Professional Documents
Culture Documents
4.
LOPEZ v CA ...............................................................................................................23
5.
SALAO v SALAO......................................................................................................24
6.
1.
MORALES v CA...........................................................................................................2
7.
PNB v CA ....................................................................................................................26
2.
PENALBER v CA ........................................................................................................3
8.
9.
Contents
I.
II.
1.
10.
ADAZA v CA .........................................................................................................29
2.
11.
3.
CANEZO v ROJAS.......................................................................................................6
12.
4.
PNB v AZNAR..............................................................................................................7
13.
5.
14.
GAYONDATO v TREASURER.......................................................................33
6.
CANEZO v ROJAS....................................................................................................10
15.
7.
16.
8.
GAMBOA.....................................................................................................................12
17.
9.
TY v TY ........................................................................................................................13
18.
10.
19.
11.
20.
BRITO v DIANALA............................................................................................39
12.
21.
13.
III.
IMPLIED TRUSTS...................................................................................................18
1.
2.
3.
1 TRUSTS CASE DIGESTS by: Alojado, Atienza, Balderama, Camarao, Carandang, Cruz, Estilles, Garcia, Gonzaga, Hui, Lazaro, Senajon
Morales v CA
G.R. No. 117228
June 19, 1997
RODOLFO MORALES, represented by his heirs, and PRISCILA MORALES,
petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (Former Seventeenth Division), RANULFO ORTIZ, JR., and
ERLINDA ORTIZ, respondents.
Celso Avelino - Seller
Ranulfo & Erlinda Ortiz Spouses-Buyers
Rodolfo Morales Nephew-Builder
Priscila Morales Sellers Other Sister / Mother of Builder
FACTS
Seller owns two adjoining parcels of land on which he constructed a
house where he let his parents and sister lived while he worked as City Fiscal of
Calbayog, then Immigration Officer, and, later on, as Judge of CFI Cebu.
While in Cebu, without the Sellers knowledge, his Nephew built a
beauty shop on his property. When he was offering to sell the property to
prospective buyer Spouses, the latter did an ocular inspection and was able to
talk with the Nephew, who encouraged them to buy the property and assured
them that he will vacate the premises if notified by the seller to do so. The sale
was consummated and the Spouses paid the purchase price. Unfortunately,
despite due notice from the Seller, the Nephew refused to vacate or demolish
the beauty shop unless he is reimbursed for P35k. The Spouses also
subsequently found out that the Nephew also then occupied the dilapidated
residential building, which the former had sought to repair. The Spouses then
filed a case to recover the property against the Nephew (later substituted by his
heirs).
According to the Nephews mother, sister of the Seller, (aside from the
one who live in the house constructed) who also intervened in the case, the
property was inherited by her together with their other siblings, except for the
Seller who was away for 30 years because of his job. The Seller, being the only
son, was allowed by their father to acquire the property with money coming
from the father. She further alleged that the constructed house was built by
their parents and that the built beauty shop was with the knowledge and
consent of the Seller. She intervened arguing that the sale was fraudulent for
including her share and the beauty shop of her son.
The Trial Court ruled in favor of the Spouses and ordered the Nephew
to vacate and remove the beauty shop. The court noted that the sellers siblings
and their descendants had not disputed the Sellers ownership of the property
nor the extra judicial-partition effected on the property, even though two of the
Sister-Intervenors children were lawyers. It further noted that the claim of
ownership by the buyer Spouses were based on documentary evidence (Deed of
Conveyance, tax declarations transferred to the wife-buyer, etc.), as against the
evidence presented by the Sellers Sister and Nephew which were only
testimonial. Furthermore, the other sisters did not join them and intervened in
the case. The court further ruled that their claim of implied trust is untenable,
because in order for implied trust to exist there must be evidence of an
equitable obligation of the trustee to convey, which was absent in this case. The
CA affirmed the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE
WON the Seller was a mere trustee for his parents and siblings
RATIO
NO. As a rule, the burden of proving the existence of a trust is on the
party asserting its existence, and such proof must be clear and satisfactorily
show the existence of the trust and its elements. While implied trusts may be
proved by oral evidence, the evidence must be trustworthy and received
by the courts with extreme caution, and should not be made to rest on
loose, equivocal or indefinite declarations.
A trust is the legal relationship between one person having an
equitable ownership in property and another person owning the legal title
to such property, the equitable ownership of the former entitling him to
the performance of certain duties and the exercise of certain powers by
the latter. The characteristics of a trust are: (a) it is a relationship; (b) it is
a relationship of fiduciary character; (c) It is a relationship with respect to
2 TRUSTS CASE DIGESTS by: Alojado, Atienza, Balderama, Camarao, Carandang, Cruz, Estilles, Garcia, Gonzaga, Hui, Lazaro, Senajon
2. PENALBER v CA
FACTS:
The mother allowed the spouses to manage the hardware store. When
Mendoza put the property up for sale, the mother did not have cash to buy the
property. She allegedly entered into a verbal agreement with the spouses
wherein the lot would be bought by the spouses for and in behalf of the mother,
and since the spouses have the better credit standing, they would be made to
appear as the buyers so that the title to be issued in their names could be used
by the spouses to secure a loan with which to build a bigger building and
expand the business of the mother.
Pursuant to agreement, the spouses Ramos allegedly entered into a
contract of sale with Mendoza. Later, the spouses returned the management of
the hardware. On the bases of receipts and disbursements, the mother asserted
that the land was fully paid out of the funds of the store and if the spouses had
given any amount for the purchase price of the said land, they had already
sufficiently reimbursed themselves from the funds of the store. The mother
demanded from the spouses the reconveyance of the title to the land but the
spouses refused.
The Mothers Arguments:
The spouses were, in reality, mere trustees of the land, thus, they were
under a moral and legal obligation to reconvey title over the said property to
her.
She calls attention to the fact that the spouses could not account for the
P116,946.15 difference in the beginning inventory and the second inventory of
the stocks of the hardware store. As the spouses never denied the existence of
the said amount, the mother contends that they have the burden of proving
where this amount had gone, and their failure to discharge such burden, the
only conclusion would be that they did use the amount to purchase the property
making such property held merely in trust by the spouses for the mother.
The mother also alleges that based on the verbal agreement between
her and the spouses, a valid and enforceable trust agreement was created, and
such was clearly intended by the parties.
The SpousesArguments
The spouses contended that they were given not only the management,
but also the full ownership of the hardware store by the the mother, on the
condition that the stocks and merchandise of the store will be inventoried, and
out of the proceeds of the sales, the spouses shall pay the mothers outstanding
liabilities. According to the spouses, they bought the property from Mendoza
out of their own funds.
The spouses also said that given that the alleged trust concerns an
immovable property, it is unenforceable since the agreement was made verbally
3 TRUSTS CASE DIGESTS by: Alojado, Atienza, Balderama, Camarao, Carandang, Cruz, Estilles, Garcia, Gonzaga, Hui, Lazaro, Senajon
mother), by itself, is not conclusive proof that the said amount was used to pay
the purchase price of the property, such as would make it the property of the
mother held merely in trust by respondent spouses Ramos. The fact that the
spouses never denied the P116,946.15 difference, or that they failed to present
proof that they indeed used the said amount to pay the other obligations of the
mother is not sufficient to discharge the mothers burden to prove the existence
of the alleged express trust agreement.
II.
EXPRESS TRUSTS
1. TORBELA v ROSARIO
FACTS
The controversy began with a parcel of land (Lot No. 356-A) in
Pangasinan which was originally a part of a larger piece of land in the name of
Valeriano Semilla, married to Potenciano Acosta. Lot No. 356-A was given by
Valeriano to his sister Marta, married to Eugenio Torbela. Upon the death of the
Spouses Torbela, Lot No. 356-A was adjudicated in equal shares among their
children, the Torbela siblings, by virtue of a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition.
Then the Torbela siblings executed a Deed of Absolute Quitclaim over
Lot No. 356-A in favor of Dr. Rosario. Another Deed of Absolute Quitclaim was
subsequently executed, this time by Dr. Rosario, acknowledging that he only
borrowed Lot No. 356-A from the Torbela siblings and was already returning
the same.
Following the issuance of TCT No. 52751, Dr. Rosario obtained a loan
from DBP secured by a mortgage constituted on Lot No. 356-A. Dr. Rosario used
the proceeds of the loan for the construction of improvements on Lot No. 356-A.
Dr. Rosario was able to fully pay his loan from DBP. Dr. Rosario
acquired another loan from the Philippine National Bank (PNB) sometime in
1979-1981.
On December 8, 1981, Dr. Rosario and his wife, Duque-Rosario
(spouses Rosario), acquired a third loan in the amount of P1,200,000.00 from
Banco Filipino. To secure said loan, the spouses Rosario again constituted
mortgages on Lot No. 356-A, Lot No. 4489, and Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A.
Because Banco Filipino paid the balance of Dr. Rosarios loan from PNB,
the mortgage on Lot No. 356-A in favor of PNB was cancelled per Entry No.
533478.
4 TRUSTS CASE DIGESTS by: Alojado, Atienza, Balderama, Camarao, Carandang, Cruz, Estilles, Garcia, Gonzaga, Hui, Lazaro, Senajon
There is no dispute that the Torbela sibling inherited the title to Lot No.
356-A from their parents. Indeed, the Torbela siblings executed a Deed of
Absolute Quitclaim on December 12, 1964 in which they transferred and
conveyed Lot No. 356-A to Dr. Rosario for the consideration of P9.00. However,
the Torbela siblings explained that they only executed the Deed as an
accommodation so that Dr. Rosario could have Lot No. 356-A registered in his
name and use said property to secure a loan from DBP, the proceeds of which
would be used for building a hospital on Lot No. 356-Aa claim supported by
testimonial and documentary evidence, and borne out by the sequence of events
immediately following the execution by the Torbela siblings of said Deed.
Trust is the right to the beneficial enjoyment of property, the legal title
to which is vested in another. It is a fiduciary relationship that obliges the
trustee to deal with the property for the benefit of the beneficiary. Trust
relations between parties may either be express or implied. An express trust is
created by the intention of the trustor or of the parties, while an implied trust
comes into being by operation of law.61Express trusts are created by direct and
positive acts of the parties, by some writing or deed, or will, or by words either
expressly or impliedly evincing an intention to create a trust.
