THE WITHERING DAYS OF THE NGUYEN DYNASTY Nguyen The AnhThe Institute of Southeast Asian Studies Established as an autonomous organisation in May, 1968, the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies is a regional research centre for scholars and other specialists concerned with modern Southeast Asia, The Institute's research interest is focused on the many-faceted problems of modernization and development, and political and social change in Southeast Asia, The Institute is governed by a twenty-four-member Board of Trustees on which are represented the University of Singapore and Nanyang University, appointees from the Government, as well as representatives from a broad range of professional and civic organizations and groups. 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This series comprises contributions which represent the tentative results of ongoing research, and of discussions, printed for the purpose of stimulating further thought on specific projects. The responsibility for facts and opinions expressed in the work that follows rests exclusively with Dr. Nguyen The Anh and his interpretations do not necessarily reflect the views or the policy of the Institute or its supporters. The Institute also publishes books and other papers from time to time in the following series: BOOKS/MONOGRAPHS: specialized studies on topics relating to Southeast Asia. SOUTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS: an annual review of significant political, economic and social developments in the region, with emphasis on the ASEAN countries. Contents include analyses in depth of topics of regional concern and of specific issues on a country-by- country basis. 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SOUTHEAST ASIAN PERSPECTIVES: aimed at wider circulation of Southeast Asian thinking, these publications are original contributions in English of Southeast Asians ortranslations of their significant papers and monographs appearing in one of the local. or national languages of the region; ORAL HISTORY PROGRAMME: publications based on the oral memoirs of persons who have made notable contribution to, or have first-hand information to impart on, certain aspects of the developments of Singapore and Malaysia; LIBRARY BULLETINS: papers on Southeast Asian librarianship and bibliography. 4 May 1978 Director Institute of Southeast Asian StudiesThe Nguyen monarchy* witnessed one of the most critical periods of its history in the aftermath of the death on 19 July 1883 of Emperor Tu-Duc. During these years, the Empire of Dai-Nam was submitted to increasing pressures on the part of the French. At the same time, the régime experienced serious internal difficulties incapacitating its leadership. By the time Tu-Duc passed away, much of Vietnam's territory had been amputated and ceded to France, while the rest was threatened by further colonial expansionism, Parallel with a deterioration in the military and diplomatic fields was the worsening political situation. Without Tu-Duc, the previous internal divisions within the Court exploded into a wrestle for power, The Emperor had died childless, and his death opened the way to a series of crises at the Court of Hue. Unfortunately for the Vietnamese, all this took place at the same time as the French decided to deal Vietnam the final blow. Sapped of its strength, the century-long House of the Nguyen succumbed to a peculiar combination of circumstances - the challenge of a powerful country and the ineptness and miscalculations of its own officials. Within the only one month of Tu-Duc's death, the Vietnamese Court was forced :to accept a lethal convention, the Harmand Convention of 25 August 1883, which laid the ground for French domination over Vietnam. Although it was to be superseded by the Treaty of 6 June 1884 (the Patenotre Treaty), the Harmand Convention already contained the governing conditions of future Franco- Vietnamese relations. The political history of Vietnam during the five following years was the story of the Nguyen monarchy's rentinciation of national independence in order to preserve its own survival. Yet its elan vital was already exhausted. It was going to be an anachronous body, playing a fast dwindling role in the life of the nation in the years to come. From the Convention of 25 August 1883 to the Treaty of 6 June 1884 The convention of 25 August 1883 between the Republic of Prance and the Empire of Dai-Nam was one of the most * This paper is a preliminary incursion into a research field currently being investigated. The author is grateful to the Ford Foundation and the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), Singapore, for their generous assistance. He is also indebted to Dr. Huynh Kim Khanh of ISEAS for helpful comments.significant events in modern Vietnamese history. Indeed, it is possible to consider this convention a turning point. Forced upon a bereaved and ‘disarrayed Vietnamese Court in the aftermath of the death of Emperor Tu-Duc by France xepresented by the domineering Dr. Jules Harmand, this Convention was to define the relationship between France and Vietnam for several decades to come. It represented, in fact, the end of the Vietnamese national sovereignty and the beginning of France's protectorate over the country. As Harmand later boasted, it aimed at nothing less than "to declare.to the whole world that ... we were free to act [in Annam] absolutely according to our will".l ‘the Court of Hue, in fact, had little choice but to come along. In a threatening note enjoining the Court of Hue to accept the imposed conditions, Harmand concluded: If you reject them, you must expect the greatest misfortunes .... The Empire of Annam, its dynasty, its princes and the Court will have pronounced their condemnation. The name Vietnam will no longer exist in history.2 The convention was more a treaty aiming at partitioning what was left of the old Empire of Vietnam than a pact to establish a protectorate. The Court of Hue had to cede the province of Binh-Thuan to Cochinchina, to pledge to recall its troops from Tonkin - now widened with the adjunction of the three Northern provinces of Annam (Thanh-Hoa, Nghe-An, Ha~Tinh) ~ and to place its administration in Tonkin under French control. The background for the convention of 25 August 1883 was France's endeavour to expand her influence and commercial activities in China, Ever since it was discovered that Tonkin offered the best way of penetrating into Southern China, the French wished to make the Court of Hue accept their presence there. In order to obtain this, they wanted to take advantage of the situation brought about by Francis Garnier's intervention in Tonkin. Garnier was dispatched by the French Governor of Cochinchina to settle the dispute caused by a French gun-runner who had 1 Quoted in Nguyen Van Phong, La.sootété vietnamienne de 1862 % 1902 (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1971), p. 212. 2 Quoted ip Nguyen Van Phong, op.cit., p. 210. ptried to force his way down the Red River but captured the citadel of Hanoi instead. Partly as a consequence of Garnier's overstepping his mission, Tu-Duc had to agree to a sort of French protectorate over Tonkin and Annam. But the Treaty signed on 15 March 1874 to this effect never defined Specifically the respective positions of France and Vietnam. In particular, it was never clear, according to this Treaty, whether the relations between the two nations had to be conducted on terms of assistance or of domination. His agreement to. the Treaty notwithstanding, Tu-Duc always refused to be bound by its terms, as far as his foreign policy was concerned. The Court of Hue continued to consider itself a vassal of China, pay its quadriennal tribute to Peking, and generally look to China as a countervailing force in its dealing with the French. For instance, as late as 1880, Tu-Duc sent an embassy to China apparently to deliver his tribute, but in reality - to the great displeasure of the French -. to ask for China's intervention. For the French, this was an indication of bad faith, since the Vietnamese Government had formally agreed to shape its foreign policy according to French desires and not to maintain independent diplomatic relations with other powers. The French, hence, decided to make the Court of Hue solemnly recognize that France had the right to control Vietnam's foreign policy. This had become a necessity, as Chinese troops had entered the provinces of Bac Ninh and Son Tay in late 1882. Convinced that diplomatic means would be ineffective, the French resorted to military pressure. On 13 March 1883, Rheinart, the French chargé d'affaires at Hue, wrote to the Governor of Cochinchina: [fhe King] will cede only when it is plainly demonstrated to him that he is confronted with the ineluctable necessity to cede or to struggle, that is to say till the day when from his palace he hears the first gunshot fired at the forts of Thuan-An ..., Tu-Duc did not live to witness the French seizure on 20 August 1883 of the fortresses of Thuan-An, which defended Hue, But a panic-stricken Court hurriedly sought negotiation. 