Tien Dat Le

Professor Tam

Introduction to East Asia Civilization

November 28th 2016

Battle against Song: the art of national defense

Vietnamese ancient history is a series of unending warfare, mostly arising from

conflicts with China. After 1000 years under Chinese domination, Vietnam, named Dai

Viet at times, was deemed independent by many scholars, but the country

occasionally went through war with neighboring countries, especially China as in the

history China proved itself to always have the desire to expand its territory. As recorded,

in most of battles against China, Dai Viet was in a defensive position and outnumbered

but eventually achieved victory through the understanding of the land and the climate that

contributed to creative tactics (Ngo Quyens taking advantage of river tide to set up traps

for Han army, Tran Hung Daos war against Yuan). However, there was one time in the

history when Dai Viet military battled offensive against Chinese counterpart. In this paper

we shall look, from the perspective of Dai Viet, into details of the 1070s battle led by Ly

Thuong Kiet that defeated the Songs military, led by general Guo Kui .

Since the foundation of the later Ly dynasty in Dai Viet in 1010, relationship

between Dai Viet and China was benign in general. The two countries often sent

ambassadors to broker mutually beneficial agreements in trade. Ly kings tent to be

deferential to Song emperors by sending tributes on an occasional basis. On the other

hand, the kings were firm when it came to territorial matters, showing great pride when

dealing with external affairs.

 In 1067, emperor Song Shenzong succeeded the supremacy from his

father, assigning Wang Anshi as the statesman. Wang Anshi proposed and

conducted several reforms. The reforms were, however, opposed by parts of the

population and many officials. Attempting to show power and authority over the opposition

side and to expand the territory, Wang Anshi and the current Song emperor planned to

conquer Dai Viet, considered weaker than Liao and Xixia, and in a vulnerable state as

king Ly Nhan Tong was only 7 years old.

Preparation for the conquering plan

Qinzhou , Lianzhou and Yongzhou , the three states on the military

advancing route from China to Dai Viet, became primary military centers where military

rations were stored and trainings were conducted. It was recorded that tens of thousands

of soldiers were recruited in these southern Song states. The newly recruited soldiers

would join the professional military force in northern Song to form the primary army to

advance to Dai Viet.

Several diplomatic moves were also executed by Wang Anshi and the emperor.

The government successfully convinced Cambodia (Khmer Kingdom back then) and

southern Vietnam (Zhancheng , an independent country at time) to form a conquering

league. In addition, spies were sent to Dai Viet to study the countrys geography. Trading

was forbidden and the border was closed. The Song government on one hand

accelerated the plan to conquer Dai Viet, on the other ensured the secrecy of the

conquering plan to prevent Dai Viets guarding up. Up till 1075, military camps were

successfully established in the three states, ready to advance to Dai Viet through the land
and the sea. However, the moves by the Song were too revealing to cover the conquering

plan. Dai Viet hence discovered the plan from the early stage.

Dai Viets counterattack strategies

Upon realizing Songs invasion desire, general Ly Thuong Kiet made a astonishing

proposal to the king: It would be better to lead the army upnorth to hinder the enemys

military formation than to merely wait for them to come. The proposal was widely

supported by the king and the officials. 1075 marks the start of the preparation for the

China raid by Dai Viets army. Ly Thuong Kiet was assigned admiral of the army marching

northward. It was estimated that Dai Viet armys strength consist of 70,000 soldiers while

Chinas 1,000,000.

Battle at Yongzhou fortress

Many scholars and history analyst agree that Dai Viet armys marching forward is

a wise, though risky, move by admiral Ly Thuong Kiet. Yongzhou, Qinzhou and Lianzhou

were the primary military assembly of Songs army. However, back then, the majority of

Songs army was up north dealing with Xia and Liao. China was a large country, so it took

almost a month for the news to reach the capital and another one for the backup army to

march to the border. As such, though not easy, it was not impossible either to raid the

three states.

October 1075, the army started marching northward. Infantry, led by general Tong

Dan , consist of tribal groups living in northern provinces of Dai Viet. At this point, Dai

Viets army reached 100,000, 40,000 of which were from the tribes and the rest were

professional soldiers from the capital, led by Ly Thuong Kiet, forming marine troops. The
army used large boats to sail to China. The boats were recorded large enough for

elephant army.

