G.R. No. 127240. March 27, 2000.

* showing of any flaw or irregularity that may cast doubt on the authenticity of these
ONG CHIA, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
Naturalization; Evidence; Pleadings and Practice; Formal Offer of Evidence;
Judgments; The rule on formal offer of evidence (Rule 132, 34) is clearly not
applicable to a petition for naturalization; Decisions in naturalization proceedings are
not covered by the rule on res judicata.Petitioner failed to note Rule 143 of the
Rules of Court which provides thatThese rules shall not apply to land registration,
cadastral and election cases, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other
cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and
whenever practicable and convenient. (Emphasis added) Prescinding from the above,
the rule on formal offer of evidence (Rule 132, 34) now being invoked by petitioner is
clearly not applicable to the present case involving a petition for naturalization. The
only instance when said rules may be applied by analogy or suppletorily in such cases
is when it is practicable and convenient. That is not the case here, since reliance
upon the documents presented by the State for the first time on appeal, in fact,
appears to be the more practical and convenient course of action considering that
decisions in naturalization proceedings are not covered by the rule on res judicata.
Consequently, a final favorable judgment does not preclude the State from later on
moving for a revocation of the grant of naturalization on the basis of the same
documents.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The reason for the rule prohibiting the admission of
evidence which has not been formally offered is to afford the opposite party the
chance to object to their admissibility.Petitioner claims that as a result of the failure
of the State to present and formally offer its documentary evidence before the trial
court, he was denied the right to object against their authenticity, effectively depriving
him of his fundamental right to procedural due process. We are not persuaded.
Indeed, the reason for the rule prohibiting the admission of evidence which has not
been formally offered is to afford the opposite party the chance to object to their
admissibility. Petitioner cannot claim that he was deprived of the right to object to the
authenticity of the documents submitted to the appellate court by the State. He could
have included his objections, as he, in fact, did, in the brief he filed with the Court of
Appeals.
documents, it is our conclusion that the appellate court did not err in relying upon
them.
Naturalization; Statutory Construction; It is settled that naturalization laws should be
rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government and against the
applicant.The above discussion would have been enough to dispose of this case,
but to settle all the issues raised, we shall briefly discuss the effect of petitioners
failure to include the address J.M. Basa St., Iloilo in his petition, in accordance with
7, CA. No. 473. This address appears on petitioners Immigrant Certificate of
Residence, a document which forms part of the records as Annex A of his 1989
petition for naturalization. Petitioner admits that he failed to mention said address in
his petition, but argues that since the Immigrant Certificate of Residence containing it
had been fully published, with the petition and the other annexes, such publication
constitutes substantial compliance with 7. This is allegedly because the publication
effectively satisfied the objective sought to be achieved by such requirement, i.e., to
give investigating agencies of the government the opportunity to check on the
background of the applicant and prevent suppression of information regarding any
possible misbehavior on his part in any community where he may have lived at one
time or another. It is settled, however, that naturalization laws should be rigidly
enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government and against the applicant.
As noted by the State, CA. No. 473, 7 clearly provides that the applicant for
naturalization shall set forth in the petition his present and former places of residence.
This provision and the rule of strict application of the law in naturalization cases defeat
petitioners argument of substantial compliance with the requirement under the
Revised Naturalization Law. On this ground alone, the instant petition ought to be
denied. Ong Chia vs. Republic, 328 SCRA 749, G.R. No. 127240 March 27, 2000

Same; Same; Public Documents; Where a party fails to make a satisfactory showing
of any flaw or irregularity that may cast doubt on the authenticity of documents which
have been executed under oath, the court may rely on them.The Court notes that
these documentsnamely, the petition in SCN Case No. 031767, petitioners
marriage contract, the joint affidavit executed by him and his wife, and petitioners
income tax returnsare all public documents. As such, they have been executed
under oath. They are thus reliable. Sinoe petitioner failed to make a satisfactory
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 127240 March 27, 2000
ONG CHIA, petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision1 of the Court of Appeals reversing the
decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Koronadal, South Cotabato2 admitting
petitioner Ong Chia to Philippine citizenship.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner was born on January 1, 1923 in Amoy, China. In 1932, as a nine-year old
boy, he arrived at the port of Manila on board the vessel "Angking." Since then, he has
stayed in the Philippines where he found employment and eventually started his own
business, married a Filipina, with whom he had four children. On July 4, 1989, at the
age of 66, he filed a verified petition to be admitted as a Filipino citizen under C.A. No.
473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, as amended. Petitioner,
after stating his qualifications as required in 2, and lack of the disqualifications
enumerated in 3 of the law, stated
17. That he has heretofore made (a) petition for citizenship under the
provisions of Letter of Instruction No. 270 with the Special Committee on
Naturalization, Office of the Solicitor General, Manila, docketed as SCN
Case No. 031776, but the same was not acted upon owing to the fact that
the said Special Committee on Naturalization was not reconstituted after the
February, 1986 revolution such that processing of petitions for naturalization
by administrative process was suspended;
During the hearings, petitioner testified as to his qualifications and presented three
witnesses to corroborate his testimony. So impressed was Prosecutor Isaac Alvero V.
Moran with the testimony of petitioner that, upon being asked by the court whether the
State intended to present any witness present any witness against him, he remarked:
Actually, Your Honor, with the testimony of the petitioner himself which is
rather surprising, in the sense that he seems to be well-versed with the
major portion of the history of the Philippines, so, on our part, we are
convinced, Your Honor Please, that petitioner really deserves to be
admitted as a citizen of the Philippines. And for this reason, we do not wish
to present any evidence to counteract or refute the testimony of the
witnesses for the petitioner, as well as the petitioner himself. 3
Accordingly, on August 25, 1999, the trial court granted the petition and admitted
petitioner to Philippine citizenship. The State, however, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, appealed all the names by which he is or had been known; (2) failed
to state all his former placer of residence in violation of C.A. No. 473, 7; (3) failed to
conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during his entire stay in the
Philippines, in violation of 2; (4) has no known lucrative trade or occupation and his
previous incomes have been insufficient or misdeclared, also in contravention of 2;
and (5) failed to support his petition with the appropriate documentary evidence.4
Annexed to the State's appellant's brief was a copy of a 1977 petition for naturalization
filed by petitioner with the Special Committee on Naturalization in SCN Case No.
031767,5 in which petitioner stated that in addition to his name of "Ong Chia," he had
likewise been known since childhood as "Loreto Chia Ong." As petitioner, however,
failed to state this other name in his 1989 petition for naturalization, it was contended
that his petition must fail.6The state also annexed income tax returns7 allegedly filed by
petitioner from 1973 to 1977 to show that his net income could hardly support himself
and his family. To prove that petitioner failed to conduct himself in a proper and
irreproachable manner during his stay in the Philippines, the State contended that,
although petitioner claimed that he and Ramona Villaruel had been married twice,
once before a judge in 1953, and then again in church in 1977, petitioner actually lived
with his wife without the benefit of marriage from 1953 until they were married in 1977.
It was alleged that petitioner failed to present his 1953 marriage contract, if there be
any. The State also annexed a copy of petitioner's 1977 marriage contract8 and a
Joint-Affidavit9 executed by petitioner and his wife. These documents show that when
petitioner married Ramona Villaruel on February 23, 1977, no marriage license had
been required in accordance with Art. 76 of the Civil Code because petitioner and
Ramona Villaruel had been living together as husband and wife since 1953 without the
benefit of marriage. This, according to the State, belies his claim that when he started
living with his wife in 1953, they had already been married.
The State also argued that, as shown by petitioner's Immigrant Certificate of
Residence, 10 petitioner resided at "J.M. Basa Street, Iloilo," but he did not include said
address in the petition.
On November 15, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision which, as already
noted, reversed the trial court and denied petitioner's application for naturalization. It
ruled that due to the importance naturalization cases, the State is not precluded from
raising questions not presented in the lower court and brought up for the first time on
appeal. 11 The appellate court held:
As correctly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General, petitioner Ong
Chia failed to state in this present petition for naturalization his other name,
"LORETO CHIA ONG," which name appeared in his previous application
under Letter of Instruction No. 270. Names and pseudonyms must be stated
in the petition for naturalization and failure to include the same militates
against a decision in his favor. . . This is a mandatory requirement to allow
those persons who know (petitioner) by those other names to come forward
and inform the authorities of any legal objection which might adversely
affect his application for citizenship.
Furthermore, Ong Chia failed to disclose in his petition for naturalization that
he formerly resided in "J.M. Basa St., Iloilo" and "Alimodian, Iloilo." Section
7 of the Revised Naturalization Law requires the applicant to state in his
petition "his present and former places of residence." This requirement is
mandatory and failure of the petitioner to comply with it is fatal to the
petition. As explained by the Court, the reason for the provision is to give the
public, as well as the investigating agencies of the government, upon the
publication of the petition, an opportunity to be informed thereof and voice
their objections against the petitioner. By failing to comply with this
provision, the petitioner is depriving the public and said agencies of such
opportunity, thus defeating the purpose of the law. . .
Ong Chia had not also conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable
manner when he lived-in with his wife for several years, and sired four
children out of wedlock. It has been the consistent ruling that the
"applicant's 8-year cohabitation with his wife without the benefit of clergy
and begetting by her three children out of wedlock is a conduct far from
being proper and irreproachable as required by the Revised Naturalization
Law", and therefore disqualifies him from becoming a citizen of the
Philippines by naturalization . . .
Lastly, petitioner Ong Chia's alleged annual income in 1961 of P5,000.00,
exclusive of bonuses, commissions and allowances, is not lucrative income.
His failure to file an income tax return "because he is not liable for income
tax yet" confirms that his income is low. . . "It is not only that the person
having the employment gets enough for his ordinary necessities in life. It
must be shown that the employment gives one an income such that there is
an appreciable margin of his income over expenses as to be able to provide
for an adequate support in the event of unemployment, sickness, or
disability to work and thus avoid one's becoming the object of charity or
public charge." . . . Now that they are in their old age, petitioner Ong Chia
and his wife are living on the allowance given to them by their children. The
monthly pension given by the elder children of the applicant cannot be
added to his income to make it lucrative because like bonuses,
commissions and allowances, said pensions are contingent, speculative and
precarious. . .
Hence, this petition based on the following assignment of errors:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
RULING THAT IN NATURALIZATION CASES, THE APPELLATE COURT
CAN DENY AN APPLICATION FOR PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP ON THE
BASIS OF DOCUMENTS NOT PRESENTED BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT
AND NOT FORMING PART OF THE RECORDS OF THE CASE.
II. THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE PETITIONER
HAS BEEN KNOWN BY SOME OTHER NAME NOT STATED IN HIS
PETITION IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.
III. CONTRARY TO THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE
PETITIONER STATED IN HIS PETITION AND ITS ANNEXES HIS
PRESENT AND FORMER PLACES OF RESIDENCE.
IV. THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE PETITIONER
FAILED TO CONDUCT HIMSELF IN A PROPER AND IRREPROACHABLE
MANNER IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.
Petitioner's principal contention is that the appellate court erred in considering the
documents which had merely been annexed by the State to its appellant's brief and,
on the basis of which, justified the reversal of the trial court's decision. Not having
been presented and formally offered as evidence, they are mere "scrap(s) of paper
devoid of any evidentiary value," 12 so it was argued, because under Rule 132, 34 of
the Revised Rules on Evidence, the court shall consider no evidence which has not
been formally offered.
13
The contention has no merit. Petitioner failed to note Rule 143 of the Rules of Court
which provides that
 These rules shall not apply to land registration, cadastral and election
cases, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not
herein provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and
whenever practicable and convenient. (Emphasis added).
Prescinding from the above, the rule on formal offer of evidence (Rule 132, 34) now
being invoked by petitioner is clearly not applicable to the present case involving a
petition for naturalization. The only instance when said rules may be applied by
analogy or suppletorily in such cases is when it is "practicable and convenient." That is
not the case here, since reliance upon the documents presented by the State for the
first time on appeal, in fact, appears to be the more practical and convenient course of
action considering that decisions in naturalization proceedings are not covered by the
rule on res judicata. 14 Consequently, a final favorable judgment does not preclude the
State from later on moving for a revocation of the grant of naturalization on the basis
of the same documents.
Petitioner claims that as a result of the failure of the State to present and formally offer
its documentary evidence before the trial court, he was denied the right to object
against their authenticity, effectively depriving him of his fundamental right to
procedural due process. 15 We are not persuaded. Indeed, the reason for the rule
prohibiting the admission of evidence which has not been formally offered is to afford
the opposite party the chance to object to their admissibility. 16 Petitioner cannot claim
that he was deprived of the right to object to the authenticity of the documents
submitted to the appellate court by the State. He could have included his objections,
as he, in fact, did, in the brief he filed with the Court of Appeals. thus:
The authenticity of the alleged petition for naturalization (SCN Case No.
031767) which was supposedly filed by Ong Chia under LOI 270 has not
been established. In fact, the case number of the alleged petition for
naturalization. . . is 031767 while the case number of the petition actually
filed by the appellee is 031776. Thus, said document is totally unreliable
and should not be considered by the Honorable Court in resolving the
instant appeal. 17
Indeed, the objection is flimsy as the alleged discrepancy is trivial, and, at most, can
be accounted for as a typographical error on the part of petitioner himself. That "SCN
Case No. 031767," a copy of which was annexed to the petition, is the correct case
number is confirmed by the Evaluation Sheet 18 of the Special Committee on
Naturalization which was also docketed as "SCN Case No. 031767." Other than this,
petitioner offered no evidence to disprove the authenticity of the documents presented
by the State.
Furthermore, the Court notes that these documents namely, the petition in SCN
Case No. 031767, petitioner's marriage contract, the joint affidavit executed by him
and his wife, and petitioner's income tax returns are all public documents. As such,
they have been executed under oath. They are thus reliable. Since petitioner failed to
make a satisfactory showing of any flaw or irregularity that may cast doubt on the
authenticity of these documents, it is our conclusion that the appellate court did not err
in relying upon them.
One last point. The above discussion would have been enough to dispose of this
case, but to settle all the issues raised, we shall briefly discuss the effect of petitioner's
failure to include the address "J.M. Basa St., Iloilo" in his petition, in accordance with
7, C.A. No. 473. This address appears on petitioner's Immigrant Certificate of
Residence, a document which forms part of the records as Annex A of his 1989
petition for naturalization. Petitioner admits that he failed to mention said address in
his petition, but argues that since the Immigrant Certificate of Residence containing it
had been fully published, 19 with the petition and the other annexes, such publication
constitutes substantial compliance with 7. 20 This is allegedly because the publication
effectively satisfied the objective sought to be achieved by such requirement, i.e., to
give investigating agencies of the government the opportunity to check on the
background of the applicant and prevent suppression of information regarding any
possible misbehavior on his part in any community where he may have lived at one
time or another. 21 It is settled, however, that naturalization laws should be rigidly
enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government and against the
applicant. 22 As noted by the State, C.A. No. 473, 7 clearly provides that the applicant
for naturalization shall set forth in the petition his present and former places of
residence. 23 This provision and the rule of strict application of the law in naturalization
cases defeat petitioner's argument of "substantial compliance" with the requirement
under the Revised Naturalization Law. On this ground alone, the instant petition ought
to be denied.1wphi1.nt
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED and the instant
petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
 Same; Same; Same; Same; A person by contracting marriage does not shed his/her
integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever
available to him or to her.The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify
any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking
them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage,
does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the
constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The law insures absolute freedom of communication
between the spouses by making it privileged.The law insures absolute freedom of
communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor
wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse
while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the
other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during
the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of
communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows
with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the
other. Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 699, G.R. No. 107383 February 20,
1996

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 107383. February 20, 1996.* SUPREME COURT
Manila
CECILIA ZULUETA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALFREDO MARTIN,
respondents. SECOND DIVISION

