Nicos Poulantzas London: NLB Antic Highlands: HUMANITIES PRESS. The Crisis of the Dictatorships Portugal Greece Spain Translated by David Fernbach DerLibrary of Congres Cataloging in Publication Data Poulan, Nico he x. Portage Poi and goverment eee, Mader-Plitcr and porement1967- 2. SprinPottee nd goverment tpape905. a Tie Breton, yos'd'o¢s 757303 iw pubihe a La Cris der Ditatrs by Feta Mayen, ss (Bi rango Mpers 1978 “This edition it publi 576 ONL so76 ote Beydone Panes Limite, Thetford, Novo Contents Preface I The Imperialist World Context II The Dictatorships, the Unitee States and Europe TIL The Dominant Classes IV The Popular Classes ‘The State Apparatuses VI Conclusion From March 1975 to June 1976 Index oy " os 90 Ry 14 163Preface dicturhip Portal and reste and the acekertod aay athe Franco pein Spin tt ovo to lon the hata ngs Bot the phan bythe al ofthe Portuguese nd Greck diseworhig andthe proces pow under wey Spain, fabcu munber of imports question which ars fr fore ining resolved. "The bane pot i thaw follow. "The Portus and Grek reps were evden not ove thrown by-an ope and’ Hostal movement of the popu ‘panna rie rr efoen sa Sata cas os Tan ten ond Nera Coma ‘Wm then are the factor that determined their overdo, re whet form his the intervene ofthe popula ase ‘Siena ts ompoctue? "Thora mo jst questions beating only on Portigl Gens ed Spas They ao concern, patil, seer ‘Sher cunts which have in common with thw we ae Geslng wih beet they stand eaionbip of depend. eres he ipsa cima apres cared ip Sept copula animes nck, bonapartin, SoS aot ae eel only aut the merous Shampiesin ter Aner. Te leone that maybe dawn em the Europea dictator are of jor importance in th cape Bursar ofthese questions lo concer the indians 7anid ree’ counties of Europe they ae called. For Greece, Pebeal and Spain are characterized by 8 special kind of rience: These countries are no longer marked by the ter tcfered to descriptively as “underdevelopment ere there teonenic and socd_sirucute & concerned BS Es in the Burogean afenn The event ving Sh ge Re ae recat asin come repost, {pte other European countries. Thee ten are the questions tat his essay dels with, end to wich i sem out 10 give at least preliminary rough ‘Save: With ths ing, Trust make the following points Teves for the sae of clanction 1) My intention has been to produce a short text of political theory, limites to the basie questions; it & in no way Eeitlhive and does not present 2 detailed history of these sentnee und their overthrow, Its addressed to a relatively ‘Filsinformed readership, who heve been follosring the events Tntheve countries with # political interest, and ean thus to & Ghar extent dispense ith a factual description and "oe underiying causes and their explanation. Neserticlean and so as not to make the presentation too dry, Iipave brouiit in what seemed to me the most important Tonerete material in an effort to avoid the usual danger of SRistppe of aniysis, je to aay a the same time too much and 10 litte 2) The overthrow of the Portuguese and Greek regimes, and aaa roses elepaing in Spain, teem £0 me to exhibit certain ‘Shetnon feats, atleast ae far asthe basic factors involved See'Concemned: ‘This is frequently despite manifest appear- Aces and the reasons for thi I shall explain. While I have ho Seun concerned to point out the important differences {hat remain, 1 ave sought above all to Keep in mind these Telit, even though thie obviously involves » certain egres of echenatism, 4) There is one major sbsence in this text which is entirely Alatberre, Even though T frequenty indicate the role that Profece 9 organizations ofthe left have played in thee proceses, Ihave fot pone into their actions m any detail, confining myself to Bringing out what is to a certain extent the effect of these tctions, namely the particular ole of the popular masses. ‘This in no way because I under-estimate the action ofthese organizations, but for quite the opposite reason, In order to eal properly with their role, it would have been necessary to embark on an exhaustive discussion of politcal strategies land the questions of political theory that underlie them, and this would have involved a separate book. Paced here in ‘particular with the danger of saying both too much and too Title, I have made the definite choice of ‘eeving the ground uuntrodden for the time being. 44) This essay, therefore, is not envisaged as anything more ‘han a contrination to the discussion alreaey under way on the vents that have taken place up tll now, particulary with eopect to the process of democratization, and the lessons to bbe drawn from them. Above al ie doesnot claim to define the paths that these countries wil follow inthe Future, and this i particulary true for Portugal, given the instability of the present balance of foree in that country. 5) One final remark ~ in certain analyses en positions taken in this text, the reader wil find some departures from my book ‘Fascign and Dictatorship, published orginally in 1970. To some extent these iffeences bear on the diferent nature of the object under consideration, in the present case regimes of military dictatorship which ae nor in the strict sense fascist, fand whieh ate locted in a different bisorical period from ‘hat ofthe inter-war years, But these differences are alo dve {pparto certain recifications of my previous analyses, due to the fact that events in these countries have undeniably presented. a series of new elements in the experience of Popular movements confronting. the exceptional capitalist Fegimes (regimes of open war ageinst Use popular mastes). Paris, February 1975‘The Imperialist World Context “The evens tit have taken place in Portugal and Gree, Taf aSoces now besinning iv Spa, can only be properly SrSapean ters ofthe new worl context which they aze Heme other words the new phase of enperiliam, and is cree ce he European counties, Within the uropean Sfepe,Porapd, Groce and Spain foc aii in Geter, doqreea # characterise expe of dependence ip SENGr he mpenalee meropliaes and the United ce oh their dominant centre ad ee eron to foi on these countries she traditional notion of “uner-detelopment. By ter eonomic a social Shute ey ae now pet of Eon; thir proxy seichi geourphie nr oven predominantly so Antepating Src wean ven sy tht cera tres of he Renee da they present elation tothe United States seep the: Buropean countries the EEC) also character~ sei thm row phase of imperialism, thowe European Siti thar thenoles_form pat of tempera. ‘Straps, ther wn elavonsip © the Uni See aee cet mean tat Portugal, Spin and Greece do oot Trae garticsar form of dependence; this i indeed ‘eine ence ofthe events that have taken place there “fis spec form of dependence, which a uncin of the pararhntry of thee courtsen, has eo aspect 0 * Perth onehand, the spect of aneld-stablehed primitive accurmston of capita deriving in the Portuguese shd SEEN IES flo the eaplotation oftheir eolontes, and in ‘The Inport World Context 12 the Greck cate frm expoitation_of the Raster. Medier- tanean, which ditties thee unt fey the par Ine igpe of dependents of ster dominated comming ante ocr andthe Blockage, drt evra reson, of an endomenius_scgunulation-of capa athe sah te, ‘Gh pus thew ht alongide oer count depandont Ea a as an ee Boatman te tow secre of pendence spat is Dhtse ths of the highest imporeance "Te principal characteristic nti apts therfore the present phan of tnperiaion, Since the begining of [nperiattm, the relationships between atonal bea farms ona (metopitan counties dominted nd dependent Countie) hare Been sarked bythe pracy ofthe export of Capital over the export of comahoditen Yer chi defntion i seliteo generis acta face the export of capa pays t ‘ariable role according the phase mpi develope ‘mene and ths can only be undertood i relation to the STanfortations of production relations and labour process on the work! tale ‘During earlier phate, infact, export of capil fram the imperial counties to the depeodcnt countries we ciel bound up with the contol Of rw natura extetve induotsie) and the extension of markt. In conjunction wth this, the prinpl dividing line between the metroplian Counties uid the dominated and dependent ones sil ‘tue ths bec egy indy and rele, been ‘Gem-and-caunpy. "Thus th capraie mode of production ‘he an dominant fits monopoly fon tm the pera {netropolies and the enperalt chan ara whol, had pct yet ‘ceecded in incorporating and dominating the relations of Droducton within the dependent counties themselves Tnelde thee counties other modes wd fons of proderion (the feudal mode of producti, anc the form of pety Commodity production} loplayed a renartable persistence, tren though sataly transformed by the penetration of ‘pale relaconahipe. "This ination hed sabstantl eet co the eco-economiestructure of the countries involved, and even on their political Structure: the preponderant and highly characteristic role of Agriculture and the extraction of raw materials, combined ‘with a matked delay in the process of industrialization, {Which has often been seen in terme ofthe incorrect notion of “tnder-development, The consequence ofthis, on the side of the dominated classes, warts) the numerical weakness and relat ind political weight of the work lass, elation to the substantial weight ofa peasantry stil ‘subordinated sc precapitalst relations of production; b) the Suite particular disposition of the pety Bourgeoisie, within Sshich could be distinguished an important traditional petty bourgeoisie in manufacture, handicrafts (small-scale produc thon) and commerce, and the substantial weight of s state ‘poi hou'genisie (agente of the state apparstus) due to the parasitic growth ofthe sate Bureauersey characteristic of this ‘ependentsitustion. On the side of the dominant classes, this ‘Situation was manifested in » particular configuration of the power bloc, often denoted by the term ‘oligarchy’: big Finded proprietors, whose weight was very substantia, allied tora charscteriieally eomprador big bourgeoisie, whose own ‘conor bagein the country was sPeak, and who functioned Ghietly as a commercial and financial intermediary for the penetration of foreign imperialist capital, being closely ‘controlled by this foreign capital "The present phase of imperiaiam has seen major changes; the beginnings of these may be located in the immediate postwar years, though their consolidation and expanded Feproduction began only in the r9fos. Capital export sil ferves for the sontol of raw materials and the extension of farkets, but this ie_10 longer it principal function. ‘The principal funcion of the export of capital today essentially Aeriver fram the need for imperialist monopoly capital to Salorize itself on the world scale by turning to profit every felative advantage in the direct exploitation of labour. What is involved here isa characteristic feature of the falling rate ‘of profit tendency, and the new conditions in which an average fate of profit it established in the present world context, The hnperiist World Context 23 “The drive to counter-act this tendency nina principally by way ofthe imenave cxplotaton of labour en's word ae Ginrease inthe vate of exploitation inthe form of rlaive turplorralue, by raining lbour productivity, technological inv ce), Thole pcton opt Tetons of production acwally ‘witin the. dependent Counties themelven, where, thes rations subordinate Inbour-powecocen tscanng wale and teorropensetoboh ‘prodigious scalizaton of nbour proce and wo a marked intemationaliztion of