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An Empirical Investigation of the Process of

Knowledge Transfer in International Strategic
Alliances

Article in Journal of International Business Studies February 2004

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An empirical investigation of the process of
knowledge transfer in international strategic
alliances
Bernard L Simonin
The Fletcher School, Tufts University, Medford,
MA, USA
Correspondence:
BL Simonin, The Fletcher School, Tufts
University, Medford, MA 02155, USA.
Tel: 1 617 627 5255;
Fax: 1 617 627 3712;
E-mail: bernard.simonin@tufts.edu
Received: 26 February 2003
Revised: 12 February 2004
Accepted: 1 April 2004
Online publication date: 8 July 2004
Journal of International Business Studies (2004) 35, 407427
& 2004 Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. All rights reserved 0047-2506 $30.00
www.jibs.net
Abstract
This research proposes and tests a basic model of organizational learning that
captures the process of knowledge transfer in international strategic alliances.
Based on a cross-sectional sample of 147 multinationals and a structural
equation methodology, this study empirically investigates the simultaneous
effects of learning intent, learning capacity (LC), knowledge ambiguity, and its
two key antecedents tacitness and partner protectiveness on technological
knowledge transfer. In the interest of expanding our understanding of the
organizational mechanisms that both hinder and facilitate learning, the
concept of LC is refined into three distinct components: resource-, incentive-,
and cognitive-based LC. Further, the strength of the relationships between these
theoretical constructs and knowledge transfer is examined in light of the
possible moderating effects of organizational culture, firm size, and the form
and competitive regime of the alliance. Consistently, learning intent (as a
driver) and knowledge ambiguity (as an impediment) emerge as the most
significant determinants of knowledge transfer. Moreover, the effects of partner
protectiveness and LC on the learning outcome are moderated by the firms
own culture towards learning, the size of the firm, the structural form of the
alliance, and the fact that partners may or may not be competitors.
Journal of International Business Studies (2004), 35, 407427.
doi:10.1057/palgrave.jibs.8400091
Keywords: strategic alliances; knowledge transfer; learning capacity
Introduction
Over the past 15 years there has been a growing interest in
international strategic alliances and how organizations learn from
their partners and develop new competencies through their
collaborative efforts (Inkpen, 2002; Mowery et al., 2002). This
distinct and multidisciplinary line of inquiry has generated a
wealth of conceptual work and theorizing, but a limited amount
of empirical work (Mjoen and Tallman, 1997; Simonin, 1999a).
Not much has changed since the early warnings of Mowery et al.
(1996, 78):
Empirical research on the role of knowledge within the firm and
alliances within firm strategy, has been hampered by the
widespread reliance on anecdotes and assertion, rather than
statistical evidence.
 Process of knowledge transfer in strategic alliances Bernard L Simonin
408

To address these limitations, the current study
will attempt to depart from speculative grounds in
favor of empirically based research that relies on a
large survey sample and on a structural equation
methodology.
Commenting on alliance learning research,
Inkpen (2002, 277) confessed:
Now that there is a solid base of antecedents
research, the next step is theoretical and empiri-
cal work that integrates the diverse perspectives
and establishes some causal links across the
variables.
Accordingly, it is the aim of this study to develop
and test such an integrated model. Based on a cross-
sectional sample of 147 multinationals and a latent
variable approach, this study will introduce and
empirically investigate the process of knowledge
transfer in international strategic alliances. The
postulated model identifies and integrates various
key organizational mechanisms that either enable
or hinder knowledge transfer. Specifically, it will
account for the concurrent effects of learning
intent, learning capacity (LC), knowledge ambigu-
ity and tacitness, and partner protectiveness on
technological knowledge transfer (see conceptual
model in Figure 1). Although many studies have
identified the importance of these variables sepa-
rately, their simultaneous effects have yet to be
examined and assessed empirically. In particular,
the model will refine the concept of LC into three
distinct components: resource-, incentive-, and cogni-
tive-based LC. Further, the strength of the relation-
ships between these theoretical constructs and
knowledge transfer will be examined in light of
the possible moderating effects of four key theore-
tical constructs: organizational culture, firm size,
alliance form (equity vs non-equity), and the
competitive regime of the alliance.
Theoretical model and background
At the heart of the learning process in alliances are
knowledge-specific, partner-specific (at the level of

Organizational Learning
Organizational

Mechanism Outcome
Motivation

LEARNING
INTENT
H3a (+) H1 (+)

RESOURCE-BASED
H3b (+) L.C.
H2a (+)
Learning Capacity

H3c (+)
INCENTIVE-BASED
(L.C.)

