2/15/2017 G.R.No.

L48226

TodayisWednesday,February15,2017

RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila

ENBANC

G.R.No.L48226December14,1942

ANAL.ANG,petitioner,
vs.
TORIBIOTEODORO,respondent.

CiriloLimforpetitioner.
MarcialP.LichaucoandManuelM.Mejiaforrespondent.

OZAETA,J.:

PetitionerhasappealedtothisCourtbycertioraritoreversethejudgmentoftheCourtofAppealsreversingthat
oftheCourtofFirstInstanceofManilaanddirectingtheDirectorofCommercetocanceltheregistrationofthe
trademark"AngTibay"infavorofsaidpetitioner,andperpetuallyenjoiningthelatterfromusingsaidtrademark
ongoodsmanufacturedandsoldbyher.

Respondent Toribio Teodoro, at first in partnership with Juan Katindig and later as sole proprietor, has
continuously used "Ang Tibay," both as a trademark and as a tradename, in the manufacture and sale of
slippers,shoes,andindoorbaseballssince1910.HeformallyregistereditastrademarkonSeptember29,1915,
and as tradename on January 3, 1933. The growth of his business is a thrilling epic of Filipino industry and
businesscapacity.Startinginanobscureshopin1910withamodestcapitalofP210butwithtirelessindustryand
unlimited perseverance, Toribio Teodoro, then an unknown young man making slippers with his own hands but
nowaprominentbusinessmagnateandmanufacturerwithalargefactoryoperatedwithmodernmachinerybya
greatnumberofemployees,hassteadilygrownwithhisbusinesstowhichhehasdedicatedthebestyearsofhis
life and which he has expanded to such proportions that his gross sales from 1918 to 1938 aggregated
P8,787,025.65. His sales in 1937 amounted to P1,299,343.10 and in 1938, P1,133,165.77. His expenses for
advertisementfrom1919to1938aggregatedP210,641.56.

Petitioner(defendantbelow)registeredthesametrademark"AngTibay"forpantsandshirtsonApril11,1932,
andestablishedafactoryforthemanufactureofsaidarticlesintheyear1937.Inthefollowingyear(1938)her
gross sales amounted to P422,682.09. Neither the decision of the trial court nor that of the Court of Appeals
shows how much petitioner has spent or advertisement. But respondent in his brief says that petitioner "was
unabletoprovethatshehadspentasinglecentavoadvertising"AngTibay"shirtsandpantspriorto1938.Inthat
yearsheadvertisedthefactorywhichshehadjustbuiltanditwaswhenthiswasbroughttotheattentionofthe
appelleethatheconsultedhisattorneysandeventuallybroughtthepresentsuit."

Thetrialcourt(JudgeQuiricoAbeto)presidingabsolvedthedefendantfromthecomplaint,withcostsagainstthe
plaintiff, on the grounds that the two trademarks are dissimilar and are used on different and noncompeting
goodsthattherehadbeennoexclusiveuseofthetrademarkbytheplaintiffandthattherehadbeennofraudin
theuseofthesaidtrademarkbythedefendantbecausethegoodsonwhichitisusedareessentiallydifferent
fromthoseoftheplaintiff.TheseconddivisionoftheCourtofAppeals,composedofJusticesBengson,Padilla,
Lopez Vito, Tuason, and Alex Reyes, with Justice Padilla as ponente, reversed that judgment, holding that by
uninterruptedanexclusiveusesince191inthemanufactureofslippersandshoes,respondent'strademarkhas
acquiredasecondarymeaningthatthegoodsorarticlesonwhichthetwotrademarksareusedaresimilaror
belong to the same class and that the use by petitioner of said trademark constitutes a violation of sections 3
and 7 of Act No. 666. The defendant Director of Commerce did not appeal from the decision of the Court of
Appeals.

