Descriptive and prescriptive language in the

Vedas: The Pu rva Mma msa interpretation of

the Vedas from San kara to Ra ma nuja and
Ven katana tha*
Elisa Freschi
Institute for the Cultural and Intellectual History of Asia, Austrian Academy of Sciences

January 26, 2017

Contents
1 Prva Mms, Vednta and the siddha vs. sdhya controversy

2 akaras theory

3 Rmnujas theory
3.1 The argument in SrBh ad 1.1.4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.2 Ra ma nujas theory of Vedic signi ication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4
5
7

4 Vekaanthas development of Rmnujas theory

5 Conclusions

How do Vedic sentences convey their meanings? Do they only convey something to be done, as claimed by Mma msa authors? Or, can they also describe something existing? This controversy animated many linguistic discussions among Pu rva
Mma msa , Advaita and Vis is tadvaita authors in the second millennium CE. In the
following, I will start by outlining the Pu rva Mma msa position, which is the oldest one formulated in extant texts, and then examine the answers to it in Advaita
Veda nta. The core of the article is the analysis of Ra ma nujas solution to the controversy as found in his texts and, in a more systematic way, in the ones of his
successor Ven katana tha.
*
Research for this article has been inanced within the FWF project V-400 and the WWTF project
MA 16-028.

1 Prva Mms, Vednta and the siddha vs. sdhya controversy

The Pu rva Mma msa is differently received within Vis is tadvaita Veda nta, with Ya muna being at times even hostile, especially when it comes to the exclusivity of
the Vedas. Ra ma nuja, by contrast, overtly endorsed the study of Mma msa , and
Ven katana tha (also known as Veda nta Des ika, the principal Vis is tadvaita Veda nta
thinker after Ra ma nuja) recognised Pu rva and Uttara Mma msa as a single s astra. The present study looks at this history from the speci ic viewpoint of one of
Ra ma nujas main hermeneutic theories.
In fact, one of the marks of the Pu rva Mma msa school is its linguistic theory
(later to be known with the label of sa dhyava kya rthava da) according to which
Vedic sentences aim at enjoining something to be done, not at describing something already given. This amounts to say that all Vedic sentences are not assertive,
but injunctive and that the ones which look assertive are to be understood as supplements to a prescription (vidhiea). Accordingly, sentences like Va yu is the
fastest Deity do not deliver us any information about Va yu, but are to be supplemented to the prescription to sacri ice to Va yu, insofar as they praise such sacri ice
by suggesting that one will obtain the sacri ices result swiftly. This interpretation,
however, means that also the Upanis adic statements about the brahman cannot
be read independently from any prescription, and are thus not telling us anything
about the brahman. It follows that they cannot even be used for strategies such as
Ya munas one (in his gamaprmya) when he grounds the validity of the Pan cara tra Sacred Texts on their being authored by God and the existence of God on
the Vedic statements about Him. In fact, such statements would also need to be
supplemented to a prescription and have no independent epistemological value.