L.C. H2b (+)

H2c (+) KNOWLEDGE

TRANSFER
COGNITIVE-BASED
L.C.

H4 (-) H5 (-)
Learning Hindrance

PARTNER
PROTECTIVENESS
H6 (+)

AMBIGUITY
H7 (+)
TACITNESS

Moderating Effects

Organizational Culture
Firm Size
Alliance Form
Competitive Regime

Figure 1 Conceptual model.

Journal of International Business Studies

 Process of knowledge transfer in strategic alliances
the knowledge seeker, knowledge provider, and
their inter-relationship), and context-specific vari-
ables (Simonin, 1999a). This view is echoed by
Inkpen (2002), who frames the antecedents of
alliance learning into learning partner character-
istics, teaching partner characteristics, knowledge
characteristics, relationship factors, and alliance
form. Building on this commonality, the proposed
model represents a parsimonious, but yet complete,
way of accounting for these various facets of the
learning process: learning intent, learning capabil-
ity, organizational culture, size (knowledge-seeker
level); partner protectiveness (knowledge-holder
level); tacitness and knowledge ambiguity (knowl-
edge level); and alliance form and competitive
regime (context level). This model also captures
the fundamental steps between stimulus and
response: motivation to learn, capacity to learn,
and learning outcome. Finally, the model contrasts
learning drivers and learning impediments by
isolating organizational specificities and mechan-
isms that facilitate and hinder knowledge transfers
in international alliances.
In line with past research that has focused on the
technology or technical-capability side (e.g., Hage-
doorn and Schakenraad, 1994; Zander and Kogut,
1995; Appleyard, 1996), this study focuses on
technology and process know-how. The various
components of the proposed model are introduced,
leading to the formulation of the specific hypoth-
eses that govern their inter-relationships; in addi-
tion, the subsequent sections offer a close template
to the operationalization of the variables in the
model.
Learning drivers: learning intent and capacity
Learning intent
In the context of individual learning, motivation to
learn is one of the major determinants of learning
(Kelly, 1974; Filley et al., 1976). In an inter-
organizational setting such as a strategic alliance,
learning intent (Hamel, 1991) describes the same
self-determination, desire and will of an organiza-
tion to learn from its partner or collaborative
environment. It captures the degree of desire for
internalizing a partners skills and competencies
(Pucik, 1988; Hamel, 1990). It is clear that strong
rationales for collaborating do not necessarily
correspond to a strong learning intent.
While the rationales for entering an alliance are
numerous and well documented (Glaister and
Bernard L Simonin
409
Buckley, 1996), the focus on learning and knowl-
edge transfer as motives has led to the emergence of
a distinct stream of research that covers:
(1) how knowledge is managed in strategic alliances
(Tiemessen et al., 1997; Khanna et al., 1998;
Inkpen, 2002; Martin and Salomon, 2002; Zeng
and Hennart, 2002);
(2) how knowledge is transferred across partners
(Appleyard, 1996; Dodgson, 1996; Mowery et al.,
1996, 2002; Baughn et al., 1997; Choi and Lee,
1997; Simonin, 1999a, b);
(3) how knowledge is acquired from the parents by
the joint venture itself (Lyles and Salk, 1996);
(4) how knowledge about collaborating per se
develops over time and impacts on collaborative
outcomes (Doz, 1996; Powell et al., 1996; Dyer
and Singh, 1998; Kale et al., 2002; Simonin,
2002); and
(5) how knowledge impacts performance (Lane
et al., 2001; Appleyard, 2002; Dussauge et al.,
2002; Reuer et al., 2002; Tallman and Jenkins,
2002).
A by-product of this research focus has been some
degree of fascination with the notion of learning
race a` la Hamel (1990, 1991) or Reich and Mankin
(1986). More recently, a strong research counter-
movement has surfaced pointing to the pitfalls and
possible fallacy of this learning race metaphor. Zeng
and Hennart (2002, 189), in particular, argue that
racing is not as frequent as commonly believed, and
that it should not be viewed
as a goal for joint ventures, but rather as a
consequence of poor joint venture design and
management when parties are attempting to
follow potentially more rewarding strategies of
cooperative specialization.
Mowery et al. (2002) acknowledge that few
scholars have distinguished between these learn-
ing and co-specialization alliances. More impor-
tantly, these authors warn that the impact of
absorptive capacity varies across these types of
alliance and, therefore, that the literatures main
emphasis on learning alliances fails to capture the
full understanding of the impact of absorptive
capacity and alliance outcomes. The model pro-
posed in this study addresses this criticism and
reconciles the two views of alliances (learning race
vs co-specialization) by formally accounting for an
organizations learning intent and postulating:
Journal of International Business Studies