First. Counsel for the petitioner, in a wellwritten brief, makes a frontal sledgehammer attack on the validity of
respondent'strademark"AngTibay."Hecontendsthatthephrase"AngTibay"asemployedbytherespondent
onthearticlesmanufacturedbyhimisadescriptivetermbecause,"freelytranslateinEnglish,"itmeans"strong,
durable,lasting."Heinvokessection2ofActNo.666,whichprovidesthatwordsordeviceswhichrelatedonlyto
the name, quality, or description of the merchandise cannot be the subject of a trademark. He cites among
others the case of Baxter vs. Zuazua (5 Phil., 16), which involved the trademark "Agua de Kananga" used on
toiletwater,andinwhichthisCourtheldthattheword"Kananga,"whichisthenameofawellknownPhilippine
treeoritsflower,couldnotbeappropriatedasatrademarkanymorethancouldthewords"sugar,""tobacco,"or
"coffee." On the other hand, counsel for the respondent, in an equally wellprepared and exhaustive brief,
contendthatthewords"AngTibay"arenotdescriptivebutmerelysuggestiveandmayproperlyberegardedas
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fancifulorarbitraryinthelegalsense.Theciteseveralcasesinwhichsimilarwordshavebeensustainedasvalid
trademarks, such as "Holeproof" for hosiery, 1 "ideal for tooth brushes, 2 and "Fashionknit" for neckties and
sweaters.3

We find it necessary to go into the etymology and meaning of the Tagalog words "Ang Tibay" to determine
whethertheyareadescriptiveterm,i.e.,whethertheyrelatetothequalityordescriptionofthemerchandiseto
whichrespondenthasappliedthemasatrademark.Theword"ang"isadefinitearticlemeaning"the"inEnglish.
It is also used as an adverb, a contraction of the word "anong" (what or how). For instance, instead of saying,
"Anongganda!"("Howbeautiful!"),weordinarilysay,"Angganda!"Tibayisarootwordfromwhicharederivedthe
verb magpatibay (to strenghten the nouns pagkamatibay (strength, durability), katibayan (proof, support,
strength),katibaytibayan(superior strength) and the adjectives matibay (strong, durable, lasting), napakatibay
(very strong), kasintibay or magkasintibay (as strong as, or of equal strength). The phrase "Ang Tibay" is an
exclamationdenotingadministrationofstrengthordurability.Forinstance,onewhotrieshardbutfailstobreakan
objectexclaims,"Angtibay!"(Howstrong!")Itmayalsobeusedinasentencethus,"Angtibayngsapatosmo!"
(Howdurableyourshoesare!")Thephrase"angtibay"isneverusedadjectivelytodefineordescribeanobject.
Onedoesnotsay,"angtibaysapatos"or"sapatosangtibay" is never used adjectively to define or describe an
object.Onedoesnotsay,"angtibaysapatos"or"sapatosangtibay" to mean "durable shoes," but "matibay na
sapatos"or"sapatosnamatibay."

Fromallofthiswededucethat"AngTibay"isnotadescriptivetermwithinthemeaningoftheTradeMarkLaw
butratherafancifulorcoinedphrasewhichmayproperlyandlegallybeappropriatedasatrademarkortrade
name.Inthisconnectionwedonotfailtonotethatwhenthepetitionerherselftookthetroubleandexpenseof
securingtheregistrationofthesesamewordsasatrademarkofherproductssheorherattorneyaswellasthe
DirectorofCommercewasundoubtedlyconvincedthatsaidwords(AngTibay)werenotadescriptivetermand
hencecouldbelegallyusedandvalidlyregisteredasatrademark.Itseemsstultifyingandpuerileforhernowto
contendotherwise,suggestiveofthestoryofsourgrapes.Counselforthepetitionersaysthatthefunctionofa
trademarkistopointdistinctively,eitherbyitsownmeaningorbyassociation,totheoriginorownershipofthe
warestowhichitisapplied.Thatiscorrect,andwefindthat"AngTibay,"asusedbytherespondenttodesignate
his wares, had exactly performed that function for twentytwo years before the petitioner adopted it as a trade
markinherownbusiness.AngTibayshoesandslippersare,byassociation,knownthroughoutthePhilippinesas
productsoftheAngTibayfactoryownedandoperatedbytherespondentToribioTeodoro.

