‘VENONA I. INTRODUCTION ‘A, Problems of Tesminalagy ‘This historical study cares a burden of anachronistic terminology, stating withthe key word in the tile— \VENONA. Theterm Venons only eame into wsein the 1960s, the fourth, depending how one counts, codename for the US-UK exploitation of high grade Soviet intelligence service communicetions, Furthermore, tbe most spectacular oceurred before a codename was regultly put on prodact reports ofthis type. The term| ‘Russian Diplomatic) might be preferred, but Venona has now widely appeared in open Sources. Then we have the problem of organizational designators for both sides, and now even the matter of ‘naming the opposiior country. The term Venona will generally be used with the earlier codenames introduced if required bythe context eg, for quotations from US-UK documents. Those eslier eodenames were: JADE, ‘BRIDE and DRUG. KGB and GRU will be the exclusive designators for the opposition services—the entities whose ‘communications we expoited—except that NKVD willbe used when the reference i to the militarized oF police elements ofthe state security apparatus, For our sie the matter of organizational designators is more dificult, because we devote a great deal of attention tothe very exly years of the Russian problem, taking care to describe in some detail who did what, ‘when. Therefore, the contemporary and often changing names forthe U.S. organizations wil sometimes be used. B. Venona, ‘Venona is the most recent code name for the US-UK exploitation of encrypted KGB and GRU ‘Communications ofthe period 194148, Except for one lane, Canberra—Moscow, none of the trafic was read until log after the messages bad been seat. Venona was nota real-time or nea real-time operation. New York KGB messages of, for example, 1944 or 1945 were not frst read until December 1946 (one message) and 1947. ‘The greatest period of decryption and translation, atleast for KGB messages on the U.S—Moscow lanes, ‘occurred in 1948-mid 1950s, and mostly involved KGB messages seat in 1944 and 1945, As we will describe, the Veoona exploitation program ran until September 1980, the last published translation being a KGB message that ha been set in 1943, Several points made here will be built upon and repested throughout the study. For many years the ASA-AFSA-NSA cryptanalysts worked the Russian Diplomatic problem asa whole, ‘attacking both curent messages and accumulted back traffic. The material that came tobe known as Venona, imbedded in that tulfic, comprised only a small minority ofthe whole. Trade messages —ulimately designated: highest in volume. These Trade communications, sent in diplomatic channel, ‘concerned Lend Lease information and reports to and from the Soviet Goverament Purchasing Commission: ‘an immense volume of information sbout equipment, parts and other supplies needed by and being sent 10 Russia to assist in te war against Nari Germany. True Diplomatic, essentially Consular messages, later called between the US-UK andthe Soviet Foreign Ministry. What we know as Venona also passed om links:EMP? ‘nmmopuction + KGB (known to US-UK ase] * GRU (known ap} + GRU-naval (own af 1 ‘The Trade message bore headdress ofthe Trade Misty; ll the eter systems, nciuding he intelligence service messages, thatof te Foreign Ministry orat the US-UK end, the embassy or consulate. The tr identity ofthe communicants was concealed by cipher. Each Russian entity ha itsown unigue codebook. In stacking all hese systems simultaneously, the US-UX followed two points of doctrine, the first an absolute eyptanalytie necessity, th second a mate of erypanalytic optimism: + Fist, from the similarities of cryptographic indicators and other message externas itbecame clear erly on tha al classes of so-aled Russian Dip should be worked together to find the best messages to attack. AS we shall see from the ress obiined if cipher pad used for routine Trade messages could be matched with 'n identical cipher pad used by the KGB, then a so-called "depth of two" existed and te messages might be read, (The actual text of e Trade message would be of no interest) * Second the UK and the US had had tremendous, virtually 100% suces against Geman and Japanese high grade cipher, both machine and manual, during World War Il—the German Enigma aad the Jepanse Purple machines for example. The US. had even broken a German diplomatic one-time pad system, Our cryptanalysts therefore remained that hi Russian diplomatic systems (and military) would si en [Many of the high evel military systems were entered Tally quickly a5 We eaTost ‘quicly because of probable espionage at ASA (a case we will discuss at length). ‘The Venons project, tia, remained frozen in time. Russian traffic of 1942 to 1946 (rather litle on each tnd) could be exploited but that was all. The Venona eryptanalyst of 1948 could read KGB messages of 1944; {in 1980, the Venona cryptanalyst was still exploiting that same block of exploitable traffic that had beea sent inthe 1940s. Butif the US-UK anal Russians couldn't _ery well get back the ear er traffic tat could be exploited. They had to wall—or make emergency moves at in the case of Burgess and Maclean—as their spies were identified, A few words on Russitn cryptographic systems and myths relating tothem. The Venone traffic passed on both international commercial radio circuits and national links. ‘The communications were encrypted by fist. using the values in code book and then enciphering those numbers from one-time pads, thats, by taking the ‘number from the pads andadding them tothe numbers from the code book, Such a system could notbe broken unless the eryptanalyst possessed the one-time pads (of which there were hundreds of thousands) or kacw the Precise means of pad geaeraton (that is, how the numbers in the pad had been selected) and could replicate it. A third possibility remained: the key in the pads might be somehow misused or re-used and thus lose their ‘uniqueness. That was our opening into Venona. ‘As forthe myths, the so-called “Black Friday”, 20 December 1949 was nota Friday, andis an event of n0 real significance to the US-UK eryptanalytic effort on Venona or Venona related materials, Likewise the ‘Venona breakthrough did not come about because the OSS had obtained Russian codebooks. The OSS did aot in any way contribute to the Venona break; the fandamental eryptanalytc discoveries and the decryptions ‘through 1952 were no idedby our side having any KGB or GRU code book fom any source, Itwasan analytic success. The story ofthe capture of Russian cryptographic material isan interesting one and willbe told in someexeMer ~FOP-SEERET-UMBRA— wmopuction ‘deuil, Bu the benefits from those actions came lat the O88). . Scope ofthis Study and Sources ‘Much of this seady will be non-iechnical. However, significant technical information will make unannounced appearances throughout the text, writen by Cecil Philips, one ofthe founders of the Venona program. Inthe course ofthis study the term “I” usually refers to Benson, the principal author of the study; and “we” ‘may refer to Benson and Philips or merely the form suggesting a partnership between author and reader. ‘The study contains three major themes, or perhaps we should say, the histories of thee different aspects of Venona: 4, US. exploitation ofthe Venona materi, t ASA, AFSA and NSA, with emphasis onthe earlier years (4943-1954) but including the entry ofthe FBI, CIA and GCHO onto the problem. 2. KGB and GRU espionage, raecraft and special activities inthe U.S. (and Mexico) es revealed in the Venona decrypis—sase studies, examples. 3. KGB espionage aguinst the Venoaa effort. ‘This study emphasizes the U.S. Venona experience, but with hope, considerable attention tothe fact that ‘enona exploitation became a US-UK partnership. This study would have to write without the UK. sources held inthe NSA Venonsa colletion, the Venona story (and to repeat, had nothing to do with ‘This study should be considered a source book. Itisnot the history of US, counteritelligence or Russian cspionage. Often, usualy infact, Thaveno puta cas in fullcontext-—we ae afer the Venona part of the record, often tothe exclusion cf the rest ofthe story. On the other hand, have in some cases gone rather far afield. Sometimes this is a mater of reference, To authorizing, and indeed commissioning this stay, Bill Crowell, as NSA Chief of Staff and then DDO, ‘sui it was time that we put together the NSA view of Venona, to have onthe shelf, eady to take out and show to the eppropriate audience, the story of an exceptional undertaking by this agency and its predecessors4 xc Prins doreground) STE: Benson ine verona Eoteton. | een Phitps and Bt ene ‘camining a Venn cevotanaiyc wore eee exeuet Pp ser ty nc mao ta eins [nna vtson Collection elitbeNSA archvesand record cae having been preserved nd ent ee eae cast hen uvered td pte by Bil Hewkns, tt te most an tte by Mild Haye of Yenan easlons the 7 (00 mexsages hel in 1391 Shinn boxes ‘of cae eu an te 20 bones everyting se: BL nd CTA repr log code ook | -FOP-SEERET-UMBIAT-FOR-SECREF-UMBRA- buNtRODUCTION ater echnical prs GCHO papers, comespondence and tote the amount of materi hat west ne (the pructio of jus fst Does of tansiation) see nsa Arenves Thisvaxamajorsouce forary pperson he Rssitn problem, TICOM paper sod for organization bars ad photographs sete archivesof te NSA C3nter for Cryptologic History. Again amar source forte ealyBistory tne Racin eben comtiingypes exceptional erestand importance suchas he Sam Soyer dies ae nany bole sary of te SSA The US. Asmy’s Spa Security ABER) “a Counerineligene papersof the NSA Office of Seu. | cect st pint or needa cndaed any inervonsot ona eter neluingys eee Rasen rote in 183 and te person hots outhelighson Venona fn 980 a et inerviows ot CCHO, and interewed UK Vena veterans vising the US. Jn Qpowtton do rotce sons when tight sem appropri, an few tne besowe sams have | been acre. Tis inten1 uummopuction (THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK)FOP-SEERET-UMBRAT (THE REGINNING OF THE RUSSIAN PROBLEM. EEB-DEC 1043 1. THE BEGINNING OF THE RUSSIAN PROBLEM, FEB-DEC 1943, ‘ene Grae, who founded he U.S. Ruslan Silt program on 1 Feb 149 (142 photo),“FOP-SEERET-UMBRA— ‘Ui AEGNING OF THE RUSSIAN PROBLEM. FEB-DEC 1043 A. Bebouary 93 ‘The Russian git problem began on Monday, 1 Feb 143, in great secrecy and with minimum resources just two people, Miss Gene Grabeel and 2/Lt Leonard M, Zubko, both recent arrivals atthe Army Signal Security Agency, Aiton Hal Station, Virginia. Lt. Zubko, a 1942 preuateof Rutgers Unversity (BSME) «ame to Arlington Hal after completing the Infantry Schoo! at Ft Benning. He did not know what to expect and had never heard ofthe place. As a combat arms officer anxious to command troops, he wes surprised to find that Arlington Fall seemed tobe staffed entirely by femse civilians ! Though he never knew for sure, be assumes that he go the assizument to Atington Hall because he was an enginec, and the Russian assignment, several months ltr, because he knew the language (his parents had come fom the Ukraine). Gene Grabee’sasignment to the Russian problem was even more unlikely. After graduating from ‘Longwood College in Farville, Virginia, she taught a the high school in Madison Heights, near Lynchburg, ‘She did not ike teaching. In Fall 1942 (i er second year as a schoolteacher) she asked her father ‘thought about her taking job withthe federal goverament. He encouraged ber to “go to Washington {or six months and she papers.” In eatly December she talked to Lt. Paavo Carlson, a young Signal Corps offices wo was recruiting sivlans atthe Post Office in Lynchburg. He offered her a position with the Army {nthe Washington aes but would not tell her what she would be doing. He aked her to leave for Weshington the next day. Miss Grabeel accepted the postion but tld Lt. Carlo that she needed ite time t find replacement iacher. On Sunday. 