.01, Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty.
Charlie L. Bancolo is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for one (1) year.
However, with regard to the charge against Atty. Janus T.
Jarder, the Board of Governors RESOLVED as it is hereby
RESOLVED to AMEND, as it is hereby AMENDED the
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and
APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the case for lack of merit.8
Tapay and Rustia filed a Motion for Reconsideration.
Likewise, Atty. Bancolo filed his Motion for Reconsideration
dated 22 December 2007. Thereafter, Atty. Jarder filed his
separate Consolidated Comment/Reply to Complainants
Motion for Reconsideration and Comment Filed by
Complainants dated 29 January 2008.
In Resolution No. XX-2012-175 dated 9 June 2012, the IBP
Board of Governors denied both complainants and Atty.
Bancolos motions for reconsideration. The IBP Board found
no cogent reason to reverse the findings of the Investigating
Commissioner and affirmed Resolution No. XVIII-2007-97
dated 19 September 2007.
The Courts Ruling
After a careful review of the records of the case, we agree with
the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board and find
reasonable grounds to hold respondent Atty. Bancolo
administratively liable.
Atty. Bancolo admitted that the Complaint he filed for a
former client before the Office of the Ombudsman was signed
in his name by a secretary of his law office. Clearly, this is a
violation of Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides:
CANON 9
A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY,
ASSIST IN THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW.
Rule 9.01 - A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified
person the performance of any task which by law may only be
performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.
This rule was clearly explained in the case of Cambaliza v.
Cristal-Tenorio,9 where we held:
The lawyers duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist
in, the unauthorized practice of law is founded on public
interest and policy. Public policy requires that the practice of
law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in
education and character. The permissive right conferred on the
lawyer is an individual and limited privilege subject to
withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral
and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public,
the court, the client, and the bar from the incompetence or
dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject
to the disciplinary control of the Court. It devolves upon a

lawyer to see that this purpose is attained. Thus, the canons

and ethics of the profession enjoin him not to permit his
professional services or his name to be used in aid of, or to
make possible the unauthorized practice of law by, any
agency, personal or corporate. And, the law makes it a
misbehavior on his part, subject to disciplinary action, to aid a
layman in the unauthorized practice of law.

In the Answer, Atty. Bancolo categorically stated that because

of some minor lapses, the communications and pleadings filed
against Tapay and Rustia were signed by his secretary, albeit
with his tolerance. Undoubtedly, Atty. Bancolo violated the
Code of Professional Responsibility by allowing a non-lawyer
to affix his signature to a pleading. This violation Is an act of
falsehood which IS a ground for disciplinary action.

In Republic v. Kenrick Development Corporation,10 we held

that the preparation and signing of a pleading constitute legal
work involving the practice of law which is reserved
exclusively for members of the legal profession. Atty.
Bancolos authority and duty to sign a pleading are personal to
him. Although he may delegate the signing of a pleading to
another lawyer, he may not delegate it to a non-lawyer.
Further, under the Rules of Court, counsels signature serves
as a certification that (1) he has read the pleading; (2) to the
best of his knowledge, information and belief there is good
ground to support it; and (3) it is not interposed for
delay.11 Thus, by affixing ones signature to a pleading, it is
counsel alone who has the responsibility to certify to these
matters and give legal effect to the document.1wphi1

The complainants did not present any evidence that Atty.

Jarder was directly involved, had knowledge of, or even
participated in the wrongful practice of Atty. Bancolo in
allowing or tolerating his secretary to sign pleadings for him.
Thus, we agree with the finding of the IBP Board that Atty.
Jarder is not administratively liable.

In his Motion for Reconsideration dated 22 December 2007,

Atty. Bancolo wants us to believe that he was a victim of
circumstances or of manipulated events because of his
unconditional trust and confidence in his former law partner,
Atty. Jarder. However, Atty. Bancolo did not take any steps to
rectify the situation, save for the affidavit he gave to Rustia
denying his signature to the Complaint filed before the Office
of the Ombudsman. Atty. Bancolo had an opportunity to
maintain his innocence when he filed with the IBP his Joint
Answer (with Atty. Jarder) dated 26 January 2006. Atty.
Bancolo, however, admitted that prior to the preparation of the
Joint Answer, Atty. Jarder threatened to file a disbarment case
against him if he did not cooperate. Thus, he was constrained
to allow Atty. Jarder to prepare the Joint Answer. Atty.
Bancolo simply signed the verification without seeing the
contents of the Joint Answer.

In sum, we find that the suspension of Atty. Bancolo from the

practice of law for one year is warranted. We also find proper
the dismissal of the case against Atty. larder.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the complaint against Atty.
Janus T. larder for lack of merit.
We find respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo administratively
liable for violating Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for one year effective upon finality of this
Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the same or similar
acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent Atty.
Charlie L. Bancolo's record in this Court as attorney. Further,
let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator,
which is directed to circulate them to all the courts in the
country for their information and guidance.