3 Archives Nationales, Section Outre-Mer, Paris (A.0.M.), Indochine Ancien Fonds (A.F.), carton 16, dossier A 30 (58).This was the historical context of the 25 August 1883 Convention. The Harmand Convention, as it turned out, was not approved by the French Government. Harmand had gone beyond his instructions on many points. The French Government, which at the time had been won over to the policy of indirect rule, considered the annexation formula implied in the convention as more complicated and more expensive than a genuine protectorate solution. In its preparations to wage war against China to prevent the latter from intervening in Tonkin, the French Government wanted to eliminate any possible Vietnamese hindrance, but not necessarily to cripple the Court of Hue. Paris therefore refused to ratify the convention. Instead, Patenotre, the newly appointed French minister to China, was ordered to call at Hue on his way to Peking, and to negotiate a less rigorous treaty. Although deeply affected by the limitation on its sovereignty by any form of protectorate, the Court of Hue, on its part, welcomed the opportunity of another settlement which would mitigate the situation caused by the previous Convention. ° On 6 June. 1884, a new treaty of protectorate was signed. The Patenotre Treaty, as this new Convention has been usually called, was to be the fundamental charter which governed Franco-Vietnamese relations until 1945. The Patenotre Treaty, despite its modifications and abandonment of certain clauses which Harmand had imposed on the Court of Hue, substantialized the de facto situation which had developed ‘since August 1883. article 1 for instance, explicitly and formally asserted the principle of French protectorate over Vietnam. The Vietnamese sovereign surrendered ‘the direction of his foreign policy to the French Government. For. its part, the French Government, according to Article 15: pledges to safeguard hereafter the integrity of the States of H.M. the King of Annam, to defend this sovereign against aggressions from the outside, and against rebellions from the inside. For this purpose, the French authority may put into military occupation, on the territory of Annam and Tonkin, ‘the positions which it will deem necessary to assure the functioning of the protectorate.By these formal arrangements, the "protected nation", while surrendering its sovereignty; retained a certain governmental authority. The Empire of Dai~Nam continued to exercise its administrative power, although such power was now legally circumscribed in certain domains. Article 16 stated: "H.M. the King of Annam will continue, as before, to conduct the internal administration of his States, save the restrictions which result from this convention." ‘Theoretically, the public services remained in the hands of the Vietnamese administration: Article 3 expressly declared that "The Annamese functionaries ... will continue to administer the provinces . it was specified that the Vietnamese admini no power over "... customs service, public works and in general the services which require a single management or the employment of European engineers or agents." From the start, the French manifested thus their will of controlling the custom-service and technical services they would be induced to establish in Annam to stay their rule such as the telegraph service which was to be set up soon. As for the administration of justice, Article 10 postulated that the contestations affecting foreigners (the French as well as other aliens) could be adjudicated only by French jurisdictions. Furthermore, lawsuits between a Vietnamese and a foreigner would fall only under French juridical competence. A point of importance in the Patenotre Treaty related to the governing of Tonkin and Annam. With Cochinchina already ceded to France as a colony, a marked differentia- tion was introduced between the two parts of the old Vietnamese Empire, Annam and Tonkin. In Annam, France was to be represented by a Resident General, whose role was to “assure the regular functioning of the protectorate", but who should not “interfere with the local administration of the provinces" (Article 5). On the contrary, the local administration of the different provinces of Tonkin would be controlled by French Residents. The provincial mandarins of Tonkin continued to be appointed by the government of Hue, but they could be removed from their offices at the request of the French Residents. The Treaty of 6 June 1884 was also to finalize Vietnam's surrender of independence. The most evident symbols of the King's prestige were destroyed: the Resident General of France at Hue was now to enjoy the xight of private and personal audience with the King, a privilege obstinately refused by Tu-Duc in the past.Immediately after the signing of the Treaty, Patenotre ordered a melting pot to:be brought in. There, in front of the Ministers representing the Vietnamese state, the imperial seal, a,symbol of Vietnam's vassality to China, was melted down.4 Symbolically, Vietnam's centuries-long dependence to China was no mor The Internal Crises of the Court of Hue Ill fortunes did not arrive singly for the Nguyen monarchy during this period. The acceptance of the French protectorate and restriction of national sovereignty was accompanied by the intrigues and manoeuvres of the different factions within the Court. Such internal strife which had been contained or averted during Tu-Duc's lifetime, partly because of his strong personality, now broke loose. The monarchy became the victim of these machinations of its high officials. An interregnum resulted from this situation, Kings were made and unmade at a vertiginous speed. But this crisis of succession was more than just a consequence of the release of the personal ambitions which had been held-in restraint by Tu-Duc's autocratism. It was also attendant upon the lack of a successor invested with a sufficient stamp of legitimacy to overcome all the opposition. Tu-Duc himself must be held partly responsible for the problems in the Court of Hue in the aftermath of his death, especially as they involved royal succession. Having had no children of his own, Tu-Duc had for a long time looked among the young sons of his brothers for someone suitable to be prepared ‘to inherit the Empire. Between 1865 and 1871, three young princes ~ Ung Chan, Ung Ky, and Ung Dang - were brought to the imperial palace and groomed for possible ‘succession. Tu-Duc, while expressing a preference for Ung Dang, the youngest, who was thirteen years old at his death, had to settle for Ung Chan, the oldest, about whom’ the Emperor had had misgivings. The source of complications, however, was contained in Tu-Duc's testament.5 Designating Ung Chan 4 Dat Nam Thuo Luo. Chinh Bien (Veridical Records of Dai-Nam, principal part, henceforth DNZL), fifth period, chapter 4. 5 DVEL, Fourth Period, chapter 69.as his successor, because of his mature age (31 years old) and presumably his possible ability to lead the country during difficult times, Tu-Duc at the same time spelled out in his testament both his reservations about the Emperor-designated and:his recommendations: Ung Chan, Tu~Duc said, had physical :and moral defects and an excessive inclination towards sexual pleasures. Care, therefore, should be taken in supervising the activities of the new Emperor. :Tu-Duc's testament then offered remedies: first, going against the aulic laws of the Nguyen Dynasty which forbade the intervention of women in governmental affairs, he committed his mother, the Grand Empress Dowager, and ‘his wife, the Empress Dowager, to the task of ."teaching .and counselling" his successor; secondly, he designated.three Ministers, Tran Tien Thanh, Nguyen Van. Tuong ‘and Ton That Thuyet as regents of the Empire, and Prince Tho~Xuan and Prince Tuy-Ly, his two uncles, as advisers of the government. The Testament, thus formulated, contained all the germs of dissolution of the future king's role. It became a weapon in the hands of Nguyen Van Tuong and Ton That Thuyet who got together immediately after Tu-Duc's death and used .it to monopolize the power of decision. The adhesion - perhaps through fear, most certainly through ignorance of political matters - of the Grand Empress Tu-Du, who was almost universally respected, to their actions gave them a semblance of legality. Only three days after Ung Chan, who titled himself Duc-Duc, went into mourning for the deceased Emperor, as required by the tradition, Tuong and Thuyet, without Tran Tien Thanh's assent, presented an indictment against Tu-Duc's testamentary successor. Three charges were brought against Due-Duc: his attempt to.falsify the testament, his wearing colourful garments in spite of mourning, and his being debauched and loving good eating. After three days of being a successor ~-he had not yet been formally enthroned - Duc-Duc was deposed ‘and Hiep-Hoa, Tu-Duc's youngest brother, was enthroned.in his.place. Of all the Court mandarins, the Imperial Censor Phan Dinh Phung was the only one bold enough to protest energetically against the violation of the deceased sovereign's testament. He was at once arrested. 