capital onthe werk sce These changes have important impliotion forthe depend- ent countrien or atleast for ceria of their urine the foreign capital invested in then increasingly takes the form ote vexesin the sto of gt nda pi ofthis foreign capi thats vested im ‘Bntactuting industry ia prowing eapidly, The car hat hes racied most attention hese iy Gat of the grest mule ational corporations, though tis only a Tani inden of the phenomenon, Those ulintinas ee for the most part [American and in cerain of the dependent countrca ey produce tubstanal portions of the fished products tht they sell on the world marker, bees ofthe favourable conte of production there: alematvely-they establish an-ense dibe asGRDIe there fished produce for local sie ‘Ths phenomenon, however, goes far beyond the particle cave of {he multinational corporations; the pin that the direction cf foreign cptalinvenroens thes countsce volves tet labour processes in the capil scalzation of” these Droceste onthe world scale "This new organisation ofthe impel chain and its associate dependence of which Greeeand Span are pial ‘amp and Portal only somewhat lw 3, substantially ers the internal socioeconomic structure ofthe countries. Subjected wo The postion at domized aed dependent ounties no longer eens simply a traditional division tectween them and the imperialist mevopoliss along the Hes industry agriculture, this depencence mow precy| tion under the aegis of foreign fapital and at i instigation. Capitalist relations of production fre reproduced on. a massive scale within these countries themselves, subordineting labour-power while. distorting, reorganizing’ and even hastening. the dissolution of pre ‘capitalist relationships “Te follows, therefore, thet Spain and Greece have not ceated to be dominated and dependent countries, with Portugal following in their wake, because they have emerged from some so-called state of ‘underdevelopment’ ~ contrary to what i mainiained bythe entire ‘development’ ideology. In their ease, the domination and dependence that foreisn imperialist copital inflicts on them are simply taking, on the ‘whole, a new turn. Tt now involves the actual process of productive industrial capital and the labour processes that pertain to ita the international level. ‘This isin fact the Phenomenon of dependent industialization, which js also ‘splayed by crfan other de countries, particularly {a Latin Amerca, and exhibits the following features: (9 These countries are confined t forms of industry based on Towelevel techsology. (i) Labour productivity is kept at # low level, controlled by ‘he integration of the labour processes in these countris into ‘Sbovialization othe productive forces (integrated production) Which, in the bipolar tendency of qualification | disqualification Of labour-powsr that is characteristic of monopoly capital, exports the eiguslfcaton aspect othe dominated countries, ‘While reserving the reproduction of highly skilled Inbour for the dominant countries, (iid) The profits directly selized from the production of serpy abour-power inthe dominate coun ae toa high degree expatriate ‘To the expletation of the popular masses bythe productive investment of foreign capital is added. «supplementary Clement, in this case involving the actual labour-power of these countries in the new internationalization of cqptalist The Inperialst World Context 15 relations a whole: the export of Ibour-power to the post megs he mint woken” whch orga, Greece tn Spin provide far Europe ona rand scale This haemorrhage ofthese oustiesIbour power onstiuts aval superexplotation ofthe popular masses by the dominant imperialist capital, ot justin she superenpoit. tion that these workers sue inthe host counts, be Su even more; inthe taining cont tat the: dominated countries lose for Iabour-powes that bears frat inthe dominant countries: Furthermore, end we shall come back to tho later, thn manive emigration &prenely rendered possible by the proce of distorted industralizton that Foreign capital promotes in these countries bythe internal Alslowtions and. devcerterings provoked by the induced oduction of the dorsnast capital lations "This new organization of exploiion an dependence in te imperialist chain thu gives Fie to new cleavages between the dominated and dependent countrirthemacives, While certain of them continue to experience, athe dominant for ther explotation by foreign capita an export of capital ‘bound up with the control of raw mateal andthe expor of commodities, and with «division between industry and Aariealtre the form of exploitation tha dominant fa our Sie though pal with ad ferme oly gradual on the ‘While I domnot want to te the reader with detailed figures, 1 hal just give afew examples ere, inorder to lutrate and situme the tocio-economic structure othe countries We ae ‘oncemned with, and their evolution in the course af fecent Tn Portage, though the potcy of eoonomie development bused on development plans Gate from 19, son rom 1960 thatthe penetration of foreign capital in substan amounts began t0 quicken, ia conjunction with a parallel Process of industal expansion. "The volume of direct6 foreign investment doubled between 1963 and 1965, and fh ontinued te ero ever since. Foreign investment at Ba more and nore concentrated isthe eierent sector of frodetve industrial capita, through subsidiary branches EF the multinationals (chemical, engiecring and clectronice Sedition a wel a various other manufacturing industries een hing Paral with this, the Portuese GNP bas Rcfemed by arcund 8 percent pet ear since geo; what ‘More tis ret down, beeween 1960 end 1972, non growth Tree of percent in industry, perce in agile, IEG So per ceo inthe tevin sector kn ug7t the primary sect only employed 318 percent ofthe active population {Sogn aa pe ent in 290), indusry 3.2 percent (24.9 tere rogo) and eee 32 per con (a6 percent Tose) The speval characterise of Portuese capital, ‘Dcover compared with thar of Gresor and Spain, the ‘Disco Conceveaion and centralization of capital, particu. ‘edly given she evel ndustialaton: 168 companies oof wad of soeoo (ue, 84 ar con) hold a lem 3 pe cent of the coal capi "In Spam although the frst burst of industrialization alo dates Bom 1953 following the ceoonsc and politi agree: GiSs"condaed wih the, United Staten, wbich opened Spain up to te penetation of Amerzan capt the proces eByThogen to celeste foward the ed ofthe socalled eaten" pend, Te, round about roto. Since then, foreign inven has lncremted gute spectacularly (rom ‘cs lion dllars ingot around 80 malin i 1969); ive. to. concentrated, through branches ofthe multe ‘cna inthe chemical inty, electric equipment and Ten enginering (chipbuilding,automsbis) and various tier murtacurng incites "The rate of crease in the Spuniah GND reached an anal average of around 7 per ‘Sarin the voter dv chely wo the expansion of indotrial Sraucion, which Increased four tines bewtesn 1956 and 580, By 196, the agicltura sector only employed 3 Per Leet of the actve population agains per cant i) 1960) SSduny 5 percents Per cattin 1960), And sevice 33 Pet The Impeii World Context 17 ‘ent (27 per cent in r960) Tn Greece, the proces ial the more interesting in wo far 8 it in posible to compare development from 1960 under & ‘democratic regime, with that from 1967 onwards under the military dictatorship. Here, too, the proces of industriaina- tom got under way at the beginning of the 19boe, together ‘with the penetration of foreign capital. The volume of foreign investment increased five times between 1960 snd 1964; 1963 tind 1966, moreover, were matked by an exceptional and Spectacular advance in foreign capital due to the massive investments of Esso- Pappas and Pechiney in these two vears Hetween 1960 and 1967, the Greek GNP grew at an annual average of 6.7 percent ‘Under the military regime ~ according to the offi figures~ the influx of foreign capital int Greece increased by 62 per cent, comparing the years 1967-71 with 1963-66 ‘Moreover, certsin other investments that the regime antici pated cad bent itself to secure did net ultimately come t0 fruition, some foreign investors showing hesitation in view of the regime's ‘instability’.) The rate of increase in the GNP lunder the military dictatorship was at fllows 38 a8 ts 73 195 Hier aguin, foreign investment wax concentrated from 1960 ‘onwards in the sector of productive industrial capital (chemi- ls electrical engincering, shipbuilding other manufacturing industry). Between 1960 and 1970, Greck subsidiaries of the a counted for 4 per cent of the increase in industrial production. ‘The most striking rate of increase, throughout this whole period, is thet shown by manu: facturing industry: some 10.3| per cent per year between“8 1963, and s97a. The percentage of the active population Employed in ariulture fell from 56 per cent in 1961 t0 45, per cent in 196%, and to 37.3 per ent i 19715 that in industry Powe from ta per cent in 196% (0 21-2 per cent in 1967, and reached 25 per eet in 1971 (in which year services employed 28 per cont), We may note that this distribution ofthe active Jopaletion m Greece doce act fully gitar the industrials fon of the country, which i shown more clearly by the fact, that agriculture oniy accounted for 18 percent of the GNP. in ro7e, while industey made up 33.2 per een; this is Because industilization here has been intensive, through the in reuse in labour productivity in certain sectors (chemicals, petroleum products, shipbuilding). ‘The new form of dependence, hich goes together with a particular typeof indusrialization, is alo shown by a whole Force of other particular features: the growing volume of manufactured products in these countries’ exports, for ‘ample, relative to agricultural exports. But the decisive Significance of this new path of dependence les above all in ‘the modificetiens that ie brings about in_ socio-economic MWe are alrealy faced with a problem here: this state of stash oft been undercetinated by the resistance ‘rganizatons. ‘This was particularly the case in Portugal, traditionally smn as 4 "backward country, but also in Spain, ‘where the resisance organizations took a fang time to recos~ pize these new realities The underiving reason ithe tradition ‘beauesthed by the ‘Third International, which considered faint regimes and military dictatorships as necessarily _setardment of 1ettogresion; there ‘ountiey ‘ecorome development or even putt into revere. ceriations go hand in hand with an economist) ‘conception of economic development and i Gastralizaton, conception that pervades the various theories of underdevelopment, itself a highly erroneous term, FFor there i no such thing esx neural economic development, ‘The Imperiait World Contest 19 «economic development as auch, wth a uniform and unambigu- tus diction that could only be. positive: an economic evelopment which cannot be propery carried out by these regimes, so that condemning them necessarily, involves characterizing them at ‘economically retogressive’. Here further and related illusion comes to light these regimes are teen as condemned inevitably to disappeaiy and thew fall Girectly predicated on their supposed inability to set under ‘way, oF follow through, ‘economic development. ‘But this “development as such” lacks any meaning. What matters sis social nd politcal significance, se. its relation= Ship to the exploitation of the popular masses in the con temporary imperialist chain. And roughy since the 19605, if ‘ot always to the same extent, the Portuguese and