Under Article 1444 of the Civil Code, [n]o particular words are
required for the creation of an express trust, it being sufficient that a trust is
clearly intended. It is possible to create a trust without using the word trust
or trustee.
Conversely, the mere fact that these words are used does not
necessarily indicate an intention to create a trust. The question in each case is
whether the trustor manifested an intention to create the kind of relationship
which to lawyers is known as trust. It is immaterial whether or not he knows
that the relationship which he intends to create is called a trust, and whether or
not he knows the precise characteristics of the relationship which is called a
trust.
When Dr. Rosario was able to register Lot No. 356-A in his name under
TCT No. 52751 on December 16, 1964, an implied trust was initially established
between him and the Torbela siblings.
Dr. Rosarios execution of the Deed of Absolute Quitclaim on December
28, 1964, containing his express admission that he only borrowed Lot No. 356-A
from the Torbela siblings, eventually transformed the nature of the trust to an
express one. The express trust continued despite Dr. Rosario stating in his Deed
of Absolute Quitclaim that he was already returning Lot No. 356-A to the
Torbela siblings as Lot No. 356-A remained registered in Dr. Rosarios name
under TCT No. 52751 and Dr. Rosario kept possession of said property, together
with the improvements thereon.
Dr. Rosario argues that he is deemed to have repudiated the trust on
December 16, 1964, when he registered Lot No. 356-A in his name under TCT
No. 5275, so he claims that the action for the recovery has already prescribed.
The court rejected this argument and said that A trustee who obtains a
Torrens title over a property held in trust for him by another cannot repudiate
the trust by relying on the registration. (Ringor v. Ringor).
However, the Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals when it
held that Dr. Rosario repudiated the express trust when he acquired another
loan from PNB and constituted a second mortgage on Lot No. 356-A sometime
in 1979, which, unlike the first mortgage to DBP in 1965, was without the
knowledge and/or consent of the Torbela siblings. But the Torbela siblings were
able to institute Civil Case No. U-4359 well before the lapse of the 10-year
prescriptive period for the enforcement of their express trust with Dr. Rosario.
2. JULIO v DALANDAN
FACTS
An affidavit was subscribed and sworn to by Clemente Dalandan. By the
terms of this writing, Clemente Dalandan, deceased father of defendants
Emiliano and Maria Dalandan, acknowledged that a four-hectare piece of
riceland in Las Pias, Rizal belonging to Victoriana Dalandan, whose only child
and heir is plaintiff Victoria Julio, was posted as security for an obligation which
he, Clemente Dalandan, assumed but, however, failed to fulfill. The result was
that Victoriana's said land was foreclosed.
The key provisions of said document are:
3. That this riceland owned by VICTORIANA DALANDAN whose sole
heir is VICTORIA JULIO was posted as security for an obligation assumed by me
5 TRUSTS CASE DIGESTS by: Alojado, Atienza, Balderama, Camarao, Carandang, Cruz, Estilles, Garcia, Gonzaga, Hui, Lazaro, Senajon
"trustee" essential to the constitution of a trust. Conversely, the mere fact that
the word "trust" or "trustee" was employed would not necessarily prove an
intention to create a trust. What is important is whether the trustor manifested
an intention to create the kind of relationship which in law is known as a trust.
It is unimportant that the trustor should know that the relationship "which he
intends to create is called a trust, and whether or not he knows the precise
characteristics of the relationship which is called a trust."7 Here, that trust is
effective as against defendants and in favor of the beneficiary thereof, plaintiff
Victoria Julio, who accepted it in the document itself.
3. CANEZO v ROJAS
SOLEDAD CAEZO, substituted by WILLIAM CAEZO and VICTORIANO CAEZO
Petitioners, vs
CONCEPCION ROJAS, Respondent.
GR No. 148788
FACTS:
Soledad Caezo (Caezo) claims that she bought a parcel of land in
1939 from Crisogono Limpiado (Limpiado) but the transaction was not reduced
into writing. She immediately took possession of the property.
When she and her husband left for Mindanao in 1948, she entrusted the
land to her father, Cripulo Rojas (Crispulo), who took possession of and
cultivated the land. However, in 1980, she discovered that her stepmother,
Concepcion Rojas (Rojas), took possession of the land and that the tax
declaration was already transferred in Crispulos name.
Thus, Caezo filed a complaint for the recovery of the land plus
damages against Rojas.
Rojas, on the other hand, claims that it Crispulo who bought the
property from Limpiado in 1948. From then on until his death in 1978, Crispulo
was on possession of the land
ISSUE:
6 TRUSTS CASE DIGESTS by: Alojado, Atienza, Balderama, Camarao, Carandang, Cruz, Estilles, Garcia, Gonzaga, Hui, Lazaro, Senajon
4. PNB v AZNAR
G.R. No. 171805, May 30, 2011
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, PETITIONER
MERELO B. AZNAR; MATIAS B. AZNAR III; JOSE L. AZNAR (DECEASED),
REPRESENTED BY HIS HEIRS; RAMON A. BARCENILLA; ROSARIO T. BARCENILLA;
JOSE B. ENAD (DECEASED), REPRESENTED BY HIS HEIRS; AND RICARDO
GABUYA (DECEASED), REPRESENTED BY HIS HEIRS, RESPONDENTS.
7 TRUSTS CASE DIGESTS by: Alojado, Atienza, Balderama, Camarao, Carandang, Cruz, Estilles, Garcia, Gonzaga, Hui, Lazaro, Senajon
the stockholders, Aznar, et al., were the beneficiaries or the cestui que trust.
The CA set aside the judgment of the trial court. Although the Court of Appeals
agreed with the trial court that a judgment on the pleadings was proper, the
appellate court opined that the monetary contributions made by Aznar, et al., to
RISCO can only be characterized as a loan secured by a lien on the subject lots,
rather than an express trust. Thus, it directed PNB to pay Aznar, et al., the
amount of their contributions plus legal interest from the time of acquisition of
the property until finality of judgment.
ISSUE:
The relevant one: Were the contributions of the stockholders AN
EXPRESS TRUST?
HELD:
No they are not an express trust.
RATIO:
Trust is the right to the beneficial enjoyment of property, the legal title
to which is vested in another. It is a fiduciary relationship that obliges the
trustee to deal with the property for the benefit of the beneficiary. Trust
relations between parties may either be express or implied. An express trust is
created by the intention of the trustor or of the parties. An implied trust comes
into being by operation of law.[21]
Express trusts, sometimes referred to as direct trusts, are intentionally
created by the direct and positive acts of the settlor or the trustor - by some
writing, deed, or will or oral declaration. It is created not necessarily by some
written words, but by the direct and positive acts of the parties.[22] This is in
consonance with Article 1444 of the Civil Code, which states that "[n]o
particular words are required for the creation of an express trust, it being
sufficient that a trust is clearly intended."
In other words, the creation of an express trust must be manifested
with reasonable certainty and cannot be inferred from loose and vague
declarations or from ambiguous circumstances susceptible of other
interpretations.[23]
No such reasonable certitude in the creation of an express trust obtains
in the case at bar. In fact, a careful scrutiny of the plain and ordinary meaning of
the terms used in the Minutes does not offer any indication that the parties
thereto intended that Aznar,et al., become beneficiaries under an express trust
and that RISCO serve as trustor.
8 TRUSTS CASE DIGESTS by: Alojado, Atienza, Balderama, Camarao, Carandang, Cruz, Estilles, Garcia, Gonzaga, Hui, Lazaro, Senajon
October 1993 they opposed the said petition but later on withdrew the same on
the basis of a compromise agreement they entered with the heirs of Jose to
expedite the reconstitution of title. So on December 14, 1994, the Register of
Deed issued the reconstituted Title in the names of the heirs of Jose.
The heirs of Jose however did not honor the compromise agreement. So
on January 13, 1995, the heirs of Lino filed a complaint for annulment of title,
re-conveyance of property with damages. Joses heirs however said that the
action of Linos heirs had long prescribed or barred by laches.
DOCTRINE
If a trust relationship has been created between the parties whether expressly or
impliedly, prescription does not run until the said trust is repudiated.
ISSUE
a) WON Linos heirs had long prescribed or barred by laches.
b) How Express Trusts are created.
FACTS
HELD / RATIO
a)No. The rules on prescription and the principle of laches cannot be
applied here because of the existence of a trust relationship.
The case involved a parcel of Friar Land with an area of 13,308 square
meters known at Cebu City which was purchased from the Bureau of Lands way
back on 1919 by Emilio in his own behalf and on behalf of his brothers and
sisters who were the heirs of Jose. (Collectively known as Heirs of Jose)
The money that was used to purchase the land came from both Emilio
and their Uncle Lino so after full payment of the purchase price but prior to the
issuance of the deed of conveyance by the Bureau of Lands, Emilio executed an
Affidavit in Spanish dated on 1923 affirming that he, as one of the heirs of Jose
and his Uncle Lino then co-owned the lot. Thereafter or on 1924 the Bureau of
Lands executed the Deed of Conveyance in favor of Emilio and his siblings, or
the heirs of Jose by virtue of which a TCT was issued by the Register of Deeds.
On 1928, the lot was subdivided by Deputy Land Surveyor, Engineer
Bunag into two (2) equal parts with an area of 6,664 square meters for Lino and
an area of 6,664 square meters for Emilio and the other heirs of Jose. This was
approved by the Director of Lands on 1928.
On 1939, the heirs of Lino purchased the share of the lot of the heirs of
Jose as evidenced by the Calig-onan sa Panagpalit executed by the parties in
Visayan dialect. So the heirs of Lino immediately took possession of the entire
13,308 sqm lot.
When World War II broke out however, Linos heirs fled the city. When
they came back after the war, they found their homes and possessions and the
records in the government offices burned and destroyed with squatters
occupying their entire property.
Linos heirs subsequently learned that one of the heirs of Jose filed a
petition for reconstitution of title over the Lot on September 17, 1993. So in
9 TRUSTS CASE DIGESTS by: Alojado, Atienza, Balderama, Camarao, Carandang, Cruz, Estilles, Garcia, Gonzaga, Hui, Lazaro, Senajon
6. CANEZO v ROJAS
FACTS
Soledad Canezo filed a complaint for the recovery of real property plus
damages against Conception Rojas (2nd wife of her father). Canezo alleged that
she bought the said land from Crisogono Limpiado although the transaction was
not in writing. Then she entrusted it to her father when she and her husband
had to go mindanao. The father took possession of the said land and then one
day canezo found out that Rojas was in possession of the said land and the tax
declarations were under his fathers name.
