The issue of Poes citizenship is not a proper ground for disqualification under the

remedies enumerated in Fermin v Comelec where the court clarified the two

remedies that may be availed

by a candidate to prevent another from running in an
electoral race. The Court debunked the interpretation that a petition for
disqualification covers the absence of the substantive qualifications of a candidate
and thus a petition for disqualification may be premised on Section 12 or 68 of the
[Omnibus Election Code], or Section 40 of the [Local Government Code]. Since
Grace Poe does not fall under the disqualifications enumerated under the said
provisions, she cannot be disqualified.*

On the other hand, a petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC can only be
grounded on a statement of a material representation in the said certificate that is
false. The petitions also have different effects. While a person who is disqualified
under Section 68 is merely prohibited to continue as a candidate, the person whose
certificate is cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is not treated as a
candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a CoC

For Grace Poe to be considered a natural-born citizen, her parents must be a Filipino
citizen but since she is a foundling, her parents are not known and cannot be
presumed as Filipino citizens, hence she cannot claim or acquire the status of
natural-born citizen.

CITIZENSHIP AS A CONFLICT OF LAWS ISSUE

December 1, 2015
Defn: That part of the law of each state w/c determines whether, in dealing with a legal
situation, the law of some other state will be recognized, given effect or applied.
Why do we have conflict of laws?
No. of sovereign states: 195, and diversity of legal systems (e.g. civil law, common law,
indigenous law, etc)
Relevance of conflict of laws:
Development in international travel and communications
4,500 filipinos travel daily
33.6m Filipinos are internet users
103 million are mobile phone subscribers
More legal situations involving a foreign element -> CoL
Jurisdiction refers to the power of the court to try a case, render judgment and execute it in
accordance with law
Proceedings in personam and in rem
personam: binds only the parties to the case
rem: binds the world and not merely the interest of the specific parties
Approaches to choice of law:
1 Traditional Approach
1 anchored on the principle that choice of law rules that are simple and capable of
easy administration will promote uniformity of results and enhance predictability
2 vested rights theory - adopts rules for the selection of the law w/o regard to its
content. may lead to unjust results
3 lex loci contractus
4 ex. during stopover they enter into a contract: Ph law would apply to contract. But
if theyre both foreigners, why should PH law apply? It would be unjust
5 advantages: predictable and simple
2 Modern Approaches
1 most significant relationship - consider the factual contacts of each case and
evaluates them in relation to their relevance and relative importance
2 interest analysis - interest of the state in having its laws applied
1 what would the interest of the Ph be in applying its laws to a contract
between 2 foreigners w/c will be enforced in another state? NOTHING
2 this is less rigid and looks at arriving at a just result
Recognition and Enforcement
A foreign jusgment refers to all decisions rendered outside the forum
Not covered by Art. 3 CC
Personal Law
Defn: permanent connection between an individual and a state that will allow courts to
determine the choice of law rules that will govern the specific transaction or situation
involving him
follows the individual wherever he goes
Nationality/citizenship (used interchangeably)
Domicile
Theories determinative of citizenship
jus sanguinis
jus soli
Nationality
Art. 4 Sec 1, 1987 Constitution
2 kinds of Filipino citizens:
1 Natural born
2 Naturalized
1 judicial (here in the Philippines)
2 non-judicial
3 special
Merits of Nationality as Personal Law
laws were passed by legislators with a specific populace in mind citizens
easily verifiable
Demerits
cant solve problems relating to those with dual citizenships
doesnt apply to nations with a federal system of government
may not be a real connection if domiciled for long elsewhere
Domicile
a persons true fixed permnanet home and principal establishment
Art. 50 CC: for the exercise of civil rights and fulfillment of civil obligations, domicile of
natl persons is plae of habitual residence
Merits of Domicile as Personal Law
relationship of persona dn place of permanent home provides an adequate basis for the state
to impose duties on him
suitable for states that do not have a unitary system
Demerits
difficult to ascertain-may need courts to establish won there is intent animo manendi
notion of domicile may differ in various countries
over emphasis on domicile of origin may give rise to the same problem as nationality
In PH: we apply the nationality principle which is found in Article 15 of the Civil Code.
ADOPTION
3 kinds of adoption: agency adoption, relative adoption and independent adoption
Relative and Independent Adoptions
the child is adopted legally w/o going through matching and supervised trial custody
Advantage: biological parent participates in choosing the adopters
Disaadvantage: the fitness of the adopters may not have been established as stringently than
if they were screened by the DSWD
Issue#1: Citizenship of the adoptee
Jus sanguinis: if the child is voluntarily committed by the parents, then nationality is that of the
parents
If the child is a foundling/abandoned child, what then?
Foundling: child whose facts of birth are unknown
Abandoned child: a child whose parents have deserted him/her for a period of at least 3
continuous months
CASE OF GRACE POE LLAMANZARES:
Facts: foundling found on parish church of Jaro
Registered as Mary Grace Contreras Militar
At 5 years old was adopted by FPJ and Jesusa Sonora Poe
LOOK AT RAPPLER ARTICLE: FOUNDLINGS ARE NATIONAL BORN CITIZENS -
FAMILY LAW EXPERTS
A long standing presumption and principle of customary international law is that a foundling
takes the nationality of the place where she was found.
What is Maams opinion based on?
1 RA 8552 (1998): An Act Establishing the rules and policies on blah blah of FILIPINO
CHILDREN
Arts 336-348 CC (when Grace Poe was adopted) makes no specific mention of nationality
Legal Bases: PH law on adoption is applicable only to Filipino children - the Philippines cannot
have foreign children adopted. Since the status of a child is determined by personal law of the
child or that of her parents if known which will say whether a child is legally free to be adopted.
Philippine courts will have no jurisdiction over a foreigner - rin rem proceeding
1 Article 7. Convention on the rights of the Child
1 The child shall be registered immediately after a birth and shall have the right to
acquire a nationality
2 States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights in particular where
the child would otherwise be stateless
3 EVERY CHILD HAS THE RIGHT TO A NAME AND NATIONALITY FROM
BIRTH. Survival rights, which is one of the four categories of childrens rights
under the CRC
4 The right to a name/nationality is indispensable to a childs identity
2 UNDHR
1 Even if CRC came into force in 1980
2 Art 15: Right to nationality
3 UN Conventions on Statelessness
1 The 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons and the 1961
Convention on the rReduction of Statelessness are key legal instruments in the
 protection of stateless people around the world and in the prevention and
reduction of statelessness
The conventions attracted relatively few ratifications or accessions for decades
There have been 33 accessions since the campaign on UNDHR was launched
The state duty to prevent statelessness, a status that exposes the effected persons to profound
vulnerability, is a generally accepted principle of international law. THE UNDHR IS ONE OF
THE 3 HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES. Even if it is a declaration its considered as customary
international law. We acceded to it even if we didnt ratify.
Poe and other foundlings are deemed Filipino citizens from birth, and from Rule 131 of Roc,
burden of proof is on person alleging otherwise. Whoever claims that Poe and other foundlings
are non-Filipino must present evidence. Otherwise they enjoy the presumption of being Filipino,
a citizenship already enjoyed since birth. What procedure did Grace Poe/other foundlings
go through?
DAVID V POE LLAMANZARES
Petition for quo warranto filed with SET
Issue: WoN Poe is eligible to sit as Senator of the Republic
Sub issues:
1 Won she is natural-born
2 WoN under both conventional and customary international law a child born in the Phil in
1968 of unknown parents is a natural born Filipino
Decision:
FROM THE DELIBERATIONS ON CONCOM 1934: NEVER INTENTION OF
FRAMERS to exclude foundlings from natural-born citizenship status! Only reason there
was no specific reference to foundlings was that these cases are few and far between. Not
necessary to include a provision on the subject exhaustively.
Evident intent was to adopt the concept found in the Spanish Code wherein all children of
unknown parentage born in Spanish territory are considered Spaniards because the
presumption is that a child of unknown parentage is the son of a Spaniard.
Under Art. 14 of Hague Convention of 1930, foundling is presumed to have been born on the
territory of the State in which it was found -> part of general principles of International
Law even if not ratified
THIS IS EXCEPTION TO JUS SANGUINIS RULE IN CONSTI
Hence foundlings were by birth accorded natural-born citizenship. They are natural-born
citizens by legal fiction
Evident from Art. 1 (State determines who are its nationals) and Art. 2 (questions on
nationality to be determined by State)
David able to show Poe is foundling but not necessarily that her parents werent citizens.
THERE WERE NO INTERNATIONAL FLIGHTS TO ILOILO IN 1968! How realistic is it
that a foreigner left her in Iloilo??? Wouldve had to take international flight to Manila
and domestic flight to Iloilo and left her there
 PETITIONER FAILED TO DISCHARGE BURDEN OF PROOF
ISSUE 2: No automatic Acquisition by Adoptee of Adopters Citizenship
Therkelsen v Republic: Danish subject: JDRC denied petition for adoption. Danish law does not
confer citizenship to adoptee.
DOJ Opinion: Child ends up as dual citizen
ISSUE 3: Qualifications of Adopters
Any Filipino citizen of legal age and any alien
Waiver of residency and certification reqts for the following
IN RE PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHELLE LIM
Held: Petition denied
ADOPTION SHALL BE JOINT
SHALL IS MANDATORY
Fact that American husband consents doesnt suffice
Republic v. CA and Spouses Hughes
ISSUE 4: RESORT TO INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION RA 8043
Rule of subsidiarity -> only if Filipino child can be adopted there
Recognition of Foreign Judgments
An adoption decree granted outside the forum may be treated as a foreign judgment. This foreign
judgment may then be recognized and enforced in the foreign state involved.
FOREIGN DIVORCE:
Art. 15 CC and Art. 26(2) FC
Lex domicili - matrimonial domicile or domicile of one of spouses
Basis of exercise of divorce jurisdiction
Can a person file for divorce in another country? YES IF A PERSON HAS BEEN DOMICILED
IN THAT COUNTRY.
But what are the grounds for divorce? LEX FORI CONTROLS THE GROUNDS
No provision of laq reuiring PH courts to recognize a foreign divorce decree between non-
Filipinos. Only principle of comity
International comity: recognition of legislative, executive, judicial acts of another nation having
due regard to international duty and convenience
TENCHAVEZ V ESCANO
CC does not permit divorce and cannot be circumvented by obtaining divorce decree from
foreign country. FOREIGN DIVORCE BETWEEN FIL CITIZENS NOT RECOGNIZED IN
THIS COUNTRY.
However we partially recognize divorce in case of marriage bet. Fil citizen and foreigner
to remedy the uneven status of Fils whose alien spouses divorce them
Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera:
FOREIGN DIVORCED SPOUSE DOESNT HAVE LEGAL STANDING TO COMMENCE
ADULTERY CASE AGAINST OLD SPOUSE
Reckoning pt is nationality at time of divorce
Catalan v Catalan
JUDICIAL RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN DIVORCE
Corpuz of Sto Tomas
ALIEN CANT INVOKE ART. 26 FC
HE FORGOT TO SUBMIT CANADIAN LAW
ISSUE#1: VAW where the Filipino spouse is a victim of domestic violence
VAW as basis for foreign divorce. must the filipina wait for the abusive alien spouse to file for
divorce
can fil woman obtain a divorce decree abroad?
ISSUE#2: Limitations of citizenship as PL
divorce intiated by BOTH spouses (administrative divorce)
Japans kyogi rikon (divorce by mutual agreement)
Will it be recognized under Art. 26?
The process is administrative and requires no court intervention. Possibility for fraud and
forgery our recognition rules require that the judgment must have been issued by a competent
judicial court or quasi-judicial agency
Similar problem: divorce by Talaq
A v. L: I DIVORCE U 3 TIMES OVER THE PHONE
-> husband says not necessary to file divorce sinc ehe already divorced her
but talaq is not a divorce by means of proceeding -> COURT DENIED PETITION
But since egyptian court was involved, it will be considered such then requires that the wife be
notified by Egyptian court
HvS
Wife born in Bahrain
Husband worked in Saudi Arabia and pronounced Talaq. Talaq recognized and confirmed before
Sharia court
Court considered English concept of marriage, Islamic concept of marriage, and Lebanese and
Pakistan laws
HELD: Husbands pronouncement of talaq entitled to recognition in UK
WILL TALAQ BE RECOGNIZED IN PHILIPPINES????? LOL WHAT WAS DA QUESTION
POSSIBLE SOLUTION IS TO USE DOMICILE AS PERSONAL LAW
We adhere to the principles under the Convention of the Rights of the Children that every child
has the right to be born, to have a name and nationality, to have a family who will love and care
for the child. Further, it is a declared policy under the Hague Convention of 1930 that a child
whose parents are both unknown shall have the nationality of the country of birth. Therefore, a
foundling is presumed to have been born in the territory of the State in which he or she was
found, unless proven otherwise.