6 D¥TL, Fourth Period, chapter 70.Hiep-Hoa's coronation (30 July 1883) marked Tuong's and Thuyet's omnipotence which. nobody, either at the Court or in.the provinces; would dare to question. In order to keep the king's .role under their complete control, they set about to eliminate their opponents. Tran Tien Thanh, the first Regent; was degraded on the charge of having deliberately ‘suppressed certain passages of Tu-Duc's testament. Princes Tho-Xuan and Tuy-Ly, whom Tu-Duc had recommended as advisers of the Empire, were prevented from voicing. their opinion. Feeling threatened by the two Regents, and influenced by certain members of the Royal Family, in particular Prince Tuy-Ly and his kin, Hiep-Hoa waited for a favourable opportunity to free himself from their tutelage. He gathered around him his cousins Hong Tham, Prince Tuy-Ly's son, whom he promoted to the functions of Secretary General of the Royal Cabinet, and ‘Hong Phi, Prince Tung-Thien's son, whom he appointed ‘as deputy to the Minister of the Interior Tran :Tien Thanh. After the signing of the Convention of 25 August 1883, -he secretly sent Prince Tuy- Ly to see the French Resident at Hue, Palasne de Champeaux, to ask whether, in case of danger, he could count on the support of the French Government. 7 Upon learning of such manoeuvres, Tuong and Thuyet decided to get rid of the King. In the evening of 28 November 1883, they assembled all the high level civil and military mandarins at the Ministry of Finance and asked them to agree to the removal of Hiep-Hoa. They charged that, since his enthronement, Hiep-Hoa had many times violated ‘the institutions of the State and favoured - traitors to -the-country.8 A placet was presented to the Grand Empress Dowager, proposing Hiep-Hoa's replacement by Ung Dang, the third adopted son of Tu-Duc. Tran Tien Thanh was killed on the same night by a detachment of the personal guard of Ton.That ‘Thuyet. The next morning, Hiep-Hoa was forced to commit suicide. Prince Tuy-Ly and the other members of the Royal Family who had tried to go against Tuong and Thuyet ‘sought refuge at the French Residency, but the French,:not wishing to cause diplomatic complications, handed them back to the Court. They underwent trial later, and were exiled to remote provinces. 7 A.O.M., Indochine A.F., carton 17, dossier A 30 (60). 8 DNTL, Fourth Period, chapter 70.Ung Dang, who was.-enthroned under the reign name Kien-Phuc, on 29 November 1883, was only fourteen years old, His selection evidenced the will of the two regents Tuong and Thuyet to-reinforce their hold on total power. For the sake of legality; a step-brother of Tu-Duc, Prince Gia-Hung, who was about -fifty years old and not well-known for his mental abilities, was made first regent, but his.role was purely nominal. In fact, in effecting the nomination and the dethronement of the kings at will, Tuong and ‘Thuyet had bécome the veritable masters of the Court of Hue. Tuong was even alleged to have the intention of proclaiming that the Nguyen family had forfeited its rights inorder to raise one of his sons onto the throne. Under these conditions, the king could no longer be the sovereign of his country. The organs of the central government, which were to represent and personify the authority of the king, became actually the instruments for the regents to serve their particular interests. But this mutilation of the King's role would prove to be detrimental to.the will of the nation to stand behind its sovereign to resist the invasion of Tonkin by the French. There was no more object for the sentiment of royalist fidelity. In the-eyes of his subjects, the King had already lost much of his sacred prestige. Accepting the French protectorate, he had yielded to the destruction of the symbols of his majesty. Obliged to give private and personal audience to the French plenipotentiary, he had surrendered part of the mystique of being the Son of Heaven. The right of audience obtained by the French was, as noted by a witness: «+s a serious innovation which patently consecrated [French] authority in a country where, according to traditional etiquette, the sacred person of the sovereign is religiously ‘screened from profane eyes .... The .impression was .considerable in the country. In the eyes of everyone, this solemnity made obvious the establishment of the [French] protectorate and the surrender of Annam.1lO 9 A.O.M., Indochine A.F., carton 17, dossier A 30 (60). 10 Gited by Nguyen Van Phong, op.cit., p. 244.lo The loss of the Kingts'prestige was first felt in Tonkin, where a numberof mandarins, doubting the legitimacy of the reigning King, -succumbed very early to the temptation of following the order of the stronger and collaborated with the occupying authority. Symptomatic of this state of mind, there were "those "mandarins, literati and notables of Tonkin" who :addressed anonymous petitions to the General commander-in=chief of the French troops requesting French protection.41.-although;+as public opinion in France at the time was opposed to colonial expansion in Tonkin, these petitions .could have been the work of pro-French catholic leaders or even of the French parties with vested interests in Vietnam themselves, it is of interest to quote from one of them: «++ the regents [Tuong and Thuyet] have condemned all the members of the royal family and killed -all.the ancient great mandarins. They have ‘profaned the palaces by their crimes, and.they have oppressed the young kings .... They have excited people to kill the Christians and .are.:in relation with the Chinese armies. They have ‘caused all possible harm to the population of Tonkin. The crimes of these two men, the regents Tuong and Thuyet, have filled all Annam with horror . We entreat you, General, to give ‘the Tonkinese people a new token of :the firm resolution of France to protect us, by destroying these two men and by reorganizing the Court of Annam to preserve the dynasty of the Nguyen. Then the Annamese people will perpetuate eternal gratitude towards France. The Court of Hue tried to punish its Francophile officials by degrading them. But the royal authority became increasingly inoperative before the authority of the protectorate: certain mandarins, recalled to Hue, refused £0 comply :and ‘sought protection from the French.12 Indeed, 11 A.0.M., Indochine A.F., carton 18, dossier A 30 (60) and A 30 (72) 12 Nguyen.Huu. Do's was one of the cases, and not the least one, among cotlaborateurs. In.his. dispatch of 8 June 1884 to the Minister of Colonies, the. General coumending.the French expeditionary corps in Tonkin wrote: "Nguyen Huu Do, governor of Hanoi, an intelligent and honest man who has not ceased to work with us, franklyiL the central government could no longer exact strict obedience from the local mandarins, not only because they felt that the authorities of the protectorate would shield them from the central government's reprisals, but above all because they thought .the King no longer retained the reality of power. The desecration of the royal personage thus resulted.in the undermining of the moral and political values of the mandarinal system, Kien-Phuc died on 31 duly 1884, eight months after his enthronement. Once again, Tuong and Thuyet maintained the regency in order to preserve their power. The two regents announced that Kien-Phuc had left a testament naming his younger brother, Ung Lich, to be his successor. It did not matter .really whether Kien-Phuc had actually died from a disease of his spinal marrow, as alleged, or whether he was another victim of the two regents, as some French administrators in Tonkin had surmized.13 what was of greater significance, was the contention voiced by Rheinart, the French representative at Hue, that the assent of the French Government was necessary before the new King could be proclaimed. While .the Court of Hue argued that Rheinart's demand was an interference with its internal affairs, Rheinart on his part considered that the choice (which the French viewed as an election) of a King without his counsel was-tantamount to an attempt by the Vietnamese Government to circumvent the terms of French protectorate.14 The ultimatum he sent to the Court on 12 August 1884 was the first interpretation of the recently signed Treaty of protectorate. The ultimatum specifically demanded the abrogation of the enthronement of King Ham-Nghi, and patriotically, to[etc] the salvation of his country, has been degraded and, had it not been for our protection, would have been already recalled to the Court and paid with his life the honourable concessions he made to France." A.0.M., Indochine A.F., carton 17, dossier A 30 (60). 