28 December 1942, she arived in Washington, tok a taxi to Arlington Hill and reported tothe duty officer. Four weeks ltr she and Lt. Zuko started the Russian problem? “Majo Frank Rowe, friend and neighbor of her family in Vitgnia, and a senior officer at Avlington all, took hero meet Lt Zubko, Rowlett told them to observe the stictest secrecy, and not to discuss ther project with co-workers. Otherwise she received no pantcuarinstsctions on how tobegin or anything abou the nature ofthe tage. ‘Miss Grabeel and Lt. 2ubko went to work. They sa at tw tables in one comer of «rom, the only other ‘cccupant being Mejor Geoffrey Stevens, the British liaison officer at Aington Hal who had «desk in another comer, This curious and pehaps accidental arrangement may have led to sme eifiulis, ora tha time snd indeed forthe next wo yeas, the Army did nt share withthe British even the “fact of the US. Sigint effort, st Russa. Miss Grabeel and Lt. Zubko began by sorting back trafic by lane and date, looking for ways to categorize the material by system and user. Arlington Hill held a considerable body of Rasen tac (variously estimated as several or 6 to 8 fling cabinet ful), and asthe mater of coverage andthe search for ‘back trafic forms a significant part ofthe Venona story, we now conser what was available tothe U.S. up t0 Feb 1943, B. The Trafic ‘The Signal Security Agency's predecessor organization, the Signal Intelligence Servi edicated intercept unit in Jan 1939, namely the Second Signal Service Company (later bat ‘operated several monitoring stations (MS) inthe pre-war period including. ‘Zabioptoe cmveratn 18 Murch, Te Sigal Sectty Agency. reamed he Amy Sci Agen iS rely eloed men Sen wanes Te wan epee ws we apo ts fom case cypetaga, WAG tae ean! hd puberty ea we S8A idea rok cana ir a “cb ies 991 ae 10 Marc 92 Bacon. Vgi: it nti by Robe Leo, sy Bein a Cs 8 ~FOP-SEERET-UMBRA-MS-1 Ft. Monmouth, NJ MS-2 The Presidio of San Francisco (MS-3 Fort Sam Houston, Texas ‘MS~4 Quarry Heights, Canal Zone MS-S Fort Shatter, Hawai ‘MS-~6 Fort McKinley, Philippine Islands (MS~7 Fort Hun: Virginia ‘These were ful modest operations, for example, the Fort Sam Houston operation staffed by Il enlisted ‘men; the Fort Hunt site by one officer and 25 enlisted men (these are sample figures from 1939-41; he numbers and sites changed from time to time). Before establishing the Second Signal Service Company, the Army had relied on various other ad-hoc and often changing intercept arrangements. For example, in an early ‘experimental operatior—a hearabilty study and trafic sampling—the Provisional Radio Ineligence Detachment at Ft. Monnouth, commanded by Lt Mark Rhoads, logged 38! foreign diplomatic messages fom Oct 1933 to 1 July 1954, including 63 Russian diplomatic messages. Regular U.S. interept of Russian diplomatic taffic, which contained KGB and GRU communications (though ofcourse this was unknown tothe U.S. at the time) began in 1939s part ofa general effort against all or most foreign diplomatic communications ‘passed on Intemational commercial citeuits. The Army Signal Ineligence Service did not atempt a ‘ryptanalytic attack on ‘he Russian traffic but pati aside for future study. However, atthe rst of pushing tis study ever further back in time and avay from Venona, we must note that during the 1920s and up to 1932, the Signal Intelligence Servic had unsvccessfully attempted to break Russian diplomatic systems. The major effort took place in 1930-31 when Congressman Hamilton Fish, a8 chairman of the House Committe on the Investigation of Communist Propaganda, subpoenaed copies of Amt Trading Corporation messages held by U.S. cable an telegraph companies. He tuned these over to the Navy for analysis and the Navy, unable to break ito the messages, passed them alongto the Army. No Tuck there either. Its worth quoting some comments made to G-2 in Feb 1931, by Major D-M, Crawford, head of the Signal Intelligence Serice:* Judging by what is known of Russian cryptographic methods in general, the (Russians) are | employing complicated, scientifically constructed systems designed to resist the organized | efforts ofexpertcryptanalyts. is my bllf that half-way measures and sporadic artemis will | ‘get nowhere in this case; nothing shor of deep, long continued, and painscaking analysis has ‘any chance of leading toa succesful solution. ‘The Venona sory indeed! ‘While U'S.cryptanalytcand transation resources had tobe concentrated onthe highest national priorities ‘of the time—Japan, Germany and Italy-—colletion procedures allowed for a vacuuming up approach. From 19390 7 December 1941, we find that encrypted Russian diplomatic traffic was taken in a modest amount fom ‘wo principal sources: intercept of commercial circuits (tha is foreign government trafic sent and eceived by, for example, RCA), by Station 3 at Fort Sam Houston — which seems to have had the principal responsibility Sis of SSA n Wl WI, We XI, Pa 14, Caer Cypoge Hisay (CH) VB. 13 ‘loerewof Fk B Rit by Bese, 14 e192, Sis, Fos ‘Daten Soviet Crnpgnpieystes 917-8 Sig Sect Agency, 1SMay SS. CCHCatecto LO22 Seepage 5 9 POR -SECRET-UMBRAFOP-SEERERUMBIOT Ie BEGINNING OF THE SUSSIAN PROBLEM. FEB-DEC 1048 for copying the Russian traffic; and clandestine photography of Russian messages filed atthe U.S. cable ‘companies. ‘The clandestine photography procedure originated in an arrangement between the Army Signal Corps and David Samoff, chief executive olficerof RCA and aeserve Signal Corps officer. In Fanvary 1940, Mr. Sarnoff wrote the Adjutant Genera. accepting a War Department proposal to have a Signal Corps officer assigned to RCA for six months, “to pus a course of study.” As Earle F Cook (Major General, retired) would recall“ ‘of this nonsense was a cover — looking over the traffic was what I was there for."® With the cooperation of RCA, who provided asafe ‘oom and photo equipment diplomatic messages were photographed and delivered tothe Signal lnteligence Service. While Cook describes the Washington DC operation in some detail, we know ‘that similar photo operations took place in New York City and possibly Sen Francisco. Photography meant perfect copy ofthe message as sent and allowed coverage of traffic that had not been intercepted or could not be (the Army copied manual and high speed morse bu at printer). Earle F. Cook “Looking ovr the trate twee wnat was therefor ‘A sampling of KGB (and some GRU) traffic fom 1940 until 7 Dec 1941 on US.<> Moscow lanes shows that both intercept and photography were extensive, but the coverage eric. ‘KGB New York traffic was intercepted by Station 3, mostly, but also by Stations 4 and 7 (Canal Zone and Fort Hunt, VA respectively) throughout 1981, while the photography mostly took place in January and again during the last few months of that year. Washington <—> Moscow GRU was collected by both meas, especially fr January-August 1941. (Only «small amount of Rusian intelligence traffic to and from San Francisco and Los Angeles seems to have been taken. ‘The KGB did not communicate out of Washington until 1943 (the New York City Residency serviced the KGB sation in Washington). ‘The KGB and GRU trafic represented a minority ofthe Russian messages sent and collected — the bulk ofthe material then and later would be Trade and Consular. ‘RSA nun of Gn Gok 5 ay 18, Rode D ae, OH 14-2, CH Calection Se she interview Col Roe ‘Scat, 2x 1850 Bo acy, OM 380, Tae tvs esr sors tna bx Army Si 10 -FOP-SECREP-UMBRATFOP-SEERET-UMBRT ‘LE REGINNING-OF THE RUSSIA PROBLEM, FEB-DEC 168 ‘The Army and Navy discussed the collection and processing of Russian trafic in some oftheir pre-war negotiations on coordination. From July-Oct 1940 several committees met to discus aivision of overall US. intercept efor, especialy of diplomatic communications. The Army, orat least General Mauborgne, the Chie Signal Officer, preferec to divide the intercept coverage based on the tanning station, The Navy preferred ‘amore comprehensive scheme based in parton agetenity, but eventually agreed tothe Army proposal, hough withthe interesting proviso thatthe Army would tum overto the Navy all Russian tafic? A small Navy effort | against Russian diplomatic, begun in 1938 and which perhaps continued into 1941, produced no resultsand did not influence later work on this target ® ‘On 7 December 1941, the U.S. established censorship of Intemational mail and communications. This should have given the Sigal Intelligence Service all Russian trafficonthe US.<-—> Moscow lanes, asthe cable ‘companies were now rewired to turn over to the Censor s copy of every communication. The Venons traffic files contsin Censorship copies of KGB. trafic (NY.<—> Moscow) starting on 16 December. The early ‘censorship coverage seen to have been quite complete, but then, unaccountbly, the coverage drops off and ‘rom the end of Jan 1942until mid-May, and for other shor periods during 1942, significant gaps exist. nother words some hundreds of KGB and GRU messages from 1942 ae missing and presumably were not taken from any source (thats, intercept and photography wer cut back in favor of the seemingly more certain censorship source — s0 everyone cropped the coverage). The Army continued to intercept some Russian diplomatic on the non-US. lanes, such as Moscow <—> Tokyo. While 1942 KGB traffic is les ikely to be readable than tha of 1943 to 1945 (and GRU even less readable for 1942), the eryptanalytic sucess rate would presumably ‘have increased had all the messages been available? By ater 1942, censcrship coverage had improved with nearly complete coverage onthe US.<—> Moscow lanes, In summary then, on 1 Feb 1943, Miss Grabeel and Lt. Zubko ad an extensive and ever-growing body ‘of Russian raficto work wit, some dating beckto 1939 (very litle 1939 waffchassurvived). Yet his cerainly represented much les than half of what had been passed in those years. CC. Interlude: The Sinkow Mission to the UK, ‘The United States entered into a de facto but limite Sigint arrangement with Britain in 1940, beginning with some discussions in London between the Brits Naval Intelligence Division and the U.S. Naval Attache ‘This came to nothing bat in August 1940, a high level Army-Navy delegation went wo the U.K. to evaluate Biriish ability to continue the wat. One of the American vistors, Brigadier General Goorge V. Strong ofthe General Staff (and later Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2) old the British thatthe US. had solved the Japanese Purple (diplomatic) machine cipher. Strong then radioed General Marshall suggesting a formal exchange program for German, Jspanese and Italian Sigint information. In Feb 1941, a US. mission went to GCHO (calling to England on the Royal Navy battleship George V which they had boarded at Annapolis). The party consisted of Captain Abraham Sinkov and 1/Lt Leo Rosen ofthe Signal Intelligence Service and Robert Weeks and Prescott Currier fom the Navy's OP-20-G, The main purpose of the mission was o exchange information "Reh? ncn prey ASA 2 ly CMY ay oe ep "he Nay ickof cca Rain poms aca ieee fom ae Aamy—Ney dacs dhe Navy owe sty sitswantn aan cosmuncate cheered ros pate lth sano. Cl Seat conto a ee) [pre te Novy cope fl Rain inept ite peer beetiey wee wong They wut) wee” Pesuneye a atogant oer of cul ic ela Wao colectin. lc Fue, hoe SA a 1989 ad wed Inte atom eed tt apieat peep snanip neg for 190 ervey etc ard Palipon 1 De, uL -FOP-SECREE_UMBRA--FOR-SECRER-EMBRT (THE REGINNING OF THE RUSSIAN PROBLEM. FEB-DEC 1063 and material onthe Axis powers (the British got Purple the Americans leaned lite about the Enigma break). “The British gave Capt. Sinkov the fllowing information about Russian systems:" + Details ofthe Russian weather ciphers + Information sbout OK 5 and OKK 6, major Russian army and sir force systems + An NKVD airsystem + Russian call-sgn and radio procedure (army, air and NKVDipolice) Inahand-written note to his summary report on Russian systems, Sinkov concluded, “The Russian secret systems ulize a one part code book. These code books are super encipheted sing additive, or special tables which vary from day to day.” ‘Sinkov's report does aot specifically mention Russian diplomatic or intelligence service systems or anything sbout th extent of British coverage ofthe Rusian target. The British as we will see would soon make some important decisions shout their coverage of Russian targets. “The British had obtained some Russian military codebooks and other cryptographic material from the Finns According o Cecil Philips, Major Bill Smith, a ater head ofthe Russian problem, told him in 19440r 1945, ‘atthe project had been shut down because Lt. Zubko had become oo friendly with Major Geofrey Stevens, {he British isisonofficerat Arlington Hll2° The U.S. didnot share with he British he fact ofthe effort against Russian diplomatic communications, «policy which continued for another two, and close to three, years?” Stevens nd Zubko hal probably met in late 1942 when Zuko, newly arived at Arlington Hall, had been ‘working the Japanese miliary attache problem (during his short tour at Arlington Hall, Zubko worked in both Bfand BI}, Stevens tock particular interest in JMA, asit wos also being worked bythe British, MuchJMA material was being exchanged between the US and UK, and one can imagine some discussion between Zuko sand Stevens about the JMAmessages that contained information on the eryptanalyss of Russian systems. But {for some strange reason, suely by accident, the two-person Russian problem had been placed ia the very fice (private office, nota bay) whose only other occupant was Geofirey Stevens, who was not supposed to know ‘what Zubko and Grabeel were doing! Gene Grabeel recalled how, given the security admonition from Frank Rowlet, she and Zubko spcke only in whispers, and she never had aeal conversation With hin. She sw Zubko ‘once shorly after the program stopped, but Major Edgerton seemed to intervene, discouraging any conversation. She never saw him again. Mr. Zubko gave me some information in a brief telephone conversation (made in an effort to set up an appointment) He sid that ie didnot recall the names of anyone at Arlington Hal except Major Stevens, whom ‘head found tobe akindredspirt (both had trained as infantry officers) He dd notenjoy the work t Arlington Hall and believed he wasat suited fori. AS for the abroptclosedown of the problem, he said tht he was reassigned outof Arlington Hall na great hury, buthe never knew why. He told me that he had been in contact with the Russians in Washington, in an official capacity, as “hey were our ais.” Mr. Zabko's ltr military ‘BIL Rich Halo, "ZYT Br", eons Clon, Piso Boe “pw on