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    of 9
    e Power and Interdependence Tuirb Eoition Robert O. Keohane Duke University Joseph S. Nye Harvard University For our parents, with gratitude, And our children, with hope. Seni Acquisions Eto: Ei Stuno ‘ASechte Bilton ta Cato Marketing Manage: Megan CaF Peden ar Daa etn jet Corton, Tet Design lest age M Peay Sones ny tn etn Pe Makeup Ei Suet on Dp ain Coe At Fs Hh ane (1904-6), “he Contin Bos mounted on panel, ¢.1845-1549, Hunter Museum of Ax scan Ae Chatansoge. Teens women Museum of Ameran At Chaar, Temes, Mant Baye: Roy Picker ; ne Praterand Bind RR. Donel Son Company / Han ore Pe: Corl Grape orcs id Libeary of Congress Cataloging n- Publication Data Kote, Robert 0. (Robert Owe), 1941- eran interdependence Raber 0. Kel, Jp. Nye. — Pom. Includes biogeapbieal referenes aed ISBN ORL-OWRET-L 1 Internation relitos, 2 International economic eations, 1 Nye Jove. Tite x1306.4428 2001 Sardi on 6364 cm Copyright © 2001 by Robert 0. Keane nd Josph Nye ‘ne Nee of sin ond sina mine trmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, ph fc ‘otherwise, without the prior P veiw eicloe, out the pir wien erin fe pis, rd ihe United Sates "ese itor web pres com SBN o.2-04557-1 125456769 10-Dou—00 020100 ee Contents Preface to First Edition viii Preface to Second Edition xi Preface to Third Edition xv Part! Understanding Interdependence 1 Guarten 1) INTERDEPENDENCE IN WoRLD Pourtics 3 “The New Rhetoric of Interdependence 5 Interdependence as an Analytic Concept 7 | Power and Interdependence 9 International Regime Change 17 Guarten2 REALISM AND COMPLEX INTERDEPENDENCE 20 ‘The Characteristics of Complex Interdependence 21 Multiple Channels 22 / Absence of Hierarchy among Issues 22 / Minor Kole of Military Fore 23 ‘The Political Processes of Complex Interdependence 2 Linkage Strategies 28 / Agenda Setting 27 / Transnational aa Sctaental Relations 29 7 Hole of Intemational Onantatns 90-0 * CharTen3 EXPLAINING INTERNATIONAL REGIME CHANGE 33 [An Economie Process Explanation 33 Overall Power Structure Explanation 36 Brodin Hegemony 36 / Limitations of an Overall Struct Explanation 40 Issue Structure 43 Limitations of Structural Explanations 45 CHAPTER 2 Realism and Complex Interdependence Oxigemente world polities profounaly affect what one sees and Thaw one constructs theories to explain events. We believe that the assump- tions of poltieal realists, whose theories dominated the postwar period are often aaeinadeqate basis Tor analyzing the polities of interdependence. The sealist sumptions shout world polis can be seen as defining an extreme st of con- “Talon or idea! type. One eonld also imagine very different conditions. In his “hapten, we sll construe another ideal type, the apposite of realism. We alt ‘Conplet interdependence. After establishing the differences between rls and omlen interdependence, we shall argue that complex interdependence some timed comes closer to reality than does realism, When it does, traditional expla ations of change in intemaional regimes become questionable andthe search for new explanatory models hecomes more urgent Yor pola realists, isteraatioal polis, ike al eter politics, isa struggle for power but unlike domestic pits a struggle dominated bonged vsence Tithe words of the most influential postwar textbook, “AI history shows that or jens naive in international politics are continuously preparing for, actively panned in, or recovering fom organized violence in the form of war." Theee itsummptons are integral the eat vision, First states as coherent units are the fominant actors in world polities, This isa double assumption: states are pr aan and they act as eoherent units. Second, realist assume that Force is ithe aud effective instrument of poliey. Other instruments may also be “ployed, but ning or threatening force isthe mos effective means of welding power Third, partly because oftheir second assurption, relists assume « hie pet of issues in world polities, headed by questions of military security: the igh poles” ofeltary security dominates the “lw palites” of econemsie ard social airs. “Thone realist assumptions define an ideal type of work polities. They allo vs to imagine 2 workin which polities is continslly characterized by active or Futentil confit among states, th the use of force pose at any tne, Fach Rae attempts to defen ts tensitory and interests from real or perceived eats Plead integration among states slight and ass only as long as it serves the The Charest Conplesinedeendoce 21 rational interests of the most powerful states. Transnational actors ether do not carer play unimportant. Only the adept exerese of force or the teat Sr fone pernts states to stvive, and only wale statesmen succeed in ating aan ces asin swell fanctioningbolance of power thesystem stable. Tach of the realist assumptions can be challenged. If we challenge the simultaneously, we ean imagine a world in which actors other than states patit- pute det in world plies, in which a clear Werarchy of sees does mot ex Par i ehich fore ion inelfective instrament of policy. Under these cond ‘Dane. inhic we cll the characteristics of complex interdependence—one woul! ‘apect world politics ta be very different than under realist conditions We il explore these diferences in the nex section ofthis