 Process of knowledge transfer in strategic alliances
410
Hypothesis 1: The higher the learning intent, the
higher the level of knowledge transfer.
Learning capacity
Under his discussion of awakening LC, Thompson
(1995) acknowledges that the starting point for
learning in the natural world is curiosity. That
desire to learn plays the role of a stressor that helps
enact the proper cognitive capacity and translates
into the deployment of other complementary
resources. Although motivation corresponds to a
required level of stress favorable to stimulating
learning, the actual level of learning is subject to
cognitive and physical limitations as well as to
internal constraints. LC at the organizational level
can be thought of as the equivalent of bounded
rationality at the individual level. Bounded ration-
ality corresponds to the limited capacity of human
beings to obtain, store, process, and share informa-
tion accurately (Simon, 1978). Under Daft and
Hubers (1987) information-processing paradigm,
organizational learning can be decomposed simi-
larly into information acquisition, distribution,
interpretation, and organizational memory. Under
this approach, efficient communication systems are
the key to alleviating the problem of bounded
rationality. In turn, the efficiency of communica-
tion systems depends on the magnitude and
appropriateness of resources allocated to that end.
In a broader sense, LC, as the collection of all these
dedicated resources, is both the engine and the
bottleneck of the learning system.
LC is related to, but at the same time distinct
from, absorptive capacity. Originally, Cohen and
Levinthal (1990, 128) defined absorptive capacity as
the ability to recognize the value of new external
knowledge, assimilate it, and apply it to commercial
ends. Whereas early investigations have focused on
the issue of prior related knowledge, absorptive
capacity remains a much more complex construct (if
not concept). Unfortunately, as argued by Zahra and
George (2002, 186), empirical studies do not always
capture the rich theoretical arguments and the
multidimensionality of the construct. In the context
of learning alliances, research on absorptive capacity
(Lane et al., 2001; Inkpen, 2002; Mowery et al., 2002)
has evolved with a strong focus on the character-
istics of the particular combination of partners. Dyer
and Singh (1998) refer to it as partner-specific
absorptive capacity. This conception of absorptive
capacity emphasizes partner similarities (Lane and
Lubatkin, 1998) and the breadth and depth of
Journal of International Business Studies
Bernard L Simonin
overlap between partners (Mowery et al., 2002)
rather than firm-level singularities.
In comparison, LC is focused less on the specific
combination of partners and the joint space
(membrane) of the alliance. Rather, it is concerned
with the firm-specific levers and resources that can
be manipulated so that external knowledge can be
recognized, assimilated, and applied beyond the
joint space. In short, LC corresponds to the
actionable side of absorptive capacity. In their
reconceptualization of absorptive capacity, Zahra
and George (2002) identify four complementary
capabilities: knowledge acquisition, assimilation,
transformation, and exploitation. For each one of
these capabilities, LC represents the firms specific
resources and assets that can be deployed opera-
tionally to drive the process and enhance its
efficiency. LC is a fundamental determinant of
absorptive capacity. Greater LC translates into
greater absorptive capacity.
Hamel (1990) names the capacity of organiza-
tions to learn from their partner receptivity. Among
the factors determining receptivity, Hamel identi-
fies the appropriateness of resource deployment,
incentive systems, attitude towards learning, and
the propensity to unlearn as crucial. Accordingly, in
the context of this study (see Figure 1), we
decompose LC into three separate components
that correspond to three distinct classes of organi-
zational routines and mechanisms that facilitate
knowledge transfers in strategic alliances:
(1) resource-based LC;
(2) incentive-based LC; and
(3) cognitive-based LC.
Finally, the propensity to unlearn is also
accounted for in the proposed model, not as a
direct antecedent of learning, but rather as a
manifestation of a particular organizational culture
that may or may not be conducive to learning
(moderating variable).
Looking at the first component of LC resource-
based LC the appropriateness of resource deploy-
ment corresponds to the commitment of both
human and tangible support assets. As recognized
by Inkpen (2002), many studies have stressed the
importance of managerial resources in the learning
process, but few have shed light on how the process
actually works. We contend that two factors have to
be present.
First, sufficient personnel should be involved
in the alliance. Resource-poor staffing strategies
 Process of knowledge transfer in strategic alliances
(Pucik, 1988), driven by cost considerations rather