Spanish regimes have followed, and the Greck military regime con- tinued, «policy of industrial development parallel with a concentration and centralisation of espa; in other words, & policy of development of capitalist relations in their monopoly form, and one conforming with the ne features of exploit tion that mark the present phase of inperiaiam and the relationships between dominant and dominated counteies poly, therefore, that by this very fart subjugates these Countries to the new dependence thet characterizes the imperialist chein. One outcome of this is that this ‘economic development” exhibits a series of aspects specific 10 the ‘dependent industrializetion of the domated countries, an industrialzation that ie very far from following the path of the dominant countries; another outcome is thet the popular ‘matees have experienced a considerably incressed exploit tion both by their own dominant clases and by those of the imperialist metropolises, from the very fact of this {ndurtralioaton, “This already sheds light on the question of the relation between the dictatorships and the type of dependence and evelopmient peculiar to these countries. Its an undeniable fae that these regimes have particular favoured this path ‘of dependence on foreien imperialist capital. We have had to ‘make this point already at this stage ofthe argument, a8 anumber of writers partly in reaction to the erroneous thesis that the dictatorships are associated. with an ‘economic fetarcment, accept that these regimes have promoted the evelopment of sapitalism, but immediately add, a if afraid ‘of having conceded s poin, that this makes no difference, a= the same develogment would have taken place anyway, and in the tame manner if these countries had had bourge ‘democratic regimes, Greece is generally given as the example here, as the hypotheris cannot be verfied in the cases of Spain and Poreugl, where the dictatorships were established So long ago. Greece saw the beginnings of industrialization ‘marked by the new structures of dependence and the massive investment of foreign capital, before the dictatorship, ‘process that was moreover accelerated from 1964 onwards, Under not s right-wing government, but yather one of the. ‘entre (George Papandreou). The junta, then, can simply be fd to have continued on the course already established. In this conception the place of a country in the imperialist chin is seen as sufficient to determine the forms ofits dependence {all ther detail: sociopolitical distinctions and the internal political institutions of the country would be unable t alter this, except in the case ofa transition to socialism. ‘Bur we must be clear aa to what ie involved here. It is obvious that a country’s dependence viscicvis imperialism ‘an only be broken by a process of national liberation, which inthe new phaseof imperialism andthe presen circumstances ‘sa whole, coincides with a process of transition to socialism ‘Thin accepted, however, thete are certainly diffrent forms and degrees of dependence, and these essentially depend on the specific intemal socio-political coordinates ofthe countries Involved. To tate a simple example, the relation of France to ‘American capital was evidently diferent under the Gauls ‘ofthe years To60-08 than it has ben since today above all tnd yet these two moments are both located in the same, present phase cf imperialiem. In this sense, the dictators Fegimes in Portugal, Spain and Greece certainly played an Important ole inthe epeciic pattern, shape and chythm ofthe dependence proves that took place under ther direction; not ‘The Imperialist World Contest 32 cause of her inherent deen frm te pmentary- ‘craton fea bute bounce Sd soc forces whom ire they remnant ropes Ste Ths yar pela te oe Gece ete tc Talay crt ple herpes wiv leet am ta ofthe previous gene. Yo fla se poem ‘ie ary the specie for of rene the dependent Searcy paar etc pete fom ed See by the ew puto dependent, arn reno the ‘Peri ral bane of fee wich ey respond ‘ne bus ured ithe Pres cpe hs nw Boe stent ndeated Tn amin fore of rege and te change in poli ination, able whieh ares ern tpi net Poles wes forthe dependent counen tm e Then pice pase of cpa in ovidraon Tha thea heweve dona py ele al ese ome earShengesby el ion relevant fran determines Se Soultnaure ef das true he anton of ic the intemal beans of espa free sch tore en copa tee veined et evo, Wool toihr et meeen ey peak ger ond Tne abr eel fa dependent eof wl rth Sipe sol fe ca eS isis eons nen rea Shr wt repens he geed pole imperiaia ioice a therm, sata the Bers Een flag i the beset she of inet Bo nee eet cer tht he cance or ht fate mune "as mat destohiy democrat ‘Spubic es ~ depend on nema acon ‘slit Thus (ow appears deae toon ont ‘Sipe tha make 9 conse irene, a fr EP Lttisa ematieranthe populares ee tthe th dependent eae a boueos ocr ore octal dctohpy hee ae hewn, he [Srmn thet bourgeoisie sone ae far fn rater of inieence, fr al thes cmon spplation at“dictatorships of the bourgesiie’ “Maintaining the primacy of internal factors in this way already takes us astep further; we have to bred once and for all with mechanistic and almost topological ( not "geo- {raphical conception of the relation between internal and fxternal factors. In the present phase of imperialism there je realy o such ting s_exeral asm on the one han tcting purely fron “outs ‘opposed w intemal factors Taolated™ in thelr own “epaad” and outclaating the others. IF ‘we mainiain the primacy of internal factors, we simply mean that those coordinates of the imperialist chain that are "external to's country ~ the global balance of froes, the role of particular great power, etc. only aet on the country in ‘question by way of their intemalization, i.e. by their artic Tation o its own specific contradietions. But these contradic tions themselves, in certain aspects, represent the induced reproduction of the contradictions of the imperialist chain ‘within the various individual countries, ‘To talk of internal factors in this sease, then, isto discover the real role thet imperialism (uneven development) plays in the evolution of the various social formations "This will be the guiding thread in he following analyses, and its implications involve a whole veries of problems, To ‘make this more clear, we can tum fora moment to the case of Chile, which is highly relevant ae regards the role of the imperialist powers ~ and their centre in particular, the United States ~ in the installation, maintenance and evolution of the regimes we are concerned with here. In discussions of the Chilean experience the mechanistic and topological concep Hon of ‘external factors is often at work in the thesis of the ‘lot against the Allende government, a thesis which ragin= fins the supposedly direct, immediate and exhaustive role played by the United Stater and the CIA. This thesis has the particular advantage that it prevents the Allende govern: fmeat’s own ercom from being examined, and. above all, loses people's eyte to those internal conjunctures which ate precisely what embled ‘outside intervention’ and the hand fof the forcigner' te be effective. No one ean doubt today that ‘The Imperiale World Contest 25 there have been and continue to be such interventions, But except in the extreme case of open and direct intervention on massive scale (Santo Domingo, Vietram, etc), this cannot ‘generally play a decisive role in the dependent countries foncerned’~ particularly in such Faropean counties at Portugal, Greece and Spain ~ without being articulated, ‘within these countries, tothe internal balance of forces,The Dictatorships, the United States and Europe Before coming tothe internal causes of the decomposition (Spain) and fal Portugal, Greece) ofthese regimes, we must first examine the world conjuncture of imperil as it concretely affects these countries, "To start withthe econemic level. I have already noted thet the Portuguese, Spanish and Greek regimes systematically promoted the investment of foreign imperialist capital. This ‘Capital invested inthe countries concerned both to directly exploit the popular masses there, and to use these countries fm a staging-port in the exploitation of other counties. In Portugal in particular, not only did the dictatorship directly promote the pillige oft» Aeican colonies by foreign capital bu the part of ths capital invested in Portugal itself wa alo rgely Oriented toward the colonies. Greece was sp used ‘by foreign capital ava hase fo the conquesgof African markets, snd for re-export of capital to African countries under the “neutral” Gredk label ‘Let us pause for « moment on the policies of promoting foreign investment that were pursued by these countries, We can certainly ncte that similar policies were also pursued by the governments of severtl other European countries (Get= ‘many, Great Brain, ete) vis-vis American capital. In the cases we are deiling sith here, however, this took particular forms. The facilities granted (tax exemptions, almost un- limited opportunity of repatrating profits, capital grants, ‘monopoly privileges, eonine contracts with national Rem), the absence of any real control, and so on, are without any parallel in the cher European countries. ‘This is particularly ‘The Dicttorhie the United Stats ond Buripe 25 striking in Greece, where the situation can be compared with the policy of the governments thet preceded the, military june, such ss that of Karamanlis (comervative), which also ‘promoted the penetration of foreign expital. As regards the facilities granted fo foreign capital for a unbridled pillage of the country, the junta’s policy towards foreign capital was ‘qualitatively diferent from thet of the previous government (sis was particularly the case with foreign capital in Greek shipping) Teshould be understood, of course, that the facilities jn question are not just those explicitly granted. Tis easy to see hhow foreign capital can also profit from the internal situation ‘na country and the repression that weighs upon the working «lass and the popular masses (abolition ofthe right to strike, the ban on working-class organization, te.) "These points are suficentiy well-known not to need par- ticular emphasis here. But what i imporeant to tress, a8 directly locates these countries at the very heart of present {nterimperialist contradictions, is the gradual inereae in the economic relations. ting these nations to_the European (Common Market, ss opposed to those tvingthemn tothe United ‘Slane "This ie perticularly apparent at the level of foreign capital ‘a Portugal, for instance, capital fro the EEC counties is raseively dominant, n particular capital rom West Germany fd the United Kingdom. In 1972 the repective share of new foreign investment, in millions of escudes, were: United Stater 391.6; Wert Germany 237-1; Urited Kingdom 56.25 France 72.6. In 1973, United States 320.3; West Germany 89.0; United Kingdom 298.6; Fiance 74.7. In 1973 United States 238.9; West Germany Brs.43 United Kingdom 552.3; France 109.6 ‘In Spain, the percentage of American capital inthe total volume of foreign investment followed an upward curve from 1961 to around 1965, rising from 27.8 pet cent to 48.3 Det cent of the tot, but it has since progressively fallen, © a level of 26.2 per cent in 1970.26 In Greece, although American. investment remains rmateively predominant, there has also been a spectacular Increase in investment from the EEC, periclarly feor, France, which now holds second place. "The same situation is to be seen in