chapter. We do not argue, however, that complex interdependence faithfally eles world polit -zaiy. Quite the contrary both it an the reabst porta are Kl types. Most rae Gail fall somewhere between these two extremes, Sometines, realist “Zeumptons wil be accurate, or largely accurate, but frequenthy complex inter eperuence wal provide a better portrayal of reality. Before one decides what ERintory model o apply toa station or problem, one wll eed to uvderstand ‘redagrec to which relist or complex interdependence assumptions correspond tothe situation, The Characteristics of Complex Interdependence ‘Complex interdependence has three main characteristics: 1. Multiple channels connect societies, including: informal tes between ov cernauental elves at well as formal foreign office arrangements; informal ties mong nongovernmental ches (acetoface and through tecommunicatons) wee nonational organizations (such as rultinational hanks or corporations). ‘These channels can be summarized as interstate, transgovernmental al transna Tieealselations. Interstate relations are the normal channels assed by realists ‘ranngoeeramental apis when we relax the realist assumption that tates at caherely ae units, ransnational applies when we relac the assumption that slates are the only units he agenda of interstate relationships cons of multiple ses that are not arranged inva clear or consistent hierarchy. This absence of Merarely among aaa aeecans, among other things, hat rlitary security does not consistently ‘Jomanate the agenda, any issues arse from what used to be consklered domes~ fhe pli, ad the distinction between domestic and foreign fsues becomes Dhened, ‘These issues are considered in several government departments (not jose foreign offices), and at several levels. Inadequate policy coordination on these aac elves significant costs. Different isues generate different coslitions, tah within governments and aross them, and tvolve diferent degrees of con- fice, Poities does not stop atthe waters edge . Miltary oree is not used by governments foward other governments within the exjon, or on the issues, when complex interdependence preva. It ‘hay, however, be important in these governments’ relations with governments 12 Chapter? Renion ad Complex erdepedence outside that region, or on other issues. Military Force could, for instance, be irel- rant to resolving disagreements on economic issues among members of an Thane, yet atthe same time be very important for tat aliance’s political and dnilitanyselations with a rival loc. For tho former relationships this condition of Comples interdependence would be met; forthe later, it wouk! net “Traditional theories of international polities implicitly or explicitly deny the accuracy of these three assumptions. Traitioalist are therefore tempted aio to deny the relevance of entcsms based on the complex interdependence ideal type. We bliove, however that our three conditions are ary well approximated eee ne global sues of economic and ecological interdependence and that they coer ehos to characterizing the entire relationship between some counties. One Stour purpoves heres to prove that contention, Ty subsequent chapters we shall Sramite complex interdependence in oceans poley and monetary policy and in the relationships ofthe United States to Canada and Australi. Tn this chapter, however, we shall try to convince you to take these ertiisms of traditional assumptions seriously: ‘Multiple Channels [Avis o any major airport is a dramatic way to confirm the eristence of multiple hamels of gontact annong advanced industrial countries; there is a voluminous It ceture to prove t+ Bureaucrats from diffeeut woonties dal directly with one snore at anetings and on the telephone as well asin writing, Similarly, non- fvernmental elites fequentl get together i the normal course of business. erguniations such as the Tellatral Commission, aed in conferences sponsored by private foundations Tadation,aultinationel ns and banks affect both domestic and intestate relations. The limits on private firms, othe closeness of tles between government nd business, vary considerably from one society to another, but the participation ‘flange and dynamic onganization, not controled entirely by governments, has become a normal part of foreign aswell as domestic relations. “These actors tre portant not only because of their activities in pursuit of their own interests, but also because they ac a transmission belts, making go ‘Mament policies in various countries more sensitive to one another. As the scope Stygowentments domestic activites has broadened, and as corporations, banks se toa fesser extent inde unions have made decisions that transcend national Dorundaries the domestic polices of diferent countses impinge on one another ven and more, Transnational contmunications reinforce these effects. Thus, foreign economic policies touch more domestic economic activity than in the yur blaring the nes between domestic and foreign policy an increasing the eievber of issues relevant to foreign policy. Parallel developments in issues of, tvronmestal elation and control aver technology reinforce this trend ‘Absence of Hierarchy among Issues Foreign alfairsagendas—that i, sts of issues relevant ¢o foreign policy with Avie governments are concerned-—have become larger