Torres v.

Gonzales
152 SCRA 272
Ponente: Justice Feliciano
Topic: Executive Clemency
Facts:
petitioner was convicted by the Court of First Instance of Manila of the crime of estafa.
Subsequently, a conditional pardon was granted to the petitioner by the President of the
Philippines on condition that petitioner would "not again violate any of the penal laws of
the Philippines. Should this condition be violated, he will be proceeded against in the
manner prescribed by law." Petitioner accepted the conditional pardon and was
consequently released from confinement.
The Board of Pardons and Parole (the "Board") resolved to recommend to the President
the cancellation of the conditional pardon granted to the petitioner because of the several
number of charges filed against him. the President cancelled the conditional pardon of the
petitioner. Te respondent Minister of Justice issued "by authority of the President" an
Order of Arrest and Recommitment against petitioner. The petitioner was accordingly
arrested and confined in Muntinlupa to serve the unexpired portion of his sentence.
Hence, the petition.
Issue:
Whether or not conviction of a crime is necessary before the petitioner can be validly
rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon and
according to serve the balance of his original sentence.
Held:
The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a conditional
pardon are purely executive acts which are not subject to judicial scrutiny.
The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon, and the
proper consequences of such breach, may be either a purely executive act, not subject to
judicial scrutiny under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or it may be a
judicial act consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a conditional pardon
under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code. Where the President opts to proceed under
Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of
a subsequent crime is necessary, much less conviction therefor by final judgment of a
court, in order that a convict may be recommended for the violation of his conditional
pardon.