Evidence; Illegally Obtained Evidence; Constitutional Law; Privacy of Communication G.R. No. 107383 February 20, 1996
and Correspondence; Privacy of communication and correspondence is inviolable.
The only exception in the Constitution is if there is a lawful order [from a] court or CECILIA ZULUETA, petitioner,
when public safety or order requires, otherwise, as prescribed by law.Indeed the vs.
documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional COURT OF APPEALS and ALFREDO MARTIN, respondents.
injunction declaring the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be]
inviolable is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself DECISION
aggrieved by her husbands infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional
provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is
MENDOZA, J.:
if there is a lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires
otherwise, as prescribed by law. Any violation of this provision renders the evidence
obtained inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch X) which ordered petitioner to return
documents and papers taken by her from private respondent's clinic without the
latter's knowledge and consent.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March
26, 1982, petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the
presence of her mother, a driver and private respondent's secretary, forcibly opened
the drawers and cabinet in her husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of
private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings
cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and photographs. The
documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation
and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against
her husband.
Dr. Martin brought this action below for recovery of the documents and papers and for
damages against petitioner. The case was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch X, which, after trial, rendered judgment for private respondent, Dr. Alfredo
Martin, declaring him "the capital/exclusive owner of the properties described in
paragraph 3 of plaintiff's Complaint or those further described in the Motion to Return
and Suppress" and ordering Cecilia Zulueta and any person acting in her behalf to a
immediately return the properties to Dr. Martin and to pay him P5,000.00, as nominal
damages; P5,000.00, as moral damages and attorney's fees; and to pay the costs of
the suit. The writ of preliminary injunction earlier issued was made final and petitioner
Cecilia Zulueta and her attorneys and representatives were enjoined from "using or
submitting/admitting as evidence" the documents and papers in question. On appeal,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Hence this
petition.
There is no question that the documents and papers in question belong to private
respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, and that they were taken by his wife, the herein
petitioner, without his knowledge and consent. For that reason, the trial court declared
the documents and papers to be properties of private respondent, ordered petitioner
to return them to private respondent and enjoined her from using them in evidence. In
appealing from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial court's decision,
petitioner's only ground is that in Alfredo Martin v. Alfonso Felix, Jr.,1 this Court ruled
that the documents and papers (marked as Annexes A-1 to J-7 of respondent's
comment in that case) were admissible in evidence and, therefore, their use by
petitioner's attorney, Alfonso Felix did not constitute malpractice or gross misconduct,
For this reason it is contended that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision
of the trial court instead of dismissing private respondent's complaint.
Petitioner's contention has no merit. The case against Atty. Felix, Jr. was for
disbarment. Among other things, private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, as
complainant in that case, charged that in using the documents in evidence, Atty. Felix,
Jr. committed malpractice or gross misconduct because of the injunctive order of the
trial court. In dismissing the complaint against Atty. Felix, Jr., this Court took note of
the following defense of Atty. Felix; Jr. which it found to be "impressed with merit:" 2
On the alleged malpractice or gross misconduct of respondent [Alfonso
Felix, Jr.], he maintains that:
....
4. When respondent refiled Cecilia's case for legal separation before the Pasig
Regional Trial Court, there was admittedly an order of the Manila Regional Trial Court
prohibiting Cecilia from using the documents Annex "A-1 to J-7." On September 6,
1983, however having appealed the said order to this Court on a petition for certiorari,
this Court issued a restraining order on aforesaid date which order temporarily set
aside the order of the trial court. Hence, during the enforceability of this Court's order,
respondent's request for petitioner to admit the genuineness and authenticity of the
subject annexes cannot be looked upon as malpractice. Notably, petitioner Dr. Martin
finally admitted the truth and authenticity of the questioned annexes, At that point in
time, would it have been malpractice for respondent to use petitioner's admission as
evidence against him in the legal separation case pending in the Regional Trial Court
of Makati? Respondent submits it is not malpractice.
Significantly, petitioner's admission was done not thru his counsel but by Dr.
Martin himself under oath, Such verified admission constitutes an affidavit,
and, therefore, receivable in evidence against him. Petitioner became
bound by his admission. For Cecilia to avail herself of her husband's
admission and use the same in her action for legal separation cannot be
treated as malpractice.
Thus, the acquittal of Atty. Felix, Jr. in the administrative case amounts to no more
than a declaration that his use of the documents and papers for the purpose of
securing Dr. Martin's admission as to their genuiness and authenticity did not
constitute a violation of the injunctive order of the trial court. By no means does the
decision in that case establish the admissibility of the documents and papers in
question.
It cannot be overemphasized that if Atty. Felix, Jr. was acquitted of the charge of
violating the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court, it was only because,
at the time he used the documents and papers, enforcement of the order of the trial
court was temporarily restrained by this Court. The TRO issued by this Court was
eventually lifted as the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner against the trial court's
order was dismissed and, therefore, the prohibition against the further use of the
documents and papers became effective again.
Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The
constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence
[to be] inviolable"3 is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks
herself aggrieved by her husband's infidelity) who is the party against whom the
constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the
Constitution is if there is a "lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order
requires otherwise, as prescribed by law."4 Any violation of this provision renders the
evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding." 5
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking
the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence
of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity
or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available
to him or to her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making
it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the
consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists.6 Neither may be examined
without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by
one from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions.7 But one thing
is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share
what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that
each owes to the other.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 150224. May 19, 2004.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. JOEL YATAR alias KAWIT, appellant.
Criminal Law; Witnesses; The Supreme Court will not interfere with the judgment of
the trial court in determining the credibility of witnesses unless there appears in the
record some fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has been overlooked
or the significance of which has been misinterpreted.The issue regarding the
credibility of the prosecution witnesses should be resolved against appellant. This
Court will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in determining the credibility
of witnesses unless there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight
and influence which has been overlooked or the significance of which has been
misinterpreted. Well-entrenched is the rule that the findings of the trial court on
credibility of witnesses are entitled to great weight on appeal unless cogent reasons
are presented necessitating a reexamination if not the disturbance of the same; the
reason being that the former is in a better and unique position of hearing first hand the
witnesses and observing their deportment, conduct and attitude. Absent any showing
that the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or
circumstances of weight which would affect the result of the case, the trial judges
assessment of credibility deserves the appellate courts highest respect. Where there
is nothing to show that the witnesses for the prosecution were actuated by improper
motive, their testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit.
Same; Same; Circumstantial Evidence; An accused can be convicted even if no
eyewitness is available, so long as sufficient circumstantial evidence is presented to
prove beyond doubt that the accused committed the crime.The weight of the
prosecutions evidence must be appreciated in light of the well-settled rule which
provides that an accused can be convicted even if no eyewitness is available, as long
as sufficient circumstantial evidence is presented by the prosecution to prove beyond
doubt that the accused committed the crime.
Same; DNA Testing; Words and Phrases; DNA is a molecule that encodes the genetic
information in all living organisms, and a persons DNA is the same in each cell and it
does not change throughout a persons lifetimethe DNA in a persons blood is the
same as the DNA found in his saliva, sweat, bone, the root and shaft of hair, earwax,
mucus, urine, skin tissue, and vaginal and rectal cells.Significantly, subsequent
testing showed that the Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) of the sperm specimen from the
vagina of the victim was identical semen to be that of appellants gene type. DNA is a
molecule that encodes the genetic information in all living organisms. A persons DNA
is the same in each cell and it does not change throughout a persons lifetime; the
DNA in a persons blood is the same as the DNA found in his saliva, sweat, bone, the
root and shaft of hair, earwax, mucus, urine, skin tissue, and vaginal and rectal cells.
Most importantly, because of polymorphisms in human genetic structure, no two
individuals have the same DNA, with the notable exception of identical twins.
Same; Same; DNA print or identification technology has been advanced as a uniquely
effective means to link a suspect to a crime, or to exonerate a wrongly accused
suspect, where biological evidence has been left.DNA print or identification
technology has been advanced as a uniquely effective means to link a suspect to a
crime, or to exonerate a wrongly accused suspect, where biological evidence has
been left. For purposes of criminal investigation, DNA identification is a fertile source
of both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence. It can assist immensely in effecting a
more accurate account of the crime committed, efficiently facilitating the conviction of
the guilty, securing the acquittal of the innocent, and ensuring the proper
administration of justice in every case. DNA evidence collected from a crime scene
can link a suspect to a crime or eliminate one from suspicion in the same principle as
fingerprints are used. Incidents involving sexual assault would leave biological
evidence such as hair, skin tissue, semen, blood, or saliva which can be left on the
victims body or at the crime scene. Hair and fiber from clothing, carpets, bedding, or
furniture could also be transferred to the victims body during the assault. Forensic
DNA evidence is helpful in proving that there was physical contact between an
assailant and a victim. If properly collected from the victim, crime scene or assailant,
DNA can be compared with known samples to place the suspect at the scene of the
crime.
Same; Same; In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should
consider, inter alia, the following factorshow the samples were collected, how they
were handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed
in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were followed
in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests;
Admittedly, we are just beginning to integrate these advances in science and
technology in the Philippine criminal justice system, so we must be cautious as we
traverse these relatively uncharted waters though we can benefit from the wealth of
persuasive jurisprudence that has developed in other jurisdictions.The U.P. National
Science Research Institute (NSRI), which conducted the DNA tests in this case, used
the Polymerase chain reaction (PCR) amplification method by Short Tandem Repeat
(STR) analysis. With PCR testing, tiny amounts of a specific DNA sequence can be
copied exponentially within hours. Thus, getting sufficient DNA for analysis has
become much easier since it became possible to reliably amplify small samples using
the PCR method. In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should
consider, inter alia, the following factors: how the samples were collected, how they
were handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed
in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were followed
in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests. In
the case at bar, Dr. Maria Corazon Abogado de Ungria was duly qualified by the
prosecution as an expert witness on DNA print or identification techniques. Based on
Dr. de Ungrias testimony, it was determined that the gene type and DNA profile of
appellant are identical to that of the extracts subject of examination. The blood sample
taken from the appellant showed that he was of the following gene types: vWA 15/19,
TH01 7/8, DHFRP2 9/10 and CSF1PO 10/11, which are identical with semen taken
from the victims vaginal canal. Verily, a DNA match exists between the semen found
in the victim and the blood sample given by the appellant in open court during the
course of the trial. Admittedly, we are just beginning to integrate these advances in
science and technology in the Philippine criminal justice system, so we must be
cautious as we traverse these relatively uncharted waters. Fortunately, we can benefit
from the wealth of persuasive jurisprudence that has developed in other jurisdictions.
Specifically, the prevailing doctrine in the U.S. has proven instructive.
Same; Same; Evidence; Evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a fact in issue
as to induce belief in its existence or non-existence.In Daubert v. Merrell Dow, it was
ruled that pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid principles could be used as
long as it was relevant and reliable. Judges, under Daubert, were allowed greater
discretion over which testimony they would allow at trial, including the introduction of
new kinds of scientific techniques. DNA typing is one such novel procedure. Under
Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a fact in issue as to
induce belief in its existence or non-existence. Applying the Daubert test to the case at
bar, the DNA evidence obtained through PCR testing and utilizing STR analysis, and
which was appreciated by the court a quo is relevant and reliable since it is reasonably
based on scientifically valid principles of human genetics and molecular biology.
Same; Same; Same; Self-Incrimination; The right against self-incrimination is simply
against the legal process of extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of
guiltit does not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an
incrimination but as part of object evidence.In an attempt to exclude the DNA
evidence, the appellant contends that the blood sample taken from him as well as the
DNA tests were conducted in violation of his right to remain silent as well as his right
against self-incrimination under Secs. 12 and 17 of Art. III of the Constitution. This
contention is untenable. The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but
against testimonial compulsion. The right against self-incrimination is simply against
the legal process of extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It
does not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but
as part of object evidence.
Same; Same; Same; Ex Post Facto Laws; No ex-post facto law is involved in DNA
testing since the science of DNA typing involves the admissibility, relevance and
reliability of the evidence obtained under the Rules of Courtwhereas an ex-post
facto law refers primarily to a question of law, DNA profiling requires a factual
determination of the probative weight of the evidence presented.Appellant further
argues that the DNA tests conducted by the prosecution against him are
unconstitutional on the ground that resort thereto is tantamount to the application of an
ex-post facto law. This argument is specious. No ex-post facto law is involved in the
case at bar. The science of DNA typing involves the admissibility, relevance and
reliability of the evidence obtained under the Rules of Court. Whereas an ex-post facto
law refers primarily to a question of law, DNA profiling requires a factual determination
of the probative weight of the evidence presented.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; The legal relevancy of evidence denotes
something more than a minimum of probative value, suggesting that such
evidentiary relevance must contain a plus valueevidence without plus value may
be logically relevant but not legally sufficient to convict.Generally, courts should only
consider and rely upon duly established evidence and never on mere conjectures or
suppositions. The legal relevancy of evidence denotes something more than a
minimum of probative value, suggesting that such evidentiary relevance must contain
a plus value. This may be necessary to preclude the trial court from being satisfied
by matters of slight value, capable of being exaggerated by prejudice and hasty
conclusions. Evidence without plus value may be logically relevant but not legally
sufficient to convict. It is incumbent upon the trial court to balance the probative value
of such evidence against the likely harm that would result from its admission. The
judgment in a criminal case can be upheld only when there is relevant evidence from
which the court can properly find or infer that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable
doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt requires moral certainty of guilt in order to
sustain a conviction. Moral certainty is that degree of certainty that convinces and
directs the understanding and satisfies the reason and judgment of those who are
bound to act conscientiously upon it. It is certainty beyond reasonable doubt. This
requires that the circumstances, taken together, should be of a conclusive nature and
tendency; leading, on the whole, to a satisfactory conclusion that the accused, and no
one else, committed the offense charged. In view of the totality of evidence
appreciated thus far, we rule that the present case passes the test of moral certainty.
Same; Same; Same; Presumption of Innocence; Motive; As a matter of procedure,
and for the purpose of meeting the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt,
motive is essential for conviction when there is doubt as to the identity of the culprit.
As a matter of procedure, and for the purpose of meeting the requirement of proof
beyond reasonable doubt, motive is essential for conviction when there is doubt as to
the identity of the culprit. Thus, appellants motive to sexually assault and kill the victim
was evident in the instant case. It is a rule in criminal law that motive, being a state of
mind, is established by the testimony of witnesses on the acts or statements of the
accused before or immediately after the commission of the offense, deeds or words
that may express it or from which his motive or reason for committing it may be
inferred.
Same; Rape with Homicide; Elements.Accordingly, we are convinced that the
appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of rape with
homicide. Appellant sexually assaulted Kathylyn Uba, and by reason or on the
occasion thereof, in order to conceal his lustful deed, permanently sealed the victims
lips by stabbing her repeatedly, thereby causing her untimely demise. The following
are the elements constitutive of rape with homicide: (1) the appellant had carnal
knowledge of a woman; (2) carnal knowledge of a woman was achieved by means of
force, threat or intimidation; and (3) by reason or on the occasion of such carnal
knowledge by means of force, threat or intimidation, appellant killed the woman.
However, in rape committed by close kin, such as the victims father, step-father,
uncle, or the common-law spouse of her mother, it is not necessary that actual force
or intimidation be employed. Moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of
violence and intimidation. The fact that the victims hymen is intact does not negate a
finding that rape was committed as mere entry by the penis into the lips of the female
genital organ, even without rupture or laceration of the hymen, suffices for conviction
of rape. The strength and dilatability of the hymen are invariable; it may be so elastic
as to stretch without laceration during intercourse. Absence of hymenal lacerations
does not disprove sexual abuse especially when the victim is of tender age. People
vs. Yatar, 428 SCRA 504, G.R. No. 150224 May 19, 2004
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 150224 May 19, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
JOEL YATAR alias "KAWIT", appellant.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
On automatic review is a Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bulanao, Tabuk,
Kalinga, Branch 25, sentencing appellant Joel Yatar alias "Kawit" to Death for the
special complex crime of Rape with Homicide, and ordering him to pay the heirs of the
victim, Kathylyn D. Uba, civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00, moral damages
in the amount of P200,000.00, exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00,
actual damages in the amount of P186,410.00, or total damages amounting to
P511,410.00, and costs of litigation.1
Appellant was charged with Rape with Homicide under the following Information:
That on or about the afternoon of June 30, 1998 at Liwan West, Rizal,
Kalinga, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, in
order to have carnal knowledge of a certain KATHYLYN D. UBA, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, and with use of a bladed
weapon stab the latter inflicting upon her fatal injuries resulting in the death
of the victim, and on the occasion or by reason thereof, accused, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, and by means of force and violence had carnal
knowledge of said Kathlyn D. Uba against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
The facts are:
 On June 30, 1998, at 8:30 a.m., Judilyn Pas-a and her first cousin,
seventeen year old Kathylyn Uba, were on the ground floor of the house of
their grandmother, Isabel Dawang, in Liwan West, Rizal, Kalinga. They were
talking about the letter sent by their aunt, Luz Yatar, to her husband,
appellant Joel Yatar, through Kathylyns friend, Cecil Casingan. Kathylyn
handed the letter to appellant earlier that morning.3
At 9:00 a.m. of the same day, Judilyn and her husband, together with Isabel Dawang,
left for their farm in Nagbitayan some two kilometers away. Before Judilyn and her
husband departed, Kathylyn told Judilyn that she intended to go to Tuguegarao, but in
the event she would not be able to leave, she would just stay home and wash her
clothes or go to the house of their aunt, Anita Wania. Kathylyn was left alone in the
house.4
Later, at 10:00 a.m., Anita Wania and fifteen year old Beverly Deneng stopped by the
house of Isabel. They saw appellant at the back of the house. They went inside the
house through the back door of the kitchen to have a drink of water. Anita asked
appellant what he was doing there, and he replied that he was getting lumber to bring
to the house of his mother.5
At 12:30 p.m., while Judilyn was on her way home from Nagbitayan, she saw
appellant descend the ladder from the second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang
and run towards the back of the house.6 She later noticed appellant, who was wearing
a white shirt with collar and black pants, pacing back and forth at the back of the
house. She did not find this unusual as appellant and his wife used to live in the house
of Isabel Dawang.7
At 1:30 p.m., Judilyn again saw appellant when he called her near her house. This
time, he was wearing a black shirt without collar and blue pants. Appellant told her that
he would not be getting the lumber he had stacked, and that Isabel could use it. She
noticed that appellants eyes were "reddish and sharp." Appellant asked her where her
husband was as he had something important to tell him. Judilyns husband then
arrived and appellant immediately left and went towards the back of the house of
Isabel.8
In the evening of the same day, Isabel Dawang arrived home and found that the lights
in her house were off. She called out for her granddaughter, Kathylyn Uba. The door
to the ground floor was open. She noticed that the water container she asked Kathylyn
to fill up earlier that day was still empty. She went up the ladder to the second floor of
the house to see if Kathylyn was upstairs. She found that the door was tied with a
rope, so she went down to get a knife. While she groped in the dark, she felt a lifeless
body that was cold and rigid.9
Isabel moved her hand throughout the entire body. She found out that it was the
naked body of her granddaughter, Kathylyn. She called for help. Judilyn and her
husband arrived. Isabel was given a flashlight by Judilyn. She focused the beam and
saw Kathylyn sprawled on the floor naked, with her intestines protruding out of her
stomach. Meanwhile, neighbors had arrived to offer assistance. A daughter of Isabel,
Cion, called the police.10
At 9:00 that evening, SP04 Melchor Faniswa received a report that a dead woman
was found in Isabel Dawangs house. Together with fellow police officers, Faniswa
went to the house and found the naked body of Kathylyn Uba with multiple stab
wounds.
The people in the vicinity informed the police officers that appellant was seen going
down the ladder of the house of Isabel Dawang at approximately 12:30 p.m.
The police discovered the victims panties, brassiere, denim pants, bag and sandals
beside her naked cadaver at the scene of the crime, and they found a dirty white shirt
splattered with blood within 50 meters from the house of Isabel.
When questioned by the police authorities, appellant denied any knowledge of
Kathylynss death,11 however, he was placed under police custody.
On July 3, 1998, appellant asked the police officers if he could relieve himself. Police
Officer Cesar Abagan accompanied him to the toilet around seven to ten meters away
from the police station. They suddenly heard someone shout in the Ilocano dialect,
"Nagtaray!" (Hes running away!). Police Officer Orlando Manuel exited through the
gate of the Police Station and saw appellant running away. Appellant was
approximately 70 meters away from the station when Police Officer Abagan
recaptured him.12 He was charged with Rape with Homicide. When he was arraigned
on July 21, 1998, appellant pleaded "not guilty."
After trial, appellant was convicted of the crime of Rape with Homicide, defined and
penalized under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 8353,
otherwise known as the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, and was accordingly, sentenced
to Death.
Hence, this automatic review pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended. In his Brief, appellant assigns the following errors:
I
 THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING MUCH WEIGHT TO
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION
NOTWITHSTANDING THEIR DOUBTFULNESS.
II
THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE SERIOUS CRIME CHARGED DUE TO
REASONABLE DOUBT.
Appellants contentions are unmeritorious.
The issue regarding the credibility of the prosecution witnesses should be resolved
against appellant. This Court will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in
determining the credibility of witnesses unless there appears in the record some fact
or circumstance of weight and influence which has been overlooked or the
significance of which has been misinterpreted.13 Well-entrenched is the rule that the
findings of the trial court on credibility of witnesses are entitled to great weight on
appeal unless cogent reasons are presented necessitating a reexamination if not the
disturbance of the same; the reason being that the former is in a better and unique
position of hearing first hand the witnesses and observing their deportment, conduct
and attitude.14 Absent any showing that the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or
misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight which would affect the result of the
case, the trial judges assessment of credibility deserves the appellate courts highest
respect.15 Where there is nothing to show that the witnesses for the prosecution were
actuated by improper motive, their testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit.16
The weight of the prosecutions evidence must be appreciated in light of the well-
settled rule which provides that an accused can be convicted even if no eyewitness is
available, as long as sufficient circumstantial evidence is presented by the prosecution
to prove beyond doubt that the accused committed the crime.17
Reference to the records will show that a total of eleven (11) wounds, six (6) stab and
five (5) incised, were found on the victims abdomen and back, causing a portion of
her small intestines to spill out of her body.18 Rigor mortis of the vicitms body was
complete when Dr. Bartolo examined the victim at 9:00 a.m. on July 1, 1998.
According to him, the time of death may be approximated from between nine (9) to
twelve (12) hours prior to the completion of rigor mortis.19 In other words, the
estimated time of death was sometime between 9:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. on June 30,
1998. This was within the timeframe within which the lone presence of appellant
lurking in the house of Isabel Dawang was testified to by witnesses.
It should also be noted that, although the Postmortem Report by the attending
physician, Dr. Pej Evan C. Bartolo, indicates that no hymenal lacerations, contusions
or hematoma were noted on the victim,20 Dr. Bartolo discovered the presence of
semen in the vaginal canal of the victim. During his testimony, Dr. Bartolo stated that
the introduction of semen into the vaginal canal could only be done through sexual
intercourse with the victim.21In addition, it is apparent from the pictures submitted by
the prosecution that the sexual violation of the victim was manifested by a bruise and
some swelling in her right forearm indicating resistance to the appellants assault on
her virtue.22
Significantly, subsequent testing showed that the Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) of the
sperm specimen from the vagina of the victim was identical the semen to be that of
appellants gene type.
DNA is a molecule that encodes the genetic information in all living organisms.23 A
persons DNA is the same in each cell and it does not change throughout a persons
lifetime; the DNA in a persons blood is the same as the DNA found in his saliva,
sweat, bone, the root and shaft of hair, earwax, mucus, urine, skin tissue, and vaginal
and rectal cells.24 Most importantly, because of polymorphisms in human genetic
structure, no two individuals have the same DNA, with the notable exception of
identical twins.25
DNA print or identification technology has been advanced as a uniquely effective
means to link a suspect to a crime, or to exonerate a wrongly accused suspect, where
biological evidence has been left. For purposes of criminal investigation, DNA
identification is a fertile source of both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence. It can
assist immensely in effecting a more accurate account of the crime committed,
efficiently facilitating the conviction of the guilty, securing the acquittal of the innocent,
and ensuring the proper administration of justice in every case.
DNA evidence collected from a crime scene can link a suspect to a crime or eliminate
one from suspicion in the same principle as fingerprints are used.26 Incidents involving
sexual assault would leave biological evidence such as hair, skin tissue, semen,
blood, or saliva which can be left on the victims body or at the crime scene. Hair and
fiber from clothing, carpets, bedding, or furniture could also be transferred to the
victims body during the assault.27 Forensic DNA evidence is helpful in proving that
there was physical contact between an assailant and a victim. If properly collected
from the victim, crime scene or assailant, DNA can be compared with known samples
to place the suspect at the scene of the crime.28
The U.P. National Science Research Institute (NSRI), which conducted the DNA tests
in this case, used the Polymerase chain reaction (PCR) amplification method by Short
Tandem Repeat (STR) analysis. With PCR testing, tiny amounts of a specific DNA
sequence can be copied exponentially within hours. Thus, getting sufficient DNA for
analysis has become much easier since it became possible to reliably amplify small
samples using the PCR method.
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should consider, inter alia,
the following factors: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the
possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the
samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting
the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests. 29
In the case at bar, Dr. Maria Corazon Abogado de Ungria was duly qualified by the
prosecution as an expert witness on DNA print or identification techniques.30 Based on
Dr. de Ungrias testimony, it was determined that the gene type and DNA profile of
appellant are identical to that of the extracts subject of examination.31 The blood
sample taken from the appellant showed that he was of the following gene types: vWA
15/19, TH01 7/8, DHFRP2 9/10 and CSF1PO 10/11, which are identical with semen
taken from the victims vaginal canal.32 Verily, a DNA match exists between the semen
found in the victim and the blood sample given by the appellant in open court during
the course of the trial.
Admittedly, we are just beginning to integrate these advances in science and
technology in the Philippine criminal justice system, so we must be cautious as we
traverse these relatively uncharted waters. Fortunately, we can benefit from the wealth
of persuasive jurisprudence that has developed in other jurisdictions. Specifically, the
prevailing doctrine in the U.S. has proven instructive.
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow,33 it was ruled that pertinent evidence based on scientifically
valid principles could be used as long as it was relevant and reliable. Judges,
under Daubert, were allowed greater discretion over which testimony they would allow
at trial, including the introduction of new kinds of scientific techniques. DNA typing is
one such novel procedure.
Under Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a fact in issue as
to induce belief in its existence or non-existence.34 Applying the Daubert test to the
case at bar, the DNA evidence obtained through PCR testing and utilizing STR
analysis, and which was appreciated by the court a quo is relevant and reliable since it
is reasonably based on scientifically valid principles of human genetics and molecular
biology.
Independently of the physical evidence of appellants semen found in the victims
vaginal canal, the trial court appreciated the following circumstantial evidence as being
sufficient to sustain a conviction beyond reasonable doubt: (1) Appellant and his wife
were living in the house of Isabel Dawang together with the victim, Kathylyn Uba; (2)
In June 1998, appellants wife left the house because of their frequent quarrels; (3)
Appellant received from the victim, Kathylyn Uba, a letter from his estranged wife in
the early morning on June 30, 1998; (4) Appellant was seen by Apolonia Wania and
Beverly Denneng at 1:00 p.m. of June 30, 1998 near the kitchen of the house of Isabel
Dawang, acting strangely and wearing a dirty white shirt with collar; (5) Judilyn Pas-a
saw appellant going down the ladder of the house of Isabel at 12:30 p.m., wearing a
dirty white shirt, and again at 1:30 p.m., this time wearing a black shirt; (6) Appellant
hurriedly left when the husband of Judilyn Pas-a was approaching; (7) Salmalina
Tandagan saw appellant in a dirty white shirt coming down the ladder of the house of
Isabel on the day Kathylyn Uba was found dead; (8) The door leading to the second
floor of the house of Isabel Dawang was tied by a rope; (9) The victim, Kathylyn Uba,
lay naked in a pool of blood with her intestines protruding from her body on the
second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang, with her stained pants, bra, underwear
and shoes scattered along the periphery; (10) Laboratory examination revealed sperm
in the victims vagina (Exhibit "H" and "J"); (11) The stained or dirty white shirt found in
the crime scene was found to be positive with blood; (12) DNA of slide, Exhibit "J" and
"H", compared with the DNA profile of the appellant are identical; and (13) Appellant
escaped two days after he was detained but was subsequently apprehended, such
flight being indicative of guilt.35
Circumstantial evidence, to be sufficient to warrant a conviction, must form an
unbroken chain which leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused, to
the exclusion of others, is the perpetrator of the crime. To determine whether there is
sufficient circumstantial evidence, three requisites must concur: (1) there is more than
one circumstance; (2) facts on which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3)
the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.36
In an attempt to exclude the DNA evidence, the appellant contends that the blood
sample taken from him as well as the DNA tests were conducted in violation of his
right to remain silent as well as his right against self-incrimination under Secs. 12 and
17 of Art. III of the Constitution.
This contention is untenable. The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but
against testimonial compulsion.37 The right against self- incrimination is simply against
the legal process of extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It
does not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but
as part of object evidence.
We ruled in People v. Rondero38 that although accused-appellant insisted that hair
samples were forcibly taken from him and submitted to the National Bureau of
Investigation for forensic examination, the hair samples may be admitted in evidence
against him, for what is proscribed is the use of testimonial compulsion or any
evidence communicative in nature acquired from the accused under duress.
Hence, a person may be compelled to submit to fingerprinting, photographing,
paraffin, blood and DNA, as there is no testimonial compulsion involved.
Under People v. Gallarde,39 where immediately after the incident, the police authorities
took pictures of the accused without the presence of counsel, we ruled that there was
no violation of the right against self-incrimination. The accused may be compelled to
submit to a physical examination to determine his involvement in an offense of which
he is accused.
It must also be noted that appellant in this case submitted himself for blood sampling
which was conducted in open court on March 30, 2000, in the presence of counsel.
Appellant further argues that the DNA tests conducted by the prosecution against him
are unconstitutional on the ground that resort thereto is tantamount to the application
of an ex-post facto law.
This argument is specious. No ex-post facto law is involved in the case at bar. The
science of DNA typing involves the admissibility, relevance and reliability of the
evidence obtained under the Rules of Court. Whereas an ex-post facto law refers
primarily to a question of law, DNA profiling requires a factual determination of the
probative weight of the evidence presented.
Appellants twin defense of denial and alibi cannot be sustained. The forensic DNA
evidence and bloodied shirt, notwithstanding the eyewitness accounts of his presence
at Isabel Dawangs house during the time when the crime was committed, undeniably
link him to the June 30, 1998 incident. Appellant did not demonstrate with clear and
convincing evidence an impossibility to be in two places at the same time, especially
in this case where the two places are located in the same barangay.40 He lives within a
one hundred (100) meter radius from the scene of the crime, and requires a mere five
minute walk to reach one house from the other. This fact severely weakens his alibi.
As to the second assignment of error, appellant asserts that the court a quo committed
reversible error in convicting him of the crime charged. He alleges that he should be
acquitted on reasonable doubt.
Appellants assertion cannot be sustained.
Generally, courts should only consider and rely upon duly established evidence and
never on mere conjectures or suppositions. The legal relevancy of evidence denotes
"something more than a minimum of probative value," suggesting that such
evidentiary relevance must contain a "plus value."41 This may be necessary to
preclude the trial court from being satisfied by matters of slight value, capable of being
exaggerated by prejudice and hasty conclusions. Evidence without "plus value" may
be logically relevant but not legally sufficient to convict. It is incumbent upon the trial
court to balance the probative value of such evidence against the likely harm that
would result from its admission.
The judgment in a criminal case can be upheld only when there is relevant evidence
from which the court can properly find or infer that the accused is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt requires moral certainty of guilt in
order to sustain a conviction. Moral certainty is that degree of certainty that convinces
and directs the understanding and satisfies the reason and judgment of those who are
bound to act conscientiously upon it. It is certainty beyond reasonable doubt.42 This
requires that the circumstances, taken together, should be of a conclusive nature and
tendency; leading, on the whole, to a satisfactory conclusion that the accused, and no
one else, committed the offense charged.43 In view of the totality of evidence
appreciated thus far, we rule that the present case passes the test of moral certainty.
However, as a matter of procedure, and for the purpose of meeting the requirement of
proof beyond reasonable doubt, motive is essential for conviction when there is doubt
as to the identity of the culprit.44
Pertinently, it must be noted that Judilyn Pas-a, first cousin of the victim, testified that
she last saw the victim alive in the morning of June 30, 1998 at the house of Isabel
Dawang.45 She witnessed the appellant running down the stairs of Isabels house and
proceeding to the back of the same house.46 She also testified that a few days before
the victim was raped and killed, the latter revealed to her that "Joel Yatar attempted to
rape her after she came from the school."47 The victim told Judilyn about the incident
or attempt of the appellant to rape her five days before her naked and violated body
was found dead in her grandmothers house on June 25, 1998.48 In addition, Judilyn
also testified that when her auntie Luz Dawang Yatar, wife of appellant, separated
from her husband, "this Joel Yatar threatened to kill our family."49 According to Judilyn,
who was personally present during an argument between her aunt and the appellant,
the exact words uttered by appellant to his wife in the Ilocano dialect was, "If you
leave me, I will kill all your family and your relatives x x x."50 These statements were
not contradicted by appellant.
Thus, appellants motive to sexually assault and kill the victim was evident in the
instant case. It is a rule in criminal law that motive, being a state of mind, is
established by the testimony of witnesses on the acts or statements of the accused
before or immediately after the commission of the offense, deeds or words that may
express it or from which his motive or reason for committing it may be inferred.51
Accordingly, we are convinced that the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the special complex crime of rape with homicide. Appellant sexually assaulted
Kathylyn Uba, and by reason or on the occasion thereof, in order to conceal his lustful
deed, permanently sealed the victims lips by stabbing her repeatedly, thereby causing
her untimely demise.
The following are the elements constitutive of rape with homicide: (1) the appellant
had carnal knowledge of a woman; (2) carnal knowledge of a woman was achieved by
means of force, threat or intimidation; and (3) by reason or on the occasion of such
carnal knowledge by means of force, threat or intimidation, appellant killed the
woman.52 However, in rape committed by close kin, such as the victims father, step-
father, uncle, or the common-law spouse of her mother, it is not necessary that actual
force or intimidation be employed.53 Moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of
violence and intimidation.54 The fact that the victims hymen is intact does not negate a
finding that rape was committed as mere entry by the penis into the lips of the female
genital organ, even without rupture or laceration of the hymen, suffices for conviction
of rape.55 The strength and dilatability of the hymen are invariable; it may be so elastic
as to stretch without laceration during intercourse. Absence of hymenal lacerations
does not disprove sexual abuse especially when the victim is of tender age.56
In the case at bar, appellant is the husband of the victims aunt. He is seven years
older than the victim Kathylyn Uba. Before he and his wife separated, appellant lived
in the house of his mother-in-law, together with the victim and his wife. After the
separation, appellant moved to the house of his parents, approximately one hundred
(100) meters from his mother-in-laws house. Being a relative by affinity within the third
civil degree, he is deemed in legal contemplation to have moral ascendancy over the
victim.
Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty of death is imposed when
by reason or on the occasion of the rape, homicide is committed. Although three (3)
Justices of this Court maintain their position that R.A. 7659 is unconstitutional insofar
as it prescribes the death penalty, they nevertheless submit to the ruling of the
majority that the law is not unconstitutional, and that the death penalty can be lawfully
imposed in the case at bar.
As to damages, civil indemnity ex delicto of P100,000.00,57 actual damages incurred
by the family of the victim that have been proved at the trial amounting to
P93,190.00,58 and moral damages of P75,000.0059 should be awarded in the light of
prevailing law and jurisprudence. Exemplary damages cannot be awarded as part of
the civil liability since the crime was not committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances.60
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the RTC of Bulanao, Tabuk,
Kalinga, Branch 25 in Criminal Case No. 35-98, sentencing appellant Joel Yatar alias
"Kawit" to Death for the special complex crime of Rape with Homicide
is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that he be ORDERED to pay the family of the
victim Kathylyn Uba civil indemnity ex delicto in the amount of P100,000.00,
P93,190.00 in actual damages and P75,000.00 in moral damages. The award of
exemplary damages is DELETED.
Upon the finality of this Decision and in accordance with Art. 83 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Sec. 25 of Rep. Act No. 7659, let the records of this case be
forthwith forwarded to the President of the Philippines for the possible exercise of the
pardoning power.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 155208. March 27, 2007.*
NENA LAZALITA** TATING, petitioner, vs. FELICIDAD TATING MARCELLA,
represented by SALVADOR MARCELLA, CARLOS TATING, and the COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
Civil Law; Contracts; A contract is simulated if the parties do not intend to be bound at
all (absolutely simulated) or if the parties conceal their true agreement (relatively
simulated).The CA and the trial court ruled that the contract of sale between
petitioner and Daniela is simulated. A contract is simulated if the parties do not intend
to be bound at all (absolutely simulated) or if the parties conceal their true agreement
(relatively simulated). The primary consideration in determining the true nature of a
contract is the intention of the parties. Such intention is determined from the express
terms of their agreement as well as from their contemporaneous and subsequent acts.
Same; Same; The most protuberant index of simulation is the complete absence on
the part of the vendee of any attempt in any manner to assert his rights of ownership
over the disputed property.In Suntay v. Court of Appeals, 251 SCRA 430 (1995), the
Court ruled that the most protuberant index of simulation is the complete absence, on
the part of the vendee, of any attempt in any manner to assert his rights of ownership
over the disputed property. In the present case, however, the evidence clearly shows
that petitioner declared the property for taxation and paid realty taxes on it in her
name. Petitioner has shown that from 1972 to 1988 she religiously paid the real estate
taxes due on the said lot and that it was only in 1974 and 1987 that she failed to pay
the taxes thereon. While tax receipts and declarations and receipts and declarations of
ownership for taxation purposes are not, in themselves, incontrovertible evidence of
ownership, they constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the
property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes
manifests not only ones sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property and
announces his adverse claim against the State and all other interested parties, but
also the intention to contribute needed revenues to the Government. Such an act
strengthens ones bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.
Same; Same; Property; Sales; Ownership; Possession along with ownership is
transferred to the vendee by virtue of the notarized deed of conveyance.It is true
that Daniela retained physical possession of the property even after she executed the
subject Absolute Deed of Sale and even after title to the property was transferred in
petitioners favor. In fact, Daniela continued to occupy the property in dispute until her
death in 1988 while, in the meantime, petitioner continued to reside in Manila.
However, it is well-established that ownership and possession are two entirely
different legal concepts. Just as possession is not a definite proof of ownership,
neither is non-possession inconsistent with ownership. The first paragraph of Article
1498 of the Civil Code states that when the sale is made through a public instrument,
the execution thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the object
of the contract, if from the deed the contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be
inferred. Possession, along with ownership, is transferred to the vendee by virtue of
the notarized deed of conveyance. Thus, in light of the circumstances of the present
case, it is of no legal consequence that petitioner did not take actual possession or
occupation of the disputed property after the execution of the deed of sale in her favor
because she was already able to perfect and complete her ownership of and title over
the subject property.
Civil Procedure; Evidence; Affidavits; The admissibility of evidence should not be
equated with weight of evidence; It is settled that affidavits are classified as hearsay
evidence since they are not generally prepared by the affiant but by another who uses
his own language in writing the affiants statements, which may thus be either omitted
or misunderstood by the one writing them.There is no issue in the admissibility of
the subject sworn statement. However, the admissibility of evidence should not be
equated with weight of evidence. The admissibility of evidence depends on its
relevance and competence while the weight of evidence pertains to evidence already
admitted and its tendency to convince and persuade. Thus, a particular item of
evidence may be admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation
within the guidelines provided by the rules of evidence. It is settled that affidavits are
classified as hearsay evidence since they are not generally prepared by the affiant but
by another who uses his own language in writing the affiants statements, which may
thus be either omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them.
Same; Same; As in all civil cases, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove the material
allegations of his complaint and he must rely on the strength of his evidence and not
on the weakness of the evidence of the defendant.Private respondents should have
presented other evidence to sufficiently prove their allegation that Daniela, in fact, had
no intention of disposing of her property when she executed the subject deed of sale
in favor of petitioner. As in all civil cases, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove the
material allegations of his complaint and he must rely on the strength of his evidence
and not on the weakness of the evidence of the defendant. Aside from Danielas
sworn statement, private respondents failed to present any other documentary
evidence to prove their claim. Even the testimonies of their witnesses failed to
establish that Daniela had a different intention when she entered into a contract of
sale with petitioner. Tating vs. Marcella, 519 SCRA 79, G.R. No. 155208 March 27,
2007
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 155208 March 27, 2007
NENA LAZALITA* TATING, Petitioner,
vs.
FELICIDAD TATING MARCELLA, represented by SALVADOR MARCELLA,
CARLOS TATING, and the COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Assailed in the Special Civil Action for Certiorari before the Court are the
Decision1 dated February 22, 2002 and the Resolution dated August 22, 2002 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 64122, which affirmed the Decision 2 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cadiz City, Negros Occidental, Branch 60.
The present case arose from a controversy involving a parcel of land denominated as
Lot 56 of Subdivision plan Psd-31182, located at Abelarde St., Cadiz City, Negros
Occidental. The subject lot, containing an area of 200 square meters, was owned by
Daniela Solano Vda. de Tating (Daniela) as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. T-4393 issued by the Registry of Deeds of the City of Cadiz.3
On October 14, 1969, Daniela sold the subject property to her granddaughter, herein
petitioner Nena Lazalita Tating (Nena). The contract of sale was embodied in a duly
notarized Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Daniela in favor of Nena.4 Subsequently,
title over the subject property was transferred in the name of Nena.5 She declared the
property in her name for tax purposes and paid the real estate taxes due thereon for
the years 1972, 1973, 1975 to 1986 and 1988.6 However, the land remained in
possession of Daniela.
On December 28, 1977, Daniela executed a sworn statement claiming that she had
actually no intention of selling the property; the true agreement between her and Nena
was simply to transfer title over the subject property in favor of the latter to enable her
to obtain a loan by mortgaging the subject property for the purpose of helping her
defray her business expenses; she later discovered that Nena did not secure any loan
nor mortgage the property; she wants the title in the name of Nena cancelled and the
subject property reconveyed to her.7
Daniela died on July 29, 19888 leaving her children as her heirs, namely: Ricardo,
Felicidad, Julio, Carlos and Cirilo who predeceased Daniela and was represented by
herein petitioner.
In a letter dated March 1, 1989, Carlos informed Nena that when Daniela died they
discovered the sworn statement she executed on December 28, 1977 and, as a
consequence, they are demanding from Nena the return of their rightful shares over
the subject property as heirs of Daniela.9 Nena did not reply. Efforts to settle the case
amicably proved futile.
Hence, on September 6, 1989, Carlos and Felicidad, represented by her son
Salvador, filed a complaint with the RTC of Cadiz City, Negros Occidental against
Nena praying for the nullification of the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Daniela in
her favor, cancellation of the TCT issued in the name of Nena, and issuance of a new
title and tax declaration in favor of the heirs of Daniela.10 The complaint also prayed for
the award of moral and exemplary damages as well as attorneys fees and litigation
expenses. On March 19, 1993, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint with leave of
court for the purpose of excluding Ricardo as a party plaintiff, he having died intestate
and without issue in March 1991.11 He left Carlos, Felicidad, Julio, and Nena as his
sole heirs.
In her Answer, Nena denied that any fraud or misrepresentation attended the
execution of the subject Deed of Absolute Sale. She also denied having received the
letter of her uncle, Carlos. She prayed for the dismissal of the complaint, and in her
counterclaim, she asked the trial court for the award of actual, exemplary and moral
damages as well as attorneys fees and litigation expenses.12
Trial ensued. On November 4, 1998, the RTC rendered judgment with the following
dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiffs and against the defendant, and hereby declaring the document of sale dated
October 14, 1969 (Exh. "Q") executed between Daniela Solano Vda. de Tating and
Nena Lazalita Tating as NULL and VOID and further ordering:
1. The Register of Deeds of Cadiz City to cancel TCT No. 5975 and in lieu
thereof to issue a new title in the names of Carlos Tating, Pro-indiviso owner
of one-fourth () portion of the property; Felicidad Tating Marcella, Pro-
indiviso owner of one-fourth () portion; Julio Tating, Pro-indiviso owner of
one-fourth () portion and Nena Lazalita Tating, Pro-indiviso owner of one-
fourth () portion, all of lot 56 after payment of the prescribed fees;
2. The City Assessor of the City of Cadiz to cancel Tax Declaration No. 143-
00672 and in lieu thereof issue a new Tax Declaration in the names of
Carlos Tating, Pro-indiviso portion; Felicidad Tating Marcella, Pro-
indiviso portion; Julio Tating, Pro-indiviso portion; and Nena Lazalita
Tating, Pro-indiviso portion, all of lot 56 as well as the house standing
thereon be likewise declared in the names of the persons mentioned in the
same proportions as above-stated after payment of the prescribed fees;
 3. The defendant is furthermore ordered to pay plaintiffs the sum
of P20,000.00 by way of moral damages, P10,000.00 by way of exemplary
damages, P5,000.00 by way of attorneys fees and P3,000.00 by way of
litigation expenses; and to
4. Pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.13
Nena filed an appeal with the CA. On February 22, 2002, the CA rendered its Decision
affirming the judgment of the RTC.14
Nenas Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the CA in its Resolution dated
August 22, 2002.15
Hence, herein petition for certiorari anchored on the ground that the CA "has decided
the instant case without due regard to and in violation of the applicable laws and
Decisions of this Honorable Court and also because the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court, which it has affirmed, is not supported by and is even against the evidence on
record."16
At the outset, it must be stated that the filing of the instant petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is inappropriate. Considering that the assailed Decision
and Resolution of the CA finally disposed of the case, the proper remedy is a petition
for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The Court notes that while the instant petition is denominated as a Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, there is no allegation that the CA
committed grave abuse of discretion. On the other hand, the petition actually avers
errors of judgment, rather than of jurisdiction, which are the proper subjects of a
petition for review on certiorari. Hence, in accordance with the liberal spirit pervading
the Rules of Court and in the interest of justice, the Court decided to treat the present
petition for certiorari as having been filed under Rule 45, especially considering that it
was filed within the reglementary period for filing the same.17
As to the merits of the case, petitioner contends that the case for the private
respondents rests on the proposition that the Deed of Absolute Sale dated October
14, 1969 is simulated because Danielas actual intention was not to dispose of her
property but simply to help petitioner by providing her with a collateral. Petitioner
asserts that the sole evidence which persuaded both the RTC and the CA in holding
that the subject deed was simulated was the Sworn Statement of Daniela dated
December 28, 1977. However, petitioner argues that said Sworn Statement should
have been rejected outright by the lower courts considering that Daniela has long
been dead when the document was offered in evidence, thereby denying petitioner the
right to cross-examine her.
Petitioner also contends that while the subject deed was executed on October 14,
1969, the Sworn Statement was purportedly executed only on December 28, 1977
and was discovered only after the death of Daniela in 1994.18 Petitioner argues that if
the deed of sale is indeed simulated, Daniela would have taken action against the
petitioner during her lifetime. However, the fact remains that up to the time of her
death or almost 20 years after the Deed of Absolute Sale was executed, she never
uttered a word of complaint against petitioner.
Petitioner further asserts that the RTC and the CA erred in departing from the doctrine
held time and again by the Supreme Court that clear, strong and convincing evidence
beyond mere preponderance is required to show the falsity or nullity of a notarial
document. Petitioner also argues that the RTC and the CA erred in its pronouncement
that the transaction between Daniela and petitioner created a trust relationship
between them because of the settled rule that where the terms of a contract are clear,
it should be given full effect.
In their Comment and Memorandum, private respondents contend that petitioner
failed to show that the CA or the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in arriving
at their assailed judgments; that Danielas Sworn Statement is sufficient evidence to
prove that the contract of sale by and between her and petitioner was merely
simulated; and that, in effect, the agreement between petitioner and Daniela created a
trust relationship between them.
The Court finds for the petitioner.
The CA and the trial court ruled that the contract of sale between petitioner and
Daniela is simulated. A contract is simulated if the parties do not intend to be bound at
all (absolutely simulated) or if the parties conceal their true agreement (relatively
simulated).19 The primary consideration in determining the true nature of a contract is
the intention of the parties.20 Such intention is determined from the express terms of
their agreement as well as from their contemporaneous and subsequent acts. 21
In the present case, the main evidence presented by private respondents in proving
their allegation that the subject deed of sale did not reflect the true intention of the
parties thereto is the sworn statement of Daniela dated December 28, 1977. The trial
court admitted the said sworn statement as part of private respondents evidence and
gave credence to it. The CA also accorded great probative weight to this document.
There is no issue in the admissibility of the subject sworn statement. However, the
admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence.22 The
admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance and competence while the weight
of evidence pertains to evidence already admitted and its tendency to convince and
persuade.23 Thus, a particular item of evidence may be admissible, but its evidentiary
weight depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided by the rules of
evidence.24 It is settled that affidavits are classified as hearsay evidence since they are
not generally prepared by the affiant but by another who uses his own language in
writing the affiants statements, which may thus be either omitted or misunderstood by
the one writing them.25Moreover, the adverse party is deprived of the opportunity to
cross-examine the affiant.26 For this reason, affidavits are generally rejected for being
hearsay, unless the affiants themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify
thereon.27 The Court finds that both the trial court and the CA committed error in giving
the sworn statement probative weight. Since Daniela is no longer available to take the
witness stand as she is already dead, the RTC and the CA should not have given
probative value on Danielas sworn statement for purposes of proving that the contract
of sale between her and petitioner was simulated and that, as a consequence, a trust
relationship was created between them.
Private respondents should have presented other evidence to sufficiently prove their
allegation that Daniela, in fact, had no intention of disposing of her property when she
executed the subject deed of sale in favor of petitioner. As in all civil cases, the burden
is on the plaintiff to prove the material allegations of his complaint and he must rely on
the strength of his evidence and not on the weakness of the evidence of the
defendant.28 Aside from Danielas sworn statement, private respondents failed to
present any other documentary evidence to prove their claim. Even the testimonies of
their witnesses failed to establish that Daniela had a different intention when she
entered into a contract of sale with petitioner.
In Suntay v. Court of Appeals,29 the Court ruled that the most protuberant index of
simulation is the complete absence, on the part of the vendee, of any attempt in any
manner to assert his rights of ownership over the disputed property.30 In the present
case, however, the evidence clearly shows that petitioner declared the property for
taxation and paid realty taxes on it in her name. Petitioner has shown that from 1972
to 1988 she religiously paid the real estate taxes due on the said lot and that it was
only in 1974 and 1987 that she failed to pay the taxes thereon. While tax receipts and
declarations and receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation purposes are not,
in themselves, incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they constitute at least proof
that the holder has a claim of title over the property.31 The voluntary declaration of a
piece of property for taxation purposes manifests not only ones sincere and honest
desire to obtain title to the property and announces his adverse claim against the
State and all other interested parties, but also the intention to contribute needed
revenues to the Government.32 Such an act strengthens ones bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership.33 On the other hand, private respondents failed to present
even a single tax receipt or declaration showing that Daniela paid taxes due on the
disputed lot as proof that she claims ownership thereof. The only Tax Declaration in
the name of Daniela, which private respondents presented in evidence, refers only to
the house standing on the lot in controversy.34 Even the said Tax Declaration contains
a notation that herein petitioner owns the lot (Lot 56) upon which said house was built.
Moreover, the Court agrees with petitioner that if the subject Deed of Absolute Sale
did not really reflect the real intention of Daniela, why is it that she remained silent
until her death; she never told any of her relatives regarding her actual purpose in
executing the subject deed; she simply chose to make known her true intentions
through the sworn statement she executed on December 28, 1977, the existence of
which she kept secret from her relatives; and despite her declaration therein that she
is appealing for help in order to get back the subject lot, she never took any concrete
step to recover the subject property from petitioner until her death more than ten years
later.
It is true that Daniela retained physical possession of the property even after she
executed the subject Absolute Deed of Sale and even after title to the property was
transferred in petitioners favor. In fact, Daniela continued to occupy the property in
dispute until her death in 1988 while, in the meantime, petitioner continued to reside in
Manila. However, it is well-established that ownership and possession are two entirely
different legal concepts.35Just as possession is not a definite proof of ownership,
neither is non-possession inconsistent with ownership. The first paragraph of Article
1498 of the Civil Code states that when the sale is made through a public instrument,
the execution thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the object
of the contract, if from the deed the contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be
inferred. Possession, along with ownership, is transferred to the vendee by virtue of
the notarized deed of conveyance.36 Thus, in light of the circumstances of the present
case, it is of no legal consequence that petitioner did not take actual possession or
occupation of the disputed property after the execution of the deed of sale in her favor
because she was already able to perfect and complete her ownership of and title over
the subject property.
As to Danielas affidavit dated June 9, 1983, submitted by petitioner, which confirmed
the validity of the sale of the disputed lot in her favor, the same has no probative
value, as the sworn statement earlier adverted to, for being hearsay. Naturally, private
respondents were not able to cross-examine the deceased-affiant on her declarations
contained in the said affidavit.
However, even if Danielas affidavit of June 9, 1983 is disregarded, the fact remains
that private respondents failed to prove by clear, strong and convincing evidence
beyond mere preponderance of evidence37 that the contract of sale between Daniela
and petitioner was simulated. The legal presumption is in favor of the validity of
contracts and the party who impugns its regularity has the burden of proving its
simulation.38 Since private respondents failed to discharge the burden of proving their
allegation that the contract of sale between petitioner and Daniela was simulated, the
presumption of regularity and validity of the October 14, 1969 Deed of Absolute Sale
stands.
Considering that the Court finds the subject contract of sale between petitioner and
Daniela to be valid and not fictitious or simulated, there is no more necessity to
discuss the issue as to whether or not a trust relationship was created between them.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 64122, affirming the Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Cadiz City, Negros Occidental, Branch 60, in Civil Case No. 278-C,
are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The complaint of the private respondents
is DISMISSED.
G.R. No. 173476.February 22, 2012.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RODRIGO SALAFRANCA y
BELLO, accused-appellant.
Criminal Law; Alibi; Denials; Denial and alibi interposed by the accused are worthless
in the face of his positive identification as the assailant.Salafrancas denial and alibi
were worthless in the face of his positive identification by Mendoza as the assailant of
Bolanon. The lower courts properly accorded full faith to such incrimination by
Mendoza considering that Salafranca did not even project any ill motive that could
have impelled Mendoza to testify against him unless it was upon the truth.
Same; Treachery; Treachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes
against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof
which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising
from the defense which the offended party might make.Based on Mendozas
account, Salafranca had attacked Bolanon from behind and had encircled his left arm
over the neck (of Bolanon) and delivered the stabbing blow using the right (hand) and
coming from wnnt (sic) up right sideways and another one encircling the blow towards
below the left nipple. Relying on Mendozas recollection of how Salafranca had
attacked Bolanon, the RTC found treachery to be attendant in the killing. This finding
the CA concurred with. We join the CAs concurrence because Mendozas eyewitness
account of the manner of attack remained uncontested by Salafranca who merely
insisted on his alibi. The method and means Salafranca employed constituted a
surprise deadly attack against Bolanon from behind and included an aggressive
physical control of the latters movements that ensured the success of the attack
without any retaliation or defense on the part of Bolanon. According to the Revised
Penal Code, treachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against
the person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend
directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Hearsay Evidence Rule; Dying Declarations; Res Gestae;
The statement of the victim an hour before his death and right after the hacking
incident bore all the earmarks either of a dying declaration or part of the res gestae
either of which was an exception to the hearsay rule.It appears from the foregoing
testimony that Bolanon had gone to the residence of Estao, his uncle, to seek help
right after being stabbed by Salafranca; that Estao had hurriedly dressed up to bring
his nephew to the Philippine General Hospital by taxicab; that on the way to the
hospital, Estao had asked Bolanon who had stabbed him, and the latter had told
Estao that his assailant had been Salafranca; that at the time of the utterance
Bolanon had seemed to be having a hard time breathing, causing Estao to advise
him not to talk anymore; and that about ten minutes after his admission at the
emergency ward of the hospital, Bolanon had expired and had been pronounced
dead. Such circumstances qualified the utterance of Bolanon as both a dying
declaration and as part of the res gestae, considering that the Court has recognized
that the statement of the victim an hour before his death and right after the hacking
incident bore all the earmarks either of a dying declaration or part of the res gestae
either of which was an exception to the hearsay rule.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A dying declaration is generally inadmissible for being
hearsay; Exceptions.A dying declaration, although generally inadmissible as
evidence due to its hearsay character, may nonetheless be admitted when the
following requisites concur, namely: (a) that the declaration must concern the cause
and surrounding circumstances of the declarants death; (b) that at the time the
declaration is made, the declarant is under a consciousness of an impending death;
(c) that the declarant is competent as a witness; and (d) that the declaration is offered
in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide, in which the declarant is a victim.
All the requisites were met herein. Bolanon communicated his ante-mortem statement
to Estao, identifying Salafranca as the person who had stabbed him. At the time of
his statement, Bolanon was conscious of his impending death, having sustained a
stab wound in the chest and, according to Estao, was then experiencing great
difficulty in breathing. Bolanon succumbed in the hospital emergency room a few
minutes from admission, which occurred under three hours after the stabbing. There is
ample authority for the view that the declarants belief in the imminence of his death
can be shown by the declarants own statements or from circumstantial evidence,
such as the nature of his wounds, statements made in his presence, or by the opinion
of his physician. Bolanon would have been competent to testify on the subject of the
declaration had he survived. Lastly, the dying declaration was offered in this criminal
prosecution for murder in which Bolanon was the victim.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Res Gestae; Requisites for declaration or an utterance as
part of the res gestae to be admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay
rule.A declaration or an utterance is deemed as part of the res gestae and thus
admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the following
requisites concur, to wit: (a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence;
(b) the statements are made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and
(c) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately
attending circumstances. The requisites for admissibility of a declaration as part of the
res gestae concur herein. Surely, when he gave the identity of the assailant to Estao,
Bolanon was referring to a startling occurrence, i.e., his stabbing by Salafranca.
Bolanon was then on board the taxicab that would bring him to the hospital, and thus
had no time to contrive his identification of Salafranca as the assailant. His utterance
about Salafranca having stabbed him was made in spontaneity and only in reaction to
the startling occurrence. The statement was relevant because it identified Salafranca
as the perpetrator.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The term res gestae has been defined as those
circumstances which are the undersigned incidents of a particular litigated act and
which are admissible when illustrative of such act.The term res gestae has been
defined as those circumstances which are the undesigned incidents of a particular
litigated act and which are admissible when illustrative of such act. In a general way,
res gestae refers to the circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the
main fact and serve to illustrate its character and are so spontaneous and
contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation and
fabrication. The rule on res gestae encompasses the exclamations and statements
made by either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before,
during, or immediately after the commission of the crime when the circumstances are
such that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired
by the excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to
deliberate and to fabricate a false statement. The test of admissibility of evidence as a
part of the res gestae is, therefore, whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is so
intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it characterizes
as to be regarded as a part of the transaction itself, and also whether it clearly
negatives any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony.
Civil Law; Damages; Civil Indemnity; Damages to be awarded when death occurs due
to a crime.We modify the limiting of civil damages by the CA and the RTC to only
the death indemnity of P50,000.00. We declare that the surviving heirs of Bolanon
were entitled by law to more than such indemnity, because the damages to be
awarded when death occurs due to a crime may include: (a) civil indemnity ex delicto
for the death of the victim (which was granted herein); (b) actual or compensatory
damages; (c) moral damages; (d) exemplary damages; and (e) temperate damages.
Same; Same; Same; The death indemnity compensated the loss of life due to crime,
but appropriate and reasonable moral damages would justly assuage the mental
anguish and emotional sufferings of the surviving family of the victim.The death
indemnity compensated the loss of life due to crime, but appropriate and reasonable
moral damages would justly assuage the mental anguish and emotional sufferings of
the surviving family of the victim. Although mental anguish and emotional sufferings of
the surviving heirs were not quantifiable with mathematical precision, the Court must
nonetheless strive to set an amount that would restore the heirs of Bolanon to their
moral status quo ante. Given the circumstances, the amount of P50,000.00 is
reasonable as moral damages, which, pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence, we are
bound to award despite the absence of any allegation and proof of the heirs mental
anguish and emotional suffering.
Same; Same; Exemplary Damages; Exemplary damages may be imposed in criminal
cases as part of the civil liability when the crime was committed with one or more
aggravating circumstances.The Civil Code provides that exemplary damages may
be imposed in criminal cases as part of the civil liability when the crime was
committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. The Civil Code permits such
damages to be awarded by way of example or correction for the public good, in
addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. Conformably
with such legal provisions, the CA and the RTC should have recognized the
entitlement of the heirs of the victim to exemplary damages because of the attendance
of treachery. It was of no moment that treachery was an attendant circumstance in
murder, and, as such, inseparable and absorbed in murder. People vs. Salafranca,
666 SCRA 501, G.R. No. 173476 February 22, 2012
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 173476 February 22, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
RODRIGO SALAFRANCA y BELLO, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
An ante-mortem declaration of a victim of murder, homicide, or parricide that meets
the conditions of admissibility under the Rules of Court and pertinent jurisprudence is
admissible either as a dying declaration or as a part of the res gestae, or both.
Rodrigo Salafranca y Bello was charged with and tried for murder for the fatal
stabbing of Johnny Bolanon, and was ultimately found guilty of the felony by the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, in Manila on September 23, 2004. On appeal, his
conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA) through its decision promulgated
on November 24, 2005.1
Salafranca has come to the Court on a final appeal, continuing to challenge the
credibility of the witnesses who had incriminated him.
The established facts show that past midnight on July 31, 1993 Bolanon was stabbed
near the Del Pan Sports Complex in Binondo, Manila; that after stabbing Bolanon, his
assailant ran away; that Bolanon was still able to walk to the house of his uncle
Rodolfo B. Estao in order to seek help; that his uncle rushed him to the Philippine
General Hospital by taxicab; that on their way to the hospital Bolanon told Estao that
it was Salafranca who had stabbed him; that Bolanon eventually succumbed at the
hospital at 2:30 am despite receiving medical attention; and that the stabbing of
Bolanon was personally witnessed by Augusto Mendoza, then still a minor of 13
years, who was in the complex at the time.2
As stated, Salafranca fled after stabbing Bolanon. He evaded arrest for a long period,
despite the warrant for his arrest being issued. He was finally arrested on April 23,
2003, and detained at the Manila City Jail.
After trial, the RTC convicted Salafranca, stating:
The evidence is clear that it was Rodrigo Salafranca who delivered two (2) stabbing
blows to the victim while holding Johnny Bolanon with his left arm encircled around
Bolanons neck stabbing the latter with the use of his right hand at the right sub costal
area which caused Bolanons death. Not only because it was testified to by Augusto
Mendoza but corroborated by Rodolfo Estao, the victims uncle who brought Bolanon
to the hospital and who relayed to the court that when he aided Bolanon and even on
their way to the hospital while the latter was suffering from hard breathing, victim
Bolanon was able to say that it was Rodrigo Salafranca who stabbed him.3
The RTC appreciated treachery based on the testimony of Prosecution witness
Mendoza on how Salafranca had effected his attack
against Bolanon, observing that by "encircling his (accused) left arm, while behind the
victim on the latters neck and stabbing the victim with the use of his right hand,"
Salafranca did not give Bolanon "any opportunity to defend himself."4 The RTC noted
inconsistencies in Salafrancas and his witness testimonies, as well as the fact that he
had fled from his residence the day after the incident and had stayed away in Bataan
for eight years until his arrest. The RTC opined that had he not been hiding, there
would be no reason for him to immediately leave his residence, especially because he
was also working near the area.5
The RTC disposed thus:
With the above observations and findings, accused Rodrigo Salafranca is hereby
found guilty of the crime of Murder defined and punished under Article 248 as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659 in relation to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code
with the presence of the qualifying aggravating circumstance of treachery (248 par. 1
as amended) without any mitigating nor other aggravating circumstance attendant to
its commission, Rodrigo Salafranca is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua.
He shall be credited with the full extent of his preventive imprisonment under Article 29
of the Revised Penal Code.
His body is hereby committed to the custody of the Director of the Bureau of
Correction, National Penitentiary, Muntinlupa City thru the City Jail Warden of Manila.
He is hereby ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim the sum of P50,000.00
representing death indemnity.
There being no claim of other damages, no pronouncement is hereby made.
SO ORDERED.6
On appeal, the CA affirmed the findings and conclusions of the RTC,7 citing the dying
declaration made to his uncle pointing to Salafranca as his assailant, 8 and
Salafrancas positive identification as the culprit by Mendoza.9It stressed that
Salafrancas denial and his alibi of being in his home during the incident did not
overcome the positive identification, especially as his unexplained flight after the
stabbing, leaving his home and employment, constituted a circumstance highly
indicative of his guilt.10
Presently, Salafranca reiterates his defenses, and insists that the State did not prove The Court further notes Estaos testimony on the utterance by Bolanon of statements
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. identifying Salafranca as his assailant right after the stabbing incident. The testimony
follows:
The appeal lacks merit.
Q Can you tell what happened on the said date?
Discrediting Mendoza and Estao as witnesses against Salafranca would be
unwarranted. The RTC and the CA correctly concluded that Mendoza and Estao A My nephew arrived in our house with a stab wound on his left chest.
were credible and reliable. The determination of the competence and credibility of
witnesses at trial rested primarily with the RTC as the trial court due to its unique and Q What time was that?
unequalled position of observing their deportment during testimony, and of assessing
their credibility and appreciating their truthfulness, honesty and candor. Absent a
substantial reason to justify the reversal of the assessment made and conclusions A 12:50 a.m.
reached by the RTC, the CA as the reviewing court was bound by such assessment
and conclusions,11 considering that the CA as the appellate court could neither Q When you saw your nephew with a stab wound, what did he say?
substitute its assessment nor draw different conclusions without a persuasive showing
that the RTC misappreciated the circumstances or omitted significant evidentiary A "Tito dalhin mo ako sa Hospital sinaksak ako."
matters that would alter the result.12 Salafranca did not persuasively show a
misappreciation or omission by the RTC. Hence, the Court, in this appeal, is in no
position to undo or to contradict the findings of the RTC and the CA, which were Q What did you do?
entitled to great weight and respect.13
A I immediately dressed up and brought him to PGH.
Salafrancas denial and alibi were worthless in the face of his positive identification by
Mendoza as the assailant of Bolanon. The lower courts properly accorded full faith to Q On the way to the PGH what transpired?
such incrimination by Mendoza considering that Salafranca did not even project any ill
motive that could have impelled Mendoza to testify against him unless it was upon the A While traveling toward PGH I asked my nephew who stabbed him?, and he
truth.14 answered, Rod Salafranca.

