ACTIONS/CAUSE OF ACTION/CERTIFICATION AGAINST FORUM

SHOPPING/CERTIORARI

13.JESUS GARCIA vs. Hon. RAY ALAN DRILON

GR No. 179267, June 25, 2013, 699 SCRA 352

FACTS:

Republic Act No. 9262 was enacted, entitled An Act Defining Violence
Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for
Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes. It defines
and criminalizes acts of violence against women and their children (VAWC)
perpetrated by womens intimate partners, such as husband, former
husband, or any person who has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or
with whom the woman has a common child.

Private Respondent Rosalie Jaype-Garcia filed for herself and in behalf

of her minor children, a petition before the RTC for the issuance of
Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against her husband, Jesus Garcia,
pursuant to RA 9262. She claimed to be a victim of physical abuse;
emotional, psychological, and economic violence as a result of marital
infidelity on the part of petitioner, Jesus Garcia, with threats of deprivation
of custody of her children and financial support. Petitioner, as described by
the private respondent, is dominant, controlling, and demands absolute
obedience from his wife and children, jealous guy, have an illicit affair with a
manager of a bank, everytime they will argue petitioner will physically hurt
the wife and the children. Worst, petitioner deprived the private respondent
of her right to their businesses. The RTC, finding reasonable ground to
believe that an imminent danger of violence against the private respondent
and her children exists or is about to recur, it issued a TPO effective for
thirty days ordering, among others, that the petitioner should stay away
from the petitioner and her children, not to harass, annoy, contact or
otherwise communicate with the Petitioner. Later on, upon motion by
Rosalie, the trial court issued an amended TPO, effective for 30 days it
added, among others, to give monthly support to the wife and children.

Claiming that petitioner continued to deprive them of financial

support; failed to faithfully comply with the TPO; and committed new acts if
harassment against her their children, Rosalie filed another application for
the issuance of a TPO ex parte which was granted by the trial court effective
for 30 days. The said TPO was extended by the trial court for another ten
(10) days, and gave petitioner a period of five (5) days within which to show
cause why the TPO should not be renewed, extended, or modified. However,

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petitioner claimed that he did not receive a copy of the Motion to
Modify/Renew the TPO, hence, the court ordered that he will be furnish with
a copy of said motion. Petitioner failed to comment on the Motion for
Renewal of the TPO arguing that it would only be an exercise in futility.

While the case is pending in the trial court, Petitioner filed before the
Court of Appeals (CA) a petition for prohibition, with prayer for injunction
and temporary restraining order, challenging the constitutionality of RA
9262 for being violative of the due process and the equal protection clauses.
The appellate court issued a 60-day Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)
against the enforcement of the TPO including the amended TPOs. However,
the appellate court dismissed the petition for failure of petitioner to raise the
constitutional issue before the trial court in the civil case.

Hence, petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the unconstitutionality of a statue is a cause of action.

RULING:

No. The unconstitutionality of a statute is not a cause of action that

could be the subject of a counterclaim, cross-claim or a third-party
complaint.

Petitioner should have raised at the earliest opportunity in his

Opposition to the petition Protection Order before the RTC. Section 20 of
A.M. 04-10-11-SC, the Rule on Violence Against Women and their Children,
provides that respondent may file an opposition to the petition and
respondent shall not include in the opposition any counterclaim, cross-claim
or third-party complaint, but any cause of action which could be the subject
thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action.

The Supreme Court cannot subscribe to the theory of Petitioner Jesus

Garcia that, since a counterclaim, cross-claim and third party complaint are
to be excluded from the opposition, the issue of constitutionality cannot
likewise be raised therein. A counterclaim is any claim for money or other
relief which a defending party may have against an opposing party. A
crossclaim, on the other hand, is any claim by one party against a co-party
arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter either
of the original action or of a counterclaim therein. A third-party complaint is
a claim that a defending party, may with leave of court, file against a person

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not a party to the action for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any
other relief, in respect of his opponents claim. Since, unconstitutionality of a
statute is not a cause of action; therefore, it is not prohibited from being
raised in the opposition, which the petitioner failed to do.

14. CATHAY PACIFIC AIRWAYS vs. JUANITA REYES, et.al.

GR No. 185891, June 26, 2013

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals. This case started as a complaint for
damages filed by respondents Reyeses against Cathay Pacific Airways
(Cathay Pacific and Sampaguita Travel.

Wilfredo Reyes made a travel reservation with Sampaguita Travel for

his familys trip to Adelaide, Australia. Upon booking and confirmation of
their flight schedule, he paid for the airfare and was issued a Cathay Pacific
round-trip plane ticket. Wilfredo Reyes, his wife, son and Sixta Lapu, his
mother-in-law flew to Adelaide, Australia. One week before they scheduled
to fly back home, Wilfredo confirmed his familys return flighty with the
Cathay Pacififc office and he was advised that the reservation was still okay
as scheduled. However, on the day of departure, Wilfredo and his family
were informed that Reyeses did not have confirmed reservations, only
Sixtas flight was confirmed. But due to pleas of Wilfredo, they were allowed
to board the flight to HongKong. When they arrived in HongKong, they were
informed of the same problem, but this time, they were not allowed to board
because the flight was fully booked. Only Sixta was allowed to proceed to
Manila from HongKong. When Wiflredo and his wife and son were allowed to
fly back home, he went to Sampaguita Travel to report the incident and he
was informed that it was actually Cathay Pacific which cancelled their
bookings. Wilfredo informed Cathay Pacific regarding the incident and
demanding payment of damages. After failure to settle the problem,
respondents, including Sixta filed a Complaint for damages against Cathay
Pacific and Sampaguita Travel. In its answer, Cathay Pacific claimed, among
others, a cross-claim against Sampaguita and blamed the same for the
cancellation of respondents return flights. On the other hand, Sampaguita
Travel denied the allegations of Cathay and blamed Cathay for the
cancellation.

