Professional Documents
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Transportation Law
Case Digests
2-Manresa
SY 2015-2016
COMMON CARRIERS
Transportation Law
Case Digests
2-Manresa
SY 2015-2016
Transportation Law
Case Digests
2-Manresa
SY 2015-2016
COMMON CARRIERS
Yes.
No.
No.
COMMON CARRIERS
Transportation Law
Case Digests
2-Manresa
SY 2015-2016
COMMON CARRIERS
Transportation Law
Case Digests
2-Manresa
SY 2015-2016
Transportation Law
Case Digests
2-Manresa
SY 2015-2016
COMMON CARRIERS
ISSUE:
WON Calvo is a common carrier
RULING:
Yes. Calvo is a common carrier.
The Civil Code defines common carriers in the following
terms:
Article
1732.
Common
carriers
are
persons,
corporations, firms or associations engaged in the
business of carrying or transporting passengers or
goods or both, by land, water, or air for compensation,
offering their services to the public.
The above article makes no distinction between one
whose principal business activity is the carrying of
persons or goods or both, and one who does such
carrying only as an ancillary activity. . . Article 1732 also
carefully avoids making any distinction between a
person or enterprise offering transportation service on
a regular or scheduled basis and one offering such
service on an occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis.
Neither does Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier
offering its services to the general public, i.e., the
general community or population, and one who offers
services
or
solicits
business
only
from
a
narrow segment of the general population. We think
that Article 1732 deliberately refrained from making
such distinctions.
The concept of common carrier under Article 1732 also
coincides with the notion of public service, under the
Public Service Act (Commonwealth Act No. 1416, as
amended) which at least partially supplements the law
on common carriers set forth in the Civil Code.
Under Section 13, paragraph (b) of the Public Service
Act, public service includes:
x x x every person that now or hereafter may own,
operate, manage, or control in the Philippines, for hire
or compensation, with general or limited clientele,
whether permanent, occasional or accidental, and done
for
general
business
purposes,
any
common
carrier, railroad, street railway, traction railway, subway
motor vehicle, either for freight or passenger, or both,
with or without fixed route and whatever may be its
classification, freight or carrier service of any class,
express serviceand other similar public services. x x x
There is greater reason for holding petitioner Calvo to
be a common carrier because the transportation of
goods is an integral part of her business. To uphold
Calvos contention would be to deprive those with whom
she contracts the protection which the law affords
them notwithstanding the fact that the obligation to
Transportation Law
Case Digests
2-Manresa
SY 2015-2016
COMMON CARRIERS
COMMON CARRIERS
PLANTERS v. CA
Planters Products Inc (PPI) versus Court of Appeals
(CA), Soriamont Steamship Agencies (SSA) and Kyosei
Kisen Kabushiki Kaisha (KKKK)
FACTS:
Planters Products Inc (PPI) purchased from Mitsubishi 9,
329.7069 metric tons (MT) of urea 46% fertilizer to be
shipped in bulk by cargo vessel M/V Sun Plum owned by
KKKK from Alaska, USA to La Union, Philippines. Prior to
its voyage, a time charter party on MV Sun Plum was
executed between Mitsubishi as shipper/charterer and
KKKK as shipowner. The ship was inspected and found
fit to take a load of urea in bulk. The urea was loaded in
bulk under the supervision of Mitsubishi and the cargo
vessel went on voyage. Upon its arrival in La Union, PPI
unloaded the cargo to dump trucks and transported
them to a warehouse 50 meters away from the wharf.
11 days after, the unloading finished. PPI found out that
there was shortage of about 94-106 MT of urea and
about 18-23 MT were contaminated with dirt thus unfit
for commerce.
PPI then sent a claim letter to SSA, KKKKs resident
agent amounting to P245,969.31 representing the cost
of the shortage and contaminated urea. SSA denied the
claim because they had nothing to do with the
discharge of shipment. PPI thus filed an action for
damages with CFI Manila. KKKK defended that the strict
public policy governing common carriers does not apply
to them because they become private carriers by reason
of the charter-party. CFI ruled in favor of PPI. Upon
appeal in CA, the appellate court absolved KKKK from
liability and ruled that it was a private carrier thus there
was no presumption of negligence. Hence, this appeal
via petition for review.