Rojas contends that her husband (father of canezo) bought the land
from the same seller. The father took possession and cultivated it. Canezo has
knowledge of it because it was included in the estate of the father (father died)
and canezo did not protest meaning she abandoned her right assuming canezos
contentions were true. Canezo is barred by laches and estoppel.
MTC was in favor of canezo. Rojas appealed to RTC, decision was
reversed because action has not yet prescribed because it is a trust. Canezo filed
a motion for reconsideration, RTC reversed again the decision (in favor of
canezo). Rojas filed a motion to reconsider the decision but denied by RTC.
Rojas then filed a petition for review with CA reversed the decision of RTC
(ground is laches and prescription). Hence, this petition.
ISSUE
W/N there was a trust
HELD
No trust!
RATIO
Procedural issue: Canezo contends that the court should not have
granted the motion for extension of time to file. The court said, the grant or
denial of a motion fro extension of time is addressed to the sound discretion of
the court and there was a reasonable basis for the said extension.
Second issue: W/N there was a trust. Trust is a legal relationship
between one person having an equitable ownership of property and another
person owning the legal title to such property, the equitable ownership of the
former entitling him to the performance of certain duties and exercise of certain
powers by the latter. Trusts are either express or implied.
Express trust are those which are created by the direct and positive
acts of the parties by some writing or deed, or will, or by words evidencing and
intention to create a trust.
Implied trusts are those which, without being expressed, are deducible
from the nature of the transaction as matters of intent or, independently, of the
particular intention of the parties, as being superinduced ont eh transaction by
operation of law basically by reason of equity. It can be either resulting trust or
constructive trust.
Resulting trust is presumed always to have been contemplated. The
intention as to which can be found in the nature of their transaction altough not
expressed in a deed or instrument. Based on the equitable doctrine that it is the
more valuable consideration than the legal title that determines the equitable
interest in property. Trustworthy evidence is required in here.
Express trust and resulting trust trustee cannot acquire by
prescription a property entrusted to him unless he repudiates a trust. This is
because, in an express trust, the possession of a trustee is not adverse,
therefore, he does not acquire by prescription the property. The burden of
proving the existence of trust is on the party asserting it.
In this case, canezo failed to provide clear and satisfactorily proof of its
existence. Elements: (1) trustor who executes the instrument creating the trust;
(2) a trustee who is the person expressly designated to carry out the trust; (3)
the trust res consisting of duly identified and definite real property; and (4)
beneficiaries whose identity must be clear.
Canezos only evidence was her self-serving testimony of the
petitioner. Express trust may not be established by parol evidence. One
exception when there was a clear intention of such. However, it cannot be
inferred from canezos testimoney and the attendant facts and circumstances.
What they agreed is to give canezo a share of the copra in land.
10 TRUSTS CASE DIGESTS by: Alojado, Atienza, Balderama, Camarao, Carandang, Cruz, Estilles, Garcia, Gonzaga, Hui, Lazaro, Senajon
7. PACHECO v ARRO
G.R. No. L-48090 February 16, 1950
PETITIONERS: Dolores Pacheco, in her capacity as guardian of the minors
Concepcion, Alicia, and Herminia Yulo (SUCCESSORS-IN-INTEREST)
RESPONDENTS: Santiago Arro et al. (CLAIMANTS)
***Jose Yulo y Regalado (PREDECESSOR IN INTEREST)
FACTS
The CLAIMANTS filed answers in a cadastral case, claiming lots as their
property and began to present evidence before a referee. Dr. Mariano Yulo, who
represented the late PREDECESSOR-IN-INTEREST in the cadastral case, assured
and promised that after the change of the street names from Zamora and
Quennon streets to T. Yulo and G. Regalado streets, the PREDECESSOR-ININTEREST would convey and assign the lots to the claimants.
Because of this, the CLAIMANTS withdrew their claims and the
cadastral court confirmed the title to the lost and decreed their registration in
the name of the PREDECESSOR-IN-INTEREST.
The representative of the PREDECESSOR-IN-INTEREST complied with
the promise by executing deeds of donation or assignment to some of the
claimants.
***2/3 of this case is in Spanish; Im guessing that the part where the
CLAIMANTS filed a complaint was explained there.
CFI ordered the PREDECESSOR-IN-INTEREST to execute deeds of
assigned in favour of the CLAIMANTS for each and every lot claimed by them.
The CA affirmed.
The SUCCESSORS-IN-INTEREST contend that since a trustee does not
have title to the property which is the subject of the trust, because title to such
property is vested in the cestui que trust, if the PREDECESSOR-IN-INTEREST of
the SUCCESSORS-IN-INTEREST was a trustee, he or his successors-in-interest
could not and cannot be compelled in an action for specific performance to
convey or assign the property the subject of the trust because in an action
for specific performance the party to be compelled to perform is the owner of
has title to the property sought to be conveyed or assigned.
ISSUE
Whether or not the SUCCESSORS-IN-INTEREST may be compelled in an
action for specific performance to convey or assign the property.
RULING
YES. Judgment affirmed.
RATIO
The juridical concept of a trust, which in a broad sense involves, arises
from, or is the result of, a fiduciary relation between the trustee and the cestui
que trust as regards certain property real, personal, funds or money, or choses
in action must not be confused with an action for specific performance.
When the claim to the lots in the cadastral case was withdrawn by the
CLAIMANTS relying upon the assurance and promise made in open court by Dr.
Mariano Yulo in behalf of the PREDECESSOR-IN-INTEREST, a trust or a fiduciary
relation between them arose, or resulted therefrom, or was created thereby.
The trustee cannot invoke the statute of limitations to bar the action
and defeat the right of the cestui que trust. If the pretense of counsel for the
11 TRUSTS CASE DIGESTS by: Alojado, Atienza, Balderama, Camarao, Carandang, Cruz, Estilles, Garcia, Gonzaga, Hui, Lazaro, Senajon
8. GAMBOA
G.R. No. L-29556
FACTS:
This action was instituted in the Court of First Instance of the Province
of Pampanga by various plaintiffs of the surname or connection of Gamboa, for
the purpose of enforcing partition of some ten parcels of real property located
in the municipality of Santa Ana, in the province of Pampanga, of which, it is
asserted, the plaintiffs are coowners with the defendants Modesta, Pedro and
Rafael, of the same name. At the same time the plaintiffs seek to obtain an
accounting from Modesta Gamboa of the plaintiffs' shares in the procedure
taken from the land in the past.
To this complaint Modesta Gamboa answered with a general denial,
supplemented by an admission that the single parcel constituting the last item
specified in the complaint and identified as tax No. 6247, is in fact common
property of herself and the plaintiffs who are her coheirs, and asserting, as to
the rest, that she is the owner of the same and has been in adverse possession
thereof for more than ten years. The defendant Rafael and Pedro Gamboa
answered with a formal general denial, but at the trial they admitted the claim
to Modesta Gamboa as owner of the contested properties.
It is not disupted that all of the properties that are the subject of this
action once belonged to Juan Gamboa and Ana Manago, the parents of the first
set of Gamboa plaintiffs of the three defendants of the same name. There is no
controversy over the further fact that on August 27, 1987, Juan Gamboa and
wife sold all of the properties which are the subject of this action, except the
parcel identified by the tax assessment No. 6247, under contract of sale with
pacto de retro for two years to one Felipe Javier, the vendors, however,
remaining in possession in the character of lessees. The period of redemption
having been effected, and the property consolidated in Javier. But Juan Gamboa,
and after his death, his family, continued in possession as tenants under Javier.
On June 18, 1910, Javier then sold the properties to Feliciana and
Modesta Gamboa. The proof shows that ever since the property in question was
conveyed by Javier to the Gamboa sisters in 1910, the same has been
continuously in the possession of Modesta, except for the two years 1912 and
1913 when, by some arrangement or other, one of her brothers had charge as
manager. During this period Modesta exercised all the rights of ownership,
accounting of course to Feliciana for the latter's share of the produce during the
term of their ownership.
For the petitioners, this buying of the land was in effect a repurchase by
Feliciana and Modesta of the land in behalf of their ancestors.
ISSUE:
Whether the purchase of the land by the Gamboa sisters was in fact, in
trust only for the Juan Gamboa and in effect, be only co-owners as co-heirs with
the petitioners?
HELD:
No. This theory of the case, in our opinion, is untenable. The sale of the
property by Javier to the two sisters in 1910 was an unconditional transfer of
title to them, inasmuch as Javier had been undisputed owner of the property for
fully eleven years. Of course if it had really been agreed that the sisters were
purchasing the property in a trust character, that agreement might have been
enforced, but the nature of the title held by the sisters and the inconclusive
character of the proof of trusteeship refute this theory. We attribute little
importance to the form in which the property was assessed for taxation, in view
of the explanation which Modesta gives of the obstructions which she
encountered in straightening that matter out. The situation, as we see it, is that
Modesta Gamboa, during the period in which she has been part owner of the
property and during the later period in which she has held title in her own
name, has been surrounded by kinsfolk who were anxious to insinuate
themselves into a coownership of the property, and this litigation was
undoubtedly promoted chiefly by her brother Serapion Gamboa. But it is
noteworthy that at least two brothers have admitted her title.
The trial judge seems to have entertained the idea that the case must
turn upon the character of the possession exercised by Modesta Gamboa during
the period allowed by law for prescription; and he assumed that it was
necessary for her to show adverse possession during that period. This idea is
not of correct application, because Modesta Gamboa, either cojointly with her
sister Feliciana or exclusively in her own right, has held the legal title since
1910; and the fact that her brother and sisters may have questioned her right
12 TRUSTS CASE DIGESTS by: Alojado, Atienza, Balderama, Camarao, Carandang, Cruz, Estilles, Garcia, Gonzaga, Hui, Lazaro, Senajon
9. TY v TY
ALEJANDRO B. TY, petitioner, vs. SYLVIA S. TY, in her capacity as Administratrix of
the Intestate Estate of Alexander Ty, respondent.