Based on Mendozas account, Salafranca had attacked Bolanon from behind and had Q Do you know this Rod Salafranca?
"encircled his left arm over the neck (of Bolanon) and delivered the stabbing blow
using the right(hand) and coming from wnnt (sic) up right sideways and another one
A Yes, Sir.
encircling the blow towards below the left nipple."15 Relying on Mendozas recollection
of how Salafranca had attacked Bolanon, the RTC found treachery to be attendant in
the killing. This finding the CA concurred with. We join the CAs concurrence because Q How long have you known him?
Mendozas eyewitness account of the manner of attack remained uncontested by
Salafranca who merely insisted on his alibi. The method and means Salafranca A "Matagal na ho kasi mag-neighbor kami."
employed constituted a surprise deadly attack against Bolanon from behind and
included an aggressive physical control of the latters movements that ensured the
Q If you see him inside the courtroom will you be able to identify him?
success of the attack without any retaliation or defense on the part of Bolanon.
According to the Revised Penal Code,16 treachery is present when the offender
commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms in A Yes, Sir.
the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without
risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. Q Will you look around and point him to us?
A (Witness pointing to a man who answered by the name of Rod Salafranca.)
COURT
When he told you the name of his assailant what was his condition?
A He was suffering from hard breathing so I told him not to talk anymore because he
will just suffer more.
Q What happened when you told him that?
A He kept silent.
Q What time did you arrive at the PGH?
A I cannot remember the time because I was already confused at that time.
Q When you arrived at the PGH what happened?
A He was brought to Emergency Room.
Q When he was brought to the emergency room what happened?
A He was pronounced dead.17
It appears from the foregoing testimony that Bolanon had gone to the residence of
Estao, his uncle, to seek help right after being stabbed by Salafranca; that Estao
had hurriedly dressed up to bring his nephew to the Philippine General Hospital by
taxicab; that on the way to the hospital, Estao had asked Bolanon who had stabbed
him, and the latter had told Estao that his assailant had been Salafranca; that at the
time of the utterance Bolanon had seemed to be having a hard time breathing,
causing Estao to advise him not to talk anymore; and that about ten minutes after his
admission at the emergency ward of the hospital, Bolanon had expired and had been
pronounced dead. Such circumstances qualified the utterance of Bolanon as both a
dying declaration and as part of the res gestae, considering that the Court has
recognized that the statement of the victim an hour before his death and right after the
hacking incident bore all the earmarks either of a dying declaration or part of the res
gestae either of which was an exception to the hearsay rule.18
A dying declaration, although generally inadmissible as evidence due to its hearsay
character, may nonetheless be admitted when the following requisites concur, namely:
(a) that the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the
declarants death; (b) that at the time the declaration is made, the declarant is under a
consciousness of an impending death; (c) that the declarant is competent as a
witness; and (d) that the declaration is offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder,
or parricide, in which the declarant is a victim.19
All the requisites were met herein. Bolanon communicated his ante-mortem statement
to Estao, identifying Salafranca as the person who had stabbed him. At the time of
his statement, Bolanon was conscious of his impending death, having sustained a
stab wound in the chest and, according to Estao, was then experiencing great
difficulty in breathing. Bolanon succumbed in the hospital emergency room a few
minutes from admission, which occurred under three hours after the stabbing. There is
ample authority for the view that the declarants belief in the imminence of his death
can be shown by the declarants own statements or from circumstantial evidence,
such as the nature of his wounds, statements made in his presence, or by the opinion
of his physician.20 Bolanon would have been competent to testify on the subject of the
declaration had he survived. Lastly, the dying declaration was offered in this criminal
prosecution for murder in which Bolanon was the victim.
A declaration or an utterance is deemed as part of the res gestae and thus admissible
in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the following requisites concur,
to wit: (a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the statements
are made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (c) the statements
must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending
circumstances.21
The requisites for admissibility of a declaration as part of the res gestae concur herein.
Surely, when he gave the identity of the assailant to Estao, Bolanon was referring to
a startling occurrence, i.e., his stabbing by Salafranca. Bolanon was then on board the
taxicab that would bring him to the hospital, and thus had no time to contrive his
identification of Salafranca as the assailant. His utterance about Salafranca having
stabbed him was made in spontaneity and only in reaction to the startling occurrence.
The statement was relevant because it identified Salafranca as the perpetrator.
The term res gestae has been defined as "those circumstances which are the
undesigned incidents of a particular litigated act and which are admissible when
illustrative of such act."22 In a general way, res gestae refers to the circumstances,
facts, and declarations that grow out of the main fact and serve to illustrate its
character and are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as to
exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication.23The rule on res gestae encompasses
the exclamations and statements made by either the participants, victims, or
spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or immediately after the commission
of the crime when the circumstances are such that the statements were made as
a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and
there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false
statement.24 The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is,
therefore, whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is so intimately interwoven or
connected with the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be regarded as a
part of the transaction itself, and also whether it clearly negatives any premeditation or
purpose to manufacture testimony.25
We modify the limiting of civil damages by the CA and the RTC to only the death
indemnity of P50,000.00. We declare that the surviving heirs of Bolanon were entitled
by law to more than such indemnity, because the damages to be awarded when death
occurs due to a crime may include: (a) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the
victim (which was granted herein); (b) actual or compensatory damages; (c) moral
damages; (d) exemplary damages; and (e) temperate damages.26
We hold that the CA and the RTC should have further granted moral damages which
were different from the death indemnity.27 The death indemnity compensated the loss
of life due to crime, but appropriate and reasonable moral damages would justly
assuage the mental anguish and emotional sufferings of the surviving family of the
victim.28 Although mental anguish and emotional sufferings of the surviving heirs were
not quantifiable with mathematical precision, the Court must nonetheless strive to set
an amount that would restore the heirs of Bolanon to their moral status quo ante.
Given the circumstances, the amount of P50,000.00 is reasonable as moral damages,
which, pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence,29 we are bound to award despite the
absence of any allegation and proof of the heirs mental anguish and emotional
suffering. The rationale for doing so rested on human nature and experience having
shown that:
xxx a violent death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and
anguish on the part of the victims family.1wphi1 It is inherently human to suffer
sorrow, torment, pain and anger when a loved one becomes the victim of a violent or
brutal killing. Such violent death or brutal killing not only steals from the family of the
deceased his precious life, deprives them forever of his love, affection and support,
but often leaves them with the gnawing feeling that an injustice has been done to
them.30
The CA and the RTC committed another omission consisting in their non-recognition
of the right of the heirs of Bolanon to temperate damages. It is already settled that
when actual damages for burial and related expenses are not substantiated by
receipts, temperate damages of at least P25,000.00 are warranted, for it would
certainly be unfair to the surviving heirs of the victim to deny them compensation by
way of actual damages.31
Moreover, the Civil Code provides that exemplary damages may be imposed in
criminal cases as part of the civil liability "when the crime was committed with one or
more aggravating circumstances."32 The Civil Code permits such damages to be
awarded "by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral,
temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages."33 Conformably with such legal
provisions, the CA and the RTC should have recognized the entitlement of the heirs of
the victim to exemplary damages because of the attendance of treachery. It was of no
moment that treachery was an attendant circumstance in murder, and, as such,
inseparable and absorbed in murder. The Court explained so in People v. Catubig:34
The term "aggravating circumstances" used by the Civil Code, the law not having
specified otherwise, is to be understood in its broad or generic sense. The commission
of an offense has a two-pronged effect, one on the public as it breaches the social
order and the other upon the private victim as it causes personal sufferings, each of
which is addressed by, respectively, the prescription of heavier punishment for the
accused and by an award of additional damages to the victim. The increase of the
penalty or a shift to a graver felony underscores the exacerbation of the offense by the
attendance of aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, in its
commission. Unlike the criminal liability which is basically a State concern, the award
of damages, however, is likewise, if not primarily, intended for the offended party who
suffers thereby. It would make little sense for an award of exemplary damages to be
due the private offended party when the aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to
be withheld when it is qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying nature of an
aggravating circumstance is a distinction that should only be of consequence to the
criminal, rather than to the civil, liability of the offender. In fine, relative to the civil
aspect of the case, an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying,
should entitle the offended party to an award of exemplary damages within the
unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code.
For the purpose of fixing the exemplary damages, the sum of P30,000.00 is deemed
reasonable and proper,35because we think that a lesser amount could not result in
genuine exemplarity.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated
on November 24, 2005, but MODIFIES the awards of civil damages by adding to the
amount of P50,000.00 awarded as death indemnity the amounts of P50,000.00 as
moral damages; P25,000.00 as temperate damages; and P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages, all of which awards shall bear interest of 6% per annum from the finality of
this decision.
The accused shall further pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 128538. February 28, 2001.*

SCC CHEMICALS CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS, STATE INVESTMENT HOUSE, INC., DANILO ARRIETA and LEOPOLDO
HALILI, respondents.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Evidence; Rule that hearsay evidence is excluded and
carries no probative value admits of an exception; It is settled that it is the opportunity
to cross-examine which negates the claim that the matters testified to by a witness are
hearsay.As a rule, hearsay evidence is excluded and carries no probative value.
However, the rule does admit of an exception. Where a party failed to object to
hearsay evidence, then the same is admissible. The rationale for this exception is to
be found in the right of a litigant to cross-examine. It is settled that it is the opportunity
to cross-examine which negates the claim that the matters testified to by a witness are
hearsay. However, the right to crossexamine may be waived. The repeated failure of a
party to cross-examine the witness is an implied waiver of such right.

Same; Same; Same; Under Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, a judicial
admission requires no proof.As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, petitioners
admission as to the execution of the promissory note by it through private respondent
Arrieta and Bermundo at pre-trial sufficed to settle the question of the genuineness of
signatures. The admission having been made in a stipulation of facts at pre-trial by the
parties, it must be treated as a judicial admission. Under Section 4, Rule 129 of the
Rules of Court, a judicial admission requires no proof.

Civil Law; Attorneys Fees; Award of attorneys fees is the exception rather than the
rule, hence it is necessary for the trial court to make findings of fact and law, which
would bring the case within the exception and justify the grant of the award.It is
settled that the award of attorneys fees is the exception rather than the rule, hence it
is necessary for the trial court to make findings of fact and law, which would bring the
case within the exception and justify the grant of the award. Otherwise stated, given
the failure by the trial court to explicitly state the rationale for the award of attorneys
fees, the same shall be disallowed. In the present case, a perusal of the records
shows that the trial court failed to explain the award of attorneys fees. We hold that
the same should thereby be deleted. SCC Chemicals Corporation vs. Court of Equally challenged in this petition is the Resolution of the appellate court dated
Appeals, 353 SCRA 70, G.R. No. 128538 February 28, 2001 February 27, 1997, denying SCC Chemicals Corporation's motion for reconsideration.

The background of this case, as culled from the decision of the Court of Appeals, is as
follows:

On December 13, 1983, SCC Chemicals Corporation (SCC for brevity) through its
chairman, private respondent Danilo Arrieta and vice president, Pablo (Pablito)
Bermundo, obtained a loan from State Investment House Inc., (hereinafter SIHI) in the
amount of P129,824.48. The loan carried an annual interest rate of 30% plus penalty
Republic of the Philippines charges of 2% per month on the remaining balance of the principal upon non-payment
SUPREME COURT on the due date-January 12, 1984. To secure the payment of the loan, Danilo Arrieta
Manila and private respondent Leopoldo Halili executed a Comprehensive Surety Agreement
binding themselves jointly and severally to pay the obligation on the maturity date.
SCC failed to pay the loan when it matured. SIHI then sent demand letters to SCC,
SECOND DIVISION
Arrieta and Halili, but notwithstanding receipt thereof, no payment was made.

G.R. No. 128538 February 28, 2001

On August 2, 1984, SIHI filed Civil Case No. 84-25881 for a sum of money with a
prayer for preliminary attachment against SCC, Arrieta, and Halili with the Regional
SCC CHEMICALS CORPORATION, petitioner, Trial Court of Manila.
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, STATE INVESTMENT HOUSE, INC.,
In its answer, SCC asserted SIHI's lack of cause of action. Petitioner contended that
DANILO ARRIETA and LEOPOLDO HALILI, respondent.
the promissory note upon which SIHI anchored its cause of action was null, void, and
of no binding effect for lack or failure of consideration.
QUISUMBING, J.:

The case was then set for pre-trial. The parties were allowed to meet out-of-court in an
Before us is a petition for review, pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, of the effort to settle the dispute amicably. No settlement was reached, but the following
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated in November 12, 1996 in CA-G.R. CV No. stipulation of facts was agreed upon:
45742 entitled "State Investment House, Inc., v. Danilo Arrieta, et al., and SCC
Chemical Corporation." The questioned decision affirmed in toto the decision of the
1. Parties agree that this Court has jurisdiction over the plaintiff and the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 33, dated March 22, 1993, in Civil Case NO.
defendant and that it has jurisdiction to try and decide this case on its merits
84-25881, the dispositive portion of which reads:
and that plaintiff and the defendant have each the capacity to sue and to be
sued in this present action;
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor
of the plaintiff and against the defendants ordering the latter to pay jointly
2. Parties agree that plaintiff sent a demand letter to the defendant SCC
and severally the plaintiff the following: a) To pay plaintiff State Investment
Chemical Corporation dated April 4, 1984 together with a statement of
House, Inc., the sum of P150,483.16 with interest thereon at 30% per
account of even date which were both received by the herein defendant;
annum reckond (sic) from April, 1984 until the whole amount is fully paid; b)
and
To pay plaintiff an amount equivalent to 25% of the total amount due and
demandable as attorney's fees and to pay the cost(s) of suit.
3. Parties finally agree that the plaintiff and the defendant SCC Chemical
1 Corporation the latter acting through defendants Danilo E. Arrieta and
SO ORDERED.
 Pablito Bermundo executed a promissory note last December 13, 1983 for
the amount of P129,824.48 with maturity date on January 12, 1984.2
The case then proceeded to trial on the sole issue of whether or not the defendants
were liable to the plaintiff and to what extent was the liability.
SIHI presented one witness to prove its claim. The cross-examination of said witness
was postponed several times due to one reason or another at the instance of either
party. The case was calendared several times for hearing but each time, SCC or its
counsel failed to appear despite notice. SCC was finally declared by the trial court to
have waived its right to cross-examine the witness of SIHI and the case was deemed
submitted for decision.
On March 22, 1993, the lower court promulgated its decision in favor of SIHI.
Aggrieved by the verdict, SCC elevated the case to the Court of Appeals where it was
docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 45742.
On appeal, SCC contended that SIHI had failed to show, by a preponderance of
evidence, that the latter had a case against it. SCC argued that the lone witness
presented by SIHI to prove its claim was insufficient as the competency of the witness
was not established and there was no showing that he had personal knowledge of the
transaction. SCC further maintained that no proof was shown of the genuineness of
the signatures in the documentary exhibits presented as evidence and that these
signatures were neither marked nor offered in evidence by SIHI. Finally, SCC pointed
out that the original copies of the documents were not presented in court.
On November 12, 1996, the appellate court affirmed in toto the judgment appealed
from.
On December 11, 1996 SCC filed its motion for reconsideration, which the Court of
Appeals denied in its resolution dated February 27, 1997.
Hence, petitioner's recourse to this Court relying on the following assignments of error:
I hearing dates, petitioner was supposed to cross-examine the lone witness offered by
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING
THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT PROVED ITS CAUSE OF ACTION AND
OVERCAME IT'S BURDEN OF PROOF.
II
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES TO THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT.
We find the pertinent issues submitted for resolution to be:
(1) Whether or not the Court of Appeals made an error of law in holding that
private respondent SIHI had proved its cause of action by preponderant
evidence; and
(2) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the award of
attorney's fees to SIHI.
Anent the first issue, petitioner contends that SIHI introduced documentary evidence
through the testimony of a witness whose competence was not established and
whose personal knowledge of the truthfulness of the facts testified to was not
demonstrated. It argues that the same was in violation of Sections 363 and 48,4 Rule
130 of the Rules of Court and it was manifest error for the Court of Appeals to have
ruled otherwise. In addition, SCC points out that the sole witness of SIHI did not
profess to have seen the document presented in evidence executed or written by
SCC. Thus, no proof of its genuineness was adduced. SIHI thus ran afoul of Section
2,5Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, which requires proof of due execution and
authenticity of private documents before the same can be received as evidence.
Petitioner likewise submits that none of the signatures affixed in the documentary
evidence presented by SIHI were offered in evidence. It vehemently argues that such
was in violation of the requirement of Section 34,6 Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. It
was thus an error of law on the part of the appellate court to consider the same.
Finally, petitioner posits that the non-production of the originals of the documents
presented in evidence allows the presumption of suppression of evidence provided for
in Section 3 (e),7 Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, to come into play.
Petitioner's arguments lack merit; they fail to persuade us.
We note that the Court of Appeals found that SCC failed to appear several times on
scheduled hearing dates despite due notice to it and counsel. On all those scheduled
SIHI to prove its case. Petitioner now charges the appellate court with committing an
error of law when it failed to disallow the admission in evidence of said testimony
pursuant to the "hearsay rule" contained in Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
Rule 130, Section 36 reads:
SEC. 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay
excluded. A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his
personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception,
except as otherwise provided in these rules.
Petitioner's reliance on Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is misplaced. As a
rule, hearsay evidence is excluded and carries no probative value.8 However, the rule
does admit of an exception. Where a party failed to object to hearsay evidence, then
the same is admissible.9 The rationale for this exception is to be found in the right of a
litigant to cross-examine. It is settled that it is the opportunity to cross-examine which
negates the claim that the matters testified to by a witness are hearsay.10 However, the
right to cross-examine may be waived. The repeated failure of a party to cross-
examine the witness is an implied waiver of such right. Petitioner was afforded several
opportunities by the trial court to cross-examine the other party's witness. Petitioner
repeatedly failed to take advantage of these opportunities. No error was thus
committed by the respondent court when it sustained the trial court's finding that
petitioner had waived its right to cross-examine the opposing party's witness. It is now
too late for petitioner to be raising this matter of hearsay evidence.
Nor was the assailed testimony hearsay. The Court of Appeals correctly found that the
witness of SIHI was a competent witness as he testified to facts, which he knew of his
personal knowledge. Thus, the requirements of Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court as to the admissibility of his testimony were satisfied.
Respecting petitioner's other submissions, the same are moot and academic. As
correctly found by the Court of Appeals, petitioner's admission as to the execution of
the promissory note by it through private respondent Arrieta and Bermundo at pre-trial
sufficed to settle the question of the genuineness of signatures. The admission having
been made in a stipulation of facts at pre-trial by the parties, it must be treated as a
judicial admission. Under Section, 411 Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, a judicial
admission requires no proof.
Nor will petitioner's reliance on the "best evidence rule"12 advance its cause.
Respondent SIHI had no need to present the original of the documents as there was
already a judicial admission by petitioner at pre-trial of the execution of the promissory
note and receipt of the demand letter. It is now too late for petitioner to be questioning
their authenticity. Its admission of the existence of these documents was sufficient to
establish its obligation. Petitioner failed to submit any evidence to the contrary or proof
of payment or other forms of extinguishment of said obligation. No reversible error
was thus committed by the appellate court when it held petitioner liable on its
obligation, pursuant to Article 1159 of the Civil Code which reads:
ART. 1159. Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between
the contracting parties and should be complied with in good faith.
On the second issue, petitioner charges the Court of Appeals with reversible error for
having sustained the trial court'' award of attorney'' fees. Petitioner relies on Radio
Communications of the Philippines v. Rodriguez, 182 SCRA 899, 909 (1990), where
we held that when attorney's fees are awarded, the reason for the award of attorney's
fees must be stated in the text of the court's decision. Petitioner submits that since the
trial court did not state any reason for awarding the same, the award of attorney's fees
should have been disallowed by the appellate court.1wphi1.nt
We find for petitioner in this regard.
It is settled that the award of attorney's fees is the exception rather than the rule,
hence it is necessary for the trial court to make findings of fact and law, which would
bring the case within the exception and justify the grant of the award.13 Otherwise
stated, given the failure by the trial court to explicitly state the rationale for the award
of attorney's fees, the same shall be disallowed. In the present case, a perusal of the
records shows that the trial court failed to explain the award of attorney's fees. We
hold that the same should thereby be deleted.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The decision dated
November 12, 1996 of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION that
the award of attorney's fees to private respondent SIHI is hereby deleted. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 143276. July 20, 2004.*
LANDBANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES VICENTE BANAL and
LEONIDAS ARENAS-BANAL, respondents.
Agrarian Reform; Just Compensation; Due Process; The determination of just
compensation of the property taken involves the examination of the factors specified
in Section 17 of R.A. 6657the trial court cannot dispense with the hearing and
merely order the parties to submit their respective memoranda.The RTC failed to
observe the basic rules of procedure and the fundamental requirements in
determining just compensation for the property. Firstly, it dispensed with the hearing
and merely ordered the parties to submit their respective memoranda. Such action is
grossly erroneous since the determination of just compensation involves the
examination of the following factors specified in Section 17 of R.A. 6657, as amended:
1. the cost of the acquisition of the land; 2. the current value of like properties; 3. its
nature, actual use and income; 4. the sworn valuation by the owner; the tax
declarations; 5. the assessment made by government assessors; 6. the social and
economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by the
government to the property; and 7. the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from
any government financing institution on the said land, if any. Obviously, these factors
involve factual matters which can be established only during a hearing wherein the
contending parties present their respective evidence. In fact, to underscore the
intricate nature of determining the valuation of the land, Section 58 of the same law
even authorizes the Special Agrarian Courts to appoint commissioners for such
purpose.
Same; Same; Judicial Notice; Well-settled is the rule that courts are not authorized to
take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases even when said cases
have been tried or are pending in the same court or before the same judge.Well-
settled is the rule that courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents
of the records of other cases even when said cases have been tried or are pending in
the same court or before the same judge. They may only do so in the absence of
objection and with the knowledge of the opposing party, which are not obtaining
here. Furthermore, as earlier stated, the Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings
before the Special Agrarian Courts. In this regard, Section 3, Rule 129 of the Revised
Rules on Evidence is explicit on the necessity of a hearing before a court takes judicial
notice of a certain matter, thus: SEC. 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary.
During the trial, the court, on its own initiative, or on request of a party, may announce
its intention to take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard
thereon. After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own
initiative or on request of a party, may take judicial notice of any matter and allow the
parties to be heard thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the case.
(emphasis added)
Same; Same; It is error for the trial court to apply the formula prescribed in E.O. No.
228 and R.A. No. 3844, as amended, in determining the valuation of land planted to
coconut and rice and in granting compounded interest pursuant to DAR Administrative
Order No. 13, Series of 1994it should have applied DAR Administrative Order No. 6,
as amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 11.The RTC erred in applying the
formula prescribed under Executive Order (EO) No. 228 and R.A. No. 3844, as
amended, in determining the valuation of the property; and in granting compounded
interest pursuant to DAR Administrative Order No. 13, Series of 1994. It must be
stressed that EO No. 228 covers private agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice
and corn, while R.A. 3844 governs agricultural leasehold relation between the
person who furnishes the landholding, either as owner, civil law lessee, usufructuary,
or legal possessor, and the person who personally cultivates the same. Here, the
land is planted to coconut and rice and does not involve agricultural leasehold relation.
What the trial court should have applied is the formula in DAR Administrative Order
No. 6, as amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 11 discussed earlier.
Same; Same; DAR Administrative Order No. 13, Series of 1994 does not apply to
lands taken under P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228 whose owners have not been
compensated.As regards the award of compounded interest, suffice it to state that
DAR Administrative Order No. 13, Series of 1994 does not apply to the subject land
but to those lands taken under Presidential Decree No. 27 and Executive Order No.
228 whose owners have not been compensated. In this case, the property is covered
by R.A. 6657, as amended, and respondents have been paid the provisional
compensation thereof, as stipulated during the pre-trial.
Same; Same; While the determination of just compensation involves the exercise of
judicial discretion, such discretion must be discharged within the bounds of the law.
While the determination of just compensation involves the exercise of judicial
discretion, however, such discretion must be discharged within the bounds of the law.
Here, the RTC wantonly disregarded R.A. 6657, as amended, and its implementing
rules and regulations. (DAR Administrative Order No. 6, as amended by DAR
Administrative Order No. 11).
Landbank of the Philippines vs. Banal, 434 SCRA 543, G.R. No. 143276 July 20,
2004
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 143276 July 20, 2004
LANDBANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES VICENTE BANAL and LEONIDAS ARENAS-BANAL, respondents.

Respondents rejected the above valuation. Thus, pursuant to Section 16(d) of R.A.
DECISION 6657, as amended, a summary administrative proceeding was conducted before the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) to determine the valuation of the
land. Eventually, the PARAD rendered its Decision affirming the Landbank's valuation.

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Spouses Vicente and Leonidas Banal, respondents, are the registered owners of
19.3422 hectares of agricultural land situated in San Felipe, Basud, Camarines Norte
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-6296. A portion of the land consisting of
6.2330 hectares (5.4730 of which is planted to coconut and 0.7600 planted to palay)
was compulsorily acquired by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) pursuant to
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657,1 as amended, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.
Dissatisfied with the Decision of the PARAD, respondents filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 40, Daet, Camarines Norte, designated as a Special Agrarian
Court, a petition for determination of just compensation, docketed as Civil Case No.
6806. Impleaded as respondents were the DAR and the Landbank. Petitioners therein
prayed for a compensation of P100,000.00 per hectare for both coconut land and
riceland, or an aggregate amount of P623,000.00.
During the pre-trial on September 23, 1998, the parties submitted to the RTC the
following admissions of facts: (1) the subject property is governed by the provisions of
R.A. 6657, as amended; (2) it was distributed to the farmers-beneficiaries; and (3) the
Landbank deposited the provisional compensation based on the valuation made by
the DAR.5

In accordance with the formula prescribed in DAR Administrative Order No. 6, Series
of 1992,2 as amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 11, Series of 1994,3 the Land On the same day after the pre-trial, the court issued an Order dispensing with the
Bank of the Philippines4 (Landbank), petitioner, made the following valuation of the hearing and directing the parties to submit their respective memoranda.6
property:
In its Decision dated February 5, 1999, the trial court computed the just compensation
for the coconut land at P657,137.00 and for the riceland at P46,000.00, or a total
of P703,137.00, which is beyond respondents' valuation of P623,000.00. The court
Acquired property Area in hectares further awarded compounded interest at P79,732.00 in cash. The dispositive portion of
the Decision reads:

"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

Coconut land 5.4730 P148,675.19

1. Ordering respondent Landbank to pay the petitioners, the spouses Dr.
Vicente Banal and Leonidas Arenas-Banal, for the 5.4730 hectares of
coconut land the sum of SIX HUNDRED FIFTY-SEVEN THOUSAND ONE
HUNDRED THIRTY-SEVEN PESOS (P657,137.00) in cash and in bonds in
the proportion provided by law;
Riceland 0.7600 25,243.36

2. Ordering respondent Landbank to pay the petitioners for the .7600

hectares of riceland the sum of FORTY-SIX THOUSAND PESOS
(P46,000.00) in cash and in bonds in the proportion provided by law; and
P173,918.55
 3. Ordering respondent Landbank to pay the petitioners the sum of
SEVENTY-NINE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED THIRTY-TWO PESOS
(P79,732.00) as the compounded interest in cash.
IT IS SO ORDERED."7
In determining the valuation of the land, the trial court based the same on the facts
established in another case pending before it (Civil Case No. 6679, "Luz Rodriguez
vs. DAR, et al."), using the following formula:
For the coconut land
1. Average Gross Production (AGP) x .70 x 9.70 (price per kilo of
coconut) = Net Income (NI)
2. NI / 6% = Price Per Hectare (PPH) (applying the capitalization
formula under Republic Act No. 38448)
For the riceland
1. 2.5 x AGP x Government Support Price (GSP) = Land Value
(LV) or PPH (using the formula under Executive Order No. 2289)
2. AGP x 6% compounded annually for 26 years x GSP = Interest
(pursuant to DAR AO No. 13, Series of 1994)
Forthwith, the Landbank filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review, docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 52163.
10
On March 20, 2000, the Appellate Court rendered a Decision affirming in toto the
judgment of the trial court. The Landbank's motion for reconsideration was likewise
denied.11
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
The fundamental issue for our resolution is whether the Court of Appeals erred in
sustaining the trial court's valuation of the land. As earlier mentioned, there was no
trial on the merits.
To begin with, under Section 1 of Executive Order No. 405 (1990), the Landbank is
charged "primarily" with "the determination of the land valuation and compensation for
all private lands suitable for agriculture under the Voluntary Offer to Sell or
Compulsory Acquisition arrangement" For its part, the DAR relies on the
determination of the land valuation and compensation by the Landbank.12
Based on the Landbank's valuation of the land, the DAR makes an offer to the
landowner.13 If the landowner accepts the offer, the Landbank shall pay him the
purchase price of the land after he executes and delivers a deed of transfer and
surrenders the certificate of title in favor of the government.14 In case the landowner
rejects the offer or fails to reply thereto, the DAR adjudicator15 conducts summary
administrative proceedings to determine the compensation for the land by requiring
the landowner, the Landbank and other interested parties to submit evidence as to the
just compensation for the land.16 These functions by the DAR are in accordance with
its quasi-judicial powers under Section 50 of R.A. 6657, as amended, which provides:
"SEC. 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. The DAR is hereby vested
with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters
and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the
implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
x x x."
A party who disagrees with the decision of the DAR adjudicator may bring the matter
to the RTC designated as a Special Agrarian Court17 "for final determination of just
compensation."18
In the proceedings before the RTC, it is mandated to apply the Rules of Court19 and,
on its own initiative or at the instance of any of the parties, "appoint one or more
commissioners to examine, investigate and ascertain facts relevant to the dispute,
including the valuation of properties, and to file a written report thereof x x x."20 In
determining just compensation, the RTC is required to consider several factors
enumerated in Section 17 of R.A. 6657, as amended, thus:
"Sec. 17. Determination of Just Compensation. In determining just
compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the current value of like
properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the
owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made by government
assessors shall be considered. The social and economic benefits
contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by the Government to
the property, as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any
government financing institution on the said land, shall be considered as
additional factors to determine its valuation."
These factors have been translated into a basic formula in DAR Administrative Order
No. 6, Series of 1992, as amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 11, Series of
1994, issued pursuant to the DAR's rule-making power to carry out the object and
purposes of R.A. 6657, as amended.21
The formula stated in DAR Administrative Order No. 6, as amended, is as follows:
 "LV = (CNI x 0.6) + (CS x 0.3) + (MV x 0.1) 5. the assessment made by government assessors;

LV = Land Value 6. the social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the
farmworkers and by the government to the property; and
CNI = Capitalized Net Income
7. the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government
financing institution on the said land, if any.
CS = Comparable Sales

Obviously, these factors involve factual matters which can be established only during
MV = Market Value per Tax Declaration
a hearing wherein the contending parties present their respective evidence. In fact, to
underscore the intricate nature of determining the valuation of the land, Section 58 of
The above formula shall be used if all the three factors are present, relevant and the same law even authorizes the Special Agrarian Courts to appoint commissioners
applicable. for such purpose.

A.1 When the CS factor is not present and CNI and MV are applicable, the Secondly, the RTC, in concluding that the valuation of respondents' property
formula shall be: is P703,137.00, merely took judicial notice of the average production figures in
the Rodriguez case pending before it and applied the same to this case without
conducting a hearing and worse, without the knowledge or consent of the parties,
LV = (CNI x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1) thus:

A.2 When the CNI factor is not present, and CS and MV are applicable, the
formula shall be:
LV = (CS x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1)
A.3 When both the CS and CNI are not present and only MV is applicable,
the formula shall be:
LV = MV x 2"
Here, the RTC failed to observe the basic rules of procedure and the fundamental
requirements in determining just compensation for the property. Firstly, it dispensed
with the hearing and merely ordered the parties to submit their respective
memoranda. Such action is grossly erroneous since the determination of just
compensation involves the examination of the following factors specified in Section 17
of R.A. 6657, as amended:
1. the cost of the acquisition of the land;
2. the current value of like properties;
3. its nature, actual use and income;
4. the sworn valuation by the owner; the tax declarations;
"x x x. In the case x x x of the coconut portion of the land 5.4730 hectares,
defendants determined the average gross production per year at 506.95
kilos only, but in the very recent case of Luz Rodriguez vs. DAR, et al.,
filed and decided by this court in Civil Case No. 6679 also for just
compensation for coconut lands and Riceland situated at Basud, Camarines
Norte wherein also the lands in the above-entitled case are situated, the
value fixed therein was 1,061.52 kilos per annum per hectare for
coconut land and the price per kilo is P8.82, but in the instant case the
price per kilo is P9.70. In the present case, we consider 506.95 kilos
average gross production per year per hectare to be very low considering
that farm practice for coconut lands is harvest every forty-five days. We
cannot also comprehended why in the Rodriguez case and in this case
there is a great variance in average production per year when in the two
cases the lands are both coconut lands and in the same place of Basud,
Camarines Norte. We believe that it is more fair to adapt the 1,061.52 kilos
per hectare per year as average gross production. In the Rodriguez case,
the defendants fixed the average gross production of palay at 3,000 kilos or
60 cavans per year. The court is also constrained to apply this yearly
palay production in the Rodriguez case to the case at bar.
xxx xxx xxx
"As shown in the Memorandum of Landbank in this case, the area of the
coconut land taken under CARP is 5.4730 hectares. But as already
noted, the average gross production a year of 506.96 kilos per hectare
fixed by Landbank is too low as compared to the Rodriguez case
which was 1,061 kilos when the coconut land in both cases are in the
 same town of Basud, Camarines Norte, compelling this court then to
adapt 1,061 kilos as the average gross production a year of the
coconut land in this case. We have to apply also the price of P9.70 per
kilo as this is the value that Landbank fixed for this case.
"The net income of the coconut land is equal to 70% of the gross income.
So, the net income of the coconut land is 1,061 x .70 x 9.70
equals P7,204.19 per hectare. Applying the capitalization formula of R.A.
3844 to the net income of P7,204.19 divided by 6%, the legal rate of
interest, equals P120,069.00 per hectare. Therefore, the just compensation
for the 5.4730 hectares is P657,137.00.
"The Riceland taken under Presidential Decree No. 27 as of October 21,
1972 has an area of .7600 hectare. If in the Rodriguez case the Landbank
fixed the average gross production of 3000 kilos or 60 cavans of palay per
year, then the .7600 hectare in this case would be 46 cavans. The value of
the riceland therefore in this case is 46 cavans x 2.5 x P400.00
equals P46,000.00.22
"PARC Resolution 94-24-1 of 25 October 1994, implemented by DAR AO
13, granted interest on the compensation at 6% compounded annually. The
compounded interest on the 46 cavans for 26 years is 199.33 cavans.
At P400.00 per cavan, the value of the compounded interest
is P79,732.00."23 (emphasis added)
Well-settled is the rule that courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the
contents of the records of other cases even when said cases have been tried or are
pending in the same court or before the same judge.24 They may only do so "in the
absence of objection" and "with the knowledge of the opposing party,"25 which are not
obtaining here.
Furthermore, as earlier stated, the Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings before
the Special Agrarian Courts. In this regard, Section 3, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules
on Evidence is explicit on the necessity of a hearing before a court takes judicial
notice of a certain matter, thus:
"SEC. 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. During the trial, the
court, on its own initiative, or on request of a party, may announce its
intention to take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be
heard thereon.
"After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its
own initiative or on request of a party, may take judicial notice of any
matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon if such matter is
decisive of a material issue in the case." (emphasis added)
The RTC failed to observe the above provisions.
Lastly, the RTC erred in applying the formula prescribed under Executive Order (EO)
No. 22826 and R.A. No. 3844,27 as amended, in determining the valuation of the
property; and in granting compounded interest pursuant to DAR Administrative Order
No. 13, Series of 1994.28 It must be stressed that EO No. 228 covers private
agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn, while R.A. 3844
governs agricultural leasehold relation between "the person who furnishes the
landholding, either as owner, civil law lessee, usufructuary, or legal possessor, and the
person who personally cultivates the same."29 Here, the land is planted to coconut and
rice and does not involve agricultural leasehold relation. What the trial court should
have applied is the formula in DAR Administrative Order No. 6, as amended by DAR
Administrative Order No. 11 discussed earlier.
As regards the award of compounded interest, suffice it to state that DAR
Administrative Order No. 13, Series of 1994 does not apply to the subject land but to
those lands taken under Presidential Decree No. 2730 and Executive Order No. 228
whose owners have not been compensated. In this case, the property is covered by
R.A. 6657, as amended, and respondents have been paid the provisional
compensation thereof, as stipulated during the pre-trial.
While the determination of just compensation involves the exercise of judicial
discretion, however, such discretion must be discharged within the bounds of the law.
Here, the RTC wantonly disregarded R.A. 6657, as amended, and its implementing
rules and regulations. (DAR Administrative Order No. 6, as amended by DAR
Administrative Order No.11).
In sum, we find that the Court of Appeals and the RTC erred in determining the
valuation of the subject land. Thus, we deem it proper to remand this case to the RTC
for trial on the merits wherein the parties may present their respective evidence. In
determining the valuation of the subject property, the trial court shall consider the
factors provided under Section 17 of R.A. 6657, as amended, mentioned earlier. The
formula prescribed by the DAR in Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 1992, as
amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 11, Series of 1994, shall be used in the
valuation of the land. Furthermore, upon its own initiative, or at the instance of any of
the parties, the trial court may appoint one or more commissioners to examine,
investigate and ascertain facts relevant to the dispute.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated March 20, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 52163 is REVERSED. Civil Case
No. 6806 is REMANDED to the RTC, Branch 40, Daet, Camarines Norte, for trial on
the merits with dispatch. The trial judge is directed to observe strictly the procedures
specified above in determining the proper valuation of the subject property.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. 100901-08. July 16, 1998.*
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JAILON KULAIS,
CARLOS FALCASANTOS @ Commander Falcasantos, AWALON KAMLON
HASSAN @ Commander Kamlon, MAJID SAMSON @ Commander Bungi,
JUMATIYA AMLANI DE FALCASANTOS, NORMA SAHIDDAN DE KULAIS,
SALVADOR MAMARIL y MENDOZA, HADJIRUL PLASIN y ALIH, JAINUDDIN
HASSAN y AHMAD, IMAM TARUK ALAH y SALIH, JALINA HASSAN DE KAMMING,
FREDDIE MANUEL @ Ajid and several JOHN and JANE DOES, accused. JAILON
KULAIS, accused-appellant.
Criminal Law; Constitutional Law; Right of Confrontation; Judicial Notice; As a general
rule, courts should not take judicial notice of the evidence presented in other
proceedings, even if these have been tried or are pending in the same court, or have
been heard and are actually pending before the same judge.True, as a general rule,
courts should not take judicial notice of the evidence presented in other proceedings,
even if these have been tried or are pending in the same court, or have been heard
and are actually pending before the same judge. This is especially true in criminal
cases, where the accused has the constitutional right to confront and cross-examine
the witnesses against him.
Same; Kidnapping; The fact that the victims were detained for only three hours does
not matter if said victims are public officers.Victims Virginia San Agustin-Gara,
Monico Saavedra and Calixto Francisco were members of the government monitoring
team abducted by appellants group. The three testified to the fact of kidnapping;
however, they were not able to identify the appellant. Even so, appellants identity as
one of the kidnappers was sufficiently established by Calunod, Bacarro and Perez,
who were with Gara, Saavedra and Francisco when the abduction occurred. That
Gara, Saavedra and Francisco were detained for only three hours does not matter. In
People vs. Domasian, the victim was similarly held for three hours, and was released
even before his parents received the ransom note. The accused therein argued that
they could not be held guilty of kidnapping as no enclosure was involved, and that
only grave coercion was committed, if at all. Convicting appellants of kidnapping or
serious illegal detention under Art. 267 (4) of the Revised Penal Code, the Court found
that the victim, an eight-year-old boy, was deprived of his liberty when he was
restrained from going home. The Court justified the conviction by holding that the
offense consisted not only in placing a person in an enclosure, but also in detaining or
depriving him, in any manner, of his liberty. Likewise, in People vs. Santos, the Court
held that since the appellant was charged and convicted under Article 267, paragraph
4, it was not the duration of the deprivation of liberty which was important, but the fact
that the victim, a minor, was locked up.
Same; Witnesses; Alibi and Denial; Jurisprudence gives greater weight to the positive
narration of prosecution witnesses than to the negative testimonies of the defense.
The appellants bare denial is a weak defense that becomes even weaker in the face
of the prosecution witnesses positive identification of him. Jurisprudence gives greater
weight to the positive narration of prosecution witnesses than to the negative
testimonies of the defense. Between positive and categorical testimony which has a
ring of truth to it on the one hand, and a bare denial on the other, the former generally
prevails. Jessica Calunod, Armando Bacarro and Edilberto Perez testified in a clear,
straightforward and frank manner; and their testimonies were compatible on material
points. Moreover, no ill motive was attributed to the kidnap victims and none was
found by this Court.
Same; Penalties; Life imprisonment is not synonymous with reclusion perpetua.The
trial court erred when it sentenced the appellant to six terms of life imprisonment. The
penalty for kidnapping with ransom, under the Revised Penal Code, is reclusion
perpetua to death. Since the crimes happened in 1988, when the capital penalty was
proscribed by the Constitution, the maximum penalty that could have been imposed
was reclusion perpetua. Life imprisonment is not synonymous with reclusion perpetua.
Unlike life imprisonment, reclusion perpetua carries with it accessory penalties
provided in the Revised Penal Code and has a definite extent or duration. Life
imprisonment is invariably imposed for serious offenses penalized by special laws,
while reclusion perpetua is prescribed in accordance with the Revised Penal Code.
People vs. Kulais, 292 SCRA 551, G.R. Nos. 100901-08 July 16, 1998
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 100901 July 16, 1998
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JAILON KULAIS, CARLOS FALCASANTOS @ "Commander Falcasantos,"
AWALON KAMLON HASSAN @ "Commander Kamlon," MAJID SAMSON @
"Commander Bungi," JUMATIYA AMLANI DE FALCASANTOS, NORMA
SAHIDDAN DE KULAIS, SALVADOR MAMARIL y MENDOZA, HADJIRUL PLASIN
y ALIH, JAINUDDIN HASSAN y AHMAD, IMAM TARUK ALAH y SALIH, JALINA
HASSAN DE KAMMING, FREDDIE MANUEL @ "Ajid" and several JOHN and
JANE DOES, accused, JAILON KULAIS, appellant.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The trial court's erroneous taking of judicial notice of a witness' testimony in another
case, also pending before it, does not affect the conviction of the appellant, whose
guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt by other clear, convincing and overwhelming
evidence, both testimonial and documentary. The Court takes this occasion also to
remind the bench and the bar that reclusion perpetua is not synonymous with life
imprisonment.
The Case
On August 22, 1990, five Informations for kidnapping for ransom (Crim. Case Nos.
10060, 10061, 10062, 10063 and 10064) and three Informations for kidnapping (Crim
Case Nos. 10065, 10066 and 10067), all dated August 14, 1990, were filed 1 before
the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City against Carlos Falcasantos, Jailon Kulais,
Jumatiya Amlani, Norma Sahiddan de Kulais, Jalina Hassan de Kamming, 2 Salvador
Mamaril, Hadjirul Plasin, Jaimuddin Hassan, Imam 3 Taruk Alah, Freddie Manuel alias
"Ajid," and several John and Jane Does. The Informations for kidnapping for ransom,
which set forth identical allegations save for the names of the victims, read as follows:
That on or about the 12th day of December, 1988, in the City of
Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being all private
individuals, conspiring and confederating together, mutually aiding
and assisting one another, with threats to kill the person of FELIX
ROSARIO [in Criminal Case No. 10060] 4 and for the purpose of
extorting ransom from the said Felix Rosario or his families or
employer, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
KIDNAP the person of said Felix Rosario, 5 a male public officer of
the City Government of Zamboanga, who was then aboard a
Cimarron vehicle with plate No. SBZ-976 which was being
ambushed by the herein accused at the highway of Sitio Tigbao
Lisomo, Zamboanga City, and brought said Felix Rosario 6 to
different mountainous places of Zamboanga City and Zamboanga
del Sur, where he was detained, held hostage and deprived of his
liberty until February 2, 1989, the day when he was released only
after payment of the ransom was made to herein accused, to the
damage and prejudice of said victim; there being present an
aggravating circumstance in that the aforecited offense was
committed with the aid of armed men or persons who insure or
afford impunity.
The three Informations for kidnapping, also under Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code, likewise alleged identical facts and circumstances, except the names of the
victims:
That on or about the 12th day of December, 1988, in the City of
Zamboanga and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, being all private individuals,
conspiring and confederating together, mutually aiding and
assisting one another, by means of threats and intimidation of
person, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
KIDNAP, take and drag away and detain the person of MONICO
SAAVEDRA Y LIMEN [Criminal Case No. 10065] 7 a male public
officer of the City Government of Zamboanga, against his will,
there being present an aggravating circumstance in that the
aforecited offense was committed with the aid of armed men or
persons who insure or afford impunity.
Of the twelve accused, only nine were apprehended, namely, Jailon Julais, Jumatiya
Amlani, Norma Sahiddan de Kulais, Salvador Mamaril Hadjirul Plasin, Jainuddin
Hassan, Imam Taruk Alah, Jalina Hassan and Freddie Manuel. 8
On their arraignment on September 13, 1990, all the accused pleaded not guilty. Joint
trial on the merits ensued. On April 8, 1991, Judge Pelagio S. Mandi rendered the
assailed 36-page Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, above premises and discussion taken into
consideration, this Court renders its judgment, ordering and
finding:
1. FREDDIE MANUEL, alias "AJID" and IMAM TARUK ALAH y
SALIH [n]ot [g]uilty of the eight charges of [k]idnapping for
[r]ansom and for [k]idnapping, their guilt not having been proved
beyond reasonable doubt.
Their immediate release from the City Jail, Zamboanga City is
ordered, unless detained for some other offense besides these 8
cases (Crim. Cases Nos. 10060-10067).
2. JAINUDDIN HASSAN y AHMAD, JAILON KULAIS, SALVADOR
MAMARIL y MENDOZA and HADJIRUL PLASIN y ALIH [g]uilty as
principals by conspiracy in all these 8 cases for [k]idnapping for
[r]ansom and for [k]idnapping (Crim. Cases Nos. 10060-10067).
Their guilt is aggravated in that they committed the 8 offenses
with the aid of armed men who insured impunity. Therefore, the
penalties imposed on them shall be at their maximum period.
WHEREFORE, for the five charges of [k]idnapping for [r]ansom,
and pursuant to Art. 267 of the Revised Penal Code, five life
imprisonments are imposed on Jainuddin Hassan y Ahmad, Jailon
Kulais, Salvador Mamaril y Mendoza and Kadjirul Plasin y Alih
(Crim. Cases Nos. 10060-10064).
WHEREFORE, Norma Sahiddan de Kulais and Jalina Hussin are
sentenced to serve five imprisonments ranging from SIX (6)
YEARS of prision correccional as minimum to TEN YEARS AND
ONE (1) DAY OF prision mayor as maximum (Crim. Cases Nos.
10060-10064).