than an investment outlook, certainly diminish the
capacity to learn (usually by denying the slack
resources necessary to learning). Limited staffing
results in a constant struggle to solve immediate
problems, leaving no leeway for learning.
Second, the involvement of key personnel in the
venture, at both the management and the opera-
tional level, is crucial for effective learning. Low
quality of staff assigned to alliances (Pucik, 1988)
can plague the learning process. Other damaging
practices include insufficient lead time for staffing
decisions and dependence on the partner for
staffing as well as the deliberate lack of assignment
of talented personnel outside headquarters or
corporate labs or, worse, the dumping of side-
tracked employees.
Next to human resources, support assets in the
form of information processing, logistic, financial,
and communication capabilities are needed to help
in the acquisition, processing, storage, and diffu-
sion of relevant information and knowledge com-
ponents. Does LC represented by the combination
of these resources impact on the learning outcome?
In their follow-up investigation of Hungarian
international joint ventures, Lane et al. (2001)
showed some partial support for the relationship
between absorptive capacity and knowledge
learned. Likewise, Mowery et al. (2002) have
reported that, indeed, the outcome of learning
alliances is influenced by partner-specific absorp-
tive capacity. In the more inclusive context of this
study, it is also expected that resource-based LC
drives the learning outcome:
Hypothesis 2a: The higher the resource-based
LC, the higher the level of knowledge transfer.
Whereas resource-based LC relates to the deploy-
ment of human resources and other physical assets,
incentive-based learning capacity corresponds to
explicit institutional routines, systems, rules and
guidelines that clarify individual expectations and
duties, steer learning activities in non-ambiguous
terms, foster a learning orientation, and induce
commitment to a learning objective. Building on
Puciks (1988) framework of organizational learning
obstacles in alliances, two specific manifestations of
this type of LC are considered: (1) the existence of
an actual reward system, and (2) the presence of a
clear learning agenda. Successful knowledge-seek-
ing firms reward alliance managers for what they
learn (Baughn et al., 1997). A reward system for
Bernard L Simonin
411
learning can take many forms (e.g., a direct
monetary incentive, a factor in promotion and
advancement, or a source of formal recognition and
acknowledgement in the organization). To be
effective, a learning agenda must not only be
clearly defined and codified in a language under-
stood by all but it must also be communicated to
the relevant parties (Pucik, 1988). As with resource-
based LC, incentive-based LC is expected to affect
significantly the learning outcome:
Hypothesis 2b: The higher the incentive-based
LC, the higher the level of knowledge transfer.
The third component of LC, cognitive-based LC,
captures general attitudes and beliefs towards
learning that prevail in the organization. In line
with Walshs (1995, 294) observation that by
understanding organization-level cognition, we
may be closer to appreciating the essence of
organizing, the parallel intent here is to move
closer to appreciating the nature of learning
capabilities. As with the study of organizational
change, the existence of cognitive impediments to
learning has been well established. For instance,
discussing barriers to organizational learning,
Mai (1996, 27) argues that blind spots skilled
incompetence that prevents us from noticing
inherent contradictions in our actions are key
impediments to learning that are a consequence of
our own intellectual arrogance. As an antidote, he
recommends humility with regard to the value and
validity of other perspectives. In the context of
strategic alliances, a common related cognitive
limitation pertains to what Hamel et al. (1989)
have coined the arrogance of leadership syn-
drome. Under this orientation, a firm tends to
develop an aura of superiority vis-a`-vis its partner; it
starts to assume the position of a teacher and to
project one of a student onto its partner. In
unequivocal terms, Hamel (1990) further argues
that humility is another prerequisite for learning.
On the other hand, ostentatious displays of tech-
nological mastery or excessive zeal in showcasing
superior competency may turn into a sure leakage
of know-how to partners only happy to oblige by
listening. Not only resource- or incentive-based
organizational procedures, competencies, and
assets, but also, more subtly, cognitive-based LC is
expected to affect learning outcomes:
Hypothesis 2c: The stronger the cognitive-based
LC, the higher the level of knowledge transfer.
Journal of International Business Studies
 Process of knowledge transfer in strategic alliances
412
Learning intent on LC
Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995, 74) argue:
The knowledge spiral is driven by organizational
intention, which is defined as an organizations
aspiration to its goals. Efforts to achieve the
intention usually take the form of strategy within
a business setting. From the viewpoint of organi-
zational knowledge creation, the essence of
strategy lies in developing the organizational
capability to acquire, create, accumulate, and
exploit knowledge.
That is, intent must translate into capability
building and resource deployment. Low priority
given to learning activities (Pucik, 1988) is com-
pounded by the problem of not being able to easily
price intangible assets that are the direct outcome
of learning. Under these circumstances, the absence
of a clear valuation tends to limit the allocation of
funds and resources to the learning purpose. As a
result, a conservative cost-driven rather than
investment-driven outlook is likely to prevail, one
that does not favor the build-up of the LC. In a way,
the deployment of appropriate human and support
capabilities essential to the transfer of knowledge is
strictly contingent upon the actual commitment of
top management to the learning agenda. Overall,
learning intent is expected to affect LC. A strong
motivation to learn from collaboration represents
the first necessary step in designing an explicit plan
for facilitating the learning process:
Hypothesis 3a: The higher the learning intent,
the higher the resource-based LC.
Learning intent is not just expected to influence
the deployment of appropriate human and physical
resources. It is also expected to translate into the
conception of explicit institutional routines and
guidelines that will help shape individual expecta-
tions and steer learning activities. From the pre-
sence of an actual reward system to the existence of
clear learning agenda, incentive-based LC is driven
by the real motivation and commitment of the
organization to learn, past corporate rhetoric and
more abstract vision statements. In fact, Von Krogh
et al. (2000) insist that a proper knowledge vision
must specify what knowledge organizational mem-
bers need to seek and create. That is, the overall
intent needs to be articulated and codified in a
language and a format that resonate with organiza-
tional members. In this spirit, Nonaka and Takeu-
chi (1995, 75) argue:
Journal of International Business Studies
Bernard L Simonin
To create knowledge, business organizations
should foster their employees commitment by
formulating an organizational intention and
proposing it to them.
Thus, as with resource-based LC, we expect intent
to influence positively the degree of incentive-
based LC.
Hypothesis 3b: The higher the learning intent,
the higher the incentive-based LC.
Finally, it is also postulated that the will to learn
is conducive to the establishment of a stronger
cognitive-based LC. Stereotypes and beliefs about
oneself and others can be resilient for individuals
and organizations. When it comes to learning from
others, fear of failing, losing face, and punishment
represent strong barriers to learning (Mai, 1996).
Nevertheless, these inhibitors can be neutralized
with proper intent and perspectives in place;
cognitive changes can take place. For instance, in
response to the not invented here syndrome,
opening doors strategies, as coined by Mai
(1996), can be rolled out. These are strategies for
encouraging inclusion (i.e., corporate initiatives to
invite other points of view, to create opportunities
for joint problem-solving). Given the right impetus
(e.g., motivation to learn), cognitive-based LC can
turn more favorable.
Hypothesis 3c: The higher the learning intent,
the stronger the cognitive-based LC.
Learning impediments: partner protectiveness,
ambiguity, and tacitness
Partner protectiveness
As the various components of LC support knowl-
edge transfer, the degree of protectiveness of a
partner inhibits such transfers. In their conceptua-
lization of knowledge transfer capacity, Martin and
Salomon (2002) distinguish between source transfer
capacity and recipient transfer capacity. Whereas
recipient transfer capacity relates to LC in this
study, source transfer capacity encapsulates the
ability of a firm to articulate its own knowledge,
to assess the needs and capabilities of the recipient,
and to transmit that knowledge effectively. Next to
the intrinsic ability of the transferor lies its own
willingness to engage in such a transfer. This duality
between ability and willingness of the knowledge
repository has been identified as an important
challenge for researchers (Mowery et al., 2002).
 Process of knowledge transfer in strategic alliances
In strategic alliances, the protection of proprie-
tary knowledge from partners is a vital issue to
many firms (Pisano, 1988; Baughn et al., 1997;
Simonin, 1999a; Inkpen, 2002). Transferring part-
ners must have an incentive to palliate the cost
typically associated with the transfer (Dyer and
Singh, 1998). If not, partners can adopt explicit