G.R. No. 165696
April 30, 2008
FACTS:
Alexander Ty died and was succeeded by his wife Sylvia and his
daughter Krizia. A few months after his death, a petition for the settlement of his
intestate estate was filed. Sylvia, as administratrix, was ordered by the
California court to distribute his property in the United States. In the
Philippines, Sylvia submitted to the intestate Court in Quezon City an inventory
of the assets of Alexanders estate, consisting of shares of stocks and various
properties (EDSA Property, Meridien, and Wack-Wack). She asked the court to
permit her to sell/mortgage the properties of the estate in order to pay
additional estate tax as assessed by the BIR.
Apparently, this action did not sit well with her father-in-law,
Alejandro, who later filed a complaint for recovery of properties with prayer for
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order. In her opposition,
Sylvia claimed that plaintiff Alejandro had no actual or existing right, which
entitles him to the writ of preliminary injunction, for the reason that no express
trust concerning an immovable maybe proved by parole evidence under the
law. In addition, Sylvia Ty argued that the claim is barred by laches, and more
than that, that irreparable injury will be suffered by the estate of Alexander Ty
should the injunction be issued.
As to the complaint for recovery of properties, it is asserted by
Alejandro that he owns the three properties mentioned above. He said he
bought all three properties at different times, and registered them under his
sons name with the understanding that they will be held in trust for his
brothers and sisters in the event of his sudden demise. Plaintiff further alleged
that at the time the properties were purchased, his son was financially
incapable of purchasing said properties. He presented Alexanders and Sylvias
income tax returns to bolster his claim. Alejandro added that defendant acted in
bad faith in including the subject properties in the inventory of Alexander Tys
estate, for she was well aware that Alexander was simply holding the said
properties in trust for his siblings.
ISSUE:
13 TRUSTS CASE DIGESTS by: Alojado, Atienza, Balderama, Camarao, Carandang, Cruz, Estilles, Garcia, Gonzaga, Hui, Lazaro, Senajon
HELD:
While the legal title of the properties of the Mindoro Sugar Company
were in the Philippine Trust Company as trustee, Tan Sen Co. secured a
judgment against the Mindoro Sugar Company and sold, transferred, and
assigned that judgment to its trustee by their contract. Whether all the
properties of the Mindoro Sugar Company were sold by the justice of the peace
as recited in paragraph 9 of the stipulation of facts, is not controlled by the
insertion or omission of a comma in the stipulation of facts. An examination of
any of the standard dictionaries will show that the relative pronoun "which" is
descriptive and not restricted. If a restrictive relative pronoun were desired, the
word "that" should have been used.
While in the contract in question the Philippine Trust Company was
usually referred to as trustee, it must be noted that nowhere in the deed of trust
from the Mindoro Sugar Company to the Philippine Trust Company, was any
authority given to enter into a contract such as is here presented. The Philippine
Trust Company held the legal title to the properties of the Mindoro Sugar
Company to protect the bond holders. So far as the Philippine Trust Company
was concerned, it was not authorized to manage the affairs of the Mindoro
Sugar Company or to enter into contracts in its behalf. But even if the contract
had been authorized by the trust indenture, the Philippine Trust Company in its
individual capacity would still be responsible for the contract as there was no
express stipulation that the true estate and not the true trustee should be held
liable on the contract in question.
Not only is there no express stipulation that the trustee should not be
held responsible but in the "Wherefore" clause of the contract, the judgment
was expressly assigned in favor of the Philippine Trust Company, not the
Philippine Trust Company. If therefore follows that appellant had a right to
proceed directly against the Philippine Trust Company on its contract and has
no claim against either the Mindoro Sugar Company or the trust estate.
14 TRUSTS CASE DIGESTS by: Alojado, Atienza, Balderama, Camarao, Carandang, Cruz, Estilles, Garcia, Gonzaga, Hui, Lazaro, Senajon
the secondary school to be established. The widow and the collateral heirs
appealed.
ISSUE
HELD:
esse.
RATIO
According to the court, the clause in the will reveals the intent of
testator which must be given effect, which is to create a trust for the benefit of a
secondary school to be established in the town of Tayabas, naming as trustee
the ayuntamiento of the town or if there be no ayuntamiento, then the civil
governor of the Province of Tayabas.
Drawing on American precedents, the court notes that in order that a
trust may become effective there must, of course, be a trustee and a cestui
que trust. On the other hand, the claimants counsel argue that there is neither
in the present case; that there is no ayuntamiento, no Gobernador Civil of the
province, and no secondary school in the town of Tayabas.
An ayuntamiento corresponds to what in English is termed a municipal
corporation. But in the Philippines, provincial governors are the chief
executives of their respective provinces, and as the successor of the civil
governor of the province under the Spanish regime, may act as trustee in the
present case. In regard to private trust, it is not always necessary that
the cestui que trust should be named, or even be in esse (to be) at the
time the trust is created in his favor. Thus a devise to a father in trust for
accumulation for his children lawfully begotten at the time of his death
has been held to be good although the father had no children at the time of
the vesting of the funds in him as trustees. In charitable trust such as the
one here under discussion, the rule is still further relaxed.
While the collateral heirs argue that assuming all this to be true they
would nevertheless be entitled to the income of the land until the cestui que
trust is actually in esse. The court however disagreed. If the trustee holds the
legal title and the devise is valid, the natural heirs of the deceased have no
remaining interest in the land except their right to the reversion in the event the
devise for some reason should fail, an event which has not as yet taken place.
From a reading of the testamentary clause under discussion it seems quite
evident that the intention of the testator was to have income of the property
15 TRUSTS CASE DIGESTS by: Alojado, Atienza, Balderama, Camarao, Carandang, Cruz, Estilles, Garcia, Gonzaga, Hui, Lazaro, Senajon
FACTS:
Epifanio Gomez sold this property with pacto de retro to Yangco,
redeemable in 5 years. The period expired without redemption. Yangco,
however still allowed Epifanio to repurchase. Epifanio borrowed money from
Baas. Baas told Epifanio that he would let Epifanio have the money if
Epifanios siblings Marcelino and Telesfora would make themselves responsible
for the loan.
Marcelino and Telesfora agreed, so all four of them (Epifanio,
Marcelino, Telesfora, and Baas) met and agreed that Baas should advance the
sum of P7,000, upon the personal credit of Marcelino and Telesfora, and that
this money should be used to repurchase the property in the name of Telesfora
and Marcelino. Telesfora and Marcelino would hold and administer the
property until the capital advanced by Baas should be paid off, after which the
property would be returned to Epifanio.
Marcelino and Telesfora entered into a "private partnership in
participation" to redeem the property from Yangco. It was agreed that the
capital of this partnership should consist of P7,000, of which Marcelino was to
supply the amount of P1,500, and Telesfora the sum of P5,550. The important
provisions in this agreement are:
1.
That all the income, rent, and produce of the aforesaid property of
Epifanio shall be applied exclusively to the amortization of the capital
employed by the Marcelino and Telesfora.
2.
As soon as the capital employed, interest and other expenses are
covered, said properties shall be returned to Epifanio Gomez or to his
legitimate children
3.
In order that the property may be returned, it is made essential that
Epifanio shall manifest good behavior in the opinion of Marcelino and
Telesfora.
Epifanio later died, leaving a widow, Paulina Cristobal, and 4children.
Marcelino meanwhile entered into possession of the property, a possession
which he subsequently maintained for 20 yrs. During this period, Marcelino
improved the larger parcel by extending the salt beds constructed upon it.
Later, Telesfora conveyed to Marcelino her interest and share in the
property previously redeemed from Yangco. Marcelino Gomez eventually paid
to Baas the sum of P7,575.92 in full satisfaction of the entire claim and
received from Baas a reconveyance of the property.
Paulina and children filed action to recover property from Marcelino.
They claimed that the capital had been covered by the propertys income, hence,
the same should be returned to them.
ISSUE:
W/N a trust agreement was created. YES.
W/N the property should be returned to Cristobal and her children. YES.
HELD:
The so-called partnership agreement (Exhibit A) between
Marcelino Gomez and his sister created a trust for the express purpose of
rescuing the property of Epifanio Gomez; and now that the purpose has
been accomplished, the property should be returned to his legitimate
children, as provided in paragraph (i) of the agreement.
This bilateral contract was fully binding on both the contracting
parties; and the trial court did not err in declaring that, under the second trial
paragraph of article 1257 of the Civil Code, the successors of Epifanio Gomez are
entitled to demand fulfillment of the trust. In Martinez vs. Grao (42 Phil., 35),
we held that a person who, before consolidation of property in the purchaser
under a contract of sale with pacto de retro, agrees with the vendors to buy the
property and administer it till all debts constituting an encumbrance thereon
16 TRUSTS CASE DIGESTS by: Alojado, Atienza, Balderama, Camarao, Carandang, Cruz, Estilles, Garcia, Gonzaga, Hui, Lazaro, Senajon
FACTS:
DBP adopted Resolution No. 794 creating the DBP Gratuity Plan and
authorizing the setting up of a retirement fund to cover the benefits due to DBP
retiring officials and employees under Commonwealth Act No. 186, as amended.
A Trust Indenture was entered into by and between the DBP and the Board of
Trustees of the Gratuity Plan Fund, vesting in the latter the control and
administration of the Fund.
The Bank established a Special Loan Program availed thru the facilities
of the DBP Provident Fund and funded by placements from the Gratuity Plan
Fund as part of the benefit program of the Bank to provide financial assistance
to qualified members to enhance and protect the value of their gratuity
benefits.
Under it, a prospective retiree is allowed the option to utilize in the
form of a loan a portion of his outstanding equity in the gratuity fund and to
invest it in a profitable investment or undertaking. The earnings of the
investment shall then be applied to pay for the interest due on the gratuity loan.
The excess or balance of the interest earnings shall then be distributed to the
investor-members.
The payments were disallowed by the Auditor under Audit Observation
Memorandum No. 93-2 on the ground that the distribution of income of the
Gratuity Plan Fund (GPF) to future retirees of DBP is irregular and constituted
the use of public funds for private purposes which is specifically proscribed
under Section 4 of P.D. 1445.