2 akaras theory
San karas Advaita Veda nta embraces instead the theory later called siddhavkyrthavda,
according to which Vedic sentences describe something given. However, due to
San karas nearly exclusive focus on the Upanis ads, he let the siddhavkyrthavda
apply only to the Upanis adic statements. Why not to the whole Vedic corpus? Because he had already stated since the beginning of the commentary on the Brahmastra (henceforth UMS) that one does not need to focus on the Bra hman as, the
prescriptive portion of the Veda, and that one can directly engage with the only
Vedic texts which can make one acquire a liberating knowledge, namely the Upanis ads. Thus, San kara did not need to try a dif icult way to explain how also
the Bra hman as in fact aim at describing something given and could let the sa dhyava kya rthava da hold for them.
The relevant text passage is found in his commentary on UMS 1.1.4. San kara
states since the beginning that if the Mma msakas are right in their interpretation,
then the Upanis adic statements have no independent value.
How comes, then, that the brahman is known through the Veda? Through
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The Veda is for the sake of the [ritual] action and [Vedic statements]
which do not aim at it are meaningless (PMS 1.2.1) it has been shown
that the Veda points to an action. Therefore the Upanis ads are meaningless, since they do not signify any action. [] Nor is it possible that
[the Veda] conveys an already established reality, since already established realities are the content of perception and inference and since
their conveying is not a human goal, as it is not [in itself] something to
be avoided or achieved.
Nor could one ever know anything about the brahman, since every Vedic sentence
would only be valid insofar as it is connected to a prescription, but prescriptions
are about actions, not about established entities, like the brahman:
Vedic sentences are are never experienced to have a meaning without
the connection with a prescription. Nor can there be a prescription
about an established reality, since prescriptions are about actions.
Thus, all Upanis adic statements could at most be interpreted as highlighting features of the sacri ice:
Therefore, the Upanis ads are a supplement to the prescriptions about
ritual actions, insofar as they show the nature of the ritual performer,
the deity and the [substance] required for the ritual.
Most of the next steps of San karas commentary are present as the implicit
background of the parallel moves in Ra ma nujas one. They are:
i Anticipation of the inal conclusion, namely that the brahman can indeed be
conveyed by the Upaniadic statements, since it is the ultimate meaning they
point to.
ii Claim that although in all other cases Vedic sentences only convey their meaning insofar as they are connected with a Vedic prescription, nonetheless in the
katham punar brahman ah sa straprama n akatvam ucyate, ya vata , a mna yasya kriya rthatva d
a narthakyam atadartha na m (PMS 1.2.1) iti kriya paratvam s astrasya pradars itam. ato veda nta na m
a narthakyam, akriya rthatva t. [] na hi parinis thitavastupratipa danam sambhavati, pratyaks adivis ayatva t parinis thitavastunah . tatpratipa dane ca heyopa deyarahite purus artha bha va t.
na kvacid api vedava kya na m vidhisamspars am antaren a rthavatta dr stopapanna va . na ca
parinis thite vastusvaru pe vidhih sambhavati, kriya vis ayatva d vidheh .
tasma t karma peks itakartr svaru padevata dipraka s anena kriya vidhis es atvam veda nta na m.
This brahman which is omniscient, omnipotent, the origin of the world and the cause of permanence and destruction [of it] is known only through the teachings of the Upanis ads. How? Because
of the understanding. For, in all the Upanis ads the sentences are understood as contextually conveying this meaning. (tad brahma sarvaja sarvaakti jagadutpatti sthitilayakraa vedntastrd
evvagamyate. katham. samanvayt. sarveu hi vednteu vkyni ttparyeaitasyrthasya pratipdakatvena samanugatni). The interpretation of samanvayt by San kara is not clear. The parallel with
Ra ma nuja would point to interpret it as a synonym of anvaya syntactical connection, but the following sentence including samanugatni could point to an etymological interpretation of samanvaya from
sam-anv-i- in analogy to sam-anu-gam-. I am grateful to Tiziana Pontillo, who discussed this issue with
me.
Throughout this article, boldface fonts represent the text commented upon.

Upanis ads they can convey the brahman, since their purpose is the knowledge
of the self.
iii A Mma msaka opponent stating that this is impossible, since the Veda aims at
actions and discontinuations of prohibited actions, and extending this claim
to all sentences, which are signi icant only insofar as they enjoin something.
iv A respondent saying that also descriptive statements can convey a meaning,
as shown by statements such as This is a rope, not a snake, which obviously
convey a meaning, as seen from their effect (namely the cessation of fear in the
listener).
v The siddhntin claiming that there is a radical distinction between the knowledge of sacri ice and that of brahman and that therefore the rules holding
in the sacri icial texts do not hold in the Upanis ads.
vi A long discussion on the permanence (nityatva) of brahman and of liberation
(moka).
vii A long discussion on the nature of cognition and how this is not an action.
viii Conclusion about the fact that the brahman is known through Upanis adic statements insofar as it is connected within them. This shows that the study of the
Upanis ads is distinct from that of the Bra hman as.
Immediately evident and directly relevant for Ra ma nujas reaction is San karas
stress on the Upanis ads and on their difference from the rest of the Vedas, as will
be examined in the next section.