the field of foreign trade: trade with the Common Market 18 4 proportion of total foreign trade has increased spectacularly inthe cases of Poreugal and Greece, end somewhat les strikingly in the ease of Spain, in relation wo trade with the United States, ‘This al leadsto a most important question. Dia the present gutless teen the ned Snes td the Evopean ‘Common Marie play a role i ine-and fall of the GEitrahpe snd ok wharemscy? Whar pertelar ‘been the role ofthe special relationships that these countries have had with the Common Market, «relationship that in the case of Greece was already instiitionalized, but offically frozen during the colonels’ regime, while a similarly institu tionalized.telatonship was also sought systematically by Poreugel under Caetano and is still sought by the present Spanish government? "To situate the role played here by the inter-imperalst contradictions between the United States and Europe, we ‘must first establish their general significance et the present time. The development and extension of the Common ‘Market, combined with the dollar crisis, led several writers to foresce the inevitable demise of American hegemony, sith lurope coming to form an effective “counter-imperiais' to the United Stes, We may note in passing that these are often the same writers who indulged in the myth of ‘ultra imperialism’ ducing the long period in which inter-imperialist contradictions seemed relatively quicacent ~ the myth of an ‘uncontested hegemony and domination by the United States ‘over the entire imperialist world, which it had allegedly ‘Both these notions are equally false. If American hegemony is now in retreat, im relation to certain quite exceptional characteristics tat i ennumed when the European economies hhad suffered pertal destruction ar a result of the Second ‘The Dictatorshipe, the United Sates and Burope 27 World War, i til the cate thatthe extinsion and develop ‘ment of the Common Market has gose together with a prodigious growth in direct American investment, more and ‘more involving sectors of directly productive capital (manu facturing industries) in the EEC counties. The privileged location of American foreign investmert ie no longer the "Third World, hut precy the Furenean Common Marker the case of West Germany, now the dominant economy within the Common Marke, is highly sigificanthere, to sav nothing of Great Brain. This actually creates a nsw fonn of depend tence of the European countries on the United State, and a ‘Quite particular Form, as it cannot be identified with that ffecting the dominated countries in ther relationship with the imperialist metropolises at a whole, being im 0 way smalogous to this. It can only be undersiod in terms of an {nternationalization of capital and of eaptalst relations, not in terms of competing ‘ational economies. The confirmation ‘of this new dependence can be found i the way that the| ‘Common Market has successively capinlsied to the- United ‘States, on many quesons_ in the present crisis period af patetlariy dhe way that i members have opta Spied inital hd tae tose dena (Geertones pol ‘One fect of tht ne! {lependence i the absence OF any eal uaication of capital ff the preset ine between the vasious European counties, Relation Between them hive in fact an extemal cone psing byway of the relationship tha ead ofthese countie ‘aintainsindvigualy with the United State. "This factor is Important to bear in mind with rege tthe EEC's anode to the dictatorships. Secondly however, there is areal eactvaton and intensif- cation of inter imperative contradiction, correlative ith the presat cris of captaliam, between the United Stster and the European Common Marke, and ene tha an 0 way incompatible with what has just been sid, Tt is only the notion of ‘ultramperiais’ that identfes the hegemony of te lnperlalie country ove others wth ecomaplen pececor {on of inter-imperialie contradictions, w thatthe reattion of these contradictions is immediately seen as. the limination ofthis hegemony. At the present moment, these Contradictions are becoming more intense; bates are aking place for the conquest of protected tericories, both for ‘Capital export, 1 counteract the tendential fall in the vate of profit fecesion) in the imperialist centres, and also for the ‘export of commodities and the contrl of eaw materials inthe ‘context ofthe imbalances in international payments that have marked the past few year. There are also intense struggle for ‘control of courtries that can serve a2 intermediate staging post for imperialist capital_in i further expansion. the Sharcteratic exes of Portugal and Greece. The problem of ‘oil has simply accentuated this atte of allais ‘As far as the countries we are concerned with here are concerned, the contradictions betwen the United States and the Common Market are expressed particularly by way of the independent etstegy thet the Common Market's pursuing. in the Mediterrinean region, ‘The question remains, however, to shat role these contradictions played inthe overthrow oF changes in the Portuguese, Greck and Spanish regimes. ‘Taking up the points already made, T maintain, firstly, thet these contradictions did not play any direct or immediate role, and secondly, that it would be quite wrong to believe thatthe EBC consistently played the democratic card, a8 it ‘ire, in order to challenge American interests which were ‘exclisively represented by these dictatorships. The contradic tion between the United States nd Europe is notin fact an explosive contadiction between two equivalent counter: Imperialisens (Gurope ata ‘citd force’), contending for Ihegemony step oy step itis essentially a contradiction centring fons rearrangement in the balance of forces, but still always Snder_Amerioms hegemony. ‘The dictatorships themaclven, ‘moreover, ang thit applies to Cactano, Papadopoulos) Markezinis and to the’ Opus Dei episode under Franco, explicitly sougbt integration into the Common Market, the fearon for this being, as we thal ee, the complex relation- ships that chey maintained with the various factions oftheir ‘own bourgeoives. Even though these attempt: proved ‘The Dictatorship, the United State and Europe 29 vonmuccessful, it was precisely under these regimes that the Import of European capital into these coustriesand the volume of trade on preferential terms between them and Europe ireW to significant proportions, in some respects supplanting ‘sconomie relations with the Urited Stas, ‘Nothing would be more wrong, then, than to view the ‘Common Market tx having ir anyway. tabjected. these ‘egimes to an economic boyentt. For al the declarations on the European side, justifying refusal of BEC membership on the grounds of the absence of democntic institutions, she real eazon why these countries have not been integrated into the Common Market is related to the very rel problems of European agricultural policy, which would be directly threatened by these countries acquiring full membership Status, and the effect this would have on their agricultural exports to the EEC. This shown by the difficulties sti ‘encountered today a regards the integrtion into the Common ‘Marker of Greece and. Portugal. ‘The EEC’s economic Strategy towards these countries did net simply hinge on a ‘change in their regimes, and this can only be understood if the notion of an explosive sed antagonistic contradiction between the United States end the Commen Market is abandoned, ‘This does not mean that this contradiction did not play san important role inthe decline and fll ofthe dictatorships; ‘imply that ite role i expressed in x very particular wa. 1, Ie x basically expressed inthe induced and specific repro= duction of this contradiction actually within these countries, td principally by the effects that this contradiction has onthe {internal differentiation of their dominars classes (we will deal ‘with thie more fully in the following chapter). "The contradic= ‘Hon United Statee/Batope, which i stroctared into. the ‘resent process of internationalization of capital, is directly reflected in various internal divisions and strategic differentia~ tions ofthe endogenous capital in these countries, according tw the divergent lines of dependence that polarize it ether towards American capital of towards European. It should also be noted here that these lines of divergence run throughboth monopoly and non-monopoly endogenous capital alike; although “he fraction of the bourgeoisie interested in integration into the Common Market har certain specific features, i is no as if monopoly capital was exclusively tied to American capital, while non-monopoy capital was wholly oriented towards a European solution. In Greece and Spain, in particular, whol eetions of monopoly capital have purnued of Greek Industialets, and Ops Des in Spain ‘Thus the prireipal effec thatthe contradictions between the United States and Burope had on these countries wes that of producing en instability of hegemony forthe power blocs, {following from intensified struggle between factions oftheir ‘own bourgeoisis. The point i that the specibe Torm of regime of these military dictatorships did not enable uch contradictions tc be regulated by the organic representation ‘of these vatious ‘tact within the state apparssun; nor did it allow the esablishment of @ compromise equilibrium ‘without serious upsets. But an equilibrium of this kind was ill necessary fer their political domination to function, ia the context of istensifed contradictions within these power ‘locs that were die, among other things othe international- ization of capital and the contradictions between Europe and the United State a reflected within them. We can add here that the fall or decline of these regimes corresponded to 8 redistribution of the balance of forees within the power bloc in_favour of the fraction of capital polarized towards the smmon Marker and st the expense ofthe fraction polarized towards the Unted States whose interests these regimes preponderantly represented, though not exchisvely. But this floes not mean, least as long asthe situation of dependence i not radically eiminated (in which case the problem would ‘ot even arise) «clear and effective overthrow ofthe hege mony of @ compeador capital tied to American capital (the military dictatorthips), in favour of an endogenous capital tied to European expital (democratic regimes). Just = the contradiction between Europe and the United States is not explosive and antagonistic, neither ists reproduction within ‘The Dictatorship, the Unit Stats and Burope 32 the power bloc translated into a contrediction of that kind. IFT am anticipating somewhat here, tht is simply to indeate already that it would be wrong to belive thatthe overthrow fof the dictatorships in these countries signifies by itself a adical challenge to the role of Ameriom expital and the Clear transition of the countries involved to some kind of Burana, third foree’ camp. ‘These ceuntris donot fee a real choice between being “American colonies’ or being “integrated into the Common Market’. The only. solu them isa process of independence and national liberation ~ vissivie oh 22 Having sei this it would be wrong to discount, in the ‘Buropean attitude to the military ditatrships, the consider fable role which the solidarity of the democratic and popular ‘movements in the European countries and public pinion there in general, has played, and continues to play, for the ‘peoples of Portugal, Spain and Greece; this massive hostility towards the dictatorhipe