A small troop led was sent to attack Guwan on October 27th 1075, starting

the operation. The castle quickly fell. This was a tactical move to lure Song soldiers out

of Yongzhou camps. As expected, Song soldiers were sent from Yongzhou to border

camps to guard up. In November 1075, Dai Viet infantry raided the border camps, killing

a considerable number of Song soldiers. Those guarding the South West side of

Yongzhou were slayed, so were all the heads of military camps. Troops led by Tong Dan

had succeeded in spreading out the Songs border military force and opening the South

West side of Yongzhou castle, setting up for the greater offense by the troops led by Ly

Thuong Kiet.

While Tong Dans infantry was attracting the attention of Songs admirals, Ly

Thuong Kiet led the larger army to attack Qinzhou castle on November 20th 1075. As

Lianzhou heard about the defeat of Qinzhou, it was too late to guard up. Lianzhou fell

three days later. Other smaller military camps were also raided.

As the raids on the three states were executed in a very short period of time, the

Song government did not know about them. Although Qinzhou, Lianzhou and part of

Yongzhou were defeated in November, the news did not get to the capital until December.

There was a month delay in the delivery of news which added to the advantage of Dai

Viet army. Now Ly Thuong Kiets force marched straight to the South West side of

Yongzhou, ready to offend.

Among the castles, Yongzhous was the most difficult to penetrate. The walls were

steady even against catapult. Military food and weapon reserves were stocked as
Yongzhou was planned to be the assembly place for the Song army before marching

south. Ly Thuong Kiets army had been offending for a month, but to no success. The

army then used fire catapult and fire archery to set fire to the castle. The strategy seemed

to work as the castle was covered in fire, but the stable walls made it impossible for the

army to penetrate. Eventually admiral Ly Thuong Kiet commanded the Song captives to

fill sand and soil to bags then to stack them high together in front of the castle. The army

then was able to climb inside the towel. On January 3rd 1076, Yongzhou castle fell. It was

estimated that 58.000 were killed. The operation was successful. Dai Viet army retreated

south, preparing to defend Thang Long, the capital, from the Songs primary armed force.

By March 1076 the whole of the army had successfully retreated to Thang Long.

Preparation for the war

By August 1076, Songs army of 100,000 fully equipped soldiers and 20,000

military assistants had assembled near the border, ready to march south under the

leadership of admiral Guo Kui. Also by then, Navy force had docked in Qinzhou.

As soon as Dai Viets army reached capital Thang Long, the king and the admiral

started guarding up the border and building a fortress to defend the castle against Song.

The borders defense line depended primarily on tribal groups force. The tribesmen were

skilled fighters, plus familiar with the regions geometry. Marine and navy were deemed

the main force of the army. Navy troops were dispatched to all entrance to the mainland.

There were many rivers running across the land, but Nhu Nguyet river was where all the

small branches merged, and Nhu Nguyet habor was the only suitable route for a large

army to travel.
 As this habor was crucial in the Songs march toward Thang Long, Ly Thuong Kiet

commanded building a fortress, called Nhu Nguyet fortress spanning across 30

kilometers, and several backup camps in the southern bank. The fortress was formed

from dikes that were built with bamboo, wood and soil. Outside, bamboo spikes were

placed in layers, among with traps underwater. Dai Viets force embarked right behind the

fortress. There were four main military assemblies along Nhu Nguyet river, named Nhu

Nguyet, Thi Cau, Phan Dong and Van Xuan. Out of the four, the marine and infantry of

Van Xuan assembly, counted 60,000 soldiers (20,000 guarding the camp with 400 boats,

the rest scattered along the fortress) were the core of the whole army. Catapult were also

placed along the river. The most skilled soldiers, normally guarding the castle, were

assigned to the battle front. The fortress would be the most crucial defense line as behind

the route that directly led to Thang Long.