For kidnapping Mrs. Virginia San Agustin-Gara, a female and
public officer and pursuant to Art. 267, Revised Penal Code (par.
4.), another life imprisonment is imposed on Jainuddin Hassan y
Ahmad, Jailon Kulais, Salvador Mamaril y Mendoza and Hadjirul
Plasin y Alih (Crim. Case No. 10066)
For kidnapping Monico Saavedra y Limen, and Calixto Francisco
y Gaspar, and their kidnapping not having lasted more than five
days, pursuant to Art. 268, Revised Penal Code, and the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the same four accused Jainuddin
Hassan y Ahmad, Jailon Kulais, Salvador Mamaril y Mendoza and
Hadjirul Plasin y Alih are sentenced to serve two (2) jail terms
ranging from ten (10) years of prision mayor as minimum, to
eighteen (18) years of reclusion temporal as maximum (Crim.
Cases Nos. 10065 and 10067).
To Jessica Calunod:
Due to the removal of the suspension of sentences of youthful
offenders "convicted of an offense punishable by death or life" by
Presidential Decree No. 1179 and Presidential Decree No. 1210
(of which [k]idnapping for [r]ansom is such an offense) the
sentences on Norma Sahiddan de Kulais and Jaliha Hussin de
Kamming are NOT suspended but must be served by them.
Januddin Hassan, Jailon Kulais, Salvador Mamaril and Hadjirul
Plasin are sentenced further to return the following personal
effects taken on December 12, 1988, the day of the kidnapping,
or their value in money, their liability being solidary.

3. JAMATIYA AMLANI DE FALCASANTOS [n]ot [g]uilty in the

three charges of [k]idnapping and she is acquitted of these
charges. (Crim. Cases Nos. 10065, 10066 and 10067).
One (1) Seiko wrist watchP P 250.00
But Jumatiya Amlani de Falcasantos is [g]uilty as accomplice in
the five charges of [k]idnapping for [r]ansom.

WHEREFORE, Jumatiya Amlani de Falcasantos is sentenced to One Bracelet P 2,400.00

serve five (5) imprisonments, ranging from TEN (10) YEARS
of prision mayor as minimum to EIGHTEEN (18) YEARS
of reclusion temporal as maximum (Crim. Cases Nos. 10060-1
0064).
One Shoulder Bag P 200.00
4. NORMA SAHIDDAN DE KULAIS, 18 years old, and JALIHA
HUSSIN (charged as Jalina Hassan de Kamming), 15 years old,
[n]ot [g]uilty in the three charges for [k]idnapping and are,
therefore, ACQUITTED of these three charges. (Crim. Cases Nos.
10065, 10066 & 10067). Cash P 200.00

But Norma Sahiddan de Kulais and Jalina Hussin are found

[g]uilty as accomplices in the five charges for [k]idnapping for
[r]ansom. Being miners, they are entitled to the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority which lowers the penalty To Armado C. Bacarro:
imposable on them by one degree.
One (1) wrist watch P 800.00

One Necklace P 300.00 One (1)Wrist Watch P 850.00

One Calculator P 295.00

The benefit of Art. 29, Revised Penal Code, on preventive

suspension, shall be extended to those sentenced.

Eyeglasses P 500.00
The cases against Majid Samson, alias "Commander Bungi"
Awalon Kamlon a.k.a. "Commander Kamlon" Carlos Falcasantos
and several "John Does" and Jane "Does" are ARCHIVED until
their arrest.
One Steel Tape P 250.00
Costs against the accused convicted.

To Edilberto S. Perez:
One (1) Rayban
SO ORDERED. 9
On May 7, 1991, Jailon Kulais, Jumatiya Amlani de Falcasantos, Norma Sahiddan de
Kulais and Jaliha Hussin filed their joint Notice of Appeal. 10 In a letter dated February
6, 1997, the same appellants, except Jailon Kulais, withdrew their appeal because of
their application for "amnesty." In our March 19, 1997 Resolution, we granted their
P 1,000.00 motion. Hence, only the appeal of Kulais remains for the consideration of this Court. 11

The Facts

The Version of the Prosecution

One Wrist WatchP P 1,800.00

The solicitor general summarized, in this wise, the facts as viewed by the People:

On December 12, 1988, a group of public officials from various

Cash
To Virginia San Agustin-Gara:
P 300.00 government agencies, organized themselves as a monitoring
team to inspect government projects in Zamboanga City. The
group was composed of Virginia Gara, as the head of the team;
Armando Bacarro, representing the Commission on Audit; Felix
del Rosario, representing the non-government: Edilberto Perez,
representing the City Assessor's Office; Jessica Calunod and
Allan Basa of the City Budget Office and Monico Saavedra, the
driver from the City Engineer's Office. (p. 3, TSN, October 22,
1990.)
On that particular day, the group headed to the Lincomo
Elementary School to check on two of its classrooms. After
inspecting the same, they proceeded to the Talaga Footbridge.
The group was not able to reach the place because on their way,
they were stopped by nine (9) armed men who pointed their guns
at them (p. 4, TSN, ibid.).
The group alighted from their Cimarron jeep where they were
divested of their personal belongings. They were then ordered to
walk to the mountain by the leader of the armed men who
introduced himself as Commander Falcasantos (p. 5, TSN, ibid.).
While the group was walking in the mountain, they encountered
government troops which caused their group to be divided.
Finally, they were able to regroup themselves. Commander
Kamlon with his men joined the others. (pp. 7-8, TSN, ibid.).
The kidnappers held their captives for fifty-four (54) days in the
forest. During their captivity, the victims were able to recognize
their captors who were at all times armed with guns. The wives of
the kidnappers performed the basic chores like cooking. (pp. 9-
10. TSN, ibid.)
Commander Falcasantos also ordered their victims to sign the
ransom notes which demanded a ransom of P100,000.00 and
P14,000.00 in exchange for twenty (20) sets of uniform. (p. 15,
TSN, ibid.)
On February 3, 1989, at around 12:00 o'clock noontime, the
victims were informed that they would be released. They started
walking until around 7:00 o'clock in the evening of that day. At
around 12:00 o'clock midnight, the victims were released after
Commander Falcasantos and Kamlon received the ransom
money. (p. 19, TSN, ibid.) The total amount paid was
P122,000.00. The same was reached after several negotiations
between Mayor Vitaliano Agan of Zamboanga City and the
representatives of the kidnappers. (pp. 2, 6, TSN, Nov. 11, 1990)
. . . 12
The prosecution presented fifteen witnesses, including some of the kidnap victims
themselves: Jessica Calunod, Armando Bacarro, Edilberto Perez, Virginia San
Agustin-Gara, Calixto Francisco, and Monico Saavedra.
The Version of the Defense
13
The facts of the case, according to the defense, are as follows:
On May 28, 1990, at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning, while
weeding their farm in Sinaburan, Zamboanga del Sur, accused-
appellant Jumatiya Amlani was picked up by soldiers and brought
to a place where one army battalion was stationed. Thereat, her
five (5) co-accused, namely Salvador Mamaril, Hadjirul Plasin,
Jainuddin Hassin, Imam Taruk Alah and Freddie Manuel were
already detained. In the afternoon of the same day, appellants
spouses Jailon Kulais and Norma Sahiddan were brought to the
battalion station and likewise detained thereat. On May 30, 1990,
the eight (8) accused were transported to Metrodiscom,
Zamboanga City. Here on the same date, they were joined by
accused-appellant Jaliha Hussin.
At the time Amlani was picked up by the military, she had just
escaped from the captivity of Carlos Falcasantos and company
who in 1988 kidnapped and brought her to the mountains. Against
their will, she stayed with Falcasantos and his two wives for two
months, during which she slept with Falcasantos as aide of the
wives and was made to cook food, wash clothes, fetch water and
run other errands for everybody. An armed guard was assigned to
watch her, so that, for sometime, she had to bear the ill-treatment
of Falcasantos' other wives one of whom was armed. After about
two months, while she was cooking and Falcasantos and his two
wives were bathing in the river, and while her guard was not
looking, she took her chance and made a successful dash for
freedom. (TSN, January 29, 1992, pp. 2-15)
Likewise a kidnap victim herself is accused-appellant Jaliha
Hussin, who was thirteen years old at the time (she was fifteen
years old when the trial of the instant cases commenced). She
was kidnapped by Daing Kamming and brought to the mountains
where he slept with her. She stayed with him for less than a
month sleeping on forest ground and otherwise performing
housekeeping errands for Kamming and his men. She made good
her escape during an encounter between the group of Kamming
and military troops. She hid in the bushes and came out at Ligui-
an where she took a "bachelor" bus in going back to her mother's
house at Pudos, Guiligan, Tungawan, Zamboanga del Sur. One
day, at around 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, while she was
harvesting palay at the neighboring village of Tigbalangao, military
 men picked her up to Ticbanuang where there was an army
battalion detachment. From Ticbawuang, she was brought to
Vitali, then to Metrodiscom, Zamboanga City, where on her
arrival, she met all the other accused for the first time except
Freddie Manuel. (Ibid., pp. 16-21)
Another female accused is appellant Norma Sahiddan, a native of
Sinaburan, Tungawan, Zamboanga del Sur. At about 3:00 o'clock
in the afternoon of a day in May, while she and her husband were
in their farm, soldiers arrested them. The soldiers did not tell them
why they were being arrested, neither were they shown any
papers. The two of them were just made to board a six by six
truck. There were no other civilians in the truck. The truck brought
the spouses to the army battalion and placed them inside the
building where there were civilians and soldiers. Among the
civilians present were her six co-accused Hadjirul Plasin,
Salvador Mamaril, Jaimuddin Hassan, Ima[m] Taruk Alah, Freddie
Manuel and Jumatiya Amlani. That night, the eight of them were
brought to Tictapul, Zamboanga City; then to Vitali; and, finally, to
the Metrodiscom, Zamboanga City where they stayed for six days
and six nights. On the seventh day, the accused were brought to
the City Jail, Zamboanga City. (TSN, January 30, 1991, pp. 6-11)
The husband of Norma Sahiddan is Jailon Kulais who, as
heretofore narrated, was arrested with his wife the day the
soldiers came to their farm on May 28, 1990. He has shared with
his wife the ordeals that followed in the wake of their arrest and in
the duration of their confinement up to the present. (TSN, January
22, 1991 pp. 2-4).
The Trial Court's Ruling
The trial court found Appellant Kulais guilty of five counts of kidnapping for ransom
and one count of kidnapping a woman and public officer, for which offenses it imposed
upon him six terms of "life imprisonment." It also found him guilty of two counts of
slight illegal detention for the kidnapping of Monico Saavedra and Calixto Francisco.
The trial court ratiocinated as follows:
Principally, the issue here is one of credibility both of the
witnesses and their version of what had happened on December
12, 1988, to February 3, 1989. On this pivotal issue, the Court
gives credence to [p]rosecution witnesses and their testimonies.
Prosecution evidence is positive, clear and convincing. No taint of
evil or dishonest motive was imputed or imputable to [p]rosecution
witnesses. To this Court, who saw all the witnesses testify,
[p]rosecution witnesses testified only because they were impelled
by [a] sense of justice, of duty and of truth.
Contrarily, [d]efense evidence is weak, uncorroborated and
consisted only of alibis. The individual testimonies of the nine
accused dwel[t] principally on what happened to each of them on
May 27, 28 and 29, 1990. None of the accused explained where
he or she was on and from December 12, 1988, to February 3,
1989, when [p]rosecution evidence show[ed] positively seven of
the nine accused were keeping the five or six hostages named by
[p]rosecution evidence.
The seven accused positively identified to have been present
during the course of the captivity of the five kidnap-victims-
complainants are: (1) Jumatiya Amlani; (2) Jaliha Hussin; (3)
Norma Sahiddan; (4) Jailon Kulais; (5) Hadjirul Plasin; (6)
Salvador Mamaril and (7) Jainuddin Hassan.
The two accused not positively identified are: Freddie
Manuel alias "Ajid", and Imam Taruk Alah. These two must,
therefore, be declared acquitted based on reasonable doubt.
The next important issue to be examined is: Are these seven
accused guilty as conspirators as charged in the eight
Informations; or only as accomplices? Prosecution evidence
shows that the kidnapping group to which the seven accused
belonged had formed themselves into an armed band for the
purpose of kidnapping for ransom. This armed band had cut
themselves off from established communities, lived in the
mountains and forests, moved from place to place in order to hide
their hostages. The wives of these armed band moved along with
their husbands, attending to their needs, giving them material and
moral support. These wives also attended to the needs of the
kidnap victims, sleeping with them or comforting them.
xxx xxx xxx
II The guilt of Jainuddin Hassan, Jailon Kulais, Salvador Mamaril
and Hadjirul Plasin. The Court holds these four men guilty as
conspirators in the 8 cases of kidnapping. Unlike the three
women-accused, these male accused were armed. They actively
participated in keeping their hostages by fighting off the military
and CAFGUS, in transferring their hostages from place to place,
and in guarding the kidnap hostages. Salvador Mamaril and
Jailon Kulais were positively identified as among the nine armed
men who had kidnapped the eight kidnap victims on December
12, 1988.
 The higher degree of participation found by the Court of the four
accused is supported by the rulings of our Supreme Court quoted
below.
(1) The time-honored jurisprudence is that direct proof is not
essential to prove conspiracy. It may be shown by a number of
infinite acts, conditions and circumstances which may vary
according to the purposes to be accomplished and from which
may logically be inferred that there was a common design,
understanding or agreement among the conspirators to commit
the offense charged. (People vs. Cabrera, 43 Phil 64; People vs.
Carbonel, 48 Phil. 868.)
(2) The crime must, therefore, in view of the solidarity of the act
and intent which existed between the sixteen accused, be
regarded as the act of the band or party created by them, and
they are all equally responsible for the murder in question. (U.S.
vs. Bundal, et. al. 3 Phil 89, 98.)
(3) When two or more persons unite to accomplish a criminal
object, whether through the physical volition of one, or all,
proceeding severally or collectively, each individual whose evil will
actively contribute to the wrongdoing is in law responsible for the
whole, the same as though performed by himself alone. (People
vs. Peralta, et. al. 25 SCRA 759, 772 (1968).) 14
The Assigned Errors
The trial court is faulted with the following errors, viz:
I
The trial court erred in taking judicial notice of a material
testimony given in another case by Lt. Melquiades Feliciano, who
allegedly was the team leader of the government troops which
allegedly captured the accused-appellants in an encounter;
thereby, depriving the accused-appellants their right to cross-
examine him.
II
On the assumption that Lt. Feliciano's testimony could be validly
taken judicial notice of, the trial court, nevertheless, erred in not
disregarding the same for being highly improbable and
contradictory.
III
The trial court erred in finding that accused-appellants Jumatiya
Amlani, Jaliha Hussin and Norma Sahiddan provided Carlos
Falcasantos, et. al., with material and moral comfort, hence, are
guilty as accomplices in all the kidnapping for ransom cases.
IV
The trial court erred in denying to accused-appellant Jaliha
Hussin and Norma Sahiddan the benefits of suspension of
sentence given to youth offenders considering that they were
minors at the time of the commission of the offense. 15
As earlier noted, Jumatiya Amlani, Jaliha Hussin and Norma Sahiddan had withdrawn
their appeal, and as such, the third and fourth assigned errors, which pertain to them
only, will no longer be dealt with. Only the following issues pertaining to Appellant
Jailon Kulais will be discussed: (1) judicial notice of other pending cases, (2)
sufficiency of the prosecution evidence, and (3) denial as a defense. In addition, the
Court will pass upon the propriety of the penalty imposed by the trial court.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is bereft of merit.
First Issue:
Judicial Notice and Denial of Due Process
Appellant Kulais argues that he was denied due process when the trial court took
judicial notice of the testimony given in another case by one Lt. Melquiades Feliciano,
who was the team leader of the government troops that captured him and his
purported cohorts. 16 Because he was allegedly deprived of his right to cross-examine
a material witness in the person of Lieutenant Feliciano, he contends that the latter's
testimony should not be used against him. 17
True, as a general rule, courts should not take judicial notice of the evidence
presented in other proceedings, even if these have been tried or are pending in the
same court, or have been heard and are actually pending before the same
judge. 18 This is especially true in criminal cases, where the accused has the
constitutional right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him.
Having said that, we note, however, that even if the court a quo did take judicial notice
of the testimony of Lieutenant Feliciano, it did not use such testimony in deciding the
cases against the appellant. Hence, Appellant Kulais was not denied due process. His
conviction was based mainly on the positive identification made by some of the kidnap A To Ila Abdurasa.
victims, namely, Jessica Calunod, Armando Bacarro and Edilberto Perez. These
witnesses were subjected to meticulous cross-examinations conducted by appellant's
Q And other than your foster [parents] or the
counsel. At best, then, the trial court's mention of Lieutenant Feliciano's testimony is a
parents whom you are assigned to, who else
decisional surplusage which neither affected the outcome of the case nor substantially
did you come to know?
prejudiced Appellant Kulais.

A Pagal and his wife; Tangkong and his wife

Second Issue:
Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence
Appellant was positively identified by Calunod, as shown by the latter's testimony:
CP CAJAYON D MS:
Q And how long were you in the custody of
these persons?
Nana; the two (2) wives of Commander
Falcasantos Mating and Janira another
brother in-law of Commander Kamlon,
Usman, the wife of Kamlon, Tira.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, you said that you were with these
men for fifty-four days and you really came to
know them. Will you still be able to recognize
these persons if you will see the[m] again?

A We stayed with them for fifty-four days.

A Yes, ma'am.

Q And during those days did you come to

Q Now will you look around this Honorable
know any of the persons who were with the
Court and see if any of those you mentioned
group?
are here?

A We came to know almost all of them

A Yes, they are here.
considering we stayed there for fifty-four
days.
Q Some of them are here?
Q And can you please name to us some of
them or how you know them? A Some of them are here.

A For example, aside from Commander xxx xxx xxx

Falcasantos and Commander Kamlon we
came to know first our foster parents, those
Q Where is Tangkong? What is he wearing?
who were assigned to give us some food.

A White t-shirt with orange collar. (witness

Q You mean to say that the captors assigned
pointing.) He was one of those nine armed
you some men who will take care of you?
men who took us from the highway.

A Yes.
RTC INTERPRETER:

Q And to whom were you assigned?

 Witness pointed to a man sitting in court and Q Now, you said you were assigned to
when asked of his name, he gave his name Tangkong and his wife. [D]o you remember
as JAILON KULAIS. how he looks like?

CP CAJAYON D MS: A Yes.

Q Aside from being with the armed men who Q Now, will you please look around this Court
stopped the vehicle and made you alight, and tell us if that said Tangkong and his wife
what else was he doing while you were in are here?
their captivity?
A Yes, ma'am.
A He was the foster parent of Armando
Bacarro and the husband of Nana.
Q Could you please point this Tangkong to
us?
COURT:
A Witness pointed to a person in
Q Who? Court. [W]hen asked his name he identified
[himself] as Jailon Kulais.
A Tangkong.
Q Why did you say his name is Tangkong?
19 Where did you get that name?
xxx xxx xxx

A Well, that is the name [by which he is]

Likewise clear and straightforward was Bacarro's testimony pointing to appellant as
usually called in the camp.
one of the culprits:

xxx xxx xxx

FISCAL CAJAYON:

ATTY. FABIAN (counsel for accused Kulais)

xxx xxx xxx

Q When did you first meet Tangkong?

Q And what happened then?