bears n0 comparison with anything in the United States. Iris this the isa the root of «certain reserve thatthe European governments have shown towards these regimes, and although this is not enough to explain the failure to integrate these countries into the Common Market, ithae seta ort of preliminary condition o the commencernent of such a process of integration, even trough ths process is itself still fraught with problems, While this enables the European govemments t0 reap the full benefits of these countries? dependent situation without running che risks involved in complete integration, it doesnot mean that the sectors of the endogenous bourgeoises interested in such an integration have not taken full ccount ofa condition ofthis kind. +, Finally the contradictions between the United States and rope are also reflected in the presen differences on both diplomatic and military strategy, induding those within NATO. One example of this is that ofthe differences between the United States and Europe over atitudes to the Israel- ‘Arab confit, and to some extent lao ntitudes towards the2 oil-producing countries; «second involves differences on the problems of European defence and the Atlantic Aline Lean ‘ot embark on an extnination of these questions here, but ft is evident that she contradictions between the United States and Europe are expressed today also in partial challenge to the internation strategy and diplomacy, and to the military Aefonce policy, represented by the traditional concept ond practice ofthe Atlante Alliance, which were identified down to their emalles: details with the strict political and economic interests ofthe United State, On balance, however, taking the points so far made into ‘consideration, it is clear that there is no question st the present time of Europe actually "freeing tet from an inte ‘ational strategy and'a military alliance under the hegemony. ‘ofthe United Sates, particulary as there isnot even unified European postion on these questions, but that what i involved if ruher the acquisition of « certain margin of ‘manoeuvre uncer this hegemony. ‘The result of thie fe that Europe di not intervene atively forthe overthrow of these military: dictatorships allegedly” ‘exclusively tied’ in this respect t the United States; the declarations of sympathy expressed by the French government after Greece left the NATO military organization (and in a manner that was more formal then anythin ce, hat) should not give te any illusions on the score. This is firstly because the present Buropean governments, while systematically rejecting a policy of disarmament, ae far fom being able to effectively Felieve Americ power in these counties. Itisalso because of the fear of the European bourgeoisie thet en uncontwolable process might be set under way, leading to an eventual ‘neutrality of te countries affected, and thus considerably weakening NATO aa whole. Finaliy, nd this pariculacly concerns the military regimes in these countries, i these regimes and thar armies formed or ail frm major compon= ents of the American military deployment in Europe (Spain included), and ate closely dependent on the United States they were never mere pavens or stooges of American diplo ‘atic and military egy. A patent example of this it the ‘The Dictatorhip, the United States and Barope 33 ‘very pro-Arsb diplomacy of the Greek junta and the Franco fegine, which bears nthe dpe ‘bourgeoisie SST contradictions between the Unitel States and Europe in this field, and those within NATO in particular, did play ‘certain role inthe overthrow or modification of these regimes bt this too laa ole expreseed in a particular fashion, ‘These Contradictions were feflcted in the intemal contradictions ‘within the state apparatuses, and particularly within the try, which was always the principal apparatus for these regimes, This gave rise to internal divisions in the military spparstus between various groups and factions, certain of these upholding an indefatigable Atlantciem, others, on the other hand, standing for a diplomatic and military strategy fore independent from the ‘rice economic and. political interests of the United States, These imermal contradictions fre manifest today inthe armies of all European countries (We feed only recall the debates on military strategy within the [French arm), and in the cases we ate dealing with here they have had a considersble effect, Since the army functions ay ‘he one's de fact pliial nat the Saunte ‘where fonmalized political parties are banned by the militar} Gicestorship, the contradictions within the _bourgeoisi| between capital with « European strategy and capital com-| plagh mberdimael ihe Uned Sueshave best expired wean ei audrina Tie meal rasee of these fractions especially those bearing on the role and fanetion of NATO, have been particularly intense in the Greek, Portuguese ‘and Spanish miliary apparatuses, and this contributed to the characteristic ineability of the Greek tnd Porguese regimes in thei Binal plas. ‘After these remarks, which were interded both to demon- strate the primacy of “internal factors! over ‘external factors ‘nd to demarcate the role of internal contadictions within the Gictatorships’ apparatunes ae. regards their overthrow oF ‘decay, we must ow examine the speciistrategy followed by the United State vs-i-vs these regime Here, too, it is necessary 10 guar aguinst simplisticexplanations. Its too clear to require any emphasis here that ‘the United States has systematically and constantly supported these military regimes. In the Greek care, it even played ‘major role in its installation, But ir would be equally false 0 ‘draw the conclusion that the overthrow or decry of these regimes has proceeded despite or aguinst the ‘will of the United States, m to believe the opposite conclasion that this hs taken place_at the United Sttes”-dipec“mstgstion ‘Because of the circumstances in which the change of regime took place, this cond error hae been particularly committed in the case of Greece. Several sectors of European public opinion saw Kissinger at sending Karamanlis back to Greece inorder todemocratize «regime that had become inconvenient, ‘while the Communist Party of the Exterior and Andreas Papandreow alee saw here at fist the hand of the Americans, in their view Eowever secking to perpetuate ‘monarcho- fascism’ under a ew facade ‘Both these explanations neglect the speciic weight of the inceral factors, and in overestimating the role of the United ‘States, they alse fail to recognize the specific orientation of ‘American policy. 1. The United States certainly does have global strategy in the present phase of imperialism, but it dees not have just fone single tactic; it rather has several tactics, The United States has 1 long experience in repressing the peoples of diferent counsris, and in is role se gendarme of tse Western ‘bourgeoisie: i docs not put all tsegge into one basket, and as fara strategy is concerned, doesnot stake everything on one single card “The United State in fact always keeps several diferent cards in hand, Certainly, these cards are not all of equal value, fad it prefers same of themn to others; but it can often ply Gifferent cards simultaneously. American strategy can there ‘olutions in the countries Tore adape itself several poss ints zone of dependence ‘This is particularly clear inthe scenario that took place in Greece, but itis equally so up to now in Portugal, oF in the The Dictatorship, the United State and Burope 35 process now taking place in Spain, In Greece we have the following alternatives, in order of ther preference by the United States (@) support almort to the end of the military dictatorship, ‘though as this decayed it became less and less secure a Wat. horse in its speife form; (i) sohtion af an evolution of the dictatorship towards a ‘egal’ facade, which failed under Marlezini/Papadepoulos in 973, bt which could have been wie again; (Gi) solution of # more major political change, but one in which the military apparatus continoed to maintain certain “reserved domains’; 0) Karamantis solution; ‘igure ofthe liberal right, far more open ws c= orgunizations dian Kanmanils (Gi) solution of «transitional government under the the centre, with a vaguely right social-democratic character of the present German type; ete Analogous scenarios could be drawn up as far as Portugal is concerned, feeen tupport forthe hard core of the dictatorship, through Cacteno-ism with liberal faade, through to and including a cettain form of Spinola of centrist govern iment (viz, the ambiguity of American policy even after the fall of Spinola). In Spain, too, the different options could be Tinted bby the United Seates with the same intensity, neither with the same constancy or by the same means; the United States attitude, confronted by @ number of possible solutions that fee ‘acceptable’, ranges from various cegrees of support 10 the more or lest peasive acceptance of wolutions that it con tiders the lester evil up to the point oa certain break. But ‘this in ite chow ow simplistic fs eo view every change in the dependent countries that does not pase thik breaking: point as due or atleast corresponding to « conscious and ‘Unambiguous act of wil onthe part ofthe United Seates. To say that in Greece, for example, the Karamanlis solutionoe corresponds to American ‘intentions ia a the same time both ‘rue and false, in 9 fran this solution ie fr the United States ‘imply one caelamong others, both ahead and behind certain ‘others in its order of preference, "This polyvalent tactic ofthe U the similar tactic ofthe bourgeoisie in general as regards the forms of it pelitial domination over the popular masses (Ghe extreme ase Of 4 socal-democratic government, OF ‘example, being pursued ort least tolerated bythe bourgeoisies sccording to creumstances), and hat bot its advantages and its disadvantages. On the one hand, it enables the United States to perpemte ita domination under various forms that fre adaptable the concrete cireumatances. On the other hhand, foreed ati is to multiply ite tactics, and given the ‘major weight ofthe intemal factors in each country and above All that of the stages ofthe popular masses, the risks of 2 kid, oF total los of control of a solution eriginally judged fscceptable or even desirable, are many times greater. Tt frequently happens, then, in the present phase of arise in popular strugsls on 2 global scale, that the United States foes control of certain cards, toa Teter oF greater extent This is what particularly matters to us here, for the United States’ low of control evident in the ease of Portugal, and a certain skid hat alto taken place with Karamanlis over the Cyprus questo ‘A second element pertaining to the glabal strategy of the United States is also involved here. This concerns. the ‘extention of the spectrum of solutions judged acceptable or folerable in this or that country, in a certain region of the ‘world ~ particularly in Europe. As far asa particular country i concerned, this depends on the opportunities evsilable 10 the United States for recapturing other countries in the sume zone, Thisis particularly apparent i the eae of Cyprus; after the failure of the Greek card (the colonels) to cect partition ofthe Bland thar would integrate it into NATO, the ‘Americans played the Turkish card, successfully this time, in so far asthe pirttion of the island, the chief goal sought Seems now {0 be # fait accompli As far as the question of ted States i analogous to ‘The Dicatrahipe, the United States and Burope 37 NATO and American bases in the Mediterranean is con- tered, the degre of escalation of United States policy ageinst Fegimes liable to challenge ite imperial prerogatives depends ‘on the possibilities it has of shifting ste baes to neighbouring Countries, This explains, among other things, the face that Subsequent to the events in Portugal ane Greece, and while those in Spain were ell only predictable, the focus of Ameri= an strategy an the Mediterranean shifted t Teal — not that thi in any way means the United States has given up hope a= far as Portugal and Greece are concerne 2.