ISSUES:
(1) WON a common carrier becomes a private carrier by
reason of a charter party. NO
(2) WON KKKK is liable for damages. NO
RULING:
(1) Article 1732 of NCC defines common carriers
as persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged
in the business of carrying or transporting passengers
or goods or both, by land, water, or air, for
compensation offering their services to the public.
The distinction between a "common or public carrier"
and a "private or special carrier" lies in the character of
the business, such that if the undertaking is a single
transaction, not a part of the general business or
occupation, although involving the carriage of goods for
Transportation Law
Case Digests
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COMMON CARRIERS
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COMMON CARRIERS
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COMMON CARRIERS
PERENA v. ZARATE
ISSUE:
FACTS:
RULING:
in Civil Code
governed by provisions
common carriers in CIVIL CODE
on
diligence
=
extraordinary
diligence, and is presumed to be at fault or
to have acted negligently in case of the loss
of the effects of passengers, or the death
or injuries to passengers.
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COMMON CARRIERS
c.
c.
Loudness of music in the van
reduced his ability to hear the warning horns
made by the train.
d.
His act of overtaking caused
him not to see the incoming train from the
opposite side of the bus and lead to his
miscalculations of getting clear from the train.
e.
Lastly, he did not slow down nor go to a
full stop before traversing the railroad tracks despite
knowing that his slackening of speed and going to a full
stop were in obs.
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The NTFC alleged that they did not receive the subject
goods. Thus, it filed a formal claim for non-delivery of
the goods shipped thru respondent. It also conducted
an investigation but before it was over, Jama resigned
as the branch supervisor of NTFC.
The government then filed an action for breach of
contract of carriage against LSC.
ISSUE:
W/N LSC is guilty for breach of contract of carriage
RULING:
NO. Article 1733 of the CC demands that a common
carrier observe extra-ordinary diligence over the goods
transported by it. Extraordinary diligence is that
extreme measure of care and caution which persons of
unusual prudence and circumspection use for securing
and preserving their own property or rights. This
exacting standard imposed on common carriers in a
contract of carriage of goods is intended to tilt the scales
in favor of the shipper who is at the mercy of the
common carrier once the goods have been lodged for
shipment. Hence, in case of loss of goods in transit, the
common carrier is presumed under the law to have been
at fault or negligent. However, the presumption of fault
or negligence, may be overturned by competent
evidence showing that the common carrier has observed
extraordinary diligence over the goods.
In this case, the SC found that the LSC adequately
proved that it exercised extraordinary diligence.
Although the original bills of lading remained with the
NTFC, LSCs agents demanded from Jama the certified
true copies of the bills of lading. They even made Jama
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COMMON CARRIERS
APPLICABLE
LAWS
COMMON CARRIERS
IN
CASES
INVOLVING
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Warsaw Convention applies.
RULING:
No, the Warsaw Convention does not apply.
The liability of the common carrier for the loss,
destruction or deterioration of goods transported from a
foreign country to the Philippines is governed primarily
by the New Civil Code. In all matters not regulated by
said Code, the rights and obligations of common carriers
shall be governed by the Code of Commerce and by
Special Laws.
The following applicable provisions of the New
Civil Code applicable are Articles 1733, 1735 and 1753
which provide:
Article 1733. Common carriers, from the nature
of their business and for reasons of public policy, are
bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the
vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the
passengers transported by them, according to all the
circumstances of each case.
Article 1735. In all cases other than those
mentioned in Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 of the preceding
article, if the goods are lost, destroyed or deteriorated,
common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or
to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they
observed extraordinary diligence as required in article
1733.
Article 1753. The law of the country to which the
goods are to be transported shall govern the liability of
the common carrier for their loss, destruction or
deterioration.