and more diverse, No The Caractere of Compeitrapendencs 23 longer con all sues be subordinated to military security. As Seeretary of State Kissinger described the situation in 1975: progresin dealing wth the trnitona agendas no longer enough. Ane and wnprec ested Find of nue has etnerge The problems of energy, resoures, envionment, pop ait the uss fspace and dhe as new rack gestions of iia security, delogy he testo ley wich have adtonally made up the diplomatic gerd Kissinger’ is, which ould be expanded, illustrates how governments’ policies, even the previously considered merely domestic, impinge on one another. The Cntensive consultative arrangements developed by the OECD, as well as the GATT. IME, and the Furopem Community ndeate how characteristic the over lap of domestic and foreign policy is among developed pluralist counties. The npanization within nine nap departments of the United States government (agriclture; Commerce; Defense; Health, Education and! Welfare: Interior: Jato, Labor State; and Treasury) al many other agencies reflects their exten Tre international commitments, The wulipl, overlapping issues that result make ‘nightmare of governmental oganizations:* When there are multiple isties onthe agenda, many of which threaten the Interests of domestic groups but do not clearly threaten the nation asa whole, the problems of formulating a ccherent and consistent foreign policy increase. In {075 energy was a foreign poley problem, but specific remedies, such asa taxon tzuotine and automobiles, imolved domestic legislation opposed by auto workers End companies alike. As one commentator observed, "virtually every time ‘Congres as seta national policy that changed the way people iv .the action fame after a consensus had developed, bit by bt, over the year, that a problem usted and that there was ove best way to solve iS Opportunities for dela, for Special protection, for ineondstency and incoherence abound when international oles requres aligning the domestic policies of pluralist democratic eountees Minor Role of Military Foree Political scientists have tradiionally emphasized the role of militar force in inter tational plies. As we win the frst chapter, force dominates other means of power: there are no constants on one's choice of instruments (a hypothetical Fiation that has only been approximated inthe two world was), the state ith Eperion miitary foree will prevail. If th secu dilemma for all states were txtremely acute, military force, supported by economic and other resources, ‘Mould leary be the dominant source of power. Survival isthe primary goal of ell ‘Gates, and inthe wort situations, force ss ultimately necessary to guarantee sur- ‘val ‘Thus military foree is rays a central component of national power, ‘Yet particularly among initialized, pluralist counties, the perceived margin af aely has widened: fears attack in general have declined, and fears of attacks by one mother ae virtually noneastent. France has abandoned the tous azimuts (ofense in all directions) strategy that President de Gaulle advocated (it was not {aken entively seriously even tthe tine). Canada’s last war plans for fighting the United States were abandoved half a century ago. Britain and Germany'no longer 24 Chat esom ad Conpos feel threatened by each other. Intense relationships of mutual influence exst between these countries, but in most of them force i rvelevant or unimportant as an instrument of pli Moreover, fore is olten not an appropriate way of achieving other goals (such as economic and ecological welfare) that are becoming more important It jsnot {impossible to imagine dramatic confit or revolutionary change im which the use or threat of military force over an economic issue or among advanced indnstrial ‘counties might become plusible, Then realist assumptions would again be a relic Sle guide to events, Bu in mst situations, the effects of miitary force ae both costly and uncertain.* ‘Even when the direct use of force fs barred among.a group of countries, how- ver mltary power ean stl be used politically. During the Cold War esch super- power used te teat of force to deter attacks by other superpowers on itself or Re alles, ts deterrence ability thus served an indirect, protective role, which it ‘ould sein bargaining on other ses with it ales, This bargaining tool was p teulaly important for the United States, whose allies were concemed about potential Soviet threats and which had fewer other means of influence over its “ies than dd the Soviet Union over its Eastern European partners, The United States had, accordingly, taken advantage of the Europeans’ (particulary the erman) desire fr its protection and inked the issue of troop levels in Europe tote and monetary negotations. Thus although the fist-order effect of deter Tent force was essentially negative to deny elfextive offensive power toa power opponent-—states could use that force positively—to gain political fluence “Thus, even for countries whose relations approximate complex interdepen- dence, two serious qualifications remain: (1) drastic social andl political change ‘ould cause force again to become an important direct instrument of policy; and {@) even when elites interest are complementary, a country that uses military force to protect another may have significant political influence over