‘This plurality of American tactics net jut the product of { conscious decision on their part; ii also related 29 the Contradictions of American capital itsell: Under-eotmating the inteenel contradictions of the enemy, in fact, is just tother way of over-estimatinghi strength Leternationalized ‘American capital snd che big American multinationals have ‘major contradictions with those fractions f American capital ‘how base of accumalaion and expansion is chiely within the United States; there is thun a cormtant oscillation of ‘American policy Between an aguressive expansionism, which ‘ltimately cartes the day, and a permanent tendency to- ‘wards a form of iolaioniem. There is alacafurthercontradic- ‘on which does not completely coincide with the former, that bherween big monopoly capital and non-monopoly capita, ‘which ie stil significant in the United States this expressed, fimong other things, inthe particular way in which the ‘American antintrart laws operate, these having made difi- ‘ultes only recently for multinational fens such as ITT and ‘ATT, with e bad reputation, Given th specie form of the ‘American politcal segiene, these’ internal contradictions ‘come to be translated into important contradictions within the sate apparatuses. The peculiarity ofthe American state {s thar its external fascism’, foreign policy that generally does not hesitate tp have recourse 10 th epocide, is embodied by institutions waich, while far from Fepresenting an ideal case of bourgeois democracy. (one need only Fe call the etuation of social and astional minorities in* the USA), sil permit an oat representtion ofthe various fractions of cpial within the se appara an the Drm of everest Aeon coon ner es sony OF the stn on aoe peli objecves and lot con be Sti about thal sector accompanied by covwant and open catraicons within the sate sopra These contacons ae precy Cepresnd in the diver scr tacticenmelareonly prsuetty the eiferens Armersan Sse appratac volved in foreign policy. The CIA, he Pentagon and military appara ab he State Deprtent ofr adopt diferent tats, do the Admin sd ‘ecutive Branch «whole oppoued to Congres; ths Gute apparent nthe cues of Cesc, Portugal and Spain AW tore, thos tactics ae often, pursued in perl, avin nto pl network tat ne oo oie of eah athe fd Seen coat one anther ‘The cn ofthe CIA ee the Fentgun erly shor-crouting the Soe Department ver the Cypras quem, o more reteniyn Portal, prove opal example of shane proce Thee mtd Aushave thei twn spore ccc, which ceotunte the Hak Sfside they ae noth the deliberste multiplication of the tactics sloped in space ete, but alin to he fal and dvegent tien reuting om the’ specie Soteaiccon within the United Stell Nothing would ie more wrong then, han so view the United Sse an Sesgn plot onolh bl wiht i om ternal ‘Al thee points Sally Lead othe sme cnchsions: not only do_factore itera to the difrent county nthe te Stats whereof nunce ply the principal lin ‘rio conus, but the vary imerrenons of Cnted Stun foregn polis lee thee counts certain marin ofthe polyaltichsteund and ‘the contradictions, exvstallized in_them,1 te last analysis ot "This margin of manocuvre is extended today by the con- tradictory relations in Europe, and partculatly i the The Dictatorshipe, the United States and Burope 39 Mediterranean region, between East and West ~ the Soviet Union and the United States ~ which rases the subsidiary {question ofthe role of the USSR in the changes of regime in the countries wth which we are concern Tn this cave, t00, ve have to take account af a dual tendency. In the fist place, there is the understanding between the United States andthe Soviet Union on maintaining the global balance of foreee Between them, ar far as the spheres of influence of each of these two miperpowers are concerned. Although this in no way means a status quo that is fixed in very detail ss fara the internal situation in ench country of ‘he respective spheres of influence ie concerned, t does mean that the two superpowers do everything in their power (hich is far from being absolute) to prevent changes tn one ‘Country from provoking a long-term uiphewal inthe balance St forces in the works, ie. © prevent these changes from tacaping the controlled eadjustment ofthis balance "As far a6 the attitude of the USSR and the Soviet-bloc countries towards the dictatorial regimes in Portugal, Spain tnd Greece is concerned, this has certain been eitcal and. negative, but this does not mean that the Soviet Union and its allies adopted, atten, policy that effectively challenged these regimes, (This indeed is the Teast that one ean #85.) From Greece; where trade and diplomaticexchange with the Soviet bloc experienced a new upswing under the colonels’ junta, through to. Spain where @-major development in ‘economic relations if now under way, the score is cle enough ‘All this, however, simply concerns the frst aspect of the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, tnd is sufficiently well-known not to need any emphasis here. "The second aspect far more important ~ this equilibrium inthe balance of forces ina dynamic one, and highly unstable, te it in no way excludes considerable convadictions between the United States and the USSR. In poirt of fac, there is «| permanent readjustment of this lance by way of the policy failures produced by these contradictions. ‘The important factor in this respect i the direct presence ofthe USSR in the EESase few year, by way ofthe Iarael-Arab conic as 9 power of the Rest order in a region that was previously a reserved domain of the United States. The Soviet presence in the ‘Meditereanean constituent element of the new readjust= ‘ment in the belinee of forces, and it has major effecta for the countries in thi region. While provaking attempts by the United States to reinforce contol of the NATO countries, it iso makes manive and open American intervention 19 this region far more risky than this was previously, and this can lundoubtedly have in Spain, a ic already has had in Greece, bighly positive effects on the circumstances in_which the fetatorships are overthrow, We may say thatthe popular ‘arses of these countries have been able to take advantage, for will be able to do #0, of the contradictions between the United States and the Soviet Union, even though their path Tier along ara" edge, on account ofthe intensified effort at ‘control on the pat of the United States, This situation could be seen at work in Greece in the Cyprus conflict, with the spectacular about-tamms of the United States duc among ‘ther things to the frm though cautious atitade of the Soviet Union, an attitude Which made a massive American inter vention in favour ofthe military junta altogether too esky. Til ‘The Dominant Classes "The fundamental question regarding the overthrow of the dictatorshipin Portugal nd Grecce, andthe changes impend= ing in Spain, isthe exact role played by the internal factors, More precisely, in what way have the s0-alled ‘external’ factors the changes involved in the present phase of imperial lam, been reproduced and internalized actually within the socio-economic and political structures of these countries? "The fret point to consider here is that of the changes within the dominant claeres of these countries, We must Fecall once again the points made as regards the new forms of dependence characterizing the relationships that certain ‘dependent counties have with the imperialist centres: on the fone hand, the rapid destruction of pre-emitaliae modes and forms of production, on account of the forms assumed by the present imports of foreign capital in these countries; on the other hand, the pracess of dependen: industriaiztion, de tothe tendency of foreign capital to invest in the directly Droductive sectors of industrial enptal, in te current context ‘OF internationalization of production and capital ‘This permits the emergence or developraeat of «new frac- tion of the bourgeoisie in these countries, which a very clear in the cases of Greece and Spain, and to somewhat lesser extent alao in Portugal: fetcion which I have referred t0 elsewhere as the domestic bourgeoisie. As this indusrializa- tion gets under way, there develop nucle of an autochtonic bourgeoisie with chiefly industrial character (direcly productive capital), grafting itelf onto ths process in thea ddmsin of light industry in the contumer goods field, more ‘occasionally in heavy industry (consumer durables, textiles, gineering, a Well satel and chemicals), and finally in the ‘constriction industries (coment, ete). This i particularly the ease, in Greece, with the domestic bourgeoisie organized in the Union of Greek Industrialist; in Portugal, with certain stutochtonous capitals of the Lisbon/Setubal/Porto industria bel, these espeala promoting the change i economic policy ‘that was attempted, but failed, under Caetano, by R, Martins and his Fomerto Industrial plan of 1972. In Spain, finally, the domestic bourgeoisie encompasses a large part of the sutochtonie.bourgeoive, with the Catalan and Basque ‘ourgeosis ints lead, but ale inchuding » section of public capital under the control of the INT (National Industializa- ‘ion Institute), ‘These bourgeoises are not simply confined to the industrial domain, bue also extend to fields directly dependent onthe industralization process, such ws transport, distribution (commercial capital and even services of ‘various kinds (particularly tourists). They are distinguished ‘rom earier frations ofthe bourgeoisie by the new complexity oftheir relationships with foreign capital. Above all, they’ are distinguished from the comprador bourgeoisie, which i tll very important in these countries. ‘This comprador bourgeoisie (sometimes referred 10 m8 the ‘oligarchy cau be defined as that fraction whose interests are entirely subordinated to those of foreign capita, and ‘which functiors asa kind of staging-post and direct inter Imediary for the implantation and reproduction of foreign ‘capital in the countries concerned. "The activiey of thi ‘compradar bourgeoisie often assumes a peculative character, being concentrated isthe financial, banking and commercial ssctors, bur it san also be found inthe industrial sector, in those branche: wholly dependent on and subordinated t0 Toreign capital. In Greece, a typical case ie that of shipping (Onassis, Niarchos, ete), and capital invested in marine construction, petrol refineries, ete. In Portugal, the smal fhumber of big comprador groups (CUF, Espirito Santo, Borges e Trad, Portugues do Atlantico, etc.) centre around r Phe Dominant Clore 43 banking, and while controlling s large pet of autochtonic ‘production, they ae atthe same time oriexted tothe exploita- ton of the African colonies — being clovly tied to foreign tapital both in Portagal and in ite colonies. In Spain, nally, there is the characteristic case of a very substantial banking and financial comprador