13 Paulin Vial, for example, wrote: "It was probable that the Annamese regents would not accept the responsibility of the concessions consented to France and.discharged it on an inoffensive and debile young prince sees The rumour spread that the Council of Regency had made him perish." Cited by Nguyen Van Phong, op.cit., p. 245. 14 Archives of the. French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (A.E.), Memoires et Documents, Aste, vol. 101, folio 29-33.12 which had already taken place, and the procedures for the selection of a.new-King-(who could well be the same person) and his enthronement be -instituted with French approval. What the French wanted -was a clearcut Vietnamese recognition of French sovereignty over Vietnam. The ultimatum stated in part: The.necessary formalities to validly proceed to the election of :a-new sdvereign having not been observed, that election is considered void. The Court will have, after having obtained our prior assent, to proceed to a new election and to the coronation of the younger brother of the. deceased King [that is, Ung Lich, accepted by the French as the new ‘King, but whose designation had to be formally approved by them]. In principle, the coronation will aways have to take place in the presence of the Representative of France, a French detachment doing the seryice of honour “inside the palace during the ceremony jointly with the Annamese guards. . The Court of Hue had to acquiesce to Rheinart's desiderata. Ung Lich, who had been titled Ham-Nghi, was enthroned anew. -For the first time, French troops were allowed inside the Imperial Palace. For the first time also, the middle door of the Ngo Mon gate, which had always been reserved by rites exclusively for the royal person, was opened.to ‘the representative of the French Govemment. The Court .of -Hue started to feel the weight of the French protectorate. © Unfortunately for the Vietnamese state, despite the French encroachments, Tuong and Thuyet continued with their machinations. Their activities offered to ‘the French, conscious of their powerful position, the opportunity to intrude further in the internal life of the Court. On 23 October 1884, Prince Gia-Hung, who held nominally the title of First Regent, had his functions removed and was condemned to be exiled, accused of having had incestuous relations with his sister, a misconduct which could be dated back many years.15 The reason for Gia-Hung's punishment appeared to be the intervention by -Rheinart who had expressed the opinion that he should -have been crowned King after the death of 15 DNTL, Fifth Period, chapter 6.13 Kien-Phuc. The French representative took advantage of the incident to win another concession from the Court. The Privy Council had to acknowledge its fault of having judged, @ischarged and condemed a regent without informing the authority of the protectorate, and to declare officially, in writing, that henceforth, the election of the King, and in the event of minority of the royal person, the nomination of the members of the Council of Regency, may be only made with the assistance and the assent of the Resident General of France, 16 The Nguyen monarchy had taken one further step on the road to its demise. The Tightening of French Control The French did not wait for the Treaty of 6 June 1884 to treat Tonkin.as a-conquered country. In fact, since 1883, they had considered it as a French possession. Parallel with their military occupation of the country, they set up very early civil. administration with the establishment of Residents at Hanoi, Hai-Phong, Nam-Dinh, Son-Tay and Bac-Ninh, and the creation of the Direction of Civil and Political Affairs at Hanoi. This Direction was xeorganized by a decision taken on 1 February 1884, but no mention was ever made of ‘the rights which were left to the Vietnamese authorities. Furthermore, the Vietnamese Government was not even informed about the measures taken by the French, as -if what happened in Tonkin was of no concern to it at all.l7 thus, two administrations existed side by side, most often antagonistic, because either the French Residents wanted to apply measures which were contrary to the instructions the Vietnamese provincial authorities received from Hue, or they prevented the latter from executing their orders. After signing the Treaty of 6 June 1884, the French exerted their right’ of control over the administration of Tonkin by filling the vacancies in certain provincial seats with mandarins won 16 A.E., Memoires et Documents, Aste, vol. 101, folio 112-113. 17 Ibid., folio 14-17.14 over to their cause. -The Court of Hue could only retaliate by not recognizing the appointments made by the French and by transferring-or degrading the mandarins suspected of sympathizing with them. In this matter, the Vietnamese Government only adhered to Article 7 of the Treaty according to which "the Residents:will avoid attending to the details of the internal administration of the provinces ...." For the French, however, the state of war in Tonkin required a tighter -control from their part on the administration of the provinces.. As far as the French were concerned, the Treaty had become obsolete and they believed they should obtain the-right of nomination of mandarins, which by its terms exclusively belonged to the Court. In the long letter addressed to the Court of Hue on 4 December 1884 .to.determine the interpretation of certain clauses of the Treaty,;18 the French Resident General at Hue, Lemaire, dwelled at length on the extent of the right of control given to the French by the Treaty, to propose amendments on the mode of nomination, transfer, promotion, degradation and revocation of the Vietnainese mandarins. The Vietnamese Government objected that France did not have the right to create civil administration in Annam and Tonkin, since Article 7 of the Treaty forbade French Residents to attend to the internal affairs of the kingdom.19 But the protestations of the Court of Hue seemed to be made only for the principle. The agreement was reached apparently without much difficulty that henceforth no nomination or transfer of high level administrative personnel of Tonkin be -made without the French Resident General being invited officially to.express his approval or objections. Moreover, the Court consented to maintain in place the French-appointed ‘functionaries who had filled the vacancies created by the flight of the old mandarins.20 18 A.E., Memotres et Documents, Asie, vol. 101, folio 211-233. 19 A.O.M., Indochine A.F., carton 18, dossier A 30 (72). In answer to this, Lemaire's reply-was that the Vietnamese translation of Article 7 was defective, and there was a great difference between "attending to the internal affairs" and "attending té the details of the administration". 