A That was on December 11, because I

A Some of the armed men assigned who will
be the host or who will be the one [to] g[i]ve
food to us.
Q [To] whom were you assigned?
A I was assigned to a certain Tangkong and
[his] wife Nana.
xxx xxx xxx
remember he was the one who took us.
Q When you were questioned by the fiscal a
while ago, you stated that Mr. Mamaril was
one of those who stopped the bus and took
you to the hill and you did not mention
Tangkong?
A I did not mention but I can remember his
face.
 xxx xxx xxx
Q And because Tangkong was always with
you as your host even if he did not tell you
that he [was] one of those who stopped you,
you would not recognize him?
A No, I can recognize him because he was
the one who took my shoes.
COURT:
Q Who?
A Tangkong, your Honor.
xxx xxx xxx 20
Also straightforward was Ernesto Perez' candid narration:
FISCAL CAJAYON:
xxx xxx xxx
Q Who else?
A The last man.
Q Did you come to know his name?
A Only his nickname, Tangkong. (Witness
pointed to a man in Court who identified
himself as Jailon Kulais.)
Q And what was Tangkong doing in the
mountain?
A The same, guarding us.
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ATTY. SAHAK.
Q Engr. Perez, you stated that you were
ambushed by nine armed men on your way
from [the] Licomo to [the] Talaga Foot Bridge.
[W]hat do you mean by ambushed?
A I mean that they blocked our way and
stopped.
Q They did not fire any shots?
A But they were pointing their guns at us.
Q And among the 9 armed men who held you
on your way to [the] Talaga Footbridge, you
stated [that] one of them [was] Commander
Falcasantos?
A Yes.
Q Could you also recognize anyone of the
accused in that group?
A Yes.
Q Will you please identify?
A That one, Tangkong. (The witness pointed
to a man sitting in court who identified himself
as Jailon Kulais.)
xxx xxx xxx
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ATTY. FABIAN.
Q You said Jailon Kulais was among those
who guarded the camp?
FISCAL CAJAYON:
Your Honor, please, he does not know the
name of Julais, he used the word Tangkong.
ATTY. FABIAN
 Q You said Tangkong guarded you[. W]hat do A I came to know the terms because I was
you mean? the one ordered by Commander Falcasantos
to write the letter, the ransom letter.
A He guarded us like prisoners[. A]fter
guarding us they have their time two hours Q At this point of time, you remember how
another will be on duty guarding us. many letters were you asked to write for your
ransom?
Q Where did you meet Tangkong?
A I could not remember as to how many, but I
can identify them.
A He was one of the armed men who
kidnapped us.
Q Why will you able to identify the same?
21
xxx xxx xxx
A Because I was the one who wrote it.
It is evident from the foregoing testimonies of Calunod, Bacarro and Perez that
kidnapping or detention did take place: the five victims were held, against their will, for Q And you are familiar, of course, with your
fifty-three days from December 12, 1988 to February 2, 1989. It is also evident that penmanship?
Appellant Kulais was a member of the group of armed men who staged the
kidnapping, and that he was one of those who guarded the victims during the entire
A Yes.
period of their captivity. His participation gives credence to the conclusion of the trial
court that he was a conspirator.
Q Now we have here some letters which
were turned over to us by the Honorable City
Kidnapping
Mayor Vitaliano Agan. 1,2,3,4,5 there are
five letters all handwritten.
for Ransom
COURT:
That the kidnapping of the five was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom is
also apparent from the testimony of Calunod, who was quite emphatic in identifying
Original?
the accused and narrating the circumstances surrounding the writing of the ransom
letters.
CP CAJAYON D MS:
CP CAJAYON D MS:
Original, your Honor.
Q Now, you were in their captivity for 54 days
and you said there were these meetings for Q And we would like you to go over these
possible negotiation with the City and say, tell us if any of these were the ones
Government. What do you mean by this? you were asked to write.
What were you supposed to negotiate?
A (Witness going over [letters])
A Because they told us that they will be
releasing us only after the terms. 22
This one 2 pages. This one 2 pages.
No more.
Q And what were the terms? Did you come to
know the terms?
Q Aside from the fact that you identified your
penmanship in these letters, what else will
make you remember that these are really the
ones you wrote while there?
A The signature is there.
Q There is a printed name here[,] Jessica
Calunod.
A And over it is a signature.
Q That is your signature?
A Yes, ma'am.
Q How about in the other letter, did you sign it
also?
A Yes, there is the other signature.
Q There are names other names here
Eddie Perez, Allan Basa, Armando Bacarro,
Felix Rosario, Jojie Ortuoste and there are
signatures above the same. Did you come up
to know who signed this one?
A Those whose signatures there were signed
by the persons. [sic].
Q And we have here at the bottom,
Commander Kamlon Hassan, and there is
the signature above the same. Did you come
to know who signed it?
A [It was] Commander Kamlon Hassan who
signed that.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Jessica, I am going over this letter . . .
Could you please read to us the portion here
which says the terms? . . .
A (Witness reading) "Mao ilang gusto nga
andamun na ninyo ang kantidad nga
P100,000 ug P14,000 baylo sa 20 sets nga
uniforms sa Biyernes (Pebrero 3, 1989). 23
xxx xxx xxx
INTERPRETER (Translation):
This is what they like you to prepare[:] the
amount of P100,000.00 and P14,000.00 in
exchange [for] 20 sets of uniform on Friday,
February 3, 1989.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now you also earlier identified this other
letter and this is dated January 21,
1988. 24Now, could you please explain to us
why it is dated January 21, 1988 and the
other one Enero 31, 1989 or January 31,
1989?
A I did not realize that I placed 1989, 1988,
but it was 1989.
Q January 21, 1989?
A Yes.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, in this letter, were the terms also
mentioned?
Please go over this.
A (Going over the letter)
Yes, ma'am.
Q Could you please read it aloud to us?
 A (Witness reading)
Gusto nila and P100,000.00 ng kapinan nu
ug 20 sets nga completong uniformer (7
colors marine type wala nay labot ang
sapatos), tunga medium ug tunga large
size. 25
xxx xxx xxx
INTERPRETER:
They like the P100,000.00 and an addition of
20 sets of complete uniform (7 colors,
marine-type not including the shoes), one half
medium, one half large.
xxx xxx xxx
Q After having written these letters, did you
come to know after [they were] signed by
your companions and all of you, do you know
if these letters were sent? If you know only.
A I would like to make it clear. The first letter
was ordered to me by Falcasantos to inform
the City Mayor that initial as P500,000.00,
and when we were already I was asked
again to write, we were ordered to affix our
signature to serve as proof that all of us are
alive. 26 [sic]
Calunod's testimony was substantially corroborated by both Armando Bacarro 27 and
Edilberto Perez. 28 The receipt of the ransom letters, the efforts made to raise and
deliver the ransom, and the release of the hostages upon payment of the money were
testified to by Zamboanga City Mayor Vitaliano Agan 29 and Teddy Mejia. 30
The elements of kidnapping for ransom, as embodied in Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code, 31 having been sufficiently proven, and the appellant, a private individual,
having been clearly identified by the kidnap victims, this Court thus affirms the trial
court's finding of appellant's guilt on five counts of kidnapping for ransom.
Kidnapping of
Public Officers
Victims Virginia San Agustin-Gara, Monico Saavedra and Calixto Francisco were
members of the government monitoring team abducted by appellant's group. The
three testified to the fact of kidnapping; however, they were not able to identify the
appellant. Even so, appellant's identity as one of the kidnappers was sufficiently
established by Calunod, Bacarro and Perez, who were with Gara, Saavedra and
Francisco when the abduction occurred.
That Gara, Saavedra and Francisco were detained for only three hours 32 does nor
matter. In People vs. Domasian, 33 the victim was similarly held for three hours, and
was released even before his parents received the ransom note. The accused therein
argued that they could not be held guilty of kidnapping as no enclosure was involved,
and that only grave coercion was committed, if at all. 34 Convicting appellants of
kidnapping or serious illegal detention under Art. 267 (4) of the Revised Penal Code,
the Court found that the victim, an eight-year-old boy, was deprived of his liberty when
he was restrained from going home. The Court justified the conviction by holding that
the offense consisted not only in placing a person in an enclosure, but also in
detaining or depriving him, in any manner, of his liberty. 35 Likewise, in People vs.
Santos, 36 the Court held that since the appellant was charged and convicted under
Article 267, paragraph 4, it was not the duration of the deprivation of liberty which was
important, but the fact that the victim, a minor, was locked up.
Thus, in the present case, the detention of Gara, Saavedra and Francisco for only a
few hours is immaterial. The clear fact is that the victims were public officers 37
Gara was a fiscal analyst for the City of Zamboanga, Saavedra worked at the City
Engineer's Office, and Francisco was a barangay councilman at the time the
kidnapping occurred. Appellant Kulais should be punished, therefore, under Article
267, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, and not Art, 268, as the trial court held.
The present case is different from People vs. Astorga, 38 which held that the crime
committed was not kidnapping under Article 267, paragraph 4, but only grave
coercion. The appellant in that case had tricked his seven-year-old victim into going
with him to a place he alone knew. His plans, however, were foiled when a group of
people became suspicious and rescued the girl from him. The Court noted that the
victim's testimony and the other pieces of evidence did not indicate that the appellant
wanted to detain her, or that he actually detained her.
In the present case, the evidence presented by the prosecution indubitably
established that the victims were detained, albeit for a few hours. There is proof
beyond reasonable doubt that kidnapping took place, and that appellant was
a member of the armed group which abducted the victims.
Third Issue:
Denial and Alibi
The appellant's bare denial is a weak defense that becomes even weaker in the face
of the prosecution witnesses' positive identification of him. Jurisprudence gives greater
weight to the positive narration of prosecution witnesses than to the negative
testimonies of the defense. 39 Between positive and categorical testimony which has a
ring of truth to it on the one hand, and a bare denial on the other, the former generally
prevails. 40 Jessica Calunod, Armando Bacarro and Edilberto Perez testified in a clear,
straightforward and frank manner; and their testimonies were compatible on material
points. Moreover, no ill motive was attributed to the kidnap victims and none was
found by this Court.
We agree with the trial court's observation that the appellant did not meet the charges
against him head on. His testimony dwelt on what happened to him on the day he was
arrested and on subsequent days thereafter. Appellant did not explain where he was
during the questioned dates (December 12, 1988 to February 3, 1989); neither did he
rebut Calunod, Bacarro and Perez, when they identified him as one of their
kidnappers.
Reclusion Perpetua, Not Life Imprisonment
The trial court erred when it sentenced the appellant to six terms of life imprisonment.
The penalty for kidnapping with ransom, under the Revised Penal Code, is reclusion
perpetua to death. Since the crimes happened in 1988, when the capital penalty was
proscribed by the Constitution, the maximum penalty that could have been imposed
was reclusion perpetua. Life imprisonment is not synonymous with reclusion perpetua.
Unlike life imprisonment, reclusion perpetua carries with it accessory penalties
provided in the Revised Penal Code and has a definite extent or duration. Life
imprisonment is invariably imposed for serious offenses penalized by special laws,
while reclusion perpetua is prescribed in accordance with the Revised Penal Code. 41
WHEREFORE, the conviction of Appellant Jailon Kulais as principal in five counts of
kidnapping for ransom and in three counts of kidnapping is AFFIRMED, but the
penalty imposed is hereby MODIFIED as follows: Appellant is sentenced to five terms
of reclusion perpetua, one for each of his five convictions for kidnapping for ransom;
and to three terms of reclusion perpetua, one each for the kidnapping of Public
Officers Virginia Gara, Monico Saavedra and Calixto Francisco. Like the other
accused who withdrew their appeals, he is REQUIRED to return the personal effects,
or their monetary value, taken from the kidnap victims. Additionally, he is ORDERED
to pay the amount of P122,000 representing the ransom money paid to the
kidnappers. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 114776. February 2, 2000.*
MENANDRO B. LAUREANO, petitioner, vs. COURT OP APPEALS AND SINGAPORE
AIRLINES LIMITED, respondents.
Actions; Conflict of Laws; The party who claims the applicability of a foreign law has
the burden of proof, and where said party has failed to discharge the burden,
Philippine law applies.At the outset, we find it necessary to state our concurrence
on the assumption of jurisdiction by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9. The
trial court rightly ruled on the application of Philippine law, thus: Neither can the Court
determine whether the termination of the plaintiff is legal under the Singapore Laws
because of the defendants failure to show which specific laws of Singapore Laws
apply to this case. As substantially discussed in the preceding paragraphs, the
Philippine Courts do not take judicial notice of the laws of Singapore. The defendant
that claims the applicability of the Singapore Laws to this case has the burden of
proof. The defendant has failed to do so. Therefore, the Philippine law should be
applied.
Same; Labor Law; Prescription; Illegal Dismissals; In illegal dismissal, it is settled, that
the ten-year prescriptive period fixed in Article 1144 of the Civil Code may not be
invoked, for the Civil Code is a law of general application, while the prescriptive period
fixed in Article 292 of the Labor Code is a special law applicable to claims arising from
employee-employer relations.What rules on prescription should apply in cases like
this one has long been decided by this Court. In illegal dismissal, it is settled, that the
ten-year prescriptive period fixed in Article 1144 of the Civil Code may not be invoked
by petitioners, for the Civil Code is a law of general application, while the prescriptive
period fixed in Article 292 of the Labor Code [now Article 291] is a SPECIAL LAW
applicable to claims arising from employee-employer relations.
Same; Same; Same; Although the commencement of a civil action stops the running
of the statute of prescription or limitations, its dismissal or voluntary abandonment by
plaintiff leaves the parties in exactly the same position as though no action had been
commenced at all.Petitioner claims that the running of the prescriptive period was
tolled when he filed his complaint for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter of the
National Labor Relations Commission. However, this claim deserves scant
consideration; it has no legal leg to stand on. In Olympia International, Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals, we held that although the commencement of a civil action stops the running
of the statute of prescription or limitations, its dismissal or voluntary abandonment by
plaintiff leaves the parties in exactly the same position as though no action had been
commenced at all.
Same; Same; Same; Contracts; It is a settled rule that contracts have the force of law
between the parties.As to whether petitioners separation from the company due to
retrenchment was valid, the appellate court found that the employment contract of
petitioner allowed for pre-termination of employment. We agree with the Court of
Appeals when it said, It is a settled rule that contracts have the force of law between
the parties. From the moment the same is perfected, the parties are bound not only to
the fulfillment of what has been expressly stipulated but also to all consequences
which, according to their nature, may be in keeping with good faith, usage and law.
Thus, when plaintiff-appellee accepted the offer of employment, he was bound by the
terms and conditions set forth in the contract, among others, the right of mutual
termination by giving three months written notice or by payment of three months
salary. Such provision is clear and readily understandable, hence, there is no room for
interpretation. Laureano vs. Court of Appeals, 324 SCRA 414, G.R. No. 114776
February 2, 2000
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 114776 February 2, 2000
MENANDRO B. LAUREANO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND SINGAPORE AIRLINES LIMITED, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to
reverse the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated October 29, 1993, in C.A. G.R.
No. CV 34476, as well as its Resolution dated February 28, 1994, which denied the
motion for reconsideration.
The facts of the case as summarized by the respondent appellate court are as follows:
Sometime in 1978, plaintiff [Menandro B. Laureano, herein petitioner], then
Director of Flight Operations and Chief Pilot of Air Manila, applied for
employment with defendant company [herein private respondent] through its
Area Manager in Manila.
On September 30, 1978, after the usual personal interview, defendant wrote
to plaintiff, offering a contract of employment as an expatriate B-707 captain
for an original period of two (2) years commencing on January 21, 1978.
Plaintiff accepted the offer and commenced working on January 20, 1979.
After passing the six-month probation period, plaintiffs appointment was
confirmed effective July 21, 1979. (Annex "B", p. 30, Rollo).
On July 21, 1979, defendant offered plaintiff an extension of his two-year
contract to five (5) years effective January 21, 1979 to January 20, 1984
subject to the terms and conditions set forth in the contract of employment,
which the latter accepted (Annex "C" p. 31, Rec.).
During his service as B-707 captain, plaintiff on August 24, 1980, while in
command of a flight, committed a noise violation offense at the Zurich
Airport, for which plaintiff apologized.(Exh. "3", p. 307, Rec.).
Sometime in 1980, plaintiff featured in a tail scraping incident wherein the
tail of the aircraft scraped or touched the runway during landing. He was
suspended for a few days until he was investigated by board headed by
Capt. Choy. He was reprimanded.
On September 25, 1981, plaintiff was invited to take a course of A-300
conversion training at Aeroformacion, Toulouse, France at dependant's
expense. Having successfully completed and passed the training course,
plaintiff was cleared on April 7, 1981, for solo duty as captain of the Airbus
A-300 and subsequently appointed as captain of the A-300 fleet
commanding an Airbus A-300 in flights over Southeast Asia. (Annexes "D",
"E" and "F", pp. 34-38, Rec.).
Sometime in 1982, defendant, hit by a recession, initiated cost-cutting
measures. Seventeen (17) expatriate captains in the Airbus fleet were found
in excess of the defendant's requirement (t.s.n., July 6, 1988. p. 11).
Consequently, defendant informed its expatriate pilots including plaintiff of
the situation and advised them to take advance leaves. (Exh. "15", p. 466,
Rec.)
Realizing that the recession would not be for a short time, defendant
decided to terminate its excess personnel (t.s.n., July 6, 1988, p. 17). It did
not, however, immediately terminate it's A-300 pilots. It reviewed their
qualifications for possible promotion to the B-747 fleet. Among the 17
excess Airbus pilots reviewed, twelve were found qualified. Unfortunately,
plaintiff was not one of the twelve.
On October 5, 1982, defendant informed plaintiff of his termination effective
November 1, 1982 and that he will be paid three (3) months salary in lieu of
three months notice (Annex "I", pp. 41-42, Rec.). Because he could not
uproot his family on such short notice, plaintiff requested a three-month
notice to afford him time to exhaust all possible avenues for reconsideration
and retention. Defendant gave only two (2) months notice and one (1)
month salary. (t.s.n., Nov. 12, 1987. p. 25).
Aggrieved, plaintiff on June 29, 1983, instituted a case for illegal dismissal
before the Labor Arbiter. Defendant moved to dismiss on jurisdiction
grounds. Before said motion was resolved, the complaint was withdrawn.
Thereafter, plaintiff filed the instant case for damages due to illegal
termination of contract of services before the court a quo (Complaint, pp. 1-
10, Rec.).
Again, defendant on February 11, 1987 filed a motion to dismiss
alleging inter alia: (1) that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the case, and (2) that Philippine courts have no jurisdiction over
the instant case. Defendant contends that the complaint is for illegal
dismissal together with a money claim arising out of and in the course of
plaintiffs employment "thus it is the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC who have
the jurisdiction pursuant to Article 217 of the Labor Code" and that, since
plaintiff was employed in Singapore, all other aspects of his employment
contract and/or documents executed in Singapore. Thus, defendant
postulates that Singapore laws should apply and courts thereat shall have
jurisdiction. (pp. 50-69, Rec.).
In traversing defendant's arguments, plaintiff claimed that: (1) where the
items demanded in a complaint are the natural consequences flowing from
a breach of an obligation and not labor benefits, the case is intrinsically a
civil dispute; (2) the case involves a question that is beyond the field of
specialization of labor arbiters; and (3) if the complaint is grounded not on
the employee's dismissal per se but on the manner of said dismissal and
the consequence thereof, the case falls under the jurisdiction of the civil
courts. (pp. 70-73, Rec.)
On March 23, 1987, the court a quo denied defendant's motion to dismiss
(pp. 82-84, Ibid). The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. (p.
95 ibid.)
On September 16, 1987, defendant filed its answer reiterating the grounds
relied upon in its motion to dismiss and further arguing that plaintiff is barred
by laches, waiver, and estoppel from instituting the complaint and that he
has no cause of action . (pp. 102-115)1
On April 10, 1991, the trial court handed down its decision in favor of plaintiff. The
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff Menandro
Laureano and against defendant Singapore Airlines Limited, ordering
defendant to pay plaintiff the amounts of
SIN$396,104.00, or its equivalent in Philippine currency at the current rate
of exchange at the time of payment, as and for unearned compensation with
legal interest from the filing of the complaint until fully paid;
SIN$154,742.00, or its equivalent in Philippine currency at the current rate
of exchange at the time of payment; and the further amounts of P67,500.00
as consequential damages with legal interest from the filing of the complaint
until fully paid;
P1,000,000.00 as and for moral damages; P1,000,000.00 as and for
exemplary damages; and P100,000.00 as and for attorney's fees.
Costs against defendant.
SO ORDERED.2
Singapore Airlines timely appealed before the respondent court and raised the issues
of jurisdiction, validity of termination, estoppel, and damages.
On October 29, 1993, the appellate court set aside the decision of the trial court, thus,
. . . In the instant case, the action for damages due to illegal termination was
filed by plaintiff-appellee only on January 8, 1987 or more than four (4)
years after the effectivity date of his dismissal on November 1, 1982.
Clearly, plaintiff-appellee's action has already prescribed.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The complaint is hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED.3
Petitioner's and Singapore Airlines' respective motions for reconsideration were
denied.
Now, before the Court, petitioner poses the following queries:
1. IS THE PRESENT ACTION ONE BASED ON CONTRACT WHICH PRESCRIBES
IN TEN YEARS UNDER ARTICLE 1144 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE OR ONE FOR
DAMAGES ARISING FROM AN INJURY TO THE RIGHTS OF THE PLAINTIFF
WHICH PRESCRIBES IN FOUR YEARS UNDER ARTICLE 1146 OF THE NEW CIVIL
CODE?
2. CAN AN EMPLOYEE WITH A FIXED PERIOD OF EMPLOYMENT BE
RETRENCHED BY HIS EMPLOYER?
3. CAN THERE BE VALID RETRENCHMENT IF AN EMPLOYER MERELY FAILS TO
REALIZE THE EXPECTED PROFITS EVEN IF IT WERE NOT, IN FACT, INCURRING
LOSSES?
At the outset, we find it necessary to state our concurrence on the assumption of
jurisdiction by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9. The trial court rightly ruled
on the application of Philippine law, thus:
Neither can the Court determine whether the termination of the plaintiff is
legal under the Singapore Laws because of the defendant's failure to show
which specific laws of Singapore Laws apply to this case. As substantially
discussed in the preceding paragraphs, the Philippine Courts do not take
judicial notice of the laws of Singapore. The defendant that claims the
applicability of the Singapore Laws to this case has the burden of proof. The
defendant has failed to do so. Therefore, the Philippine law should be
applied.4
Respondent Court of Appeals acquired jurisdiction when defendant filed its appeal
before said court.5 On this matter, respondent court was correct when it barred
defendant-appellant below from raising further the issue of jurisdiction.6
Petitioner now raises the issue of whether his action is one based on Article 1144 or
on Article 1146 of the Civil Code. According to him, his termination of employment
effective November 1, 1982, was based on an employment contract which is under
Article 1144, so his action should prescribe in 10 years as provided for in said article.
Thus he claims the ruling of the appellate court based on Article 1146 where
prescription is only four (4) years, is an error. The appellate court concluded that the
action for illegal dismissal originally filed before the Labor Arbiter on June 29, 1983,
but which was withdrawn, then filed again in 1987 before the Regional Trial Court, had
already prescribed.
In our view, neither Article 11447 nor Article 11468 of the Civil Code is here pertinent.
What is applicable is Article 291 of the Labor Code, viz:
Art. 291. Money claims. All money claims arising from employee-
employer relations accruing during the effectivity of this Code shall be filed
within three (3) years from the time the cause of action accrued; otherwise
they shall be forever barred.
xxx xxx xxx
What rules on prescription should apply in cases like this one has long been decided
by this Court. In illegal dismissal, it is settled, that the ten-year prescriptive period fixed
in Article 1144 of the Civil Code may not be invoked by petitioners, for the Civil Code is
a law of general application, while the prescriptive period fixed in Article 292 of the
Labor Code [now Article 291] is a SPECIAL LAW applicable to claims arising from
employee-employer relations.9
More recently in De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals,10 where the money claim was
based on a written contract, the Collective Bargaining Agreement, the Court held:
. . . The language of Art. 291 of the Labor Code does not limit its application
only to "money claims specifically recoverable under said Code" but covers
all money claims arising from an employee-employer relations" (Citing
Cadalin v. POEA Administrator, 238 SCRA 721, 764 [1994]; and Uy v.
National Labor Relations Commission, 261 SCRA 505, 515 [1996]). . . .
It should be noted further that Article 291 of the Labor Code is a special law
applicable to money claims arising from employer-employee relations; thus,
it necessarily prevails over Article 1144 of the Civil Code, a general law.
Basic is the rule in statutory construction that "where two statutes are of
equal theoretical application to a particular case, the one designed therefore
should prevail." (Citing Leveriza v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 157 SCRA
282, 294.) Generalia specialibus non derogant.11
In the light of Article 291, aforecited, we agree with the appellate court's conclusion
that petitioner's action for damages due to illegal termination filed again on January 8,
1987 or more than four (4) years after the effective date of his dismissal on November
1, 1982 has already prescribed.
In the instant case, the action for damages due to illegal termination was
filed by plaintiff-appelle only on January 8, 1987 or more than four (4) years
after the effectivity date of his dismissal on November 1, 1982. Clearly,
plaintiff-appellee's action has already prescribed.
We base our conclusion not on Article 1144 of the Civil Code but on which sets the
prescription period at three (3) years and which governs under this jurisdiction.
Petitioner claims that the running of the prescriptive period was tolled when he filed
his complaint for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter of the National Labor
Relations Commission. However, this claim deserves scant consideration; it has no
legal leg to stand on. In Olympia International, Inc., vs., Court of Appeals, we held that
"although the commencement of a civil action stops the running of the statute of
prescription or limitations, its dismissal or voluntary abandonment by the plaintiff
leaves in exactly the same position as though no action had been commenced at
all."12
Now, as to whether petitioner's separation from the company due to retrenchment was
valid, the appellate court found that the employment contract of petitioner allowed for
pre-termination of employment. We agree with the Court of Appeals when it said,
It is a settled rule that contracts have the force of law between the parties.
From the moment the same is perfected, the parties are bound not only to
the fulfillment of what has been expressly stipulated but also to all
consequences which, according to their nature, may be in keeping with
good faith, usage and law. Thus, when plaintiff-appellee accepted the offer
of employment, he was bound by the terms and conditions set forth in the
contract, among others, the right of mutual termination by giving three
months written notice or by payment of three months salary. Such provision
is clear and readily understandable, hence, there is no room for
interpretation.
xxx xxx xxx
Further, plaintiff-appellee's contention that he is not bound by the provisions
of the Agreement, as he is not a signatory thereto, deserves no merit. It
must be noted that when plaintiff-appellee's employment was confirmed, he
applied for membership with the Singapore Airlines Limited (Pilots)
Association, the signatory to the aforementioned Agreement. As such,
plaintiff-appellee is estopped from questioning the legality of the said
agreement or any proviso contained therein.13
Moreover, the records of the present case clearly show that respondent court's
decision is amply supported by evidence and it did not err in its findings, including the
reason for the retrenchment:
When defendant-appellant was faced with the world-wide recession of the
airline industry resulting in a slow down in the company's growth particularly
in the regional operation (Asian Area) where the Airbus 300 operates. It had
no choice but to adopt cost cutting measures, such as cutting down
services, number of frequencies of flights, and reduction of the number of
flying points for the A-300 fleet (t.s.n., July 6, 1988, pp. 17-18). As a result,
defendant-appellant had to lay off A-300 pilots, including plaintiff-appellee,
which it found to be in excess of what is reasonably needed.14
All these considered, we find sufficient factual and legal basis to conclude that
petitioner's termination from employment was for an authorized cause, for which he
was given ample notice and opportunity to be heard, by respondent company. No
error nor grave abuse of discretion, therefore, could be attributed to respondent
appellate court.1wphi1.nt
ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals in C.A. CV No. 34476 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 195649.July 2, 2013.*
CASAN MACODE MAQUILING, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO, and LINOG G. BALUA, respondents.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Judicial Notice; Foreign Laws; The Supreme Court cannot
take judicial notice of foreign laws, which must be presented as public documents of a
foreign country and must be evidenced by an official publication thereof.
Respondent cites Section 349 of the Immigration and Naturalization Act of the United
States as having the effect of expatriation when he executed his Affidavit of
Renunciation of American Citizenship on April 3, 2009 and thus claims that he was
divested of his American citizenship. If indeed, respondent was divested of all the
rights of an American citizen, the fact that he was still able to use his US passport
after executing his Affidavit of Renunciation repudiates this claim. The Court cannot
take judicial notice of foreign laws, which must be presented as public documents of a
foreign country and must be evidenced by an official publication thereof. Mere
reference to a foreign law in a pleading does not suffice for it to be considered in
deciding a case.
Election Law; Disqualification of Candidates; Citizenship; Dual Citizens; This
requirement of renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship, when read together with
Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code which disqualifies those with dual
citizenship from running for any elective local position, indicates a policy that anyone
who seeks to run for public office must be solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen.
With all due respect to the dissent, the declared policy of Republic Act No. (RA) 9225
is that all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed
not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act. This policy
pertains to the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. Section 5(2) requires those who
have re-acquired Philippine citizenship and who seek elective public office, to
renounce any and all foreign citizenship. This requirement of renunciation of any and
all foreign citizenship, when read together with Section 40(d) of the Local Government
Code which disqualifies those with dual citizenship from running for any elective local
position, indicates a policy that anyone who seeks to run for public office must be
solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen. To allow a former Filipino who reacquires
Philippine citizenship to continue using a foreign passport which indicates the
recognition of a foreign state of the individual as its national even after the Filipino
has renounced his foreign citizenship, is to allow a complete disregard of this policy.
Same; Same; Same; Same; There is no doubt that the use of a passport is a positive
declaration that one is a citizen of the country which issued the passport, or that a
passport proves that the country which issued it recognizes the person named therein
as its national.Indeed, there is no doubt that Section 40(d) of the Local Government
Code disqualifies those with dual citizenship from running for local elective positions.
There is likewise no doubt that the use of a passport is a positive declaration that one
is a citizen of the country which issued the passport, or that a passport proves that the
country which issued it recognizes the person named therein as its national.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The requirement that the renunciation must be made
through an oath emphasizes the solemn duty of the one making the oath of
renunciation to remain true to what he has sworn to.It is unquestioned that Arnado
is a natural born Filipino citizen, or that he acquired American citizenship by
naturalization. There is no doubt that he reacquired his Filipino citizenship by taking
his Oath of Allegiance to the Philippines and that he renounced his American
citizenship. It is also indubitable that after renouncing his American citizenship, Arnado
used his U.S. passport at least six times. If there is any remaining doubt, it is
regarding the efficacy of Arnados renunciation of his American citizenship when he
subsequently used his U.S. passport. The renunciation of foreign citizenship must be
complete and unequivocal. The requirement that the renunciation must be made
through an oath emphasizes the solemn duty of the one making the oath of
renunciation to remain true to what he has sworn to. Allowing the subsequent use of a
foreign passport because it is convenient for the person to do so is rendering the oath
a hollow act. It devalues the act of taking of an oath, reducing it to a mere ceremonial
formality.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Well-settled is the rule that findings of fact of
administrative bodies will not be interfered with by the courts in the absence of grave
abuse of discretion on the part of said agencies, or unless the aforementioned findings
are not supported by substantial evidence.Well-settled is the rule that findings of
fact of administrative bodies will not be interfered with by the courts in the absence of
grave abuse of discretion on the part of said agencies, or unless the aforementioned
findings are not supported by substantial evidence. They are accorded not only great
respect but even finality, and are binding upon this Court, unless it is shown that the
administrative body had arbitrarily disregarded or misapprehended evidence before it
to such an extent as to compel a contrary conclusion had such evidence been
properly appreciated.
Election Law; Disqualification of Candidates; Citizenship; Dual Citizens; If we allow
dual citizens who wish to run for public office to renounce their foreign citizenship and
afterwards continue using their foreign passports, we are creating a special privilege
for these dual citizens, thereby effectively junking the prohibition in Section 40(d) of
the Local Government Code.It must be stressed that what is at stake here is the
principle that only those who are exclusively Filipinos are qualified to run for public
office. If we allow dual citizens who wish to run for public office to renounce their
foreign citizenship and afterwards continue using their foreign passports, we are
creating a special privilege for these dual citizens, thereby effectively junking the
prohibition in Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code.
BRION,J., Dissenting Opinion:
Election Law; Disqualification of Candidates; Citizenship; Dual Citizens; View that the
majority in fact concedes that Arnados use of his U.S. passport is not a ground for
loss of Filipino citizenship under Commonwealth Act No. 63 as the law requires
express renunciation and not by implication or inference from conduct.After
complying with the twin requirements of RA 9225, Arnado not only became a pure
Filipino citizen but also became eligible to run for public office. To be sure, the majority
in fact concedes that Arnados use of his U.S. passport is not a ground for loss of
Filipino citizenship under Commonwealth Act No. 63 as the law requires express
renunciation and not by implication or inference from conduct. Why the norm will be
any different with respect to the loss of citizenship rights is, to my mind, a question
that the majority ruling left hanging and unanswered as it disregards a directly related
jurisprudential landmark Aznar v. Commission on Elections, 185 SCRA 703 (1990)
where the Court ruled that the mere fact that therein respondent Emilio Mario
Renner Osmea was a holder of a certificate that he is an American did not mean that
he was no longer a Filipino, and that an application for an alien certificate of
registration did not amount to a renunciation of his Philippine citizenship. Through the
Courts ruling in the present case (that by Arnados isolated use of his U.S. passport,
he is reverted to the status of a dual citizen), the Court effectively reversed Aznar and,
under murky facts and the flimsiest of reasons, created a new ground for the loss of
the political rights of a Filipino citizen.
Same; Same; Same; Same; View that in a situation of doubt, doubts should be
resolved in favor of full Filipino citizenship since the thrust of R.A. No. 9225 is to
encourage the return to Filipino citizenship of natural-born Filipinos who lost their
Philippine citizenship through their acquisition of another citizenship.In a situation of
doubt, doubts should be resolved in favor of full Filipino citizenship since the thrust of
RA 9225 is to encourage the return to Filipino citizenship of natural-born Filipinos who
lost their Philippine citizenship through their acquisition of another citizenship. Note in
this regard that Arnado consciously and voluntarily gave up a very much sought after
citizenship status in favor of returning to full Filipino citizenship and participating in
Philippine governance.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Republic Act No. 9225; View that under R.A. No. 9225,
natural-born citizens who were deemed to have lost their Philippine citizenship
because of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country and who subsequently
complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 9225 are deemed not to have lost their
Philippine citizenship.Under RA 9225, natural-born citizens who were deemed to
have lost their Philippine citizenship because of their naturalization as citizens of a
foreign country and who subsequently complied with the requirements of RA 9225
are deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship. RA 9225 cured and negated
the presumption made under CA 63. Hence, as in Japzon v. Commission on Elections,
576 SCRA 331 (2009), Arnado assumed pure Philippine citizenship again after
taking the Oath of Allegiance and executing an Oath of Renunciation of his American
citizenship under RA 9225.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; View that the law requires express renunciation in
order to lose Philippine citizenship. The term means a renunciation that is made
distinctly and explicitly and is not left to inference or implication; it is a renunciation
manifested by direct and appropriate language, as distinguished from that which is
inferred from conduct.That Arnados use of his U.S. passport amounts to an express
renunciation of his Filipino citizenship or some of his rights as a citizen when its use
was an isolated act that he sufficiently explained and fully justified is not a
conclusion that is easy to accept under the available facts of the case and the
prevailing law. I emphasize that the law requires express renunciation in order to lose
Philippine citizenship. The term means a renunciation that is made distinctly and
explicitly and is not left to inference or implication; it is a renunciation manifested by
direct and appropriate language, as distinguished from that which is inferred from
conduct. The appreciation of Arnados use of his U.S. passport should not depart from
this norm, particularly in a situation of doubt.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; View that in the absence of clear and affirmative
acts of re-acquisition of U.S. citizenship either by naturalization or by express acts
(such as the re-establishment of permanent residency in the U.S.), Arnados use of his
U.S. passport cannot but be considered an isolated act that did not undo his
renunciation of his U.S. citizenship.In the present case, other than the use of his
U.S. passport in two trips to and from the U.S., the record does not bear out any
indication, supported by evidence, of Arnados intention to re-acquire U.S. citizenship.
In the absence of clear and affirmative acts of re-acquisition of U.S. citizenship either
by naturalization or by express acts (such as the re-establishment of permanent
residency in the U.S.), Arnados use of his U.S. passport cannot but be considered an
isolated act that did not undo his renunciation of his U.S. citizenship. What he might in
fact have done was to violate American law on the use of passports, but this is a
matter irrelevant to the present case. Thus, Arnado remains to be a pure Filipino
citizen and the loss of his Philippine citizenship or of citizenship rights cannot be
presumed or inferred from his isolated act of using his U.S. passport for travel
purposes.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; View that as a mandatory requirement under
Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225, it allows former natural-born Filipino citizens who were
deemed to have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of naturalization as citizens
of a foreign country to enjoy full civil and political rights, foremost among them, the
privilege to run for public office.I do not dispute that an Oath of Renunciation is not
an empty or formal ceremony that can be perfunctorily professed at any given day,
only to be disregarded on the next. As a mandatory requirement under Section 5(2) of
RA 9225, it allows former natural-born Filipino citizens who were deemed to have lost
their Philippine citizenship by reason of naturalization as citizens of a foreign country
to enjoy full civil and political rights, foremost among them, the privilege to run for
public office. Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections, 700 SCRA 367, G.R. No.
195649 July 2, 2013
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
 EN BANC
G.R. No. 195649 April 16, 2013
CASAN MACODE MAQUILING, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO, LINOG G.
BALUA, Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ.:
THE CASE
This is a Petition for Certiorari ender Rule 64 in conjunction with Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court to review the Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). The
Resolution1 in SPA No. 10-1 09(DC) of the COMELEC First Division dated 5 October
201 0 is being assailed for applying Section 44 of the Local Government Code while
the Resolution2 of the COMELEC En Banc dated 2 February 2011 is being questioned
for finding that respondent Rommel Arnado y Cagoco (respondent Arnado/Arnado) is
solely a Filipino citizen qualified to run for public office despite his continued use of a
U.S. passport.
FACTS
Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen.3 However, as a consequence of
his subsequent naturalization as a citizen of the United States of America, he lost his
Filipino citizenship. Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225
before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Franciso, USA and took the
Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on 10 July 2008.4 On the same
day an Order of Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition was issued
in his favor.5
The aforementioned Oath of Allegiance states:
I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, solemnly swear that I will support and defend the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders
promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines and I hereby declare
that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain
true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon myself
voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion. 6
On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and
executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship, which states:
I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, do solemnly swear that I absolutely and perpetually
renounce all allegiance and fidelity to the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA of which I
am a citizen, and I divest myself of full employment of all civil and political rights and
privileges of the United States of America.
I solemnly swear that all the foregoing statement is true and correct to the best of my
knowledge and belief.7
On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte, which contains, among others, the following
statements:
I am a natural born Filipino citizen / naturalized Filipino citizen.
I am not a permanent resident of, or immigrant to, a foreign country.
I am eligible for the office I seek to be elected to.
I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto. I will obey the laws, legal orders and
decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities.
I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose
of evasion.8
On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate,
filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his certificate of candidacy for
municipal mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in connection with the 10 May 2010
local and national elections.9
Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte and that he is a foreigner, attaching thereto a certification issued by the Bureau
of Immigration dated 23 April 2010 indicating the nationality of Arnado as "USA-
American."10To further bolster his claim of Arnados US citizenship, Balua presented in
his Memorandum a computer-generated travel record11 dated 03 December 2009
indicating that Arnado has been using his US Passport No. 057782700 in entering and
departing the Philippines. The said record shows that Arnado left the country on 14
April 2009 and returned on 25 June 2009, and again departed on 29 July 2009,
arriving back in the Philippines on 24 November 2009.
Balua likewise presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April
2010, certifying that the name "Arnado, Rommel Cagoco" appears in the available
Computer Database/Passenger manifest/IBM listing on file as of 21 April 2010, with
the following pertinent travel records:
DATE OF Arrival : 01/12/2010
NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN
PASSPORT : 057782700
DATE OF Arrival : 03/23/2010
NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN
PASSPORT : 05778270012
On 30 April 2010, the COMELEC (First Division) issued an Order13 requiring the
respondent to personally file his answer and memorandum within three (3) days from
receipt thereof.
After Arnado failed to answer the petition, Balua moved to declare him in default and
to present evidence ex-parte.
Neither motion was acted upon, having been overtaken by the 2010 elections where
Arnado garnered the highest number of votes and was subsequently proclaimed as
the winning candidate for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.
It was only after his proclamation that Arnado filed his verified answer, submitting the
following documents as evidence:14
1. Affidavit of Renunciation and Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines dated 03 April 2009;
2. Joint-Affidavit dated 31 May 2010 of Engr. Virgil Seno, Virginia Branzuela,
Leoncio Daligdig, and Jessy Corpin, all neighbors of Arnado, attesting that
Arnado is a long-time resident of Kauswagan and that he has been
conspicuously and continuously residing in his familys ancestral house in
Kauswagan;
3. Certification from the Punong Barangay of Poblacion, Kauswagan, Lanao
del Norte dated 03 June 2010 stating that Arnado is a bona fide resident of
his barangay and that Arnado went to the United States in 1985 to work and
returned to the Philippines in 2009;
4. Certification dated 31 May 2010 from the Municipal Local Government
Operations Office of Kauswagan stating that Dr. Maximo P. Arnado, Sr.
served as Mayor of Kauswagan, from January 1964 to June 1974 and from
15 February 1979 to 15 April 1986; and
5. Voter Certification issued by the Election Officer of Kauswagan certifying
that Arnado has been a registered voter of Kauswagan since 03 April 2009.
THE RULING OF THE COMELEC FIRST DIVISION
Instead of treating the Petition as an action for the cancellation of a certificate of
candidacy based on misrepresentation,15 the COMELEC First Division considered it as
one for disqualification. Baluas contention that Arnado is a resident of the United
States was dismissed upon the finding that "Balua failed to present any evidence to
support his contention,"16 whereas the First Division still could "not conclude that
Arnado failed to meet the one-year residency requirement under the Local
Government Code."17
In the matter of the issue of citizenship, however, the First Division disagreed with
Arnados claim that he is a Filipino citizen.18
We find that although Arnado appears to have substantially complied with the
requirements of R.A. No. 9225, Arnados act of consistently using his US passport
after renouncing his US citizenship on 03 April 2009 effectively negated his Affidavit of
Renunciation.
xxxx
Arnados continued use of his US passport is a strong indication that Arnado had no
real intention to renounce his US citizenship and that he only executed an Affidavit of
Renunciation to enable him to run for office. We cannot turn a blind eye to the glaring
inconsistency between Arnados unexplained use of a US passport six times and his
claim that he re-acquired his Philippine citizenship and renounced his US citizenship.
As noted by the Supreme Court in the Yu case, "a passport is defined as an official
document of identity and nationality issued to a person intending to travel or sojourn in
foreign countries." Surely, one who truly divested himself of US citizenship would not
continue to avail of privileges reserved solely for US nationals. 19
The dispositive portion of the Resolution rendered by the COMELEC
First Division reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for disqualification and/or to
cancel the certificate of candidacy of Rommel C. Arnado is hereby GRANTED.
Rommel C. Arnados proclamation as the winning candidate for Municipal Mayor of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Nore is hereby ANNULLED. Let the order of succession under
Section 44 of the Local Government Code of 1991 take effect.20
The Motion for Reconsideration and
the Motion for Intervention
Arnado sought reconsideration of the resolution before the COMELEC En Banc on the
ground that "the evidence is insufficient to justify the Resolution and that the said
Resolution is contrary to law."21 He raised the following contentions:22
1. The finding that he is not a Filipino citizen is not supported by the
evidence consisting of his Oath of Allegiance and the Affidavit of
Renunciation, which show that he has substantially complied with the
requirements of R.A. No. 9225;
2. The use of his US passport subsequent to his renunciation of his
American citizenship is not tantamount to a repudiation of his Filipino
citizenship, as he did not perform any act to swear allegiance to a country
other than the Philippines;
3. He used his US passport only because he was not informed of the
issuance of his Philippine passport, and that he used his Philippine passport
after he obtained it;
4. Baluas petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Arnado was filed
out of time, and the First Divisions treatment of the petition as one for
disqualification constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction;23
5. He is undoubtedly the peoples choice as indicated by his winning the
elections;
6. His proclamation as the winning candidate ousted the COMELEC from
jurisdiction over the case; and
7. The proper remedy to question his citizenship is through a petition for quo
warranto, which should have been filed within ten days from his
proclamation.
Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling), another candidate for mayor of
Kauswagan, and who garnered the second highest number of votes in the 2010
elections, intervened in the case and filed before the COMELEC En Banc a Motion for
Reconsideration together with an Opposition to Arnados Amended Motion for
Reconsideration. Maquiling argued that while the First Division correctly disqualified
Arnado, the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code is
not applicable in this case. Consequently, he claimed that the cancellation of Arnados
candidacy and the nullification of his proclamation, Maquiling, as the legitimate
candidate who obtained the highest number of lawful votes, should be proclaimed as
the winner.
Maquiling simultaneously filed his Memorandum with his Motion for Intervention and
his Motion for Reconsideration. Arnado opposed all motions filed by Maquiling,
claiming that intervention is prohibited after a decision has already been rendered,
and that as a second-placer, Maquiling undoubtedly lost the elections and thus does
not stand to be prejudiced or benefitted by the final adjudication of the case.
RULING OF THE COMELEC EN BANC
In its Resolution of 02 February 2011, the COMELEC En Banc held that under Section
6 of Republic Act No. 6646, the Commission "shall continue with the trial and hearing
of the action, inquiry or protest even after the proclamation of the candidate whose
qualifications for office is questioned."
As to Maquilings intervention, the COMELEC En Banc also cited Section 6 of R.A.
No. 6646 which allows intervention in proceedings for disqualification even after
elections if no final judgment has been rendered, but went on further to say that
Maquiling, as the second placer, would not be prejudiced by the outcome of the case
as it agrees with the dispositive portion of the Resolution of the First Division allowing
the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code to take
effect.
The COMELEC En Banc agreed with the treatment by the First Division of the petition
as one for disqualification, and ruled that the petition was filed well within the period
prescribed by law,24 having been filed on 28 April 2010, which is not later than 11 May
2010, the date of proclamation.
However, the COMELEC En Banc reversed and set aside the ruling of the First
Division and granted Arnados Motion for Reconsideration, on the following premises:
First:
By renouncing his US citizenship as imposed by R.A. No. 9225, the respondent
embraced his Philippine citizenship as though he never became a citizen of another
country. It was at that time, April 3, 2009, that the respondent became a pure
Philippine Citizen again.
xxxx
The use of a US passport does not operate to revert back his status as a dual
citizen prior to his renunciation as there is no law saying such. More succinctly, the
use of a US passport does not operate to "un-renounce" what he has earlier on
renounced. The First Divisions reliance in the case of In Re: Petition for Habeas
Corpus of Willy Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, et al. is misplaced. The petitioner in the said
case is a naturalized citizen who, after taking his oath as a naturalized Filipino, applied
for the renewal of his Portuguese passport. Strict policy is maintained in the conduct
of citizens who are not natural born, who acquire their citizenship by choice, thus
discarding their original citizenship. The Philippine State expects strict conduct of
allegiance to those who choose to be its citizens. In the present case, respondent is
not a naturalized citizen but a natural born citizen who chose greener pastures by
working abroad and then decided to repatriate to supposedly help in the progress of
Kauswagan. He did not apply for a US passport after his renunciation. Thus the
mentioned case is not on all fours with the case at bar.
xxxx
The respondent presented a plausible explanation as to the use of his US passport.
Although he applied for a Philippine passport, the passport was only issued on June
18, 2009. However, he was not notified of the issuance of his Philippine passport so
that he was actually able to get it about three (3) months later. Yet as soon as he was
in possession of his Philippine passport, the respondent already used the same in his
subsequent travels abroad. This fact is proven by the respondents submission of a
certified true copy of his passport showing that he used the same for his travels on the
following dates: January 31, 2010, April 16, 2010, May 20, 2010, January 12, 2010,
March 31, 2010 and June 4, 2010. This then shows that the use of the US passport
was because to his knowledge, his Philippine passport was not yet issued to him for
his use. As probably pressing needs might be undertaken, the respondent used
whatever is within his control during that time.25
In his Separate Concurring Opinion, COMELEC Chairman Sixto Brillantes cited that
the use of foreign passport is not one of the grounds provided for under Section 1 of
Commonwealth Act No. 63 through which Philippine citizenship may be lost.
"The application of the more assimilative principle of continuity of citizenship is more
appropriate in this case. Under said principle, once a person becomes a citizen, either
by birth or naturalization, it is assumed that he desires to continue to be a citizen, and
this assumption stands until he voluntarily denationalizes or expatriates himself. Thus,
in the instant case respondent after reacquiring his Philippine citizenship should be
presumed to have remained a Filipino despite his use of his American passport in the
absence of clear, unequivocal and competent proof of expatriation. Accordingly, all
doubts should be resolved in favor of retention of citizenship."26
On the other hand, Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento dissented, thus:
Respondent evidently failed to prove that he truly and wholeheartedly abandoned his
allegiance to the United States. The latters continued use of his US passport and
enjoyment of all the privileges of a US citizen despite his previous renunciation of the
afore-mentioned citizenship runs contrary to his declaration that he chose to retain
only his Philippine citizenship. Respondents submission with the twin requirements
was obviously only for the purpose of complying with the requirements for running for
the mayoralty post in connection with the May 10, 2010 Automated National and Local
Elections.
Qualifications for elective office, such as citizenship, are continuing requirements;
once any of them is lost during his incumbency, title to the office itself is deemed
forfeited. If a candidate is not a citizen at the time he ran for office or if he lost his
citizenship after his election to office, he is disqualified to serve as such. Neither does
the fact that respondent obtained the plurality of votes for the mayoralty post cure the
latters failure to comply with the qualification requirements regarding his citizenship.
Since a disqualified candidate is no candidate at all in the eyes of the law, his having
received the highest number of votes does not validate his election. It has been held
that where a petition for disqualification was filed before election against a candidate
but was adversely resolved against him after election, his having obtained the highest
number of votes did not make his election valid. His ouster from office does not violate
the principle of vox populi suprema est lex because the application of the
constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of popularity.
To apply it is to breath[e] life to the sovereign will of the people who expressed it when
they ratified the Constitution and when they elected their representatives who enacted
the law.27
THE PETITION BEFORE THE COURT
Maquiling filed the instant petition questioning the propriety of declaring Arnado
qualified to run for public office despite his continued use of a US passport, and
praying that Maquiling be proclaimed as the winner in the 2010 mayoralty race in
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.
Ascribing both grave abuse of discretion and reversible error on the part of the
COMELEC En Banc for ruling that Arnado is a Filipino citizen despite his continued
use of a US passport, Maquiling now seeks to reverse the finding of the COMELEC
En Banc that Arnado is qualified to run for public office.
Corollary to his plea to reverse the ruling of the COMELEC En Banc or to affirm the
First Divisions disqualification of Arnado, Maquiling also seeks the review of the
applicability of Section 44 of the Local Government Code, claiming that the COMELEC
committed reversible error in ruling that "the succession of the vice mayor in case the
respondent is disqualified is in order."
There are three questions posed by the parties before this Court which will be
addressed seriatim as the subsequent questions hinge on the result of the first.
The first question is whether or not intervention is allowed in a disqualification case.
The second question is whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing
foreign citizenship amounts to undoing a renunciation earlier made.
A better framing of the question though should be whether or not the use of a foreign
passport after renouncing foreign citizenship affects ones qualifications to run for
public office.
The third question is whether or not the rule on succession in the Local Government
Code is applicable to this case.
OUR RULING
Intervention of a rival candidate in a
disqualification case is proper when
there has not yet been any
proclamation of the winner.
Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling intervened at the stage when respondent Arnado
filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the First Division Resolution before the
COMELEC En Banc. As the candidate who garnered the second highest number of
votes, Maquiling contends that he has an interest in the disqualification case filed
against Arnado, considering that in the event the latter is disqualified, the votes cast
for him should be considered stray and the second-placer should be proclaimed as
the winner in the elections.
It must be emphasized that while the original petition before the COMELEC is one for
cancellation of the certificate of candidacy and / or disqualification, the COMELEC
First Division and the COMELEC En Banc correctly treated the petition as one for
disqualification.
The effect of a disqualification case is enunciated in Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646:
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not
be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an
election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of
votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and
hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any
intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation
of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
Mercado v. Manzano28
clarified the right of intervention in a disqualification case. In that case, the Court said:
That petitioner had a right to intervene at that stage of the proceedings for the
disqualification against private respondent is clear from Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646,
otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which provides: Any
candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be
voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a
candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and
he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or
Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest
and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency
thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the
evidence of guilt is strong. Under this provision, intervention may be allowed in
proceedings for disqualification even after election if there has yet been no final
judgment rendered.29
Clearly then, Maquiling has the right to intervene in the case. The fact that the
COMELEC En Banc has already ruled that Maquiling has not shown that the
requisites for the exemption to the second-placer rule set forth in Sinsuat v.
COMELEC30 are present and therefore would not be prejudiced by the outcome of the
case, does not deprive Maquiling of the right to elevate the matter before this Court.
Arnados claim that the main case has attained finality as the original petitioner and
respondents therein have not appealed the decision of the COMELEC En Banc,
cannot be sustained. The elevation of the case by the intervenor prevents it from
attaining finality. It is only after this Court has ruled upon the issues raised in this
instant petition that the disqualification case originally filed by Balua against Arnado
will attain finality.
The use of foreign passport after renouncing ones foreign citizenship is a
positive and voluntary act of representation as to ones nationality and
citizenship; it does not divest Filipino citizenship regained by repatriation but it
recants the Oath of Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an elective
position.
Section 5(2) of The Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003 provides:
Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil
and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under
existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
xxxx
(2)Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for
holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the
time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign before any public officer authorized to administer an
oath.
x x x31
Rommel Arnado took all the necessary steps to qualify to run for a public office. He
took the Oath of Allegiance and renounced his foreign citizenship. There is no
question that after performing these twin requirements required under Section 5(2) of
R.A. No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003, he became
eligible to run for public office.
Indeed, Arnado took the Oath of Allegiance not just only once but twice: first, on 10
July 2008 when he applied for repatriation before the Consulate General of the
Philippines in San Francisco, USA, and again on 03 April 2009 simultaneous with the
execution of his Affidavit of Renunciation. By taking the Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic, Arnado re-acquired his Philippine citizenship. At the time, however, he
likewise possessed American citizenship. Arnado had therefore become a dual citizen.
After reacquiring his Philippine citizenship, Arnado renounced his American citizenship
by executing an Affidavit of Renunciation, thus completing the requirements for
eligibility to run for public office.
By renouncing his foreign citizenship, he was deemed to be solely a Filipino citizen,
regardless of the effect of such renunciation under the laws of the foreign country.32
However, this legal presumption does not operate permanently and is open to attack
when, after renouncing the foreign citizenship, the citizen performs positive acts
showing his continued possession of a foreign citizenship. 33
Arnado himself subjected the issue of his citizenship to attack when, after renouncing
his foreign citizenship, he continued to use his US passport to travel in and out of the
country before filing his certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009. The pivotal
question to determine is whether he was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen at the
time he filed his certificate of candidacy, thereby rendering him eligible to run for public
office.
Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign citizenship, and 30
November 2009, the date he filed his COC, he used his US passport four times,
actions that run counter to the affidavit of renunciation he had earlier executed. By
using his foreign passport, Arnado positively and voluntarily represented himself as an
American, in effect declaring before immigration authorities of both countries that he is
an American citizen, with all attendant rights and privileges granted by the United
States of America.
The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be
professed at any time, only to be violated the next day. It requires an absolute and
perpetual renunciation of the foreign citizenship and a full divestment of all civil and
political rights granted by the foreign country which granted the citizenship.
Mercado v. Manzano34 already hinted at this situation when the Court declared:
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made
under oath. Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the
loss of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu
v. Defensor-Santiago, we sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on
the ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the
renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in commercial documents executed
abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken against
anyone who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but
subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts enumerated in
Commonwealth Act No. 63 constituting renunciation and loss of Philippine
citizenship,35 it is nevertheless an act which repudiates the very oath of renunciation
required for a former Filipino citizen who is also a citizen of another country to be
qualified to run for a local elective position.
When Arnado used his US passport on 14 April 2009, or just eleven days after he
renounced his American citizenship, he recanted his Oath of Renunciation36 that he
"absolutely and perpetually renounce(s) all allegiance and fidelity to the UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA"37 and that he "divest(s) himself of full employment of all civil
and political rights and privileges of the United States of America." 38
We agree with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using a foreign passport does
not divest Arnado of his Filipino citizenship, which he acquired by repatriation.
However, by representing himself as an American citizen, Arnado voluntarily and
effectively reverted to his earlier status as a dual citizen. Such reversion was not
retroactive; it took place the instant Arnado represented himself as an American
citizen by using his US passport.
This act of using a foreign passport after renouncing ones foreign citizenship is fatal
to Arnados bid for public office, as it effectively imposed on him a disqualification to
run for an elective local position.
Arnados category of dual citizenship is that by which foreign citizenship is acquired
through a positive act of applying for naturalization. This is distinct from those
considered dual citizens by virtue of birth, who are not required by law to take the oath
of renunciation as the mere filing of the certificate of candidacy already carries with it
an implied renunciation of foreign citizenship.39 Dual citizens by naturalization, on the
other hand, are required to take not only the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines but also to personally renounce foreign citizenship in order to qualify as a
candidate for public office.
By the time he filed his certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009, Arnado was a
dual citizen enjoying the rights and privileges of Filipino and American citizenship. He
was qualified to vote, but by the express disqualification under Section 40(d) of the
Local Government Code,40 he was not qualified to run for a local elective position.
In effect, Arnado was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen only for a period of
eleven days, or from 3 April 2009 until 14 April 2009, on which date he first used his
American passport after renouncing his American citizenship.
This Court has previously ruled that:
Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not
only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the
officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be
seasonably challenged. x x x.41
The citizenship requirement for elective public office is a continuing one. It must be
possessed not just at the time of the renunciation of the foreign citizenship but
continuously. Any act which violates the oath of renunciation opens the citizenship
issue to attack.
We agree with the pronouncement of the COMELEC First Division that "Arnados act
of consistently using his US passport effectively negated his "Affidavit of
Renunciation."42 This does not mean, that he failed to comply with the twin
requirements under R.A. No. 9225, for he in fact did.
It was after complying with the requirements that he performed positive acts which
effectively disqualified him from running for an elective public office pursuant to
Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991.
The purpose of the Local Government Code in disqualifying dual citizens from running
for any elective public office would be thwarted if we were to allow a person who has
earlier renounced his foreign citizenship, but who subsequently represents himself as
a foreign citizen, to hold any public office.
Arnado justifies the continued use of his US passport with the explanation that he was
not notified of the issuance of his Philippine passport on 18 June 2009, as a result of
which he was only able to obtain his Philippine passport three (3) months later.43
The COMELEC En Banc differentiated Arnado from Willy Yu, the Portuguese national
who sought naturalization as a Filipino citizen and later applied for the renewal of his
Portuguese passport. That Arnado did not apply for a US passport after his
renunciation does not make his use of a US passport less of an act that violated the
Oath of Renunciation he took. It was still a positive act of representation as a US
citizen before the immigration officials of this country.
The COMELEC, in ruling favorably for Arnado, stated "Yet, as soon as he was in
possession of his Philippine passport, the respondent already used the same in his
subsequent travels abroad."44 We cannot agree with the COMELEC. Three months
from June is September. If indeed, Arnado used his Philippine passport as soon as he
was in possession of it, he would not have used his US passport on 24 November
2009.
Besides, Arnados subsequent use of his Philippine passport does not correct the fact
that after he renounced his foreign citizenship and prior to filing his certificate of
candidacy, he used his US passport. In the same way that the use of his foreign
passport does not undo his Oath of Renunciation, his subsequent use of his Philippine
passport does not undo his earlier use of his US passport.
Citizenship is not a matter of convenience. It is a badge of identity that comes with
attendant civil and political rights accorded by the state to its citizens. It likewise
demands the concomitant duty to maintain allegiance to ones flag and country. While
those who acquire dual citizenship by choice are afforded the right of suffrage, those
who seek election or appointment to public office are required to renounce their
foreign citizenship to be deserving of the public trust. Holding public office demands
full and undivided allegiance to the Republic and to no other.
We therefore hold that Arnado, by using his US passport after renouncing his
American citizenship, has recanted the same Oath of Renunciation he took. Section
40(d) of the Local Government Code applies to his situation. He is disqualified not
only from holding the public office but even from becoming a candidate in the May
2010 elections.
We now resolve the next issue.
Resolving the third issue necessitates revisiting Topacio v. Paredes45 which is the
jurisprudential spring of the principle that a second-placer cannot be proclaimed as the
winner in an election contest. This doctrine must be re-examined and its soundness
once again put to the test to address the ever-recurring issue that a second-placer
who loses to an ineligible candidate cannot be proclaimed as the winner in the
elections.
The Facts of the case are as follows:
On June 4, 1912, a general election was held in the town of Imus, Province of Cavite,
to fill the office of municipal president. The petitioner, Felipe Topacio, and the
respondent, Maximo Abad, were opposing candidates for that office. Topacio received
430 votes, and Abad 281. Abad contested the election upon the sole ground that
Topacio was ineligible in that he was reelected the second time to the office of the
municipal president on June 4, 1912, without the four years required by Act No. 2045
having intervened.46
Abad thus questioned the eligibility of To p a c i o on the basis of a statutory prohibition
for seeking a second re-election absent the four year interruption.
The often-quoted phrase in Topacio v. Paredes is that "the wreath of victory cannot be
transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole question
is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots." 47
This phrase is not even the ratio decidendi; it is a mere obiter dictum. The Court was
comparing "the effect of a decision that a candidate is not entitled to the office
because of fraud or irregularities in the elections x x x with that produced by declaring
a person ineligible to hold such an office."
The complete sentence where the phrase is found is part of a comparison and
contrast between the two situations, thus:
Again, the effect of a decision that a candidate is not entitled to the office because of
fraud or irregularities in the elections is quite different from that produced by declaring
a person ineligible to hold such an office. In the former case the court, after an
examination of the ballots may find that some other person than the candidate
declared to have received a plurality by the board of canvassers actually received the
greater number of votes, in which case the court issues its mandamus to the board of
canvassers to correct the returns accordingly; or it may find that the manner of holding
the election and the returns are so tainted with fraud or illegality that it cannot be
determined who received a plurality of the legally cast ballots. In the latter case, no
question as to the correctness of the returns or the manner of casting and counting
the ballots is before the deciding power, and generally the only result can be that the
election fails entirely. In the former, we have a contest in the strict sense of the word,
because of the opposing parties are striving for supremacy. If it be found that the
successful candidate (according to the board of canvassers) obtained a plurality in an
illegal manner, and that another candidate was the real victor, the former must retire in
favor of the latter. In the other case, there is not, strictly speaking, a contest, as the
wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other
candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the
legally cast ballots. In the one case the question is as to who received a plurality of the
legally cast ballots; in the other, the question is confined to the personal character and
circumstances of a single individual.48 (Emphasis supplied)
Note that the sentence where the phrase is found starts with "In the other case, there
is not, strictly speaking, a contest" in contrast to the earlier statement, "In the former,
we have a contest in the strict sense of the word, because of the opposing parties are
striving for supremacy."
The Court in Topacio v. Paredes cannot be said to have held that "the wreath of victory
cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the
sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots."
A proper reading of the case reveals that the ruling therein is that since the Court of
First Instance is without jurisdiction to try a disqualification case based on the eligibility
of the person who obtained the highest number of votes in the election, its jurisdiction
being confined "to determine which of the contestants has been duly elected" the
judge exceeded his jurisdiction when he "declared that no one had been legally
elected president of the municipality of Imus at the general election held in that town
on 4 June 1912" where "the only question raised was whether or not Topacio was
eligible to be elected and to hold the office of municipal president."
The Court did not rule that Topacio was disqualified and that Abad as the second
placer cannot be proclaimed in his stead. The Court therein ruled:
For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion and so hold that the respondent
judge exceeded his jurisdiction in declaring in those proceedings that no one was
elected municipal president of the municipality of Imus at the last general election; and
that said order and all subsequent proceedings based thereon are null and void and of
no effect; and, although this decision is rendered on respondents' answer to the order
to show cause, unless respondents raised some new and additional issues, let
judgment be entered accordingly in 5 days, without costs. So ordered.49
On closer scrutiny, the phrase relied upon by a host of decisions does not even have a
legal basis to stand on. It was a mere pronouncement of the Court comparing one
process with another and explaining the effects thereof. As an independent statement,
it is even illogical.
Let us examine the statement:
"x x x the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any
other candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality
of the legally cast ballots."
What prevents the transfer of the wreath of victory from the ineligible candidate to
another candidate?
When the issue being decided upon by the Court is the eligibility of the one receiving a
plurality of the legally cast ballots and ineligibility is thereafter established, what stops
the Court from adjudging another eligible candidate who received the next highest
number of votes as the winner and bestowing upon him that "wreath?"
An ineligible candidate who receives the highest number of votes is a wrongful winner.
By express legal mandate, he could not even have been a candidate in the first place,
but by virtue of the lack of material time or any other intervening circumstances, his
ineligibility might not have been passed upon prior to election date. Consequently, he
may have had the opportunity to hold himself out to the electorate as a legitimate and
duly qualified candidate. However, notwithstanding the outcome of the elections, his
ineligibility as a candidate remains unchanged. Ineligibility does not only pertain to his
qualifications as a candidate but necessarily affects his right to hold public office. The
number of ballots cast in his favor cannot cure the defect of failure to qualify with the
substantive legal requirements of eligibility to run for public office.
The popular vote does not cure the
ineligibility of a candidate.
The ballot cannot override the constitutional and statutory requirements for
qualifications and disqualifications of candidates. When the law requires certain
qualifications to be possessed or that certain disqualifications be not possessed by
persons desiring to serve as elective public officials, those qualifications must be met
before one even becomes a candidate. When a person who is not qualified is voted
for and eventually garners the highest number of votes, even the will of the electorate
expressed through the ballot cannot cure the defect in the qualifications of the
candidate. To rule otherwise is to trample upon and rent asunder the very law that sets
forth the qualifications and disqualifications of candidates. We might as well write off
our election laws if the voice of the electorate is the sole determinant of who should be
proclaimed worthy to occupy elective positions in our republic.
This has been, in fact, already laid down by the Court in Frivaldo v. COMELEC50 when
we pronounced:
x x x. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this
patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the
citizens of this country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be
erased by the electorate alone.
The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of
ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate
was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the deficiency is lack
of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must
owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity
to any other state.51(Emphasis supplied)
This issue has also been jurisprudentially clarified in Velasco v. COMELEC52 where
the Court ruled that the ruling in Quizon and Saya-ang cannot be interpreted without
qualifications lest "Election victory x x x becomes a magic formula to bypass election
eligibility requirements."53
We have ruled in the past that a candidates victory in the election may be considered
a sufficient basis to rule in favor of the candidate sought to be disqualified if the main
issue involves defects in the candidates certificate of candidacy. We said that while
provisions relating to certificates of candidacy are mandatory in terms, it is an
established rule of interpretation as regards election laws, that mandatory provisions
requiring certain steps before elections will be construed as directory after the
elections, to give effect to the will of the people. We so ruled in Quizon v. COMELEC
and Saya-ang v. COMELEC:
The present case perhaps presents the proper time and opportunity to fine-tune our
above ruling. We say this with the realization that a blanket and unqualified reading
and application of this ruling can be fraught with dangerous significance for the rule of
law and the integrity of our elections. For one, such blanket/unqualified reading may
provide a way around the law that effectively negates election requirements aimed at
providing the electorate with the basic information to make an informed choice about a
candidates eligibility and fitness for office.
The first requirement that may fall when an unqualified reading is made is Section 39
of the LGC which specifies the basic qualifications of local government officials.
Equally susceptive of being rendered toothless is Section 74 of the OEC that sets out
what should be stated in a COC. Section 78 may likewise be emasculated as mere
delay in the resolution of the petition to cancel or deny due course to a COC can
render a Section 78 petition useless if a candidate with false COC data wins. To state
the obvious, candidates may risk falsifying their COC qualifications if they know that
an election victory will cure any defect that their COCs may have. Election victory then
becomes a magic formula to bypass election eligibility requirements. (Citations
omitted)
What will stop an otherwise disqualified individual from filing a seemingly valid COC,
concealing any disqualification, and employing every strategy to delay any
disqualification case filed against him so he can submit himself to the electorate and
win, if winning the election will guarantee a disregard of constitutional and statutory
provisions on qualifications and disqualifications of candidates?
It is imperative to safeguard the expression of the sovereign voice through the ballot
by ensuring that its exercise respects the rule of law. To allow the sovereign voice
spoken through the ballot to trump constitutional and statutory provisions on
qualifications and disqualifications of candidates is not democracy or republicanism. It
is electoral anarchy. When set rules are disregarded and only the electorates voice
spoken through the ballot is made to matter in the end, it precisely serves as an open
invitation for electoral anarchy to set in.1wphi1
Maquiling is not a second-placer as
he obtained the highest number of
votes from among the qualified
candidates.
With Arnados disqualification, Maquiling then becomes the winner in the election as
he obtained the highest number of votes from among the qualified candidates.
We have ruled in the recent cases of Aratea v. COMELEC54 and Jalosjos v.
COMELEC55 that a void COC cannot produce any legal effect.
Thus, the votes cast in favor of the ineligible candidate are not considered at all in
determining the winner of an election.
Even when the votes for the ineligible candidate are disregarded, the will of the
electorate is still respected, and even more so. The votes cast in favor of an ineligible
candidate do not constitute the sole and total expression of the sovereign voice. The
votes cast in favor of eligible and legitimate candidates form part of that voice and
must also be respected.
As in any contest, elections are governed by rules that determine the qualifications
and disqualifications of those who are allowed to participate as players. When there
are participants who turn out to be ineligible, their victory is voided and the laurel is
awarded to the next in rank who does not possess any of the disqualifications nor
lacks any of the qualifications set in the rules to be eligible as candidates.
There is no need to apply the rule cited in Labo v. COMELEC56 that when the voters
are well aware within the realm of notoriety of a candidates disqualification and still
cast their votes in favor said candidate, then the eligible candidate obtaining the next
higher number of votes may be deemed elected. That rule is also a mere obiter that
further complicated the rules affecting qualified candidates who placed second to
ineligible ones.
The electorates awareness of the candidates disqualification is not a prerequisite for
the disqualification to attach to the candidate. The very existence of a disqualifying
circumstance makes the candidate ineligible. Knowledge by the electorate of a
candidates disqualification is not necessary before a qualified candidate who placed
second to a disqualified one can be proclaimed as the winner. The second-placer in
the vote count is actually the first-placer among the qualified candidates.
That the disqualified candidate has already been proclaimed and has assumed office
is of no moment. The subsequent disqualification based on a substantive ground that
existed prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy voids not only the COC but also
the proclamation.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 provides:
Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by
final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall
not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before
an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of
votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and
hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any
intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation
of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
There was no chance for Arnados proclamation to be suspended under this rule
because Arnado failed to file his answer to the petition seeking his disqualification.
Arnado only filed his Answer on 15 June 2010, long after the elections and after he
was already proclaimed as the winner.
The disqualifying circumstance surrounding Arnados candidacy involves his
citizenship. It does not involve the commission of election offenses as provided for in
the first sentence of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, the effect of which is to
disqualify the individual from continuing as a candidate, or if he has already been
elected, from holding the office.
The disqualifying circumstance affecting Arnado is his citizenship. As earlier
discussed, Arnado was both a Filipino and an American citizen when he filed his
certificate of candidacy. He was a dual citizen disqualified to run for public office based
on Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code.
Section 40 starts with the statement "The following persons are disqualified from
running for any elective local position." The prohibition serves as a bar against the
individuals who fall under any of the enumeration from participating as candidates in
the election.
With Arnado being barred from even becoming a candidate, his certificate of
candidacy is thus rendered void from the beginning. It could not have produced any
other legal effect except that Arnado rendered it impossible to effect his
disqualification prior to the elections because he filed his answer to the petition when
the elections were conducted already and he was already proclaimed the winner.
To hold that such proclamation is valid is to negate the prohibitory character of the
disqualification which Arnado possessed even prior to the filing of the certificate of
candidacy. The affirmation of Arnado's disqualification, although made long after the
elections, reaches back to the filing of the certificate of candidacy. Arnado is declared
to be not a candidate at all in the May 201 0 elections.
Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should not have been
counted. This leaves Maquiling as the qualified candidate who obtained the highest
number of votes. Therefore, the rule on succession under the Local Government Code
will not apply.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the
COMELEC En Bane dated 2 February 2011 is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
Respondent ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO is disqualified from running for any local
elective position. CASAN MACODE MAQUILING is hereby DECLARED the duly
elected Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in the 10 May 2010 elections.
This Decision is immediately executory.
Let a copy of this Decision be served personally upon the parties and the Commission
on Elections.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 188314.January 10, 2011.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. KHADDAFY JANJALANI,
GAMAL B. BAHARAN a.k.a. Tapay, ANGELO TRINIDAD a.k.a. Abu Khalil, GAPPAL
BANNAH ASALI a.k.a. Maidan or Negro, JAINAL SALI a.k.a. Abu Solaiman, ROHMAT
ABDURROHIM a.k.a. Jackie or Zaky, and other JOHN and JANE DOES, accused,
GAMAL B. BAHARAN a.k.a. Tapay, ANGELO TRINIDAD a.k.a. Abu Khalil, and
ROHMAT ABDURROHIM a.k.a. Abu Jackie or Zaky, accused-appellants.
Criminal Procedure; Plea of Guilty; All trial judges must refrain from accepting with
alacrity an accuseds plea of guilty, for while justice demands a speedy administration,
judges are duty bound to be extra solicitous in seeing to it that when an accused
pleads guilty, he understands fully the meaning of his plea and the import of an
inevitable conviction; The requirement for a judge to conduct a searching inquiry
applies more so in cases of re-arraignment.As early as in People v. Apduhan, 24
SCRA 798 the Supreme Court has ruled that all trial judges must refrain from
accepting with alacrity an accuseds plea of guilty, for while justice demands a speedy
administration, judges are duty bound to be extra solicitous in seeing to it that when
an accused pleads guilty, he understands fully the meaning of his plea and the import
of an inevitable conviction. Thus, trial court judges are required to observe the
following procedure under Section 3, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court: SEC. 3. Plea of
guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence.When the accused pleads guilty to a
capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and
full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and shall require the prosecution
to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may also present
evidence in his behalf. The requirement to conduct a searching inquiry applies more
so in cases of re-arraignment. In People v. Galvez, 378 SCRA 389 (2002), the Court
noted that since accused-appellants original plea was not guilty, the trial court
should have exerted careful effort in inquiring into why he changed his plea to guilty.
Same; Same; The requirement to conduct a searching inquiry should not be deemed
satisfied in cases in which it was the defense counsel who explained the
consequences of a guilty plea to the accusedthe conduct of a searching inquiry
remains the duty of judges, as they are mandated by the rules to satisfy themselves
that the accused had not been under coercion or duress; mistaken impressions; or a
misunderstanding of the significance, effects, and consequences of their guilty plea.
The requirement to conduct a searching inquiry should not be deemed satisfied in
cases in which it was the defense counsel who explained the consequences of a
guilty plea to the accused, as it appears in this case. In People v. Alborida, 359
SCRA 495 (2001), this Court found that there was still an improvident plea of guilty,
even if the accused had already signified in open court that his counsel had explained
the consequences of the guilty plea; that he understood the explanation of his
counsel; that the accused understood that the penalty of death would still be meted
out to him; and that he had not been intimidated, bribed, or threatened. We have
reiterated in a long line of cases that the conduct of a searching inquiry remains the
duty of judges, as they are mandated by the rules to satisfy themselves that the
accused had not been under coercion or duress; mistaken impressions; or a
misunderstanding of the significance, effects, and consequences of their guilty plea.
This requirement is stringent and mandatory.
Same; Same; Convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside only if
such plea is the sole basis of the judgment.In People v. Oden, 427 SCRA 634
(2004), the Court declared that even if the requirement of conducting a searching
inquiry was not complied with, [t]he manner by which the plea of guilt is made
loses much of great significance where the conviction can be based on independent
evidence proving the commission by the person accused of the offense charged.
Thus, in People v. Nadera, 324 SCRA 490 (2000), the Court stated: Convictions based
on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside only if such plea is the sole basis of the
judgment. If the trial court relied on sufficient and credible evidence to convict the
accused, the conviction must be sustained, because then it is predicated not merely
on the guilty plea of the accused but on evidence proving his commission of the
offense charged.
Criminal Law; Conspiracy; Principals; One who gave instructions and training to
another on how to make bombscoupled with their careful planning and persistent
attempts to bomb different areas in Metro Manila and his confirmation that another
would be getting TNT from one of the accused as part of their missionmake him a
principal by inducement since it is his co-inducement which was the determining
cause of the commission of the crime.In the light of the foregoing evidence, the
Court upholds the finding of guilt against Rohmat. Article 17 of the Revised Penal
Code reads: Art. 17. Principals.The following are considered principals: 1. Those
who take a direct part in the execution of the act 2. Those who directly force or induce
others to commit it 3. Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by
another act without which it would not have been accomplished Accused Rohmat is
criminally responsible under the second paragraph, or the provision on principal by
inducement. The instructions and training he had given Asali on how to make bombs
coupled with their careful planning and persistent attempts to bomb different areas
in Metro Manila and Rohmats confirmation that Trinidad would be getting TNT from
Asali as part of their missionprove the finding that Rohmats co-inducement was the
determining cause of the commission of the crime. Such command or advice [was] of
such nature that, without it, the crime would not have materialized.
Same; Same; Evidence; While it is true that statements made by a conspirator against
a co-conspirator are admissible only when made during the existence of the
conspiracy, if the declarant repeats the statement in court, his extrajudicial confession
becomes a judicial admission, making the testimony admissible as to both
conspirators.Accused contend that the testimony of Asali is inadmissible pursuant to
Sec. 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. It is true that under the rule, statements made
by a conspirator against a co-conspirator are admissible only when made during the
existence of the conspiracy. However, as the Court ruled in People v. Buntag, 427
SCRA 180 (2004), if the declarant repeats the statement in court, his extrajudicial
confession becomes a judicial admission, making the testimony admissible as to both
conspirators. Thus, in People v. Palijon, 343 SCRA 486 (2000), the Court held the
following: [W]e must make a distinction between extrajudicial and judicial
confessions. An extrajudicial confession may be given in evidence against the
confessant but not against his co-accused as they are deprived of the opportunity to
cross-examine him. A judicial confession is admissible against the declarants co-
accused since the latter are afforded opportunity to cross-examine the former. Section
30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court applies only to extrajudicial acts or admissions and
not to testimony at trial where the party adversely affected has the opportunity to
cross-examine the declarant. Mercenes admission implicating his co-accused was
given on the witness stand. It is admissible in evidence against appellant Palijon.
Moreover, where several accused are tried together for the same offense, the
testimony of a co-accused implicating his co-accused is competent evidence against
the latter. People vs. Baharan, 639 SCRA 157, G.R. No. 188314 January 10, 2011
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 188314 January 10, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
KHADDAFY JANJALANI, GAMAL B. BAHARAN a.k.a. Tapay, ANGELO TRINIDAD
a.k.a. Abu Khalil, GAPPAL BANNAH ASALI a.k.a. Maidan or Negro, JAINAL SALI
a.k.a. Abu Solaiman, ROHMAT ABDURROHIM a.k.a. Jackie or Zaky, and other
JOHN and JANE DOES, Accused,
GAMAL B. BAHARAN a.k.a. Tapay, ANGELO TRINIDAD a.k.a. Abu Khalil, and
ROHMAT ABDURROHIM a.k.a. Abu Jackie or Zaky, Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
Before the Court is an appeal from the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated 30
June 2008, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City in
Criminal Case Nos. 05-476 and 05-4777 dated 18 October 2005. The latter Decision
convicted the three accused-appellants namely, Gamal B. Baharan a.k.a. Tapay,
Angelo Trinidad a.k.a. Abu Khalil, and Rohmat Abdurrohim a.k.a. Abu Jackie or Zaky
of the complex crime of multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder, and sentenced
them to suffer the penalty of death by lethal injection. The CA modified the sentence to
reclusion perpetua as required by Republic Act No. 9346 (Act Abolishing the
Imposition of Death Penalty).
Statement of Facts
The pertinent facts, as determined by the trial court, are as follows:
On 14 February 2005, an RRCG bus was plying its usual southbound route, from its
Navotas bus terminal towards its Alabang bus terminal via Epifanio de los Santos
Avenue (EDSA). Around 6:30 to 7:30 in the evening, while they were about to move
out of the Guadalupe-EDSA southbound bus stop, the bus conductor noticed two men
running after the bus. The two insisted on getting on the bus, so the conductor obliged
and let them in.
According to Elmer Andales, the bus conductor, he immediately became wary of the
two men, because, even if they got on the bus together, the two sat away from each
other one sat two seats behind the driver, while the other sat at the back of the bus.
At the time, there were only 15 passengers inside the bus. He also noticed that the
eyes of one of the men were reddish. When he approached the person near the driver
and asked him whether he was paying for two passengers, the latter looked dumb
struck by the question. He then stuttered and said he was paying for two and gave
PhP20. Andales grew more concerned when the other man seated at the back also
paid for both passengers. At this point, Andales said he became more certain that the
two were up to no good, and that there might be a holdup.
Afterwards, Andales said he became more suspicious because both men kept on
asking him if the bus was going to stop at Ayala Avenue. The witness also noticed that
the man at the back appeared to be slouching, with his legs stretched out in front of
him and his arms hanging out and hidden from view as if he was tinkering with
something. When Andales would get near the man, the latter would glare at him.
Andales admitted, however, that he did not report the suspicious characters to the
police.
As soon as the bus reached the stoplight at the corner of Ayala Avenue and EDSA,
the two men insisted on getting off the bus. According to Andales, the bus driver
initially did not want to let them off the bus, because a Makati ordinance prohibited
unloading anywhere except at designated bus stops. Eventually, the bus driver gave in
and allowed the two passengers to alight. The two immediately got off the bus and ran
towards Ayala Avenue. Moments after, Andales felt an explosion. He then saw fire
quickly engulfing the bus. He ran out of the bus towards a nearby mall. After a while,
he went back to where the bus was. He saw their bus passengers either lying on the
ground or looking traumatized. A few hours after, he made a statement before the
Makati Police Station narrating the whole incident.
The prosecution presented documents furnished by the Department of Justice,
confirming that shortly before the explosion, the spokesperson of the Abu Sayyaf
Group Abu Solaiman announced over radio station DZBB that the group had a
Valentines Day "gift" for former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. After the
bombing, he again went on radio and warned of more bomb attacks.
As stipulated during pretrial, accused Trinidad gave ABS-CBN News Network an
exclusive interview some time after the incident, confessing his participation in the
Valentines Day bombing incident. In another exclusive interview on the network,
accused Baharan likewise admitted his role in the bombing incident. Finally, accused
Asali gave a television interview, confessing that he had supplied the explosive
devices for the 14 February 2005 bombing. The bus conductor identified the accused
Baharan and Trinidad, and confirmed that they were the two men who had entered the
RRCG bus on the evening of 14 February.
Members of the Abu Sayyaf Group namely Khaddafy Janjalani, Gamal B. Baharan,
Angelo Trinidad, Gappal Bannah Asali, Jainal Asali, Rohmat Abdurrohim a.k.a. Abu
Jackie or Zaky, and other "John" and "Jane Does" were then charged with multiple
murder and multiple frustrated murder. Only Baharan, Trinidad, Asali, and Rohmat
were arrested, while the other accused remain at-large.
On their arraignment for the multiple murder charge (Crim. Case No. 05-476),
Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali all entered a plea of guilty. On the other hand, upon
arraignment for the multiple frustrated murder charge (Crim. Case No. 05-477),
accused Asali pled guilty. Accused Trinidad and Baharan pled not guilty. Rohmat pled
not guilty to both charges. During the pretrial hearing, the parties stipulated the
following:
1.) The jurisdiction of this court over the offenses charged.
2.) That all three accused namely alias Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali
admitted knowing one another before February 14, 2005.
3.) All the same three accused likewise admitted that a bomb exploded in
the RRCG bus while the bus was plying the EDSA route fronting the MRT
terminal which is in front of the Makati Commercial Center.
4.) Accused Asali admitted knowing the other accused alias Rohmat whom
he claims taught him how to make explosive devices.
5.) The accused Trinidad also admitted knowing Rohmat before the
February 14 bombing incident.
6.) The accused Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali all admitted to causing the
bomb explosion inside the RRCG bus which left four people dead and more
or less forty persons injured.
7.) Both Baharan and Trinidad agreed to stipulate that within the period
March 20-24 each gave separate interviews to the ABS-CBN news network
admitting their participation in the commission of the said crimes, subject of
these cases.
8.) Accused Trinidad and Baharan also admitted to pleading guilty to these
crimes, because they were guilt-stricken after seeing a man carrying a child
in the first bus that they had entered.
9.) Accused Asali likewise admitted that in the middle of March 2005 he
gave a television news interview in which he admitted that he supplied the
explosive devices which resulted in this explosion inside the RRCG bus and
which resulted in the filing of these charges.
 10.) Finally, accused Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali admitted that they are
members of the Abu Sayyaf.1
In the light of the pretrial stipulations, the trial court asked whether accused Baharan
and Trinidad were amenable to changing their "not guilty" pleas to the charge of
multiple frustrated murder, considering that they pled "guilty" to the heavier charge of
multiple murder, creating an apparent inconsistency in their pleas. Defense counsel
conferred with accused Baharan and Trinidad and explained to them the
consequences of the pleas. The two accused acknowledged the inconsistencies and
manifested their readiness for re-arraignment. After the Information was read to them,
Baharan and Trinidad pled guilty to the charge of multiple frustrated murder.2
After being discharged as state witness, accused Asali testified that while under
training with the Abu Sayyaf in 2004, Rohmat, a.k.a Abu Jackie or Zaky, and two other
persons taught him how to make bombs and explosives. The trainees were told that
they were to wage battles against the government in the city, and that their first
mission was to plant bombs in malls, the Light Railway Transit (LRT), and other parts
of Metro Manila.
As found by the trial court, Asali, after his training, was required by the Abu Sayyaf
leadership, specifically Abu Solaiman and Rohmat, to secure eight kilos of TNT, a
soldering gun, aluminum powder, a tester, and Christmas lights, all of which he knew
would be used to make a bomb. He then recalled that sometime in November to
December 2004, Trinidad asked him for a total of 4 kilos of TNT that is, 2 kilos on
two separate occasions. Rohmat allegedly called Asali to confirm that Trinidad would
get TNT from Asali and use it for their first mission. The TNT was allegedly placed in
two buses sometime in December 2004, but neither one of them exploded.
Asali then testified that the night before the Valentines Day bombing, Trinidad and
Baharan got another two kilos of TNT from him. Late in the evening of 14 February, he
received a call from Abu Solaiman. The latter told Asali not to leave home or go to
crowded areas, since the TNT taken by Baharan and Trinidad had already been
exploded in Makati. Thirty minutes later, Trinidad called Asali, repeating the warning of
Abu Solaiman. The next day, Asali allegedly received a call from accused Rohmat,
congratulating the former on the success of the mission.3 According to Asali, Abu Zaky
specifically said, "Sa wakas nag success din yung tinuro ko sayo."
Assignment of Errors
Accused-appellants raise the following assignment of errors:
I. The trial court gravely erred in accepting accused-appellants plea of guilt despite
insufficiency of searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the
consequences of the said plea.
II. The trial court gravely erred in finding that the guilt of accused-appellants for the
crimes charged had been proven beyond reasonable doubt.4
First Assignment of Error
Accused-appellants Baharan and Trinidad argue that the trial court did not conduct a
searching inquiry after they had changed their plea from "not guilty" to "guilty." The
transcript of stenographic notes during the 18 April 2005 re-arraignment before the
Makati Regional Trial Court is reproduced below:
Court : Anyway, I think what we should have to do, considering the stipulations that
were agreed upon during the last hearing, is to address this matter of pleas of not
guilty entered for the frustrated murder charges by the two accused, Mr. Trinidad and
Mr. Baharan, because if you will recall they entered pleas of guilty to the multiple
murder charges, but then earlier pleas of not guilty for the frustrated multiple murder
charges remain [I]s that not inconsistent considering the stipulations that were
entered into during the initial pretrial of this case? [If] you will recall, they admitted to
have caused the bomb explosion that led to the death of at least four people and
injury of about forty other persons and so under the circumstances, Atty Pea, have
you discussed this matter with your clients?
Atty. Pea : Then we should be given enough time to talk with them. I havent
conferred with them about this with regard to the multiple murder case.
Court : Okay. So let us proceed now. Atty. Pea, can you assist the two accused
because if they are interested in withdrawing their [pleas], I want to hear it from your
lips.
Atty. Pea : Yes, your Honor.
(At this juncture, Atty. Pea confers with the two accused, namely Trinidad and
Baharan)
I have talked to them, your Honor, and I have explained to them the consequence of
their pleas, your Honor, and that the plea of guilt to the murder case and plea of not
guilty to the frustrated multiple murder actually are inconsistent with their pleas.
Court : With matters that they stipulated upon?
Atty. Pea : Yes, your Honor. So, they are now, since they already plead guilt to the
murder case, then they are now changing their pleas, your Honor, from not guilty to
the one of guilt. They are now ready, your Honor, for re-arraignment.
that the accused understood that the penalty of death would still be meted out to him;
INTERPRETER: (Read again that portion [of the information] and translated it in
Filipino in a clearer way and asked both accused what their pleas are).
Your Honor, both accused are entering separate pleas of guilt to the crime charged.
COURT : All right. So after the information was re-read to the accused, they have
withdrawn their pleas of not guilty and changed it to the pleas of guilty to the charge of
frustrated murder. Thank you. Are there any matters you need to address at pretrial
now? If there are none, then I will terminate pretrial and accommodate5
As early as in People v. Apduhan, the Supreme Court has ruled that "all trial judges
must refrain from accepting with alacrity an accused's plea of guilty, for while justice
demands a speedy administration, judges are duty bound to be extra solicitous in
seeing to it that when an accused pleads guilty, he understands fully the meaning of
his plea and the import of an inevitable conviction."6 Thus, trial court judges are
required to observe the following procedure under Section 3, Rule 116 of the Rules of
Court:
SEC. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. When the accused
pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the
voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and shall
require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The
accused may also present evidence in his behalf. (Emphasis supplied)
The requirement to conduct a searching inquiry applies more so in cases of re-
arraignment. In People v. Galvez, the Court noted that since accused-appellant's
original plea was "not guilty," the trial court should have exerted careful effort in
inquiring into why he changed his plea to "guilty."7 According to the Court:
The stringent procedure governing the reception of a plea of guilt, especially in a case
involving the death penalty, is imposed upon the trial judge in order to leave no room
for doubt on the possibility that the accused might have misunderstood the nature of
the charge and the consequences of the plea.8
Likewise, the requirement to conduct a searching inquiry should not be deemed
satisfied in cases in which it was the defense counsel who explained the
consequences of a "guilty" plea to the accused, as it appears in this case. In People v.
Alborida, this Court found that there was still an improvident plea of guilty, even if the
accused had already signified in open court that his counsel had explained the
consequences of the guilty plea; that he understood the explanation of his counsel;
and that he had not been intimidated, bribed, or threatened.9
We have reiterated in a long line of cases that the conduct of a searching inquiry
remains the duty of judges, as they are mandated by the rules to satisfy themselves
that the accused had not been under coercion or duress; mistaken impressions; or a
misunderstanding of the significance, effects, and consequences of their guilty
plea.10This requirement is stringent and mandatory.11
Nevertheless, we are not unmindful of the context under which the re-arraignment was
conducted or of the factual milieu surrounding the finding of guilt against the accused.
The Court observes that accused Baharan and Trinidad previously pled guilty to
another charge multiple murder based on the same act relied upon in the multiple
frustrated murder charge. The Court further notes that prior to the change of plea to
one of guilt, accused Baharan and Trinidad made two other confessions of guilt one
through an extrajudicial confession (exclusive television interviews, as stipulated by
both accused during pretrial), and the other via judicial admission (pretrial stipulation).
Considering the foregoing circumstances, we deem it unnecessary to rule on the
sufficiency of the "searching inquiry" in this instance. Remanding the case for re-
arraignment is not warranted, as the accuseds plea of guilt was not the sole basis of
the condemnatory judgment under consideration.12
Second Assignment of Error
In People v. Oden, the Court declared that even if the requirement of conducting a
searching inquiry was not complied with, "[t]he manner by which the plea of guilt is
made loses much of great significance where the conviction can be based on
independent evidence proving the commission by the person accused of the offense
charged."13 Thus, in People v. Nadera, the Court stated:
Convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside only if such plea is the A : If I am not mistaken, we were thought to make bomb about one month
sole basis of the judgment. If the trial court relied on sufficient and credible evidence to and two weeks.
convict the accused, the conviction must be sustained, because then it is predicated
not merely on the guilty plea of the accused but on evidence proving his commission
of the offense charged.14 (Emphasis supplied.)