sector (industria banks in particular) fd industries thet diectiy depend on it From the political point of view, this bourgeoisie is the true support and agent Of foreign imperialist capital. ‘The domestic bourgeoisie on the other hand, although dependent on foreign capital, also has significant contradic tions with it. "This i principally beonuse it is cheated in ie Share of the cake, afar ab the explostation ofthe masts is feoncerned; the lion's share of the surplus-value goes t0 foreign capital and its agents the compridor bourgeoisie, at the domertic bourgeoisie’ expense. ‘Ther is also the fact that since the domestic bourgeoisie i concentrated ehietly in the industrial sector, fs incerested in an indatral development ese polarized towards the exploitation of the country by foreign capital, and in a site intervention which would ‘uarantee fits protected markets at hom, while alo making. FE more competitive vis-i-vis foreign capital. It seeks an textention and development of the home market by a certain Increare in the purchasing power and consumption of the masses, which would supply it witha greater market outlet, ‘nd aleo secks seat aid to help it develop its exports Tt must stil be made clear ~ and this s very important st far as this domestic bourgeoisie's policy towards the dictator ships is concerned~thatitisnota genuine national bourgeoisie, i.e bourgeoisie that i really independent of foreign capital td which could take part nan anti-imperialist struggle for ‘effective national independence, such as vometimes di exist ‘Sinan countries the pnt Spa above al daring the SRE Sa oe inperatinn Toe devdopmeat ofhs ‘domestic bourgeoisie coincides with the internationalization ‘of labour processes and production, and with the international~ {tation of capital, in other words with the induced reproduc tion of the dominant relations of production actually within“ ‘these various social formations. By this fact alone, while is existence involves certain contradictions with foreign capital, this domestic bourgeoisie isto certain extent itself dependent fon the process of internationsliztion under the aegis of foreign capital dependent on techzolegical procestes and Jabour product vty, on complex network of sub-contraction| for foreign capital, on the sector of light industry and con- ‘mer goods in which is frequently confined in thi sector's relationships with heavy industry (the privileged sector for foreigh multinctional corporations), ab wel as on commercial outlets. This explains, among other things, the political sweskness of this domestic bourgeoisie, which, although i {ties to translate into political action ito contradictions with foreign eapital and the big comprador bourgeoisie, is unable, for the most part, to wield long-term political hegemony lover the other “ractions af the bourgeoisie and the dominant lasses, ic, over the power bloc. “Two other important characteristics should be added to this, 2) The domests bourgeoisie does not all entirely on one side Of the divide btween monopoly and non-monopoly capital While the domestic bourgeoisie does include « section of rnon-monopely capital in the countries with which we are ‘concerned (the small and medium-size firm), ialeo includes entire segments of monopoly capital; and conversely, there ‘are also segments of non-monopoly capital entirely subor- inated 10 foreign capital by way of sub-contracting agree- ‘ments and comercial channel. ‘Thus although the domestic ‘Dourgeoisie exhibits a certain political unity in ts contradi tions with foreign capital tis itself deeply divided, particularly in so faras it iscleft by the contradiction betwoen manopaly and non-monopoly capital, and this fac is not without effect (on ie political weakens. ) Since the domestic bourgeoisie is itolf sill relatively ‘dependent on foreign capital, the contradictions between the various foreign capitals in these countries, particularly those beeen United State capital and capital from the The Dominant Clases 45 Common Market, and between capinls from different fractions of internationlized capital (industrial, banking, commercial), are all reflected and reproduced actually within the domestic bourgeoisie itself, aovording to the divergent linesofdependencethet cut across The comesticbourgenise js marked by the same ‘externally centred” character the nti economy of these countries, which polarised towers process of internationaization under the aegis of capital from the dominant countries. And this always factor in the politcal weakness ofthis bourgeoivie Trahould now be clear thatthe dstintica between domestic bourgeoisie and comprador bourgeoisie i not based on simplistic distinction between « bourgeoisie isolated” and ‘enclosed’ in its own national space end an internationaized bourgeoisie, ie. on « spatial distinction but rather on the process of internationaliztion of capital, ts various moments, ‘Phases and turns as they are expremsed in each social forma: tion. The distinction between compredor and domestic bourgeoisie, while being based an the new structure of dependence, i not a ststisical and erspirieal distinction, fixed rigidly once and for al. Ie rather atendentialdiferen” tiation, the concrete configuration it takes depending to a certain extent on the conjuncture. ‘This espital or that, this or that fraction of capital, industrial branch or enterprise, originally ted to foreign eapital, may inthis process acquire a ‘lative autonomy and gradually come to ake its place in the ranks of the domestic bourgeoisie, just as, in the opposite Girection, capital that were originally autochtonic may tradually fall under the thumb of foreign capital ~x process of constant reclassification which must aways be taken into “This phenomenon of the domestic bourgeoisie docs not just affect Spain, Greece and, toa somewhat seer extent, Portu- fal Tr can be found in the majority of European countries, on secount of the peculier and complex dependence of Europe visei-vis the United States. But there at significant differ fences between the domestic bourgeoisie of the European it countries and those ofthe countries thatthe main” dividing line ofthe imperialist chain locates on the side ofthe ‘dominated, ‘These bourgeoises not only have a far weaker teconoini base than do the domestic Bourgeoisie of the other European counities; they are also marked by an ideological snd political weakness, in countries where the introduction fd development of capitaliam took place on the basis of « ‘ery slender endogenous base of primitive accumulation (orsugal, Spain), or even entirely under the aegis of foreign ‘capital (Greece) A notable fac inthis regard wa the inability of the Portuguese, Spanish and Greek bourgeoisies to carry through their own bourgeois-demoeratic revolutions. One ‘must of course reject the ideal-type model of bourgeois ‘democratic. revolution against. which these “felures™ are ‘mesaured a model whose political imagery somehow blends together the French Revolution with the result of the English Revolution: « French Revolution without its various Bons partes, ar were, It x hardly necestary to recall that such a ‘model has never existed, and measured against it, all the bbourgeois-democratic revolutions have to a certain extent “faled” or been wanting. In the final analyst, they never existed at all, Bo iti none the less true that, if we examine ‘what has happened in these countries in relation wo the other Buropean counties (including Germany), the diferences are clear: they are expressed in particular in the characteristic Inability of the Portuguese and Spanish bourgeoises, and to ‘somewhat lesser extent slo the Greek, 1 esteblish a bbourgeois-ideobogical discourse with a hegemonic character in their socal formations, and in their difculties of political ‘organization waich are equally specific to these counties. ‘Those characterstica sill weigh very heavily on the domestic bourgei Nevertheless, this domestic bourgeoisie still played an important part in the change of regime in Greece and in Poreugal; wil be equally important in the process that we can foresce in Spain. What is beyond doubt in ll three cases fe that gradually, iin different degrees, broad sector of the domestic bourgrosie distanced themselves from the military ‘ctatorship (ot are doing so now in the Spanish case), and ‘The Dominant Clases 47 ‘withdrew their support fromit. Bros sectorsof the comprador Dourgeoisies, on the other hand, supported these regimes til the ond, if to n-varying extent and by complex tactics, We must now study thir aspect of the problem, taking into account. the specific characteristic of the domestic Dbourgevsis 1 Im the first place, these regimes overwhelmingly promoted the interests of the comprador bourgeoisie, inthe long run, leading toa clearly visible subordination to foreign capital, ‘American in. particular, until this ultimately finshed by feriously inconveniencing the domestic bourgeoisies. Tt would be wrong to ce these bourgeoisies as constantly and systematically bullied by the military regimes, them- Selves mere ‘pawns’ of foreign capital, ao that their attitude ‘was always one of constant, open snd unambiguous opposition to the regime in question, Besides the acvantages that these bbourgecisies themselves drew from the ‘domestic peace’, the Greek and Spanish regimes often promoted and sometimes even sought their development. ‘The damestic bourgeoisie thus formed part of the power bloc corresponding t the ictatorshipe, and on top of this, in the Greek ease, this bourgeoisie had ite clearly supported the actual extablish- tment ofthe military dictatorship in 1067, tlling behind the ‘comprador bourgevise, in the face of ‘he rise of popular Struggles and a brea in the representational tie with its political representatives. Bu the development ofthe domestic Bourgeoinies under these regimes, essentially due to the internationalization of capital, revived their contradictions with the compradar bourgeoisie, and wa the source of their Jwrowing reserve towards the dictatorships, whose onganic lationship to the comprador bourgedsie and to foreign Capital had become in the meantime t90 arrow a Yoke. "The domestic bourgeoisie thus demanied a growing share ‘of state support ie thatthe state should we more account of its own particular interests, It sought to readjust the com~ ‘Promise with the big comprador bourgeoisie within the power bloc, and inthis way fo acquire a polite weight appropriatero to its place in society. Moreover, in the case of Spain, and. particularly that of Portugal, it sought to beeak the very Configuration «f this power bloc, characterized by a close alliance between the comprador bourgeoisie and the large landowners, bychallenging the weight ofthe agrarian interes, ‘which had become disproportionate. In Spain, the stailiza” tion plan of f0 had to a certain extent already reduced the political weigh of the landlords to the benefit of the com= Drador boureoise, and the same thing had happened to 3 ‘much smaller ecent in Portugal between 1950 and 1960. The ‘weight of the indlords, which was related tothe very origin 1nd Portuguese regimes, not only no longer ‘corresponded 1 their economic position, already on the ‘wane, But was ever more of 2 Brake on the process of in- ‘dustrilization, Because of the accentusted contradictions between agriculture and industry in the development of this way sucseeded in directly overthrowing it, and remained relatively isolated in the country asa whole. “There i also the case for