Apart from requiring the recipients to refund their dividends, the
Auditor recommended that the DBP record in its books as miscellaneous
income the income of the Gratuity Plan Fund (Fund). The Auditor reasoned
that the Fund is still owned by the Bank, the Board of Trustees is a mere
administrator of the Fund in the same way that the Trust Services Department
where the fund was invested was a mere investor and neither can the
employees, who have still an inchoate interest [i]n the Fund be considered as
rightful owner of the Fund.
Former DBP Chairman Alfredo C. Antonio requested then COA
Chairman Celso D. Gangan to reconsider AOM No. 93-2. It was denied by the
COA.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
are
17 TRUSTS CASE DIGESTS by: Alojado, Atienza, Balderama, Camarao, Carandang, Cruz, Estilles, Garcia, Gonzaga, Hui, Lazaro, Senajon
merely
III.
IMPLIED TRUSTS
1. RAMOS v RAMOS
FACTS:
Spouses Martin Ramos and Candida Tanate died and were survived by
their three legitimate children named Jose, Agustin and Granada. Martin Ramos
was also survived by his seven natural children named Atanacia, Timoteo,
Modesto, Manuel, Emiliano, Maria and Federico.
Martin Ramos left considerable real estate, the most valuable of which
were the Hacienda Calaza and Hacienda Ylaya, both located in Himamaylay,
Negros Occidental. Hacienda Calaza consists of sugar land, palay land and nipa
groves with an area of 400 hectares and with a sugar quota allotment of 10,000
piculs, more or less, and having as its present actual value P500,000 more or
less.
All the children of Martin Ramos, whether legitimate or acknowledged
natural, lived together in Hacienda Ylaya during his lifetime and were under his
care. All said children continued to live in said house of their father for years
even after his death.
Upon their father's death, his properties were left under the
administration of Rafael Ramos, the younger brother of their father and their
uncle, Rafael Ramos continued to administer those properties of their father,
giving plaintiffs money as their shares of the produce of said properties but
plaintiffs not receiving any property or piece of land however, until 1913 when
Rafael Ramos gathered all the heirs, including plaintiffs, in the house of their
father, saying he would return the administration of the properties. He turned
over Hacienda Ylaya to Agustin Ramos and Hacienda Calaza to Jose Ramos.
All said children, defendants and plaintiffs alike, continued to live in the
same house of their father in Hacienda Ylaya, now under the support of Agustin
Ramos. Agustin Ramos supported plaintiffs, getting the money from the produce
of Hacienda Ylaya, the only source of income of Agustin coming from said
hacienda. Plaintiffs asked money from Agustin pertaining to their share in the
18 TRUSTS CASE DIGESTS by: Alojado, Atienza, Balderama, Camarao, Carandang, Cruz, Estilles, Garcia, Gonzaga, Hui, Lazaro, Senajon
approved, both being of age at that time. No guardian could in law act on their
behalf.
Plaintiffs only discovered later on that the property administered by
their elder brother Jose had a Torrens Title in the name of his widow, Gregoria,
and daughter, Candida, when plaintiff Modesto's children insisted and inquired
from the Register of Deeds sometime in 1956 or 1957. Plaintiffs did not
intervene in the intestate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of their
brother Jose as they did not know of it.
Plaintiffs were thus constrained to bring the present suit before the
Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental seeking for the reconveyance in
their favor by defendants Gregoria and daughter Candida and husband Jose
Bayot of their corresponding participations in said parcels of land in accordance
with article 840 of the old Civil Code.
ISSUE:
W/N plaintiffs' shares were held in trust by the defendants.
HELD:
NO. The plaintiffs did not prove any express trust in this case. The
expediente of the intestate proceeding, particularly the project of partition, the
decision and the manifestation as to the receipt of negatives the existence of an
express trust. Those public documents prove that the estate of Martin Ramos
was settled in that proceeding and that adjudications were made to his seven
natural children. A trust must be proven by clear, satisfactory, and convincing
evidence. It cannot rest on vague and uncertain evidence or on loose, equivocal
or indefinite declarations (De Leon vs. Peckson, 62 O. G. 994). As already noted,
an express trust cannot be proven by parol evidence(Pascual vs. Meneses, L18838, May 25, 1967, 20 SCRA 219, 228; Cuaycong vs. Cuaycong, L-21616,
December 11, 1967, 21 SCRA 1192).
Neither have the plaintiffs specified the kind of implied trust
contemplated in their action. We have stated that whether it is a resulting or
constructive trust, its enforcement may be barred by laches.
In the cadastral proceedings, which supervened after the closure of the
intestate proceeding, the eight lots involved herein were claimed by the spouses
Jose Ramos and Gregoria T. Ramos to the exclusion of the plaintiffs. After the
death of Jose Ramos, the said lots were adjudicated to his widow and daughter.
In 1932 Gregoria T. Ramos and Candida Ramos leased the said lots to Felix Yulo.
Yulo in 1934 transferred his lease rights over Hacienda Calazato Juan S. Bonin
and Nestor Olmedo, the husband of plaintiff Atanacia Ramos. Bonin and Olmedo
in 1935 sold their lease rights over Hacienda Calaza to Jesus S. Consing.
19 TRUSTS CASE DIGESTS by: Alojado, Atienza, Balderama, Camarao, Carandang, Cruz, Estilles, Garcia, Gonzaga, Hui, Lazaro, Senajon
20 TRUSTS CASE DIGESTS by: Alojado, Atienza, Balderama, Camarao, Carandang, Cruz, Estilles, Garcia, Gonzaga, Hui, Lazaro, Senajon
Pursuant to this deed, TCTs were issued in her name and she has been in
possession of the land ever since.
However, the sheriff erroneously conveyed to Gorricho the whole
parcels of Lot Nos. 1941 and 3073, instead of only the half interest of Maria.
Thus, petitioners filed an action against Gorricho to execute a deed of
reconveyance over the half interest of the property (pertaining to the interest of
Francisco), which was illegally conveyed by the sheriff to Gorricho.
Gorricho answered that the action has already prescribed. Petitioners
contend that since Gorricho acquired their fathers half through an error of the
sheriff, the land became subject to an implied trust; therefore, since the trust is
continuing and subsisting, the appellants may compel reconveyance of the
property despite the lapse of time
ISSUE:
WON petitioners are barred by laches
HELD:
Yes. Petitioners are in error in believing that like express trusts, such
constructive trusts may not be barred by lapse of time.
The American law on trusts has always maintained a distinction
between express trusts created by intention of the parties, and the implied or
constructive trusts that are exclusively created by law, the latter not being
trusts in their technical sense.
The express trusts disable the trustee from acquiring for his own
benefit the property committed to his management or custody, at least while he
does not openly repudiate the trust, and makes such repudiation known to the
beneficiary or cestui que trust. For this reason, the old Code of Civil Procedure
(Act 190) declared that the rules on adverse possession do not apply to
"continuing and subsisting" (i.e., unrepudiated) trusts.
But in constructive trusts, the rule is that laches constitutes a bar to
actions to enforce the trust, and repudiation is not required, unless there is
concealment of the facts giving rise to the trust.
The reason for the difference in treatment is obvious. In express trusts,
the delay of the beneficiary is directly attributable to the trustee who
undertakes to hold the property for the former, or who linked to the beneficiary
by confidential or fiduciary relations. The trustee's possession is, therefore, not
adverse to the beneficiary, until and unless the latter is made aware that the
trust has been repudiated. But in constructive trusts (that are imposed by law),
there is neither promise nor fiduciary relation; the so-called trustee does not
recognize any trust and has no intent to hold for the beneficiary; therefore, the
21 TRUSTS CASE DIGESTS by: Alojado, Atienza, Balderama, Camarao, Carandang, Cruz, Estilles, Garcia, Gonzaga, Hui, Lazaro, Senajon
lawful exercise of the right of eminent domain. After the payment of the
foregoing financial obligation to the landowners, directing the latter to deliver
to the plaintiff the corresponding TCT; and upon the presentation of the said
titles, ordering the RoD to cancel the same and to issue new TCTs in the name of
the plaintiff. In view of the adverted buy-back assurance, the owners no longer
appealed the decision of the trial court. Following the finality of the judgment of
condemnation, certificates of title for the covered parcels of land were issued in
the name of the Republic which, were subsequently transferred to MCIAA.
At the end of 1991, or soon after the transfer of the lots, Lahug Airport
completely ceased operations, Mactan Airport having opened to accommodate
incoming and outgoing commercial flights. On the ground, the expropriated lots
were never utilized for the purpose they were taken. This development
prompted the former lot owners to formally demand from the government that
they be allowed to exercise their promised right to repurchase.
G.R. No. 168812 (MCIAA Petition)
Inocian and four others (all children of Isabel Limbaga who originally
owned 6 of the lots expropriated); and Aletha Suico Magat and 7 others,
successors-in-interest of Santiago Suico, the original owner of 2 of the
condemned lots (collectively, the Inocians), filed before the RTC in Cebu City a
complaint for reconveyance of real properties and damages against MCIAA.
Albert Chiongbian (Chiongbian), alleging to be the owner of one of the lots, but
which the Inocians were now claiming, moved and was later allowed to
intervene.
MCIAA admitted that the purpose of the expropriation was for the
expansion of the old Lahug Airport; that the Lahug Airport was not expanded;
that the old Lahug Airport was closed sometime in June 1992;and that some
properties were reconveyed by the MCIAA because the previous owners were
able to secure express waivers or riders wherein the government agreed to
return the properties should the expansion of the Lahug Airport not materialize.
ISSUE
HELD
The Republic and MCIAAs petition in G.R. No. 168812 is bereft of merit,
while the Ouano petition in G.R. No. 168770 is meritorious.
RATIO
22 TRUSTS CASE DIGESTS by: Alojado, Atienza, Balderama, Camarao, Carandang, Cruz, Estilles, Garcia, Gonzaga, Hui, Lazaro, Senajon
4. LOPEZ v CA
574 SCRA 26 (2008)
FACTS
The decedent, Juliana, was married to Jose (Jose). Their union did not
bear any children. Juliana was the owner of several properties, which are the
subject of this dispute.
On 1968, Juliana executed a notarial will, whereby she expressed that
she wished to constitute a trust fund for her paraphernal properties,
denominated as Fideicomiso de Juliana Lopez Manzano (Fideicomiso), to be
administered by her husband Jose. If her husband were to die or renounce the
obligation, her nephew, Enrique Lopez (Petioner's father), was to become
administrator and executor of the Fideicomiso.