3 Rmnujas theory
Ra ma nuja shares with San kara the belief that the brahman can be known through
the Upanis ads. However, Ra ma nujas understanding of how the Vedic language
works is completely different. First of all, Ra ma nuja does not want to focus on
the Upanis ads only. Since the beginning of his commentary on the UMS, the rbhya (henceforth SrBh) he has explicitly pointed out that the brahmajijs desire to investigate the brahman presupposes the study of the whole Veda, not just
of the Upanis ads (as maintained by San kara). Moreover, Ra ma nuja does not aim
yady apy anyatra vedava kya na m vidhisamspars am antaren a prama n atvam na dr stam, tatha py a tmavijn a nasya phalaparyantatva n na tadvis ayasya s astrasya pra ma n yam s akyam pratya khya tum.
pravr ttinivr ttiprayojanatva c cha strasya. tatha hi s astrata tparyavida a huh - dr sto hi tasya rthah
karma vabodhanam iti. codaneti kriya ya h pravartakam vacanam. tasya jn a nam upades ah (PMS
1.1.5) tadbhu ta na m kriya rthena sama mna yah (PMS 1.1.25) a mna yasya kriya rthatva d a narthakyam
atadartha na m (PMS 1.2.1) iti ca.
ra ja sau gacchattya diva kyavad veda ntava kya na m a narthakyam eva sya t.
atra bhidhyate- na, karmabrahmavidya phalayor vailaks an ya t.
The discussion starts as follows: nanu jn a nam na ma ma nas kriya . na, vailaks an ya t.
brahma s astraprama n akam veda ntava kyasamanvaya diti siddham.
evan ca sati atha to brahmajijn a sa iti tadvis ayah pr thaks astra rambha upapadyate.

at rejecting the Pu rva Mma msa approach, but rather at subsuming it as part of his
Vis is tadvaita Veda nta system (on both topics see Freschi 2017).
Consequently, Ra ma nuja could not be satis ied with a half-done solution, which
makes only the Upanis adic statements able to describe the brahman, while all the
rest of the Vedic texts only prescribes actions. Therefore, Ra ma nujas approach
in his commentary on the same UMS 1.1.4 (called samanvayastra) is altogether
different from San karas one. Unlike San kara, Ra ma nuja tried to understand the
whole Veda as functioning in a uniform way and therefore needed to include the
prescriptive statements of the Bra hman as in his explanation. He therefore needed
to bridge the gap between sentences describing states of affairs and sentences promoting sacri icial actions, like the Bra hman a prescriptions.
Let me now go through the details of the argument as found in SrBh ad 1.1.4.

3.1 The argument in rBh ad 1.1.4

As in San karas commentary, also in the SrBh the stra UMS 1.1.4 is introduced as
dealing exactly with the topic of this article:
[Obj.:] Although the brahman is outside the precinct of application of
any instrument of knowledge other [than the Veda], nonetheless the
Veda cannot convey it, since it is something established and lacks the
nature of pointing to an action or to something to be discontinued.
[R:] Due to this doubt, he says This, by contrast, [is possible], due to
the connection || 1.1.4 ||
The opponents reasoning is clear: if the Vedas point to something to be done,
they cannot speak about the brahman and if they speak about the brahman, they
cannot point to something to be done.
San kara had chosen the second alternative and restricted it to the Upanis ads:
They speak about the brahman and do not point to something to be done. Ra ma nuja
starts by refusing this sharp distinction and by pointing to a continuity between
prescriptive and descriptive aspects of language. As already hinted at in the previous section, this continuity will be highlighted also in Ra ma nujas inal solution. In
contrast to the sharp distinction presupposed by the opponent, Ra ma nuja shows
that the brahman needs to be included in each Vedic prescription, since these point
to a goal (artha), and the brahman is the ultimate human goal:
The word by contrast serves to interrupt the doubt which had been
automatically carried on in the context. This is the fact that it is indeed possible that the brahman is known through the Veda. Why? Due
to the connection. The connection is the connection [of the brahman within each Vedic prescription] through the fact of [its] being the
supreme human goal. The brahman [can be conveyed by the Veda] beyady api prama n a ntara gocaram brahma, tatha pi pravr ttinivr ttiparatva bha vena siddharu pam
brahma na s astram pratipa dayatty a s an kya hatat tu samanvayt || 1.1.4 ||