From 1950 to 2014, the number of foundlings registered with Philippines Statistics Authority had
a total of 4,482. We cannot deprive these foundlings of their civil and political rights. It is a basic
policy set forth in the Convention of the Rights of the Children that the rights of the child shall
be respected without discrimination of any kind, irrespective of the child's or his or her parent's
or legal guardian's race, color, sex, language, religion, political opinion, national, ethnic or social
origin, property, disability, birth or other status. The State shall take all appropriate measures to
ensure that the child is protected against all forms of discrimination or punishment on the basis
of the status, activities, expressed opinions, or beliefs of the child's parents, legal guardians, or
family members.

It was never the intention of the framers of the 1935 Constitution to discriminate against
foundlings by depriving them of their status as natural born citizens. As correctly pointed out by
the majority, there was a recognition that children or people born in a country of unknown
parents are citizens of this nation and the only reason that there was no specific reference to
foundlings in the 1935 Constitution was that foundlings are few and far in between so that it is
not necessary to include a provision on the subject exclusively.

The excerpts of the deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional Convention on citizenship revealed
the following:

SR RAFOLS:

The amendment should read thus: "Natural or illegitimate of a foreign father and a Filipino
mother recognized by one, or the children of unknown parentage"

SR BRIONES:

The amendment [should] mean children born in the Philippines of unknown parentage.

xxx xxx

SR ROXAS:

Mr. President, my humble opinion is that these cases are few and far in between, that the
Constitution need [not] refer to them. By international law the principle that children or
people born in a country of unknown parents are citizens in this nation is recognized, and it
is not necessary to include a provision on the subject exhaustively.

(Emphasis supplied)

Suffice it to say, international law which emanates from the general principles of law denounces
discrimination. These general principles of law include principles of equity, fairness and justice
which are anchored on the test of what is reasonable.

It is also embodied in the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights that no
distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the
country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-
governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty. Furthermore, it is also recognized that no
one shall be arbitrarily deprived of one's nationality nor denied the right to change one's
nationality.