a ete KOB ena rm he en eng sng a a pron wo be upended oan peeved ale operation cay climes pene sees ben wiibeGCHQ in gape ands ee cdr apee von. Fak Lian Alge al ee ‘so made input tii he dome ba ns Rae Dylon, nese Seve tint Merit KC: a ‘Tse IMA ith Za et Sevens bt be ol sted ot on Zt eee ‘nk Rowie, Fenans Cousens Olver Kiyo at Raa cen wat 1S. peso hing 96-45, SSA eit soe eotempoy ln py (ante! en 16 POP-SHCREUMBRA--FOP-SEEREPEMBRAT | ‘TLE BEGINSING OF TE RUSSIAN PROBLEM, FEB-DEC 1963, | setvice included behind the lines activity in China. Mt. Zubko declined 10 be interviewed orto corespond on his service at Arlington Hall, citing the fat it wes so long ago and he could not remember mach about it, ||__During the research for this study we asked many interviewees if they recalled anything about the suspension of the Russian problem. AMlermuch effort, we found nothing, but st least we found thatthe mystery was long standing. In March 1946 Colonel M.A. Solomon, G2, inguited about the origin and history ofthe Russian problem. The answer, fom Lt Col James B. Greene of ASA suggests thatthe erly history of the program wasalready clouded. Greene wrote that, “fr reasons not knownto personnel now at ASA, the Russian problem was fist begun in late 1942, (employing two persons), was for some reason abansoned soon after, and was again started in the Spring of 1943." As we have shown, the project started in Feb 1943, not late 1942. A curious element of Groene's reply 10 G-2 is that it was drafted by Bill Smith, who pethaps wasnt anxious for the Genera Staff to know too much about this mater2® ‘Ina paper writen in 1965, “Recollections of Work on Russian” Frank Rowlett commented tht “the first Russian Section was short-lived, for some reason which I donot remember it was disbanded." G. The Russian Program Resumed ‘As with the original shortived program, we lack documentary material to account forthe decision to re-open the Russian prcblem. But we do have the reculectios of those who were there —once more Gene Grabeel, now joined by Ferdinand W. Coudert, Captain Fernand Coudert ety ead she Ruslan program a Arnon an {Couder had been directly commissioned int he Signal Corps sa 1 and was ordered active duty on 24 011942, His background — shoal the material prove tobe exploitable —oves especially stable forthe Russian problem. A member of famous international fanily lw im, Coudet Frees, be had BA and MA | Soeremrrene ean ee te ac erie woa Aegina | Pihgepes gehen ede Rb 6, Lala COC, VE. Dagny eer iM Rol es ‘wal ing ser eho ft Raion, | ” -T0P_SECRET-UMBRA-“TOP-SEEREF-UMBRA- ‘UTE REGIVNING OF THE RUSSIAN PROBLEM, FEB DEC 1043 ‘depres from Harvard, the later in Slavic Studies, anda aw degre fom Columbia, He knew French, German, Russian, Serbo-Croatian, Bulgarian and had completed two crash courses in Japanese at Colubia”” His erly military assignments ormisesignments included supply and motor maintenance coures at Fort, Monmouth. He escaped from these in ate November 1942 for duty at Arlington Hall, where he ist worked 4s night security duty officer and courier. He briefly worked on the Japanese Army problem but filed an ad hoc oral language testy Colonel Dovd (head of B Divison, the Sigin production organization) and tansferced to the German problem. One day in April 1943, Major Kullback, head of section B II called him aside for a conference in a vacant office. Kullback told Couder that the agency intended to begin working Russian tn orp tan pep ener nr poten wOP Heder Conn ‘ri is cn ee id we gD tiesto he inc see oH ae ence po ‘hi, Ute end tr ey of iiNet ef en steers eer mh Pap ms mnie arta a ane Ssenttemcrrer tantric evan Howe og snus mr sfc ma none a st Og sana Ny ‘ners cpt rn, riya pl ps pg ‘ten Son nga to Ny Daa ppm ta ch ant ng Bn hy. Orbs ee pend pera anes ese a ~POP_SECRET-UMBRA-FOR-SEERETUMBRAT 11 THE BEGINING OF THE RUSSIAN PROBLEM, FEB-DEC 1048, ‘operation at Banbridge an¢in June four operators began a watch a Station W, Winter Harbor, Mane. During 1943-1944, the units headed by Lt. Coudert and Commander Taecker cooperatively worked a number of niltary and police systems, Lt (.) Moeschl of OP-20-G working within the Russian section at Arlington all and Coudert and Tueccer meeting weekly. Some ofthe Russian systems they studied included: 'B-20 and B-21, Ship and air movements. Broken in 1944 B-28, Radio service messages. Simple substitution B-A0 (ZMO). Intercepted from Fuly 1943. Radio service messages, postal reports in 3 digit, simple substitution, B83 (ZMO). Recognized in Sep 1943. Minor military administrative matters. Readable, B46 (ZMP/ZYP). Inercepted from Sep 1943, Minor military administrative matters and Communist Party instructions. Readabie ‘Much ofthis material was extremely simple cryptographically ad rarely contained anything of interest, ‘while other systems that might have been of interest could not be copied. Lt, Coudet recalled « Russian police ‘ormilitary message dealing wth god places o go fishing —he said that the was typleal message, We read acomment (probably by Coudert or Taecker) about B-43/2MO traffic, hat “some of the material mentioned israther believable, and itis just posibe that when anjtem such as ‘ed bilberr” [a shrub, RLB is mentioned, it might have an eniely different meaning tothe recipient of the message" in other words, an open code tunderlying the pain text. Other messages concemed production of vegetable crop, care of animals and repeit ofrailroad cars. Butitwasastarton Russian systems. Weshould mention that the Navy credits their Mrs, Leora Cunningham with “the first break ito Russian eryptographic systems, by either Army or Navy” in Oct 1943, by her study of "tralic berg received from both the Amy and Navy” |. Mone Japanese Military Attache Messapes In Avgost 194, Sam Snyde, head of the Jpanese Miltary Atache (IMA) problem st Aiingon Hall, renewed his support othe Russian problem. Some ofthe ents in Sayder’s dines for 1943 includes! + 2 Avgust. Conference with Captain Marston re liaison with Lt. Coudert, + 3 August. Completed compilation of messages re Russian system. + 4 August. Spent rest f afternoon working with Mr Millad (frm the Language Branch) on message re ‘Russian Diplomatic Codes “tion Lange Ssin History” De. Toke ta ely 145, Ge Shag an Sin, we Se cance evn ‘et OC Sinn 5. ea ah wo chanel TTY mp Ia en nm en ae Thy fue te ‘il developed ioe pros etc nd pede OF 20-0, Hes ned tlhe Amy SSA Son 0 ‘Ret Ranch in asp uke Rs ieee Nea eae hs Amy prog. Hwee ne nt Po, “id cone the Acconci eter of Rann san mae (whch Wa wht Sa Sa ng). Bes Pigs ‘Moves wi Dr Toa 3 Bee) “i, eesti ses: The Be Car” Rago #18 (srma pt IR Sep 1945) inbeNA Acie, CBPL46 pes sen Rasen lian ype for 3s he ier Rene areas ee Nba Aas OOIOE A AT Be Frten”. ssypleaato te Arnal Ref Banc, Sign Seat Agency 18 030 94, CH Caleton Ves. We ‘tino wit aM Caml els ot a Ranen emai. Ar wl cede en om igen Hater fis etal eye acres ung 143, st Rance lonaspacon Te fin cape cpt el "sun mitarymesopspobiy de ect 15 ran 4s, Te Bs aig Samat Ten) bg ae 198, at ‘eal Gapmens ay esa he enenion fh sxpape we ie ber CCH Coes, XIK2. Box ote eye Papers, See arf 2 Age 19403 ne 184 2 HOP SHEREEEMBRAL“FOP -SEERET-OMBIN ‘THE: BEGINYNG OF THE RUSSIAN PRORLEM, FEB-DEC 1042 Fran played Fusslanexptography + 6and9 August. More discussions with Millard + 11 August. Visied Lt Coudert re Russian message, + 13 August. Helped Millard complete messages re Russian Diplomatic Codes. Gave material to Lt Coudert + 190ct. Visited Frank Lewis who is doing special problem for Lt. Coudert. + 24 Nov. Major Rowlett and Captain Smith visited to ee (Lt) Mikofsky's work on Russian — arrange closer coordination both ways. ‘The SMA message that probably caused the excitement during August was a circular, Tokyo —> IMA Helsinki and Budapest, D 1835 sent 6 April 1943 (butnot available ual July or August). That message began: | We have bepun to read the Russian Foreign Diplomatic Code used for communication between the Consuls in Seoul and Daiten in communication with Moscow and Vladivostok.” The message contained a wealth of ‘ryptanalytic information including the statement (ftera description of the relationship of opening code groups in Rossian messages) tht “Thi gives you the starting point ia the additive abl, and from thisasa stating point, the additives are used consecutively.” Other relevant SMA messages that Snyder would have made availabe to Coudert included: + Tokyo to JMA Berlin, 29 Jan 1943 (translated 18 March 1943) refers to S-igit Russian code and the possibilty ofa Russian machine system, + IMA Beilin to Tokyo, 6 Sep 1941 (wanslated 15 April 1943) in which the attache reports that “Today we received the Russian military code OCKK 7” and that the code values would be radioed to Tokyo. ‘The later and other IMA messages mention the Russian crypto-materal recovered at Petsamo, such as“ liplomatic code which was being burned by the Russian Consut in Ptsamo was captured and reconstructed.” “a esi Hoon repro and 2 Aart 96 Repro Pope WoonRusan Ces eigen Ade Fs “FOR SECRET UMBRA.-POR_SECRET-UMBRA- tie BEGINING OF THE RUSSIAN PROBLEM, FEB-DEC 1982 ‘This was KOD 26, a system used between the Foreign Ministry and the consulates and which would later be available to the US-UK for Venona purposes. IMA, and its special erypt-intelligene subseres, SAT, continued to give clues to Russian systems forthe test ofthe wat. Once JAT was fully slved, in about Now 1944, atemendous amount of material became available, Ithad become apparent wellbefore then tat Japanese military intelligence ha Sigit liaison officers inthe Axis capitols, Berir, Budapest ané Helsinki, who received and provided eryptologic materials on many allied and neutal targets including the US.and Russia. tha also become apparent thal the Finns especially had seized important Russian diplomatic and military materials, the diplomatic at the Rusian consulate ia Petsamo, Finland on or atout 22 June 1941 (the date Germany invaded Russia) when Germany and Finland became de facto allies. Shortly before Finland obtained an armistice with Russia in 1944, the Finnish Sigint ‘organization and the JMA evacuated to Stockholm. Bu the Fins continued to cooperate with the Japanese Miltary Attache who also withdrew to Sweden ® In a message of 18 Jan 1943 (not ansated st Arlington Hall until 4 July 1945) the JMA Helsinki wired the Vice Chef ofthe General Staff with ome concems about the security of the IMA crypto-ystems. He noted that, "Recently all countries have been devoting great energy to eryplanalysis, and they have made rematkable progress. Fo instance, Finland has decrypted Russian, American and Turkish codes” andin view of these facts itseems necessary o take the utmos precautions to secure the secrity of our present cages” He warns Tokyo about the vulnerability ofthe JMA system, especially the re-use of additive key. But in conclusion he sai, "T suppose that tis hazardous to instruct be higher authorities (therefore) I will cu this shor.” 4. Progress on Russian Dip On 1 Sep 1943, Actington Hall r-organized in a fundamentally important way. Section B Hl (Lt Col Solomon Kuilbck) was row to work solely on the Japanese Army target. Section B Ill (Major Rowlett) assumed erypiaalytic and reporting responsibilty for everything ese, including the Russian problem, which ‘became known as the Special Problems Uni, designator B Ill b 9, Lt Coudert remaining in charge: ‘The Russian diplomat problem now bogan o receive more ttetion and resources. Justa about tha time Aington Hall completed a Morale Surey of each clement of the agency. The teport of hat survey includes «short entry on Lt, Coudert’s operation, giving us the names ofthe people then working the Russian problem and an evaluation ofthe operation. The people inthe unit were divided into several informal units: Lt. Coudert, O1C Helen J. Bradley, technical advisor Gene Grabeel Doris Johnson. Ruby Roland “Tine oy ai ots no Rassias co 2 fone 1, aeough ey hei eral wit Geomay byt ti, A fw nse Rass peste Fn prior soe Sen Rani Wap, Howe e KO ‘GRU mites pope tly eacate si Pm a 0973 eet ety eveybing. eats Sv ‘ri ate ca wt Seated = Ts Sen ote pes Mary Acs 9s or Clip al) ‘is mornoon nas mae recipi a major eogsia 194, epi inchigh ge pe Any pens. Te ‘rondbs ohne cmt oft brig, eas arinan ede eras te Nase ucts ‘hajesoueofiorasn oe stage seem Eun, IMA oipeacreyhngel tae lope sy Weta Rowe 4 -FOR_SEERER EMER ACone B. ery Mary L Boake Suan MeCuteon Roa Brown oven Miler ‘Thenaratve stern! of workeprs the nit was ecsvingan average of250 message pe week, andthe number wasinceasng speci the Tine and Diplomat. In adn te permnest party ee | clerks were loaned in tohelp withthe logging. Further: "The eficiny oth unt god. Thee is nodes and fw complains or revances aie Tha for th ork has boo egtve resus. The am so ek the tems an fof caper oul eof ae un Indeed, the ned for *staffesperts and professional erpamalticellor was pow becoming parent, but processing never acesingamountowulicand concen shut compartment comin oop) [EtGonder. On 3 Sep 143 he reported fo Major Rowe a long wih Ruan diplomat incuding Trae, td Rusia plhintes,misellancous wali such ns plomate (goverumeas in exe) ‘rasbeing routed his seton, “open he aicT2Tan Teanga we were selng witha Rustan | pobiem "Te Rexsna rae wee being sored sccringW sysem