Republic v.

Cantor
G.R. No. 184621; December 10, 2013

FACTS:
Sometime in January 1998, Jerry F. Cantor left his wife Maria Fe Espinosa Cantor
after a violent quarrel. After more than four years of not seeing or hearing from
Jerry, Maria Fe filed a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of her
husband. She alleged that she conducted a diligent search for her husband and
exerted earnest efforts to find him. The RTC granted her petition. Dissatisfied with
the ruling, the OSG filed the present petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:
Did Maria Fe have a well-founded belief that Jerry was dead in pursuant with Article
41 of the Family Code?

HELD:
Whether or not one has a well-founded belief that his or her spouse is dead
depends on the unique circumstance of each case and that there is no set standard
or procedure in determining the same. Maria Fes alleged well-founded belief
arose when: 1) Jerrys relatives and friends could not give her any information on his
whereabouts; and 2) she did not find Jerrys name in the patients directory
whenever she went to a hospital. It appears that Maria Fe did not actively look for
her husband in hospitals and it may be sensed that her search was not intentional
or planned. Her search for Jerry was far from diligent. Were it not for the finality of
the RTC ruling, the declaration of presumptive death should have been recalled and
set aside for utter lack of factual basis.
VALINO vs ADRIANO et al.
G.R. No. 182894; April 22, 2014; Mendoza, En Banc

DOCTRINE:
The law confines the right and duty to make funeral arrangements to
the members of the family to the exclusion of ones common law partner.
Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and
woman not legally married who cohabit for many years as husband and wife,
who represent themselves to the public as husband and wife, and who are
reputed to be husband and wife in the community where they live may be
considered legally married in common law jurisdictions but not in the
Philippines.

It is generally recognized that the corpse of an individual is outside the

commerce of man. However, the law recognizes that a certain right of
possession over the corpse exists, for the purpose of a decent burial, and for
the exclusion of the intrusion by third persons who have no legitimate
interest in it. This quasi-property right, arising out of the duty of those
obligated by law to bury their dead, also authorizes them to take possession
of the dead body for purposes of burial to have it remain in its final resting
place, or to even transfer it to a proper place where the memory of the dead
may receive the respect of the living. This is a family right. There can be no
doubt that persons having this right may recover the corpse from third
persons.

FACTS:
Atty. Adriano Adriano (Atty. Adriano) married respondent Rosario
Adriano in 1955. The couple had 5 children and 1 adopted child,
also impleaded herein as respondents. The marriage did turn sour
and the couple separated in fact, though Adriano continued to
support his wife and children.

Atty. Adriano then started living with Valino, whom he courted. Atty.
Adriano died and since his immediate family, including respondent
were in the United States, Valino took it upon herself to bury Atty.
Adriano at her family's mausoleum. In the meantime, Respondents
heard about the death and requested Valino to delay the burial so
they can pay their final respects, but Valino still buried the body.
Respondents commenced suit against Valino praying that they be
indemnified for actual, moral and exemplary damages and
attorneys fees and that the remains of Atty. Adriano be exhumed
and transferred to the family plot.

Valino claimed that it was Atty. Adriano's last wish to be buried at

Valino's family's mausoleum and that the respondent's knew that
Atty. Adriano was already in a coma yet they still proceeded to the
US on vacation. And that as far as the public was concerned, Valino
had been introducing her as his wife for the past 20 years.

The RTC dismissed the complaint of respondents for lack of merit as

well as the counterclaim of Valino after it found them to have not
been sufficiently proven.

CA reversed [explained that Rosario, being the legal wife, was

entitled to the custody of the remains of her deceased husband.
Citing Article 305 of the New Civil Code in relation to Article 199 of
the Family Code, it was the considered view of the appellate court
that the law gave the surviving spouse not only the duty but also
the right to make arrangements for the funeral of her husband. For
the CA, Rosario was still entitled to such right on the ground of her
subsisting marriage with Atty. Adriano at the time of the latters
death, notwithstanding their 30-year separation in fact.]

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents (wife and children of deceased Atty.
Adriano) are entitled to the remains of Atty. Adriano.

HELD:
YES. The weight of legal provisions puts the responsibility of the
burial with the respondents, to wit:
The duty and the right to make arrangements for the funeral of a relative
shall be in accordance with the order established for support, under Article
294. In case of descendants of the same degree, or of brothers and sisters,
the oldest shall be preferred. In case of ascendants, the paternal shall have
a better right. (New Civil Code Art. 305)

Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support, the liability shall
devolve upon the following persons in the order herein provided:
(1) The spouse;
(2) The descendants in the nearest degree;
(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and
(4) The brothers and sisters. (Family Code, Art. 199)

No human remains shall be retained, interred, disposed of or exhumed

without the consent of the persons mentioned in Articles [199 of the Family
Code] and 305. (New Civil Code, Art. 308)

As applied to this case, it is clear that the law gives the right and
duty to make funeral arrangements to Rosario, she being the
surviving legal wife of Atty. Adriano. The fact that she was living
separately from her husband and was in the United States when he
died has no controlling significance. To say that Rosario had, in
effect, waived or renounced, expressly or impliedly, her right and
duty to make arrangements for the funeral of her deceased husband
is baseless.