In Chief Justice Warren's dissent in the case of Perez vs. Brownell, "Citizenship is man's basic
right for it is nothing less than the right to have rights. Remove this priceless possession and
there remains a stateless person, disgraced and degraded in the eyes of his countrymen."
Foundlings are among the most vulnerable to statelessness and discrimination. Social justice
dictates that the State should be the first to recognize and ensure that foundlings are able to enjoy
each and every right accorded to them.

Therefore, there lies a presumption that for those who have less in life, we should afford them the
most basic right. Logic dictates that foundlings are not naturalized nor stateless but natural born
citizens of the Philippines. But this does not preclude the petitioner from presenting evidence
that the respondent's parents are not Filipinos, and this ruling should not prejudice that
possibility. With the respondent currently unable to submit the results of the DNA tests to prove
that she is indeed a natural born citizen, the presumption of regularity and the presump6on of the
utmost best for those who have least in life should be upheld and maintained.

For all the foregoing reasons, I concur with the majority view, without prejudice to the
submission of the results of the DNA tests by respondent Mary Grace Poe Llamanzares at a later
time. Thus, I register my vote to dismiss the petition for quo warranto proceedings.

To the surprise of many, but not to me and others who know Solicitor General Florin Hilbays
constitutional approach, the comment submitted by the latter signed with 10 other solicitors sided
with the majority decision of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. Without doubt, the comment is both
brilliant and courageous.
From the first paragraph of the comment, it is clear that Hilbay and his colleagues understood rightly
what this SET case is all about: This case involves an inquiry into the status of foundlings under
Philippine law and the right of such class of vulnerable persons against undue burdens that restrict
their membership in society, opportunities for political participation, and recognition as full citizens of
the republic.
I could not have said this better. This is the only legal and ethical way to frame the issues on the Poe
disqualification cases. In this case of her natural born citizenship, it is the rights of foundlings at
stake; in the residency case filed with the Comelec, it is the rights of global FilipinosOFWs,
migrants and dual citizens that are at stake. Indeed, I have been saying the same thing for months,
that this case is not just about Grace Poe but it is the rights of the tens or maybe hundreds of
thousands of Filipino foundlings and the millions of global Filipinos at stake. The Supreme Court will
be ruling not just on Grace Poes rights but on the rights of these other citizens. This is the only fair
way to deal with these cases. If Poe loses, the precedent will be used by unscrupulous people to file
cases against other foundlings and global Filipinos. It will not just be for political reasons, but for
employment, property and other causes as well.
On the SET case, the comment tackles four issues, namely: a) whether Poe is a natural-born citizen;
b) whether she validly reacquired her former status as natural-born; c) whether she has validly
renounced her foreign citizenship; and d) whether her use of US passport did not amount to a
recantation of her renunciation of US citizenship.
On the first issue, Hilbay and colleagues argue persuasively that the deliberations in the 1934
Constitutional Convention conclusively indicate that it was the intent of the framers to confer Filipino
citizenship to foundlings. The textual silence in the 1935 Constitution on the citizenship of foundlings
does not suggest an exclusionary policy but rather a benevolent, if practical, policy of inclusion. The
silence was more of an effort at linguistic efficiency and avoidance of redundancy.
The most convincing argument of the solicitor general and his team of lawyers is their assertion that
the evidence shows that Poe is a natural-born Filipino. I totally agree with this. From the beginning, I
have believed that there is no need to apply evidentiary presumptions to show Poe was a natural-
born citizen. Yes, its true that Poe cannot present a birth certificate to prove her filiation. But the
circumstances of how she was found, including her physical features and that she was found
abandoned in a parish church of Jaro, Iloilo, the population of which then as now was predominantly
Filipino; all of these are undisputed facts that prove her parents were Filipinos.
Foundlings are ordinarily abandoned due to poverty. It defies reason, according to Hilbay and
colleagues, citing Senator Legardas line of reasoning, for a poor foreigner to travel thousands of
miles from her place of origin, come to the country, give birth and leave her child in a parish church
in Iloilo. These are facts that a reasonable mind can accept as sufficient and credible to reach the
conclusion that Poe was sired by Filipino parents. They add: to adopt certainty as an evidentiary
standard, that is, accepting only a birth certificate to prove Filipino parentage as the acceptable
proof, for proving Poes natural-born status is discriminatory to foundlings. This imposes an undue
burden to this class of individuals to prove they are qualified to exercise certain fundamental political
rights.
Second, as to whether Senator Poe reacquired her Filipino citizenship, the comment observes that
the preponderance of evidence favors Poe. First, she executed an Oath of Allegiance in 2006; then,
she filed with the Bureau of Immigration a petition for reacquisition of Filipino citizenship which was
granted by the said office in 2006. Under Section 3 of RA 9225, natural-born citizens who have lost
their status due to naturalization shall be deemed to have reacquired their former citizenship status
upon taking the required oath of allegiance to the republic.
Third, Hilbay and colleagues pointed out that Poe validly renounced her American citizenship when
she validly executed a sworn affidavit of renunciation of her American citizenship which she did
before assuming her post as chairperson of MTRCB; when in 2010, she furnished the BI of her copy
of the affidavit of renunciation; and in 2011 when she executed before the vice consul of the US
Embassy in Manila an oath/affirmation of renunciation of her American citizenship.
Finally, the comment acknowledged that although use of a foreign passport may ordinarily be
considered as a repudiation of renunciation of foreign citizenship, this does not apply to Poe as it
has been conclusively proven that the last time she used her US passport was in 2009months
before she executed the renunciation of her foreign citizenship.
Overall, this is truly excellent work by the solicitor general and his colleagues, upholding that Poe is
a natural-born citizen and that foundlings are natural-born citizens not because of international law
but because our Constitution says they are, and not just by presumptions but by the evidence. The
scholarship is rigorous and the compassion and sense of justice is palpable as you read through the
arguments. Tongue in cheek, the comment even makes an allusion, and definitely a justifiable one,
to the Harry Potter books:
One must therefore be similarly mindful of the almost-comical scale with which we are scrutinizing
the purity of private respondents blood, as if purity of blood were a standard for capacity to govern
as if our nation belonged to House Slytherin; and this scrutiny assumes an ironic twist when
considered against the backdrop of our aggressive attempts to justify the Filipino citizenship of
others just so we may, as a nation, improve our athletic or cultural profile.
This paragraph stands out and exposes Florin Hilbay (I am proud to claim him as a UP Law faculty
colleague, fellow Yale Law School alumnus, and former student when he was in his first year in law
school) for the genius that he is. But more than the brilliance, I must also praise Hilbay and his
colleagues (some of whom I also happily and proudly note were my former students from the
University of the Philippines College of Law and Ateneo School of Law) for the courage they
mustered in filing this comment. This is a career-risky move but that did not deter them from doing
the right thing. We are so lucky that we have them as the tribune of the people.
ALFAIS T. MUNDER, G.R. No. 194076
Petitioner,

- versus -

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
AND ATTY. TAGO R. SARIP,
Respondents.
x--------------------------x
ATTY. TAGO R. SARIP, G.R. No. 194160
Petitioner,
Present:

CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
- versus - LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
ALFAIS T. MUNDER, VILLARAMA, JR.,
OLOMODIN M. MACABALANG, PEREZ,
JAMAL M. MANUA AND MENDOZA,
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, SERENO,
Respondents. REYES, and
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.