an anand (extra) mesa ane | etncators tine! and handritnon the fcr ofeach mesg alongwith gropcoute™ A week | ner Cooder eared this had weve s000mesqes curing the pasted, 8 Tae ipl | plaintext and tet ot yet charred | The minutes of the B II Executive Council (which at various times dusing 1943-45 was ealled the | coptanlytc Reseach Commie or Group, and fall nteligence Divison Encetve Coun) gives sone seat othe roprasof he Rasa problem gle 185 a icssed oy Frank Rowe ed is ‘principal assistants:*> 2S. More expienederpunalyts needed for he Russian problem + 4 Sep. Li Cone t give ast eport wih eoommenatons 17 Sep. “twas pointed out that th regard tothe Rssan robles he Besh know ooking abot it +9 Sep. Both Rusia military endplate wo be exploited 5 much spss | 6 11Sep ts precessng of Russi trafic woud be handled in speci tego. +14 Sep. The Nay oe ven duplicate copies of Rssin tae | __ + 16Sep. Major Rowe noted Lt, Coude's recommendation: experienced eryplanaytc prope would | eof value to te poten: uaning needed tobe expanded. Met SSB ne Sane hit Age 80, SA Atv COD tna mai Seay Age he er ge ‘fern wrasse rales dee nna) Tosa} ep ges scrnae aw re ve emp irvnagen, Sauer men fr 01 BIL Sep 143. CCH Coben Veins er mdProcing of a4 The ease ae, ‘str eu ume se sender RGB, GRU ex) waa erp be xt nd aca a, eee. ‘eB wet ee end Capa EL Whey. NSA Aron CBTBS, ide ah SA Welly Rept ano Ost $98" 2s FOR-SECRET-UMBRA-TOP_SECREF-EMBRA— ‘UTE BEGINNING OF THE RUSSIAN PROBLEM, FEB-DEC 1043 + 30'Sep, Colonel Cook (heat of B Branch) rected the notion thet Russian Trade material shouldbe seat {othe Bureau of Eoonomic Warfare (note by RLB: The KGB ha, as Venona would ater show, significantly infiltrated the BEW). + 13 Nov. Rowlett reported that “definite lads” had now been developed regarding the Rusian traffic and that “Mr. Lewis and Lt. Elmquist should be commended for tei work inthis connection." However, ‘because ofthe urgent demands ofthe Japanese problem, they Would have to be relieved of from tt work on ‘he Russian progr. * ‘These “definite Ieads"included the discovery that the Rusian Trade traffic (then called ZYTby Arlington all was an additive system, that san additively enciphered code, The Russians were using a code book of ulnown size (tha the tal mmbe of values unknown), ad o each code group or value selected from the ‘book fo create the message, applying an additive to crete cipher group —the group hat Would be transmitted inte message, The problem then woul be to “solve” the additive, and sip ito reveal the rue code group, ‘nd then obiin the indivial code group values (hee meaning) by book-breaking. The later would be complied by tious analysis or by somehow sequin the rghit codebook, The biggest problem would bet solve the additive (also called the cipher or the key). I twas fom tue one-time pad it could not be solved, Lt, Cour’ people were re-enforced during Sep-Oct 1943, test Lt Richard. Hallock Mr. Burton Poilips, L.KarlEimguistand Mr, Frank Levis (Mrs. Genevieve Feinstein and Miss Mary Jo Dunning: and Ceci Philips would come onto the problem during 1943), ‘They were all experienced cryptanaysts end several had stong academic backgrounds. Lt Richard Tieadwell Hallock had received «PhD. from the University of Chiagoin 1934, in ancient Near Eastem languages. He subsequently joined the faclty ofthat schools Oriental Institute, During his long academic career he published many works on ancient cuneiform veing (Assyrian). By the time these people arived to help, Coudert’s unit had been able to divide the Russian (aon-military) tufficnto a numberof systems which hecalleel! nd] and—pndl—Tthe later two being ‘Trade and thel_Jsystems passing as Diplomatic Begining in July and into December 1983, Mary Boake stud sy issuing five research report during November and December. She reported haf [soo ‘e-smed ZZB)appeated 08 24 taficlanes but only Washington <--> Moscow cared enough flcTo work with. She concluded that none of he studies showed any — results and the work was disconinued for some 6 months {would later be designated as the system for Russian Naval Inteligence (GRU-Naval), Cave Bery and Miss McClelland suTET HT tet ZZCIZZD, and sil ater known uring his same period. As with{ —Jnachine runs were made with no useful resus. ‘Trafic on the Lox Angeles, New York, Washington, San Fiancisco lanes (to and from Moscow) and the New York <--> (Ottawa lanes wes studied Sys ld ater be identities as GRU, "Cain il Si nerd Ceci Phil thu er had bet as ay Batwees Role ant Kale ce hi po. Apacaty some of ‘deed tom B BI ep othe Rs rote atc ste esiong ac aig Rowe Sit ‘utr eon ex DB: 103825 No 1943; 14968 Dee 14 enn calc, Pov ox. Mer at en Mi ase Mie ‘inom por ot DG: 18 Nov an a9 Deer 194, Veo Caletn,Pvison Bos: % se ‘EXEMPT -FOP-SECRET-UMBRA-“POP-SECRET-UMBRA- (THE BEGINNING OF THE BUSAN PROBLEM, BEB-DEC 1963 (On 8 Oct 1943, Coutet reported thatthe IBM section at Aington Hal had completed rus on the fist ad las five groups of 10,000] Thade) messages.57_ Presumably Hallock and the others made their rae itunes 4D 1, ar apices nace ‘Frome Hc pons an Ce Fail 5 Splemeto te Rou apr of B ech, 1969 0:30 94; The He Pl, CCH Callie, Wa & 3 TOP-SECRET EMBRA--FOP-SEERE-UMBRAT | {ML THE ILA SUITLEBS. NOX 183-1246 | pre cryptanalytc problem, which it would remain until Dip systems became readable—then the consumers ‘would decide what hac intelligence value and the problem would go from there. Following Halloct’s discovery sbout re-use of key, the unit found several thousand pages of re-use, bt no usage more than a second time, that is, a depth of two only could be found. This was discouraging to the cryptanalysis at that me because the conventional wisdom was that re-use solvable, [This anack, completed tn March 194%, filed to produce any results, Halock also constereT possi aTaC in which entative key groups from the existing e-uses might be tested agains other messages. There sno evidence that he tried this tthe time, but a later work al solved key was | tested against all messoges,? ‘Meansshile effort continued to fully explain the message indicator of the messages where re-use had been ‘ound and to recover some code groups from the re-uses already found. About hal ofthe ease of re-use did not have the same key page number, but in all cases the frst two digits of the indicator were identical if the ‘messages were in dep from the beginning. The Tapanese had suggested that these two digits were some form ‘ofrow and column coordinates, but Hallock’ group had alo discovered that when these digits were subtracted from the first two digits ofthe third group, the resulting dinome was not randomly distributed. According to Captain Smith (na discussion wth Cecil Philips in 1944) Burton Phillips coneluded thatthe two digits in the indicator were key and thatthe nn random result was two digits of code. While we have no information as to how he arrived st tis conclusion, it was clearly proven by the next major success on the depths—the iscovery of self-checking code groups for numbers atthe start of many messages. Miss Berry recalled that she ether noticed or identified some aspect ofthe Trade indicator in later 1943, Since Miss Bezry was working closely with Burton Pillip at the ime, er discovery may have related othe two digits of key inte indicator ‘which Burtoa Philips apparenly confirmed ihadbeen observe earlier thatthe code digraph among the long messages which appeared tobe pats were Afferent from shorter messages. These messages were almost uniformly about four pages or 240 groups in length, and the non-random digits derived by sublracting the first two digits of the indicator from the third "usualy begun with zero in the second and succeeding members. Further, thad been observed that he digraph ‘was Ol fora long sequence and later became 02. According to Hallock'srepont, this led Mrs. Feinstein to sugges that this might be representation of some continuation message numberof the previous message. This proved tobe true—andeven beter—it turned out tobe a representation of the exterual mmber of the preceding Imessage—providing an almost certain four group crib ino the tt four groups ofthe message, At about the “Through or iste od ves of econ ey bevel eterna ety ‘ey bad been dtd nk x pone ROB er GRU pte. Ro on ee ver aig ned wine i nce ‘usp andnoceevertaa bing tram Ort F ret she Rt js sve wee eye pe re he emo vey bsg tang eal lp roe aed rp ihe eaal eemcn e fagap a a inhi on, He a ron ose (ib ey of Waa. | CPs Co cuss in 92 with Care Bey.-FOR_SECREFUMBRA- UL 48 BL SMITH bs NOV. 1048-1046 ‘sume time the code gps for numbers were found to be aumeric code groups of a clear selchecking ‘varety-—which enabled virtually insanlancous determination of the form ofthe 1000 code groups used t0 express numbers? “The Russian wnt mored in January 1944, into a larger work area, butone typical of most ofthe work teas of Arlington Hall. They cecupied an open area measuring about $0 x 50 inthe back of the second Noor ofthe Building. Their space was separated from the resto he open wing, occupied bythe weather section, by large ‘wooden screens that weresome seven feethigh and four to six fect wide, A-small pening between te screens provided the entrance tothe “office”, Captain Smith sat at along table tothe left of his tiny entrance, with his back to the partitions aed so that he could watch everyone at work and coming and going (as they hd to squeeze by him). This ws truly another era— the section had only a couple of desks, othervise everyone sat two-by-to at tables seated on old, cast-off and unmatched chairs. The unit had just two or tte standard |ypewriters and oe Russian typewriter, Everything except paper and pencils was in short supply. The place ‘as not airconditioned. The unit, officers nd civilians, worked a six day week (ut were not pais fll day's pay for Saturdays), ‘Security was especialy tight inthe Russian section. Those studying Russian under Lt, Couert ad to lock vp their language books and dictionaries; maps of Rusia came off the wall tthe end ofthe day. Smith and ‘Coudert admonished eveyone to talkin low voice and to avoid discussing their Work with anyone else at ‘Arlington Hall. Atthe end of the day all the cabinets were locked andthe classified or target-revealing trash pot ina special contin! ‘Unfortunately the KGB seems to have alreedy heard about the Russian problem at Arlington Halland their stooges were hard at wok trying to lear the detail. CC. Lanchlin Cun th Silvermastr Ring and the KGB: Spring 1944 In November 195, Hizabeth Bentley, a veteran KGB agent, gave the FBI a 107 page statement (See section I. ofthis chaps). Among the many starting revelations about KGB espionage in the the U.S. was this: ‘During this same period I became aware ofthe fact that Lauchlin Currie was friendly withthe ‘SILVERMASTERS and was particularly friendly with GEORGE SILVERMAN. To the best of ‘my recollection, Currie did not supply SILVERMAN or the SILVERMASTERS with any ‘documents, but sed to inform SILVERMAN orally on cerain various maters. As an example ofthe informaionorally furnished SILVERMAN, I recall one occasion when CURRIE informed ‘him that the United States was on the verge of breaking the Soviet code.} ‘Unfortunately, Mss Bentley didnot give a date fr this incident, norcana date be determined by the phrase “During this same period” However, alate investigation would show twas most likely March or April 1944 Currie, bom in Nora Scotia, was a prominent academic economist connected 10 the Roosevelt ‘administration from 1934-45. He received a PRD from Harvard in 1951, became a US, citizen in 1934 and ‘aught at Harvard ad the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. In 1934 Treasury Secretary Morgenthau * Ceci aiip, Ces wht this ine wie ete i Cee Fini Mayo Denig and Cape Sai wer ming se dona em Ono pr te a Seno et pans aso a or en [WA ete y Cat Pee Grate Frat Cooter: to te ep oa Te Bt Pen, previous ces. Mis ba ‘eco tar Le Cote nt ly Gnete i ety sl ao plese ali ee Ot Code nt {fine ipresicn, ea tne, ba hose wan we or sawn i "PStlemeot sign 0 Reece 988, MY iste FBI cope stent ae Ven cotton 36 FO SECRET EMBRAPOP-SEERET-UMBRAT (UL THER SMIHLERA. NOY. 1943-1046 $ppoited Bim as snr analyst forthe Tesry Deartent in 1939 he became an admistatve assist ind economic sdvisort President Roosevelt He beth poston om 1839-4 adintermineay erat 4d uring the wat yeaa at ast oe sit 8 emporry stand infor Harty Hopkin. He pefonne various {Pedal misions dong te war iacuding a fot ng mission China 1 1947 Curie denied tothe FBI hat ad ld iverman hat the US. was onthe verge of breaking the Soviet eae. Curie i sy tht he might have ead abou sich codebeakng developments in view of is Contac ad positon. He si tht be would have bad no problem ling Sivan hat ype of information but id not recall avng done o (Svemnan, an employee ofthe Ai Sta he Pelago haw clarance though no Known fc acest Sin andcbvcusly no need o know rpardng te Rain prblen) ‘Ina December 1952 appearance before a Federal Grand Jury in connection with another matte (not involving: isl, Curie was sled about the codbreating mate. Te dened eve dscusing ts wih syoue, Whee ‘eine of his previo ements othe FB abou Sivermat be sada be wouldnt haved Siverman sch infomation (butte dda say that e knew that information anyway) | tnter1981 