Second.InhersecondassignmentoferrorpetitionercontendsthattheCourtofAppealserredinholdingthatthe
words"AngTibay"hadacquiredasecondarymeaning.Inviewoftheconclusionwehavereacheduponthefirst
assignmentoferror,itisunnecessarytoapplyherethedoctrineof"secondarymeaning"intrademarkparlance.
Thisdoctrineistotheeffectthatawordorphraseoriginallyincapableofexclusiveappropriationwithreferenceto
anarticleofthemarket,becausegeographicallyorotherwisedescriptive,mightneverthelesshavebeenusedso
longandsoexclusivelybyoneproducerwithreferencetohisarticlethat,inthattradeandtothatbranchofthe
purchasingpublic,thewordorphrasehascometomeanthatthearticlewashisproduct.(G.&C.MerriamCo.
vs. Salfield, 198 F., 369, 373.) We have said that the phrase "Ang Tibay," being neither geographic nor
descriptive,wasoriginallycapableofexclusiveappropriationasatrademark.Butwereitnotso,theapplicationof
thedoctrineofsecondarymeaningmadebytheCourtofAppealscouldneverthelessbefullysustainedbecause,
in any event, by respondent's long and exclusive use of said phrase with reference to his products and his
business,ithasacquiredaproprietaryconnotation.(Landers,Frary,andClarkvs.UniversalCoolerCorporation,
85F.[2d],46.)

Third.Petitioner'sthirdassignmentoferroris,thattheCourtofAppealserredinholdingthatpantsandshirtsare
goods similar to shoes and slippers within the meaning of sections 3 and 7 of Act No. 666. She also contends
underherfourthassignmentoferror(whichwedeemconvenienttopassupontogetherwiththethird)thatthere
canneitherbeinfringementoftrademarkundersection3norunfaircompetitionundersection7throughheruse
ofthewords"AngTibay"inconnectionwithpantsandshirts,becausethosearticlesdonotbelongtothesame
classofmerchandiseasshoesandslippers.

Thequestionraisedbypetitionerinvolvethescopeandapplicationofsections3,7,11,13,and20oftheTrade
Mark Law (Act No. 666.) Section 3 provides that "any person entitled to the exclusive use of a trademark to
designatetheoriginorownershipofgoodshehasmadeordealsin,mayrecoverdamagesinacivilactionsfrom
anypersonwhohassoldgoodsofasimilarkind,bearingsuchtrademark...Thecomplainingparty...may
have a preliminary injunction, . . . and such injunction upon final hearing, if the complainant's property in the
trademark and the defendant's violation thereof shall be fully established, shall be made perpetual, and this
injunctionshallbepartofthejudgmentfordamagestoberenderedinthesamecause."Section7providesthat
anypersonwho,insellinghisgoods,shallgivethemthegeneralappearanceofthegoodsofanothereitherinthe
wrappingofthepackages,orinthedevicesorwordsthereon,orinanyotherfeatureoftheirappearance,which
would be likely to influence purchasers to believe that the goods offered are those of the complainant, shall be
guiltyofunfaircompetition,andshallbeliabletoanactionfordamagesandtoaninjunction,asinthecasesof
trademark infringement under section 3. Section 11 requires the applicant for registration of a trademark to
state,amongothers,"thegeneralclassofmerchandisetowhichthetrademarkclaimedhasbeenappropriated."
Section 13 provides that no alleged trademark or trade name shall be registered which is identical with a
registeredorknowntrademarkownedbyanotherandappropriatetothesameclassofmerchandise,orwhichto
nearlyresemblesanotherperson'slawfultrademarkortradenameastobelikelytocauseconfusionormistake
in the mind of the public, or to deceive purchasers. And section 2 authorizes the Director of Commerce to
establish classes of merchandise for the purpose of the registration of trademarks and to determine the
particular description of articles included in each class it also provides that "an application for registration of a

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trademark shall be registered only for one class of articles and only for the particular description of articles
mentionedinsaidapplication."