Promulgated:

October 19, 2011

x------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
SERENO, J.:

Jurisprudence has clearly established the doctrine that a petition for

disqualification and a petition to deny due course to or to cancel a certificate of
candidacy, are two distinct remedies to prevent a candidate from entering an
electoral race. Both remedies prescribe distinct periods to file the corresponding
petition, on which the jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) over
the case is dependent. The present case, assailing a resolution of the Comelec En
Banc, is not an exception. It must follow the rule set by law and jurisprudential
doctrine.

The consolidated cases before us stem from a controversy resolved by the

Comelec En Banc in SPA No. 10-086(DC) in its Resolution *promulgated on 04
October 2010.1The Comelec En Banc reversed the
earlier Resolution2 of the Comelec Second Division and disqualified
petitioner Alfais T. Munder (Munder) from holding office as Mayor of
Bubong, Lanao del Sur.

The Antecedents

In the last national election, which included the election of local elective officials,

**Penned by Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento; with the concurrence of Chairman

Jose A. R. Melo, Commissioners Lucenito N. Tagle, Armando C. Velasco, Gregorio Y.
Larrazabal; and the dissent of Nicodemo T. Ferrer, Elias R. Yusoph.

1 Rollo (G.R. No. 194076) pp 48-54; Rollo (G.R. No. 194160) pp 32-38.

2 Rendered per curiam by the Second Division composed of Presiding Commissioner

Nicodemo T. Ferrer, and Commissioners Lucenito N. Tagle (on leave) and Elias R.
Yusoph.
petitioner Munder ran as mayor of Bubong, Lanao del Sur, and filed his certificate
of candidacy (CoC) on 26 November 2009. The last day for filing the certificate of
candidacy was on 30 November 2009.3 Under Sec. 4(A)(1) of Comelec Resolution
8696, a petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy must be
filed within five days from the last day of the filing of the certificate of candidacy
but not later than twenty-five days from the filing thereof. 4 Respondent Atty. Tago
Sarip (Sarip) likewise filed a certificate of candidacy and vied for the same
position in the same municipality.

On 13 April 2010, Sarip filed a Petition for Disqualification 5with the

Comelec on the ground that Munder was not a registered voter of Bubong, Lanao
del Sur, and that the latters application for candidacy was not accomplished in full.

Sarip corroborated his allegation that Munder was not a registered voter by
presenting a Certification from Amerah M. Hadji Sarip Election Officer of
Bubong, Lanao del Sur that, in the election list, there was no Alfais T. Munder born
on 7 May 1987.6He also presented a copy of a Voter Certification of one Munder,
Alfais Tocalo, residing at Rogero, Bubong, Lanao del Sur, whose date of birth was
05/07/1984, and who was registered as a voter on 7/26/2003. The said person was

3 Comelec Resolution No. 8678, Guidelines on the Filing of Certificates of Candidacy

and Nomination of Official Candidates of Registered Political Parties in Connection
with the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections, promulgated on 06 October
2009.

4 See also Section 78, Omnibus Election Code.

5 Rollo (G.R. No. 194076), pp 57-65; Rollo (G.R. No. 194169), pp 57-65.

6 Id. at 69; 53.

18 years old at that time.7 On the other hand, petitioner Munders CoC for Mayor
contained the name of a candidate as Munder, Alfais Tocalo, 22 years old, with
residence at Barangay Montia-an, Bubong, Lanao del Sur, and whose date of birth
was 05-07-1987.8

Capitalizing on the seeming inconsistencies, Sarip argued that the candidate

Munder was different from the registered voter Munder, since they had different
birth years. Consequently, according to Sarip, Munder did not possess the
qualification to run as elective official and should be disqualified. Sarip also
maintained that Munder had committed dishonesty and falsity in stating that the
latter was a registered voter of Bubong, Lanao del Sur. Sarip filed his Petition for
Disqualification pursuant to Resolution No. 8696, Section 4 (B) 1 and argued that
he had timely filed the petition. Munder, on the other hand, countered that he was a
registered voter of Precinct No. 0033, Barangay Rogero, Municipality of Bubong,
Lanao del Sur.9

In the 10 May 2010 elections, Munder won overwhelmingly. Garnering 4,793

votes, he had more than twice the number obtained by Sarip, who came in second
with 2,356 votes. The Municipal Board of Canvassers of Bubong, Lanao del Sur,
thus proclaimed Munder as mayor on 15 May 2010. He filed his answer on 22 May
2010.

In his Answer with Affirmative Defenses, 10Munder denied committing any

misrepresentation in his CoC. He also argued that false representations, dishonesty

7 Id. at 70; 54.

8 Id. at 207; 52.

9 Rollo (G.R. No. 194076), pp 75-77.

and mockery of justice were not grounds for disqualification of a candidate under
Comelec Resolution No. 8696. In effect, he argued that Sarip had availed himself
of the wrong remedy and that the latters petition should be treated as a Petition to
Deny Due Course to or to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy. At the time Sarip filed
his petition, the said period had already lapsed. Munder thus prayed for the
dismissal of the formers petition against him.

On 29 June 2010, the Comelec Second Division sustained Munders arguments and
dismissed Sarips Petition. It agreed with Munder that the grounds invoked by Sarip
were not proper for a petition for disqualification, and that the latters petition was
actually seeking the purging of Munders CoC. It partly held:

...[I]t appears that the nucleus of petitioners cause of action to sustain his
petition are the misrepresentations (respondent not being a registered voter of
Municipality of Bubong, Lanao del Sur and the respondent was still a minor
when he registered as a voter of the said municipality) allegedly perpetrated by
the respondent, and the failure of the respondent to accomplish the formalities of
his COC (the respondents failure to indicate his precinct and to affix his
thumbprint therein). We view all these disputations raised by the petitioner
inappropriate for the petition for disqualification. These are not grounds for the
petition for disqualification contemplated by the rules. In quintessence (sic) of
the action taken the petitioner is actually seeking the denial or cancellation of
the respondents COC invoking false material representation of the respondents
qualification(s). However, the filing of a petition under this remedy has a
prescriptive period which must be strictly followed. Under the rules, a verified
petition to deny due course or to cancel certificate of candidacy may be filed by
any person within five (5) days from the last day for the filing of certificate of
candidacy but not later than twenty-five (25) days from the filing of certificate
of candidacy under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. Pursuant to the
above rule, the petitioner has twenty-five (25) days after the filing the
assailed COC or until December 21, 2009 to file the petition. Since the
instant petition was filed only on March 13, 2010 or one hundred-seven (107)
days beyond the reglementary period to file a petition to deny due course or to
cancel the respondents COC, the petitioner miserably failed to file his petition
A petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy filed
within the prescribed period.
beyond the required period is filed out of time and may be not entertained. An attempt to circumvent the rules on

10Id. at 75-82.
 prescription of period to file a petition to deny due course or to cancel COC in disguise of a petition for qualification will

not be countenanced in this jurisdiction.

