Section 4.

No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of

the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government
for redress of grievances.

Bayan, et al., Vs. Eduardo Ermita, et al.,

G.R. No. 169838
April 25, 2006

Facts: The petitioners, Bayan, et al., alleged that they are citizens and taxpayers of the
Philippines and that their right as organizations and individuals were violated when the rally they
participated in on October 6, 2005 was violently dispersed by policemen implementing Batas
Pambansa No. 880.

Petitioners contended that Batas Pambansa No. 880 is clearly a violation of the Constitution and
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human rights treaties of which
the Philippines is a signatory. They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can
stage a public assembly regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and present danger. It
also curtails the choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as
the time and place of a public assembly form part of the message which the expression is sought.
Furthermore, it is not content-neutral as it does not apply to mass actions in support of the
government. The words lawful cause, opinion, protesting or influencing suggest the
exposition of some cause not espoused by the government. Also, the phrase maximum
tolerance shows that the law applies to assemblies against the government because they are
being tolerated. As a content-based legislation, it cannot pass the strict scrutiny test. This petition
and two other petitions were ordered to be consolidated on February 14, 2006. During the course
of oral arguments, the petitioners, in the interest of a speedy resolution of the petitions, withdrew
the portions of their petitions raising factual issues, particularly those raising the issue of whether
B.P. No. 880 and/or CPR is void as applied to the rallies of September 20, October 4, 5 and 6,
2005.

Issue: Whether the Calibrated Pre-emptive response and the Batas Pambansa No. 880,
specifically Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a) and 14(a) violates Art. III Sec. 4 of the Philippine
Constitution as it causes a disturbing effect on the exercise by the people of the right to
peaceably assemble.

Held: Section 4 of Article III of the Philippine Constitution provides that no law shall be passed
abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances. The right to
peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances, together with freedom of speech, of
expression, and of the press, is a right that enjoys dominance in the sphere of constitutional
protection. For this rights represent the very basis of a functional democratic polity, without which
all the other rights would be meaningless and unprotected.

However, it must be remembered that the right, while sacrosanct, is not absolute. It may be
regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor
injurious to the rights of the community or society. The power to regulate the exercise of such and
other constitutional rights is termed the sovereign police power, which is the power to prescribe
regulations, to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general
welfare of the people.

B.P. No 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the
time, place and manner of the assemblies. B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that it refers to all
kinds of public assemblies that would use public places. The reference to lawful cause does not
make it content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they
would not be peaceable and entitled to protection. Neither the words opinion, protesting, and
influencing in of grievances come from the wording of the Constitution, so its use cannot be
avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all rallyist and is
independent of the content of the expression in the rally.

Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present danger to public
order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health. This is a recognized
exception to the exercise of the rights even under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Wherefore, the petitions are GRANTED in part, and respondents, more particularly the Secretary
of the Interior and Local Governments, are DIRECTED to take all necessary steps for the
immediate compliance with Section 15 of Batas Pambansa No. 880 through the establishment or
designation of at least one suitable freedom park or plaza in every city and municipality of the
country. After thirty (30) days from the finality of this Decision, subject to the giving of advance
notices, no prior permit shall be required to exercise the right to peaceably assemble and petition
in the public parks or plaza in every city or municipality that has not yet complied with section 15
of the law. Furthermore, Calibrated pre-emptive response (CPR), insofar as it would purport to
differ from or be in lieu of maximum tolerance, is NULL and VOID and respondents are
ENJOINED to REFRAIN from using it and to STRICTLY OBSERVE the requirements of
maximum tolerance, The petitions are DISMISSED in all other respects, and the constitutionality
of Batas Pambansa No. 880 is SUSTAINED

Content-neutral when the restriction is directed, not to the speech itself, but to the incidents (such
as time, place, or manner) of the speech

An example of a content-neutral restriction is when the government regulates the manner of

posting campaign advertisements, in which case the restriction is on the manner the right is
made.

David vs Arroyo

On February 24, 2006, as the Filipino nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the EDSA
People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017, implemented by G.O. No. 5, declaring a state
of national emergency, thus:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the

Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, by virtue of the
powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which states that:
The President. . . whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to prevent
or suppress. . .rebellion. . ., and in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby
command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the
Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or
rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations
promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of
the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency.

In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, respondents stated
that the proximate cause behind the executive issuances was the conspiracy among some
military officers, leftist insurgents of the New Peoples Army, and some members of the political
opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate President Arroyo.They considered the aim to oust or
assassinate the President and take-over the reins of government as a clear and present danger.

Petitioners David and Llamas were arrested without warrants on February 24, 2006 on
their way to EDSA. Meanwhile, the offices of the newspaper Daily Tribune, which was perceived
to be anti-Arroyo, was searched without warrant at about 1:00 A.M. on February 25, 2006. Seized
from the premises in the absence of any official of the Daily Tribune except the security guard of
the building were several materials for publication. The law enforcers, a composite team of PNP
and AFP officers, cited as basis of the warrantless arrests and the warrantless search and seizure
was Presidential Proclamation 1017 issued by then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in the
exercise of her constitutional power to call out the Armed Forces of the Philippines to prevent or
suppress lawless violence.

II. THE ISSUE

1. Were the warrantless arrests of petitioners David, et al., made pursuant to PP 1017, valid?
2. Was the warrantless search and seizure on the Daily Tribunes officesconducted pursuant
to PP 1017 valid?

III. THE RULING

[The Court partially GRANTED the petitions.]

1. NO, the warrantless arrests of petitioners David, et al., made pursuant to PP

1017, were NOT valid.