took stat Bondage, Mis Bey didnot mention he adebreaing incident. However se [nae trie ference itn er i pat eis nthe New York Dally Minn, Upon siterview oy te FB, Miss Bene dated the ncident othe Spring of 1944. She eae the conser ashing bout by Cai Siverman and Siveratr fo ge hi information othe Russians and tea follow tp. A Oat ne 'Silvermaster controlled a major KGB net; Bentley was an auxiliary agent handler and the courier between Silvera andthe KOB, Beate ad hats verbally reporied ober KGB superior, "Bilt nation thal wme agency of te US. government was onthe vege of eaing he Sov coe andthe most had i Bl hen sido hey, “Wel iit tp ort tpt He tl he that he etwerk ad he asian and duty” to determine the pater coe the Anes were about o beak, Mis Beale) sai that ie | she and the Silvermaster net worked on this fora time, they never learned which cade was about to be broken (Gor id they lear nytng else about the US. Ruston Sign programa east Mis Denty could pve the | FBI no funk information on is mater). | enona would prove that Miss Beae’s statements abot KGB actives inthe U.S were exemely accurate, Nonetheless er Csi tory might be considered bison deta ap la ao bee ound Venom.” However, te FBI found two independent witness One, senior government ofa (ane wile who worked cosy with Cur during te wa si tt Cc im tbe (Cur) ad evel tothe Rusians thal he US. had “broken te Save Diplomate ode". Cae was tuted ta he US. had | done such thing, and tecause he believed it wrong, he suid that he had “tipped off the Russians Inlater discussions with the FBI this official recalled his conversation with Cure in greater detail placing itn the Spring of 1944 (though he said it could possibly have been as late as Fll 1944). The officiel reported ‘hat Cure raised this miter by telling him that he knew of avery hush-ush mater, too seasitve to talk about. Carte then proceeded to el him that he had learned thatthe U.S. had broken the Soviet Diplomatic code and {that this was a terble thing todo to any ally “and indicated our lack of tos inthe Russians.” Currie sid that ‘he had fied this by tli the Russians, while assuring the that he, Curte, did not approve of such activities (Carte suid that by his ations e had prevented the sowing of seeds of distrust between alles, Currie didnot ‘ell this oficial how he had leamed about this and gave no deus bout the code that might be involved, The 37GFAP SCRE EMH (IL THE. BILL SMITHERS NOV 1043-1046 official rebuked Currie, The oficial said that he had Inter deserted this incident to Frank Wisner of CLA and to members and staffers othe House Committe on Un-American Activites including Robert Stripling, Ben Mandel and Richard Nixc, ‘A second person assosted with Currie daring tat time recalled that Curse suid thatthe U.S. had broken the Soviet code. But that source said that her recollections were too vague for her to be good witness in any proceedings. ‘The FBI contacted NSA for assistance inthis matter. General Ralph J. Canine, Director, NSA tod the Bureau on 9 Dec 1953 tht to his knowledge no Russian codes had been broken in 1942 oF 1943. In a memo of 25 Januaty 1954 Genesal Canine told the FBI thatthe Army and Navy made no decryption of Russian systems until 1945. On 12 Feb 1954, the Washington Field Office advised Bureau headquarters that: thas been determined by NSA that ln 1943 work on Soviet codes was inttated by both the Army ‘and the Navy and that in early 1944 limited success was had with one Soviet system not strictly 4 diplomatic code. It was also ascertained that decrypts of messages wer shown 10 President Roosevelt by a Unted Sates Naval Officer whose duty it was to take the decrypts tothe White House and that Currie could have learned ofthe contents of some of them in that manner. For ‘your information, NSA is making efforts to identify the Naval Officer whose duty it was to take the deerypis tothe White House, NSA was notable to make this identification. ‘The Agency could have done better, inthe Curie case and inthe Weisband case, as we wil discus in later part ofthis study. Suice cto say thatthe FBI interviewed a lot of officers who had been i ison with the White House, including Colonel Frank McCarthy, former Secretary of the Army General Staff and (later producer of the movie “Paton”) but found very litle. One offices, however, reported that dally summaries of ‘Russian decrypts had nt hen prepared , “for this code had not been broken stlficiently "> Did the KGB react to Lavehin Curve’ information? D. May Day 1944 ‘On 1 May 1944, the KGB changed the indicator system for its encrypted international communication, thats forthe enciphered code used by the Residencies and the Moscow Center. Tis change had been made on short notice although that would not be known until the Venona breakthrough, at which time the following ‘message, from Moscow “To all Residents", dated 25 April 1944, was decrypted and translated: EXEMPT Tn My pitti ne se NSA cou ae de Dr ery wat a lng te Rusa prog svg 182184 Carer Cn Reel Thelen gpm NSA oma ana oa wa pe {bbe eskeue—as preps eet mydg oe uo seg, These otan eo ad NSA ce ayo 1S" APSA ha bc sity el whe Be te wenn eoneeagecne are Capri x -FOP-SECRET_UMBRA-(UL THE BILL SMITH ERA NOY, 103-1096 From I May intend ofthe method of setting up the indicator group in effect at the present time, for the determination of the reciphering table enter in clear the beginning of the cipher text thefirst group ofthe table with which the leaf ofthe pad (on the occasion?) begins. The recipherment itself begins with the second group of th table. At the end of the cipher text enter, likewise inthe clear, the group following upon the last used group of the (additive key) (the second indicator group). If the recipherment ends with the last group of a tate, enter the first group of the following table, inote by RLB: thereafter som: $9 groups of the message could not be exploited|* Cecil Philips has cbserved that this indicator change was the KGB crypiographers second most important "esa acy erate apo ingen ce as emp See ea ees ae nr Ses Sra ace cn ae ea SGRILISSeo ns cute oe ethics mibheeereatpeace it mcenven batianad Sencar ese eaiens oes ERE Reta cette SREP eres Bn mt Ag ae nn 4 “TOR_SECREF-EMBRA-exeMer GR SERB EMER A UL THE BLL SMITHLERS NO 193-1046 In April 1945, the uit completed the machine proctses of matching Key digraph to find Trade-Tade depts. This produced large aumber of roused pages. But tis technique gave way tothe Hypothetical Additive Bank becauseof the latter's potential for finding mor{ Jr other non-Trade depths. succes of November 144, i nding depth by using the Hype Adklitve Bank, had nade ths sppoacT the primary method fr dept finding. By August 1, this method prodsced te first of the Canbera (sali) KOB matches—limately an important depth, Miss Jean Norris transfer fom the weather section—joined Cecil Philips, who had row taken fll responsibility for macne liaison from Miss Dunning, They expanded the Hype Additive Bank and ‘began machine atacks moter problems, Philips ales picked up responsi (GRU-neval and (GRU) during 1945. Tn August 1945, an stack was made aml without much Sucoes, tough Dr Richard Lele ltr buon tia the erly 1950s and FFOTEED some text in conjunction ‘with Meredith Gardncs. Ts efor involved iologs, generally cela messages in the same code Using different additive pats By the end of 1945, ington Hall had made an entry into a Rassian machin cipher, known a] or Fink. Senor eypanlts Robert Ferer and Mary fo Dunning collaborsedoslve austin tive that ad been by hs Da Vly Cheroes tom Oko who was Working te wale seton ging a frail “Joes, This tale ter pena rahogh ap Ran liar systems probbly made Te Rasa Diplomatic problem —Venona—let interesting to Aaington Hall and its consumer, one ofthe many factors in the slow road tothe Venona opening. HH, TICOM and BOURBON; US-UX Joint active in 145 Shomly before the end of World Wa I, the U.S andthe UK began to sate fact of nd some details of thee Russian igi programs and began planing fr joint or complementary operations epsins hat target. “The codename forthe overall Rusian tage became Rattan and later Bourbon. ‘The TICOM progam (Target Intelligence Comittee), established before Rttan/Bourboa, had as its objective the collection of German (and ate apasese) Sint and Comsce information, records andequpment. Iemight be compared w the TAREX programs of ltr year The TICOM teams found information, about ‘Russian systems inthe Geman reords and bogen sending this back to their especie Sigint centers though withthe understanding that GC&CS would be the cetralzepoitory—actaly Aringion Hall, Navy and GCACS gots copy of everything Inthissecion we wil race these two developments, At this stage itis sil nt possible from an historical perspective, to completely separate the Venona project from the rest ofthe R program(s). At Aligion Hall, Captain Bil Seth's Russian itil handle al Rassian alfic—Dip, itary 4nd plainer, As we hive see the entre Rusia program was compartment ‘TICOM, with ts amecedents and descendants, it very complicated subject, not east because the records a ifficult to use, Furthermore, the legends about the OSS and “the Russian codebook(s)” TD EORTICHe misunderstanding about our Venona breakthrough. It is probably useful to give the most. importantconcusionsnadvanc, expanding them intisand ater section necessary. These conclusions 1. The people wio broke the KGBand GRU systems—Venona—have no recollection of sein, hearing ny Rusa erypengrapie material provided by the OSS, Meredith Gardnerand Frank Rowlet °-FOP-SECREF-UMBRA, UL THE ILL. SMITH ERA. NOV, 1943-1046 ‘were quite plain-spokenonthis point. Likewise, Ferdinand Coudet, atthe conter of the Russian program before the Venona break (Spring 1943 ithe end of 1945) sai the Russia unt received nothing of interest fromthe ‘OSS. The documentary evidence supports this. 2, The TICOM operation, conducted by US-UK military and naval personel from the eryptologic and itetigence services did acquire Russian cryptographic material of some importance tothe Venona effort. But ‘while thar material assisted Meredith Gardner etal in bokbzeaking, nothing coulé be done wnt the cipher (tht ithe adver key) hd ben spp off te message rupee ur cole group Atta pit Set wo ip Bae psi xen ino KGB an fa Malic itinelee doensst anes 3. Intend he TICOM torts inthe US-UK tack guint Rossin argetsand wasespecally sel frit eonlon bagel understanding of Rss ys nd rng in 19834 or eco into KGB syen{_———- Yc had been in te bore rove tat) Septemter 1944 wa very buy mont in the hoy spec suppor Sig operas agaist he Rusia ptr ne shld, potest mparan On 21 Sepenter an adenc pry of fe Fish Spintec arvedin Sweden oh ecordstndeqipmen ancvctaon ha haben cored wi dhe Swedih eres, Win afow ays US. Sete Deparment epee pen esting ithe Fins toleam boat atackson US. cypto sense Stovember Lewene’ Pave Caron of ange al tndPai Gas neyplopopic afer fo Ste coed Swedes nr imate coer sonnue debriefing te Hn ashgente prone, On2 Sept he Drfng bcos of ho ormed ‘get ntligence Comm ee CNCOM) held st meng ‘Aswehave seen ome foreign cryptograpinteligence repre in Japanese Miar ache OMA) comiincatons he Finshadan sve Sig pcan ad become ce om ur eng of A at She Fins had oem sl ead some Ruan tad USS systems sod et hy sed information wi he [apaes sod te Gemmone* nthe summer 94 he Flan eli hy wero be wrong agen tepottin wih he Ruan ose wha! cou The inh tlignc served ined aay trove wil te Resins insted s poppe goverment or cco the eon. The ins had ooperted Sih the inaigence serves of the neal neighbor, Swece, for many Jer, Major Genet Ca Eeavat chet of te Swedish Defoe Sta weed ou tm arangene! wih Colne! llama of he Finn intigene service forthe arpton of Fash pone ing wi ei cords end equlmaen, The finteractcsarved Sweden on2!Sepenter, Th Finn tea shee Swedes neal eat both Gemany and Resi vel the Finns Sign group an its records, memes nd eqipen would be ao 8 source Sut Polar uty he t,o rh some contol over ems Sous 25, In sen eye Sle PoaivSoues 267 a TICOM re on te sane funda sou for oma ote Rain Dip incoing KB andGRO. came sboutsometing ine hs The nm psu teitsecuy ple) "5 Fnan pegs cue ois Wald Wor he US and ind ge vay eh apn he vain Rss a se sro 0580 be Winer Wa ehoyeta pod epaton sas US and Clones ima Cees indeed Sig ae iia fa aae {Sth ad ones-FOP-SEEREF-UMBRA (THE BILL STIL ERA Nov 1082-1046 had entered the Soviet consulate at Peta (echengo) Finan on or about 22 Jane 1941, hen he Gemans begin heir invasion of Resi. The ans i jon te invasion fre or evr dys bt spparenly he Rana went emcgency desacion sn evacsionproeduesrightavey, Taliep ot German feces om the crupationfores in Norway acaly gor the comelt as Germans staged taigh the Fetsmo ae. Inany event the Rustin desincton procedures wer incompstea the Finns pats wat ted out be ually bund sodcook ofthe Fs Chit Dice the KOB, tha he olen itligence seme tthe ganization responsible for esponge and coutsenpionage shoe Tha codhook (KOD POBIEDAY), unit indicator system ater cme tobe own fhe Psa tvealo fede KOD 2, ue Dip cost) codtook. and ast oe ORU COUT as wel ser fosing thoi fads ihe aso enipher raps tom he codebook, ed instuciors orig a0 emcee epee in cat of compromise ofthe elt stems. Te te, non ne Vena werd ‘stte-Petamo Energncy Syste gare US-UK cpt sban dea