the other county, ‘i North-South relations, or vlations among Third World countries, as well s in East-West relations, force is often inyportant. Miltary power helped the Soviet Union to dominate Eastern Europe economically as well as politely. The threat fof open or covert American military intervention helped to limit revolutionary ‘changes in the Caribbean, especially in Guatemala in 1954 and in the Dominican Republic in 1965. Seeretary of State Kissinger, in January 1975, issued a veiled warning to members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) that the United States anight use force against them “where there Is some atval strangulation of the Industrialized world? ‘Even in there rather conflicted situation, however, the recourse to force seenns less likely now than at most times during the century before 1945. The {cstructiveness of nuclear weapons makes any attack agsinst a nvclear power dlangerous, Nuclear weapons are mostly sed asa deterent. Threats of nuclear ‘ction against much weaker counties may occasionally be eficacions, but they are ‘cally or more likely to soli relations between one’s adversaries, The limited ‘The Pota Pocenss of Campi lirdepenenee 25 usefulness of conventional force to control socially mobilized populations has tbeen shown bythe United States fire in Vietnam aswell shy te rapid decine tf colonialism in Afica Furthermore, employing force on one isue against a independent state with which one has a variety of relationships is Hey to rupture inutuallyroftable relations on aber ses. In other words, the se af ore often Tis cst effects. on nonsecurty goals. A finally, in Wester desocraies, pop ‘lar opposition to prolonged military confiets i very high ® Tl clear that these constraints bear unequally on various countries, or on the same countries in different situations. Risks of nuclear escalation affect everyone, Dut domestic opinion is fr less constraining for authoritarian powers than forthe United States, Europe, or Japan. Even authoritarian countries may be reluctant to tise force to eblain eeonornie objectives when such use might be ineffective and Usrupt esher relationships. Both the difficlty of controling soilly mobilized jopulations th foreign troops andthe changing technology of weaponry may eal enhance the ability of certain countries, oF nonstate group, to use fer= forism asa political weapon without effective fear of reprisal “The fat thatthe ehanging role of force has uneven effects des not make the cluauge less important, but does make matters moce complex, This complexity te compounded by diferences in the usability of force among ise areas. When achat arouses little interest or passion, force may be unthinkable, In suck patances, compley interdependence may bea valuable concept or analyzing the political process. But i that fsue becomes a mater of ie and deat—as some Feople thought ol sight bocome the use or threat of force coud become dee Five again, Realist assumptions would then be more relevant. T's thus important to determine the appleaility of ream or of complex interdepenlence to each situation. Without this determination, rer analysis Ihely to be confused. Our purpose in developing an alternatve tothe realist {lescription of world politics i to encourage adliferentiated approach that citi {gushes ameng dimensions ad areas af world polties—not (as some moxdrnist Soservers do} to replace one oversimplification with another, ‘The toe main characterises of complex interdependence give rise to distinctive polite processes, which translate power eesonres into powers contol of ou eones, As we argued earlier, something s usually lst oraddedin the translation. Under conditions of complex interdependence the translation will be different than under realist conditions, al our preditions about outcomes willneed to be aajusted accordingly Hh the reals world military sectaity willbe che dominant goal of states. il even affect issues that are not directly invelved with military power or territorial ‘efene. Nonmlitary preblems wll nat oly be subordinated to military ones they All be stad fr thelr poitico-nulitar implications. Balance of payments soe 25 Coys? Ralon od Conlxinerdepeiance for instance, wil be considered atleast a8 much in the light oftheir implications for wank power generally as for their purely financial ramifications. McGeorge Tunay conformed to realist expectations when he argued in 1964 that devaluation ot the dollar should be seriously considered if necessary to fight the war in Vietuam?"To some extent, so did former Treasury Secretary Henry Fowler when fhe contended in 1971 that the United States needed a trade surplus of 4 billion to $6 illion in order to lead in Western defense." aa world of complex interdependence, however, oe expects some officals tcl at lover levels to emphasize the variety of tate gone dat mest be rprued ne absence ofa clear hierarchy of ues, goals wil ay by ss, and Pray no be closely elated. Each bureaueracy wil pursue is own concenss and “itough several agencies may reach compromises on issues that alec dhem al, they wl tata consistent pater of pois dl to maintain, Moreover, caer estional actor wil introduce different goals int varios groups of issues Linkage Strategies ‘Goals wil therefore vary by issue area under complex intenlependence, but so wil