Anent the contention of the petitioner vis-a-vis the failure of the respondent to comply with the formalities of

the COC, the law governing the contents of the COC is Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code. The alleged defect on

the COC of the respondent, which is, failure to indicate therein his precinct and his failure to affix his thumbprint are not

among those mandatory requirements enumerated under the aforementioned law. Hence, those assailed flaw in the

formalities of the respondents COC does not warrant the invalidation of the same. At most, it can only be considered as a

minor inadvertence on the part of the respondent which does not necessarily nullify his COC. It has been held that when

the law does not provide otherwise, a departure from the requirements of law which has been due to honest mistake or

misinterpretation of the law on the part of him who is obligated to observe it and such departure has not been used as a

means for fraudulent practices, will he held directory and such departure will be considered a harmless irregularity.
11

(Emphases supplied)

The outcome was, however, different when the Comelec En Banc, upon Sarips
Motion for Reconsideration,12reversed the ruling of the Second Division and
disqualified Munder in its 4 October 2010 Resolution. The Comelec ruled directly
on the substantive merit of the case, and not on the propriety of the remedy taken
by Sarip. It thus ruled on the question of the continuing possession by Munder of
one of the qualifications of the office of the Mayor being a registered voter of the
municipality where he runs as a candidate.

The Comelec En Banc decided the case on a single issue whether the person
described in the CoC and in the Certificate of Live Birth referred to the same
person in the Voters Certification, petitioner Alfais Tocalo Munder. The Comelec
En Banc ruled on this factual issue, stating that the said persons were not one and
the same, as they had different birth years. The Comelec held thus:

...It is difficult to reconcile that the ALFAIS TOCALO MUNDER who filed his
11Id. at 44-46.

12Id. at 114-122.
 COC, showing his intent to run as municipal mayor of Bubong, Lanao del Sur is
one and the same person as that of ALFAIS TOCALO MUNDER who
registered as voter of Barangay Rogero, Bubong, Lanao del Sur when records
show that the ALFAIS TOCALO MUNDER who filed his COC indicated his
date of birth as MAY 7, 1987 (as supported by the Certificate of Live Birth
issued by the NSO) while the ALFAIS TOCALO MUNDER who registered as
voter of Barangay Rogero, Bubong, Lanao del Sur indicated his date of birth as
MAY 7, 1984. No person can be born twice.13

The Comelec also disregarded the fact that Munder had already been proclaimed as
mayor of Bubong, Lanao del Sur. Consequently, it ruled against him and proceeded
to declare him disqualified to hold the office of the mayor, for which he had been
elected. The Comelec En Banc held:

The Supreme Court has time and again ruled that qualifications for an elective
office are continuing requirements and once any of them is lost, title to the office
is forfeited. Munder lacking the requisite qualification of being a registered
voter, should be removed from office.14

It ordered Munder to vacate the Office of the Mayor, and the elected vice-mayor to
assume the position of mayor. It further directed the Department of Interior and
Local Government and the Philippine National Police (PNP) to implement the
Resolution against Munder. From this Resolution originated the two petitions filed
by the two rivals for the mayoral position.

At the instance of Munder, we issued on 18 January 2011, a Temporary Restraining

Order against the Comelec, DILG and PNP from implementing the 4 October 2010
Resolution of the Comelec removing Munder from the office. 15 The impending

13 Id at 51.

14 Id at 52-53.

15Id. at 215-219.
execution of the Comelecs Resolution created divisiveness and disorder in the
municipality of Bubong such that even the military attested that they were on red
alert due to the volatile political situation in the area brought about by the possible
ouster of Munder. The Vice Mayor also prematurely assumed the office of the
mayor and allegedly withdrew the Internal Revenue Allocation without a
resolution from the Sangguniang Bayan. This aggravated the tension that had
already been created by the election dispute between the petitioners of these
consolidated petitions. The Court, thus, deemed a TRO justified to prevent disorder
and bloodshed in Bubong.

In his petition, Munder argues that the Comelec acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction in taking cognizance of Sarips petition which was filed beyond the
reglementary period provided by law. Munder claims that Sarip should have
instead filed a petition for quo warranto after the formers proclamation as the
winning candidate. Munder likewise asserts that the Comelec committed grave
abuse of discretion in effectively ruling upon his right to vote, when it attacked his
status as a registered voter, in order to disqualify him from the mayoralty office.

Sarip, on the other hand, argues that the Comelec En Banc also acted with
grave abuse of discretion in not declaring him entitled to assume the office of the
municipal mayor of Bubong, Lanao del Sur after the disqualification of respondent
Munder.

Public respondent Comelec, through the Office of the Solicitor General,

chose to file its Comment only with respect to G.R. No. 194160, Sarips Petition. It
reiterated the legal doctrine that the second placer cannot be declared a winner in
case the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is disqualified. The
OSG opposed Sarips prayer that he, instead of the Vice-Mayor, be installed as
Mayor of Bubong, Lanao del Sur.

The Issues

1 May a petition filed as a Petition for Disqualification properly

invoke, as a ground, that the candidate sought to be disqualified was
not a registered voter and thus not be barred by the earlier
prescriptive period applicable to Petition to Deny Due Course to or
to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy?

1 Did the Comelec commit grave abuse of discretion in concluding that

the Alfais Munder in the voters list is not the same as Alfais Munder
the candidate?

2 Does Sarip have the right to be installed as Mayor of Bubong, Lanao

del Sur for having placed second in the electoral contest therefor?

The Courts Ruling

The Comelec has the constitutional mandate to enforce and administer all
laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election. 16 It has the power to
create its own rules and regulations, a power it exercised on 11 November 2009 in
promulgating Resolution No. 8696, or the Rules on Disqualification of Cases filed
in Connection with the May 10, 2010 Automated National and Local Elections.
Section 4 thereof provides for the procedure to be followed in filing the following
petitions: 1) Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy; 2)
Petition to Declare a Nuisance Candidate, and 3) petition to disqualify a candidate
pursuant to Section 68 of the Election Code and petition to disqualify for lack of
qualifications or for possessing some grounds for disqualification.

16 1987 Constitution, Art. IX, Sec. 2(1).

Resolution No. 8696 provides for the venue for the filing of the petitions and the
period within which they should be filed. The validity of the said Resolution has
been recognized by this Court in the fairly recent case of Amora v. Comelec.17

Munder alleges that Sarips petition with the Comelec should be considered as one
to deny due course to or to cancel a CoC, and not for disqualification. One of the
important differences between the two petitions is their prescriptive periods. For a
Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy, the period to
file is within five days from the last day of the filing of the certificate of candidacy,
but not later than 25 days from the filing thereof. On the other hand, a petition to
disqualify a candidate may be filed at any day after the last day of filing of the
certificate of candidacy, but not later than the date of proclamation.

It has been argued by Munder, who was earlier sustained by the Comelec
Second Division, that the petition for disqualification should be treated as a
petition to deny due course to or to cancel a certificate of candidacy, which had
already prescribed.

We agree with Munder as to the nature of the petition filed by Sarip. The
main ground of the said petition is that Munder committed dishonesty in declaring
that he was a registered voter of Barangay Rogero, Bubong, Lanao del Sur, when
in fact he was not. This ground is appropriate for a Petition to Deny Due Course or
to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy.

Amora v. Comelec is applicable to the present controversy. In that case,

similar to the present one, a mayoralty candidate was disqualified by the Comelec
pursuant to a Petition for Disqualification. The petition was filed by one of the

17G.R. No. 192280. January 25, 2011, 640 SCRA 473.

candidates for councilor in the same municipality, on the ground that the CoC had
not been properly sworn to. Amora won in the election, but was disqualified by the
Comelec after he was proclaimed as mayor of Candijay, Bohol. One of the issues
clarified in the said case was the distinction between a Petition for Disqualification
and a Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy. The
Court, in effect, held that the Comelec should have dismissed the petition outright,
since it was premised on a wrong ground. A Petition for Disqualification has
specific grounds different from those of a Petition to Deny Due Course to or to
Cancel Certificate of Candidacy. The latter is anchored on the false representation
by a candidate as to material information in the CoC.18

For a petition for disqualification, the law expressly enumerates the grounds in
Section 68 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 as amended, and which was replicated in
Section 4(b) of Comelec Resolution No. 8696. The grounds stated by respondent in
his Petition for Disqualification that Munder was not qualified to run for not being
a registered voter therein was not included in the enumeration of the grounds for
disqualification. The grounds in Section 68 may be categorized into two. First,
those comprising prohibited acts of candidates; and second, the fact of their
permanent residency in another country when that fact affects the residency
requirement of a candidate according to the law.

