Human and Cultural Minority Rights
Lex Talionis Fraternitas Inc.
Human and Cultural Minority Rights
Case Digests
Cario vs CHR (G.R. No. 96681 Dec 2, 1991)
Commission on Human Rights has no jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers
over, or the power to try and decide, or hear and determine, certain
specific type of cases, like alleged human rights violations involving civil or
political rights
On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a class day, some 800
public school teachers, among them members of the Manila
Public School Teachers Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of
Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook what they described as
"mass concerted actions" to "dramatize and highlight" their
plight resulting from the alleged failure of the public
authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again
been brought to the latter's attention. The "mass actions"
consisted in staying away from their classes, converging at
the Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in peaceable assemblies,
etc. Through their representatives, the teachers participating
in the mass actions were served with an order of the
Secretary of Education to return to work in 24 hours or face
dismissal, and a memorandum directing the DECS officials
concerned to initiate dismissal proceedings against those who
did not comply and to hire their replacements. For failure to
heed the return-to-work order, the CHR complainants
(private respondents) were administratively charged on the
basis of the principal's report and given five (5) days to
answer the charges. They were also preventively suspended
for ninety (90) days "pursuant to Section 41 of P.D. 807" and
temporarily replaced. The case eventually resulted in a
Decision of Secretary Cario dated December 17, 1990,
rendered after evaluation of the evidence as well as the
answers, affidavits and documents submitted by the
respondents, decreeing dismissal from the service of
Apolinario Esber and the suspension for nine (9) months of
Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo.
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Issue: WoN the Commission on Human Rights has jurisdiction
or adjudicatory powers over, or the power to try and decide,
or hear and determine, certain specific type of cases, like
alleged human rights violations involving civil or political
rights
Held: No, CHR have no power to do so. The most that may be
conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative
power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and
make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights
violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding
is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial
function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency
or official. The function of receiving evidence and
ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a
judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such,
the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual
conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the
authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to
the end that the controversy may be decided or determined
authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such
appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This
function, to repeat, the Commission does not have. Hence it
is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the
power "to investigate," cannot and should not "try and
resolve on the merits" (adjudicate) the matters involved in
Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it
means to do; and it cannot do so even if there be a claim
that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against
the teachers in question, initiated and conducted by the
DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had been
transgressed. More particularly, the Commission has no power
to "resolve on the merits" the question of (a) whether or not
the mass concerted actions engaged in by the teachers
constitute and are prohibited or otherwise restricted by law;
(b) whether or not the act of carrying on and taking part in
those actions, and the failure of the teachers to discontinue
those actions, and return to their classes despite the order to
this effect by the Secretary of Education, constitute
infractions of relevant rules and regulations warranting
administrative disciplinary sanctions, or are justified by the
grievances complained of by them; and (c) what where the
particular acts done by each individual teacher and what
sanctions, if any, may properly be imposed for said acts or
omissions. These are matters undoubtedly and clearly within
the original jurisdiction of the Secretary of Education, being
within the scope of the disciplinary powers granted to him
under the Civil Service Law, and also, within the appellate
jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. The Commission
on Human Rights simply has no place in this scheme of
things. It has no business intruding into the jurisdiction and
functions of the Education Secretary or the Civil Service
Commission. It has no business going over the same ground
traversed by the latter and making its own judgment on the
questions involved. This would accord success to what may
well have been the complaining teachers' strategy to abort,
frustrate or negate the judgment of the Education Secretary
in the administrative cases against them which they
anticipated would be adverse to them. This cannot be done.
It will not be permitted to be done. In any event, the
investigation by the Commission on Human Rights would
serve no useful purpose. If its investigation should result in
conclusions contrary to those reached by Secretary Cario, it
would have no power anyway to reverse the Secretary's
conclusions. Reversal thereof can only by done by the Civil
Service Commission and lastly by this Court. The only thing
the Commission can do, if it concludes that Secretary Cario
was in error, is to refer the matter to the appropriate
Government agency or tribunal for assistance; that would be
the Civil Service Commission. 35 It cannot arrogate unto
itself the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service
Commission.
Simon vs. CHR (G.R. No. 100150 Jan 5, 1994)
CHRs power to cite for contempt should be understood to apply only to
violations of its adopted operational guidelines and rules of procedure
essential to carry out its investigatorial powers.
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A "Demolition Notice," dated 9 July 1990, signed by Carlos
Quimpo (one of the petitioners) in his capacity as an
Executive Officer of the Quezon City Integrated Hawkers
Management Council under the Office of the City Mayor, was
sent to, and received by, the private respondents (being the
officers and members of the North EDSA Vendors Association,
Incorporated). In said notice, the respondents were given a
grace-period of three (3) days (up to 12 July 1990) within
which to vacate the questioned premises of North EDSA.
Prior to their receipt of the demolition notice, the private
respondents were informed by petitioner Quimpo that their
stalls should be removed to give way to the "People's Park".