After trial, the RTC dismissed the case for lack of merit and likewise
dismissed the counterclaims and cross-claims by Cathay. The trial court
found that respondents were in possession of valid tickets but did not have

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confirmed reservations for their return trip to Manila. However, it did not
find any basis to establish liability on the part of either Cathay Pacific or
Sampaguita Travel. Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. The
Court of Appeals ordered Cathay to pay respondents nominal damages.

Upon denial of their motion for reconsideration, Cathay Pacific filed

the instant petition for review.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent Sixta Lapuz had cause of action against

Cathay Pacific or Sampaguita Travel.

RULING:

No. It bears pointing out that respondent Sixta Lapuz had no cause of
action against Cathay Pacific or Sampaguita Travel.

The elements of a cause of action are: (1) a right existing in favor of

the plaintiff; (2) a duty on the part of the defendant to respect the plaintiffs
right; and (3) an act or omission of the defendant in violation of such right.

As culled from the records, there has been no violation of any right or
breach of any duty on the part of Cathay Pacific and Sampaguita Trave. As a
holder of a valid booking, Sixta had the right to expect that she would fly on
the flight and on the date specified on her airplane ticket. Cathay Pacific met
her expectations and Sixta was indeed able to complete her flight without
any trouble. The absence of any violation to Sixtas right as passenger
effectively deprived her of any relief against either Cathay Pacific or
Sampaguita Travel.

APPEALS/DOCKET FEES/CERTIORARI/MODES OF DISCOVERY

15. INTERNATIONAL HOTEL CORP. vs. FRANCISCO JOAQUIN JR. and

RAFAEL SUAREZ.
GR No. 158361, April 10, 2013

FACTS:

This is Petition for Review on Certiorari of a decision of the Court of

Appeals.

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 Respondent Joaquin Jr., submit a proposal to the Board of Directors of
the International Hotel Corporation (IHC) for him to render technical
assistance in securing a foreign loan for the construction of a hotel. Phase 1
to Phase 6 of the proposal was approved and respondents were paid of their
services rendered. Subsequently, Joaquin was able to negotiate to foreign a
financier which is Barnes International (Barnes). Pending the negotiation
with Barnes, IHC negotiate with another financier which is Weston.
However, Joaquin was not able to secure the needed loan, IHC, canceled the
shares of stock issued to Joaquin and Suarez as payment for their services.

Consequently, Joaquin Jr. and Suarez filed an action for specific

performance, annulment, damages and injunction impleading IHC and its
Board of Directors. The complaint alleged among others that the
cancellation of the shares had been illegal. The RTC decided the case in
favor of Joaquin Jr. and Suarez. Both parties appealed to the Court of
Appeals. The CA concurred with the RTC, upholding IHCs liability under
Art. 1186 of the Civil Code. It ruled that in the context of Article 1234 of the
Civil Code, Joaquin had substantially performed his obligation and had
become entitled to be paid for his services.

IHC appealed to the Supreme Court assailing the decision of the CA.
Joaquin filed a comment arguing among others that the petition was fatally
defective for raising questions of facts.

ISSUE:

Whether or not IHCs Petition improperly raised question of fact.

RULING:

Considering that what IHC seeks to review is the CAs application of

the law on the facts presented therein, there is no doubt that IHC raises
questions of law and not fact.

A question of law exists when there is doubt as to what the law is on a

certain state of facts, but, in contrast, a question of fact exists when the
doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the facts alleged. When there is no
dispute as to the facts, the question of whether or not the conclusion drawn
from the facts is correct is a question of law.

The basic issue posed here is whether the conclusions drawn by the
CA were correct under the pertinent laws.

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 Article 1186 and Article 1234 of the Civil Code cannot be the source
of IHCs obligation to pay respondents. The argument of IHC that it should
not be held liable because it was Joaquin who had recommended Barnes and
IHCs negotiation with Barnes had been neither intentional to prevent
Joaquin from complying with his obligations. Such argument is meritorious.

The Supreme Court discusses Art. 1186 and Art, 1234. Article 1186
provides that the condition shall be deemed fulfilled when the obligor
voluntarily prevents its fulfillment. This provision refers to the constructive
fulfillment of a suspensive condition which has two requirements, namely:
(a) the intent of the obligor to prevent the fulfillment of the condition, and
(b) the actual prevention of the fulfillment. Mere intention without actually
preventing the fulfillment is insufficient. The error lies in the CAs failure to
determine IHCs intent to preempt Joaquin from meeting his obligations.
IHC only relied on the opinion of its consultants in deciding to transact with
Materials Handling and later on, with Barnes. In negotiating with Barnes,
IHC had no intention to prevent Joaquin and Suarez from meeting their
undertaking. Such absence of any intention negated the basis for the CAs
reliance on Article 1186.

Article 1234 applies only when the obligor admits breaching the
contract after honestly and faithfully performing all the material elements
thereof except for some technical aspects that cause no serious harm to the
obligee. IHC correctly submits that the provision refers to an omission or
deviation that is slight, or technical and unimportant, and does not affect the
real purpose of the contract. All the steps that Joaquin and Suarez undertook
to accomplish had a single objective, to obtain a loan to fund the
construction and eventual operation of the hotel of IHC. Joaquin himself
admitted that his assistance was specifically sought to seek finance for IHCs
hotel project. Whatever benefits IHC gained from their services could only
be minimal, and were even probably outweighed by whatever losses IHC
suffered from the delayed construction of its hotel. Consequently, Article
1234 did not apply.

Notwithstanding the inapplicability of Article 1186 and Article 1234

of the Civil Code, IHC was liable based on the nature of obligation.