cause it is connected (with each Vedic prescription), as something to

be denoted, insofar as it is the supreme human goal.
In this way, Ra ma nujas analysis leaves the door open to a model of interpretation
stressing the injunctive function of language, insofar as sentences all ultimately
point to a purpose (prayojana). Ra ma nuja goes on explaining that even statements
which do not seem to convey any purpose ultimately do point to one:
Similarly, also in the case of [sentences that] point at [the description
of] their own nature, like A son was born to you or This is not a
snake, one sees that they [in fact] have the purpose of joy or of the
cessation of fear.
However, the opponent steps in again and contests the implicit equivalence of goal
and purpose. He insists that the brahman cannot be conveyed by the Veda and
unfolds his argument as follows:
1. No sentence is used without a purpose (na ca kicit prayojanam anuddiya
vkyaprayoga ravaa v sabhavati).
2. In the case of A son was born to you (or This is a rope, not a snake) the
purpose (prayojana) is achieved not through the obtainment of a human goal
(artha), but only through the cognition (jna) of its obtainment (cf. argument No. iv in San kara).
3. Therefore a purpose can be achieved by a sentence by means of causing one
to undertake or discontinue an action, but also by means of communicating a piece of information (tasmt sarvatra pravttinivttiparatvena jnaparatvena v prayojanaparyavasnam).
4. Vedic sentences cannot convey the brahman, which is something established,
since there cannot be any purpose in regard to something already established (parinipanne vastuni ttparysabhavn na vednt parinipanna
brahma pratipdayanti).
5. A further opponent adds that the brahman cannot be itself something to
be done, since it is permanent (tasya nityatvenbhavyarpatvt). If it were
something to be done, it would necessarily end up being impermanent.
The point No. 3 is then discussed at length, since the status of knowledge (jna)
is fundamental also within the Vis is tadvaita vs. Advaita polemics (cf. San kara,
argument No. vii). Ra ma nuja concludes that sheer knowledge is not enough to
eliminate the hinderance to liberation (vkyrthajnamtrt bandhanivttyanupapatte). Then, the discussion focuses for several pages on ontology (the status
prasakta s an ka nivr ttyarthah tus abdah . tat s astraprama n akatvam brahman ah sambhavaty eva.
kutah . samanvayt. paramapurus arthataya nvayah samanvayah ; paramapurus arthabhu tasyaiva brahman ah abhidheyataya nvaya t. (SrBh ad UMS 1.1.4)
tatha - svaru papares v api putras te ja tah , na yam sarpah itya dis u hars abhayanivr ttiru paprayojanavattvam dr stam.

of liberation, that of the brahman and of its relation to the jva individual soul)
and the linguistic aspect of the problem is left aside (as in San kara, see argument
No. vi).
At the end of this long excursus, Ra ma nuja re-asserts his conclusion, according to which the brahman can be connected within each Vedic sentence, insofar
as it is the (ultimate) human goal (pururthataynvaya). He then elaborates on
the unitary nature of the Vedas: Some Vedic sentences merely describe the brahman, others enjoin devotion (upsana) as a means to attain it. The two sets are
connected, since once one has established the existence of the brahman, one naturally asks for the means to reach it. In a beautiful simile, Ra ma nuja speaks of one
who has known about a treasure hidden in her house. This very piece of information causes her to undertake an action, as she will start looking for it and digging
around:
For instance, someone comes to know that there is a treasure in her
house by means of a sentence stating it. Unsatis ied [by the sheer knowledge], she then undertakes action to get it.
Thus, Vedic statements describe the brahman, but at the same time they raise
ones desire to know the means to attain it, namely adoration (upsana).

3.2 Rmnujas theory of Vedic signi ication

Ra ma nujas SrBh is not written as a treatise (prakaraa) dealing independently
and exhaustively with one or more philosophical topics. Therefore, it is no wonder that also the present topic is not dealt as completely as a contemporary scholarly audience would have hoped for. Ra ma nuja clearly opposed the Mma msaka
standpoint, according to which Vedic sentences are all prescriptive in nature, as
well as the Advaita one, according to which knowledge is equated to the elimination of nescience and is directly tantamount to liberation. He also paved the way
for Ven katana thas incorporation of the Mma msa theory within the Vis is tadvaita
one, insofar as he considered the brahman as a goal, does allowing a reconciliation between the theories stressing the descriptive function of language and the
one stressing its prescriptive function.