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Transportation Law
Case Digests
2-Manresa
SY 2015-2016
YES
RULING:
Under Article 1733 of the New Civil Code, "Common carriers, from the nature of their business and
for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe
extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods
and for the safety of the passengers transported by
them, according to all the circumstances of each case"
The defendant having received the two boxes in
good condition, its legal duty was to deliver them to the
plaintiff in the same condition in which it received them.
From the time of their delivery to the defendant in New
York until they are delivered to the plaintiff in Manila,
the boxes were under the control and supervision of the
defendant and beyond the control of the plaintiff. The
defendant having admitted that the boxes were
damaged while in transit and in its possession, the
burden of proof then shifted, and it devolved upon the
defendant to both allege and prove that the damage was
caused by reason of some fact which exempted it from
liability. As to how the boxes were damaged, when or
where, was a matter peculiarly and exclusively within
the knowledge of the defendant and in the very nature
of things could not be in the knowledge of the plaintiff.
To require the plaintiff to prove as to when and how the
damage was caused would force him to call and rely
upon the employees of the defendant's ship, which in
legal effect would be to say that he could not recover
any damage for any reason. That is not the law.
Shippers who are forced to ship goods on an
ocean liner or any other ship have some legal rights,
and when goods are delivered on board ship in good
order and condition, and the ship owner delivers them
to the shipper in bad order and condition, it then
devolves upon the ship owner to both allege and prove
that the goods were damaged by the reason of some
fact which legally exempts him from liability; otherwise,
the shipper would be left without any redress, no matter
what may have caused the damage.
The lower court in its opinion says:
The defendant has not even attempted to prove
that the two cases were wet with sea water by fictitious
event, force majeure or nature and defect of the things
themselves. Consequently, it must be presumed that it
was by causes entirely distinct and in no manner
imputable to the plaintiff, and of which the steamer
President Garfield or any of its crew could not have been
entirely unaware.
And the evidence for the defendant shows that
the damage was largely caused by "sea water," from
which it contends that it is exempt under the provisions
of its bill of lading and the provisions of the Article 361
of the Code of Commerce, which is as follows:
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FACTS:
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FACTS:
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FACTS:
On August 31, 1984, Fatima boarded De Luxe Bus No.
5 in Manila on her way to Legazpi City. She had three
pieces of luggage containing all of her optometry review
books, materials and equipment, trial lenses, trial
contact lenses, passport and visa, as well as her mother
Marisols U.S. immigration (green) card, among other
important documents and personal belongings. During
a stopover at Daet, it was discovered that all but one
bag remained in the open compartment as the other
bags, including Fatimas things, were missing and could
have dropped along the way.
Fatima immediately reported the loss to her mother who
went to petitioners offices in Legazpi City and Manila
where she was merely offered her P1,000.00 for each
piece of luggage lost. In an effort to recover the bags,
the petitioners asked assistance from the radio stations
and even from Philtranco bus drivers who plied the same
route on August 31st. This paid off when one of Fatimas
bags was recovered.
On September 20, 1984, respondents, through counsel,
made a formal demand from the petitioner. In a letter
dated October 1, 1984, the latter apologized for the
delay and said that a team has been sent out to Bicol
for the purpose of recovering or at least getting the full
detail of the incident. After more than nine
months, respondents decided to file a case for breach of
contract of carriage. They claimed that the loss was due
to petitioners failure to observe extraordinary diligence
in the care of Fatimas luggage and that petitioner dealt
with them in bad faith. Petitioner, on the other hand,
disowned any liability for the loss on the ground that
Fatima allegedly did not declare any excess baggage
upon boarding its bus.
RTC: The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioners and
ordered the payment of the value of the lost belongings,
transportation expenses and damages among other.
CA: The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC but deleted
the award of moral and exemplary damages.
ISSUE:
W/N Sarkies Tours is liable for breach of contract
of carriage due to the loss of Fatimas belongings
RULING:
YES.
