Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Romualdez-Marcos
COMELEC.
v.
Caasi vs Comelec
Macalintal vs Comelec
Badelles vs Cabili
Purisima vs Salanga
Cauton vs Comelec
Roque vs Comelec
honest,
peaceful
elections.
and
credible
People vs Corral
Registration of Voters
Yra vs Abano
Frivaldo vs COMELEC
Mercado vs Manzano
Villaber vs Comelec
Lonzanida vs Comelec
Abundo vs Comelec
The
consecutiveness
of
what
otherwise would have been Abundos
three
successive,
continuous
mayorship was effectively broken
during the 2004- 2007 term when he
was initially deprived of title to, and
was veritably disallowed to serve and
occupy, an office to which he, after
due proceedings, was eventually
declared to have been the rightful
choice of the electorate.
The declaration of being the winner in
an election protest grants the local
elected official the right to serve the
unexpired portion of the term. Verily,
while he was declared winner in the
protest for the mayoralty seat for the
2004-2007 term, Abundos full term
has been substantially reduced by the
actual service rendered by his
opponent (Torres). Hence, there was
actual involuntary interruption in the
term of Abundo and he cannot be
considered to have served the full
2004-2007 term.
Prior to the finality of the election
protest, Abundo did not serve in the
mayors office and, in fact, had no
legal right to said position. During the
pendency of the election protest,
Abundo ceased from exercising power
or authority. Consequently, the period
during which Abundo was not serving
as mayor should be considered as a
rest period or break in his service
because prior to the judgment in the
election protest, it was Abundos
opponent, Torres, who was exercising
Marquez vs Comelec
Risos-Vidal vs Comelec
Maquiling vs Comelec
Miranda vs Abaya
Jalosjos vs Comelec
In
considering
persons
holding
appointive positions as ipso facto
resigned from their posts upon the
filing of their CoCs, but not considering
as resigned all other civil servants,
specifically the elective ones, the law
unduly discriminates against the first
class. The fact alone that there is
substantial distinction between those
who hold appointive positions and
those occupying elective posts, does
not justify such differential treatment.
In order that there can be valid
classification so that a discriminatory
governmental act may pass the
constitutional
norm
of
equal
protection, it is necessary that the four
Administrative
Code
of
1987
(Executive Order No. 292), appointive
officials, as officers and employees in
the civil service, are strictly prohibited
from engaging in any partisan political
activity or take (sic) part in any
election except to vote. Under the
same provision, elective officials, or
officers or employees holding political
offices,
are
obviously
expressly
allowed to take part in political and
electoral activities.
Since the classification justifying
Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, i.e.,
elected officials vis--vis appointive
officials, is anchored upon material
and significant distinctions and all the
persons belonging under the same
classification are similarly treated, the
equal protection clause of the
Constitution is, thus, not infringed.
Considering that elected officials are
put in office by their constituents for a
definite term, it may justifiably be said
that they were excluded from the
ambit of the deemed resigned
provisions in utmost respect for the
mandate of the sovereign will. In other
words,
complete
deference
is
accorded to the will of the electorate
that they be served by such officials
until the end of the term for which
they were elected. In contrast, there is
no such expectation insofar as
appointed officials are concerned
The
dichotomized
treatment
of
appointive and elective officials is
therefore germane to the purposes of
the law.
Mendoza vs Comelec
recent
case
of
Marcoleta
v.
COMELEC, 5 it completely ignored and
disregarded its very own decree and
proceeded
with
the
questioned
Resolution of 8 February 2010 and
Order of 4 March 2010, in all, annulling
the proclamation of petitioner Joselito
R. Mendoza as the duly elected
governor
of
Bulacan,
declaring
respondent Roberto M. Pagdanganan
as the duly elected governor, and
ordering petitioner Joselito R. Mendoza
to cease and desist from performing
the functions of the Governor of
Bulacan and to vacate said office in
favor of respondent Roberto M.
Pagdanganan.
The grave abuse of discretion of the
COMELEC is underscored by the fact
that the protest that petitioner
Pagdanganan filed on 1 June 2007
overstayed with the COMELEC until
the present election year when the
end of the term of the contested office
is at hand and there was hardly
enough time for the re-hearing that
was conducted only on 15 February
2010. As the hearing time at the
division had run out, and the rehearing time at the banc was fast
running out, the unwanted result came
about: incomplete appreciation of
ballots; invalidation of ballots on
general
and
unspecific
grounds;
unrebutted presumption of validity of
ballots.
Socrates vs Comelec
Chavez vs Comelec
SECTION
32. All
propaganda
materials such as posters, streamers,
stickers or paintings on walls and
other materials showing the picture,
image or name of a person, and all
Penera
2009)
vs
Comelec
(MFR
(1) The
effective
date
when
partisan political acts become
unlawful as to a candidate is
when the campaign period
starts. Before the start of the
campaign period, the same
partisan political acts are lawful.
(2) Accordingly, a candidate is
liable for an election offense
only for acts done during the
campaign period, not before. In
other words, election offenses
can
be
committed
by
a
candidate only upon the start of
the campaign period. Before the
start of the campaign period,
such election offenses cannot
be so committed. Since the law
is clear, the Court has no
recourse but to apply it.
SWS vs Comelec
ER Ejercito vs Comelec
The
aggregate
amount that a candidate or
registered political party may
spend for election campaign
shall be as follows:
(a) For candidates Ten pesos
(P10.00) for President and Vice
President;
and
for
other
candidates, Three pesos (P3.00)
for
every
voter
currently
registered in the constituency
where he filed his certificate of
candidacy: Provided, That,
a
candidate without any political
party and without support from
any political party may be
allowed to spend Five pesos
(P5.00) for every such voter;
and
(b) For political parties Five
pesos (P5.00) for every voter
currently registered in the
constituency or constituencies
where it has official candidates.
Any provision of law to the
contrary notwithstanding, any
contribution in cash or in kind to
any candidate or political party
or coalition of parties for
campaign
purposes,
duly
reported to the Commission,
shall not be subject to the
payment of any gift tax.
The phrase "those incurred or caused
to be incurred by the candidate" is
sufficiently adequate to cover those
expenses which are contributed or
donated in the candidate's behalf. By
virtue of the legal requirement that a
contribution or donation should bear
the
written
conformity
of
the
candidate,
a
contributor/supporter/donor certainly
qualifies as "any person authorized by
such candidate or treasurer." Ubi lex
non distinguit, nec nos distinguere
debemus. (Where the law does not
distinguish, neither should We.) There
should be no distinction in the
application of a law where none is
indicated.
The
inclusion
of
the
amount
contributed by a donor to the
candidate's allowable limit of election
expenses does not trample upon the
free exercise of the voters' rights of
speech and of expression under
Section
4,
Article
III
of
the Constitution. As a content-neutral
regulation, the law's concern is not to
curtail the message or content of the
advertisement promoting a particular
candidate but to ensure equality
between and among aspirants with
"deep pockets" and those with less
financial resources. Any restriction on
speech or expression is only incidental
and is no more than necessary to
achieve the substantial governmental
interest of promoting equality of
opportunity in political advertising.
Diocese
Comelec
of
Bacolod
vs
1-UTAK vs Comelec