In the earlier case of Fermin v. Comelec19, the Court clarified the two
remedies that may be availed of by a candidate to prevent another from running in
an electoral race. The Court held:

18See Id. at 482-483.

19 G.R. No. 179695, 18 December 2008, 574 SCRA 782.

 The ground raised in the Dilangalen petition is that Fermin allegedly lacked one
of the qualifications to be elected as mayor of Northern Kabuntalan, i.e., he had
not established residence in the said locality for at least one year immediately
preceding the election. Failure to meet the one-year residency requirement for the
public office is not a ground for the disqualification of a candidate under Section
68. The provision only refers to the commission of prohibited acts and the
possession of a permanent resident status in a foreign country as grounds for
disqualification.
...
To emphasize, a petition for disqualification, on the one hand, can be premised on
Section 12 or 68 of the [Omnibus Election Code], or Section 40 of the [Local
Government Code]. On the other hand, a petition to deny due course to or cancel
a CoC can only be grounded on a statement of a material representation in the
said certificate that is false. The petitions also have different effects. While a
person who is disqualified under Section 68 is merely prohibited to continue as a
candidate, the person whose certificate is cancelled or denied due course under
Section 78 is not treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a CoC.20

In Fermin, the Court has debunked the interpretation that a petition for
disqualification covers the absence of the substantive qualifications of a candidate
(with the exception of the existence of the fact of the candidate's permanent
residency abroad). It has, in effect, even struck down a Comelec Resolution
Resolution No. 7800, which enumerated the grounds for a petition for
disqualification to include the non-registration of a candidate as voter in the
locality where he or she is running as a candidate. In ruling as such, Resolution No.
7800 which was considered as infringement of the powers of the legislature, the
Court reiterated an earlier ruling:

A COMELEC rule or resolution cannot supplant or vary the legislative

enactments that distinguish the grounds for disqualification from those of
ineligibility, and the appropriate proceedings to raise the said grounds. In other
words, Rule 25 and COMELEC Resolution No. 7800 cannot supersede the
dissimilar requirements of the law for the filing of a petition for disqualification
under Section 68, and a petition for the denial of due course to or cancellation of
CoC under Section 78 of the OEC.21

20Id. at 794-796.
Responding to the above ruling, the Comelecs subsequent Resolution on the same
matter deleted the enumerated grounds, interpreted by the Court as improper for a
petition for disqualification, found in Comelec Resolution 7800.22

It is thus clear that the ground invoked by Sarip in his Petition for Disqualification
against Munder the latters alleged status as unregistered voter in the municipality
was inappropriate for the said petition. The said ground should have been raised
in a petition to cancel Munders CoC. Since the two remedies vary in nature, they
also vary in their prescriptive period. A petition to cancel a CoC gives a registered
candidate the chance to question the qualification of a rival candidate for a shorter
period: within 5 days from the last day of their filing of CoCs, but not later than 25
days from the filing of the CoC sought to be cancelled. 23 A petition for
disqualification may be filed any day after the last day of the filing of CoC but not
later than the date of the proclamation.24

The Comelec Second Division stated that the last day of filing of the CoCs was on
21 December 2009. Thus, the period to file a Petition to Deny Due Course or to
Cancel Certificate of Candidacy had already prescribed when Sarip filed his
petition against Munder.

It was therefore grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Comelec En

21Id. at 798, citing Loong v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 93986, 22 December
1992, 216 SCRA 760, 767, cited by Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. (ret.) in his
Dissenting Opinion in Aquino v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 120265, 18
September 1995, 248 SCRA 400, 445-447.

22 See Comelec Resolution No. 8696.

23OEC, Sec. 69.

24Comelec Resolution No. 8696, Section 4(B).

Banc to gloss over the issue of whether the petition was one for disqualification or
for the cancellation of CoC. The nature of the petition will determine whether the
action has prescribed, and whether the Commission can take cognizance of the
petition. In directly tackling the factual issues without determining whether it can
properly take cognizance of the petition, the Comelec En Banc committed grave
abuse of discretion.

Assuming arguendo that the Comelec En Banc could answer the factual
issue of Munders non-registration as a voter in Bubong by considering it as a
ground for the disqualification of his candidacy, we find that the Comelec
committed grave abuse of discretion in concluding that Munder the voter was not
Munder the mayoralty candidate. We observe that the Comelec En Banc relied on
the Voter's Certification indicating one Alfaiz Tocalo Munder registering for the
first time in 2003, with 7 May 1984 as birth date, and stating therein that he was 18
years old at the time of the registration. We find this evidence insufficient to
impeach the fact that he
was a registered voter of Bubong, Lanao del Sur. In the first place, the registration
was in 2003, while the election was in 2010. The said evidence would not negate
the fact that in 2010, he had already attained eligibility to run for mayor. In such a
small municipality like Bubong, the likelihood of not being able to know whether
one has a namesake, especially when one is running for a public office, is very
slim. Sarip should have proved that another Alfais Tocalo Munder is in existence,
and that the latter is the registered voter and not herein petitioner. In such a case,
Sarip's remedy is not a Petition for Disqualification, but a Petition to Deny Due
Course or to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy which must comply with the
prescriptive period. Otherwise, his remedy, after Munder has been proclaimed is to
file a quo warranto action with the Regional Trial Court to prove that Munder
lacks the eligibility required by law.

It may be true that in 2003, Munder, who was still a minor, registered
himself as a voter and misrepresented that he was already of legal age. Even if it
was deliberate, we cannot review his past political acts in this petition. Neither can
the Comelec review those acts in an inappropriate remedy. In so doing, it
committed grave abuse of discretion, and the act resulting therefrom must be
nullified.

With this conclusion, Sarip's petition has become moot. There is no longer
any issue of whether to apply the rule on succession to an elective office, since
Munder is necessarily established in the position for which the people have elected
him.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, G.R. No. 194076 is hereby

GRANTED. The Comelec En Banc Resolution dated 4 October 2010 which
granted the petition to disqualify Alfais Tocalo Munder as Mayor of Bubong,
Lanao del Sur is hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. The Comelec Second
Division Resolution dated 29 June 2010 dismissing the petition for disqualification
filed by Atty. Tago R. Sarip against Alfais Tocalo Munder is REINSTATED. G.R.
No. 194160 is hereby DISMISSED. For having been rendered moot by this
Decision, the Temporary Restraining Order we issued on 18 January 2011 in favor
of Alfais Tocalo Munder is hereby made permanent.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA BIENVENIDO L. REYES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
 C E R T I F I C AT I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

EN BANC
 PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS G.R. No. 190529
BROTHERHOOD, INC.
(PGBI), represented by its
Secretary-General
GEORGE FGBF GEORGE Present:
DULDULAO,

Petitioner,
PUNO, C.J.,

CARPIO,

CORONA,

CARPIO MORALES,

VELASCO, JR.,

NACHURA,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
- versus -
BRION,

PERALTA,

BERSAMIN,

DEL CASTILLO,

ABAD,

VILLARAMA, JR.,

PEREZ, and
COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, MENDOZA, JJ.
Respondent.