[S]earches, seizures and arrests are normally unreasonable unless authorized by a

validly issued search warrant or warrant of arrest. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure provides [for the following circumstances of valid warrantless arrests]:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense.
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and
x x x.

Neither of the [provisions on in flagrante nor hot pursuit warrantless arrests] justifies
petitioner Davids warrantless arrest. During the inquest for the charges of inciting to sedition and
violation of BP 880, all that the arresting officers could invoke was their observation that some
rallyists were wearing t-shirts with the invective Oust Gloria Nowand their erroneous assumption
that petitioner David was the leader of the rally.Consequently, the Inquest Prosecutor ordered his
immediate release on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. He noted that petitioner David was
not wearing the subject t-shirt and even if he was wearing it, such fact is insufficient to charge him
with inciting to sedition.

2. NO, the warrantless search and seizure on the Daily

Tribunes officesconducted pursuant to PP 1017 was NOT valid.

[T]he search [and seizure in the Daily Tribune premises] is illegal. Rule 126 of The
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure lays down the steps in the conduct of search and seizure.
Section 4 requires that a search warrant be issued upon probable cause in connection with one
specific offence to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. Section 8 mandates that the
search of a house, room, or any other premise be made in the presence of the lawful occupant
thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, in the presence of two (2)
witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality. And Section 9 states
that the warrant must direct that it be served in the daytime, unless the property is on the person
or in the place ordered to be searched, in which case a direction may be inserted that it be served
at any time of the day or night. All these rules were violated by the CIDG operatives.
Eastern Brodacasting vs Dans

Facts: A petition was filed to reopen the Radio Station DYRE. DYRE was summarily
closed on grounds of national security. The radio station was allegedly used to incite
people to sedition. Petitioner, DYRE contends that they were denied due process.
There was no hearing to establish factual evidence for the closure. Furthermore, the
closure of the radio station violates freedom of expression. Before the court could
even promulgate a decision upon the Issue raised, Petitioner, through its president
Mr. Rene Espina, filed a motion to withdraw the petition. The rights of the station
were sold to a new owner, Manuel Pastrana; who is no longer interested in pursuing
the case. Despite the case becoming moot and academic, (because there are no
longer interested parties, thus the dismissal of the case) the Supreme Court still
finds that there is need to pass a RESOLUTION for the guidance of inferior courts
and administrative tribunals in matters as this case.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not due process was exercised in the case of DYRE.

(2) Whether or not the closure of DYRE is a violation of the Constitutional Right of
Freedom of Expression.

Held: The court finds that the closure of the Radio Station in 1980 as null and void.
The absence of a hearing is a violation of Constitutional Rights. The primary
requirements in administrative proceedings are laid down in the case of Ang Tibay v.
Court of Industrial Relation (69 Phil.635). The Ang Tibay Doctrine should be followed
before any broadcast station may be closed. The Ang Tibay Doctrine provides the
following requirements:

(1) The right to hearing, includes the right to present ones case and submit evidence
presented.
(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented
(3) The decision must have something to support itself.
(4) Evidence must be substantial (reasonable evidence that is adequate to support
conclusion)
(5) Decision must be based on the evidence presented at hearing
(6) The tribunal body must act on its own independent consideration of law and facts
and not simply accept subordinates views
(7) Court must render decision in such a manner that the proceeding can know the
various issued involved and reasons for decisions rendered.

The court stresses that while there is no controlling and precise definition of Due
Process, it gives an unavoidable standard that government actions must conform in
order that deprivation of life, liberty and property is valid.

The closure of the radio station is like wise a violation of the constitutional right of
freedom of speech and expression. The court stresses that all forms of media,
whether print or broadcast are entitled to this constitutional right. Although the
government still has the right to be protected against broadcasts which incite the
listeners to violently overthrow it. The test for the limitation of freedom of expression
is the clear and present danger rule. If in the circumstances that the media is used
in such nature as to create this danger that will bring in such evils, then the law has
the right to prevent it. However, Radio and television may not be used to organize a
rebellion or signal a start of widespread uprising. The freedom to comment on public
affairs is essential to the vitality of a representative democracy. The people continues
to have the right to be informed on public affairs and broadcast media continues to
have the pervasive influence to the people being the most accessible form of media.
Therefore, broadcast stations deserve the the special protection given to all forms of
media by the due process and freedom of expression clauses of the Constitution.

People vs. Perez

FACTS:
Accused-appellant was charged for rape. The information alleged that the victim was his
stepdaughter but did not allege that the victim was only 13 years old at the time of the rape.

During arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to the accusation against him. During trial it was
proved that the victim was the stepdaughter of the accused and was in fact 13 years old at the
time the crime of rape was committed. Accused was then convicted of qualified rape and was
meted out the penalty of death.

ISSUE: WON an accused may be convicted of qualified rape when the information alleged only
simple rape?
HELD: NO. Citing People vs. Garcia, the court heldthat it would be a denial of the right of the
accused to be informed of the charges against him and, consequently, a denial of due
process, if he is charged with simple rape and be convicted of its qualified form
punishable by death, although the attendant circumstance qualifying the offense and
resulting in capital punishment was not alleged in the indictment on which he was
arraigned.Procedurally, then, while the minority of Maribel and the relationship of appellant and
his victim were established during the trial, appellant can only be convicted of simple rape
because he cannot be punished for a graver offense than that with which he was charged.
Under the rules of criminal procedure, a qualifying circumstance to be considered as such
must be so alleged in the information, which is not required of aggravating circumstances.
The requirement for complete allegations on the particulars of the indictment is based on the right
of the accused to be fully informed of the nature of the charge against him, so that be may
adequately prepare for this defense pursuant to the due process clause of the Constitution.