Petitioner claims that Fatima did not bring any piece of
luggage with her, and even if she did, none was declared
at the start of the trip. However, in a letter dated
October 1, 1984, petitioner tacitly admitted its liability
Transportation Law
Case Digests
2-Manresa
SY 2015-2016
Facts:
MV Alexander Saveliey, a vessel owned by Black Sea
contains a shipment of 545 hot rolled steels from Russia
which was discharged at the Port of Manila in favour of
the Consignee, Little Giant Corporation. These were
insured against all risks with Industrial Insurance
Company. Upon arrival in the port of Manila, it was
assigned outside the breakwater of Manila South
Harbor.
Schmitz Transport is the customs broker whose
services were engaged by Little Giant to secure the
clearances, receive the cargoes from the shipside and
deliver it to Little Giants warehouse. Since Schmitz does
not own a barge and a tugboat to unload the coils at
shipside, it in turn engaged the services of Transport
Venture (TVI).
The weather condition had become inclement due to an
approaching storm and 37 coils unloaded from the
vessel to the barge were already accomplished around
12:30 am. However, no tugboat pulled the barge back
to the pier. The barge was abandoned by the crew at
5:30 am due to the strong waves. It eventually capsized
washing away the 37 coils and was never recovered.
Little Giant filed a formal claim against Industrial
Insurance which paid it the amount of P5,246,113.11.
It then executed a subrogation receipt in favor of
Industrial Insurance. Industrial Insurance later filed a
complaint against Schmitz Transport, TVI, and Black
Sea for the recovery of the amount it paid to Little Giant.
It faulted the defendants for undertaking the unloading
of the cargoes while typhoon signal No. 1 was raised in
Metro Manila.
Defendants defenses:
Schmitz Transport asserts that it was acting as an agent
of Little Giant, hence the transportation contract was
between Little Giant and TVI and that both of them were
not common carriers. Black Sea argued that the cargoes
were received by Little Giant through Schmitz in good
order, hence it cannot be faulted. TVI maintained that it
acted as a passive party as it merely received the
cargoes and transferred the same to the barge upon
instruction of Schmitz Transport.
Transportation Law
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SY 2015-2016
Issues:
1. Whether the cargoes were lost due to a
fortuitous event and no negligence on the part
of the 3 of them?
2. If there was negligence, to whom should liability
attach?
Held:
1. No, it was not lost due to a fortuitous event
under Article 1174.
The loss thus is outside the act of God Doctrine. In this
case, the proximate cause of the loss of the cargoes was
that no tugboat towed back the barge to the pier after
it was completely loaded. Had the barge been towed
back promptly to the pier, the deteriorating sea
conditions notwithstanding, the loss could have been
avoided. But the barge was left floating in open sea until
big waves set in causing it to shrink along with the
cargoes.
When the effect is found to be in part the result of the
participation of man, whether due to his active
intervention or neglect or failure to act, the whole
occurrence is then humanized and removed from the
rules applicable to the acts of God.
2. Schmitz Transport and TVI are liable.
Schmitz Transport is a Common Carrier. A customs
broker may be regarded as a common carrier. As long
as a person or corporation holds itself to the public for
the purpose of transporting goods as a business, it is
already considered a common carrier regardless if it
owns the vehicle to be used or has to hire one. It
undertook to transport the cargoes from the shipside to
Little Giants warehouse. This is proven by the testimony
of its own VP and General Manager that part of the
services it offers to its clients as a brokerage firm
includes the transportation of cargoes reflects so.
It suffices that petitioner undertakes to deliver the
goods for pecuniary consideration. Article 1732 does not
distinguish between one whose principal business
activity is the carrying of goods and one who does such
carrying only as an ancillary activity. To declare
otherwise "would be to deprive those with whom it
contracts the protection which the law affords them
notwithstanding the fact that the obligation to carry
goods for its customers, is part and parcel of petitioners
business.
Transportation Law
Case Digests
2-Manresa
SY 2015-2016