Note: Fideicomiso- Arrangement by which the testator left his estate or part of it
to the good faith of someone so that, in certain case and time, transmit it to
another person or invest it in the way that was pointed out by the testator.
Paraphernal properties- Exclusive properties of the wife.
Jose died on 1980, leaving a holographic will disposing of the disputed
properties to respondents. The will was allowed probate on 1983. Pursuant to
Joses will, the RTC ordered the transfer of the disputed properties to the
respondents as the heirs of Jose. Consequently, the certificates of title of the
disputed properties were cancelled and new ones issued in the names of
respondents.
Enrique Lopez, also assumed the trusteeship of Julianas estate. On
1984, the RTC appointed petitioner Richard Lopez as trustee of Julianas estate.
Thereafter, petitioner instituted an action for reconveyance of parcels of land
with sum of money before the RTC against respondents. The complaint
essentially alleged that Jose (the husband) was able to register in his name the
disputed properties, which were the paraphernal properties of Juliana, either
during their conjugal union or in the course of the performance of his duties as
executor of the testate estate of Juliana and that upon the death of Jose, the
disputed properties were included in the inventory as if they formed part of
Joses estate when in fact Jose was holding them only in trust for the trust estate
of Juliana.
The RTC rendered a summary judgment, dismissing the action on the
ground of prescription of action. The Court of Appeals rendered the assailed
decision denying the appeals filed by both petitioner and respondents. In
addition, the CA held that the petitioner's action for reconveyance has
prescribed and that the fiduciary relation assumed by the late Jose was an
Implied Trust.
ISSUE
23 TRUSTS CASE DIGESTS by: Alojado, Atienza, Balderama, Camarao, Carandang, Cruz, Estilles, Garcia, Gonzaga, Hui, Lazaro, Senajon
5. SALAO v SALAO
FACTS:
24 TRUSTS CASE DIGESTS by: Alojado, Atienza, Balderama, Camarao, Carandang, Cruz, Estilles, Garcia, Gonzaga, Hui, Lazaro, Senajon
W/N the fishfpond was held in trust for Valentin by Juan and Ambrosia
and W/N their action for reconveyance had already prescribed.
HELD:
No! And if ever there was a trust, action has already prescribed.
RATIO:
6. MUNICIPALITY OF VICTORIAS v CA
G.R. No. L-31189 March 31, 1987
PETITIONER: Municipality of Victorias (MUNICIPALITY)
RESPONDENTS: CA, Norma Leuenberger (GRANDAUGHTER), Francisco Soliva
(HUSBAND)
Simeona J. Vda. de Ditching (WIDOW) / (GRANDMOTHER)
FACTS:
Lot No. 76, which forms part of Cadastral Lot No. 140, is in the name of
the deceased Gonzalo Ditching under a tax declaration for the year 1941. He
was survived by his widow and daughter. The latter died leaving a 6 month-old
daughter, Norma Leuenberger.
The GRANDDAUHTER, married to Soliva, inherited the whole Lot. No.
140 from her GRANDMOTHER. In 1952, she donated a portion of Lot No. 140 to
the municipality for the ground of a certain high school, and had another
portion converted into a subdivision.
In 1963, following a survey of the remaining area, it was discovered
that a parcel of land within her property is used by the MUNICIPALITY as a
cemetery from 1934 (identified as Lot No. 76).
The GRANDDAUGHTER wrote to the Mayor regarding her discovery
and demanded payment of past rentals and requesting delivery of the area
allegedly illegally occupied by the MUNICIPALITY. The Mayor claimed that the
MUNICPALITY bought the land from the GRANDMOTHER in 1934 but failed to
show documents concerning the sale.
In 1964, the GRANDDAUGHTER filed a complaint in the CFI for
recovery of possession of the parcel of land occupied by the municipal
cemetery.
In lieu of a Deed of Sale, the MUNICIPALITY presented certificate issued
by the Archives Division of the Bureau of Records Management which showed
the nature of the instrument, the subject of the sale, the parties of the contract,
the consideration, the name of the witnesses, and the dale of the sale. Several
testimonies and tax declarations corroborated and supported the document.
The CFI ruled in favour of the MUNICIPALITY, declaring the cemetery
side as property of the MUNICIPALITY. The CA set aside the decision of the
lower court.
Hence, this petition.
25 TRUSTS CASE DIGESTS by: Alojado, Atienza, Balderama, Camarao, Carandang, Cruz, Estilles, Garcia, Gonzaga, Hui, Lazaro, Senajon
7. PNB v CA
FACTS:
Private Respondent B.P. Mata & Co. Inc. (Mata), is a private corporation
engaged in providing goods and services to shipping companies. Since 1966, it
has acted as a manning or crewing agent for several foreign firms, one of which
is Star Kist Foods, Inc., USA (Star Kist). As part of their agreement, Mata makes
advances for the crew's medical expenses, National Seaman's Board fees,
Seaman's Welfare fund, and standby fees and for the crew's basic personal
needs. Subsequently, Mata sends monthly billings to its foreign principal Star
Kist, which in turn reimburses Mata by sending a telegraphic transfer through
banks for credit to the latter's account.
Against this background, on February 21, 1975, Security Pacific
National Bank (SEPAC) of Los Angeles which had an agency arrangement with
Philippine National Bank (PNB), transmitted a cable message to the
International Department of PNB to pay the amount of US$14,000 to Mata by
crediting the latter's account with the Insular Bank of Asia and America (IBAA),
per order of Star Kist. Upon receipt of this cabled message on February 24,
1975, PNB's International Department noticed an error and sent a service
message to SEPAC Bank. The latter replied with instructions that the amount of
US$14,000 should only be for US$1,400.
Based n this, PNB issued Check No. 269522 for $1,400(P9,772.95) for
the account of Mata. 14 days after, PNB again issued another Cashier's Check
No. 270271 for $14,000 (P97,878.60).
Six years later, or more specifically, on May 13, 1981, PNB requested
Mata for refund of US$14,000 (P97,878.60) after it discovered its error in
effecting the second payment.
On February 4, 1982, PNB then filed a case for the collection of the
$14,000 on the basis of a constructive trust but the RTC dismissed the case
ruling that it falls under Solution indebiti and not Constructive trust. The CA
affirmed this decision.
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari proceeding seeking to annul
the decision of the appellate court on the basis that Mata's obligation to return
US$14,000 is governed, in the alternative, by either Article 1456 on constructive
trust or Article 2154 of the Civil Code on quasi-contract.
Petitioner naturally opts for an interpretation under constructive trust
as its action filed on February 4, 1982 can still prosper, as it is well within the
prescriptive period of ten 10 years because if it would fall under solution
indebiti, prescription period is only for 6 years and therefore, prescribed.
ISSUE:
Whether the case falls under trust of it falls under quasi-contracts?
26 TRUSTS CASE DIGESTS by: Alojado, Atienza, Balderama, Camarao, Carandang, Cruz, Estilles, Garcia, Gonzaga, Hui, Lazaro, Senajon
amount and that under Article 1144, petitioner is well within the prescriptive
period for the enforcement of a constructive or implied trust, we rule that
petitioner's claim cannot prosper since it is already barred by laches. It is a wellsettled rule now that an action to enforce an implied trust, whether resulting or
constructive, may be barred not only by prescription but also by laches.
8. PARUNGIT v BAJIT
SPS. FELIPE and JOSEFA PARINGIT, Petitioner, vs. MARCIANA PARINGIT BAJIT,
ADOLIO PARINGIT and ROSARIO PARINGIT ORDOO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 181844
September 29, 2010
FACTS:
During their lifetime, spouses Paringit leased a lot in Sampaloc, Manila
from Terocel Realty. They built their home there and raised five children. For
having occupied the lot for years, Terocel Realty offered to sell it to Julian but he
did not have enough money at that time to meet the payment deadline. Julian
sought the help of his children so he can buy the property but only his son
Felipe and wife Josefa had the financial resources he needed at that time. To
bring about the purchase, Julian executed a deed of assignment of leasehold
right in favor of Felipe and his wife that would enable them to acquire the lot.
The latter then bought the same from Terocel Realty and a TCT was
subsequently issued in favor of spouses Felipe and Josefa.
Later on, due to issues among Julians children regarding the ownership
of the lot, Julian executed an affidavit clarifying the nature of Felipe and his
wifes purchase of the lot. He claimed that it was bought for the benefit of all his
children.
Despite the title being under their name, the spouses moved to another
house on the same street in 1988. Marciana, et al, on the other hand, continued
to occupy the lot with their families without paying rent. This was the situation
when their father died in 1994. A year later, Felipe and his wife sent a demand
letter to his siblings who occupy the lot, asking them to pay rental arrearages
for occupying the property. They refused to pay or reply to the letter, believing
that they had the right to occupy the house and lot, it being their inheritance
from their parents. Because of this, Felipe and his wife filed an ejectment suit
against them. The suit prospered, resulting in the ejectment of Marciana, et al
and their families from the property.
27 TRUSTS CASE DIGESTS by: Alojado, Atienza, Balderama, Camarao, Carandang, Cruz, Estilles, Garcia, Gonzaga, Hui, Lazaro, Senajon
siblings to reside on the property. This is incompatible with their claim that
they bought the house and lot for themselves back in 1984. Until they filed the
suit, they did nothing to assert their supposed ownership of the house and lot.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Felipe and his wife purchased the subject lot under an
implied trust for the benefit of all the children of Julian;
RULING/RATIO:
Yes, the Court ruled that the case at bar falls under the rubric of the
implied trust provided in Article 1450 of the Civil Code.Implied trust under
Article 1450 presupposes a situation where a person, using his own funds, buys
property on behalf of another, who in the meantime may not have the funds to
purchase it. Title to the property is for the time being placed in the name of the
trustee, the person who pays for it, until he is reimbursed by the beneficiary, the
person for whom the trustee bought the land. It is only after the beneficiary
reimburses the trustee of the purchase price that the former can compel
conveyance of the property from the latter.
The circumstances of this case are actually what implied trust is about.
Although no express agreement covered Felipe and his wifes purchase of the lot
for the siblings and their father, it came about by operation of law and is
protected by it. The nature of the transaction established the implied trust and
this in turn gave rise to the rights and obligations provided by law. Implied trust
is a rule of equity, independent of the particular intention of the parties.