It is also recognized that a corpse is outside the commerce of man.

However, the law recognizes that a certain right of possession over
the corpse exists, for the purpose of a decent burial, and for the
exclusion of the intrusion by third persons who have no legitimate
interest in it. This quasi-property right, arising out of the duty of
those obligated by law to bury their dead, also authorizes them to
take possession of the dead body for purposes of burial to have it
remain in its final resting place, or to even transfer it to a proper
place where the memory of the dead may receive the respect of the
living. This is a family right. There can be no doubt that persons
having this right may recover the corpse from third persons.
Tomas Eugenio, Sr. vs. Velez

Facts: Vitaliana Vargas brothers and sisters unaware of the formers death on August 28,
1988 filed a petition for Habeas Corpus on September 27, 1988 before the RTC of Misamis Oriental
alleging that she was forcible taken from her residence sometime in 1987 and was confined by the
herein petitioner, Tomas Eugenio in his palacial residence in Jasaan, Misamis Oriental.

The respondent court in an order dated 28 September 1988 issued the writ of habeas corpus, but the
writ was returned unsatisfied. Petitioner refused to surrender the body of Vitaliana (who had died on
28 August 1988) to the respondent sheriff, reasoning that a corpse cannot be the subject of habeas
corpus proceedings; besides, according to petitioner, he had already obtained a burial permit.
Petitioner claims that as her common law husband, he has legal custody of her body.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner can claim custody of the deceased.

Held:
The custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to the surviving brothers and sisters.
Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides:

Persons charged with duty of burial - if the deceased was an unmarried man or woman or a child and
left any kin; the duty of the burial shall devolve upon the nearest kin of the deceased.

Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and woman not legally married who
cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the public as husband and
wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the community where they live may be
considered legally married in common law jurisdictions but not in the Philippines.

While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside the fact that such relationships are present in our
society, and that they produce a community of properties and interests which is governed by law,
authority exists in case law to the effect that such form of co-ownership requires that the man and
woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage. In any case, herein
petitioner has a subsisting marriage with another woman, a legal impediment which disqualified him
from even legally marrying Vitaliana.
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA
HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner.
G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005

FACTS:
Honorato Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He
prayed that the child's middle name Astorga be changed to Garcia, her mother's surname, and that her
surname Garcia be changed to Catindig, his surname.
Trial court granted the petition and declared Stephanie as his legitimate child and heir, and pursuant to
Art. 189 of the Family Code, she is now known as Stephanie Nathy Catindig.
Honorato filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration that Stephanie should be allowed to use
the surname Garcia as her middle name.
The Republic, through the OSG, agreed with Honorato for her relationship with her natural mother should
be maintained and preserved, to prevent any confusion and hardship in the future, and under Article 189
she remains to be an intestate heir of her mother.

ISSUE:
Whether or not an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her natural
mother as her middle name.

RULING:
Yes. there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like Stephanie, to use,
as middle name her mothers surname, we find no reason why she should not be allowed to do so.
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, (An Act Allowing Illegitimate
Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father) is silent as to what middle name a child may use. Article
365 of the CC merely provides that an adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter. Article 189
of the Family Code, enumerating the legal effects of adoption, is likewise silent on the matter.

Republic Act No. 8552, (Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) an legitimate child by virtue of her adoption,
Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any
kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother.
G.R. No. 97906 May 21, 1992

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MAXIMO WONG, respondents.

Public Attorney's Office for private respondent.

Facts:

Private respondent Maximo Wong is the legitimate son of Maximo Alcala, Sr. and Segundina Y.
Alcala. When he was but two and a half years old and then known as Maximo Alcala, Jr., and his
sister Margaret Alcala, was then nine years old, they were, with the consent of their natural
parents 3 and by order of the court in Special Case No. 593 4 issued on September 9, 1967, adopted by
spouses Hoong Wong and Concepcion Ty Wong, both naturalized Filipinos. Hoong Wong, now deceased,
was an insurance agent while Concepcion Ty Wong was a high school teacher. They decided to adopt the
children as they remained childless after fifteen years of marriage. The couples showered their adopted
children with parental love and reared them as their own children.

Upon reaching the age of twenty-two, herein private respondent, by then married and a junior
Engineering student at Notre Dame University, Cotabato City, filed a petition to change his name to
Maximo Alcala, Jr. It was averred that his use of the surname Wong embarrassed and isolated him
from his relatives and friends, as the same suggests a Chinese ancestry when in truth and in fact he
is a Muslim Filipino residing in a Muslim community, and he wants to erase any implication
whatsoever of alien nationality; that he is being ridiculed for carrying a Chinese surname, thus
hampering his business and social life; and that his adoptive mother does not oppose his desire to
revert to his former surname.

Issue: