De-Parsonizing Weber: A Critique of Parsons’ Interpretation of Weber's Sociology Jere Cohen; Lawrence E, Hazelrigg: Whitney Pope American Sociological Review, Vol. 40, No. 2 (Apt., 1975), 229-241. Stable URL: hitp://links,jstor.org/sic¥?sici=0003-1224% 28197504%2940%3A2%3C229%3ADWACOP%3E2.0,CO%3B2-S American Sociological Review is currently published by American Sociological Association. ‘Your use of the ISTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR’s Terms and Conditions of Use, available at hhup:/www.jstororg/about/terms.huml. JSTOR’s Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at hup:/ www jstor.org/journalsasahu, Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the sereen or printed page of such transmission, JSTOR is an independent not-for-profit organization dedicated to creating and preserving a digital archive of scholarly journals. For more information regarding JSTOR, please contact support @jstor.org. hupulwww jstor.org/ Thu Feb 9 07:39:54 2006DE-PARSONIZING WEBER: A CRITIQUE OF PARSONS’ INTERPRETATION OF WEBER'S SOCIOLOGY* JERE COHEN University of Maryland, Baltimore County LAWRENCE E. HAZELRIGG Indiana University, Bloomington WHITNEY POPE Indiana University, Bloomington American Sociologlel Review 1975, Vol, 40 (April: 229.241, One of the most influential tmerpretations of Mex Weber's sociology has been that provided by Talcott Parsons, especally in The Structure of Social Action. We contend {hat the Parsonian interpretation is erroneous both in man} of lis particulars etd In the ieneral cast that It gives t0 Weber's theoretical product. The crux of Parsons’ Inisepresentation lo hls overweening. emiphasis on the category of the normative. A ‘confusion of “factual regularities” with "normative validity” ~ despite Weber's numerous ‘warnings apnint such ~ led Parsons 10 an exaggeration of the importance Weber assigned to normatie orientations of social action, legitimacy aid collectivity integration, and, ‘correspondingly, 10 a severe understatement of the importance of nonnormative aspects of focal action ond structures of dominance, In consequence, Parsons expanded what Wa3 but @ port of Weber's soclology and made it very nearly the whole arsons’ The Structure of Social Action (1949; originally published in 1937; hereafter referred to as The Structure) is one of the most influential works of sociological theory written originally in English. This paper is particularly concerned with Parsons’ introduction to and interpre- tation of the work of Max Weber to Englishreading audiences having no facility with the anfractuosities of the Germanic original. On the positive side, Parsons" exposition was eminently successful as intel- lectual importation, at least in a formal way; since the late 1930s, Weber has been accorded a singular stature in English-language sociology far more often than in that of his ‘homeland. Ironically, though, the very success of this deparochialization has magnified a negative effect, namely, the distortion of Weber that is implicit in Parsons’ interpreta tion. Had The Structure failed to diffuse knowledge of Weber, there would be little purpose to this paper beyond, perhaps, the Interest of intellectual chronicles demonstrat- “We with to acknowledge the helpful comments ‘of Randall Collins, Joseph Lopreato, Guenther Roth, ‘and Louis Schneider, and the editorial asistance of ‘Carolyn J. Mullins. Tit is Research Report No. 134 fof the institute for Social ‘Research, Indiana University, ing interpretive error and_ clarifying the witten record. That successful diffusion did occur indicates the vacuum that. existed before The Structure and also reinforces its negative effects (witness the numerous teat rents of Weber that have been influenced by The Structure). Since 1937 Parsons has been theoretical assimilationst, synthesizer and generalizer par ‘excellence in U.S. sociology, a compound role that has sometimes interfered (in avoidable ways) with faithful interpretation. Deter- ‘ined to develop sociological theory in the srand tradition, Parsons rightfully engaged in extensive analysis of works preceding his own. Hhaying ferreted out their strengths, to his satisfaction, he then attempted to” absorb those strengths by building upon them, In addition, Parsons continually tied to demon- strate continuities between his own and earlier works, thereby enhancing his arguments via appeals to a masterful heritage. This combina- tion of activities has resulted inevitably in systematic reinterpretations of the original source works (see e.g., Pope, 1973): not only have these works been pulled toward each other and then partly assimilated into Parsons’ own, but the direction of the integration has changed as his theoretical perspectives have changed. The theorists analyzed in The Structure were integrated so as to converge in ne230 support of a voluntarstic theory of action; in later analyses, the goal of integration was Parsons’ brand of structural. functionalism and, most recently, an old-style evolutionism. Since Parsons fully appreciated the merits of his own theoretical perspectives, we trust that he attempted to present the targets of his exegesis in the best possible light. Thus, for example, while Parsons tended to treat others’ theoretical formulations (Weber's, Durkheim’ and Pareto’s, for example) as prefatory to his own, he still gave a. sympathetic and appreciative account of their achievements. But Parsons saw greater convergence between his own action theory and that of Weber than can be justified, and thus gave Weber more credit as a progenitor than he actually deserved. For example, in commenting on Weber's theoretical deficiencies, Parsons (1947289) particularly cited his failure to develop “a systematized general theory... of the structure of systems of socal action.” The tone of Parsons’ commentary is revealing as he proceeds to observe that if) Weber had developed such a systematized theory, “he could hardly have failed” (emphasis added) to realize that functionalism represents the most Viable theoretical approach. With some justification, Parsons (1967: 41n) has observed that The Structure contains sociology’s most important analysis of Weber as theosist* Parsons (1949:c) himself has commented on the “welter of secondary interpretations and misinterpreta- tions” surrounding the theorists analyzed in The Structure and has attempted elsewhere (1935) to disprove at least one misinterpret tion. Itis ironic, then that Parsons’ own work contains what is today the major misinterpre- tation of Weber's sociology.® That misinter- pretation has several components. (1) Fre- "This contention is_untena (1968:135, 178) himself rejected. functionals; 1968). * although with the publication of Max Weber: An intellectual Portrait (Bendix, 1960) and numer ‘us additional works (eg., Bendix and Roth, 1971), Reinhard Bendix also has become recognized as & ‘major American interpreter of Weber. Sour analysis focuses on dominant themes in Parsons’ rendition of Weber. In so doing we have ceachewed systematic identification of vanous incon Aistoncies among Parsons’ own statements on Weber. AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW quently an aspect of Weber’ theory was given ‘an iniportanoe different from that assigned by Weber; for example, factors treated as decisive rather’ than as one of several important considerations, (as stipulated by Weber), Conversely, aspects of the original that were incompatible with Parsons’ own formulations have sometimes been discounted or ignored. This kind of misinterpretation has character- ized Parsons’ general understanding of ‘the relative importance of normative and non- normative factors in Weber's sociology. (2) Sometimes Parsons merely asserted that Weber meant “thus and so,” without provid- ing adequate reference to the original; in extreme instances (e.g, the example just above), he even asserted an interpretation explicitly rejected by Weber. (3) Frequently Parsons correctly noted a degree of overlap between one of Weber's concepts and one of his own, subsequently equating the two by translating Weber’s into his own vocabulary This provedure caused distortion in two ways, First, the overlaps were never perfect (and typically were far from being $0); by emphasizing similarities, Parsons may have ignored an equally or even more important area of discrepancy. Second, because concepts acquire meaning in context, giving the original concept a new context inevitably gave it a new meaning. (4) In order to place Weber within a particular tradition or framework, Parsons sometimes cited one or a few aspects ‘of Weber’s work as being characteristic of the whole. However, in doing so he often overlooked other, equally important or more numerous, aspects that were incompatible with the intended characterization. Parsons? employment of these and other procedures easily resulted in unfaithful representation— not merely of a few particularities of Weber's work but, by reason of their centrality, of its entirety. However, it should not be presuined that Parsons was oblivious to those aspects of Weber's thought that were inconsistent with his own interpretations. ‘To the contrary, Parsons made numerous statements ‘that suggest interpretations of Weber inconsistent with the main thrust of Parsons’ own analysis. Indeed, one striking-and certainly frustrating —as- pect of Parsons’ analysis is precisely the way in ‘hich he frequently took dus note of basic Weberian perspectives before either letting them dsop from Sight or reinterpeting them until they become ‘unrecognizable.DE-PARSONIZING WEBER In order to demonstrate these misinterpre- tations we examine here (1) Parsons’ treat- ment of Weber's Kategorienlehre-e.g., the concept of social action, the group and its properties, the relation of normative to onnormative elements, the interest catego- 'y-and of the manner in which Weber used those concepts to analyze social phenomena ind (2) Parsons’ understanding of Weber's analysis of domination NORMS AND THE THEORY OF ACTION Since Weber is recognized as an important srogenitor of action theory in contemporary cciology, we might expect that Parsons hould have experienced little difficulty in lemonstrating that ‘Weber was an. action heorist. However, his portrayal of Weber's mbracement of the voluntarstic theory of ction a defined in The Structure 1949:43-86, esp. 4351) snot convincing. In {tempting to asimilate Weber's formulations © his own version of action theory, Parsons 1949:650) asserted that a focus of interest 1 the normative aspects of action systems” vas basic to Weber's scheme. Prima facie there $lite room for quibling with tht rendering Weber's concerns. But the significance of te statement goes far beyond a mere “focus interest.” According to Parsons (1949:43, 4; emphasis added), the key term for action heory is the “unit act," and integral to his conceptuaization of the unit act is the resumption of “a ‘normative orientation’ of ction.” Defining “norm” as a verbal descxip- jon ofa desirable course of action “combined ‘ith an injunction to make certain future ctions conform to. this course,” Parsons 1949:75) stated that an element of action is cormative if it involves “a sentiment... that something isan end in itself.” Indeed, “here no such thing as action except as effort to >nform with norms" for Parsons (1949:76-7; mphasis added). Thus, while Parsons argued ortectly that Weber had a focus of interest n the normative aspects of action, he seggerated by sserting that norms’ are -ntral to Weber's conception of social action. 1 issues where Weber made no mention of arms or explicitly denied their importance, usons claimed (to the contrary) that norms ‘re important for Weber. When Weber stated lat norms were of baying importance, ansons asserted. their ontral importance. Then Weber nominated other factors as being 231 primary, Parsons elevated norms toa position of centrality and deemphasized nonnormative factors. The consequence is that Weber's action theory has been severely distorted. According to Weber (1968:4), “action” is behavior to which “the acting individual attaches a subjective meaning”; behavior is social action “insofar as its subjective meaning takes account of the behavior of others and is thereby oriented in its course.” Action may be oriented on instrumentally rational, value- rational, affectual or traditional grounds. That is, the actor’ orientation may be determined (Weber, 1968:24-5) principally by his “expec- {ations as to the behavior of objects... and of other human beings,” by his “conscious belief in [a] valve for its own sake,” by his “specific affects and feeling states,” or by “ingrained habituation.” Weber (1968:29) also noted three types of subjective meaning common in social action: usage, custom and complex of interests. That is, an action may be performed repeatedly because of current use, because of long familiarity, or because of stable opportunites for realizing interests, Parsons (see his editorial note in Weber, 1947:12In; see also Parsons, 1949:645-6, 650-1, 677-86) perceived all three of these types’ of subjective meaning as essentially normative. In addition, he viewed as essen- tially normative three of the four categories for orienting action: traditionalism (Parsons, 1949:646-7), instrumentally rational action (1949:643-4) and —_value-rational_action (1949:643). Only with regard to affectual action—identified in The Structure (p. 648) as 4 residual category—did Parsons forego any attempt to demonstrate the centrality of rnorms. However, a category-by-category anal- ysis shows that traditional behavior, usages ‘and customs are primarily habitual, while instrumentally rational behavior and com- plexes of interests are largely oriented to expediency rather than to norms. Only valve-rational behavior is primarily normative in any of the senses intended by Parsons. Traditional Action The category. Although noting (Parsons, 1949:646) that Weber defined traditional action as occurring “through the habituation of long practice,” Parsons (1949:647) claimed that Weber's concept of traditional action had little to do with habit but ‘a great deal to do232 with the normative aspect of action.” This interpretation directly reverses Weber's own emphasis. Although tradition may become connected with a normative orientation, Weber (1968:25) did not view norms as very important motivators of traditional action “Strictly traditional behavior ...is very often 2 matter of almost automatic reaction to hhabitual stimuli which guide behavior in a ‘course which has been repeatedly followed.” Ironically, Parsons’ (1949:646) own observa- ion that “there is absolutely nothing normative about habit as such” forcefully ‘undermines his own argument here. ‘Examples. Parsons (1949) further argued that Weber’s uses of traditional action revealed its powerful normative component, and cited three supporting examples: “a traditionally fixed standard of living” (p. 514), efficacious magical procedures (pp. 565-6), and orientations to traditionally legitimated orders which may acquire sanctity because they have come down from the past (pp. 646-7). Again, though, Parsons” interpre- tation is distorted. Weber's (1958:59-62) reference to a fixed standard of living contains ‘no suggestion that workers felt any “%injunc- tion" to adhere to the traditional level. On the contrary, when Weber (1961:261) later treated this form of economic traditionalism, he observed that the “general incapacity and indisposition to depart from the beaten paths is motive for the maintenance of tradition.” ‘The passage clearly stresses the habitual aspect. In his discussion of magical procedures, Parsons (1949:656) understated the degree to which Weber viewed stereotyped traditions as practical adaptations to perceived forces. While Weber (1968:405) did refer to social injunctions that grew up around magical beliefs and practices, he (1968:399-400) argued that the performance of magically significant acts stemmed essentially from direct “experience” and assessment of the practical consequences and magical efficacy of such acts. In China, for example, the locations of railroads and’ factories were chosen carefully so as “not to disturb the rest of the spirits” (Weber, 1961:265; see also 1946:437, 1968:429); and music was played “according to the old rules and strictly following the old measures” in order to keep the spisits “in their fetters™ (Weber, 1946:429); a breach of tradition was feared because it could result AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW (magically) in “drought, inundation, eclipse of the sun, defeat in arms,” and. various supematiral ews (Weber, 1946:442). Al. though Weber's (1968:433) discussion of punishment, disapproval, ete, indicates that a norm can be involved, his interpretation of historical examples makes it doubtful that (at least in these cases) a norm constituted the actos’ principal orientation toward tration. ‘The intensification of primitive traditionalism beyond. the habitual depends rather _on “material interests” and a “general belief in the potency of magical procestes which are feared,” and Weber (1961:20, 261) limited such intensification to these “two. crcum- stances." In short, infsing human deeds with magic symbolism guaranteed their precise repetition, but largely for practical reasons. The third example is equally misleading. When actom submit toa traditionally legitimate order, the decisive orientations are not primarily normative. “The validity of a Soci order by virtue of the sacredness of tradition is the oldest and most universal type of legitimacy. ‘The fear of magical emis reinforces the general paychological inhibi- tions against any sort of change in customary modes of action” (Weber, 1968:37).* Weber stressed. the practical bases of traditional legitimacy; he noted that ethical systems could attain normative status but stated that “itis. by no. means necessary. that all conventionally or legally guaranteed forms of order should claim the authority of ethical norms” (Weber, 1968:36). Since Weber emphasized the decline in the modern world of magic and traditional legitimacy, in his view the. rather weak normative’ component in traditional action had little impact on social action in modem. societies. Examples of magilly reinforced tradition appear in discussions of the histor- cal ise of religious belief and of ancient Chinese society; but the modem Occident, in “Despite the current tendency to assign to “sanctity” (Weiigkeit) connotations of “ethical,” ‘the chief significance that Weber attached to the sanctity of an order was simply” that practical ‘consequences flowed from this property (ee Weber, 1968:406), Hence, Parsons (1949:660) was incorrect in taking Weber's fink betwoen traditional legitimacy and sanctity to imply that actors necessily hold religous attitudes toward. traditionally legitimate orders.DEPARSONIZING WEBER, contrast, is “disenchanted” (Weber, 1946: 139), Action in the modem world (insofar as it approximates Weber's ideal type of modern action) is freed from magical forces and the need to implore the spirits and is divested of ‘whatever normative flavor might be imparted by magic. Usage and Custom “Usages” are closely related to tradition, and Parsons’ distortion of Weber's meaning in the case of usage recalls the distortion in his analysis of traditional action. Weber (1968:29) referred to usage as regularly recurring social action “based on nothing but actual practice.” Giving “custom” as an example, Weber (1968:29) stated that “the actor conforms with them of his own free will, whether his motivation lies in the fact that he merely fails to think about it, that itis ‘more comfortable to conform, or whatever else the reason may be. ... Conformity with it is not ‘demanded’ by anybody.” Clearly usage and custom, like traditional action, are closely akin to habit. Although Parsons (1949:650) noted that Weber’s definition “suggests the psychological ‘mechanism of habit as the primary point that hie has in mind,” he (1949:678) went on to claim that usages involved orientation to norms, in particular to “standards of ‘good taste,” and that Weber’s “actual treat- ment ... shows beyond doubt that here also normative elements are involved” (1949:650). Tn fact, however, Weber said nothing about norms or “standards of taste” (even in the example cited by Parsons); this concept is of strictly Parsonian provenience. Parsons would hhave done better had he developed an interpretation consistent with his observation that “Weber's own formulation ... suggests” that usage refers to “nonnormative elements” (Parsons, 1949:650). In contrast to Parsons’ attempt to connect norms with usage, Weber painstakingly dis- tinguished usage from normative elements introduced by the legal system. Maintaining that law often begins as usage, Weber (1968:333) stated that “‘the beginnings of actual regularity and ‘usage’... are attributed by the sociologist ...to the instinctive habituation of a pattern of conduct which was ‘adapted’ to given necessities. At least initially, this pattem of conduct was neither conditioned nor changed by an enacted 233, norm.” For the “broad mass of participants,” action corresponds to legal norms, “not out of ‘obedience regarded as a legal obligation,” but due to the environment’s approval of dis- approval, or “merely as a result of unreflective habituation to a regularity of life that has engraved itself as a custom” (Weber, 1968:312; see also 324), Regarding the last two possibilities, Weber (1968:333) stressed that a law is obeyed “owing not so much to the availability of coercive guaranties as to its Ahabituation as ‘usage’ and its ‘routinization.”” ‘Again, then, Weber did not, as Parsons would hhave it, stress the importance of norms to the relative exclusion of other factors, such as habituation. Instrumentally Rational Action (Zweckra- tionalitat and Interessenlage ‘Means. Parsons (1949:653-4) interpreted Weber's instrumentally rational action G@weekrationalitét and Interessenlage)* 3s normative because both means and ends are normatively selected, ic. actors we “efficien- ey-norms” and other “objective standards” when they decide what means to employ in ‘order to attain given ends. However, Weber (1968:26) said only that “the end, the means, and the secondary results are all rationally taken into account and weighed,” and that there is @ “rational consideration of altema- tive means to the end.” Indeed, other than to characterize the process itself as rational, Weber did not further specify how actors select and weigh means. Although nothing in Weber’s formulation excludes the possibility that actors might choose to employ “efficien- ey-norms”—and the concept of legal-rational authority implies a norm of rationality in ‘many bureaucratic settings—he did not, in the general case, connect the rational choice of ‘means with normative adherence of any sort Ends. Parsons (1949:650) further dis- torted Weber when he clsimed that the ends ‘of rational action are normatively chosen. Certainly Weber (1968:26) recognized this possibility: “Choice between alternative and conflicting ends and results may well be determined in a value-rational manner.” But he further observed that “the actor may, “Interesenlage implies Zweckrationaltt Parsons (1949:683) treats these categories alike as wwe do,234 instead of deciding between altemative and conflicting ends in terms of a rational crientation to a system of values, simply take them as given subjective wants ‘and arrange them in a scale of consciously assessed relative urgency. He may then orient his action to this scale in such a way that they are satisfied as far as posible in order of urgency.” In this case, utilities are determined and, hence, ends ‘of action chosen without reference to norms or absolute values. While Weber (1968:26) felt that any action (except in that limiting case) ‘bore some relation to fundamental values, he did not suggest that the relationship need be important in the choice of ends.* Religion, meaning, and ends. Parsons’ (1949:645) interpretation of the zweckration- ‘al category laid great stress upon the way in which religious systems influence the ultimate ends of action. He (1949:668) stated that religous ideas, as rationalized interpretations ‘of the meaning of the world include “a complete metaphysical system” from which is derived “what meaning the world can have for ‘man and, from ths, in tur, what his ultimate values can ‘meaningfully’ be.” These supreme central values—e.g., salvation (1949:643)—"define ultimate ends and through them influence action” in all spheres of life (1949:668). This understanding diverges from the original. Far from holding that every religion provided world meanings for its faithful, Weber described religious ideas as world-e ‘Parsons postion on the choi of ends may in putt reflect his misinterpretation of Weber's example ff the ‘Slsian “mowers. According. {0 Parsons (1949:617), the ‘Silesian mowers" rationality is ‘maximized if “the fixity of the standard of ving is also maximized,” while economic rationality in a ‘modern “free ‘enterprse” system involves “an Increasing want sale" In short, Parsons interpreted economie rationality as conformity to prevaiing ‘norm of consumption, However, Weber considered the mowers’ econom- fc acton traditional in orientation, and hence nor rational, since the taditional determination of fetlon is “Incompatible” with the rational type (0968:26). Furthermore, Weber introduced “no consumption norms in describing rational economic action, which is “best adapted to. the normal Interests of the actors as they themssives are aware ‘of them” (Weber, 1968:30); for both Weber and the ‘actors, then, material and ideal interestsare givens, Never did’ Weber state that economic itsrests are derived (either subjectively or objectively) from consumption norms. AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW vealing (/e., providing ultimate meaning) only in certain historical cases. For example, the search for ultimate meaning was thought fo be all-important in mysticism — (Weber, 1946:326), and Buddhism reflects intellectual ‘man’s “inner compulsion to understand the world as a meaningful cosmos” (Weber, 1968:499). In contrast, the inner-worldly ascetic executes “resolutions whose ultimate meaning remains concealed” (Weber, 1946:326; also 1968:547-8); since the Calvin- ist god is inexplicable the asoetic who wishes to act within this world “must become afficted with a sort of happy closure of the ‘mind regarding any question about the ‘meaning of the world, for he must not worry about such questions” (Weber, 1968:547-8). Furthermore, Weber (1968:578) felt that religiously based conceptions of meaning varied in their effects on nonreligious spheres of life. Although “the hope of salvation” may have “the most farseaching consequences for the conduct of life” under certain conditions (Weber, 1968:528; see also 576-634), “re ‘ous motivations, especially the hope of salvation, need not necessarily exert any influence at all upon the manner of the conduct of life” (Weber, 1968:528; emphasis added). Weber identified historical cases in which the quest for salvation systematically ordered the conduct of life: mysticism (1968:544), other-worldly asceticism (01958:118), the pre-Enlightenment Calvinist sects (1958:117, 128, 181-2), and, later, Methodism (1958:139); also, contrasting cases such as Lutheranism, which was adjudged uncompelling because of its doctrine of grace ((1958:128). Cases of strong religious influ- ence are quite limited, both in terms of Hee sauteed Galen e cecione 1968:556) and in the number of participants (Weber, 1958:118; 1946:287.8). Tn other cases, “a religious ethic simply appropriates the general virtues of life within the world” or is