thecdiatrbution of power and the typical political processes. Traditional analysis Thewses the international system, and leads us to anticipate similar politica trocees on a variety of issues. Mitarly and economically strong sates will ivatnate «variety of organizations and variety of sues, Dy linking their wm Soles on some issues fo other states’ poles on other isues. By using their regal dominance to prevail on their weak issues, the strongest states wil inthe Taitionel model, ensure a congruence between the overall structure of sitary tral eoonomie power and the pattern of outeoses on any one isu ares, Thus ‘word polities can be treated a a seamless web, Winger complex interdependence, such congruence i les key to occur. As anilitery force devalued, military strong states wil find t more feat to use heir everal dominance to contr outcomes on issues in which they are weak. Ani since the distribution of power resources in trade, shipping, o of for exam ‘in may be quite different, patteras of outcomes and distinctive pobteal process: re rao to vary from one set of issues to another. HF force were readily SFolable, and itary secuty were the highest foreign policy goal these var are inthe sve structures of power would not matter very much, The linkages “Gram from then to military issues would ensure consistent dominance by the reral strongest states. But when military fore i largely immobilized, strong ten wil find that linkage is less effective. They may stil attempt such inks, but athe absence ofa hierarchy of issues, their success will be problematic. ‘Dominant sates may ty to secure much the same result by using overall ec rome pome to affect rests on other sues. fon eeonomie objectives Make: they may succeed: money, after al is fungible. But economic objectives have political implications ae economic linkage by the strong i Himited by Hemet, transnational, and transgovernmental actors who resist having ehelt treats traded of Furthermore, the international actors may be diferent on dif ‘he oka Processes of Camp depndene 27 {erent issues, and the international organizations in which negotiations take place tre often quite separate. Ths i iffiul, for example, t magne anaty or onomically strong state linking concessions on monetary policy to reeiprsat cSncessions in aces policy. On the othe hand, poor weak states are not sinilayty {atubited from linking unrelated sses, partly because their domestic Interest are les complon Linkage of unrelated isues is often a means of extracting conees- Sensor ae payments fom rich and povverful states. And unlike powerful states ‘Mtn instrument fo hnkage anita force) soften too costly to use, the linkage Tstrument used by poor, weak states—interational organization—Is available and inexpensive. “Tina the uty of force declines, nd as issues become more equal in impor taney the dstibution of power within each issue wil become more important If Tkages become les effective onthe whole, outcomes of political bargaining wil increasingly vary by issue area. “The diferenlation among issue areas in complex interdependence means that linkages among issues wil become more problematic and wil tend 0 reduce rathes than reinforee international hierarchy. Linkage strategies, and defense guna them, wl pose exit strategic choices fr states Should sees be om sercred separately or as a package? If linkages are to be drawn, which isues shoal be fnked, and on which ofthe linked issues should concessions be made? How far can one push @ linkage hefore it becomes counterproductive? For IHotance, should one seek formal agreements or informal, bt less politically sen~ itive derstaings? The fact thst world politics under complex interdepen ‘Jones is nota seamless we leads us to expect that efforts to stitch seams together ‘cvantageeusy, as reflected in linkage strategies, wil very often, determin the Shape of the fabric. Fre negligible role of fore leads us to expect states to rely more on other Instruments in oder to wield power, For the reasons we have already discussed, ee vulnerable states will ry to use asyinmetrcal interdependence in particular froups of asus asa source of power they wills te to use international org aernfons and transnational actors and los. Stats will approech econorule inter dlepenttene in terms of power as well ast effects on citizens’ welfare, although rifare considerations vl limit their attempts to maximize power. Most eco- wernt and cologeal interdependence involves the possbiity of font yin, or joie Tones, Mutanl svareness of potential gins and losses andthe danger of evening each actors postion through overly rigorous strgales over the dst pation ofthe gains can limit the use of asymmetrical interdependence Agenda Setting ‘Our second assumption of complex interdependence, the lack of clear hierarchy mong multiple sues, leads os to expect thatthe polities of agenda formation snd santa wil Recome more important Traditional analyses lead statesmen to faces ‘a poticovmiitary issues and to pay litle attention to the broader polities of “Gea formation. Statesmen asuine thatthe agenda wl best hy ssn the 2 chats? Panam and Complexion anne of poet cna of nt andy persed reas tothe seu balance of es cyber gta hen thy scm tat unt) sate, ete ena, agendas wile fenced tony

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