On 12 July 1990, the group, led by their President Roque
Fermo, filed a letter-complaint (Pinag-samang Sinumpaang
Salaysay) with the CHR against the petitioners, asking the
late CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista for a letter to
be addressed to then Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr., of Quezon
City to stop the demolition of the private respondents' stalls,
sari-sari stores, and carinderia along North EDSA. The
complaint was docketed as CHR Case No. 90-1580. On 23 July
1990, the CHR issued an Order, directing the petitioners "to
desist from demolishing the stalls and shanties at North EDSA
pending resolution of the vendors/squatters' complaint
before the Commission" and ordering said petitioners to
appear before the CHR. In an Order, dated 25 September
1990, the CHR cited the petitioners in contempt for carrying
out the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and
carinderia despite the "order to desist", and it imposed a fine
of P500.00 on each of them.
Issue: Whether or not the CHR has jurisdiction:
a) to investigate the alleged violations of the "business
rights" of the private respondents whose stalls were
demolished by the petitioners at the instance and
authority given by the Mayor of Quezon City;
b) to impose the fine of P500.00 each on the petitioners
for contempt;
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Human and Cultural Minority Rights
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Held: a) Recalling the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission, aforequoted, it is readily apparent that the
delegates envisioned a Commission on Human Rights that
would focus its attention to the more severe cases of human
rights violations. Delegate Garcia, for instance, mentioned
such areas as the "(1) protection of rights of political
detainees, (2) treatment of prisoners and the prevention of
tortures, (3) fair and public trials, (4) cases of
disappearances, (5) salvagings and hamletting, and (6) other
crimes committed against the religious." While the
enumeration has not likely been meant to have any
preclusive effect, more than just expressing a statement of
priority, it is, nonetheless, significant for the tone it has set.
In any event, the delegates did not apparently take comfort
in peremptorily making a conclusive delineation of the CHR's
scope of investigatorial jurisdiction. They have thus seen it
fit to resolve, instead, that "Congress may provide for other
cases of violations of human rights that should fall within the
authority of the Commission, taking into account its
recommendation." In the particular case at hand, there is no
cavil that what are sought to be demolished are the stalls,
sari-sari stores and carinderia, as well as temporary shanties,
erected by private respondents on a land which is planned to
be developed into a "People's Park". More than that, the land
adjoins the North EDSA of Quezon City which, this Court can
take judicial notice of, is a busy national highway. The
consequent danger to life and limb is not thus to be likewise
simply ignored. It is indeed paradoxical that a right which is
claimed to have been violated is one that cannot, in the first
place, even be invoked, if it is, in fact, extant. Be that as it
may, looking at the standards hereinabove discoursed vis-a-
vis the circumstances obtaining in this instance, we are not
prepared to conclude that the order for the demolition of the
stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia of the private
respondents can fall within the compartment of "human
rights violations involving civil and political rights" intended
by the Constitution.
b) No, on its contempt powers, the CHR is constitutionally
authorized to "adopt its operational guidelines and rules of
procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in
accordance with the Rules of Court." Accordingly, the CHR
acted within its authority in providing in its revised rules, its
power "to cite or hold any person in direct or indirect
contempt, and to impose the appropriate penalties in
accordance with the procedure and sanctions provided for in
the Rules of Court." That power to cite for contempt,
however, should be understood to apply only to violations of
its adopted operational guidelines and rules of procedure
essential to carry out its investigatorial powers. To exemplify,
the power to cite for contempt could be exercised against
persons who refuse to cooperate with the said body, or who
unduly withhold relevant information, or who decline to
honor summons, and the like, in pursuing its investigative
work. The "order to desist" (a semantic interplay for a
restraining order) in the instance before us, however, is not
investigatorial in character but prescinds from an
adjudicative power that it does not possess.
Marcos vs. Manglapus (G.R. No. 88211 Oct 27, 1989)
The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically
guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which treats only of the liberty of abode
and the right to travel.
Issue: WON the President have the power to bar the return of
former President Marcos and family to the Philippines?
Held: Yes, President Aquino has the power to bar the return
of former President Marcos and family to the Philippines. It
must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not
the right to travel from the Philippines to other countries or
within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel
would normally connote. Essentially, the right involved is the
right to return to one's country, a totally distinct right under
international law, independent from although related to the
right to travel. The right to return to one's country is not
among the rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights,
which treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to
travel, but it is our well-considered view that the right to
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 Human and Cultural Minority Rights
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return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle
of international law and, under our Constitution, is part of
the law of the land [Art. II, Sec. 2 of the Constitution.]