20 Aw Memotres et Documents, Aste, vol. 101, folio 238-240.15 Was the Court of Hue fully cognizant of the fact that, by renouncing its right-of nominating its agents in Tonkin, it had deprived itself of one of the essential attributes of sovereignty and had allowed the French to supplant it in one of its fundamental roles? For a while, it appeared that the Court had hoped ‘that the Treaty of 6 June 1884 would remain, just like the Treaty of 1874, a dead letter, and that France, because of the Chinese intervention in Tonkin, would be satisfied with seeing the protectorate officially recognized :and then dispense with interfering in the internal administration of the kingdom. But, now that it appeared that Tonkin would be rapidly absorbed into French influence, it became manifest that the Court resigned itself to its incapacity to contest the French encroachments in Tonkin. It was not impossible that Hue even contemplated the eventuality of ceding Tonkin to France, in exchange for the concessions that France would make in Annam. In fact, on 23 December 1884, the Phu Doan (Prefect) of the province of Thua-Thien, concurrently a high official of the central government, went to see Resident General Lemaire confidentially and presented to him a scheme which was allegedly conceived by him alone, but which would have all the chances of being adopted by the Court. According to this proposal, the Vietnamese Government would abandon Tonkin to France, in return for a part of the revenues of the ceded provinces; Annam, then, would remain under a mitigated form of protectorate; the French would evacuate the citadel of Hue and Thuan-An, but an agent of the protectorate would remain.2l1 Informed of this proposal which reflected the confusion, if not the discouragement, of the Vietnamese Court, Paris cabled its representative that such an arrangement was unacceptable and that it remained "decided to execute the obligations of the Treaty and to demand their strict observation." Shortly thereafter, the Vietnamese Government surrendered further the control over its territory. when in the period 1884-85 it was involved in negotiations of contracts of sale and concession of mines in the province of Quang-Yen, it met with obstructions from the French. Invoking Article 18 of the Treaty, the French authorities denied to the Court and its aggyts the rdght of conceding mines without their agreement.** The French interpretation 21 A.E., Memotves et Documents, Aste, vol. 101, folio 255-256. 22 Ibid., folio 245-246.16 of the Treaty, based on the pretext that the exploitation of mines demanded special technical knowledge and consequently came under the category of the services requiring a single direction and the employment of European engineers and agents, was thus forced on the Court. The feeble protestations of the Vietnamese Government were swept aside without much formality. By the Mining Convention signed on 18 February 1885, His Majesty the King of Annam accept{[ed] to submit the régime and the exploitation of the mines situated in his states to regulations the usefulness of which [would] have been recognized by the Government of the Republic. This convention implied a new relinquishment of the Vietnamese Government's authority over Tonkin since all the revenues of the exploitation of the mines in Tonkin were to be attributed to the Tonkinese administration, and not even a_small portion would be yielded to the Court of Hue.2 The legal issues aside, the Court of Hue now had to put up with petty vexations. Under the pretext of stopping all sources of supplies to the Chinese troops warring in Tonkin, the General commander-in-chief of the French expeditionary corps, Briere de 1'Isle, ordered the blockade of the Vietnamese coasts. As a result, the contributions in cash and in rice from the provinces of Tonkin could not be brought to Hue. By late January 1885, the provisions of the capital were already exhausted. In spite of all the entreaties of the Court, which was rendered humble by necessity, not only did General Briere de 1'Isle refuse to xelease the rice due to the Vietnamese Government, but he also reduced arbitrarily the quantity of money and rice it was supposed to collect. The dispute was only partly settled by the end of the month of May.24 Another source of vexation and humiliation was the exactions of the French military authorities. As agreed in Article 5 of the Treaty which stipulated that the French Resident General was to reside in the citadel with his 23 Ibid., folio 363-368. 24 A.E., Memotres et Documents, Aste, vol. 102, folio 71-72.17 escort, part of the citadel of Hue (Mang Ca) was assigned to the French. Transforming this contingent into a veritable corps of occupation, the Resident decided to station more troops in the concession in order to have strong means of pressure. But, alleging that the old’ guns on the ramparts of the citadel threatened the security of the French concessions, the French proceeded to spike them. The excitement caused by this action was so great at the Court that the Grand Empress Dowager, contrary to tradition, had to issue an edict on 26 March 1885 to set the people's minds at rest. The repeated French provocations were such that the party of resistance in the Court which since the time of Tu-Duc had been wanting to measure swords with the French, but which had been silenced until now, was beginning to voice its opinions more boldly. Ton That Thuyet, the Minister of War and one of the two Regents, particularly suffered to see the Court's decisions continuously flouted. Out of personal interest, he had up to this time modelled his attitude after that of Nguyen Van Tuong, the other Regent, on whom he had most often relied for decisions on the general policy of the government. But, in anticipation of the eventuality in which the Court might have to flee from Hue as a solution of last resort to break away from French control, Thuyet had given orders to fortify Cam Lo, since the beginning of 1884.25 By the end of the year, Cam Lo, situated in the mountainous area of the province of Quang Tri, had become a well-organized camp, which had a mountain road connecting it with the high regions of Tonkin, He also had special troops recruited for the purpose. With mounting impatience, Thuyet looked for an opportunity to fight it out with the French. Finally, in April 1885, exasperated, watching French troops moving about freely in the citadel of Hue, he issued a stern declaration forbidding access of the streets surrounding his Ministry to all Frenchmen, be they officers or simple soldiers. The French, who had been informed of the Vietnamese secret projects, considered Nguyen Van Tuong and Ton That. ‘Thuyet as obstacles to the application of the régime of 25 DWEL, Fifth Period, chapter 2. 26 A.O.M., Indochine. A.F., carton 17, dossier A 30 (65).18 protectorate. The two Regents were reproached with systematically obstructing the progress of French interests. In mid-March 1885, Lemaire already schemed to overthrow the two Regents and replace them with Nguyen Huu Do, the Governor of Hanoi, in whom the French saw a devoted eollaborateur. In Lemaire's plan, Nguyen Huu Do would be placed at the head of the Vietnamese Government, which would only have the appearance of sovereignty while the Resident General would be its veritable chief and the different ministers would be responsible to,im for the execution of the measures dictated to them.2/ Lemaire's projects, however, could only be realized if the two Regents could be seized before they could escape from Hue, taking with them the King. But as military operations against the Chinese troops in Tonkin then entered into a decisive stage, the French Government did not deem the moment propitious to carry out Lemaire's scheme. The question of making a coup d'etat against the Court of Hue was brought up again in the middle of May 188: In answer to the decision taken by General Briere de sle to recruit two battalions of Tonkinese tirailleure (native infantrymen), Ton That Thuyet wrote to Lemaire a letter which was seen as a veritable challenge. Thuyet threatened to withdraw all the Vietnamese functionaries from Tonkin, warned the French of an insurrec: tion in Tonkin, and asserted that France's recent losses in men and material in Tonkin were an affair between France and China and were no concern of Vietnam's. Thuyet further expressed the opinion that the General should go back to France with his men and his boats, leaving behind only the Resident General with three to five Residents. Thuyet's letter ended with the declaration that he would not consent to the recruitment of ‘the tiratileurs.28 This time the French Government believed that the moment had come to discard Ton That Thuyet. On 1 July 1885, there arrived in Hue General de Courcy, the newly appointed Commander-in- Chief of the French troops with an escort of 800 Zouaves and 100 light infantrymen. Upon his arrival, de Courcy applied for an audience with the King, but demanded that the Regents come first to the French legation to confer with him, Although Thuyet, suspicious that the French 27 = AWE., Memotres et Documents, Asie, vol. 101, folio 414-416. 