Here, the evidence shows that Felipe and his wife bought the lot for the
benefit of Julian and his children, rather than for themselves. There is no
question that the house originally belonged to Julian and Aurelia who built it.
First, if Julian really intended to sell the entire house and assign the right to
acquire the lot to Felipe and his wife, he would have arranged for Felipes other
siblings to give their conformity as co-owners to such sale. Second, Julian said in
his affidavit that Felipe and his wife bought the lot from Terocel Realty on his
behalf and on behalf of his other children. Felipe and his wife advanced the
payment because Julian and his other children did not then have the money
needed to meet the realty companys deadline for the purchase. Notably, Felipe,
acting through his wife, countersigned Julians affidavit the way his siblings did.
Third, if Felipe and his wife really believed that they were the absolute owners
of the lot, then their moving out of the house in 1988 and letting Marciana, et al
continue to occupy the house did not make sense. Fourth, Felipe and his wife
demanded rent from Marciana, et al only a year following Julians death. This
shows that for over 10 years, Felipe and his wife respected the right of the
28 TRUSTS CASE DIGESTS by: Alojado, Atienza, Balderama, Camarao, Carandang, Cruz, Estilles, Garcia, Gonzaga, Hui, Lazaro, Senajon
10. ADAZA v CA
G.R. No. 47354
March 21, 1989
HORACIO G. ADAZA and FELICIDAD MARUNDAN, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and VIOLETA G. ADAZA, assisted by her
husband LINO AMOR, respondents.
Victor Adaza Deceased/Father/Donor
Violeta Adaza Donee/Daughter (RESPONDENT)
Horacio Adaza 1st Brother/Fiscal (PETITIONER)
FACTS
Before dying, the Father executed a Deed of Donation covering a parcel
of land to his daughter, then single. (NOTE: a crossed out provision in the
Deed of Donation provided: The donee shall share of the entire
property with one of her brothers or sisters after the death of the donor.
The Father had five other children.) The Deed was notarized and accepted in the
same instrument. However, the property was then still part of the public
domain, but was held and cultivated by the Father. The Daughter, aided by her
Brother, filed a homestead application for the land which eventually lead to the
registration of the property under her name. After the Daughter married, she
and her spouse mortgaged the property to secure a loan with PNB. Meanwhile,
the Brother became a Provincial Fiscal of Davao Oriental and moved to the said
province.
When the said Brother returned for a family gathering, he asked his
sister to sign a Deed of Waiver over the property stating that the property was
co-owned by them, including all the improvements thereon. The Deed also
provided for the waiver, transfer and conveyance of the said share from Sister
to Brother.
A few months later, the Daughter, with her husband, filed a complaint
for annulment of the Deed of Waiver against the Brother, together with the
latters wife, declaring that the Daughter signed the Deed because of the
Brothers fraud, misrepresentation and undue influence. Meanwhile, the
Brother contended that they were co-owners and that the Deed of Waiver was
signed by his sister freely and voluntarily.
The trial court declared the Deed of Waiver as valid and binding and
that the brother and sister was co-owners of the said property. Upon the
Daughters appeal, the CA reversed the trial courts decision, while agreeing that
the Deed of Waiver was signed voluntarily, was without cause or consideration,
because the land had been unconditionally donated to the Daughter alone. CA
further held that the Deed of Waiver could not be regarded as a gratuitous
contract or a donation as it did not comply with the requirements of Articles
749 and 1270 of the Civil Code.
In the brothers petition for review with the SC, he argues that the fact
of co-ownership was sufficient consideration to sustain the validity of the Deed
of Waiver and testified that the intention of the deceased father was to donate
the brother to him and his Sister. He further testified that he himself crossed out
the provision, with the Fathers consent, to facilitate the issuance in his sisters
name.
ISSUE
WON the property was co-owned by the brother and sister.
HELD / RATIO
YES. The execution of the Deed of Donation by the Father created
an implied trust in favor of the brother in respect of half of the property
donated. Art. 1449 There is also an implied trust when a donation is made to a
29 TRUSTS CASE DIGESTS by: Alojado, Atienza, Balderama, Camarao, Carandang, Cruz, Estilles, Garcia, Gonzaga, Hui, Lazaro, Senajon
Sing Juco and Sing Bengco obtained from Maria Gay a written option to
purchase an estate known as "San Antonio Estate". The term of the option
expired, but Sing Juco and Sing Bengco had it extended verbally.
Sunyantong was an employee of Sing Juco and Sing Bengco, and the
evidence shows that they reposed confidence in him and did not mind
disclosing to him their plans of purchasing the San Antonio estate and the status
of their negotiations with Gay.
In one of the meetings held by Sing Juco and Sing Bengco, Sunyantong
was present. At that time, Sunyantong remarked that it would be advisable to let
some days elapse before accepting the terms of the transfer as proposed by
Maria Gay, in order that the Gay might not think that they were desperate for
the said property.
On the day that Sing Juco and Sing Bengcos option to purchase was to
expire, Sunyantong called at the house of Gay and offered to buy the estate on
the terms she proposed, which were not yet accepted by Sing Juco and Sing
Bengco. Sunyantong offered to buy not for the benefit of Sing Juco and Sing
Bengco, but for the benefit of his own wife.
Maria Gay informed the broker of Sing Juco and Sing Bengco that there
was another interested buyer and that she would like to know immediately Sing
Juco and Sing Bengcos decision.
Sing Bengco instructed Sotelo to inform her, "siya ang bahala".
Interpreting the phrase to mean that Sing Juco and Sing Bengco waived their
option to buy, Maria Gay closed the sale of the estate in favor of Sunyantong.
Sing Bengco and Sing Juco then filed a case against Sunyantong. The
lower court ordering the Sunyantong to execute a deed of conveyance to Sing
Bengco and Sing Juco of the San Antonio Estate for the same price and with the
same conditions as those of the purchase thereof from Maria Gay
ISSUE
W/N Sunyantong must be held liable
HELD
Yes. Even supposing that Sing Bengco intended to waive all claims to
the option when he said bahala ka, the action of the Sunyantong in intervening
in the negotiations does not make him innocent of infidelity in view of the fact
that he was an employee of the plaintiffs to whom he owed loyalty and
faithfulnes.
Despite the fact that when Sunyantong closed the contract of sale with
Maria Gay, Sing Juco and Sing Bengco option had expired, it cant be denied that
he was the cause of the option having precipitously come to such an end. His
30 TRUSTS CASE DIGESTS by: Alojado, Atienza, Balderama, Camarao, Carandang, Cruz, Estilles, Garcia, Gonzaga, Hui, Lazaro, Senajon
31 TRUSTS CASE DIGESTS by: Alojado, Atienza, Balderama, Camarao, Carandang, Cruz, Estilles, Garcia, Gonzaga, Hui, Lazaro, Senajon
possession of Lot No. 2139, by themselves and through their predecessors-ininterest. They alleged that Rufo Larumbe sold Lot No. 2139 to Petra Teves. Petra
thereafter executed a deed of sale over Lot No. 2139 in favor of Vicente Teves.
Later, Vicente executed a pacto de retro sale over the land in favor of Arturo
Teves. Arturo then sold Lot No. 2139 in favor of respondents father, Dr.
Monterroyo, by virtue of an oral contract. He Arturo executed a Deed of
Confirmation of Absolute Sale of Unregistered Land in favor of Dr. Monterroyos
heirs.
ISSUE
W/N petitioners are rightful owners and possessors of Lot No. 2139.
HELD
32 TRUSTS CASE DIGESTS by: Alojado, Atienza, Balderama, Camarao, Carandang, Cruz, Estilles, Garcia, Gonzaga, Hui, Lazaro, Senajon
RULING
33 TRUSTS CASE DIGESTS by: Alojado, Atienza, Balderama, Camarao, Carandang, Cruz, Estilles, Garcia, Gonzaga, Hui, Lazaro, Senajon
The complaint alleges that the plaintiff is the owner of the subject lot;
and that in the course of the cadastral proceedings, plaintiff being illiterate,
asked Sumangil to claim the same for her (plaintiff) but Sumangil committed a
breach of trust by claiming the lot for himself, so it was adjudicated in favor of
Sumangil. The defendant is the special administrator of the estate of Juana
Ringor, to whom the parcel of land in question was assigned by partition in the
intestate estate of Sumangil and Duque.
The CFI found that the plaintiff is the real owner of the lot which she
had acquired in 1914 by donation propter nuptias from Pablo Ringor; that
plaintiff had since that year been in possession of the land; and that the same
had been decreed in the cadastral proceedings in favor of Domingo Sumangil.
The trial court, while recognizing that the plaintiff had the equitable title and
the defendant the legal title, nevertheless dismissed the complaint because the
period of one year provided for in section 38 of the Land Registration Act for the
review of a decree had elapsed, and the plaintiff had not availed herself of this
remedy.
ISSUE
contained in this Act shall in any way be construed to relieve registered land or
the owners thereof from any rights incident to the relation of husband and wife, or
from liability to attachment on mesne process or levy on execution, or from
liability to any lien of any description established by law on land and the buildings
thereon, or the interest of the owner in such land or buildings, or to change the
laws of descent, or the rights of partition between coparceners, joint tenants and
other cotenants, or the right to take the same by eminent domain, or to relieve
such land from liability to be appropriated in any lawful manner for the payment
of debts, or to change or affect in any other way any other rights or liabilities
created by law and applicable to unregistered land, except as otherwise expressly
provided in this Act or in the amendments hereof.
A trust such as that which was created between the plaintiff and
Domingo Sumangil is sacred and inviolable. The Courts have therefore
shielded fiduciary relations against every manner of chicanery or detestable
design cloaked by legal technicalities. The Torrens system was never calculated
to foment betrayal in the performance of a trust.
The judgment appealed from is hereby reverse, and the defendant is
ordered to convey that lot in question to the plaintiff within fifteen days from
the entry of final judgment herein; and upon his failure or refusal to do so, this
judgment shall constitute sufficient authorization for the Register of Deeds of
Nueva Ecija, in lieu of a deed of conveyance, to transfer the certificate of title for
said lot No. 692 to the plaintiff Eusebia Escobar. The defendant shall pay the
costs of both instances.