Q : Now, speaking of that mission, Mr. witness, while you were still in
In their second assignment of error, accused-appellants assert that guilt was not training at Mr. Cararao, is there any mission that you undertook, if any, with
proven beyond reasonable doubt. They pointed out that the testimony of the conductor respect to that mission?
was merely circumstantial, while that of Asali as to the conspiracy was insufficient.

Insofar as accused-appellants Baharan and Trinidad are concerned, the evidence for
the prosecution, in addition to that which can be drawn from the stipulation of facts,
primarily consisted of the testimonies of the bus conductor, Elmer Andales, and of the
accused-turned-state-witness, Asali. Andales positively identified accused Baharan
and Trinidad as the two men who had acted suspiciously while inside the bus; who
had insisted on getting off the bus in violation of a Makati ordinance; and who had
scampered away from the bus moments before the bomb exploded. On the other
hand, Asali testified that he had given accused Baharan and Trinidad the TNT used in
the bombing incident in Makati City. The guilt of the accused Baharan and Trinidad
was sufficiently established by these corroborating testimonies, coupled with their
respective judicial admissions (pretrial stipulations) and extrajudicial confessions
(exclusive television interviews, as they both stipulated during pretrial) that they were
indeed the perpetrators of the Valentines Day bombing.15 Accordingly, the Court
upholds the findings of guilt made by the trial court as affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.
A : Our first mission was to plant a bomb in the malls, LRT, and other parts
of Metro Manila, sir.16
The witness then testified that he kept eight kilos of TNT for accused
Baharan and Trinidad.
Q : Now, going back to the bomb. Mr. witness, did you know what happened
to the 2 kilos of bomb that Trinidad and Tapay took from you sometime in
November 2004?
A : That was the explosive that he planted in the G-liner, which did not
explode.

Anent accused Rohmat, the evidence for the prosecution consisted of the testimony of Q : How did you know, Mr. witness?
accused-turned-state-witness Asali. Below is a reproduction of the transcript of
stenographic notes on the state prosecutors direct examination of state-witness Asali A : He was the one who told me, Mr. Angelo Trinidad, sir.
during the 26 May 2005 trial:

Q : You stated that Zaky trained you and Trinidad. Under what
circumstances did he train you, Mr. Witness, to assemble those explosives, Q : What happened next, Mr. witness, when the bomb did not explode, as
you and Trinidad? told to you by Trinidad?

A : Abu Zaky, Abu Solaiman, Khadaffy Janjalani, the three of them, that A : On December 29, Angelo Trinidad got 2 more kilos of TNT bombs.
Angelo Trinidad and myself be the one to be trained to make an explosive,
sir.

Q : Mr. witness, how long that training, or how long did it take that training?
Q : Did Trinidad tell you why he needed another amount of explosive on that
date, December 29, 2004? Will you kindly tell us the reason why?
 Q : Who got from you the explosive Mr. witness?

A : He told me that Abu Solaiman instructed me to get the TNT so that he
could detonate a bomb
Q : Were there any other person, besides Abu Solaiman, who called you up,
with respect to the taking of the explosives from you?
A : Its Angelo Trinidad and Tapay, sir.
Q : How many explosives did they get from you, Mr. witness, at that time?
A : They got 2 kilos TNT bomb, sir.

A : There is, sir Abu Zaky, sir, called up also.
Q : What did Abu Zaky tell you when he called you up?
A : He told me that "this is your first mission."
Q : Please enlighten the Honorable Court. What is that mission you are
referring to?
A : That is the first mission where we can show our anger towards the
Christians.
Q : Did they tell you, Mr. witness, where are they going to use that
explosive?
A : No, sir.
Q : Do you know, Mr. witness, what happened to the third batch of
explosives, which were taken from you by Trinidad and Tapay?
A : That is the bomb that exploded in Makati, sir.

Q : Why did you know, Mr. witness?

Q : The second time that he got a bomb from you, Mr. witness, do you know A : Because I was called in the evening of February 14 by Abu Solaiman. He
if the bomb explode? told me not to leave the house because the explosive that were taken by
Tapay and Angelo Trinidad exploded.
A : I did not know what happened to the next 2 kilos taken by Angelo
Trinidad from me until after I was caught, because I was told by the
policeman that interviewed me after I was arrested that the 2 kilos were
planted in a bus, which also did not explode.
Q : Was there any other call during that time, Mr. Witness?

Q : So besides these two incidents, were there any other incidents that
Angelo Trinidad and Tapay get an explosive for you, Mr. witness?

A : I was told by Angelo Trinidad not to leave the house because the
explosive that he took exploded already, sir.

A : If I am not mistaken, sir, on February 13, 2005 at 6:30 p.m.

Q : How sure were you, Mr. witness, at that time, that indeed, the bomb
exploded at Makati, beside the call of Abu Solaiman and Trinidad?
A : It was told by Abu Solaiman that the bombing in Makati should coincide A : Because when we were undergoing training, we were told that the Abu
with the bombing in General Santos. Sayyaf should not wage war to the forest, but also wage our battles in the
city.

Q : Wage the battle against who, Mr. witness?
A : He told it to me, sir I cannot remember the date anymore, but I know it
was sometime in February 2005. A : The government, sir.17

Q : Any other call, Mr. witness, from Abu Solaiman and Trinidad after the What can be culled from the testimony of Asali is that the Abu Sayyaf Group was
bombing exploded in Makati, any other call? determined to sow terror in Metro Manila, so that they could show their "anger towards
the Christians."18 It can also be seen that Rohmat, together with Janjalani and Abu
Solaiman, had carefully planned the Valentines Day bombing incident, months before
it happened. Rohmat had trained Asali and Trinidad to make bombs and explosives.
While in training, Asali and others were told that their mission was to plant bombs in
A : There is, sir The call came from Abu Zaky. malls, the LRT, and other parts of Metro Manila. According to Asali, Rohmat called him
on 29 December 2004 to confirm that Trinidad would get two kilos of TNT from Asali,
Q : What did Abu Zaky tell you, Mr. witness? as they were "about to commence" their "first mission."19 They made two separate
attempts to bomb a bus in Metro Manila, but to no avail. The day before the
A : He just greeted us congratulations, because we have a successful Valentines Day bombing, Trinidad got another two kilos of TNT from Asali. On
mission. Valentines Day, the Abu Sayyaf Group announced that they had a gift for the former
President, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. On their third try, their plan finally succeeded.
Right after the bomb exploded, the Abu Sayyaf Group declared that there would be
more bombings in the future. Asali then received a call from Rohmat, praising the
former: "Sa wakas nag success din yung tinuro ko sayo."20
A : He told me that "sa wakas, nag success din yung tinuro ko sayo."
In the light of the foregoing evidence, the Court upholds the finding of guilt against
Rohmat. Article 17 of the Revised Penal Code reads:

Q : By the way, Mr. witness, I would just like to clarify this. You stated that Art. 17. Principals. The following are considered principals:
Abu Zaky called you up the following day, that was February 15, and
congratulating you for the success of the mission. My question to you, Mr. 1. Those who take a direct part in the execution of the act
witness, if you know what is the relation of that mission, wherein you were
congratulated by Abu Zaky, to the mission, which have been indoctrinated to
you, while you were in Mt. Cararao, Mr. witness? 2. Those who directly force or induce others to commit it

A : They are connected, sir. 3. Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another act without which
it would not have been accomplished

Q : Connected in what sense, Mr. witness?