Wehaveunderlinedthekeywordsusedinthestatute:"goodsofasimilarkin,""generalclassofmerchandise,"
"same class of merchandise," "classes of merchandise," and "class of articles," because it is upon their
implications that the result of the case hinges. These phrases, which refer to the same thing, have the same
meaningasthephrase"merchandiseofthesamedescriptiveproperties"usedinthestatutesandjurisprudence
ofotherjurisdictions.

Theburdenofpetitioner'sargumentisthatundersections11and20theregistrationbyrespondentofthetrade
mark"AngTibay"forshoesandslippersisnosafeguardagainstitsbeingusedbypetitionerforpantsandshirts
becausethelatterdonotbelongtothesameclassofmerchandiseorarticlesastheformerthatshecannotbe
held guilty of infringement of trademark under section 3 because respondent's mark is not a valid trademark,
norhasitacquiredasecondarymeaningthatpantsandshirtsdonotpossessthesamedescriptivepropertiesas
shoesandslippersthatneithercanshebeheldguiltyofunfaircompetitionundersection7becausetheuseby
herofthetrademark"AngTibay"uponpantsandshirtsisnotlikelytomisleadthegeneralpublicastotheirorigin
or ownership and that there is now showing that she in unfairly or fraudulently using that mark "Ang Tibay"
againsttherespondent.Ifwewereinterpretingthestatuteforthefirsttimeandinthefirstdecadeofthetwentieth
century, when it was enacted, and were to construe it strictly and literally, we might uphold petitioner's
contentions. But law and jurisprudence must keep abreast with the progress of mankind, and the courts must
breathelifeintothestatutesiftheyaretoservetheirpurpose.OurTrademarkLaw,enactednearlyfortyyears
ago, has grown in its implications and practical application, like a constitution, in virtue of the life continually
breathedintoit.Itisnotofmerelylocalapplicationithasitscounterpartinotherjurisdictionsofthecivilizedworld
fromwhosejurisprudenceithasalsoreceivedvitalizingnourishment.Wehavetoapplythislawasithasgrown
andnotasitwasborn.Itsgrowthordevelopmentabreastwiththatofsisterstatutesandjurisprudenceinother
jurisdictionsisreflectedinthefollowingobservationofawellknownauthor:

This fundamental change in attitude first manifested itself in the year 19151917. Until about then, the
courts had proceeded on the theory that the same trademark, used on unlike goods, could not cause
confusion in trade and that, therefore, there could be no objection to the use and registration of a well
knownmarkbyathirdpartyforadifferentclassofgoods.Since1916however,agrowingsentimentbegan
toarisethatintheselectionofafamousmarkbyathirdparty,therewasgenerallythehiddenintentionto
"haveafreeride"onthetrademarkowner'sreputationandgoodwill.(Derenberg,TradeMarkProtection
&UnfairTrading,1936edition,p.409.)

InthepresentstateofdevelopmentofthelawonTradeMarks,UnfairCompetition,andUnfairTrading,thetest
employedbythecourtstodeterminewhethernoncompetinggoodsareorarenotofthesameclassisconfusion
astotheoriginofthegoodsoftheseconduser.Althoughtwononcompetingarticlesmaybeclassifiedundertwo
differentclassesbythePatentOfficebecausetheyaredeemednottopossessthesamedescriptiveproperties,
theywould,nevertheless,beheldbythecourtstobelongtothesameclassifthesimultaneoususeonthemof
identicalorcloselysimilartrademarkswouldbelikelytocauseconfusionastotheorigin,orpersonalsource,of
the second user's goods. They would be considered as not falling under the same class only if they are so
dissimilarorsoforeigntoeachotherastomakeitunlikelythatthepurchaserwouldthinkthefirstusermadethe
seconduser'sgoods.