of how te Renan eed to pl and systems, o moran fan opetins®” Some tai planet and eter ext ws ho ken a samo. Anstermporant ing, OD Ise bythe NRVD er sevice sc Woops Red een sla bythe Pans dig mtr operon on be Kaelin on So, te Fina «san alt Petsamo nd elewhee. Photocopies went the Geman and probaly th apnese The Swedes gt hel copies n 944. Ts material formed aa inportan cnt tthe Seta Forster 247 group. Whe he ish ook oer ts soutr in 946, ey toe ge cops of fe Fexamo mei sd ped mre cops along te Ainge Hal. Dug 194, Ne OSS tacesngClA predecessor orga, which (she OSS) ad iafrted te Sella Paar toop starting i 944 154, ia got omef hs matral Howevee he ea story ths a 148, TICOM bad areal sane al oft zd more in hel swes through te Goman Sign enters teams sing Geman potas of te ‘ata rg kes by the Pans (or maybe he Geman hemselves) Peano. (0n29ep1944,L Randolph Higgsof the US Emtass in Stocolm erly me with Flash Colonel Hatanaa oa sot the appre cplabliy of our cles ad pes cpt Ste Depart systema, Inamemoradum concerning at eeting Higgs weet, "(e) were on crea sal meso Sy thing reqsting ny sar actin on tpt the Unie Ses orto gre sy any naton ‘futing our ce which Co Hausa didnot Gemoostate jon all ows he ea) ad” The Fan ‘Stun gave Mr gg an earls and Migs eponeu™ The te Fes had cen ret ded nth orkon raking ou sips by carlessnesson cr parte preparation msgs or eka) we were constant putig formation In clpers hey tad aieady broken regarding meseges now ciphers, fcr whch they cad “eat new ones, is peneralcondence nib decode ayo our mesages atime they wane, Suggests ry song ta te do just at “The sens might tno 3 ook ssi ca ora eee pt, Te ast wd he Caner wou have he sae eon steteck Gers sno ve ook) ado cos ys ehh ae om hem. Nan Yona Reaper set Syst tes erty ne bn apn esol Sv Aas la nse ng neve ces ls Smt efenceaan Stmesrrbe sa bcp toner es es ‘Nachle att 0 Sepenter inte CH Cac Het Some, Agnes teh st FOP_SECRET_UMBRA-—FOP-SEERET-UMBRAT UL THE ILL SMIIHLERA No. 1948-1946 Mostof thir efforts he pointed out, were naturally exerted on Soviet codes, of whic he claimed they had broken over a thousand. He exibited convincing specimens oftheir work on Soviet codes. (One day in eatly November Colonel Harold Hayes, chief of Sigit operations at Arlington Hall, old Lt Paavo Carlson (whose earer personnel recutng duties are described in Chapter Il to immedistely report to the Pentagon for 8 meeting with Carter W. Clarke. AL that time Carlson was Working on the Finish problem for Ms, Arold Duney. Colonel Clarke told him he would be going Stockholm Tw acta an interpreter Clitke said that he would be met there by Colonel Raines, the U.S, Miltary Atache to Sweden and his assistant, Major Robert Woo, but Carlson was not o show that he already knew bot of ther. By coincidence, he hed worked for them when they were, respectively, the G-2and assistant G-2 at Fist Army Headquarters, Governor's Island.®® Clarke then sent him 1 the State Deparment where he was given a new background identity, as a State Department employee who had graduated from the University of Alsbama (rather than his actual scheol, Clemson). He ened his tre name, however” “The nextday Carson and State Depariment eyplographic exper Paul E,Goldsberry flew out of Andrews AFB, eventually reaching Stockholm ater layovers in Iceland and Prestwik, where Count Bernadott joined the Might, ‘Starting on 16 November 1944, Lt Calon and Paul E, Goldsberry began questioning Finnish Sigint personnel, In commenting on their report dated 23 November, Mr. Higgs ofthe U.S. Embassy made this fmportant remark (he had been a the sessions to ‘Atno time did we receive any Russian cade material nor did we ask for any from the Finns ‘The Carlson/Goldsbery report, which bears no letterhead or subject line (and no signatures, only intial) descriped in some detail how the Finns had exploited US. Dip systems and that they and the Germans were exploiting many other Allied and Neutal systems to0. ‘The Finns denied that they had given anything to the Japanese! Carlson and Geldsberry summarized some of the comments the Finns made about their work on Rssian systems: Russian diplomatic codes are unbreatable—eaid they used a block of cipher groups and enciphered plain tet only once an each group. Captain Pale (a Finish officer] sated hat collaboration with Germany consisted of exchange of information regarding Russia. Jus erough to bean ally. Stated you have to ‘give a litle and take alle’ Entire (Finnish) organization 1000-1200 people of which greater part worked on Russian military and navel odes with such success that they were able to break a new cade within to ‘weeks after is frst appearance. Sa SEs pte mtn es stam et Sposa proetrtacety rea tet a ae a eee es Se SSS San eee arcermeramen sires ‘Geemarc ah epee Univer Abana gs ee in corer wile etbings Soe SER ee ce cemeteries Seaghia ial Somuteatenroapesciate acm can aane 32—TOP_-SECRETUMBRA- (UL THE BILL SMITH. ERA NOV 1988-1946 He broached thesubjectof some of their experts going othe United States where their analytical ability could be put to ust Interestingly enough, Paavo Carlson's most vivid memory of these meetings concerned German, not Russian, material. He reslled how OSS officer Wi Tikander opened a suitcase filled with U.S. currency and Ihanded it over to the Fins, in exchange fora German Enigma machine with the whecis.® “The Stella Polaris Finish) group continued o make overtures to the British and Americans during the last _yar ofthe war, eventually becoming, as stated, the British Source 267 re-located to Pars. Apparently they did indeed sth legend hast, sell Russian codcbooks to the OSS“ In January 1945, the Swedes returned fo the Russian controled government of Finland some ofthe material that had been brought ou by the Finish Sigint Service, Nothing of import was returned, unless it had fist been copied. The OSS view ofthe Stella Polaris _roup as that (On the basis ofthe record and of inside information which indicated more or less complete ppenctration of the Finnish resistance—ond of Stella Polaris itself—by Soviet and Soviet-controlled Finnish agents, [OSS] rejected these overtures and restricted itself to the ‘counter espionage coverage and United positive imelligence exploitation of the group's facilites througe our own agents within it! Inamemo of 11 Oc: 1946, the Army G-2 gave the Director of Central Intelligence an appraisal ofthe Sela Polaris/Source 267 material and some background, concluding that most ofthe material had already become available trough TICOM-—but that it was wel to keep this emigre Finish Sigint group occupied lest they sell ut to another party: (One final noteon th: OSS and Russian material. We know that General Wiliam Donovan, chief ofthe OSS, ‘with the approval of President Roosevelt, entered into negotiations and an exchange agreement withthe KGB conceming operations against Nazi Germany. According to General Deane, the head of the US. military mmission to Moscow, who acted as Donovan's liaison to the KGB, the OSS gave the Russians a considerable ‘amount of information (and ofcourse gotlitteinretura) including some documentary proof thatthe Germans nad broken certain Russian codes (which seems o bea separate episode from the November 1944 purchases “Ta chm a Set apy ft ee oe Nido A ‘Sthau ures, Calan a secon tc acc wiht Fs shat usa cypnphy. Hebelwed a hwesns tetaned wo cleats te Suet eer wer at pent. Twat ml Ce Rls seamed te ch. Cane, Srercssigcmensnen ahs mc mae oy Ser hy Gera ‘BS Sues Winn y dey Fi (asic Bons Now Yor, 196). ave st ned Sm soweesr tev eased (OSs thera ay Nan). ly, Sey ny “a Nowe OS Scr ws lon npr yom sch wre omsur Save milry Gicanes ety Deer O85 Seidl che 30 page Sve! ata ‘ict ya lm osnvex” Aeon Gecembs, Deo ean Roses tte a cee a ‘eps sos en eh oc he Sa nd War Donen” Tes poppe sea an eed ‘Rss nerf Seca aie Setine. We wl doar sae ag hcp on KORGRU penton ie OSS. We i hc OS er ech Wa exEMED OH SECRET EMBRA-“FOP-SEEREF-UMBRA- (i THe BIL SME ERA NOY 3943-1046 in Stockholm for which se footnote 40). This affair remains murky even today, and we canot be certain just ‘what crypt material Donovan showed the KGB:* ‘The TICOM came intcexistence under the auspices ofthe Chiefs of Staff ofthe US and UK. Mr. FH. (later Professor) Hinsley of GC&CS often chaired meetingsof the commie." Colonel George Biche, an Alington Hall veteran, and General Eisenhower's senior Sigint officer inthe European Theater, was the senior US. representative. The purpose of TICOM, as mentioned earlier, was he recovery and study of German Sigint and cryptographic materials to seize important records and equipment, destroy What coud not be taken, destoy ‘German Sigit capability detain and interrogate key German cxyptoiogc personnel. Todo all hs, the US and UK formed TICOM team composed of military andnaval intelligence people who were to receive Support rom local commanders, Some of the early plans ofthe committee now seem abt fanciful, fr example, the plat use five US. Amy infanty battalions to seize German cryptologic centers in Besin. Eventually, some six oint TICOM teams were established. The team composition, and team numbers changed from time to time, which occasionally makes it difficult to sort out who was doing what, Some well known NSA people were cn those teams, including (with thei 1944/45 ranks): Lt. Oliver Kisby, Lt. Arthur J Levenson, 1 Arthur Lewis, Lt. James K. Lively, Lt Selmer Norland, T/Sgt George Vergine and Lt.Col. Paul E. Neff also Major William P. Bundy of that family famous in higher government ctces. ‘Team3,previously known as Team 5, under the command of Lt. Co Paul Neff, assisted by Lt. Col. Geolfey H. Evans, Intelligence Comps, British Army, found the Russian materia of greatest interest fo the Venona story. ‘Other members of that eam included Major Bundy, Captain Duncan McIntyre, Major R.W. Adams, Sergeants FAA. Marx, and. Lorar, and Cp. Schnabel, all ofthe US. Army (all ETOUSA Sigiat people). Major Caddick acted as courier and LL. Sibling coordinated wansporation. Some others probably were on the team: ‘esiofenfos atime EO etapa’ dc: omens iste Dope Se ee ee dd { Seeticoath Fe Rear of ICOM TEAM 3,8 June 145 Ca va Bh Army. pei the po Mew Mason, (chi acto Vener ce I sty a Ta ee ei Resa ac Hey, Loe ave me ‘Spy oases The ten leo id py NA espe st —POP-SECRET-UMBRA-Major watt Pound, First US. Army, visited te cise at Burgscheidungen, hereafter Burg, sear Naumberg, Saxony-Anhalt in east-central Germany, anata that was about tobe tuned over to the Russians according fo the agreement ox ‘Allied zones (the war sting for about 2 weeks after this date). He spoke tothe owner of the east, with “Miss Friedrichs and Me. Rohrbach of the German Foreign Office present 1 asist i the conversations. Friedrichs, was reluctant to discuss the official duties that she had been carrying out atthe castle. Lt. Fena 8TOP-SPERET-UMBIA (UL THE BILL SMILE. NOV. 1948-1040 ‘retuned afew days ater te demand more information and learned that Friedrchs and Rohybach had been with 4 cryptologic unit of the German Foreign Office working atthe castle. Fenn obtained basic information about their work and the records, and then warned them that they would be executed if the les were disturbed prior to US. inspection. Lt. Fenn’s information about Burg reached Colonel Cleaves, Signal Officer V Corps. Cleaves telephoned Colonel Bicher. A guard detachment from the 102nd Cavalry Regiment then secured the castle ‘TICOM Team 3 left Pars in automobiles on 25 April driving to Bung via Verdun, Wiesbaden, Weimar and [Naumburg resching the cestle on 27 April. They ound that Burg had been e principal eryptanalytic center for the Sigint clement of the German Foreign Office, wih records intact and key personnel waiting around to be ‘questioned —undovbtedly telieved thatthe Americans and British had gotten there before the Russian. The team worked atthe castle and nearby Sigint-related facilites for ewo weeks, inventorying the material, packing itand questioning the Gemans. Security was particularly important, because the Russians were expected 10 arrive soon, Lt Col Neff aranged the evacuation, to Marburg inthe American zone, of ll Germans who might have been in contact with the tam inthe Burg area. Equipment, records and people were flown out of anearby airfield on 7 May, on 9 May a truck convoy took out the rest ofthe people and material. On VE Day (8 My) engineers from the U.S, 104h Infantry Division blew up the German machine processing equipment. ‘The Neff/Evans tam shipped the contents of 73 tel filecabinets. ‘The Bug cache included 300,00 pages ‘of material, Major John Seaman, Arlington Hall's chet representative to GC&CS, advised headquarters that the haul included "some “Sill Smith’ material". Smith was at that time stil heading the Russian problem.” ‘Some of the tum’s material, shipped to GC&CS for study, was microfilmed and set on to Arlington Hall rather ‘quickly, none ofthe messages concerning the Burg material we read, “Seaman is sending much ‘Bill Smith” ‘materials inanother messege Smith asks Seaman to microfilm material of interestio him, andina 25 une report ‘we earn that Arlington Hall had recsived “further material for Bill Smith”, probably picked upby Oliver Kitby wo weeks earier®” “RENAARo tit NSA Arty CHOK leo TOMA ih SA CCOMMA et Boe sone ICONMA fe 56Li ‘Army Sig fears In UK, 189. Olver Ky (tom gh), BI Bundy ta gh) and ‘tur Levnwon (So On 10 June 1945, Lt. Oliver Kiby, a US. Amy Sigint officer, temporarily serving with British Naval Intelligence detachment 12 A/TICOM Team 6 discovered more Russian cryptographic material! Kirby had been commissioned thrugh ROTC upon his graduation from the University of Ilinois.