28 Ibid., vol. 102, folio 100-101.19 might arrest him, refused to come, claiming that he was sick, de Courcy still insisted on his presence. It was not improbable that, in order to forestall the French attempts to get hold of him personally, Thuyet resolved to strike first.29 On 5 July 1885, at one in the morning, the Vietnamese troops attacked the French legation and the French garrison in Hue. The attack, though intense, was abortive. Seven hours later, the royal palaces fell into the hands of the French. Ton That Thuyet, realizing his failure, retreated with the remains of his men to Cam Lo, taking with him King Ham-Nghi. The fall of Hue signified the complete surrender of the Court. In the following state of anarchy, the Vietnamese political élite was divided into two parties. In response to the appeal of a "Can Vuong" (Rally to the King) movement, mandarins and literati loyal to Ham-Nghi led anti-French revolts in virtually all the provinces of Tonkin and Anpam. Meanwhile, the Royal Family, still hoping to salvage some of Tu-Duc's heritage, gathered around the Empresses Dowagers and accepted all the French diktats. Only two weeks after the events of 5 July, a French newspaper in Tonkin could write that: the Annamese military party has played a game that is lost. It has counted on a popular movement, on the support of the princes of the royal family. But the latter have disowned it at its first failure and made their surrender, taking along with them most of the high functionaries of the kingdom. Annam is divided in two camps: in the first, Prince Thuyet with insignificant forces, but in possession of the person of the young king; in the other, the Regent with the royal family, leaning on our bayonets. 30 Thereafter, the Court of Hue reduced to members of the Royal Family and a handful of mandarins, became nothing more than an instrument of the French authorities. On 30 July 1885, General de Courcy's representative imposed on the Court a new convention, containing the following terms: 29 DWTL, Fifth Period, chapter 8. 30 Le Courrier d'Haiphong, 18 July 1885.20 - article 1. The Resident General has the right to preside over the Council of Government and to summon it in all circumstances. In case of his absence, he may be represented by a delegate. - article 2. Neither nomination nor revocation of Regent, Minister, civil or military high functionary can take place without the preliminary assent of the Resident General. He can demand the revocation of any Regent, Minister or high functionary against whom the French Government would have cause to complain. - article 3. The régime of protectorate instituted for Tonkin by the Treaty concluded in Hue on 6 June 1884, can be, by decision of the Resident General, extended entirely or partly to the provinces of Annam proper. - article 4. France put at the disposal of the King of Annam a military mission, the cost of which will be supported by the royal treasury. The reorganized Annamese army will not exceed an effective force of 8,000 or 10,000 men and will be commanded by a French officer. - article 5. The Tonkinese regiments at present at @ service of France will remain distinct from the Annamese army. - article 6. The present convention will come into force in the meantime, without waiting for the approval Of the French Government.31 In application of the new convention, the French tightened their grip over Vietnamese politics. Nguyen Huu Do, who, because of his professed Francophilia, had been the object of the Vietnamese Government's punitive measures, was made a."Pillar of the Empire" (Vo Hien) 32 and concurrently 31 A.B., Memotres et Documents, Asie, vol. 104, folio 257. 32 "Pillar of the Empire" was one of the highest honorific title bestowed by the King to his most deserving mandarins. There were at any time only four "Pillars of the Empire": ‘Thai Hoa, Can Chanh, Van Minh, Vo Hien. In practice, the Four Pillars were the closest advisors to the21 first Deputy Head of the Privy Council. At the same_time, he was entrusted with the administration of Tonkin.33 The high-level mandarins who were considered as France's adversaries were arrested and exiled. Nguyen Van Tuong, in spite of his dissociations with Ton That Thuyet's military adventures, himself met with the same fate. Tuong was arrested, exiled and his properties confiscated. The reasons for his punishment were given by the following proclamation, on 26 October 1885: Nguyen Van Tuong who was Regent of the kingdom, not only. failed to take equitable and wise resolutions to consolidate the good and amicable relations which existed between the two nations, but was also involved in secret intelligence with Ton That Thuyet to initiate the attacks on the French troops, so as to cause misfortunes to the government, After the battle, he presented himself and pledged to restore by his means security all over the country; but at the end of two months, he has not been able to obtain any good result. To have broken peace and ruined the governnent as he,has done, his culpability is very serious ....3 Having established complete control over the Vietnamese kingdom, de Courcy gratified himself with the making of a new king. He hoped by this to divest the fugitive Ham Nghi's cause of all legitimacy. Ung Ky, Ham-Nghi's oldest brother, was chosen. He was styled Dong-Khanh. The new king was nothing more than a decoration. This was obvious in the way he was enthroned. Certain features of his coronation on 19 September 1885 indicated that the French General willed him to be nothing more than the chief of a conquered nation. The correspondent of the French newspaper Le Figaro described de Courcy's off-hand treatment of the new king in this manner: Emperor and stood in attendance nearest to the throne during all important ceremonial occasions. 33° DWEL, Fifth Period, chapter 8. 34 A.E., Memotres et Documents, Aste, vol. 102, folio 194,22 The general takes the king's hand, makes him go the steps of the throne, but does not allow him to sit down, in spite of a timid trial of the king. A look from the general makes him stand erect .... The real monarch, it is said around me, is not that pale young man sitting on the throne, it is him ... [General de Courcy] who is no longer nameq_in Hue otherwise than the viceroy of Annam.35 However, on his. part de Courcy could report with complacency to the French Minister of War on 4 October 1885 that: With the new King, everything changed. The situation becomes clear, perfectly defined. Friends and foes could know each other The men of order now know where to_ go. Between a wandering child, [who is] sequestered by Thuyet, [ and who was] put on the throne by intrigue, in order to satisfy the criminal ambition of two Regents who disappear from the scene, and the real King, the legitimate King, [who was] designated by the queen Mother and by the Court, residing in Hue, backed by France who presides over the destiny of Annam, hesitation is no longer possible.36 Dong-Khanh and the Complete Forfeit of the Monarchy De Courcy's eulogy of his own accomplishment might seem too much of an overstatement. In fact, put on the throne by the French, while general insurrection spread all over the provinces, Dong-Khanh .in fact possessed only the appearance of reigning. Hue resembled a desert. In his own capital, amidst a diminished court in number, the new king divested of his regal authority and prestige, was subjected to endless humiliations from his "protectors". The imperial citadel was occupied by French troops. Officers lodged in the Ngo-Mon gate, where they could 35 Quoted in Nguyen Van Phong, op.cit., p. 246. 36 A.E., Memotres et Documents, Aste, vol. 102, folio 118.23 look into the throne-hall, and rode on horseback as far as the doors of the sacrosanct palace of the Grand Empress Dowager. The old Queen Mothers sometimes had to undergo disrespectful gestures of inquisitiveness. Even a second lieutenant now could pretend to the right of audience, which the Treaty reserved only to the Resident General. The King had to put up with the habits of the French, and in the process compromised his prestige in the eyes of his subjects. He whose sacred person should remain unexposed, had often to take part in European dinner parties, during which ‘he was sometimes served in gold plates stolen from his own palace.37 For, almost three months after the events of 5 July 1885, the looting of the royal palaces ‘still continued. Not only soldiers, but also high-ranking officers seized upon all the precious objects they could lay their hands on. Under these conditions, lacking authority over his subjects and before the foreigners, Dong-Khanh could not fulfill his royal role, which was the foundation of all legal power regulating the operation of the administrative machinery of the kingdom. The traditional political order which he was supposed to represent had been utterly overturped and was now but a sham. The king's mandate no