Such construction of the law is induced by cogent reasons of equity and fair dealing. The courts have come to
realizethattherecanbeunfaircompetitionorunfairtradingevenifthegoodsarenoncompeting,andthatsuch
unfairtradingcancauseinjuryordamagetothefirstuserofagiventrademark,first,bypreventionofthenatural
expansionofhisbusinessand,second,byhavinghisbusinessreputationconfusedwithandputatthemercyof
the second user. Then noncompetitive products are sold under the same mark, the gradual whittling away or
dispersionoftheidentityandholduponthepublicmindofthemarkcreatedbyitsfirstuser,inevitablyresults.The
originalownerisentitledtothepreservationofthevaluablelinkbetweenhimandthepublicthathasbeencreated
by his ingenuity and the merit of his wares or services. Experience has demonstrated that when a wellknown
trademark is adopted by another even for a totally different class of goods, it is done to get the benefit of the
reputationandadvertisementsoftheoriginatorofsaidmark,toconveytothepublicafalseimpressionofsome
supposedconnectionbetweenthemanufacturerofthearticlesoldundertheoriginalmarkandthenewarticles
beingtenderedtothepublicunderthesameorsimilarmark.Astradehasdevelopedandcommercialchanges
have come about, the law of unfair competition has expanded to keep pace with the times and the element of
strictcompetitioninitselfhasceasedtobethedeterminingfactor.Theownerofatrademarkortradenamehas
apropertyrightinwhichheisentitledtoprotection,sincethereisdamagetohimfromconfusionofreputationor
goodwillinthemindofthepublicaswellasfromconfusionofgoods.Themoderntrendistogiveemphasistothe
unfairnessoftheactsandtoclassifyandtreattheissueasafraud.

A few of the numerous cases in which the foregoing doctrines have been laid down in one form or another will
nowbecited:(1)InTeodoroKalawNgKhevs.LevelBrothersCompany(G.R.No.46817),decidedbythisCourt
on April 18, 1941, the respondent company (plaintiff below) was granted injunctive relief against the use by the
petitioner of the trademark "Lux" and "Lifebuoy" for hair pomade, they having been originally used by the
respondent for soap The Court held in effect that although said articles are noncompetitive, they are similar or
belongtothesameclass.(2)InLincolnMotorCo.vs.LincolnAutomobileCo.(44F.[2d],812),themanufacturer
ofthewellknownLincolnautomobilewasgrantedinjunctivereliefagainsttheuseoftheword"Lincoln"byanother
companyaspartofitsfirmname.(3)ThecaseofAuntJemimaMillsCo.vs.Rigney&Co.(247F.,407),involved
thetrademark"AuntJemima,"originallyusedonflour,whichthedefendantattemptedtouseonsyrup,andthere
the court held that the goods, though different, are so related as to fall within the mischief which equity should

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prevent. (4) In Tiffany & Co., vs. Tiffany Productions, Inc. (264 N.Y.S., 459 23 Trademark Reporter, 183), the
plaintiff,ajewelryconcern,wasgrantedinjunctivereliefagainstthedefendant,amanufacturerofmotionpictures,
from using the name "Tiffany." Other famous cases cited on the margin, wherein the courts granted injunctive
relief, involved the following trademarks or tradenames: "Kodak," for cameras and photographic supplies,
againstitsuseforbicycles.4"Penslar,"formedicinesandtoiletarticles,againstitsuseforcigars5"RollsRoyce,"
forautomobiles.againstitsuseforradiotubes6"Vogue,"asthenameofamagazine,againstitsuseforhats7
"Kotex,"forsanitarynapkins,againsttheuseof"Rotex"forvaginalsyringes8"SunMaid,"forraisins,againstits
useforflour9 "Yale,"forlocksandkeys,againstitsuseforelectricflashlights 10 and "Waterman," for fountain
pens,againstitsuseforrazorblades.11 la w p h il.n e t

Againstthisarrayoffamouscases,theindustryofcounselforthepetitionerhasenabledhimtociteonthispoint
onlythefollowingcases:(1)MohawkMilkProductsvs.GeneralDistilleriesCorporation(95F.[2d],334),wherein
thecourtheldthatginandcannedmilkandcreamdonotbelongtothesameclass(2)FawcettPublications,Inc.
vs.PopularMechanicsCo.(80F.[2d],194),whereinthecourtheldthatthewords"PopularMechanics"usedas
the title of a magazine and duly registered as a trademark were not infringed by defendant's use of the words
"Modern Mechanics and Inventions" on a competitive magazine, because the word "mechanics" is merely a
descriptivenameand(3)OxfordBookCo.vs.CollegeEntranceBookCo.(98F.[2d],688),whereintheplaintiff
unsuccessfully attempted to enjoin the defendant from using the word "Visualized" in connection with history
books,thecourtholdingthatsaidwordismerelydescriptive.Thesecasescitesandrelieduponbypetitionerare
obviouslyofnodecisiveapplicationtothecaseatbar.

Wethinkreasonablemenmaynotdisagreethatshoesandshirtsarenotasunrelatedasfountainpensandrazor
blades, for instance. The mere relation or association of the articles is not controlling. As may readily be noted
fromwhatwehaveheretoforesaid,theproprietaryconnotationthatatrademarkortradenamehasacquiredis
of more paramount consideration. The Court of Appeals found in this case that by uninterrupted and exclusive
usesince1910ofrespondent'sregisteredtrademarkonslippersandshoesmanufacturedbyhim,ithascometo
indicate the origin and ownership of said goods. It is certainly not farfetched to surmise that the selection by
petitioner of the same trademark for pants and shirts was motivated by a desire to get a free ride on the
reputationandsellingpowerithasacquiredatthehandsoftherespondent.Asobservedinanothercase, 12 the
field from which a person may select a trademark is practically unlimited, and hence there is no excuse for
impinging upon or even closely approaching the mark of a business rival. In the unlimited field of choice, what
couldhavebeenpetitioner'spurposeinselecting"AngTibay"ifnotforitsfame?

Lastly,inherfifthassignmentoferrorpetitionerseemstomakeafranticefforttoretaintheuseofthemark"Ang
Tibay."Hercounselsuggeststhatinsteadofenjoiningherfromusingit,shemayberequiredtostateinherlabels
affixedtoherproductstheinscription:"NotmanufacturedbyToribioTeodoro."Wethinksuchpracticewouldbe
unethical and unworthy of a reputable businessman. To the suggestion of petitioner, respondent may say, not
withoutjusticethoughwithatingeofbitterness:"Whyofferaperpetualapologyorexplanationastotheoriginof
your products in order to use my trademark instead of creating one of your own?" On our part may we add,
without meaning to be harsh, that a selfrespecting person does not remain in the shelter of another but builds
oneofhisown.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed, with costs against the petitioner in the three instances. So
ordered.

Yulo,C.J.,Moran,ParasandBocobo,JJ.,concur.

Footnotes

1HoleproofHosieryCo.vs.WallachBros.(167F.,373).

2Hughesvs.SmithCo.(205F.,302).

3FranklinKnittingMillsvs.FashionitSweaterMills(297F.,247).

4EastmanCo.vs.KodakCycleCo.(15R.PC.,105).

5PeninsularChemicalCo.vs.Levinson(247f.,658).

6Wallvs.RollsRoyceofAmerica(4F.[2d],333).

7VogueCo.vs.ThompsonHudsonCo.(300F.,509).

8KotexCo.vs.McArthur(45F.[2d],256).

9SunMaidRaisinGrowersofCaliforniavs.AmericanGrocerCo.(40F.[2d],116).

10YaleElectricCorporationvs.RobertsonandTheYale&TowneCo.(21F.[2d],467)affirmedin26F.
[2d],9722.

11L.E.WatermanCo.vs.BenjaminGordon(8F.Supp.,35124TrademarkReporter,347)affirmedin72
F.[2d],272.
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