Accused Rohmat is criminally responsible under the second paragraph, or the
provision on "principal by inducement." The instructions and training he had given
Asali on how to make bombs coupled with their careful planning and persistent
attempts to bomb different areas in Metro Manila and Rohmats confirmation that
Trinidad would be getting TNT from Asali as part of their mission prove the finding
that Rohmats co-inducement was the determining cause of the commission of the
crime.21 Such "command or advice [was] of such nature that, without it, the crime
would not have materialized."22lawphi1
Further, the inducement was "so influential in producing the criminal act that without it,
the act would not have been performed."23 In People v. Sanchez, et al., the Court ruled
that, notwithstanding the fact that Mayor Sanchez was not at the crime scene,
evidence proved that he was the mastermind of the criminal act or the principal by
inducement. Thus, because Mayor Sanchez was a co-principal and co-conspirator,
and because the act of one conspirator is the act of all, the mayor was rendered liable
for all the resulting crimes.24 The same finding must be applied to the case at bar.
The Court also affirms the finding of the existence of conspiracy involving accused
Baharan, Trinidad, and Rohmat. Conspiracy was clearly established from the
"collective acts of the accused-appellants before, during and after the commission of
the crime." As correctly declared by the trial court in its Omnibus Decision:
Asalis clear and categorical testimony, which remains unrebutted on its major points,
coupled with the judicial admissions freely and voluntarily given by the two other
accused, are sufficient to prove the existence of a conspiracy hatched between and
among the four accused, all members of the terrorist group Abu Sayyaf, to wreak
chaos and mayhem in the metropolis by indiscriminately killing and injuring civilian
victims by utilizing bombs and other similar destructive explosive devices.
While said conspiracy involving the four malefactors has not been expressly admitted
by accused Baharan, Angelo Trinidad, and Rohmat, more specifically with respect to
the latters participation in the commission of the crimes, nonetheless it has been
established by virtue of the aforementioned evidence, which established the existence
of the conspiracy itself and the indispensable participation of accused Rohmat in
seeing to it that the conspirators criminal design would be realized.
It is well-established that conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused,
which clearly manifests a concurrence of wills, a common intent or design to commit a
crime (People v. Lenantud, 352 SCRA 544). Hence, where acts of the accused
collectively and individually demonstrate the existence of a common design towards
the accomplishment of the same unlawful purpose, conspiracy is evident and all the
perpetrators will be held liable as principals (People v. Ellado, 353 SCRA 643).25
In People v. Geronimo, the Court pronounced that it would be justified in concluding
that the defendants therein were engaged in a conspiracy "when the defendants by
their acts aimed at the same object, one performing one part and the other performing
another part so as to complete it, with a view to the attainment of the same object; and
their acts, though apparently independent, were in fact concerted and cooperative,
indicating closeness of personal association, concerted action and concurrence of
sentiments."26
Accused contend that the testimony of Asali is inadmissible pursuant to Sec. 30, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court. It is true that under the rule, statements made by a
conspirator against a co-conspirator are admissible only when made during the
existence of the conspiracy. However, as the Court ruled in People v. Buntag, if the
declarant repeats the statement in court, his extrajudicial confession becomes a
judicial admission, making the testimony admissible as to both conspirators.27 Thus, in
People v. Palijon, the Court held the following:
[W]e must make a distinction between extrajudicial and judicial confessions. An
extrajudicial confession may be given in evidence against the confessant but not
against his co-accused as they are deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine him.
A judicial confession is admissible against the declarants co-accused since the latter
are afforded opportunity to cross-examine the former. Section 30, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court applies only to extrajudicial acts or admissions and not to testimony at
trial where the party adversely affected has the opportunity to cross-examine the
declarant. Mercenes admission implicating his co-accused was given on the witness
stand. It is admissible in evidence against appellant Palijon. Moreover, where several
accused are tried together for the same offense, the testimony of a co-accused
implicating his co-accused is competent evidence against the latter.28
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, as affirmed with modification by the Court of Appeals, is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 152375.December 13, 2011.*
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (FOURTH
DIVISION), JOSE L. AFRICA (substituted by his heirs), MANUEL H. NIETO, JR.,
FERDINAND E. MARCOS (substituted by his heirs), IMELDA R. MARCOS,
FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR., JUAN PONCE ENRILE, and POTENCIANO
ILUSORIO (substituted by his heirs), respondents.
Remedial Law; Distinction between a Final Judgment or Order and an Interlocutory
Order.Case law has conveniently demarcated the line between a final judgment or
order and an interlocutory one on the basis of the disposition made. A judgment or
order is considered final if the order disposes of the action or proceeding completely,
or terminates a particular stage of the same action; in such case, the remedy available
to an aggrieved party is appeal. If the order or resolution, however, merely resolves
incidental matters and leaves something more to be done to resolve the merits of the
case, the order is interlocutory and the aggrieved partys remedy is a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65. Jurisprudence pointedly holds that: As distinguished from a
final order which disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular
proceeding or action, leaving nothing else to be done but to enforce by execution what
has been determined by the court, an interlocutory order does not dispose of a case
completely, but leaves something more to be adjudicated upon. The term final
judgment or order signifies a judgment or an order which disposes of the case as to all
the parties, reserving no further questions or directions for future determination. On
the other hand, a court order is merely interlocutory in character if it leaves substantial
proceedings yet to be had in connection with the controversy. It does not end the task
of the court in adjudicating the parties contentions and determining their rights and
liabilities as against each other. In this sense, it is basically provisional in its
application.
Same; An interlocutory order remains under the control of the court until the case is
finally resolved on the merits.We clarify, too, that an interlocutory order remains
under the control of the court until the case is finally resolved on the merits. The court
may therefore modify or rescind the order upon sufficient grounds shown at any time
before final judgment. In this light, the Sandiganbayans 1998 resolutionwhich
merely denied the adoption of the Bane deposition as part of the evidence in Civil
Case No. 0009could not have attained finality (in the manner that a decision or final
order resolving the case on the merits does) despite the petitioners failure to move for
its reconsideration or to appeal.
Same; The proscription against a second motion for reconsideration is directed
against a judgment or final order; Although a second motion for reconsideration of an
interlocutory order can be denied on the ground that it is a mere rehash of the
arguments already passed upon and resolved by the court, it cannot be rejected on
the ground that it is forbidden by the law or by the rules as a prohibited motion.We
also agree with the petitioner that its 3rd motion cannot be considered as a proscribed
third (actually second) motion for reconsideration of the Sandiganbayans 1998
resolution. As Section 5, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court clearly provides, the
proscription against a second motion for reconsideration is directed against a
judgment or final order. Although a second motion for reconsideration of an
interlocutory order can be denied on the ground that it is a mere rehash of the
arguments already passed upon and resolved by the court, it cannot be rejected on
the ground that it is forbidden by the law or by the rules as a prohibited motion.
Same; Certiorari; While Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court prohibits an appeal
from an interlocutory order, the aggrieved party is afforded the chance to question an
interlocutory order through a special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65.Under
Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, an aggrieved party may appeal from a
judgment or final order which completely disposes of a case or from an order that the
Rules of Court declares to be appealable. While this provision prohibits an appeal
from an interlocutory order, the aggrieved party is afforded the chance to question an
interlocutory order through a special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65; the petition
must be filed within sixty days from notice of the assailed judgment, order, resolution,
or denial of a motion for reconsideration.
Same; Same; For a petition for certiorari to prosper, Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court requires among others that neither an appeal nor any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law is available to the aggrieved party;
Exception.While the 1998 resolution is an interlocutory order, as correctly argued by
the petitioner and impliedly conceded by the respondents, the claim that the 1998
resolution should have been immediately questioned by the petitioner on certiorari is
not totally correct as a petition for certiorari is not grounded solely on the issuance of a
disputed interlocutory ruling. For a petition for certiorari to prosper, Section 1, Rule 65
of the Rules of Court requires, among others, that neither an appeal nor any plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law is available to the
aggrieved party. As a matter of exception, the writ of certiorari may issue
notwithstanding the existence of an available alternative remedy, if such remedy is
inadequate or insufficient in relieving the aggrieved party of the injurious effects of the
order complained of.
Same; Same; Without clear showing that its action was a capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment affecting its exercise of jurisdiction, the Sandiganbayans
erroneous legal conclusion was only an error of judgment or at best an abuse of
discretion but not a grave one.In light of the above discussions and conclusions, the
Sandiganbayan undoubtedly erred on a question of law in its ruling, but this legal error
did not necessarily amount to a grave abuse of discretion in the absence of a clear
showing that its action was a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment affecting
its exercise of jurisdiction. Without this showing, the Sandiganbayans erroneous legal
conclusion was only an error of judgment, or, at best, an abuse of discretion but not a
grave one. For this reason alone, the petition should be dismissed.
Same; Evidence; Under Section 5, Rule 30, after a party has adduced his direct
evidence in the course of discharging the burden of proof, he is considered to have
rested his case, and is thereafter allowed to offer rebutting evidence only.Although
the word rested nowhere appears in the Rules of Court, ordinary court procedure
has inferred it from an overview of trial sequence under Section 5, Rule 30 (which
capsulizes the order of presentation of a partys evidence during trial), read in relation
to Rule 18 on Pre-Trial, both of the Rules of Court. Under Section 5, Rule 30, after a
party has adduced his direct evidence in the course of discharging the burden of
proof, he is considered to have rested his case, and is thereafter allowed to offer
rebutting evidence only. Whether a party has rested his case in some measure
depends on his manifestation in court on whether he has concluded his presentation
of evidence.
Same; Same; The Rules of Court does not prohibit a party from requesting the court to
allow it to present additional evidence even after it has rested its case.On the other
end, though, there was nothing intrinsically objectionable in the petitioners motion to
reopen its case before the court ruled on its formal offer of evidence. The Rules of
Court does not prohibit a party from requesting the court to allow it to present
additional evidence even after it has rested its case. Any such opportunity, however,
for the ultimate purpose of the admission of additional evidence is already addressed
to the sound discretion of the court. It is from the prism of the exercise of this
discretion that the Sandiganbayans refusal to reopen the case (for the purpose of
introducing, marking and offering additional evidence) should be viewed. We can
declare this Sandiganbayan action invalid if it had acted with grave abuse of
discretion.
Same; Same; Under Section 5 Rule 30, a party who has the burden of proof must
introduce, at the first instance, all the evidence he relies upon and such evidence
cannot be given piecemeal.Under this rule, a party who has the burden of proof
must introduce, at the first instance, all the evidence he relies upon and such evidence
cannot be given piecemeal. The obvious rationale of the requirement is to avoid
injurious surprises to the other party and the consequent delay in the administration of
justice.
Same; Where the evidence is rebuttal in character, whose necessity, for instance,
arose from the shifting of the burden of evidence from one party to the other or where
the evidence sought to be presented is in the nature of newly discovered evidence,
the partys right to introduce further evidence must be recognized.A partys
declaration of the completion of the presentation of his evidence prevents him from
introducing further evidence; but where the evidence is rebuttal in character, whose
necessity, for instance, arose from the shifting of the burden of evidence from one
party to the other; or where the evidence sought to be presented is in the nature of
newly discovered evidence, the partys right to introduce further evidence must be
recognized. Otherwise, the aggrieved party may avail of the remedy of certiorari.
Same; Civil Procedure; Consolidation of Cases; Consolidation is a procedural device
granted to the court as an aid in deciding how cases in its docket are to be tried so
that the business of the court may be dispatched expeditiously and with economy
while providing justice to the parties.Consolidation is a procedural device granted to
the court as an aid in deciding how cases in its docket are to be tried so that the
business of the court may be dispatched expeditiously and with economy while
providing justice to the parties. To promote this end, the rule permits the consolidation
and a single trial of several cases in the courts docket, or the consolidation of issues
within those cases.
Same; Same; Deposition; Before a party can make use of the deposition taken at the
trial of a pending action, Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court does not only require
due observance of its sub-paragraphs (a) to (d), it also requires as a condition for
admissibility, compliance with the rules on evidence.Before a party can make use
of the deposition taken at the trial of a pending action, Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules
of Court does not only require due observance of its sub-paragraphs (a) to (d); it also
requires, as a condition for admissibility, compliance with the rules on evidence.
Thus, even Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court makes an implied reference to
Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court before the deposition may be used in
evidence. By reading Rule 23 in isolation, the petitioner failed to recognize that the
principle conceding admissibility to a deposition under Rule 23 should be consistent
with the rules on evidence under Section 47, Rule 130. In determining the admissibility
of the Bane deposition, therefore, reliance cannot be given on one provision to the
exclusion of the other; both provisions must be considered. This is particularly true in
this case where the evidence in the prior proceeding does not simply refer to a
witness testimony in open court but to a deposition taken under another and farther
jurisdiction.
Same; Same; Same; Depositions are not meant as substitute for the actual testimony
in open court of a party or witness.A deposition is chiefly a mode of discovery whose
primary function is to supplement the pleadings for the purpose of disclosing the real
points of dispute between the parties and affording an adequate factual basis during
the preparation for trial. Since depositions are principally made available to the parties
as a means of informing themselves of all the relevant facts, depositions are not
meant as substitute for the actual testimony in open court of a party or witness.
Generally, the deponent must be presented for oral examination in open court at the
trial or hearing. This is a requirement of the rules on evidence under Section 1, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court.
Same; Same; Same; Under certain conditions and for certain limited purposes laid
down in Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, the deposition may be used without
the deponent being actually called to the witness stand.That opportunity for cross-
examination was afforded during the taking of the deposition alone is no argument, as
the opportunity for cross-examination must normally be accorded a party at the time
that the testimonial evidence is actually presented against him during the trial or
hearing of a case. However, under certain conditions and for certain limited purposes
laid down in Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, the deposition may be used
without the deponent being actually called to the witness stand.
Same; Same; Same; Section 47, Rule 130 explicitly requires inter alia, for the
admissibility of a former testimony or deposition that the adverse party must have had
an opportunity to cross-examine the witness or the deponent in the prior proceeding.
Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is an entirely different provision. While a
former testimony or deposition appears under the Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule,
the classification of former testimony or deposition as an admissible hearsay is not
universally conceded. A fundamental characteristic of hearsay evidence is the adverse
partys lack of opportunity to cross-examine the out-of-court declarant. However,
Section 47, Rule 130 explicitly requires, inter alia, for the admissibility of a former
testimony or deposition that the adverse party must have had an opportunity to cross-
examine the witness or the deponent in the prior proceeding.
Same; Same; Same; Requisites for the admission of a testimony or deposition given
at a former case or proceeding.Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court lays
down the following requisites for the admission of a testimony or deposition given at a
former case or proceeding. 1. The testimony or deposition of a witness deceased or
otherwise unable to testify; 2. The testimony was given in a former case or
proceeding, judicial or administrative; 3. Involving the same parties; 4. Relating to the
same matter; 5. The adverse party having had the opportunity to cross-examine him.
Same; Same; Same; The phrase unable to testify appearing in both Rule 23 and
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court refers to a physical inability to appear at the witness
stand and to give a testimony; Where the deposition is taken not for discovery
purposes, but to accommodate the deponent, then the deposition should be rejected
in evidence.The phrase unable to testify appearing in both Rule 23 and Rule 130
of the Rules of Court refers to a physical inability to appear at the witness stand and to
give a testimony. Hence notwithstanding the deletion of the phrase out of the
Philippines, which previously appeared in Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,
absence from jurisdictionthe petitioners excuse for the non-presentation of Bane in
open courtmay still constitute inability to testify under the same rule. This is not to
say, however, that resort to deposition on this instance of unavailability will always be
upheld. Where the deposition is taken not for discovery purposes, but to
accommodate the deponent, then the deposition should be rejected in evidence.
Same; Same; Same; The witness himself, if available, must be produced in court as if
he were testifying de novo since his testimony given at the former trial is mere
hearsay.Although the testimony of a witness has been given in the course of a
former proceeding between the parties to a case on trial, this testimony alone is not a
ground for its admission in evidence. The witness himself, if available, must be
produced in court as if he were testifying de novo since his testimony given at the
former trial is mere hearsay. The deposition of a witness, otherwise available, is also
inadmissible for the same reason.
Same; Witnesses; Cross-Examination; The function of cross-examination is to test the
truthfulness of the statements of a witness made on direct examination; this right is
available of course, at the taking of deposition, as well as on the examination of
witnesses at the trial.The function of cross-examination is to test the truthfulness of
the statements of a witness made on direct examination. The opportunity of cross-
examination has been regarded as an essential safeguard of the accuracy and
completeness of a testimony. In civil cases, the right of cross-examination is absolute,
and is not a mere privilege of the party against whom a witness may be called. This
right is available, of course, at the taking of depositions, as well as on the examination
of witnesses at the trial. The principal justification for the general exclusion of hearsay
statements and for the admission, as an exception to the hearsay rule, of reported
testimony taken at a former hearing where the present adversary was afforded the
opportunity to cross-examine, is based on the premise that the opportunity of cross-
examination is an essential safeguard against falsehoods and frauds.
Same; Evidence; Judicial Notice; In adjudicating a case on trial, courts are not
authorized to take a judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases, even
when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court and
notwithstanding that both cases may have been tried or are actually pending before
the same judge; Rule admits of exceptions.In adjudicating a case on trial, generally,
courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other
cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and
notwithstanding that both cases may have been tried or are actually pending before
the same judge. This rule though admits of exceptions. As a matter of convenience to
all the parties, a court may properly treat all or any part of the original record of a case
filed in its archives as read into the record of a case pending before it, when, with the
knowledge of, and absent an objection from, the adverse party, reference is made to it
for that purpose, by name and number or in some other manner by which it is
sufficiently designated; or when the original record of the former case or any part of it,
is actually withdrawn from the archives at the courts direction, at the request or with
the consent of the parties, and admitted as a part of the record of the case then
pending. Courts must also take judicial notice of the records of another case or cases,
where sufficient basis exists in the records of the case before it, warranting the
dismissal of the latter case.
CARPIO,J., Dissenting Opinion:
Civil Procedure; Consolidation of Cases; In Philippine jurisprudence, the consolidation
of cases merges the different actions into one and the rights of the parties are
adjudicated in a single judgment.In Philippine jurisprudence, the consolidation of
cases merges the different actions into one and the rights of the parties are
adjudicated in a single judgment, thus: The effect of consolidation of actions is to unite
and merge all of the different actions consolidated into a single action, in the same
manner as if the different causes of action involved had originally been joined in a
single action, and the order of consolidation, if made by a court of competent
jurisdiction, is binding upon all the parties to the different actions until it is vacated or
set aside. After the consolidation there can be no further proceedings in the separate
actions, which are by virtue of the consolidation discontinued and superseded by a
single action, which should be entitled in such manner as the court may direct, and all
subsequent proceedings therein be conducted and the rights of the parties
adjudicated in a single action.
Same; Same; Same; Unlike a mere order of a joint hearing or trial of any or all the
matters in issue in the actions, the consolidation of actions merges the different
actions into one single action; this means that evidence such as depositions taken
after the consolidation is admissible in all the actions consolidated whenever relevant
or material.The 12 April 1993 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan ordered the
consolidation of the incidental cases, including Civil Case No. 0130, with the main
case, Civil Case No. 0009. Unlike a mere order of a joint hearing or trial of any or all
the matters in issue in the actions, the consolidation of actions merges the different
actions into one single action. This means that evidence, such as depositions, taken
after the consolidation is admissible in all the actions consolidated whenever relevant
or material. In this case, since the notice and the deposition-taking was after the
consolidation of Civil Case No. 0130 with the main case, Civil Case No. 0009, the
deposition could be admitted as evidence in the consolidated cases. Republic vs.
Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division), 662 SCRA 152, G.R. No. 152375 December 13,
2011
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 152375 December 16, 2011
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (FOURTH DIVISION), JOSE L. AFRICA (substituted by his
heirs), MANUEL H. NIETO, JR., FERDINAND E. MARCOS (substituted by his
heirs), IMELDA R. MARCOS, FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR., JUAN PONCE
ENRILE, and POTENCIANO ILUSORIO (substituted by his heirs), Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before us is the petition for certiorari1 filed by the Republic of the Philippines
(petitioner) to set aside the February 7, 2002 resolution (2002 resolution)2 of the
Sandiganbayan3 denying the petitioners Motion to Admit Supplemental Offer of
Evidence (Re: Deposition of Maurice V. Bane) (3rd motion).
THE ANTECEDENTS
On July 22, 1987, the petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG), filed a complaint (docketed as Civil Case
No. 0009) against Jose L. Africa, Manuel H. Nieto, Jr., Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R.
Marcos, Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., Juan Ponce Enrile, and Potenciano Ilusorio
(collectively, the respondents) for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution,
and damages before the Sandiganbayan. The petitioner alleged, inter alia, that the
respondents illegally manipulated the purchase of the major shareholdings of Cable
and Wireless Limited in Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. (ETPI), which
shareholdings respondents Jose Africa and Manuel Nieto, Jr. held for themselves and,
through their holdings and the corporations they organized, beneficially for
respondents Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos.4
Civil Case No. 0009 is the main case subject of the present petition. Victor Africa
(Africa), son of the late Jose L. Africa, was not impleaded in and so is plainly not a
party to Civil Case No. 0009.5
Civil Case No. 0009 spawned numerous incidental cases, 6 among them, Civil Case
No. 0130.7 The present respondents were not made parties either in Civil Case No.
0130.
I. Civil Case No. 0130
In the August 7, 1991 PCGG-conducted ETPI stockholders meeting, a PCGG-
controlled board of directors was elected. Later, the registered ETPI stockholders
convened a special stockholders meeting wherein another set of board of directors
was elected. As a result, two sets of ETPI board and officers were elected.8
Thereafter, Africa, as an ETPI stockholder, filed a petition for certiorari, with prayer for
a temporary restraining order/preliminary injunction with the Sandiganbayan (docketed
as Civil Case No. 0130), seeking to nullify the August 5, 1991 and August 9, 1991
Orders of the PCGG. These Orders directed Africa:
[T]o account for his sequestered shares in ETPI and to cease and desist from
exercising voting rights on the sequestered shares in the special stockholders
meeting to be held on August 12, 1991, from representing himself as a director, officer,
employee or agent of ETPI, and from participating, directly or indirectly[,] in the
management of ETPI.9
During the pendency of Africas petition, Civil Case No. 0130, Africa filed a motion with
the Sandiganbayan, alleging that since January 29, 1988 the PCGG had been
"illegally exercising the rights of stockholders of ETPI,"10 especially in the election of
the members of the board of directors. Africa prayed for the issuance of an order for
the "calling and holding of [ETPI] annual stockholders meeting for 1992 under the
[c]ourts control and supervision and prescribed guidelines."11
In its November 13, 1992 resolution, the Sandiganbayan favored Africas motion in this
wise:
Invoking Section 1, Rule 24 (of the old Rules of Court), purportedly allowing the
petitioner to depose Bane without leave of court, i.e., as a matter of right after the
defendants have filed their answer, the notice stated that "[t]he purpose of the
deposition is for [Bane] to identify and testify on the facts set forth in his affidavit19 x x x
so as to prove the ownership issue in favor of [the petitioner] and/or establish
the prima facie factual foundation for sequestration of [ETPIs] Class A stock in support
of the [Urgent Petition]."20 The notice also states that the petitioner shall use the Bane
deposition "in evidence in the main case of Civil Case No. 0009."21 On the
scheduled deposition date, only Africa was present and he cross-examined Bane.

On December 13, 1996, the Sandiganbayan resolved the Urgent Petition by granting
WHEREFORE, it is ordered that an annual stockholders meeting of the [ETPI], for
authority to the PCGG (i) "to cause the holding of a special stockholders meeting of
1992 be held on Friday, November 27, 1992, at 2:00 oclock in the afternoon, at the
ETPI for the sole purpose of increasing ETPIs authorized capital stock" and (ii) "to
ETPI Board Room, Telecoms Plaza, 7th Floor, 316 Gil J. Puyat Avenue, Makati, Metro
vote therein the sequestered Class A shares of stock."22 Thus, a special stockholders
Manila. x x x The stockholders meeting shall be conducted under the supervision and
meeting was held, as previously scheduled, on March 17, 1997 and the increase in
control of this Court, through Mr. Justice Sabino R. de Leon, Jr. [O]nly the registered
ETPIs authorized capital stock was "unanimously approved."23 From this ruling, Africa
owners, their duly authorized representatives or their proxies may vote their
went to this Court via a petition for certiorari24docketed as G.R. No. 147214 (Africas
corresponding shares.
petition).

The following minimum safeguards must be set in place and carefully maintained until
We jointly resolved the PCGGs and Africas petitions, and ruled:
final judicial resolution of the question of whether or not the sequestered shares of
stock (or in a proper case the underlying assets of the corporation concerned)
constitute ill-gotten wealth[.]12 This Court notes that, like in Africas motion to hold a stockholders meeting (to elect a
board of directors), the Sandiganbayan, in the PCGGs petition to hold a stockholders
meeting (to amend the articles of incorporation to increase the authorized capital
The PCGG assailed this resolution before this Court via a petition
stock), again failed to apply the two-tiered test. On such determination hinges the
for certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 10778913(PCGGs petition), imputing grave abuse
validity of the votes cast by the PCGG in the stockholders meeting of March 17, 1997.
of discretion on the Sandiganbayan for holding, inter alia, that the registered
This lapse by the Sandiganbayan leaves this Court with no other choice but to remand
stockholders of ETPI had the right to vote.14 In our November 26, 1992 Resolution, we
these questions to it for proper determination.
enjoined the Sandiganbayan from implementing its assailed resolution.

xxxx
In the meantime, in an April 12, 1993 resolution, the Sandiganbayan ordered the
consolidation of Civil Case No. 0130, among others, with Civil Case No. 0009, with the
latter as the main case and the former merely an incident.15 WHEREFORE, this Court Resolved to REFER the petitions at bar to the
Sandiganbayan for reception of evidence to determine whether there is a prima facie
evidence showing that the sequestered shares in question are ill-gotten and there is
During the pendency of PCGGs petition (G.R. No. 107789), the PCGG filed with this
an imminent danger of dissipation to entitle the PCGG to vote them in a stockholders
Court a "Very Urgent Petition for Authority to Hold Special Stockholders Meeting for
meeting to elect the ETPI Board of Directors and to amend the ETPI Articles of
[the] Sole Purpose of Increasing [ETPIs] Authorized Capital Stock" (Urgent Petition).
Incorporation for the sole purpose of increasing the authorized capital stock of ETPI.
In our May 7, 1996 Resolution, we referred this Urgent Petition to the Sandiganbayan
for reception of evidence and immediate resolution.16 The Sandiganbayan included the
Urgent Petition in Civil Case No. 0130.17 The Sandiganbayan shall render a decision thereon within sixty (60) days from receipt
of this Resolution and in conformity herewith.
In the proceedings to resolve the Urgent Petition, the testimony of Mr. Maurice V.
Bane (former director and treasurer-in-trust of ETPI) was taken at the petitioners II. Civil Case No. 0009
instance and after serving notice of the deposition-taking on the respondents18 on
October 23 and 24, 1996 by way of deposition upon oral examination (Bane
Although Civil Case No. 0009 was filed on July 22, 1987, it was only on November 29,
deposition) before Consul General Ernesto Castro of the Philippine Embassy in
1996 and March 17, 1997 that the first pre-trial conference was scheduled and
London, England.
concluded.25
In its Pre-Trial Brief26 dated August 30, 1996, the petitioner offered to present the f. Rolando Gapud
following witnesses:
2. [The petitioner] wishes to adopt in [Civil Case No. 0009] their testimonies
WITNESSES TO BE PRESENTED AND A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THEIR and the documentary exhibits presented and identified by them, since their
TESTIMONIES testimonies and the said documentary exhibits are very relevant to prove
the case of the [petitioner] in [Civil Case No. 0009].
(1) Maurice V. Bane representative of Cable and Wireless Limited (C & W)
at the time ETPI was organized. 3. The adverse parties in the aforementioned incidents had the opportunity
to cross-examine them.
xxxx
The respondents filed their respective Oppositions to the 1st motion; 29 in turn, the
petitioner filed a Common Reply30 to these Oppositions.
(2) Mr. Manuel H. Nieto x x x

On April 1, 1998, the Sandiganbayan31 promulgated a resolution32 (1998 resolution)

(3) Ms. Evelyn Singson x x x
denying the petitioners 1st motion, as follows:

(4) Mr. Severino P. Buan, Jr. x x x

Wherefore, the [petitioners] Motion x x x is

(5) Mr. Apolinario K. Medina - x x x

1. partly denied insofar as [the petitioner] prays therein to adopt the
testimonies on oral deposition of Maurice V. Bane and Rolando Gapud as
(6) Mr. Potenciano A. Roque x x x part of its evidence in Civil Case No. 0009 for the reason that said
deponents according to the [petitioner] are not available for cross-
examination in this Court by the [respondents]. (emphasis added)
(7) Caesar Parlade - x x x

2. partly Granted, in the interest of speedy disposition of this long pending

IIa. Motion to Admit the Bane Deposition case, insofar as plaintiff prays therein to adopt certain/particular testimonies
of Cesar O. Parlade, Evelyn Singson, Leoncio Martinez, and Ricardo Castro
At the trial of Civil Case No. 0009, the petitioner filed a Motion27 (1st motion), stating and documentary exhibits which said witnesses have identified in incident
that Civil Case Nos. xxx 0130 xxx, subject to the following conditions :

1. In the hearings of the incidents of [Civil Case No. 0009], i.e., Civil Case 1. xxx
Nos. 0048, 0050, 0130, 014628the following witnesses were presented
therein: 2. xxx

a. Cesar O.V. Parlade 3. That the said witnesses be presented in this Court so that they
can be cross-examined on their particular testimonies in incident
b. Maurice Bane Civil Cases xxx [by the respondents].

c. Evelyn Singson IIb. Urgent Motion and/or Request for Judicial Notice

d. Leonorio Martinez The petitioner did not in any way question the 1998 resolution, and instead made its
Formal Offer of Evidence on December 14, 1999.33 Significantly, the Bane deposition
was not included as part of its offered exhibits. Rectifying the omission, the petitioner
e. Ricardo Castro; and
filed an Urgent Motion and/or Request for Judicial Notice34 (2nd motion) dated
February 21, 2000, with the alternative prayer that:
1. An order forthwith be issued re-opening the plaintiffs case and setting
the same for trial any day in April 2000 for the sole purpose of introducing
additional evidence and limited only to the marking and offering of the [Bane
deposition] which already forms part of the records and used in Civil Case
No. 0130 x x x;
2. In the alternative, x x x the [Sandiganbayan] to take judicial notice of the
facts established by the [Bane deposition], together with the marked exhibits
appended thereto. [emphasis ours]
On August 21, 2000, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a resolution35 (2000 resolution)
denying the petitioners 2nd motion:
cross-examination. Indeed, We do not see any need to dwell on these matters in view
of this Courts Resolution rendered on April 1, 1998 which already denied the
introduction in evidence of Banes deposition and which has become final in view of
plaintiffs failure to file any motion for reconsideration or appeal within the 15-
day reglementary period. Rightly or wrongly, the resolution stands and for this court
to grant plaintiffs motion at this point in time would in effect sanction plaintiffs
disregard for the rules of procedure. Plaintiff has slept on its rights for almost two
years and it was only in February of 2000 that it sought to rectify its ineptitude by filing
a motion to reopen its case as to enable it to introduce and offer Banes deposition as
additional evidence, or in the alternative for the court to take judicial notice of the
allegations of the deposition. But how can such a motion be granted when it has been
resolved as early as 1998 that the deposition is inadmissible. Without plaintiff having
moved for reconsideration within the reglementary period, the resolution has
attained finality and its effect cannot be undone by the simple expedient of filing a
motion, which though purporting to be a novel motion, is in reality a motion for
reconsideration of this courts 1998 ruling. [emphases ours]

The resolution triggered the filing of the present petition.

Judicial notice is found under Rule 129 which is titled "What Need Not Be Proved."
Apparently, this provision refers to the Courts duty to consider admissions made by
the parties in the pleadings, or in the course of the trial or other proceedings in THE PETITION
resolving cases before it. The duty of the Court is mandatory and in those cases
where it is discretionary, the initiative is upon the Court. Such being the case, the
The petitioner filed the present petition claiming that the Sandiganbayan committed
Court finds the Urgent Motion and/or Request for Judicial Notice as something which
grave abuse of discretion:
need not be acted upon as the same is considered redundant.

I.
On the matter of the [Bane deposition], [its] admission is done through the ordinary
formal offer of exhibits wherein the defendant is given ample opportunity to raise
objection on grounds provided by law. Definitely, it is not under Article (sic) 129 on x x x IN HOLDING THAT ITS INTERLOCUTORY ORDER IN 1998 HAD
judicial notice. [Emphasis ours] BECOME FINAL.

On November 6, 2000 and on several dates thereafter, the respondents separately II.
filed their respective demurrers to evidence.36 On the other hand, the petitioner moved
for the reconsideration of the 2000 resolution, but was rebuffed by the Sandiganbayan
x x x IN x x x REFUSING TO ADMIT THE BANE DEPOSITION WHICH
in its April 3, 2001 resolution37 (2001 resolution).
WAS ALREADY ADMITTED AS EVIDENCE IN AN INCIDENT CASE
(CIVIL CASE NO. 0130) AS PART OF PETITIONERS EVIDENCE IN
IIc. Motion to Admit Supplemental Offer of THE MAIN x x x CASE (CIVIL CASE NO. 0009).
Evidence (Re: Deposition of Maurice Bane)
III.
On November 16, 2001, the petitioner filed its 3rd Motion, seeking once more the
admission of the Bane deposition.38 On February 7, 2002 (pending resolution of the
x x x IN REFUSING TO ADMIT A HIGHLY RELEVANT AND IMPORTANT
respondents demurrers to evidence),39 the Sandiganbayan promulgated the assailed
PIECE OF EVIDENCE FOR THE PETITIONER ON THE BASIS OF
2002 resolution,40 denying the petitioners 3rd motion. The Sandiganbayan ruled:
FLIMSY AND TENUOUS TECHNICAL GROUNDS.