longer came from Heaven, and he was described as being "the prisoner and the servant" of the French. A great part of his subjects, standing up for Ham-Nghi, refuted the legitimacy of his authority. The feelings of the politically conscious elements of the population with regard to Dong- Khanh were very well depicted in this answer, late in January 1886, of "the literati, notables, soldiers and people” of the province of Binh-Dinh to a proclamation of the Court-appointed governor: «+. Armed for the defence of the throne and the independence of the fatherland, we want to help the Court recover its freedom of action. The world is expecting that from us. It is true that the kingdom has now a king, but the king does not govern, the power is in the hand of he French. The present Court, talking about [the French], says that they are strong, that to resist them is an impossible matter and that, consequently, we must bend with the circumstances 37 A.E., Memotres et Documents, Aste, vol. 103, folio 36.24 and appear to yield until we are capable of taking our-revenge. But, with their protectorate, the French lie to us and deceive us. For, what do they understand by "protectorate", if they by it [they mean] in the whole kingdom, there is not one man capable of governing it? ... Although the Court orders that we surrender and become the servants of the French, we shall do nothing of the sort. We must have lost our common sense and be of wood or stone to accept such humiliations. It is writteri in the Book of Odes: "where there is aking, there mist be a people", but also: “the people are like the roots of the kingdom;if the roots of a tree are in good condition, the tree lives on, prospers and grows". So it is with a kingdom where the people are well cultivated, peace and prosperity fall to its lot.38 The Court of Hue suffered from this degeneration of its authority; humiliated and an object of derision, it ached for the restoration to the king of the plenitude of his powers at least with regard to the internal adminis- tration of the kingdom, even if, in exchange for this, only a last shred of Gia-Long's old great empire could be preserved. Early in 1886, the Grand Empress Dowager dispatched an envoy ‘to Saigon to meet Resident General Paul Bert to renew the earlier offer to cede Tonkin to France in exchange for autonomy of Annam. The resigned attitude of the Court was apparent through the words of its envoy, as related by Paul Bert: We want to save Annam from irretrievable ruin. France is presently in possession of Tonkin. It is an accomplished fact before which we how down. But it would be a great solace to us - that, on a portion of our soil, royal authority could be freely performed. Without wishing to remove the kingdom from France's protection, we Would be pleased if, from Thanh-Hoa to Bing- Thuan, our traditions, our customs, our rights and olr actions could be preserved from the control, from the daily scrutiny of your agents, and our citadels could be evacuated by your troops... .39 38 A.E., Memoires et Documente, Asie, vol. 102, folio 368-370. 39 Ibid., vol. 102, folio 347.25 Joseph Chailley, Paul Bert's son-in-law and close collaborator, gave ‘a still more explicit account of the Court's consciousness of its impotence when he reported Phan Liem, the envoy, as having said: Annam has gone, after the fifth of July and the subsequent régime of iron, so far as to give up all ambition, to lose all hope. You hold Tonkin and you will never release it. In Annam, you occupy our principal towns, you reign in Hue, you do violence to our policy, you upset our administration. Your civilization not only is repulsive to ours: ours does not understand it, does not see it. You crush us, sometimes without knowing it. All these sufferings ... have worn us out, and despaired us. We aspire after rest. Perhaps after us will spring up a generation converted to your ideas, eager for destruction and change. As for us, we are the aged children of an old race. We only ask to die in peace. A retired part where to perpetuate in secret and without desire of propaganda, our traditions and our rites, where to reread our archives and relive our ancient glory, that is all we want. That consent to our desires, the apparent independence of the kingdom, the power restored to the king, that is all that is necessary to quell a revolt incompressible by any other means; and after us, Annam, slowly seduced ‘to your ideas, will come and spontaneously offer itself to your transformation.40 Such a proposal had no chance of being accepted by the French, who did not need. the formal renunciation of the Court to perform their control over Tonkin, and who did not wish to go against the prevailing current of opinion in France by officially carrying out the annexation of Tonkin. On the contrary, they preferred to retain the fiction of the protectorate formula, while tightening their grip in practice. Therefore, in exchange for the repeal of the convention of 30 July 1885, the impracticability of which had become evident to the French authorities, Dong- Khanh agreed, through an ordinance taken on 10 June 1886, to delegate his royal powers to the Kinh-luoe (Royal Emissary) 40 Joseph Chailey, Paul Bert au Tonkin, Paris, 1887, pp. 77-78.26 of Tonkin, This was an unprecedented deed. Henceforth, the Xinh-luoe could appoint all the functionaries, take all the decisions without having to refer to the Court. Ironi- cally, the French had the authority to revoke him according to Article 7 of the 1884 Treaty. In fact, the nomination and dismissal of functionaries and the modification of internal administration in Tonkin were under French control. Paul Bert could claim that: by right, public acts will always be accomplished and promulgated in the name of the King of Annam. In reality, we are the absolute masters; we have thus all the advantages of the annexation, without its inconveniences ....41 Tonkin thus drifted further away from Annam. The French, meanwhile, witnessed in Annam, through the wide range of the support given to the fugijtive king Ham- Nghi, the strength of the monarchical concept, and that kingship, with its sacred character, continued to remain a great social and political force. In order to use the monarchical institution as an effective instrument of government, it was indispensable for them to preserve the sacred and inviolable character of the king's prestigious role. Even the French military authorities understood this necessity. General Warnet, who replaced de Courcy as commander of the French troops in Tonkin, wrote to Paul Bert that since the French had proclaimed Dong-Khanh king in Hue, they ought to do all that would be needed: to uphold him there and have his authority respected in all the provinces of his kingdom; he could offer a considerable help, by the prestige which the royal authority still preserves over the populations in pacifying and reorganizing the country.42 Paul Bert also declared: If we want to act as protectors, and use the King as an intermediary between his subjects and ourselves, it is evidently necessary that this intermediary have some authority. And, 41 A.O.M., Indochine A.F., carton 51, dossier D 12 (7). 42 A.E., Memotres et Doownents, Asie, vol. 103, folio 184.27 as he lacks this authority by original vice, it is incumbent upon us to give it to him by dint of attention and respect.43 Moral and material reparations were subsequently made to the Court: most of the objects belonging to the palaces were returned, the imperial citadel was evacuated, freedom of movement was restored to the king and his Court, etc. +s. Orders were given to all ‘the French authorities to display, in every occasion, marks of deference to the royal person. A royal expedition was organized in July 1886 in order for Dong-Khanh to make a tour of inspection of the northern provinces of Annam. There was something ironical in this parade. Here was the spectacle of a king marching against his own people who had taken up arms to resist foreign aggression to his own country. Nevertheless, satisfaction given to the King and his Court had only something of a platonic nature. Notwith- standing all their declarations of intent, the French never hesitated to clip away new portions of Dong-Khanh's authority, whenever they deemed it necessary. ‘The fear of new troubles prevented the French authorities from acceding to the Governor of Cochinchina's desire to annex the two provinces of Binh-Thuan and Khanh-Hoa to Cochinchina, which had been occupied by Cochinchinese troops in 1886-87. The alleged reason for this refusal was that the king's prestige would be harmed by this new amputation of his territory. But, when the French failed to repress the revolts in the Northern provinces of Annam, they did not hesitate to force the Court of Hue to agree to a political arrangement through which a sort of viceroyalty would be formed with the three provinces of Thanh-Hoa, Nghe-An and Ha-Tinh and placed under Ham-Nghi's rule, if the latter made his surrender. 