4 Vekaanthas development of Rmnujas theory

Last, let me focus on the further development of Ra ma nujas theory within Vis is tadvaita Veda nta by looking at the work of Ven katana tha (also known with the honori ic title of Veda nta Des ika, traditional dates 12691370), and especially at his
Sevaramms, which interprets from a Vis is tadvaita Veda nta perspective the
Pu rva Mma msa theories. Due to this double starting-point, Ven katana thas Sevaramms needed to accommodate Ra ma nujas theories while at the same time
keeping a Pu rva Mma msa frame of reference. In the case at stake, the Sevaramms
7

needed to take into account the Pu rva Mma msa view about the prescriptive nature
of the Vedas without violating Ra ma nujas authoritative theory. Simultaneously,
Ven katana tha needed to convince even his Pu rva Mma msa audience of the rightness of Ra ma nujas theory. Thus, the analysis of the Sevaramms enables one
to look at Ra ma nujas reception within his own school and to focus on the speci ic
challenge constituted by the in luent Pu rva Mma msa school.
More in detail, Ven katana tha deals at length with the issue in the second book
of the Sevaramms (henceforth SM), dedicated to the arthavdas commendatory statements in the Veda. These statements are not prescriptive in nature and
are therefore a perfect case study to discuss the validity of non-prescriptive statements of the Veda. Pu rva Mma msa authors typically explain that arthavdas convey valid knowledge (since the whole Veda cannot entail non-valid statements),
but only insofar as they supplement a prescription. For instance, the commendatory statement vyur vai kepih devata Va yu is indeed the fastest deity does
not convey any information about a speci ic deity and his fastness, but is rather to
be read as a supplement to the prescription to sacri ice to Va yu. What purpose
does this supplement serve? It conveys a praise (stuti) of the sacri icial action
which is thus commended, insofar as it will deliver swiftly the wished result. In
other words, the mention of Va yus fastness is to be read as commending the sacri ice to Va yu as a fast means to its result.
In this sense, Mma msa authors claim, the commendatory statements ful il the
role of conveying the itikartavyat procedure of a prescription. In other words,
they do not convey the action to be performed, nor the person who needs to perform it, but rather ful il the same role of the accessory prescriptions specifying
all the speci ic details enjoined when a main sacri ice such as the Full and New
Moon sacri ice is prescribed (how to prepare the oblation cakes, out of which wood
should the ladle be made and son. The procedure is necessarily needed to perform
a sacri ice, since otherwise one would not know what exactly to sacri ice, when,
and how to sacri ice it. In this sense, commendatory statements are also deemed
necessary. The weak point of this theory about commendatory statements is that,
in contrast to what happens with the ritual procedure, they are not necessarily
present in connection to each prescription. There are in fact several Vedic prescriptions to which no arthavda is attached (as aptly noted by the opponent embedded
in SM ad PMS 1.2.6, p. 155, especially: parasparkky hi tayo sambandhaniyamas syt. na vtra ssti, arthavdnvayam antarea vidhyuddeasya pravartakatvaakte, yath arthavdarahitasya. na hi arthavda sarvey vidhiu). How
is this possible, if the praise conveyed by commendatory statements is as needed
as the ritual procedure? The answer can only be that praise is an added element,
but not a necessary requirement (see, again, the opponent embedded in SM ad PMS
1.2.6, p. 155: pravtte ca stutydyapekniyambhvt). One might suggest that
the praise is indeed always needed and that if it is not present in an explicit commendatory statement, one must supply it (through adhyhra). But this leads to
a petitio principii: One postulates that the praise conveyed by the commendatory
statements is needed, because it is present in the Veda. However, when no praise is
conveyed, because there are no commendatory statements, one postulates that an
unspoken praise should nonetheless be supplied, because it is needed (aabdc ca
8