forced to make “in the world of facts the inevitable compromises” (Weber, 1968:579, 585). In early religion especially, religious and magical behaviors were simply practical manipulations of supematural forces and “not ... set apart from the range of everyday purposive conduct” (Weber, 1968:399-400); likewise, pure ritualism was “not very different from magic in its effect on the conduct of life” (Weber, 1968:530). In these instances—and Weber suggests that theyDE-PARSONIZING WEBER are the most frequent ones~religious ideas axert lite influence on the choice of nonreligious ends. Even where religion is influential, the choice of ends is not generally set by the content of norms and values. Weber did not angve that religious ethics ae followed simply because they are absolute values or norms; rather, in many cases they are followed primarily because they provide means to the achievement of selfinterest. To cite a prime example, Weber (and sometimes Parsons in explicating Weber; see 1949:520, $72) inter- preted the desire for salvation not as a norm or value that individuals adopt from religious systems but as a fundamental human need or “deal interest.” In the case of the Protestant ethic, the need for assurance of salvation was the prime motivation for religious conformity and “forced all other interests into. the background” (see Weber, 1958:110, 112). This motive falls into’ the category of selPinterest, and Weber (1958:128-54) stated that concem over salvation motivated Pitists and Methodists also. In a later essay Weber (1946:312-7) mentioned church norms and sanctions as additional reasons for religious conformity: since conformity was required for admittance to the Lord's Supper, the “eligious regulation of life” supplemented ‘the pure pursuit of salvation, thus adding a ‘normative motive for following the Protestant ethic. Overall, however, Weber's. work on religion stressed divine ‘sanctions and ideal interests more than social norms 2s motivators of conformity to ritual prescriptions and religous law." In discussing religious motives involved in the soterial quests of disprviloged and oppressed clases (1946:277; 1968:492, 4989), the search of the privileged classes for ‘2 means to justify their rank (1946:271, 276-7), the explanation of suffering and misfortune (1946:274-5; 1968:518-29), and the need to keep the gods and spirits satisfied "When religious norms and taboos have devel ‘oped and become subject to human sanctions, this cthical and normative system may be enforced “to provent evil sorcary from overtaking the entire group because of the transgression of tho guy individual” (Weber, 1968433). However, conformity is only partly due to the collective enforcement of social norms (Weber, 1968:432). Fear of divine retribu- tion, a selPinterested religious motive independent ‘of hinan norms, remains important. 235, {in order to control their powers or to avoid divine retribution (1968:408-9, 415-6, 422, 4289, 432, 437, 520-1, 633), Weber referred to these " motives as “religious needs,” “intemal interestsituations,” and a “rational religious pragmatism” (e., 1946:270, 286). These ideal interests were’ treated as given hhuman desires, pursued primarily out of selfinterest, rather than as social injunctions in themselves. Since the ends of religious action are not provided by systems of religious precepts themselves, such precepts cannot be the ultimate ends of human action, as Parsons suggested. Weber did not argue that in the general case the ends of rational action were derived from systems of religious ideas, in the sense either of norms or of meanings. Whereas Parsons interpreted the relationship between religious conceptions and social action as constant, Weber treated it as a variable and devoted ‘considerable effort to studying the variation, In short, Parsons took that which Weber identified ‘as exceptional (though nonetheless sometimes decisively impor- ‘tant)—the instance in which a metaphysical religious system provided meanings that determined values which in tum decisively influenced human conduct in all spheres of life—and treated it as typical, if not universal. Whereas Parsons consistently portrayed choices of means and ends as decisively influenced by norms, Weber_was equally consistent in minimizing the effect of norms ‘on rational action. Zweckrationalitit is not always, or even usually, a normative category of action. Value-Oriented Action Wertrational action is the one category that Parsons interpreted correctly. Weber (1968:24-5) saw the pursuit of ultimate values 2 dutiful, obligatory, and sometimes antithet- ical to selfinterest. Contrary to Parsons’ overall characterization of Weber’ Scheme as sentially normative, though, this lone normative element was not,” in Weber’s (1968:25) view, a frequently decisive motiva- tion: behavior was value-ational “in widely varying degrees, but for the most part only to relatively slight extent.” Although the existence of such action “is important enough to justify its formulation as a distinct type” (Weber, 1968:25), Weber did not assign236 paramount importance to value-orented ac- tion. Ta summary, then, for Weber the category of the normative constituted only a part of social action. Contrary to Parsons” interpreta- tion, Weber’s categories of action and types of subjective meaning emphasize habit and self-interest, while strong normative influence is depicted as unusual. In fact, when read correctly, even the examples "chosen by Parsons as exemplifications of Weber's norma- tive stance “umally emphasize instead. the nonnormative elements. DOMINATION Ideas, Values, and Interest ‘A crucial component of Parsons’ theoreti cal framework is his premise that common values are the sine qua non of social order. Unfortunately, this premise is also implicit in his commentary on Weber. Parsons’ great stress on the alleged importance of the “common value” element in Weber's work forced a fundamental reordering of Weberian perspectives on the significance of ideas and interests in social action, and eventually resulted in misinterpretation of Weber's perspective on domination Parsons (1949:721) has noted that the development of Weber's theory was inspired in part by his fruitful reaction against the so-called Marxist tradition. And, to be sure, much of Weber's writing, regardless of his specific topic, was concemed with the relationships between material factors or conditions and spiritual or ideal factors—a ‘matter very much at isue in the literature of Philosophy and the social sciences. But to argue that Weber was “fighting ... against the Positivstic tendencies of Marxian historical materialism” (Parsons, 1949:721; he defines Positivism on p. 61) is ambiguous at best and erroneous at worst. Clearly, Weber and Marx diverged in fundamental ways, but Weber would undoubtedly agree that t0 label Marx's theory as “positivistic” was and is completely nonsensical. On the other hand, Weber was also quite aware