* In 1943 he went to the UK as part ofthe 613th Signal Security Detwchment (Provisional), an Arlington Hall fed operating unit ‘that had been formed o pve the U.S. a greater role in working German Enigma trafic Most Amy personnel ‘detailed tothe TICOM eams came from that unit, One of Kirby's TICOM assignments was to interrogate Dr. Roeder who had been a member of the German Foreign Office Cryptanalytic organization that Lt. Colone] [Neff'steam had expoite Roeder wasbpeing eld t Schloss Glucksberg in Schleswig near the old Danish own of Flensburg. Me. Kisbyhas preserved his notes from that meeting (which he made onthe back of a poem written by a British officer): 7 Goma Aad Ms RXV. nomi tonne Oe iy ints, INES es ang Aton al 92 wee ret wi hee smi gh ROTC. A umber te Ferd Gout eed Smee om cy 10 Oe Sl Cape Ot Cane Sa (OCS ped a (gives ote Sg Seay Agcy. ey ew pr liar set Artg it fan ‘Sc umacea sty oy Sige ne epee mt compe, Calnel Geog Rc Aingon Hal eran thee eplope ene Cupene Teel Cyrene 1942104 emanate Sil lcigce Dra enn ‘trot Ay HS ETOUSAL wan 59 yon Seta Ln, -ETOUSA woe posta cil nd tng pnt, fad +e poeig clean eee soma ne hie UG ‘Ring al ond he Sige hat wu in Pre eats ac aso pa al Goede in, ‘Sense SID-ETOUSA "he buh sine opine er coms scene Cloel Bet wa US ‘TCoM pcm Tae 13s mesh ie Br nen ey Pa 37 POR-SECRET-UMBRA-b. woed pre: oh ee eee ie Paes ‘liver Kirby sncte upon recovering Russian ip codecook, nar Fensburp, 10 June 198. H, Doktor Roeder Juni 10 1945 ‘Near Flesb,, will pick up... At Schloss, fo bring away from Schloss. Papers to Major. ‘Code Book - copy caputed Petsamo. Used by [Germans] 1 read Larshp te. No fe. avail. Doli. thinks sil is use. Sent thru Navy channels, Add. for WDC. Quicker and OK. Sent ms. for N. Reps. Dok. R. in Flas. Mil—same a Fricke Kirby bad found a photocopy of Code 26, the Russian consular codebook taken at Petsamo in 1961, Note ‘Dr Roeder’s claim tha th Germans ead this diplomatic system. This seems unlikely unless the Germans had key pads or had successfully worked Code 26 material enciphered in other than one time pad (such as the Emergency System). Kitby put the material in approved Navy channels and it was own back to the US., probably via London. In later reports from Msjor Seaman and his successor Captain CP. Collins we see the TICOM inventory numbers that had been assigned tothe material and can therefore identify items that were later used forthe ‘Venooa exploitation, T-1014 and T-1015 were, respectively, the GRU (naval) codebook and the KGB codebook for system[———] Seaman describes these as “System TB Petsamo 1941” material and as ‘iby inde spec mins gti, Ine, es oy Mae ier orga se Rann one ioe Resa Snes ade ene putes wba fr Garman so yo eponey hates tows we. aed ce Wiel Pensbng oak rss tho tn ed tan commutes Aste rove ep beeing lace te ‘fcr poop femal nes bs us or rape nce ed sealed gan aa. Hon hi ep ‘Sins tet cxper vet ynm era contre: wah Thea Fay. He i err own ie goth Gola VE etentvon uc atc es heen ouingpese Kip name tte Raya tras? Ambo Asa Ua ASG) spond ba fase ce ae ss -FOP-SEEREP-UMBRAFOP-SEERET-UMBRA- UL THE BILL SMOTHL ERS NOV 1083-1048 “charred fragments of Russian 4/F Dip! codebook’"S® He and Collins also meation the filming of T-961 and ‘T-3345 (actully identeal items) which were later identified as KOD 14, used by the NKVD rear area tops, and TICOM 1 to 7,911 and 14. TICOM 10, apparently included inthe foregoing was KOD 26, the consular code only partially burned inthe evacuation of Petsama 3° iis this material, mostly recovered by TICOM Team 3, and by Lt. Kiby, that hasbeen the basis for many ‘Venona legends, such a that the breakthrough came about because ofa charred Russian codebook recovered from the batlefield, bythe OSS or by the Finns ad given of sold tothe OSS aad etc? Some ofthe material is charred and te circumstances ofthe recovery are indeed intresting, but for atlefield we have to substitute ' classified trash fire atthe Soviet Consulate in Petsamo and a collection sta caste in eastern Germany, and for OSS read TICOM Tram 3, Olver Kinby (and the Fins, Stella Polaris/Source 267). Meredith Gardner, who ‘was the frst person to recognize the KGB nature off ater told Bab Lamphere ofthe FBI that the codebook that he (Gardner) used to make the breakthrougi Baden found onabatlefield and had bullethole init. Meredith late told me tat he was referring toa matk that looked like abullethoe but certainly wasn’t. ‘Weare getting ahead ofthe story, but the book that Meredith was using was the aforemeationed KOD 14, which he studied to lear possible KGB codebook vocabulary and just to see what a Russian codebook looked like. Iwasnota Venona system, and did not lead to the frst Venona break, Which was accomplished by bookbreaking without the benefit of te relevant bo ]Pages 86 and 87 ofthe KOD 14 book (which I've only seen in photocopy) do indeed show a roURT, BUT Tega, black mark probably an in bit. ‘Soon after the TICOM teams had been deployed tothe field, the U.S. snd UK made arrangements to ‘cooperate on the Russian problem. The US. used this development to further the process of Army-Navy Sigint ‘consolidation tha ill led to the creation of AFSA aud then NSA. In July 1945, Captain Joseph Weager of OP-20-G and General Preston Corderman, head of the Arlington Hall operation (Soon to change its ‘organizational name from Signal Security Agency, SSA tothe Army Security Agency, ASA) agred tha liaison with the British on Ratan, the codename for the Russian problem, would be under the auspices ofthe joint ‘Army-Navy Communzations inligenee Coordinating Commitee (ANCICC) rather then individually be cach sevice EXEMET "Bens Soman 09 SSA, 17 hy 1945 SA Aries CBOK 7 ‘8 TheSeman so Cains panaae inte NGA ces re Ral ep Hea a en wt ct ne ody, Me Lo Main, GCHO ai ae a Mes Wenger o OF 0 is aly 748, REA Archives w CBONGS in foes “BouboeScas Manly Reps ud Reed Daceneas” xem ofan toot fapr alo Cnr Poa, Eo FOR SECRET ENB R ASec Frank Rowlt wit stat 145 Bt Sith top row, 2nd rom ht Maurice Kinng ne ow, British and American cooperation on the Russian problem developed very quickly as outlined below in seties of quotes and extracs from ANCICC (ater called STANCICC, with State Department added to Aray and Navy) Bourbon progress reports. One interesting US-UK policy item, before we catalog the Bourbon evolution: it became apparent early Om that the U.S. would no longer conceal from the British is work on Russian Dip and would wilingly share not only “act of" but also technical details. Edward Christopher and later Cecil Phillips would be sent tothe UK to further this process. But once Arlington Hall discovered what vas inthe tratfic—that twas not Dip but espionage traffic—a U.S. eyes-only policy would again be imposed, though briefly and probably not very effectively. A story for later sections of this study, ‘The Bourbon highlights: +7 Aug 1945. Major Seaman authorized to open negotiations with the British — first step to negotiate for immediate complete exchange of traffic, status of solutions, technical materials, techniques. Seaman to sugges to British that the codeword Bourboa replace Rattan. “+ Seaman had leanedon 5 Aug that British had only 3or 4 months worth of Russian Dip traffic; no cable traffic to/from London but collection would begin + 8 Aug 1945. Washingon to send Major Saman additional information on Russian Dip systems with ‘proposal that US-UK exebange beck traffic on microfilm + 15 Aug 1945. Artington Hall and Navy have identified 35 Russian systems, ofthese 6 were Dip and 2 ‘of these in process of solution: depth of overlaps limited to two. TICOM has made clear that Russians use one time pads to encipher codes. Other than Dip all US intercept from Russian Far Eastern nes ‘15 Aug 1945. Sir Edward Travis, head of GCHO “has confirmed our proposal that cooperation on ‘Bourbon i to be complete, though informal”, Travis has given Major Seaman access to all UK Bourbon materia. « ~FOP-SEERET-UMBRAT+ Sep 1945. Discusion of further exchange of liaison officers + 16 0c: 1945, US liaison officers touring sll British field stations, + 16Nov 1945. Coptain CP. Collins to relieve Major Seaman and MEd Christopher to relieve Mr Frank Lewis for Bourboa liaison at GCHO. + Lan 1946, Arangements for exchanging ll Bourbon translations including back material + 16 Mar 1946, US begins receiving films of Source 267 material + Throughout thispeiod, much discussion of Russian machine ciphers (ilitaryINKVD) + 27 June 1946. Bourbon lisison has been removed from special category, hati, the general Russian Sigint problem no longer a special compartment — Venona s000 woud be eompartenied In the mids of al his, “wired the GCHO representatives inthe US as Immediate, 23 Sep 1945: RCM have in cusiody a cypher clerk from office of Soviet Miltary Atache. He has already _provided some ssefalerypo information. Canadians have agreed, at our request that he should be interrogated at once by American affcenifAmericans will consent. We consider his information wil probably be of considerable assistance ifhe's interrogated on technical matters by an office fully versed in erypto problem involved. Americansagre to send an officer (and Canadians ask haitbe restricted one ony), please arrange that hesontats Stephenson in New York who will hand kim over to oppropriate contact in Canado. Tis is necessary 1 avoid erssing lines with FB. Stephenson is steering FBI interrogations it Canada clear of erypto matters. ‘A follow-up messe the same day gave some crypt intelligence thatthe defector bad provided in preliminary debriefings. The message specified thatthe pont of entct for the U.S. would be Sir Wiliam Stephenson, head of Bris Secret Service operations in the Wester Hemisphere 1940-45 (sometimesrefered to a5 “Itrepi) ‘The ANCICC leared the next day from Group Captain Jones, 8 GCHO lsison office, of the foreging. “After clearance fom 20-G, Cominch, and G-2 was obtained, it was agreed that it might be profitable and nt too dangerous to take acvantageof the opportunity to have an Army officer interrogate the clerk." Lt, Colonel Frank B. Rowlett depirted Washington, in civilian clothes, on 25 September 1945, to question Li. Igor Gouzenko, the GRU cxde clerk who had defected, The KGB almost aught Gouzenko, and after he got away KGB officers using crowbars broke into his apartment, but were tuned away bythe police. As we woul later learn inthe eventual decryption of one ofthe most famous Venons messages, Kim Philby had alered KGB {London upon leering of « message from Stephenson to "C" announcing the defection. 1. Gouzenko, Bente, Chambers andthe Anonymous Letter A stunning series af elosely spaced counterintllgence event took place in 1945:0n 10 May the FBI had conducted & serious, al-day interogaton of Whitaker Chambers at his Time. magazine office (Chambers ‘air atempts fo tel ll had gone astay inthe hands of A.A. Bere and Director Hoover); Gouzenko of the ‘GRU defected in Septanber; Bizabeth Bentley, a veteran KGB office, gave the FBI a 107 pag statement in 6-FOP-SEERET-UMBRAT Uh TH BLL. STH ERA 1088-1946 November. And forthe past wo years the FBI had been studying an anonymous letter, from a KGB (or just, possibly GRU) officer. A incredible amount of information became availble on Soviet espionage inthe United Statesbut wit very litle documentation to Back it up. Whitaker Chambers had saved a few papers that would help convit Alger Hiss; Gouzenko had alot of papers on Canadian, bl not American pies; Bentley, ‘with the most fo tel, had only her recollections. Venona would eventually provide the missing documentation and identify many more spies. rank Rowlett spent several days questioning Igor Gouzenko, codenamed “Corby”, and the following paragraps are based on Ms "Special Report on Bourbon Cryptography Reprton Inerogation of Corby", ated 15 October 1945. Rowlett earned that Gouzenko had gone tothe RCMP ola 10 Sep 1945, in fear of being called back othe Soviet Union because he tad committed a serious security violation. He had fist tried to go to Canadian newspapers with his story of Russian espionage but had been turned vay (Russian trade official Kravehenko hd “defected to the New York press i 1944, reasoning that by going public he would be protected. We will see in Venona how the KGB and theit American agent tried to track him down.) He then tried the Justice ry bul was again gebufed, Finally, the RCMP took otectve custody (alo wife and young sn). TRowiet drove to an Folated,lakenide summer cabin some 90 miles from Ottawa where Gouzenko was under guard. The Rowlet party included Professor Gilbert Robinsoa, a wartime Canadian Sigint officer, Inspector Leopold of the RCMP and a driver. (Robinson had conducted the preliminary questioning of ‘Gouzenko on eryptologc maticrs— Gouzeako had given names of spies and supporting papers to the Secret ‘Service, RCMP and FEL) Rowlett learned that Russian cryptography, inthe external affairs area could be