Porcugal ofthe African national liberation movements in the Portuguese colonies, which ‘theres an unfortunate tendency often to forge. the present phase of internatonalizaion of capital and production, ‘othing could be more stupid than w gnere the role that these ‘movements played in the actual overthrow of the Caetano regime. And this ip paralleled in some respects alo by the semed popular resistance of the Cypriot people to the coup <ézat unleashed by the Greek junta and its local supporters, the EOKA-B, against Makarios. It anazing how the role of international events’ is Brought up in connection with the ‘overthrow of these regimes, while quielly forgetting # say that theoe were inthe last analysis nothing less than popular ‘uprisings against these regimes by their vassals "Yet even here, the role ofthese struggles was not a direct fone; if i wan not just ¢ matter of “extemal” factors, heir impact was stil fel chiefly ‘ata distance’, above all in itensi- fying the contradictions within the dictaorehips themeeves, and particulary in their main pillar, the eed forces. Strictly speaking, these struggles were articulated to the contradic. ‘done of the national social formations in Portugal and Greece, helping to condense these, ané thus marking the beginning of the dowfal of regimes in beth cases already well “undermined from within. The effect of these struggles must” also not be overestimated, and thi is particularly important ft regards the Spanish case: to believe that nothing will hheppen in Spain nthe absence of factors ofthis kind would ‘eas wiongastodirectly attribute thefallofchePortaguese and Greek dictatordhipa to the colonial war in Africa and the Greek colonels sdventure in Cyprus. After al, there have Ibeen wory roany examples of successful national liberation Struggles that did noe have direct effects on the internal fegimes of the colonial powers. ‘The national liberation, ‘Srugales in Aftiea, and the Friction between the people of Cyprus and the Athens regime, had both lasted « very long. time before ther came to latch onto the particular eontradic~ tions within the Portuguese and Greek armies. We repeat, then, that except in the ease of direct invasion (Nazi Germany tnd fascist Italy), if has always been the interna contradic tions ofa given country that have so far played the predomi rant role in fundamental changes ip its forms of state and regime, ‘The tational liberation straps, just ike American Imperiale from the other side, only influenced these ‘countries to the extent that their effects were internalized within them. "There wayne frontal mass movement against the dictator= ships, and in this sens, the popular struggles were not the director principal factor in their overthrow. Nevertheless, these struggles were certainly the determining factor. What ‘etn by this ita the factors directly involved inthis over- throw (the regimes’ own internal contradictions) were themn~ selves determined by the popular struggle. This already indicates the se and the complexity of the basie problem in ‘what way, exacly, did chese popular struggles (the determin- ing factor) prodice the effects (the principal factor) that directly contributed to the overthrow of the dictatorships? We ere familias enough with the reply of the bourgeoisie basing itself on she undeniable fact that the overthrow as not directly brought sbout by a popular mass movement, it ‘maintrine thatthe popular struggles counted for nothing in ‘this process, ora least for very He. “This point isthe first to bear ip mind here. But « second ‘Te Popular Claszer 79 must also be noted, which I shall come back tin the next chapter, The popular matser did not ju play the role of determining the internal contradictions that directly con- tributed tothe downfall of the dictatorshps but another role 1 well. Although the regimes! internal contradictions foverned the decisive beginnings of the proces, the Tact that thir was atl a genuine process of democratisation meant that in both Greece and in Portugal, che pepular masses inter. vened by way of bitter struggles. Nothing would be more ‘wrong than to see the overthrow ofthe dictatorships ae having ‘been fully achieved in Portugal on 2:th Apri, with the accession of Spinola t power, or in Greece on 23rd July, ‘vith the etum of Karsmanlis. In other words, the regimes" internal contradictions, which were themselves the effects of the mass etragyles, also functioned asthe oceasion fora direct, intervention by the masses, once the process of democratize ‘ion gor under way. ‘As far as the first point ix concemed, the popular and political opposition to the dictatorships faund expression in ‘Quite particular way, the importance of which we must now ‘examine, namely in the characteristic disaffection of the ‘matees towards these regites, leading totheirioltion fora the masecs ~to different extent in each ease. This wes the station in Greece right from the start, oF atleast very s00n after; in Portugal, a also in Spain, it took place gradually, as ‘he regimes there had originally enjoyed 1 certain popular support, particularly in the countryside. in the last few years, this mute, varied, but constant resistance by the people (0 the dictatorships vas a featore distinguishing them from the classical fascist regimes, although, as is the cae with every feonerete exceptional regime, these dicaorships themselves wwere each a unique combination of various regimes of the exceptional state: they did in fact display certain fascit clements, but always under the dominmt form of military ictatorship. In point of fac, the regimes in these countries fither never succeeded in implanting themselves in the imareee, or they gradually loot whatever popular base they hnad enjoyed; either they never managed to set up their ownfonganizations ef mass mobilization and indoctrination, a fascist party or relatively ‘representative’ unions, (in the Greek cate, densite repeated etempta in this direction by the junta), or if they did, these organizations ended up as no ‘more than ossifed relics (= with the Falange and the Movi ‘miento Naciond! in Spain) "The izolationof then dictatorships and thei difference in ‘this respect from the fascist regimes proper, i of the greatest Jmportance. It hes often been underestimated by the left and its organizmtions, and seen as simply a‘pateve' resistance by the people, ultimately quite ineffective, but thisisa completely false assessment. Ithas als fed people to think ofthese states te separate from the “civil society" of the popular masoe ‘onolithicaly sintsining themselves in an ivory tower until ‘final confrontation makes ther collapc like abouse of card ‘This isolation is thus seen as somehow preventing cas contraditions fem affecting the state apparatus, hardening it ‘agsinst internal contradictions, so that class contradictions ‘can only be ‘extemal’ to thi apparatus, ic located between it find the masses ‘outside’ he state. In sach a conception, the internal contradictions of these apparatuses would be no more ‘than the fiction between clans and camarilas sboveor outside of clase contradetions. ‘This conception, of course, has proved itself false. Whst is ‘more, it males t impossible to grasp 8 seemingly paradoxical feature of the military dictatorships, For ifthe enlistment of the popular elaies in the fascist apparatuses, end in certain ‘eases, particulatly that ofthe petty bourgeoisie, is voluntary enrolment in them, created considerable internal contradic tions within the Nasi and Tealian fascist spparatuss (partis) States) reflecting the direct contradictions within them berween the interests ofthese clases and those of big capital these contradictions have been far more pronounced in the ‘ise of the inlitary dletatorshipe, derpite their “isolation” from the poplar classes, ina stuation where the classes have ‘not been directy and massively present and mobilize inthis way, Fusthermore, these contradictions have played f more importan’ role in the fll ofthe military dictatorships side, bythe play of The Popular Claner 81 than they did in the overthrow ofthe fiscist regimes proper. "The question then aries as to how the contradictions betseen the dominant and dominated classes could fect sate apparatus particularly isolated’ ‘rom them. In other ‘words, Row did the weight ofthe popular masses male seit felt within sate apparatusce from which these masses were spparently absent (either because they were excluded, or ‘Because they simply kept themselves alot)? “To answer this question, brief theoretical detour is necessary. ‘The relationship between the state and ct Clansea has mort often been viewed ws one of extermality; this 8 typical feature of bourgeois ideology, Dut ha also had its effects onthe Marxist theory of the state Tn thie problematic, thestate is considered either asasubjectorasa thing. Considered tira subjec, we are bac atthe old Hegelian conception of « State that realy is ‘separate’ from ‘evil society’, endowed with an intrinsic rationality the embodiment of the general wll inthe fae of atomized individuals, Thisconception is directly eteced nthe wrk of he Your Marz andi il pers. his liter ststement cay an onganism independent of society and above i tothe state's function of class domination, Viewed asa thing, we have the “instrumentalist conception also present within Marxism; the state is considered as by its nature 1 mere instrument, ‘machine, that can be manipulated at vil by the dominant lasses, and whose relationship of representation with thelr las interests is supposedly due to ther ‘grip’ on ths inert, instrument. ‘The political repercussions ofthese two positions, [Rone such elec, common to both of then, that paral) immportant for un heres i this problematic of the satel ee re wen acting nthe tte only fer out influences eth of hem ki NOK Of “Pies of the sate, ofthe sate tg whole, In this conception, {he military dictatorship, in thir ioition, appear ax the ‘stern example ofthis inatumentality ofthe saeBut this precisely makes it impossible to grasp the internal contradictions ofthe state ell. In no cate, in fact, is the state tubject or a things iti always by nature azlation, just as is “capita to he ore precise, the condensation of cof forces between the class that is expressed in aapeciie” already contains in jer-within te state, Just as “cap Ttself the contradiction beeween capital and wage-labour, 0 class contradicuons. always cut tight through the state, ‘accause the statereproduces these class contradictions within itself by. its very nature a. clas state. This meana in effect ‘that clase contractions are always expressed, ina apeciic ‘vay, a internal contradictions within the state, which never IBand can never bea monolithic blac devoid of fssutes. There is certainly alway a unity of state power relted to the state's representation «f the interests of the hegemonic class or fraction, and the is the reason why the popular classes can never occupy the state apparatus bit by bi, ut have o stash itin the transition to socialism; but this should not give rise. to the idea of the state gy. bloc devoid of fissures "To return to the miliary dictatorships that we are con- ccemed with hers, Just at with every bourgeois state, their felationthip to the popular classes is expressed in internal contradictions involving the Various political snd economic ‘measures they have to take towards them, i. the particular modalities of capital accumulation. In actu fact, the

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