that those whom Marx himself had rejected as “vulgar Marxists,” together with their various successors (see Lenin’s, 1902, discussion of the “Economists” and the “Opportunists”), had badly distorted Marx’s work by making of it a simplistic, AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW highly _positivistic, “historical, materialism” and “economic “determinism” (see, 4 Weber, 1968:112; also. of. Giddens, 1971:185-95). It was probably such anachron- istic formulations that Weber had foremost in mind when, for example, he (1958:183) cautioned that his aim had not been “to substitute for a one-sided materialistic an equally one-sided spiritualstic causal interpre- tation of culture and of history.” While we cannot be certain whether Parsons misunder- stood the target of Weber's critique of “Marxian historical materialism,” he dearly missed its substantive point. Weber quite clealy retained the interest category (includ- ing material interest) as a central motive for action and as an important social force; he rejected only sociological formulations that assigned an exclusive attention to self-interest (especially material interest). In contrast, Parsons very nearly read the interest category ‘out of Weber altogether, thereby denuding his work of its attention to the “dynamic of interest” asa basic motive for action Jn a famous passage from the essay to which Gerth and Mills assigned the ttl, “The Social Psychology of the World Religions,” Weber (1946:280) summarized his position He first observed that “not ideas, but material and ideal interests, directly govern men’s, conduct” (a sharp contrast to Parsons’ interpretation, which held that Weber assigned priority to the value component), and then continued with the qualification that “very frequently the ‘world images’ that have been created by ‘ideas’ have, like switchmen, determined the tracks along which action has been pushed by the dynamic of interest.” In short, ideas and interests are interdependent Gee, eg, Weber 1946:277-8). It is. this ‘emphasis on mutual interaction and persistent tension between the two that isso charactris- tically (though not exclusively) Weberian. It might be expected a priori that any analysis stressing the importance of norms, Yalues and ideas in Weber would focus largely ‘on his Sociology of religion rather than (for instance) on his sociology of domination After all, Weber regarded his work on religion as (among other things) an empirically based disputation of the degenerate Marxist perspec- tive that had become so prevalent by the tum of the century. Nevertheless, Weber's sociol- ogy of domination exhibits’ another, much ‘more salient, conoem for material interests,DE-PARSONIZING WEBER power, conflict, exploitation and the coercive aspects of domination. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that Parsons buttressed his, case through highly selective emphases. Four chapters of The Structure (Parsons, 1949:500-694) focus on Max Weber. Two of these, spanning 79 pages (Parsons, 1949: 500-78), discuss his sociology of religion. Only one chapter subsection (Parsons, 1949: £658.72) is. devoted to domination—hardly an allotment of commensurate importance, And, as the section heading (“Legitimate Order, Charisma and Religion”) suggests, in it Par- sons is more concemed to employ the concept ‘of charisma as the connection between Weber's political and his religious sociology than to analyze Weber's sociology of domina- tion in its own right. Power (Macht) Weber argued that struggles for advantage of intorest and their consequent accommoda- tions and selections occurred within structures ‘of domination. His (1968:941) position is forceful: “without exception every sphere of social action is profoundly influenced by structures of dominancy.” A correct under standing of Weber’s general sociology is impossible unless founded on a faithful reading of his theory. of domination (Herr schafi). Yet Parsons’ pronouncements on the latter are mutually inconsistent and, in some instances, inaccurate, To be sure, Parsons repeatedly acknowl- ‘edged the centrality of the concept of power in Weber’s work; likewise, he noted the importance of the concepts of force, coercion and hierarchically structured power: Weber “had a deep, almost tragic, consciousness of ‘the importance of coercion in human affairs,” and his work reflects “a clear recognition of ‘the importance of coercive power” (Parsons, 1949:658, 717; see also. 1942:62, and 1947:56).* Yet elsewhere, in a key passage in which he rejects Bendix’s (1960) decision to translate Herrschaft as “domination,” Parsons (1960:752) reduced power to a subordinate “Later, Weber's “clear recognition” became “a tendency to overemphasize tho coercive aspect of authority ‘and hierarchy in human relations” (arsons, 1947:60n). Parions excused this “Wifi culty” on the ground that Weber's exposition was “highly schematic.” 237 position inthe Weberian scheme. The term (Herrschaft], which in its most general meaning 1 shotld now translate as “Teadership,” implies that a leader has power over his followers. But “domina- tion” suggests that this fact, rather than the integration of the collectivity, in the interest of effective functioning (especially the integration of the crucial Verband or corporate group), is the critical factor fom Weber's point of view... The former interpretation (does not tepresent] the main trend of Weber's thought, although hhe was in certain respects a “realist” in the analysis of power. ‘The. preferable. inter- pretation .. is represented especialy” by his tremendous emphasis on the impor- tance of legitimation...legitime Herrschaft Iwas] for Weber. -overwhelmingly” the ‘est sigificant case for goneral structural analysis” This interpretation differs radically from that developed in other passages. Our analysis shows that Parsons was incorrect when he (1960:752) stated that Weber’s prime empha- sis was on either (1) leadership in the interest of effective collectivity functioning. or: (2) legitimation. Herrschaft Since Herschaft is the key term in Weber's analysis of power and authority, Parsons? redefinition had serious implications. Parsons balked at translating Herrschaft in terms implying the centrality of power (which Weber, 1968:942, defined as “the possibility of imposing one's own will upon the behavior of other persons”). Yet Weber (1968:942) identified power (Macht) as the “general sense” of Herschaft! Furthermore, when Weber used domination in its “narrower sense,” he (1968:946, 943) referred to “domination by virtue of authority, ic., *Pusons began by refering to Herschaft but concluded by’ speaking of legtime Herschaft (egitimate domination). He thus lft unclear what was true of Herrschat in general, in contrast to legitime Herschaf- At times he seemed to equate the two. At other times he (1942:65) noted that two intertwined claims of rulers—that they have aright ‘to command and the ruled a duty to