Promulgated:

April 29, 2010

x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------x

RESOLUTION

BRION, J.:

The Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI) seeks in

this petition for certiorari25 and in the motion for reconsideration it
subsequently filed to nullify Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
Resolution No. 8679 dated October 13, 2009 insofar as it relates

25 Filed under Rule 65 of the RULES OF COURT.

to PGBI, and the Resolution dated December 9, 2009 denying
PGBIs motion for reconsideration in SPP No. 09-004 (MP). Via
these resolutions, the COMELEC delisted PGBI from the roster of
registered national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or
coalitions under the party-list system.

BACKGROUND

Section 6(8) of Republic Act No. 7941 (RA 7941), otherwise

known as the Party-List System Act, provides:

Section 6. Removal and/or Cancellation of Registration. The

COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any
interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the
registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or
coalition on any of the following grounds:

xxxx

(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections

or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under
the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the
constituency in which it has registered.[Emphasis supplied.]
The COMELEC replicated this provision in COMELEC Resolution No.
2847 the Rules and Regulations Governing the Election of the
Party-List Representatives through the Party-List System which it
promulgated on June 25, 1996.

For the upcoming May 2010 elections, the COMELEC en banc

issued on October 13, 2009 Resolution No. 8679 deleting several
party-list groups or organizations from the list of registered
national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions.
Among the party-list organizations affected was PGBI; it
was delisted because it failed to get 2% of the votes cast
in 2004 and it did not participate in the 2007 elections.
Nevertheless, the COMELEC stated in this Resolution that any
national, regional sectoral party or organizations or coalitions
adversely affected can personally or through its authorized
representative file a verified opposition on October 26, 2009.

PGBI filed its Opposition to Resolution No. 8679, but likewise

sought, through its pleading, the admission ad cautelam of its
petition for accreditation as a party-list organization under the
Party-List System Act. Among other arguments, PGBI asserted
that:
 (1) The assailed resolution negates the right of movant and those
similarly situated to invoke Section 4 of R.A. No. 7941, which
allows any party, organization and coalition already registered
with the Commission to no longer register anew; the party
though is required to file with the Commission, not later than
ninety (90) days before the election, a manifestation of its desire
to participate in the party-list system; since PGBI filed a
Request/Manifestation seeking a deferment of its participation in
the 2007 elections within the required period prior to the 2007
elections, it has the option to choose whether or not to
participate in the next succeeding election under the same
conditions as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed;

(2) The Supreme Courts ruling in G.R. No. 177548 Philippine

Mines Safety Environment Association, also known as MINERO v.
Commission on Elections cannot apply in the instant controversy
for two reasons: (a) the factual milieu of the cited case is
removed from PGBIs; (b) MINERO, prior to delisting, was afforded
the opportunity to be heard, while PGBI and the 25 others
similarly affected by Resolution No. 8679 were not. Additionally,
the requirement of Section 6(8) has been relaxed by the Courts
ruling in G.R. No. 179271 (Banat v. COMELEC) and the exclusion
of PGBI and the 25 other party-list is a denial of the equal
protection of the laws;

(3) The implementation of the challenged resolution should be

suspended and/or aborted to prevent a miscarriage of justice in
view of the failure to notify the parties in accordance with the
same Section 6(8) or R.A. No. 7941.26

The COMELEC denied PGBIs motion/opposition for lack of

merit.

26 Rollo, pp. 42-48.

 First, the COMELEC observed that PGBI clearly
misunderstood the import of Section 4 of R.A. 7941. 27 The
provision simply means that without the required manifestation or
if a party or organization does not participate, the exemption from
registration does not arise and the party, organization or coalition
must go through the process again and apply for requalification; a
request for deferment would not exempt PGBI from registering
anew.

Second, the MINERO ruling is squarely in point, as MINERO

failed to get 2% of the votes in 2001 and did not participate at all
in the 2004 elections.

Third, PGBI was given an opportunity to be heard or to seek

the reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of the
essence of due process; this is clear from Resolution No. 8679
which expressly gave the adversely affected parties the
opportunity to file their opposition.

27 Sec. 4. Manifestation to Participate in the Party-List System. Any party,

organization or coalition already registered with the Commission need not register
anew. However, such party, organization or coalition shall file with the Commission,
not later than ninety (90) days before the election, a manifestation of its desire to
participate in the party-list system.
As regards the alternative relief of application for accreditation,
the COMELEC found the motion to have been filed out of time, as
August 17, 2009 was the deadline for accreditation provided in
Resolution 8646. The motion was obviously filed months after the
deadline.

PGBI came to us in its petition for certiorari, arguing the

same positions it raised with the COMELEC when it moved to
reconsider its delisting.

We initially dismissed the petition in light of our ruling in

Philippine Mines Safety Environment Association, also known as
MINERO v. Commission on Elections (Minero);28 we said that no
grave abuse of discretion exists in a ruling that correctly applies
the prevailing law and jurisprudence. Applying Section 6(8) of RA
7941, the Court disqualified MINERO under the following
reasoning:

Since petitioner by its own admission failed to get 2% of the votes in

2001 and did not participate at all in the 2004 elections, it necessarily
failed to get at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast in the two
preceding elections. COMELEC, therefore, is not duty bound to certify
it.

28 G.R. No. 177548, May 10, 2007; see rollo of G.R. No. 177548, pp. 46-48.
 PGBI subsequently moved to reconsider the dismissal of its
petition. Among other arguments, PGBI claimed that the dismissal
of the petition was contrary to law, the evidence and existing
jurisprudence. Essentially, PGBI asserts that Section 6(8) of RA
7941 does not apply if one is to follow the tenor and import of the
deliberations inclusive of the interpellations in Senate Bill No.
1913 on October 19, 1994. It cited the following excerpts from the
Records of the Senate:

Senator Gonzales: On the other hand, Mr. President, under

ground no. (7), Section 5 there are actually two grounds it states:
Failure to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or its failure
to obtain at least ten percent (10%) of the votes case under the party-
list system in either of the last two (2) preceding elections for the
constituency in which it has registered

In short, the first ground is that, it failed to participate in the last two
(2) preceding elections. The second is, failure to obtain at least 10
percent of the votes cast under the party-list system in either of the
last two preceding elections, Mr. President,

Senator Tolentino: Actually, these are two separate grounds.

Senator Gonzales: There are actually two grounds, Mr.

President.

Senator Tolentino: Yes, Mr. President.29 [Underscoring

supplied.]

29 Rollo, pp. 74-75.

PGBI thus asserts that Section 6(8) does not apply to its situation,
as it is obvious that it failed to participate in one (1) but not in
the two (2) preceding elections. Implied in this is that it also
failed to secure the required percentage in one (1) but not in the
two (2) preceding elections.

Considering PGBIs arguments, we granted the motion and

reinstated the petition in the courts docket.

THE ISSUES

We are called upon to resolve: (a) whether there is legal

basis for delisting PGBI; and (b) whether PGBIs right to due
process was violated.
 OUR RULING

We find the petition partly impressed with merit.

a. The Minero Ruling

Our Minero ruling is an erroneous application of Section 6(8)

of RA 7941; hence, it cannot sustain PGBIs delisting from the
roster of registered national, regional or sectoral parties,
organizations or coalitions under the party-list system.