You might also like

• Her Body and Other Parties: Stories

  

  From Everand

  Her Body and Other Parties: Stories

  Carmen Maria Machado

  Rating: 4 out of 5 stars

  4/5 (822)
• The Sympathizer: A Novel (Pulitzer Prize for Fiction)

  

  From Everand

  The Sympathizer: A Novel (Pulitzer Prize for Fiction)

  Viet Thanh Nguyen

  Rating: 4.5 out of 5 stars

  4.5/5 (122)
• A Man Called Ove: A Novel

  

  From Everand

  A Man Called Ove: A Novel

  Fredrik Backman

  Rating: 4.5 out of 5 stars

  4.5/5 (4610)
• • Magazines
  • Podcasts
  • Sheet music
• A Heartbreaking Work Of Staggering Genius: A Memoir Based on a True Story

  

  From Everand

  A Heartbreaking Work Of Staggering Genius: A Memoir Based on a True Story

  Dave Eggers

  Rating: 3.5 out of 5 stars

  3.5/5 (231)
• Rise of ISIS: A Threat We Can't Ignore

  

  From Everand

  Rise of ISIS: A Threat We Can't Ignore

  Jay Sekulow

  Rating: 3.5 out of 5 stars

  3.5/5 (137)
• Team of Rivals: The Political Genius of Abraham Lincoln

  

  From Everand

  Team of Rivals: The Political Genius of Abraham Lincoln

  Doris Kearns Goodwin

  Rating: 4.5 out of 5 stars

  4.5/5 (234)
• Sing, Unburied, Sing: A Novel

  

  From Everand

  Sing, Unburied, Sing: A Novel

  Jesmyn Ward

  Rating: 4 out of 5 stars

  4/5 (1104)
• On Fire: The (Burning) Case for a Green New Deal

  

  From Everand

  On Fire: The (Burning) Case for a Green New Deal

  Naomi Klein

  Rating: 4 out of 5 stars

  4/5 (74)
• The Perks of Being a Wallflower

  

  From Everand

  The Perks of Being a Wallflower

  Stephen Chbosky

  Rating: 4.5 out of 5 stars

  4.5/5 (2104)
• Fear: Trump in the White House

  

  From Everand

  Fear: Trump in the White House

  Bob Woodward

  Rating: 3.5 out of 5 stars

  3.5/5 (738)
• The Yellow House: A Memoir (2019 National Book Award Winner)

  

  From Everand

  The Yellow House: A Memoir (2019 National Book Award Winner)

  Sarah M. Broom

  Rating: 4 out of 5 stars

  4/5 (98)
• Brooklyn: A Novel

  

  From Everand

  Brooklyn: A Novel

  Colm Tóibín

  Rating: 3.5 out of 5 stars

  3.5/5 (1947)
• Devil in the Grove: Thurgood Marshall, the Groveland Boys, and the Dawn of a New America

  

  From Everand

  Devil in the Grove: Thurgood Marshall, the Groveland Boys, and the Dawn of a New America

  Gilbert King

  Rating: 4.5 out of 5 stars

  4.5/5 (266)
• Yes Please

  

  From Everand

  Yes Please

  Amy Poehler

  Rating: 4 out of 5 stars

  4/5 (1898)
• Shoe Dog: A Memoir by the Creator of Nike

  

  From Everand

  Shoe Dog: A Memoir by the Creator of Nike

  Phil Knight

  Rating: 4.5 out of 5 stars

  4.5/5 (540)
• The Unwinding: An Inner History of the New America

  

  From Everand

  The Unwinding: An Inner History of the New America

  George Packer

  Rating: 4 out of 5 stars

  4/5 (45)
• Bad Feminist: Essays

  

  From Everand

  Bad Feminist: Essays

  Roxane Gay

  Rating: 4 out of 5 stars

  4/5 (1018)
• A Tree Grows in Brooklyn

  

  From Everand

  A Tree Grows in Brooklyn

  Betty Smith

  Rating: 4.5 out of 5 stars

  4.5/5 (1929)
• John Adams

  

  From Everand

  John Adams

  David McCullough

  Rating: 4.5 out of 5 stars

  4.5/5 (2409)
• The World Is Flat 3.0: A Brief History of the Twenty-first Century

  

  From Everand

  The World Is Flat 3.0: A Brief History of the Twenty-first Century

  Thomas L. Friedman

  Rating: 3.5 out of 5 stars

  3.5/5 (2259)
• Manhattan Beach: A Novel

  

  From Everand

  Manhattan Beach: A Novel

  Jennifer Egan

  Rating: 3.5 out of 5 stars

  3.5/5 (792)
• Wolf Hall: A Novel

  

  From Everand

  Wolf Hall: A Novel

  Hilary Mantel

  Rating: 4 out of 5 stars

  4/5 (3811)
• The Emperor of All Maladies: A Biography of Cancer

  

  From Everand

  The Emperor of All Maladies: A Biography of Cancer

  Siddhartha Mukherjee

  Rating: 4.5 out of 5 stars

  4.5/5 (271)
• Hidden Figures: The American Dream and the Untold Story of the Black Women Mathematicians Who Helped Win the Space Race

  

  From Everand

  Hidden Figures: The American Dream and the Untold Story of the Black Women Mathematicians Who Helped Win the Space Race

  Margot Lee Shetterly

  Rating: 4 out of 5 stars

  4/5 (897)
• The Woman in Cabin 10

  

  From Everand

  The Woman in Cabin 10

  Ruth Ware

  Rating: 3.5 out of 5 stars

  3.5/5 (2521)
• Grit: The Power of Passion and Perseverance

  

  From Everand

  Grit: The Power of Passion and Perseverance

  Angela Duckworth

  Rating: 4 out of 5 stars

  4/5 (590)
• The Outsider: A Novel

  

  From Everand

  The Outsider: A Novel

  Stephen King

  Rating: 4 out of 5 stars

  4/5 (1850)
• Elon Musk: Tesla, SpaceX, and the Quest for a Fantastic Future

  

  From Everand

  Elon Musk: Tesla, SpaceX, and the Quest for a Fantastic Future

  Ashlee Vance

  Rating: 4.5 out of 5 stars

  4.5/5 (474)
• The Light Between Oceans: A Novel

  

  From Everand

  The Light Between Oceans: A Novel

  M.L. Stedman

  Rating: 4.5 out of 5 stars

  4.5/5 (789)
• The Art of Racing in the Rain: A Novel

  

  From Everand

  The Art of Racing in the Rain: A Novel

  Garth Stein

  Rating: 4 out of 5 stars

  4/5 (4203)
• The Little Book of Hygge: Danish Secrets to Happy Living

  

  From Everand

  The Little Book of Hygge: Danish Secrets to Happy Living

  Meik Wiking

  Rating: 3.5 out of 5 stars

  3.5/5 (401)
• The Glass Castle: A Memoir

  

  From Everand

  The Glass Castle: A Memoir

  Jeannette Walls

  Rating: 4.5 out of 5 stars

  4.5/5 (1716)
• Principles: Life and Work

  

  From Everand

  Principles: Life and Work

  Ray Dalio

  Rating: 4 out of 5 stars

  4/5 (608)
• The Subtle Art of Not Giving a F*ck: A Counterintuitive Approach to Living a Good Life

  

  From Everand

  The Subtle Art of Not Giving a F*ck: A Counterintuitive Approach to Living a Good Life

  Mark Manson

  Rating: 4 out of 5 stars

  4/5 (5810)
• Angela's Ashes: A Memoir

  

  From Everand

  Angela's Ashes: A Memoir

  Frank McCourt

  Rating: 4.5 out of 5 stars

  4.5/5 (441)
• The Hard Thing About Hard Things: Building a Business When There Are No Easy Answers

  

  From Everand

  The Hard Thing About Hard Things: Building a Business When There Are No Easy Answers

  Ben Horowitz

  Rating: 4.5 out of 5 stars

  4.5/5 (348)
• The Constant Gardener: A Novel

  

  From Everand

  The Constant Gardener: A Novel

  John le Carré

  Rating: 3.5 out of 5 stars

  3.5/5 (104)
• Little Women

  

  From Everand

  Little Women

  Louisa May Alcott

  Rating: 4 out of 5 stars

  4/5 (104)
• Never Split the Difference: Negotiating As If Your Life Depended On It

  

  From Everand

  Never Split the Difference: Negotiating As If Your Life Depended On It

  Chris Voss

  Rating: 4.5 out of 5 stars

  4.5/5 (844)
• The Gifts of Imperfection: Let Go of Who You Think You're Supposed to Be and Embrace Who You Are

  

  From Everand

  The Gifts of Imperfection: Let Go of Who You Think You're Supposed to Be and Embrace Who You Are

  Brené Brown

  Rating: 4 out of 5 stars

  4/5 (1092)
• Steve Jobs

  

  From Everand

  Steve Jobs

  Walter Isaacson

  Rating: 4.5 out of 5 stars

  4.5/5 (807)
• U.S. Department of Justice: Washington, D.C. 20535

  

  Document4 pages

  U.S. Department of Justice: Washington, D.C. 20535

  MBest

  No ratings yet
• FBI Compliance With FOIA

  

  Document82 pages

  FBI Compliance With FOIA

  MBest

  No ratings yet
• Picciotto, Concepcion

  

  Document60 pages

  Picciotto, Concepcion

  MBest

  No ratings yet
• Casolaro Autopsy

  

  Document20 pages

  Casolaro Autopsy

  MBest

  100% (1)
• Trump, John G

  

  Document16 pages

  Trump, John G

  MBest

  No ratings yet
• Leary FBI File CIA-CACTUS Excerpts

  

  Document6 pages

  Leary FBI File CIA-CACTUS Excerpts

  MBest

  No ratings yet
• Crile, George

  

  Document18 pages

  Crile, George

  MBest

  No ratings yet
• Grashiem Interview

  

  Document8 pages

  Grashiem Interview

  MBest

  No ratings yet
• Khalifa, Rashad

  

  Document23 pages

  Khalifa, Rashad

  MBest

  No ratings yet
• Shockley, William Bradford

  

  Document96 pages

  Shockley, William Bradford

  MBest

  No ratings yet
• Hanssen Affidavit

  

  Document103 pages

  Hanssen Affidavit

  MBest

  No ratings yet