stutyde kalpane nyonyrayat). In other words, one irst postulates that commendatory statements need a role, because they are present, and then states that
they must be postulated also when they are not present, because they have a role.
Accordingly, within the SM an opponent is even more radical than the mainstream Mma msa scholar and says that commendatory statements are not valid at
all, neither as supplement of a prescription nor independently. They are not valid
as supplements to the prescription because prescriptions alone are able to attain
their purpose and commendatory statements are therefore useless. They are also
not independently valid, since the PMS itself explains that the Veda is only valid insofar as it conveys an action (The Veda is for the purpose of an action (mnyasya
kriyrthatvt) PMS 1.2.1) (SM ad 1.2.1, Viraraghavacharya and Nainaracarya 1971,
p. 140). Therefore, the opponent concludes, the commendatory statements are
purposeless and may even be impermanent (anitya).
But Ven katana tha notes that this conclusion risks to jeopardise the authority
of the whole Veda, which is deeply connected to its being permanent and thus independent of any author. His conclusion is that commendatory statements need
to convey something established and true. Only insofar as they convey something
true can the praise they deliver be effective. How could one praise by saying something false? This point (usually formulated with some variation of asat stutir
ayukt a praise through something unreal is incorrect) is repeated again and
again in SM 1.2 (see, for instance, SM ad 1.2.1, Viraraghavacharya and Nainaracarya
1971, p. 145, SM ad 1.2.28, Viraraghavacharya and Nainaracarya 1971, p. 198).
Thus, Ven katana thas conclusion sees the commendatory statements as conveying something established (siddha) and as being, through that, able to subserve
a prescription. This leads him to conclude that the whole Veda conveys irst and
foremost something established. Due to the truth of these conveyed contents, one
is lead to action in order to obtain the corresponding results.
At this point, a further objector raises his voice in the SM, and states that there
is no continuity between describing and prescribing. A discussant observes that a
continuity happens to be noticeable in worldly experience, so that a sentence explaining how lucrative selling gems can be, is enough to lead one to undertake that
activity (SM ad 1.2.20, Viraraghavacharya and Nainaracarya 1971, p. 186). The
objector replies that this may be the case in ordinary experience, where we have
enough background information helping us, but not in the Veda (Viraraghavacharya
and Nainaracarya 1971, pp. 186187). Ven katana tha is not explicit about this
background information, but one might imagine he is referring to the fact that people in the world already know how nice it is to be wealthy and how easy it is to sell
small things like gems (unlike selling horses or big quantities of rice etc.), so that
the shift from the descriptive to the prescriptive is easily accomplished through
ones own assumptions telling one something like Use each easy chance to become wealthy. By contrast, Vedic rituals may be cumbersome and some of them
do not even have an immediate result, so that there is nothing apart a prescription
which could motivate one to undertake them.
This is achieved in accordance with Ra ma nujas theory and his simile of the
treasure (see above, end of section ??). Ven katana tha further explains that all sacri icial actiona conveyed in the Bra hman as and examined in the PMS are in fact
9

some form or other of upsana adoration. Thus, the sacri ices enjoined in the
Bra hman as are in fact an adoration of God insofar as he is the inner controller (antarymin) of the deities who are the recipients of the various sacri ices. The Veda
speaks about Him and leads people to undertake actions to please Him as a consequence.

5 Conclusions
Ven katana tha fully spells out Ra ma nujas intuition of a continuity between prescriptive and descriptive texts. Ra ma nujas commentary on UMS 1.1.4 seems to imply that he intended this continuity as proceeding from descriptive texts towards
prescriptive ones, since the former make their listener desirous to know about the
means to reach the positive things they describe. Ven katana thas SM (perhaps also
because of its being a commentary on the PMS) takes a slightly different perspective and interprets the prescriptive element as the inal outcome of the communicative process. Ven katana tha agrees with Ra ma nuja that the Vedas do convey
factual truths and that without it no undertaking of actions would be possible, and
sees even more than Ra ma nuja, it seems description and prescription as two
elements of the same communication process, with the latter being a natural continuation of the former.
Trying to look at the topic from without, one is led to think of the parallel with
Austins theory of speech acts, and of how a plainly descriptive statements can have
perlocutionary (i.e., prescriptive) effects.

Abbreviations
PMS Pu rva Mma msa Su tra attributed to Jaimini
SM Ses varamma msa by Ven katana tha
SrBh Sr Bha s ya (commentary on the UMS) by Ra ma nuja
UMS Uttara Mma msa Su tra (also known as Brahmasu tra or Veda ntasu tra) attributed
to Ba dara yan a

References
Freschi, Elisa (2014). The Study of Indian Linguistics. Prescriptive Function of Language in the Nyyamajar and in the Speech Act Theory. In: Open Pages in
South Asian Studies. Ed. by Alexander A. Stolyarov and Joe Pellegrino. Woodland Hills, California: SASA Books, pp. 2762.
I discussed this topic from the point of view of Jayantas theory of language in Freschi 2014.

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 (2017). Reusing, Adapting, Distorting? Ven katana thas reuse of Ra ma nuja, Ya muna and the Vr ttika ra in his commentary ad PMS 1.1.1. In: Adaptive Reuse
of Texts, Ideas and Images in Classical India. Ed. by Elisa Freschi and Philipp
A. Maas. Abhandlungen fu r die Kunde des Morgenlandes. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz.
Viraraghavacharya, Uttamur T. and Nainaracarya, eds. (1971). SevarammsMmspaduke, Seswara Mimamsa and Mimamsa paduka [by Vekaantha].
Madras: Ubhaya Vedanta Granthamala.

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