obey—distin- fuish legtime. Herrschaft from other forms of Herriheft. "This allure. to distinguish cleasly between legitimate and other types of domination has contributed tothe ifficuties in’ Parsons’ interpretation.238 Power to command and duty to obey,” and defined domination as the probability that commands will be obeyed (1968:53, 212). ‘Thus, in contrast to Parsons’ attempted diminution of both the importance of power and the implication that some people exert power over others, Weber’s own explication ‘makes both considerations central to the concept of Herrchaft. Leadership. Slighting the centrality of pow- er in Weber's conception, Parsons (196 752) chose to substitute leadership as the “general meaning” of Herrschaft. Leader- ship was important to Weber, and he (1968:48-51) identified accustomed obedi- ence to leaders as the defining criterion of “Organization,” However, Herrschaft was not confined to leadership in an organization or Verband (Weber, 1968:53), and nowhere did Weber identify these manifestations of Herr- schaft as more important than any other Observing that there are numerous possible types of Herrschaft, Weber (1968:943) singled ‘out for special mention “two diametrically contrasting types,” namely, “domination by virtue of a constellation of interests ... and domination by virtue of authority.” ‘The former category, of which monopolistic ‘market power is “the purest type” (Weber, 1968:943), excludes leadership altogether. In this instance, power “is based upon influence derived exclusively from the possession of ‘goods or marketable skills guaranteed in some ‘way and acting upon the conduct of those dominated, who remain, however, formally free and are motivated simply by the pursuit of their own interests.” In addition to defining leadership 2s the general meaning of Herrschaft, Parsons (1960:752) further specified that leadership resulting in “the integration of the collectivity in the interest of effective functioning is... the critical factor from Weber's point of view.” This interpretation reflects Parsons? own structural-functional perspective, in ‘which society is conceived as a social system the parts of which are analyzed in terms of the contsibutions they make toward the integration and effective functioning of the whole. Weber (1968:15), however, wamed ‘against this type of reasoning: its “cognitive value” is not to be “overestimated” or “its concepts ilegitimately ‘reified™; itis useful only “for purposes of practical illustration and... provisional orientation.” For these AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW and other reasons, he (1968:18) limited functional analysis to “preliminary” role in sociological analysis. Furthermore, Weber did not suggest that dominant persons act to integrate collectivi- ties in the interest of effective functioning. Rather, he treated such individuals as acting in terms of their own ideal and material interests as they perceive them. In the sphere of politcal Herschaft, this typically meant that dominant persons either slight or ignore altogether any larger interests of the collectiv- ity o take the later into account only insofar as they perceive them as ultimately affecting their own interests. Even when the politically dominant claim to have the interests of the larger collectivity at heart, those claims may be invalid, as in the case of the German Junkers who, Weber felt (1924:471-3; also see Bendix, 1960:30-41), employed nationalistic appeals as a cloak for their pursuit of polices that benefited themselves at the expense of national interests. Though Weber’ approach in no way precluded the possiblity that the politically dominant might choose to pursue collectivity integration (perhaps as an ideal interest), to hhim this would be an exceptional case. Nor did the economically dominant pursue col- lectivity integration. Rather they used their ‘market advantage to pursue their economic (and other) interests. Legitimation. Parsons (1960:752; see also 1949:658f1) also interpreted Herrschaft so as to make legitimacy the element of paramount concem for Weber. This attempt is no more ‘convincing than Parsons’ related attempt to do the same for leadership. Weber (1968:942) felt that although Herrschaft does not “in every case ... utilize... economic power for its foundation and maintenance... in the vast majority of cases, and indeed in the most important ones, ‘this is just what hap- pens... and often to such an extent that the mode of applying economic means for the purpose of maintaining domination (Herr Schaft], in tum, exercises a determining influence on the structure of domination.” This passage directly contradicts. Parsons’ ((1960:752) claim that for Weber legitimate domination (legitime Herrschafi) was “over- whelmingly the most. significant case for general structural analysis.” Parsons’ (1960) analysis also exaggerated the importance of the belief in legitimacyDE-PARSONIZING WEBER relative to that of other factors in domination. He (1960752) claimed a “tremendous em- phasis on the importance of legitimation” in Weber. However, in the same review article Parsons (1960:752) offered a different view. point, observing that “Weber achieved an integration” of the “material” factor and legitimation. This statement is more nearly accurate than many others in Parsons, because Weber did not elevate legitimacy to a position of paramount importance relative to that of other factors in the exercise of Herrschaft. Domination can exist in (be based in): physical coercion; habituation, to which at Jeast under certain conditions Weber applied the label “discipline”; rational calculation of interests, a specific version of which is found in relationships of expertise; and belief in the legitimacy of perceived order (Weber, 1968:53-4, 212-4, 942.6), Although one type of domination, “domin- ation by virture of authority,” included by definition an “alleged absolute duty to obey” (Weber, 1968:943) and “conduct to a socially relevant degree occurs as if the ruled had ‘made the content of the command the maxim of their conduct for its very own sake,” nonetheless “in a concrete case the perfor- ‘mance of the command may have been motivated by the ruled’s own conviction of its propriety, or by his sense of duty, or by fear, or by ‘dull" custom, or by a desire to obtain some benefit. for himself” (Weber, 1968:946-7). Weber (1968:214) made it lear that even in such instances of legitimate order, duty or the belief in legitimacy need not be the primary force upholding the order:*® It is by no means true that every case of submissiveness to persons in positions of Parsons may have emphasized the importance of legitimacy because Webers famous typology of legitimate domination was derived in tems of the different claims to validity. However, his we ofthis typology should not be considered’ evidence that beliefs in legitimacy were of paramount importance to him. Weber poined out that legitimate orders vary greatly in the degree to. which legitimizing aims are actually accepted. Furthermore, for ven order, acceptance of these claims is differen tually disttbuted among those subject to it; indeed, Some wide pockets of resistance or even complete ‘ejection of legitimacy claims are to be expected. In ‘contrast, Parsons” approach implied that claims to legitimacy are both widely accepted and of prime Importance in upholding an order. 