No
RATIO
The trial court plainly erred. The complaint did not seek the review of
the decree or the reopening of the cadastral case, but the enforcement of a trust.
Hence, section 38 of Act No. 496 does not apply. The estate of Juana Ringor as
the successor in interest of the trustee, Domingo Sumangil, is in equity bound to
execute a deed of conveyance of this lot to the plaintiff-appellant. The remedy
herein prayed for has been upheld by this Court in previous cases, one of which
is Severino vs. Severino (44 Phil., 343, year 1923).
There is no indication there of an intention to cut off, through the issuance of a
decree of registration, equitable rights or remedies such as those here in
question. On the contrary, section 70 of the Act provides:
Registered lands and ownership therein, shall in all respects be subject to
the same burdens and incidents attached by law to unregistered land. Nothing
FACTS:
34 TRUSTS CASE DIGESTS by: Alojado, Atienza, Balderama, Camarao, Carandang, Cruz, Estilles, Garcia, Gonzaga, Hui, Lazaro, Senajon
35 TRUSTS CASE DIGESTS by: Alojado, Atienza, Balderama, Camarao, Carandang, Cruz, Estilles, Garcia, Gonzaga, Hui, Lazaro, Senajon
document. It was susana who paid the taxes before. Perfecta then filed a motion
for reconsideration but was denied. Perfecta then filed this petition.
ISSUE
W/N Perfecta has a the better right to the subject lots
HELD
Yes!
RATIO
In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his
case by a preponderance of evidence. It is the weight, credit, and value of the
aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous
with the term greater weight of the evidence or greater weight of the credible
evidence. It is the probability of truth.
The heirs of susana was only able to provide as evidence the document
of the Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition and the tax declaration. Tax
declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership but it can be used to
support such claim. In addition, susana failed to shed light on why or how the
said properties wholly pertained to her when her parents Bernardo and
Tranquilina clearly had other heirs who also had shares in the inheritance. No
information was provided as to how said possession of the lots was actually
excercised or demonstrated by Susana.
On the side of perfecta, the land was registered under her name, a
patent was legally issued by the government in her name. Possession of lots
was established not just by the testimony of Perfecta but was corroborated by
the testimony of Luciana Navarra, whose husband was a tenant working on the
subject lots. Moreover, they planted coconuts, rice, and corn on which the heirs
of susana were unable to refute.
Therefore, the court was convinced that the evidence adduced by
perfecta preponderated over that of the heirs of susanna.
It is important to note that the heirs of susana brought the action for
reconveyance of the subject lots before RTC only more than 12 years after the
torrens titles were issued in favor of perfecta. The remedy then was already
time-barred (implied or constructive trust 10 years from the date of the
issuance of certificate of title over the property provided not transferred to
innocent purchaser for value). And even if it has not been barrred, still perfecta
will win because of the preponderance of evidence.
36 TRUSTS CASE DIGESTS by: Alojado, Atienza, Balderama, Camarao, Carandang, Cruz, Estilles, Garcia, Gonzaga, Hui, Lazaro, Senajon
owners and adjudicating unto himself Lots 3244, 3246, and 1404. The OCTs
were cancelled and new TCTs were issued in respondent Joses name.
Based on the records of the RD, the NEPHEW sold Lots 3244 and 1404
to Catalino Torre. Lot 3246 was sold to Antonio Doronila. Torre sold the Lots
3244 and 1404 to Doronila. Doronila sold back to Jose Lots 1404, 3244, and
3246.
In 1990, Estrella filed a complaint against the NEPHEW and Doronila.
RTC ruled in favour of Jose for prescription has set since the complaint was filed
in 1990 or some 16 years after the NEPHEW caused to be registered the
affidavit of adjudication. The CA AFFIRMED.
ISSUE
Who has a better right to the properties.
RULING
Estrella Tiongco Yared. The CA decision is reversed and set aside. The
RD is ordered to restore the OCTs under the name/s of the registered original
owners.
HELD
37 TRUSTS CASE DIGESTS by: Alojado, Atienza, Balderama, Camarao, Carandang, Cruz, Estilles, Garcia, Gonzaga, Hui, Lazaro, Senajon
pendens was annotated at the back of OCT No. P-4952 as Entry No. 16554712
on November 28, 1988.
The RTC and CA ruled that Ciriaco is correct and that PNB must
reconvey the land to Ciriaco. Thus PNB filed this case to question the ruling of
the RTC and CA.
ISSUE
HELD
Yes. PNB is not an innocent purchaser/ mortgagee for value. PNB In
this case is considered a trustee in a constructive trust holding the land in trust
for Ciriaco. Also, since Ciriaco is in possession of the land, the action based on
constructive trust is imprecriptible.
Undoubtedly, our land registration statute extends its protection to an
innocent purchaser for value, defined as "one who buys the property of another,
without notice that some other person has a right or interest in such property
and pays the full price for the same, at the time of such purchase or before he
has notice of the claims or interest of some other person in the property."25 An
"innocent purchaser for value" includes an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other
encumbrancer for value .26
Here, we agree with the disposition of the RTC and the CA that PNB is
not an innocent purchaser for value. As we have already declared:
A banking institution is expected to exercise due diligence before
entering into a mortgage contract. The ascertainment of the status or condition
of a property offered to it as security for a loan must be a standard and
indispensable part of its operations.27 (Emphasis ours.)
PNBs contention that Ciriaco failed to allege in his complaint that PNB
failed to take the necessary precautions before accepting the mortgage is of no
moment. It is undisputed that the 2.5002-hectare portion of the mortgaged
property has been adjudged in favor of Ciriacos predecessor-in-interest in Civil
Case No. 2514. Hence, PNB has the burden of evidence that it acted in good faith
from the time the land was offered as collateral. However, PNB miserably failed
to overcome this burden. There was no showing at all that it conducted an
investigation; that it observed due diligence and prudence by checking for flaws
in the title; that it verified the identity of the true owner and possessor of the
land; and, that it visited subject premises to determine its actual condition
before accepting the same as collateral.
Both the CA and the trial court correctly observed that PNB could not
validly raise the defense that it relied on Antonios clean title. The land, when it
38 TRUSTS CASE DIGESTS by: Alojado, Atienza, Balderama, Camarao, Carandang, Cruz, Estilles, Garcia, Gonzaga, Hui, Lazaro, Senajon
against a certain Jose Maria Golez. Petitioner's wife, Margarita and the others,
alleged that they are the heirs the descendants of Esteban and Eufemia and that
the subject lot is part of their inheritance.
On July 29, 1983, herein respondents filed an Answer-in-Intervention
claiming that prior to his marriage to Eufemia, Esteban was married to a certain
Francisca; that Esteban and Francisca bore five children, all of whom are
already deceased; that herein respondents are the heirs of Esteban and
Francisca's children; that they are in open, actual, public and uninterrupted
possession of a portion of Lot No. 1536-B for more than 30 years; that their
legal interests over the subject lot prevails over those of petitioner and his coheirs; that, in fact, petitioner and his co-heirs have already disposed of their
shares in the said property a long time ago.
Subsequently, the parties in Civil Case No. 12887 agreed to enter into a
Compromise Agreement wherein Lot No. 1536-B was divided between Jose
Maria Golez, on one hand, and the heirs of Vicente, namely: Margarita,
Bienvenido, and Francisco, on the other. It was stated in the said agreement
that the heirs of Eusebio had sold their share in the said lot to the mother of
Golez. Thus, on September 9, 1998, the RTC trying the case rendered a decision
approving the said Compromise Agreement.
Thereafter, a new TCT was issued by the Register of Deeds in the name
of Margarita, Bienvenido and Francisco.
In 1999, Brito and his co-heirs filed another Complaint for Recovery of
Possession and Damages, this time against herein respondents Dianalas. The
Dianalas, on the other hand, filed with the same court, a Complaint for
Reconveyance and Damages against petitioner and his co-heirs. One of the
defenses raised by Brito was that the Dianalas are a guilty of laches and are
already estopped from questioning the decision of the RTC in Civil Case No.
12887 on the ground that they slept on their rights and allowed the said
decision to become final.
ISSUE
Whether or not the respondents are barred by laches
HELD
No, they are not barred by laches. In the first place, respondents cannot
be faulted for not appealing the decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 12887
simply because they are no longer parties to the case and, as such, have no
personality to assail the said judgment.
Secondly, respondents' act of filing their action for reconveyance within
the ten-year prescriptive period does not constitute an unreasonable delay in
39 TRUSTS CASE DIGESTS by: Alojado, Atienza, Balderama, Camarao, Carandang, Cruz, Estilles, Garcia, Gonzaga, Hui, Lazaro, Senajon
Valientes, had their Affidavit of Adverse Claim duly entered in the Memorandum
of Encumbrances at the back of TCT No. T-5, 427.
Upon the death of the spouses Belen, their surviving heirs Brigida
Sescon Belen and Maria Lina Belen executed an extra-judicial settlement with
partition and sale in favor of private respondent Vilma Valencia-Minor, the
present possessor of the subject property. On 1979, herein private respondent
Minor filed with the courts a "PETITION FOR CANCELLATION OF
MEMORANDUM OF ENCUMBRANCE. Private respondent Minor filed an
Omnibus Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. 98-021 on the grounds of forum
shopping and litis pendentia.
ISSUE
W/N action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust
is imprescriptible
HELD
FACTS
Petitioners claim that they are the heirs of Domingo Valientes who,
before his death, was the owner of a parcel of land in Zamboanga del Sur. In
1939, Domingo Valientes mortgaged the subject property to secure his loan to
the spouses Leon Belen and Brigida Sescon (spouses Belen). In the 1950s, the
Valientes family purportedly attempted, but failed, to retrieve the subject
property from the spouses Belen. Through an allegedly forged document
captioned VENTA DEFINITIVA purporting to be a deed of sale of the subject
property between Domingo Valientes and the spouses Belen, the latter obtained
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-5, 427 in their name. On 1970, Maria
Valientes Bucoy and Vicente Valientes, legitimate children of the late Domingo
40 TRUSTS CASE DIGESTS by: Alojado, Atienza, Balderama, Camarao, Carandang, Cruz, Estilles, Garcia, Gonzaga, Hui, Lazaro, Senajon