But in the courts view, it is not really a question of whether or not plaintiff has already
The petitioner41 argues that the 1998 resolution of the Sandiganbayan is merely an
rested its case as to obviate the further presentation of evidence. It is not even a
interlocutory order; thus, the petitioners failure to question this 1998 resolution could
question of whether the non-appearing defendants are deemed to have waived their
not have given it a character of "finality" so long as the main case remains
right to cross-examine Bane as to qualify the admission of the deposition sans such
pending.42 On this basis, the petitioner concludes that the Sandiganbayans denial of
its 3rd motion was plainly tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
On the issue of the Sandiganbayans refusal (in its 2002 resolution) either to take
judicial notice of or to admit the Bane deposition as part of its evidence, the petitioner
asserts that Civil Case No. 0130 (where the Bane deposition was originally taken,
introduced and admitted in evidence) is but a "child" of the "parent" case, Civil Case
No. 0009; under this relationship, evidence offered and admitted in any of the
"children" cases should be considered as evidence in the "parent" case.
Lastly, the petitioner claims that given the crucial importance of the Bane deposition,
the Sandiganbayan should not have denied its admission on "flimsy grounds,"
considering that:
1. It was also already stated in the notice (of the taking of the Bane
deposition) that it would be used as evidence in Civil Case No. 0009.
Notices having been duly served on all the parties concerned, they must
accordingly be deemed to have waived their right to cross-examine the
witness when they failed to show up.
2. The Bane deposition was a very vital cog in the case of the petitioner
relative to its allegation that the respondents interest in ETPI and related
firms properly belongs to the government.
3. The non-inclusion of the Bane deposition in the petitioners formal offer of
evidence was obviously excusable considering the period that had lapsed
from the time the case was filed and the voluminous records that the
present case has generated.43
THE RESPONDENTS COMMENTS
and THE PETITIONERS REPLY
In the respondents Comments44 (filed in compliance with our Resolution of April 10,
200245 ), they claim that the present petition was filed out of time - i.e., beyond the 60-
day reglementary period prescribed under Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court.46 This assertion proceeds from the view that the petitioners 3rd motion, being a
mere rehash of similar motions earlier filed by the petitioner, likewise simply assails
the Sandiganbayans 1998 resolution. Along the same line, they posit that the
petitioners 3rd motion actually partakes of a proscribed third motion for
reconsideration of the Sandiganbayans 1998 resolution.47 They likewise assert, on the
assumption that the 1998 resolution is interlocutory in character, that the petitioners
failure to contest the resolution by way of certiorari within the proper period gave the
1998 resolution a character of "finality."
The respondents further claim that after a party has rested its case, the admission of a
supplemental offer of evidence requires the reopening of the case at the discretion of
the trial court; the Sandiganbayan simply exercised its sound discretion in refusing to
reopen the case since the evidence sought to be admitted was "within the knowledge
of the [petitioner] and available to [it] before [it] rested its case."48 The respondents
also advert to the belated filing of the petitioners 3rd motion i.e., after the
respondents had filed their respective demurrers to evidence.
On the petitioners claim of waiver, the respondents assert that they have not waived
their right to cross-examine the deponent; the Sandiganbayan recognized this right in
its 1998 resolution and the petitioner never questioned this recognition. They also
assert that the allegations in the Bane deposition cannot be a proper subject of judicial
notice under Rule 129 of the Rules of Court. The respondents lastly submit that the
Bane deposition is inadmissible in evidence because the petitioner failed to comply
with the requisites for admission under Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
In its Reply,49 the petitioner defends the timeliness of the present petition by arguing
that a party may opt to wait out and collect a pattern of questionable acts before
resorting to the extraordinary remedy of certiorari. The petitioner stresses that it filed
the 3rd motion precisely because of the Sandiganbayans 2000 resolution, which held
that the admission of the Bane deposition should be done through the ordinary formal
offer of evidence. Thus, the Sandiganbayan seriously erred in considering the
petitioners 3rd motion as a proscribed motion for reconsideration. The petitioner
generally submits that the dictates of substantial justice should have guided the
Sandiganbayan to rule otherwise.
The petitioner also clarifies that it has not yet rested its case although it has filed a
formal offer of evidence. A party normally rests his case only after the admission of the
pieces of evidence he formally offered; before then, he still has the opportunity to
present further evidence to substantiate his theory of the case should the court reject
any piece of the offered evidence.50
The petitioner further maintains that the mere reasonable opportunity to cross-
examine the deponent is sufficient for the admission of the Bane deposition
considering that the deponent is not an ordinary witness who can be easily summoned
by our courts in light of his foreign residence, his citizenship, and his advanced age.
The petitioner asserts that Rule 24 (now Rule 23), and not Section 47, Rule 130, of
the Rules of Court should apply to the present case, as explicitly stated in the notice of
the deposition-taking.
To date, respondents Imelda Marcos and the heirs of Potenciano Ilusorio have yet to
file their respective comments on the petition. Given the time that had lapsed since we
required their comments, we resolve to dispense with the filing of these comments
and to consider this petition submitted for decision.
THE ISSUES
On the basis of the pleadings, we summarize the pivotal issues for our resolution, as
follows:
 1. Whether the petition was filed within the required period.
2. Whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion
i. In holding that the 1998 resolution has already attained finality;
ii. In holding that the petitioners 3rd motion partakes of a
prohibited motion for reconsideration;
iii. In refusing to re-open the case given the critical importance of
the Bane deposition to the petitioners cause; and
iv. In refusing to admit the Bane deposition notwithstanding the
prior consolidation of Civil Case No. 0009 and Civil Case No.
0130.
3. Whether the Bane deposition is admissible under -
i. Rule 23, Section 4, par. (c) alone or in relation to Section 47,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court; and
ii. The principle of judicial notice.
THE COURTS RULING
We deny the petition for lack of merit.
I. Preliminary Considerations
I (a). The interlocutory nature of the Sandiganbayans 1998 resolution.
In determining the appropriate remedy or remedies available, a party aggrieved by a
court order, resolution or decision must first correctly identify the nature of the order,
resolution or decision he intends to assail.51 In this case, we must preliminarily
determine whether the 1998 resolution is "final" or "interlocutory" in nature.
Case law has conveniently demarcated the line between a final judgment or order and
an interlocutory one on the basis of the disposition made.52 A judgment or order is
considered final if the order disposes of the action or proceeding completely, or
terminates a particular stage of the same action; in such case, the remedy available to
an aggrieved party is appeal. If the order or resolution, however, merely resolves
incidental matters and leaves something more to be done to resolve the merits of the
case, the order is interlocutory53 and the aggrieved partys remedy is a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65. Jurisprudence pointedly holds that:
As distinguished from a final order which disposes of the subject matter in its entirety
or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing else to be done but to
enforce by execution what has been determined by the court, an interlocutory order
does not dispose of a case completely, but leaves something more to be adjudicated
upon. The term "final" judgment or order signifies a judgment or an order which
disposes of the case as to all the parties, reserving no further questions or directions
for future determination.
On the other hand, a court order is merely interlocutory in character if it leaves
substantial proceedings yet to be had in connection with the controversy. It does not
end the task of the court in adjudicating the parties contentions and determining their
rights and liabilities as against each other. In this sense, it is basically provisional in
its application.54 (emphasis supplied)
Under these guidelines, we agree with the petitioner that the 1998 resolution is
interlocutory. The Sandiganbayans denial of the petitioners 1st motion through the
1998 Resolution came at a time when the petitioner had not even concluded the
presentation of its evidence. Plainly, the denial of the motion did not resolve the merits
of the case, as something still had to be done to achieve this end.
We clarify, too, that an interlocutory order remains under the control of the court until
the case is finally resolved on the merits. The court may therefore modify or rescind
the order upon sufficient grounds shown at any time before final judgment. 55 In this
light, the Sandiganbayans 1998 resolution which merely denied the adoption of the
Bane deposition as part of the evidence in Civil Case No. 0009 could not have
attained finality (in the manner that a decision or final order resolving the case on the
merits does) despite the petitioners failure to move for its reconsideration or to
appeal.56
I (b). The 3rd motion was not prohibited by the Rules.
We also agree with the petitioner that its 3rd motion cannot be considered as a
proscribed third (actually second) motion for reconsideration of the Sandiganbayans
1998 resolution. As Section 5, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court clearly provides, the
proscription against a second motion for reconsideration is directed against "a
judgment or final order." Although a second motion for reconsideration of an
interlocutory order can be denied on the ground that it is a mere "rehash" of the
arguments already passed upon and resolved by the court, it cannot be rejected on
the ground that it is forbidden by the law or by the rules as a prohibited motion. 57
I (c). The 1998 resolution was not ripe for a petition for certiorari.
Under Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, an aggrieved party may appeal from a
judgment or final order which completely disposes of a case or from an order that the
Rules of Court declares to be appealable. While this provision prohibits an appeal
from an interlocutory order, the aggrieved party is afforded the chance to question an
interlocutory order through a special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65; the petition
must be filed within sixty days from notice of the assailed judgment, order, resolution,
or denial of a motion for reconsideration.
On the premise that the 1998 resolution is interlocutory in nature, the respondents
insist that the 60-day period for filing a petition for certiorari should be reckoned from
the petitioners notice of the Sandiganbayans 1998 resolution. They argue that since
this ruling had long been rendered by the court, the petitioners subsequent filing of
similar motions was actually a devious attempt to resuscitate the long-denied
admission of the Bane deposition.
We do not find the respondents submission meritorious. While the 1998 resolution is
an interlocutory order, as correctly argued by the petitioner and impliedly conceded by
the respondents, the claim that the 1998 resolution should have been immediately
questioned by the petitioner on certiorari is not totally correct as a petition
for certiorari is not grounded solely on the issuance of a disputed interlocutory
ruling.58 For a petition for certiorari to prosper, Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
requires, among others, that neither an appeal nor any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law is available to the aggrieved party. As
a matter of exception, the writ of certiorari may issue notwithstanding the existence of
an available alternative remedy, if such remedy is inadequate or insufficient in
relieving the aggrieved party of the injurious effects of the order complained of.59
We note that at the time of its 1st motion in Civil Case No. 0009, the petitioner had not
yet concluded the presentation of its evidence, much less made any formal offer of
evidence. At this stage of the case, the prematurity of using the extraordinary remedy
of certiorari to question the admission of the Bane deposition is obvious. After the
denial of the 1st motion, the plain remedy available to the petitioner was to move for a
reconsideration to assert and even clarify its position on the admission of the Bane
deposition. The petitioner could introduce60 anew the Bane deposition and include this
as evidence in its formal offer61 as the petitioner presumably did in Civil Case No.
0130.
Thus, at that point, the case was not yet ripe for the filing of a petition for certiorari,
and the denial of the 1st motion could not have been the reckoning point for the period
of filing such a petition.
II. The Sandiganbayans ruling on the finality of its 1998 resolution was legally
erroneous but did not constitute grave abuse of discretion
In light of the above discussions and conclusions, the Sandiganbayan
undoubtedly erred on a question of law in its ruling, but this legal error did not
necessarily amount to a grave abuse of discretion in the absence of a clear showing
that its action was a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment affecting its
exercise of jurisdiction.62Without this showing, the Sandiganbayans erroneous legal
conclusion was only an error of judgment, or, at best, an abuse of discretion but not
a grave one. For this reason alone, the petition should be dismissed.
Despite this conclusion, however, we opt not to immediately dismiss the petition in
light of the unique circumstances of this case where the petitioner cannot entirely be
faulted for not availing of the remedy at the opportune time, and where the case, by its
nature, is undoubtedly endowed with public interest and has become a matter of
public concern.63 In other words, we opt to resolve the petition on the merits to lay the
issues raised to rest and to avoid their recurrence in the course of completely
resolving the merits of Civil Case No. 0009.
Although the word "rested" nowhere appears in the Rules of Court, ordinary court
procedure has inferred it from an overview of trial sequence under Section 5, Rule 30
(which capsulizes the order of presentation of a
partys evidence during trial), read in relation to Rule 18 on Pre-Trial, 64 both of the
Rules of Court. Under Section 5, Rule 30, after a party has adduced his direct
evidence in the course of discharging the burden of proof,65 he is considered to have
rested his case, and is thereafter allowed to offer rebutting evidence only.66 Whether a
party has rested his case in some measure depends on his manifestation in court on
whether he has concluded his presentation of evidence.67
In its second and third motions, respectively, the petitioner expressly admitted that
"due to oversight, [the petitioner] closed and rested its case";68 and that it
"had terminated the presentation of its evidence in x x x Civil Case No. 0009."69 In the
face of these categorical judicial admissions,70 the petitioner cannot suddenly make
an about-face and insist on the introduction of evidence out of the usual order.
Contrary to the petitioners assertion, the resting of its case could not have been
conditioned on the admission of the evidence it formally offered. To begin with, the
Bane deposition, which is the lone piece of evidence subject of this present petition,
was not among the pieces of evidence included in its formal offer of evidence and thus
could not have been admitted or rejected by the trial court.
The Court observes with interest that it was only in this present petition
for certiorari that the petitioner had firmly denied having rested its case.71 Before then,
the petitioner never found it appropriate to question on certiorari the Sandiganbayans
denial of its 2nd motion which prayed, inter alia, for the reopening of the case. This is
a fatal defect in the petitioners case.
Although the denial of the petitioners first motion did not necessitate an immediate
recourse to the corrective writ of certiorari, the denial of the 2nd motion dictated a
different course of action. The petitioners non-observance of the proper procedure for
the admission of the Bane deposition, while seemingly innocuous, carried fatal
implications for its case. Having been rebuffed on its first attempt to have the Bane
deposition adopted in Civil Case No. 0009, and without seeking reconsideration of the
denial, the petitioner presented its other pieces of evidence and eventually rested its
case. This time, the petitioner forgot about the Bane deposition and so failed to
include that piece of evidence in its formal offer of evidence.
More than two years later, the petitioner again tried to squeeze in the Bane deposition
into its case. In resolving the petitioners motion for reconsideration of the
Sandiganbayans 2000 resolution, the Sandiganbayan held that the Bane deposition
has "become part and parcel" of Civil Case No. 0009. This pronouncement has
obscured the real status of the Bane deposition as evidence (considering that, earlier,
the Sandiganbayan already denied the petitioners attempt to adopt the Bane
deposition as evidence in Civil Case No. 0009 for the deponent cannot be cross-
examined in court). Nevertheless, the Sandiganbayan ultimately denied the
petitioners motion to reopen the case. Having judicially admitted the resting of its
case, the petitioner should have already questioned the denial of its 2nd motion by
way of certiorari, since the denial of its attempt to reopen the case effectively
foreclosed all avenues available to it for the consideration of the Bane deposition.
Instead of doing so, however, the petitioner allowed the 60-day reglementary
period, under Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, to lapse, and proceeded to
file its 3rd motion.
Significantly, the petitioner changed its legal position in its 3rd motion by denying
having rested its case and insisting on the introduction of the Bane deposition.
Rebuffed once more, the petitioner filed the present petition, inviting our attention to
the Sandiganbayans resolutions,72 which allegedly gave it "mixed signals."73 By
pointing to these resolutions, ironically, even the petitioner impliedly recognized that
they were then already ripe for review on certiorari. What the petitioner should have
realized was that its 2nd motion unequivocally aimed to reopen the case for the
introduction of further evidence consisting of the Bane deposition. Having
been ultimately denied by the court, the petitioner could not have been prevented from
taking the proper remedy notwithstanding any perceived ambiguity in the resolutions.
On the other end, though, there was nothing intrinsically objectionable in the
petitioners motion to reopen its case before the court ruled on its formal offer of
evidence. The Rules of Court does not prohibit a party from requesting the court to
allow it to present additional evidence even after it has rested its case. Any such
opportunity, however, for the ultimate purpose of the admission of additional evidence
is already addressed to the sound discretion of the court. It is from the prism of the
exercise of this discretion that the Sandiganbayans refusal to reopen the case (for the
purpose of introducing, "marking and offering" additional evidence) should be viewed.
We can declare this Sandiganbayan action invalid if it had acted with grave abuse of
discretion.
III. The Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in ultimately refusing to
reopen the case for the purpose of introducing and admitting in evidence the
Bane deposition
The basis for a motion to reopen a case to introduce further evidence is Section 5,
Rule 30 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
Sec. 5. Order of trial. Subject to the provisions of section 2 of Rule 31, and unless
the court for special reasons otherwise directs, the trial shall be limited to the issues
stated in the pre-trial order and shall proceed as follows:
xxxx
(f) The parties may then respectively adduce rebutting evidence only, unless the
court, for good reasons and in the furtherance of justice, permits them to adduce
evidence upon their original case[.] [emphases ours]
Under this rule, a party who has the burden of proof must introduce, at the first
instance, all the evidence he relies upon74 and such evidence cannot be given
piecemeal.75 The obvious rationale of the requirement is to avoid injurious surprises to
the other party and the consequent delay in the administration of justice.76
A partys declaration of the completion of the presentation of his evidence prevents
him from introducing further evidence;77 but where the evidence is rebuttal in
character, whose necessity, for instance, arose from the shifting of the burden of
evidence from one party to the other;78 or where the evidence sought to be presented
is in the nature of newly discovered evidence,79 the partys right to introduce further
evidence must be recognized. Otherwise, the aggrieved party may avail of the remedy
of certiorari.
Largely, the exercise of the courts discretion80 under the exception of Section 5(f),
Rule 30 of the Rules of Court depends on the attendant facts i.e., on whether the
evidence would qualify as a "good reason" and be in furtherance of "the interest of
justice." For a reviewing court to properly interfere with the lower courts exercise of
discretion, the petitioner must show that the lower courts action was attended by
grave abuse of discretion. Settled jurisprudence has defined this term as the
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment, equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; or,
the exercise of power in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or
personal hostility, so patent or so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty,
to a virtual refusal to perform the mandated duty, or to act at all in contemplation of the
law.81 Grave abuse of discretion goes beyond the bare and unsupported imputation of
caprice, whimsicality or arbitrariness, and beyond allegations that merely constitute
errors of judgment82 or mere abuse of discretion.83
In Lopez v. Liboro,84 we had occasion to make the following pronouncement:
After the parties have produced their respective direct proofs, they are allowed to offer
rebutting evidence only, but, it has been held, the court, for good reasons, in the
furtherance of justice, may permit them to offer evidence upon their original case, and
its ruling will not be disturbed in the appellate court where no abuse of discretion
appears. So, generally, additional evidence is allowed when it is newly discovered,
or where it has been omitted through inadvertence or mistake, or where the
purpose of the evidence is to correct evidence previously offered. The omission to
present evidence on the testator's knowledge of Spanish had not been deliberate. It
was due to a misapprehension or oversight. (citations omitted; emphases ours)
Likewise, in Director of Lands v. Roman Archbishop of Manila,85 we ruled:
The strict rule is that the plaintiff must try his case out when he commences.
Nevertheless, a relaxation of the rule is permitted in the sound discretion of the court.
"The proper rule for the exercise of this discretion," it has been said by an eminent
author, "is, that material testimony should not be excluded because offered by
the plaintiff after the defendant has rested, although not in rebuttal, unless it
has been kept back by a trick, and for the purpose of deceiving the defendant
and affecting his case injuriously."
These principles find their echo in Philippine remedial law. While the general rule is
rightly recognized, the Code of Civil Procedure authorizes the judge "for special
reasons," to change the order of the trial, and "for good reason, in the furtherance of
justice," to permit the parties "to offer evidence upon their original case." These
exceptions are made stronger when one considers the character of registration
proceedings and the fact that where so many parties are involved, and action is taken
quickly and abruptly, conformity with precise legal rules should not always be
expected. Even at the risk of violating legal formul, an opportunity should be
given to parties to submit additional corroborative evidence in support of their
claims of title, if the ends of justice so require. (emphases ours)
In his commentaries, Chief Justice Moran had this to say:
However, the court for good reasons, may, in the furtherance of justice, permit the
parties to offer evidence upon their original case, and its ruling will not be disturbed
where no abuse of discretion appears, Generally, additional evidence is allowed
when x x x; but it may be properly disallowed where it was withheld deliberately
and without justification.86
The weight of the exception is also recognized in foreign jurisprudence. 87
Under these guidelines, we hold that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion
in refusing to reopen the case. Instead of squarely ruling on the petitioners 2nd
motion to avoid any uncertainty on the evidentiary status of the Bane deposition, the
Sandiganbayans action actually left the petitioners concern in limbo by considering
the petitioners motion "redundant." This is tantamount to a refusal to undertake a
positive duty as mandated by the circumstances and is equivalent to an act outside
the contemplation of law.
It has not escaped our notice that at the time the petitioner moved to re-open its case,
the respondents had not yet even presented their evidence in chief. The respondents,
therefore, would not have been prejudiced by allowing the petitioners introduction of
the Bane deposition, which was concededly omitted "through oversight."88The higher
interest of substantial justice, of course, is another consideration that cannot be taken
lightly.89
In light of these circumstances, the Sandiganbayan should not have perfunctorily
applied Section 5, Rule 30 of the Rules of Court on the petitioners request to reopen
the case for the submission of the Bane deposition.
On the basis of this conclusion, a remand of this case should follow as a matter of
course. The state of the parties submissions and the delay that has already attended
this aspect of Civil Case No. 0009, however, dictate against this obvious course of
action. At this point, the parties have more than extensively argued for or against the
admission of the Bane deposition. Civil Case No. 0009 is a 25-year old sequestration
case that is now crying out for complete resolution. Admissibility, too, is an issue that
would have again been raised on remand and would surely stare us in the face after
remand.90 We are thus left with no choice but to resolve the issue of admissibility of
the Bane deposition here and now.
IV. The admissibility of the Bane deposition
IV (a). The consolidation of Civil Case No. 0009 and Civil Case No. 0130 did not
dispense with the usual requisites of admissibility
In support of its 3rd motion, the petitioner argues that the Bane deposition can be
admitted in evidence without observing the provisions of Section 47, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court.91 The petitioner claims that in light of the prior consolidation of Civil
Case No. 0009 and Civil Case No. 0130, among others,92 the "former case or
proceeding" that Section 47, Rule 130 speaks of no longer exists.
Rule 31 of the old Rules of Court93 the rule in effect at the time Civil Case Nos. 0009
and 0130 were consolidated provided that:
Rule 31
Consolidation or Severance
Section 1. Consolidation. When actions involving a common question of law or fact
are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the
matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated; and it may
make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary
costs or delay.94 (emphases ours)
Consolidation is a procedural device granted to the court as an aid in deciding how
cases in its docket are to be tried so that the business of the court may be dispatched
expeditiously and with economy while providing justice to the parties. To promote this
end, the rule permits the consolidation and a single trial of several cases in the courts
docket, or the consolidation of issues within those cases.95
A reading of Rule 31 of the Rules of Court easily lends itself to two observations. First,
Rule 31 is completely silent on the effect/s of consolidation on the cases consolidated;
on the parties and the causes of action involved; and on the evidence presented in the
consolidated cases. Second, while Rule 31 gives the court the discretion either to
order a joint hearing or trial, or to order the actions consolidated, jurisprudence will
show that the term "consolidation" is used generically and even synonymously with
joint hearing or trial of several causes.96 In fact, the title "consolidation" of Rule 31
covers all the different senses of consolidation, as discussed below.
These observations are not without practical reason. Considering that consolidation is
basically a function given to the court, the latter is in the best position to determine for
itself (given the nature of the cases, the complexity of the issues involved, the parties
affected, and the courts capability and resources vis--vis all the official business
pending before it, among other things) what "consolidation" will bring, bearing in mind
the rights of the parties appearing before it.
To disregard the kind of consolidation effected by the Sandiganbayan on the simple
and convenient premise that the deposition-taking took place after the Sandiganbayan
ordered the consolidation is to beg the question. It is precisely the silence of our Rules
of Procedure and the dearth of applicable case law on the effect of "consolidation" that
strongly compel this Court to determine the kind of "consolidation" effected to directly
resolve the very issue of admissibility in this case.
In the context of legal procedure, the term "consolidation" is used in three different
senses:97
(1) Where all except one of several actions are stayed until one is tried, in
which case the judgment in the one trial is conclusive as to the others. This
is not actually consolidation but is referred to as such. (quasi-
consolidation)98
(2) Where several actions are combined into one, lose their separate
identity, and become a single action in which a single judgment is rendered.
This is illustrated by a situation where several actions are pending between
the same parties stating claims which might have been set out originally in
one complaint. (actual consolidation)99
(3) Where several actions are ordered to be tried together but each retains
its separate character and requires the entry of a separate judgment. This
type of consolidation does not merge the suits into a single action, or cause
the parties to one action to be parties to the other. (consolidation for trial)100
Considering that the Sandiganbayans order101 to consolidate several incident cases
does not at all provide a hint on the extent of the courts exercise of its discretion as to
the effects of the consolidation it ordered in view of the function of this procedural
device to principally aid the court itself in dealing with its official business we are
compelled to look deeper into the voluminous records of the proceedings conducted
below. We note that there is nothing that would even suggest that the Sandiganbayan
in fact intended a merger of causes of action, parties and evidence.102 To be sure,
there would have been no need for a motion to adopt (which did not remain
unopposed) the testimonies in the incident cases had a merger actually resulted from
the order of consolidation, for in that case, the Sandiganbayan can already take
judicial notice of the same.
Significantly, even the petitioner itself viewed consolidation, at most, to be merely a
consolidation for trial.103Accordingly, despite the consolidation in 1993, the petitioner
acceded to the Sandiganbayans 1998 Resolution (which denied the petitioners 1st
Motion on the ground that the witnesses, whose testimony in the incident cases is
sought to be adopted, "are not available for cross-examination in" the Sandiganbayan)
by presenting these other witnesses again in the main case, so that the respondents
can cross-examine them.
These considerations run counter to the conclusion that the Sandiganbayans order of
consolidation had actually resulted in the complete merger of the incident cases with
the main case, in the sense of actual consolidation, and that the parties in these
consolidated cases had (at least constructively) been aware of and had allowed actual
consolidation without objection.104
Considering, too, that the consolidated actions were originally independent of one
another and the fact that in the present case the party respondents to Civil Case No.
0009 (an action for reconveyance, accounting, restitution and damages) are not
parties to Civil Case No. 0130 (a special civil action filed by an ETPI stockholder
involving a corporate squabble within ETPI), the conclusion that the Sandiganbayan in
fact intended an actual consolidation and, together with the parties affected,105 acted
towards that end - where the actions become fused and unidentifiable from one
another and where the evidence appreciated in one action is also appreciated in
another action must find support in the proceedings held below. This is particularly
true in a case with the magnitude and complexity of the present case. Otherwise, to
impose upon the respondents the effects of an actual consolidation (which find no
clear support in the provisions of the Rules of Court, jurisprudence,106 and even in the
proceedings before the Sandiganbayan itself and despite the aforementioned
considerations) results in an outright deprivation of the petitioners right to due
process. We reach this conclusion especially where the evidence sought to be
admitted is not simply a testimony taken in one of the several cases, but a deposition
upon oral examination taken in another jurisdiction and whose admission is governed
by specific provisions on our rules on evidence.
We stress on this point, too, that while the Sandiganbayan ordered the consolidation
in 1993 (that is, before the deposition was taken), neither does the Pre-Trial
Order107 issued by the Sandiganbayan in 1997 in Civil Case No. 0009 contain any
reference, formal or substantive, to Civil Case No. 0130.108 Interestingly, in its Pre-Trial
Brief dated August 30, 1996,109 the petitioner even made a representation to present
Bane as one of its witnesses.
IV (b). Use of deposition under Section 4, Rule 23 and as a former testimony
under Section 47, Rule 130
Since the present consolidation did not affect Civil Case No. 0130 as an original, albeit
incidental, case, the admissibility of the Bane deposition cannot avoid being measured
against the requirements of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court the rule on
the admissibility of testimonies or deposition taken in a different proceeding. In this
regard, the petitioner argues that Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court (then Rule
24)110must, at any rate, prevail over Section 47, Rule 130111 of the same Rules.
At the outset, we note that when the petitioners motion to adopt the testimonies taken
in the incident cases drew individual oppositions from the respondents, the petitioner
represented to the Sandiganbayan its willingness to comply with the provisions of
Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,112 and, in fact, again presented some of
the witnesses. The petitioners about-face two years thereafter even contributed to the
Sandiganbayans own inconsistency on how to treat the Bane deposition, in particular,
as evidence.
Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court on "Deposition Pending Action"
(deposition de bene esse) provides for the circumstances when depositions may be
used in the trial, or at the hearing of a motion or an interlocutory proceeding.
SEC. 4. Use of depositions. At the trial or upon the hearing of a motion or an
interlocutory proceeding, any part or all of a deposition, so far as admissible under
the rules of evidence, may be used against any party who was present or
represented at the taking of the deposition or who had due notice thereof, in
accordance with any one of the following provisions:
xxxx
(c) The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used by any party for
any purpose if the court finds: (1) that the witness is dead; or (2) that the witness
resides at a distance more than one hundred (100) kilometers from the place of trial or
hearing, or is out of the Philippines, unless it appears that his absence was procured
by the party offering the deposition; or (3) that the witness is unable to attend or testify
because of age, sickness, infirmity, or imprisonment; or (4) that the party offering the
deposition has been unable to procure the attendance of the witness by subpoena; or
(5) upon application and notice, that such exceptional circumstances exist as to make
it desirable, in the interest of justice and with due regard to the importance of
presenting the testimony of witnesses orally in open court, to allow the deposition to
be used[.] [emphasis ours]
On the other hand, Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 47. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding. The testimony or
deposition of a witness deceased or unable to testify, given in a former case or
proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and subject
matter, may be given in evidence against the adverse party who had the opportunity
to cross-examine him.
A plain reading of Rule 23 of the Rules of Court readily rejects the petitioners position
that the Bane deposition can be admitted into evidence without observing the
requirements of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
Before a party can make use of the deposition taken at the trial of a pending action,
Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court does not only require due observance of its
sub-paragraphs (a) to (d); it also requires, as a condition for admissibility, compliance
with "the rules on evidence." Thus, even Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court
makes an implied reference to Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court before the
deposition may be used in evidence. By reading Rule 23 in isolation, the petitioner
failed to recognize that the principle conceding admissibility to a deposition under Rule
23 should be consistent with the rules on evidence under Section 47, Rule 130.113 In
determining the admissibility of the Bane deposition, therefore, reliance cannot be
given on one provision to the exclusion of the other; both provisions must be
considered. This is particularly true in this case where the evidence in the prior
proceeding does not simply refer to a witness testimony in open court but to a
deposition taken under another and farther jurisdiction.
A common thread that runs from Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court and Section
47, Rule 130 of the same Rules is their mutual reference to depositions.
A deposition is chiefly a mode of discovery whose primary function is to supplement
the pleadings for the purpose of disclosing the real points of dispute between the
parties and affording an adequate factual basis during the preparation for trial.114 Since
depositions are principally made available to the parties as a means of informing
themselves of all the relevant facts, depositions are not meant as substitute for the
actual testimony in open court of a party or witness. Generally, the deponent must be
presented for oral examination in open court at the trial or hearing. This is a These considerations, among others, make Section 47, Rule 130 a distinct rule on
requirement of the rules on evidence under Section 1, Rule 132 of the Rules of evidence and therefore should not be confused with the general provisions on
Court.115 deposition under Rule 23 of the Rules of Court. In other words, even if the petitioner
complies with Rule 23 of the Rules of Court on the use of depositions, the observance
of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court cannot simply be avoided or
Examination to be done in open court. The examination of witnesses presented
disregarded.
in a trial or hearing shall be done in open court, and under oath or affirmation. Unless
the witness is incapacitated to speak, or the question calls for a different mode of
answer, the answers of the witness shall be given orally. Undisputably, the Sandiganbayan relied on the Bane deposition, taken in Civil Case
No. 0130, for purposes of this very same case. Thus, what the petitioner established
and what the Sandiganbayan found, for purposes of using the Bane deposition, refer
Indeed, any deposition offered to prove the facts set forth therein, in lieu of the actual
only to the circumstances laid down under Section 4(c), Rule 23 of the Rules of Court,
oral testimony of the deponent in open court, may be opposed by the adverse party
not necessarily to those of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, as a distinct
and excluded under the hearsay rule i.e., that the adverse party had or has no
rule on evidence that imposes further requirements in the use of depositions in
opportunity to cross-examine the deponent at the time that his testimony is offered.
a different case or proceeding. In other words, the prior use of the deposition under
That opportunity for cross-examination was afforded during the taking of the
Section 4(c), Rule 23 cannot be taken as compliance with Section 47, Rule 130 which
deposition alone is no argument, as the opportunity for cross-examination must
considers the same deposition as hearsay, unless the requisites for its admission
normally be accorded a party at the time that the testimonial evidence is
under this rule are observed. The aching question is whether the petitioner complied
actually presented against him during the trial or hearing of a case.116 However, under
with the latter rule.
certain conditions and for certain limited purposes laid down in Section 4, Rule 23 of
the Rules of Court, the deposition may be used without the deponent being actually
called to the witness stand.117 Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court lays down the following requisites for
the admission of a testimony or deposition given at a former case or proceeding.
Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is an entirely different provision. While
a former testimony or deposition appears under the Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule, 1. The testimony or deposition of a witness deceased or otherwise unable to
the classification of former testimony or deposition as an admissible hearsay is not testify;
universally conceded.118 A fundamental characteristic of hearsay evidence is the
adverse partys lack of opportunity to cross-examine the out-of-court declarant.
2. The testimony was given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or
However, Section 47, Rule 130 explicitly requires, inter alia, for the admissibility of
administrative;
a former testimony or deposition that the adverse party must have had an opportunity
to cross-examine the witness or the deponent in the prior proceeding.
3. Involving the same parties;
This opportunity to cross-examine though is not the ordinary cross-
examination119 afforded an adverse party in usual trials regarding "matters stated in 4. Relating to the same matter;
the direct examination or connected therewith." Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court contemplates a different kind of cross-examination, whether actual or a mere
5. The adverse party having had the opportunity to cross-examine him.123
opportunity, whose adequacy depends on the requisite identity of issues in the former
case or proceeding and in the present case where the former testimony or deposition
is sought to be introduced. The reasons for the admissibility of testimony or deposition taken at a former trial or
proceeding are the necessity for the testimony and its trustworthiness.124 However,
before the former testimony or deposition can be introduced in evidence, the
Section 47, Rule 130 requires that the issues involved in both cases must, at least, be
proponent must first lay the proper predicate therefor,125 i.e., the party must establish
substantially the same; otherwise, there is no basis in saying that the former
the basis for the admission of the Bane deposition in the realm of admissible
statement was - or would have been - sufficiently tested by cross-examination or by an
evidence. This basis is the prior issue that we must now examine and resolve.
opportunity to do so.120 (The requirement of similarity though does not mean that all
the issues in the two proceedings should be the same.121 Although some issues may
not be the same in the two actions, the admissibility of a former testimony on an issue IV (c). Unavailability of witness
which is similar in both actions cannot be questioned.122 )
For the admission of a former testimony or deposition, Section 47, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court simply requires, inter alia, that the witness or deponent be "deceased
or unable to testify." On the other hand, in using a deposition that was taken during the
pendency of an action, Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court provides several
grounds that will justify dispensing with the actual testimony of the deponent in open
court and specifies, inter alia, the circumstances of the deponents inability to attend or
testify, as follows:
(3) that the witness is unable to attend or testify because of age, sickness, infirmity,
or imprisonment[.] [emphases ours]126
The phrase "unable to testify" appearing in both Rule 23 and Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court refers to a physical inability to appear at the witness stand and to give a
testimony.127 Hence notwithstanding the deletion of the phrase "out of the Philippines,"
which previously appeared in Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, absence
from jurisdiction128 - the petitioners excuse for the non-presentation of Bane in open
court - may still constitute inability to testify under the same rule. This is not to say,
however, that resort to deposition on this instance of unavailability will always be
upheld. Where the deposition is taken not for discovery purposes, but to
accommodate the deponent, then the deposition should be rejected in evidence. 129
Although the testimony of a witness has been given in the course of a former
proceeding between the parties to a case on trial, this testimony alone is not a ground
for its admission in evidence. The witness himself, if available, must be produced in
court as if he were testifying de novo since his testimony given at the former trial is
mere hearsay.130 The deposition of a witness, otherwise available, is also inadmissible
for the same reason.
Indeed, the Sandiganbayans reliance on the Bane deposition in the other case (Civil
Case No. 0130) is an argument in favor of the requisite unavailability of the witness.
For purposes of the present case (Civil Case No. 0009), however, the Sandiganbayan
would have no basis to presume, and neither can or should we, that the previous
condition, which previously allowed the use of the deposition, remains and would
thereby justify the use of the same deposition in another case or proceeding, even if
the other case or proceeding is before the same court. Since the basis for the
admission of the Bane deposition, in principle, being necessity,131 the burden of
establishing its existence rests on the party who seeks the admission of the evidence.
This burden cannot be supplanted by assuming the continuity of the previous
condition or conditions in light of the general rule against the non-presentation of the
deponent in court.132
IV (d). The requirement of opportunity of the adverse party to cross-examine;
identity of parties; and identity of subject matter
The function of cross-examination is to test the truthfulness of the statements of a
witness made on direct examination.133 The opportunity of cross-examination has
been regarded as an essential safeguard of the accuracy and completeness of a
testimony. In civil cases, the right of cross-examination is absolute, and is not a mere
privilege of the party against whom a witness may be called.134 This right is available,
of course, at the taking of depositions, as well as on the examination of witnesses at
the trial. The principal justification for the general exclusion of hearsay statements and
for the admission, as an exception to the hearsay rule, of reported testimony taken at
a former hearing where the present adversary was afforded the opportunity to cross-
examine, is based on the premise that the opportunity of cross-examination is an
essential safeguard135 against falsehoods and frauds.
In resolving the question of whether the requirement of opportunity to cross-examine
has been satisfied, we have to consider first the required identity of parties as the
present opponent to the admission of the Bane deposition to whom the opportunity to
cross-examine the deponent is imputed may not after all be the same "adverse party"
who actually had such opportunity.
To render the testimony of a witness admissible at a later trial or action, the parties to
the first proceeding must be the same as the parties to the later proceeding. Physical
identity, however, is not required; substantial identity136or identity of
interests137 suffices, as where the subsequent proceeding is between persons who
represent the parties to the prior proceeding by privity in law, in blood, or in estate.
The term "privity" denotes mutual or successive relationships to the same rights of
property.138
In the present case, the petitioner failed to impute, much less establish, the identity of
interest or privity between the then opponent, Africa, and the present opponents, the
respondents. While Africa is the son of the late respondent Jose Africa, at most, the
deposition should be admissible only against him as an ETPI stockholder who filed the
certiorari petition docketed as Civil Case No. 0130 (and, unavoidably, as successor-in-
interest of the late respondent Jose Africa). While Africa and the respondents are all
ETPI stockholders, this commonality does not establish at all any privity between them
for purposes of binding the latter to the acts or omissions of the former respecting the
cross-examination of the deponent. The sequestration of their shares does not result
in the integration of their rights and obligations as stockholders which remain distinct
and personal to them, vis-a-vis other stockholders.139
IV (d1). The respondents notice of taking of Bane deposition is insufficient evidence of
waiver
The petitioner staunchly asserts that the respondents have waived their right to cross-
examine the deponent for their failure to appear at the deposition-taking despite
individual notices previously sent to them.140
In its first Notice to Take Oral Deposition of Mr. Maurice V. Bane dated August 30,
1996,141 the petitioner originally intended to depose Mr. Bane on September 25-26
1996. Because it failed to specify in the notice the purpose for taking Mr. Banes
deposition, the petitioner sent a Second Amended Notice to Take Deposition of Mr.
Maurice V. Bane Upon Oral Examination where it likewise moved the scheduled
deposition-taking to October 23-26, 1996.
The records show that Africa moved several times for protective orders against the Civil Case No. 0130, its action was premised on Africas status as a party in that case
intended deposition of Maurice Bane.142 On the other hand, among the respondents, where the Bane deposition was taken.
only respondent Enrile appears to have filed an Opposition143 to the petitioners first
notice, where he squarely raised the issue of reasonability of the petitioners nineteen-
Corollarily, the idea of privity also permeates Rule 23 of the Rules of Court through its
day first notice. While the Sandiganbayan denied Africas motion for protective
Section 5 which provides:
orders,144 it strikes us that no ruling was ever handed down on respondent Enriles
Opposition.145
Effect of substitution of parties. Substitution of parties does not affect the right to
use depositions previously taken; and, when an action has been dismissed and
It must be emphasized that even under Rule 23, the admission of the deposition upon
another action involving the same subject is afterward brought between the same
oral examination is not simply based on the fact of prior notice on the individual sought
parties or their representatives or successors in interest, all depositions lawfully taken
to be bound thereby. In Northwest Airlines v. Cruz, 146 we ruled that -
and duly filed in the former action may be used in the latter as if originally taken
therefor. [italics and underscoring ours]
The provision explicitly vesting in the court the power to order that the deposition shall
not be taken connotes the authority to exercise discretion on the matter. However, the
In light of these considerations, we reject the petitioners claim that the respondents
discretion conferred by law is not unlimited. It must be exercised, not arbitrarily or
waived their right to cross-examination when they failed to attend the taking of the
oppressively, but in a reasonable manner and in consonance with the spirit of he law.
Bane deposition. Incidentally, the respondents vigorous insistence on their right to
The courts should always see to it that the safeguards for the protection of the parties
cross-examine the deponent speaks loudly that they never intended any waiver of this
and deponents are firmly maintained. As aptly stated by Chief Justice Moran:
right.

. . . . (T)his provision affords the adverse party, as well as the deponent, sufficient
protection against abuses that may be committed by a party in the exercise of his
unlimited right to discovery. As a writer said: "Any discovery involves a prying into
another person's affairs prying that is quite justified if it is to be a legitimate aid to
litigation, but not justified if it is not to be such an aid." For this reason, courts are
given ample powers to forbid discovery which is intended not as an aid to litigation,
but merely to annoy, embarrass or oppress either the deponent or the adverse party,
or both. (emphasis ours)
In the present case, not only did the Sandiganbayan fail to rule on respondent Enriles
Opposition (which is equally applicable to his co-respondents), it also failed to provide
even the bare minimum "safeguards for the protection of," (more so) non-
parties,147 and to ensure that these safeguards are firmly maintained. Instead, the
Sandiganbayan simply bought the petitioners assertion (that the taking of Bane
deposition is a matter of right) and treated the lingering concerns e.g., reasonability
of the notice; and the non-party status of the respondents in Civil Case No. 0130 - at
whose incident (docketed as G.R. No. 107789) the Bane deposition was taken - rather
perfunctorily to the prejudice of the respondents.
In conjunction with the order of consolidation, the petitioners reliance on the prior
notice on the respondents, as adequate opportunity for cross-examination, cannot
override the non-party status of the respondents in Civil Case No. 0130 the effect of
consolidation being merely for trial. As non-parties, they cannot be bound by
proceedings in that case. Specifically, they cannot be bound by the taking of the Bane
deposition without the consequent impairment of their right of cross-
examination.148 Opportunity for cross-examination, too, even assuming its presence,
cannot be singled out as basis for the admissibility of a former testimony or
deposition since such admissibility is also anchored on the requisite identity of parties.
To reiterate, although the Sandiganbayan considered the Bane deposition in resolving
Interestingly, the petitioners notice of the deposition-taking relied on Rule 23 of the
Rules of Court. Section 15 of this rule reads:
Deposition upon oral examination; notice; time and place. A party desiring to
take the deposition of any person upon oral examination shall give reasonable notice
in writing to every other party to the action. The notice shall state the time and place
for taking the deposition and the name and address of each person to be examined, if
known, and if the name is not known, a general description sufficient to identify him or
the particular class or group to which he belongs. On motion of any party upon whom
the notice is served, the court may for cause shown enlarge or shorten the time.
Under this provision, we do not believe that the petitioner could reasonably expect that
the individual notices it sent to the respondents would be sufficient to bind them to the
conduct of the then opponents (Africas) cross-examination since, to begin with, they
were not even parties to the action. Additionally, we observe that in the notice of the
deposition taking, conspicuously absent was any indication sufficient to forewarn the
notified persons that their inexcusable failure to appear at the deposition taking would
amount to a waiver of their right of cross-examination, without prejudice to the right of
the respondents to raise their objections at the appropriate time.149We would be
treading on dangerous grounds indeed were we to hold that one not a party to an
action, and neither in privity nor in substantial identity of interest with any of the
parties in the same action, can be bound by the action or omission of the latter,
by the mere expedient of a notice. Thus, we cannot simply deduce a resultant
waiver from the respondents mere failure to attend the deposition-taking despite
notice sent by the petitioner.
Lastly, we see no reason why the Bane deposition could not have been taken earlier
in Civil Case No. 0009 the principal action where it was sought to be introduced
while Bane was still here in the Philippines. We note in this regard that the Philippines
was no longer under the Marcos administration and had returned to normal
democratic processes when Civil Case No. 0009 was filed. In fact, the petitioners
notice itself states that the "purpose of the deposition is for Mr. Maurice Bane to
identify and testify on the facts set forth in his Affidavit," which Mr. Bane had long
executed in 1991 in Makati, Metro Manila.150 Clearly, a deposition could then have
been taken - without compromising the respondents right to cross-examine a witness
against them - considering that the principal purpose of the deposition is chiefly a
mode of discovery. These, to our mind, are avoidable omissions that, when added to
the deficient handling of the present matter, add up to the gross deficiencies of the
petitioner in the handling of Civil Case No. 0009.
After failing to take Banes deposition in 1991 and in view of the peculiar
circumstances of this case, the least that the petitioner could have done was to move
for the taking of the Bane deposition and proceed with the deposition immediately
upon securing a favorable ruling thereon. On that occasion, where the respondents
would have a chance to be heard, the respondents cannot avoid a resultant waiver of
their right of cross-examination if they still fail to appear at the deposition-taking.
Fundamental fairness dictates this course of action. It must be stressed that not only
were the respondents non-parties to Civil Case No. 0130, they likewise have no
interest in Africas certiorari petition asserting his right as an ETPI stockholder.
Setting aside the petitioners flip-flopping on its own representations,151 this Court can
only express dismay on why the petitioner had to let Bane leave the Philippines before
taking his deposition despite having knowledge already of the substance of what he
would testify on. Considering that the testimony of Bane is allegedly a "vital cog" in the
petitioners case against the respondents, the Court is left to wonder why the
petitioner had to take the deposition in an incident case (instead of the main case) at a
time when it became the technical right of the petitioner to do so.
V. The petitioner cannot rely on principle of judicial notice
The petitioner also claims that since the Bane deposition had already been previously
introduced and admitted in Civil Case No. 0130, then the Sandiganbayan should have
taken judicial notice of the Bane deposition as part of its evidence.
Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts that judges may properly take and act
on without proof because these facts are already known to them.152 Put differently, it is
the assumption by a court of a fact without need of further traditional evidentiary
support. The principle is based on convenience and expediency in securing and
introducing evidence on matters which are not ordinarily capable of dispute and are
not bona fide disputed.153
The foundation for judicial notice may be traced to the civil and canon law
maxim, manifesta (or notoria) non indigent probatione.154 The taking of judicial notice
means that the court will dispense with the traditional form of presentation of
evidence. In so doing, the court assumes that the matter is so notorious that it would
not be disputed.
The concept of judicial notice is embodied in Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence. Rule 129 either requires the court to take judicial notice, inter alia, of "the
official acts of the x x x judicial departments of the Philippines,"155 or gives the court
the discretion to take judicial notice of matters "ought to be known to judges because
of their judicial functions."156 On the other hand, a party-litigant may ask the court to
take judicial notice of any matter and the court may allow the parties to be heard on
the propriety of taking judicial notice of the matter involved.157 In the present case,
after the petitioner filed its Urgent Motion and/or Request for Judicial Notice, the
respondents were also heard through their corresponding oppositions.
In adjudicating a case on trial, generally, courts are not authorized to take judicial
notice of the contents of the records of other cases, even when such cases have been
tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding that both cases may have
been tried or are actually pending before the same judge.158 This rule though admits of
exceptions.
As a matter of convenience to all the parties, a court may properly treat all or any part
of the original record of a case filed in its archives as read into the record of a case
pending before it, when, with the knowledge of, andabsent an objection from, the
adverse party, reference is made to it for that purpose, by name and number or in
some other manner by which it is sufficiently designated; or when the original record of
the former case or any part of it, is actually withdrawn from the archives at the court's
direction, at the request or with the consent of the parties, and admitted as a part of
the record of the case then pending.159
Courts must also take judicial notice of the records of another case or cases, where
sufficient basis exists in the records of the case before it, warranting the dismissal of
the latter case.160
The issue before us does not involve the applicability of the rule on mandatory taking
of judicial notice; neither is the applicability of the rule on discretionary taking of
judicial notice seriously pursued. Rather, the petitioner approaches the concept of
judicial notice from a genealogical perspective of treating whatever evidence offered in
any of the "children" cases Civil Case 0130 as evidence in the "parent" case
Civil Case 0009 - or "of the whole family of cases."161 To the petitioner, the supposed
relationship of these cases warrants the taking of judicial notice.
We strongly disagree. First, the supporting cases162 the petitioner cited are
inapplicable either because these cases involve only a single proceeding or an
exception to the rule, which proscribes the courts from taking judicial notice of the
contents of the records of other cases.163 Second, the petitioners proposition is
obviously obnoxious to a system of orderly procedure. The petitioner itself admits that
the present case has generated a lot of cases, which, in all likelihood, involve issues
of varying complexity. If we follow the logic of the petitioners argument, we would be
espousing judicial confusion by indiscriminately allowing the admission of evidence in
one case, which was presumably found competent and relevant in another case,
simply based on the supposed lineage of the cases. It is the duty of the petitioner, as a
party-litigant, to properly lay before the court the evidence it relies upon in support of
the relief it seeks, instead of imposing that same duty on the court. We invite the
petitioners attention to our prefatory pronouncement in Lopez v. Sandiganbayan:164
Down the oft-trodden path in our judicial system, by common sense, tradition and the
law, the Judge in trying a case sees only with judicial eyes as he ought to know
nothing about the facts of the case, except those which have been adduced judicially
in evidence. Thus, when the case is up for trial, the judicial head is empty as to facts
involved and it is incumbent upon the litigants to the action to establish by evidence
the facts upon which they rely. (emphasis ours)
We therefore refuse, in the strongest terms, to entertain the petitioners argument that
we should take judicial notice of the Bane deposition.
VI. Summation
To recapitulate, we hold that: (1) the Sandiganbayans denial of the petitioners 3rd
motion the Motion to Admit Supplemental Offer of Evidence (Re: Deposition of
Maurice Bane) was a legal error that did not amount to grave abuse of discretion; (2)
the Sandiganbayans refusal to reopen the case at the petitioners instance was
tainted with grave abuse of discretion; and (3) notwithstanding the grave abuse of
discretion, the petition must ultimately fail as the Bane deposition is not admissible
under the rules of evidence.165
VII. Refutation of Justice Carpios Last Minute Modified Dissent
At the last minute, Justice Carpio circulated a modified dissent, quoting the Bane
deposition. His covering note states:
I have revised my dissenting opinion to include the Bane deposition so that the Court
and the public will understand what the Bane deposition is all about. (underlining
added)
In light of this thrust, a discussion refuting the modified dissent is in order.
First: Contents of the Bane deposition not an Issue. The dissent perfectly identified
what is at issue in this case i.e., the admissibility of the Bane deposition.
Admissibility is concerned with the competence and relevance166 of the evidence,
whose admission is sought. While the dissent quoted at length the Bane deposition, it
may not be amiss to point out that the relevance of the Bane deposition (or, to adopt
the dissents characterization, whether "Maurice V. Bane is a vital witness") is not an
issue here unless it can be established first that the Bane deposition is a competent
evidence.
Second: Misrepresentation of Cited Authority. The dissent insists that "in Philippine
Jurisprudence, the consolidation of cases merges the different actions into one and
the rights of the parties are adjudicated in a single judgment," citing Vicente J.
Francisco. In our discussion on consolidation, we footnoted the following in response
to the dissents position, which we will restate here for emphasis:
In the 1966 edition of Vicente J. Franciscos Revised Rules of Court, Francisco wrote:
The effect of consolidation of actions is to unite and merge all of the different actions
consolidated into a single action, in the same manner as if the different causes of
actions involved had originally been joined in a single action, and the order of
consolidation, if made by a court of competent jurisdiction, is binding upon all the
parties to the different actions until it is vacated or set aside. After the consolidation
there can be no further proceedings in the separate actions, which are by virtue of the
consolidation discontinued and superseded by a single action, which should be
entitled in such manner as the court may direct, and all subsequent proceedings
therein be conducted and the rights of the parties adjudicated in a single action (1
C.J.S., 113, pp. 1371-1372).
At the very beginning of the discussion on consolidation of actions in the Corpus Juris
Secundum, the following caveat appears:
The term consolidation is used in three different senses. First, where several actions
are combined into one and lose their separate identity and become a single action in
which a single judgment is rendered; second, where all except one of several actions
are stayed until one is tried, in which case the judgment in the one is conclusive as to
the others; third, where several actions are ordered to be tried together but each
retains its separate character and requires the entry of a separate judgment. The
failure to distinguish between these methods of procedure, which are entirely distinct,
the two latter, strictly speaking, not being consolidation, a fact which has not always
been noted, has caused some confusion and conflict in the cases. (1 C.J.S., 107, pp.
1341-1342) (Emphasis added).
In defining the term "consolidation of actions," Francisco provided a colatilla that the
term "consolidation" is used in three different senses, citing 1 C.J.S. 1341 and 1 Am.
Jur. 477 (Francisco, Revised Rules of Court, p. 348).
From the foregoing, it is clear that the dissent appears to have quoted Franciscos
statement out of context. As it is, the issue of the effect of consolidation on evidence is
at most an unsettled matter that requires the approach we did in the majoritys
discussion on consolidation.167
Third: Misappreciation of the Purpose of Consolidation. The dissent then turns to the the Sandiganbayan did not "grant" the request since the petitioner staunchly asserted
purpose of consolidation to "expeditiously settle the interwoven issues involved in that the deposition-taking was a matter of right. No one can deny the complexity of the
the consolidated cases" and "the simplification of the proceedings." It argues that this issues that these consolidated cases have reached. Considering the consolidation of
can only be achieved if the repetition of the same evidence is dispensed with. cases of this nature, the most minimum of fairness demands upon the petitioner to
move for the taking of the Bane deposition and for the Sandiganbayan to make a
ruling thereon (including the opposition filed by respondent Enrile which equally
It is unfortunate that the dissent refuses to recognize the fact that since consolidation
applies to his co-respondents). The burgeoning omission and failures that have
is primarily addressed to the court concerned to aid it in dispatching its official
prevailed in this case cannot be cured by this Court without itself being guilty of
business, it would be in keeping with the orderly trial procedure if the court should
violating the constitutional guarantee of due process.
have a say on what consolidation would actually bring168 (especially where several
cases are involved which have become relatively complex). In the present case, there
is nothing in the proceedings below that would suggest that the Sandiganbayan or the Sixth: Issues Posed and Resolved Go Beyond Technicalities. The above conclusions,
parties themselves (the petitioner and the respondents) had in mind a consolidation contrary to the petitioners claim, are not only matters of technicality. Admittedly, rules
beyond joint hearing or trial. Why should this Court which is not a trial court of procedure involve technicality, to which we have applied the liberality that technical
impose a purported effect that has no factual or legal grounds? rules deserve. But the resolution of the issues raised goes beyond pure or mere
technicalities as the preceding discussions show. They involve issues of due process
and basic unfairness to the respondents, particularly to respondent Enrile, who is
Fourth: The Due Process Consideration. The dissent argues that even if the
portrayed in the Bane deposition to be acting in behalf of the Marcoses so that these
consolidation only resulted in a joint hearing or trial, the "respondents are still bound
shares should be deemed to be those of the Marcoses. They involved, too, principles
by the Bane deposition considering that they were given notice of the deposition-
upon which our rules of procedure are founded and which we cannot disregard
taking." The issue here boils down to one of due process the fundamental reason
without flirting with the violation of guaranteed substantive rights and without risking
why a hearsay statement (not subjected to the rigor of cross-examination) is generally
the disorder that these rules have sought to avert in the course of their evolution.
excluded in the realm of admissible evidence especially when read in light of the
general rule that depositions are not meant as substitute for the actual testimony, in
open court, of a party or witness. In the Court En Banc deliberations of December 6, 2011, the Court failed to arrive at a
conclusive decision because of a tie vote (7-7, with one Justice taking no part). The
same vote resulted in the re-voting of December 13, 2011. In this light, the ponencia is
Respondent Enrile had a pending Opposition to the notice of deposition-taking
deemed sustained.
(questioning the reasonableness thereof an issue applicable to the rest of the
respondents) which the Sandiganbayan failed to rule on. To make the
Sandiganbayans omission worse, the Sandiganbayan blindly relied on the petitioners WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the petition for lack of merit. No
assertion that the deposition-taking was a matter of right and, thus, failed to address costs.
the consequences and/or issues that may arise from the apparently innocuous
statement of the petitioner (that it intends to use the Bane deposition in Civil Case No.
SO ORDERED.
0009, where only the respondents, and not Africa, are the parties).169 There is simply
the absence of "due" in due process.

Fifth: Misstatement of the Sandiganbayans Action. The dissent repeatedly misstates

that the Sandiganbayan "granted" the request for the deposition-taking. For emphasis,