44 This project was abandoned after Ham-Nghi fell into the hands of the Frerlch and was exiled to Algeria, but the French Residents and French troops controlled the above mentioned provinces. That was not all. Dong-Khanh had to hand over to France his sovereignty upon certain territories deemed essential for the interest of French 43° A.E., Memoires et Documents, Asie,vol. 103, folio 36. 44 Depot des Archives d'Outre-Mer, Aix-en-Provence (D.A.0.M.), Fonds des Amirauz, 10513.28 presence and trade. By his ordinance of 3 October 1888, he xelinguished to the French Government the ownership of the municipal territories of Hanoi, Hai-Phong and Tourane. Meanwhile, pressed by urgent. financial needs, the Court of Hue requested the annual payment of a subsidy to be deducted from the resources of Tonkin. But the French authorities referred to the Treaty to dismiss the Court's claim, at the same time making difficulties to give to the Court its due from the collection of taxes from the provinces of Tonkin. In short, in spite of the presence of some partisans of an attenuated form of protectorate among the French Residents, the general tendency of French policy during Dong-Khanh's reign was towards a more direct mode of domination. which would allow :the French to take in hand even the orientation of the kingdom. With the constitution in October 1887 of the Unton Indochinoise, placing all the countries of Indochina under the authority of a Governor General, the distinction in the political status of Annam &nd Tonkin became more of a fiction in practice. 46 Therefore, one should not be misled by the appearance of a revival of political activity at the Court of Hue in the last year of Dong-Khanh's reign. It was the French who willed that the King and his entourage possessed a semblance Of independence in Annam, and, if they could preserve a territory which remained "empire of Dai-Nam", it was mainly for the purpose of perpetuating there the tradition and rites of the monarchy. But, in order to obtain the reforms and improvements needed for their security and their interests in Annam, the French were not going to restrict themselves to only exerting pressure on the King's advisers and ministers, or even on the King himself, but they were going soon to claim direct control of the key positions of the central administration. Dong-Khanh died on .28 January 1889. The Court concurred to the designation, as his successor, of a ten- year-old child, Buu Lan, the son of Duc-Duc who had been king for only three days after Tu-Duc's death. The French 45 D.A.0.M., Fonds des Amiraum, 22133. 46 A.0.M., Indochine A.F., carton 3, dossier A 12 (3). Instructions to Constans, Governor General of Indochina, 19-XI-1887.29 xepresentative, who had been consulted in due form, could have nothing to say against this designation, However, it was felt that the Court alarmed by the concession Dong-Khanh had so readily made to the French, had wanted, by proclaiming a minor king and instituting a Council of Regency, to screen the royal person from direct external pressure with the interposition of an impersonal and irresponsible board. But this could be only a derisory attempt to safeguard what was left of the rights of the monarchy. This attempt was immediately neutralized by the convention signed on 26 February 1889, between the Council of Regency and the French Resident General, to regulate the relations of the two governments: The Council of Regency will hold everyday a session. for the expedition of current matters «ss. Independently from these daily sessions, the Council of Regency will. meet after agreement with the Resident General for the study or the examination of the questions which could not have been solved in the ordinary sessions. The President of the Council and the Resident General will deliberate to settle the days and hours of the Council. The Resident General will attend or will have himself represented at the sessions of the Council.47 In fact, only five years after the disappearance of Tu-Duc, the Vietnamese monarchy, enervated by the French protectorate, abandoned by a part of its supporters, had lost most of its attributions. And still, it was going to be robbed of its last prerogatives in the near future. 47 D.A.0.M., Fonds des Amirauc, 9618, document no. 31.30 BIBLIOGRAPHY This paper is based primarily on the Records of the Nguyen dynasty, and on documents consulted in the archives of the Ministére des Affaires Etrangéres and the former Ministére de la France d'Outre-Mer (whose holdings now constitute the Section Outre-Mer of the Archives Nationales) in Paris, and in the Dép6t des Archives d'Outre-Mer at Aix-en-Provence. (France). Because its main focus is on the effort of the Nguyen monarchy to survive during the fateful years 1883-88, it has deliberately avoided dealing at length with the military aspects of French intervention in Vietnam. For details of these aspects, the rebder could xefer to such works as: Cho. Huan-Lai.. Lee ortgines du conflit franeo-chinots a propos du Tonkin juequien 1883. Paris, 1935. Delvaux A. La prise de Hué par les Francais. Bulletin des Amis du Vieux Hué, 1940, pp. 259-294. Evans B.L. The Attitudes and Polictes of Great-Britain and China toward French Eupansion in Cochin China, Cambodia, Annam and Tongking (1858-1883). Ph.D. dissertation, University of London, 1961. McAleavy H. Black Flags in Vietnam. The Story of a Chinese Intervention. ‘The Tonkin War of 1884-1885. New York, 1968. Nguyen Van Phong. La société vietnamienne de 1882 a 1902, Paris, 1971. Osborn M.E. The French Presence in Cochinchina and Cambodia. Rule and Reeponse, 1859-1905. Ithaca, N.Y., 1969. Sogny L., M. Rheinart, premier chargé d'affaires 4 Hue: journal, notes et correspondance. Bulletin dee Amis du Vieux Hue, 1943, pp. 1-246. faboulet, G. La Geete franeatse en Indochine. Paris, 1955-56. 2 vol.Truong-Buu Lam. Paterne of Vietnamese Response to Foreign Intervention, 1858-1900. New Haven, 1967. Vial P. Wos premttres années au Tonkin. Paris, 1889. General X. L'Annam du 5 juillet 1885 au 4 avril 1886. Paris, 1887. 31Appendix 1“g06T uMfuel uaiQ-zuexyxg.p aswounag 2]09%,] ap uNaTng ‘sayyureuue sonseukp sop onbWojouoryp neajquy, ‘] s22xpeD - ua yusyD ONT OnyL WON’ mG - *ADANOS (we7_nng) reer s98T-1-9 WOT LIS 6681-1-83 S881-01-9 uo pap HBT RS OF SBBT-11-63 © S8BT-6-41 “e881 Amf wy zosszoone moxy pouipar wo pour wo pouljar Fong-ny se poyeudysoy TSTS-g vO WOR ‘E9BI-ZZT UO WOE FORT-Z-6T UO Wg 2981-342 wo wrog (prt San) (@ueq_ San) (44 Sun) (wey 8un) PEN-Oe Sa OT WET aog Saqrong S88T-T1-62_ OF 9881-96 UO z2AnyL pue ‘IPEP mow PP “EsBI SBRT-L-0G Woy pour -g7eT-G-9T 4O PIP HEL UY FSBT-6-6T Buony, musfer om Jo “LESTEZ —“L-GT % BPBT-OT-GS WOH 2BT-TT-T wo wag “S981 M] wuog = uo aBuHy Jo Pag sapio Aq poywmpeeery = WO pap “GEREN Wog — pus GZET-6-6% UO Wog (Saop-00ng}-8ue7) $007 song uary 10 (ama 80H) (rou-try) won TOON On Buogg Ay Foona Ban ORL. oer 6% 98 8% ® savy Saou ‘suos gz pey HL-NIYY, roredugINSTITUTE OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES LIST OF PUBLICATIONS IN THE Research Notes and Discussions Series 1M. Maingsy, Reengmic Problems Related to Oil and Gas Exploration; 1976. 2 Rk ae Liddle, Cultural and Class Politics in New Order Indonesia, 1977. Raja Segaran Arumugam, State and Oil in Burma, 1977. 36pp. $5.00 4 Hilman Adil, Australia’s Policy Towards Indonesia During Confrontation, 1962-66, ait australis olicy During Confrontation, 5. Albers; Moscotti, Burma's Constitution and Elections of 1974: A Source Book, 917. ae 6 Thamsook Thailand and the Japanese Presence, 1941-45, 1977. ep BRTBOS J ene’ 7 Nguyen The Anh, The Withering Days of the Nguyen Dynasty, 1978. 88pp. For publications other than the above series, please write for further information to p The Editor Institute of Southeast Asian Studies Gluny Road ‘Singapore 10THE AUTHOR ‘Dr, Nguyen The Anh is currently Researcher at the Centre National de Ja Recherche Scientifique (Paris) and Visiting Professor of Vietnamese History at . Harvard University (till June 1978). He was Visiting Fellow at ISEAS from, June to September 1977. He has published articles and books on Vietnamese history in English, Vietnamese and French and is a contributor to. the Journal of the Royal Society for Asian Affairs and other bulletins.