Battles in Dai Viets land

The tribal force in the border was the first line of defense that Songs army had to

face. When Ly Thuong Kiet assembled arm force to march north, he formed a

considerable force from the tribal groups. They were the groups who made this first line

of defense. Although the first line of defense was supposed to slow down the Song armys

march toward Thang Long and cast damage, it was not supposed to defeat the whole of

Songs force. In less than ten days, the Songs army had reached Phu Luong river, close

to Thang Long capital. However, here the army faced an extensive fortress with layers of

spikes and infantry behind. There was no way for the conquering army to go around this

fortress. Admiral Guo Kui camped the force at the north bank of Phu Luong river, waiting
to join force with the navy. However, he did not expect that the navy would never pass

the Dai Viets navy defense line.

Songs navy was formed in Qinzhou and reached Vinh An county in Fall 1076

without any sight of Dai Viets force. As the troops entered Bach Dang river, they were

ambushed by Dai Viets navy led by general Ly Ke Nguyen. Clunky boats of Songs force

proved ineffective against light and mobile boats of Dai Viets force. Songs navy was

slaughtered.

Guo Kui commanded building ad-hoc bridges for the infantry to cross the river to

attempt small offences while waiting for the navy. With the bridges being built in a night,

Songs pioneer troops crossed the river to the south bank, but were slaughtered in an

ambush.

Figure 1: Map of the Nhu Nguyet battle set-up

 Failing in the first attempt to offence, Guo Kui decided not to make any moves until

the navy arrive. However, the infantry had been camping in the river bank for a month

with the navy nowhere to be found. Now for a large army, logistics started to become a

problem. The army under Guo Kui was running out of food and supplies, so it was in a

difficult situation: either continuing camping in the river bank or engaging would bring

them disadvantage. Guo Kui commanded chopping down trees to make rafts to cross the

river, organizing small battles, but once again, rafts crossing the river were all killed in

ambushes.

On Dai Viets side, every night Ly Thuong Kiet sent a person to a nearby temple

repeating the later famous poem:

Nam quc sn h nam c

(The mountains and rivers that carved the southern empire, dwelled by the Southern

Emperor.)

Tuyt nhin nh phn ti thin th

(Its sovereignty is of nature's will and is allotted in script from the heaven.)

Nh h nghch l lai xm phm

(If these invaders dare trespass)

Nh ng hnh khan h bi h

(They're going to get a huge beating)

It was recorded that the poem was a psychology tactic from Ly Thuong Kiet to

scare Songs soldiers.

Failing twice in crossing the river, Guo Kui ceased further attempts to cross the

river. Instead, he commanded using catapult as a way to offend without crossing the river.
Dai Viet soldier used light boats to cross over to north bank, trying to lure Guo Kui to cross

the river again, but to no success. Now both side were taking defensive stance. However,

the longer they camped on the river bank, the more disadvantages Songs troops were

in. Supplies were running out; diseases developed due to unfamiliarity with Dai Viets

climate; soldiers were tired. Songs army was weakening.

Figure 2: Nhu Nguyet battle

In February 1077, Ly Thuong Kiet decided to offend. 400 boats transporting 20,000

soldiers sailed from Van Xuan camp, attacking Songs army from the east. At the same

time, Dai Viets marine embarked in Nham Bien mountain, pushing back 5,000 Song

horsemen guarding the area. From Nham Bien mountain, the force continued to attack

Guo Kuis camp. A bloody battle occured between Dai Viets marine and Songs

horsemen, and eventually the former retreated. The attack by from the navy was

diversionary. While Songs army had yet to reform after the attack, the rest of Dai Viet
army followed Ly Thuong Kiet, strength of 40,000, crossed the river during night time,

slaughtering the opponent, completely defeating Chinas conquering army.

Overall, 50,000 Song soldiers were killed. After the battle, Guo Kui were left with

around 40,000 discouraged and tired soliders. On Dai Viets side, the army was left with

50,000 soldiers, all healthy thanks to effective supplies and logistics. General Ly Thuong

Kiet, with the right strategies, a formidable fortress and effective assignment of armed

force, successfully defended Dai Viet from the conquering desire of the Song. The battle

was the answer of Dai Viet to the condescending attitude of Chinese, showing creative

tactics that set the foundation for Guerilla warfare that would be practiced in future wars,

even up to the Vietnam War in the last century.

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