239 power is primarily (or even at all oriented to this belief [in legitimacy]. Loyalty may be hypoeritically simulated by individuals or by: whole groups on purely opportunis- tic grounds, or carried out in practice for reasons of material slfinterest. Or people ‘may submit from individual weakness and helplessness because there is no acceptable alternative Moreover, while a legitimate order is more stable than “one upheld on @_ purely customary basis through the fact that the corresponding behavior has become habi- tual... the latter is much the most common type of. subjective attitude” (Weber, 1968:31).!" We might infer that if Weber had considered either legitimation or habituation the most prevalent force supporting a social ‘order, it would have to be the latter, not the former. In short, contrary to Parsons, who attempted to equate Herrschaft with legti- mate domination, Weber considered nonlegit sate domination at least equal in importance to legitimate domination. Furthermore, even in the case of legitime Herrschaft, Weber did not elevate beliefs in legitimacy to a decisive position. Although Weber's multipl-factor approach isa dominant motif in his discussions of Herrchaft, a second emphasis is nevertheless present. That emphasis is on power and not, as Parsons would have it, on leadership, integration or legitimacy ‘CONCLUSION We have argued that certain basic aspects of Parsons’ interpretation of Weber are seriously distorted. Numerous passages have been quoted or cited in support of our argument; many others could have been Drought to bear on the matter, but these would only have reproduced the emphases of "TAlthough Weber (1968:31) stated thatthe legitimacy of an order enhances, “often to a very considerable degree,” the likelihood that action will conform fo it and that it will be stable, he did not consider stability a typical attribute of social Structures. As Pusons (1942:169) noted, “to Weber social systems were notably unstable and inherently involved in tension and conflict." For Weber the antral dynamic of sodety tested in the joint fdrcumstances related to the perpetual struggle for ‘advantage in material and ideal interests, and the Inherent instability of structures of domination, including authority.240 those cited aleady. ‘The crux of Parsons’ risrepresentation of Weber is his overwoening emphasis on the category of the normative (Gorms, normative orientation, values), which Jed him to expand what is but a part of Weber's sociology and make it very nearly the whole. “There is no such thing as action except as effort to conform with norms,” asserts Pans, And in his discussion of the allegedly Weberian concept, “standards of taste,” Parsons (1949:678) attempted to underwrite what was, infact, his own formulation with this astonishing statement: “The factual regularities, sofa as they obtain, axe to be interpreted a arising from common (or like) orientation to common norms.” It is ‘ot amiss to recall here the trenchant ertcism of R. Stamler leveled by Weber (1968:32-3, 3253)-that in his analyses of order, convention and law, Stammier failed both to distinguish normative from empirical mean- ings of validity and to recognize that “socal action is oriented to other things beside systems of order” (Weber, 1968:32). The Parsonian interpretation of Weber's sociology isin some considerable degree subject to that same criticism: it “confuses the normative regulation of conduct by ruler whore “oughtnes” is factually accepted by a sizeable number of persons, with the factual reguar- ties of human conduct" (Weber, 1968:326). ‘According to Weber, factual regularities of subjectively meaningful behavior (Gocial ac- tion) could result from a variety of condi- tions. A frequent one is habituation, defined as “sage,” of which “custom is a special case. Another is “elfinterest.” The regularity ‘of both modes of social action derives essentially from the fact that failure to adapt oneself 0 customary action or to acknow edge the interests of othe can lead to “inconveniences and annoyanos” or to damage of one's own interests, From such experiences of “failure” one might indeed come to recognize certain “operational rues” in the conduct of one's own actions, However, these “are merely. the “rulednest™ that describes the regular coune of things, recognition of the empirical regulates (and ‘thus predictabilities) in the world; they are neither obligatory nor necessarily even exem- plary (though eventually, Weber points out, they might become norms).!* ‘The factual regularities of social action may be due additionally to actors’ orents- AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW tions to a legitimate or valid order. Motives of compliance to a valid order include normative beliefs of obligation, and insofar as. this subjective attude is characteristic, an actor may be said to be normatively oriented in his or her action.'® But compliance can occur also for reasons of selfintrest that involve no sense of obligation or duty (except to one’s own interests as one understands them). And, ‘ost common. of all empirical situations, social action may conform to an order on a largely customary bass In sum, and contrary to Pasons’ view of the matter, the Weberian analysis leaves considerable room for action that is not “effort to conform with norms.” Only by stretching the terminological domain of “norm” until it encompassed virtually every sense of “ruledness," regardless ofthe actor's ‘subjective considerations, could Parsons con- strue in Weber's formulations an equation of social ation with (effort toward) normative conformity. Only by such redefinition could Parsons see “norms” and “normative orenta- tion” as central to each of Weber's types of social action and to Weber's conceptual and substantive analyses of domination, Non- normative. elements in Weber either are discounted hugely of cease to exist as such; norms and valves, more than the articulation of (confictive as wel a compatible) interests ‘become the linchpin of social order; domina- tion becomes primarily a matter of legitimacy and of leadership. whose. purpose is the effective functioning and integration of collectiviies. The reconstruction of Weber's tociology is clearly both fundamental and extensive. REFERENCES ‘Bendix, Reinhard 1960” Max Weber: An Intellectual Portsit. Garden Ciyy, New "York: Doubleday, Anchor, 1962. ‘Bendix, Reinhard and Guenther Roth 1971" Scholarship and. Purtsanship: Essays on Max. Weber. 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