However, it is distinct and separate from the right to travel
and enjoys a different protection under the International
Covenant of Civil and Political Rights. Contrary to petitioners'
view, it cannot be denied that the President, upon whom
executive power is vested, has unstated residual powers
which are implied from the grant of executive power and
which are necessary for her to comply with her duties under
the Constitution. The powers of the President are not limited
to what are expressly enumerated in the article on the
Executive Department and in scattered provisions of the
Constitution. The Court cannot close its eyes to present
realities and pretend that the country is not besieged from
within by a well-organized communist insurgency, a
separatist movement in Mindanao, rightist conspiracies to
grab power, urban terrorism, the murder with impunity of
military men, police officers and civilian officials, to mention
only a few. The documented history of the efforts of the
Marcoses and their followers to destabilize the country, as
earlier narrated in this ponencia bolsters the conclusion that
the return of the Marcoses at this time would only
exacerbate and intensify the violence directed against the
State and instigate more chaos. As divergent and discordant
forces, the enemies of the State may be contained. The
military establishment has given assurances that it could
handle the threats posed by particular groups. But it is the
catalytic effect of the return of the Marcoses that may prove
to be the proverbial final straw that would break the camel's
back. With these before her, the President cannot be said to
have acted arbitrarily and capriciously and whimsically in
determining that the return of the Marcoses poses a serious
threat to the national interest and welfare and in prohibiting
their return. It will not do to argue that if the return of the
Marcoses to the Philippines will cause the escalation of
violence against the State, that would be the time for the
President to step in and exercise the commander-in-chief
powers granted her by the Constitution to suppress or stamp
out such violence. The State, acting through the
Government, is not precluded from taking pre-emptive action
against threats to its existence if, though still nascent they
are perceived as apt to become serious and direct.
Protection of the people is the essence of the duty of
government. The preservation of the State the fruition of the
people's sovereignty is an obligation in the highest order. The
President, sworn to preserve and defend the Constitution and
to see the faithful execution the laws, cannot shirk from that
responsibility. Among the duties of the President under the
Constitution, in compliance with his (or her) oath of office, is
to protect and promote the interest and welfare of the
people. Her decision to bar the return of the Marcoses and
subsequently, the remains of Mr. Marcos at the present time
and under present circumstances is in compliance with this
bounden duty. The return of the deposed President, his wife
and children cannot but pose a clear and present danger to
public order and safety.
Gutierrez (dissenting): There is only one Bill of Rights with the same
interpretation of liberty and the same guarantee of freedom for both
unloved and despised persons on one hand and the rest who are not so
stigmatized on the other. I am, therefore, disturbed by the majority ruling
which declares that it should not be a precedent. We are interpreting the
Constitution for only one person and constituting him into a class by himself.
The Constitution is a law for all classes of men at all times. To have a person
as one class by himself smacks of unequal protection of the laws. With all
due respect for the majority in the Court, I believe that the issue before us
is one of rights and not of power. Mr. Marcos is insensate and would not live
if separated from the machines which have taken over the functions of his
kidneys and other organs. To treat him at this point as one with full panoply
of power against whom the forces of Government should be marshalled is
totally unrealistic. The Government has the power to arrest and punish him.
But does it have the power to deny him his right to come home and die
among familiar surroundings? Hence, this dissent. The Bill of Rights provides:
Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits
prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the
court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of
national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.
(Emphasis supplied, Section 6, Art. 111, Constitution) With all due respect
for the majority opinion, I disagree with its dictum on the right to travel. I
do not think we should differentiate the right to return home from the right
to go abroad or to move around in the Philippines. If at all, the right to come
home must be more preferred than any other aspect of the right to travel.
Cruz(dissenting): It is my belief that the petitioner, as a citizen of the
Philippines, is entitled to return to and live and die in his own country. I
say this with a heavy heart but say it nonetheless. That conviction is not
diminished one whit simply because many believe Marcos to be beneath
contempt and undeserving of the very liberties he flounted when he was the
absolute ruler of this land.
Paras(dissenting): There is no dispute that the former President is still a
Filipino citizen and both under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines, he has the right to return to his
own country except only if prevented by the demands of national safety and
national security. Our Armed Forces have failed to prove this danger. They
are bereft of hard evidence, and all they can rely on is sheer speculation.
True, there is some danger but there is no showing as to the extent. It is
incredible that one man alone together with his family, who had been ousted
from this country by popular will, can arouse an entire country to rise in
morbid sympathy for the cause he once espoused.
Sarmiento (dissenting): The only issue that saddles the Court is simply:
"whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution,
the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines." I
therefore take exception to allusions anent "the capacity of the Marcoses to
stir trouble even from afar." I have legitimate reason to fear that my
brethren, in passing judgment on the Marcoses (insofar as their "capacity to
stir trouble" is concerned), have overstepped the bounds of judicial
restraint, or even worse, convicted them without trial. I also find quite
strained what the majority would have as the "real issues" facing the Court:
"The right to return to one's country," pitted against "the right of travel and
freedom of abode", and their supposed distinctions under international law,
as if such distinctions, under international law in truth and in fact exist.
There is only one right involved here, whether under municipal or
international law: the light of travel, whether within one's own country, or
to another, and the right to return thereto. The Constitution itself makes no
distinctions; let then, no one make a distinction. Ubi lex non distinguish nec
nos distinguere debemus.

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