First, the law is clear the COMELEC may motu proprio or

upon verified complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel,
after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national,
regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition if it: (a) fails to
participate in the last two (2) preceding elections; or (b) fails to
obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the
party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the
constituency in which it has registered.30 The word or is a
disjunctive term signifying disassociation and independence of
one thing from the other things enumerated; it should, as a rule,
30 Numbering supplied.
be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies, as a
disjunctive word.31 Thus, the plain, clear and unmistakable
language of the law provides for two (2) separate reasons for
delisting.

Second, Minero is diametrically opposed to the legislative

intent of Section 6(8) of RA 7941, as PGBIs cited congressional
deliberations clearly show.

Minero therefore simply cannot stand. Its basic defect lies in

its characterization of the non-participation of a party-list
organization in an election as similar to a failure to garner the 2%
threshold party-list vote. What Minero effectively holds is that a
party list organization that does not participate in an election
necessarily gets, by default, less than 2% of the party-list votes.
To be sure, this is a confused interpretation of the law, given the
laws clear and categorical language and the legislative intent to
treat the two scenarios differently. A delisting based on a mixture
or fusion of these two different and separate grounds for delisting
is therefore a strained application of the law in jurisdictional
terms, it is an interpretation not within the contemplation of the

31 Agpalo, Statutory Construction, p. 204 (2003); see also The Heirs of George Poe v. Malayan Insurance
Company, Inc. G.R. No. 156302, April 7, 2009.
framers of the law and hence is a gravely abusive interpretation
of the law.32

What we say here should of course take into account our

ruling in Barangay Association for Advancement and National
Transparency v. COMELEC33 (Banat) where we partly invalidated
the 2% party-list vote requirement provided in RA 7941 as follows:

We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats,

the continued operation of the two percent threshold for the
distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause
of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds
that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to
achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the
number of available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued
operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the
additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that
20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of
party-list representatives.

The disqualification for failure to get 2% party-list votes in two (2)

preceding elections should therefore be understood in light of the
Banat ruling that party-list groups or organizations garnering less

32 See Varias v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 189078, February 11, 2010
where we held that the use of wrong considerations is an act not in contemplation
of law a jurisdictional error for this is one way of gravely abusing ones discretion.

33 G.R. No. 179271, April 21, 2009.

than 2% of the party-list votes may yet qualify for a seat in the
allocation of additional seats.

We need not extensively discuss Banats significance, except to

state that a party-list group or organization which qualified in the
second round of seat allocation cannot now validly be delisted for
the reason alone that it garnered less than 2% in the last two
elections. In other words, the application of this disqualification
should henceforth be contingent on the percentage of party-list
votes garnered by the last party-list organization that qualified for
a seat in the House of Representatives, a percentage that is less
than the 2% threshold invalidated in Banat. The disqualification
should now necessarily be read to apply to party-list groups or
organizations that did not qualify for a seat in the two preceding
elections for the constituency in which it registered.

To reiterate, (a) Section 6(8) of RA 7941 provides for two

separate grounds for delisting; these grounds cannot be mixed or
combined to support delisting; and (b) the disqualification for
failure to garner 2% party-list votes in two preceding elections
should now be understood, in light of the Banat ruling, to mean
failure to qualify for a party-list seat in two preceding elections for
the constituency in which it has registered. This, we declare, is
how Section 6(8) of RA 7941 should be understood and applied.
We do so under our authority to state what the law is, 34 and as an
exception to the application of the principle of stare decisis.

The doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere (to adhere

to precedents and not to unsettle things which are established) is
embodied in Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which
provides, thus:

ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the

Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.

The doctrine enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It

requires courts in a country to follow the rule established
in a decision of its Supreme Court. That decision becomes a
judicial precedent to be followed in subsequent cases by all courts
in the land. The doctrine of stare decisis is based on the principle
that once a question of law has been examined and decided, it
should be deemed settled and closed to further argument. 35 The
doctrine is grounded on the necessity for securing certainty and

34 Marbury v. Madison (1 Cranch [5 US] 137, 2 L ed 60 [1803]) holds that it is

emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what
the law is.

35 See Lazatin v. Desierto, G.R. No. 147097, June 5, 2009, citing Fermin v. People,
G.R. No. 157643, March 28, 2008, 550 SCRA 132.
stability of judicial decisions, thus:

Time and again, the court has held that it is a very desirable and
necessary judicial practice that when a court has laid down a
principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to
that principle and apply it to all future cases in which the facts are
substantially the same. Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Stand by
the decisions and disturb not what is settled. Stare decisis simply
means that for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in
one case should be applied to those that follow if the facts are
substantially the same, even though the parties may be different. It
proceeds from the first principle of justice that, absent any powerful
countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided
alike. Thus, where the same questions relating to the same event
have been put forward by the parties similarly situated as in a previous
case litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare
decisis is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issue.36

The doctrine though is not cast in stone for upon a showing

that circumstances attendant in a particular case override the
great benefits derived by our judicial system from the doctrine of
stare decisis, the Court is justified in setting it aside. 37

As our discussion above shows, the most compelling reason

to abandon Minero exists; it was clearly an erroneous application
of the law an application that the principle of stability or

36 Id., citing Chinese Young Men's Christian Association of the Philippine Islands v.
Remington Steel Corporation, G.R. No. 159422, March 28, 2008, 550 SCRA 180.

37 Ibid.
predictability of decisions alone cannot sustain. Minero did
unnecessary violence to the language of the law, the intent of the
legislature, and to the rule of law in general. Clearly, we cannot
allow PGBI to be prejudiced by the continuing validity of an
erroneous ruling. Thus, we now abandon Minero and strike it out
from our ruling case law.

We are aware that PGBIs situation a party list group or

organization that failed to garner 2% in a prior election and
immediately thereafter did not participate in the preceding
election is something that is not covered by Section 6(8) of RA
7941. From this perspective, it may be an unintended gap in the
law and as such is a matter for Congress to address. We cannot
and do not address matters over which full discretionary authority
is given by the Constitution to the legislature; to do so will offend
the principle of separation of powers. If a gap indeed exists, then
the present case should bring this concern to the legislatures
notice.

b. The Issue of Due Process

On the due process issue, we agree with the COMELEC that

PGBIs right to due process was not violated for PGBI was given an
opportunity to seek, as it did seek, a reconsideration of Resolution
No. 8679. The essence of due process, we have consistently held,
is simply the opportunity to be heard; as applied to administrative
proceedings, due process is the opportunity to explain ones side
or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times
and in all instances essential. The requirement is satisfied where
the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain their side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned
upon is absolute lack of notice and hearing x x x.38 We find it
obvious under the attendant circumstances that PGBI was not
denied due process. In any case, given the result of this
Resolution, PGBI has no longer any cause for complaint on due
process grounds.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the petition and

accordingly ANNUL COMELEC Resolution No. 8679 dated October
13, 2009 insofar as the petitioner PGBI is concerned, and the
Resolution dated December 9, 2009 which denied PGBIs motion
for reconsideration in SPP No. 09-004 (MP). PGBI is qualified to be
voted upon as a party-list group or organization in the coming
May 2010 elections.

38 Bautista v. Comelec, 460 Phil, 459, 478 (2003).

 SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO

Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO RENATO C. CORONA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

 CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE

CASTRO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice
 JOSE C

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby

certified that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court.

REYNATO S. PUNO

Chief Justice