measures, deploy shielding mechanisms, and
engage in defensive actions to protect the transpar-
ency of their competencies, particularly when the
embodied knowledge is explicit and held by only a
few experts (Hamel, 1991; Inkpen and Beamish,
1997). Hence protection of technological know-
how is likely to be prevalent and actively managed.
Therefore, partner protectiveness is expected to
lead to greater knowledge ambiguity and directly
impede knowledge transfer.
Hypothesis 4: The more protective the partner is
of its knowledge, the lower the level of knowl-
edge transfer.
Ambiguity
Far from being readily or easily transferred from the
originator to a user, knowledge faces barriers and is
relatively immobile (Kogut and Zander, 1992;
Tiemessen et al., 1997). Knowledge transfer depends
on how easily that knowledge can be transported,
interpreted, and absorbed (Hamel et al., 1989). In
this process, Hedlund and Zander (1993) pointed to
the need to consider the more subtle aspects of
knowledge in particular its ambiguity, its resis-
tance to clear communication, its embeddedness in
context, and its idiosyncrasy. Likewise, Crossan and
Inkpen (1995) acknowledged that successful joint-
venture learning strategies call for firms to over-
come the ambiguity associated with their partners
skills. All these studies are indicative of the
existence of an important underlying latent con-
struct knowledge ambiguity that needs to be
explicitly recognized and integrated in modeling
efforts (Simonin, 1999a, b).
When studying knowledge ambiguity, a funda-
mental starting point resides in Reed and DeFillip-
pis (1990) observation that a strong barrier to
imitation originates from the inability of competi-
tors to comprehend the competencies that are
sources of competitive advantage. These authors
expanded on Lippman and Rumelts (1982) concept
of causal ambiguity that is, the basic ambiguity
concerning the nature of the causal connections
between actions and results. In this study, knowl-
edge ambiguity is defined as a similar lack of
Bernard L Simonin
413
understanding of the logical linkages between
actions and outcomes, inputs and outputs, and
causes and effects that are related to technological
or process know-how. It encapsulates the degree of
transferability of information, know-how, compe-
tence, knowledge, or skills. If ambiguity in skill
and resource deployment which are sources of
competitive advantage creates barriers to imita-
tion among competitors (Reed and DeFillippi,
1990) and within the firm (Szulanski, 1996), it also
affects negatively the propensity to learn from a
strategic alliance partner. It ultimately affects the
transfer outcome.
Hypothesis 5: The greater the degree of knowl-
edge ambiguity, the lower the level of knowledge
transfer.
As argued above, partner protectiveness is
expected to have a similar direct, negative effect
on knowledge transfer. At the same time, protec-
tiveness is also expected to be an antecedent of
knowledge ambiguity. That is, the knowledge held
by more protective partners is likely to be more
causally ambiguous.
Hypothesis 6: The more protective the partner is
of its knowledge, the greater the degree of
knowledge ambiguity.
Tacitness
Numerous studies have acknowledged the critical-
ity of tacitness (e.g., Kogut and Zander, 1993;
Zander and Kogut, 1995; Choi and Lee, 1997), but
few have examined empirically its exact impor-
tance in light of other key theoretical constructs
related to knowledge transfer (cf. Simonin,
1999a, b). Tacitness is often associated with Pola-
nyis (1967) observation that we can know more
than we can tell. The dichotomy between tacit and
explicit knowledge is based on whether knowledge
can or cannot be codified and transmitted in a
formal, systematic language or representation, and
has been well documented (Kogut and Zander,
1993; Zander and Kogut, 1995; Choi and Lee,
1997). Theoretically, Reed and DeFillippi (1990)
singled out tacitness as a key source of ambiguity
that raises barriers to imitation. Empirically, in
their study of the transfer of manufacturing
capabilities, Zander and Kogut (1995) found that,
indeed, the degree to which capabilities are codifi-
able and teachable (i.e., are non-tacit) significantly
influences the speed of their transfer. Thus, in this
study, next to partner protectiveness, which is also
Journal of International Business Studies
 Process of knowledge transfer in strategic alliances
414
expected to exert a direct effect on the learning
outcome, tacitness is posited as the main ante-
cedent of ambiguity.
Hypothesis 7: The more tacit the partners
knowledge, the greater the degree of knowledge
ambiguity.
Moderating effects: the role of organizational
culture, firm size, alliance form, and competitive
regime
The previous relationships are likely to be moder-
ated by four important variables: organizational
culture, firm size, alliance form, and competitive
regime. Both size and organizational culture repre-
sent pertinent firm-level variables that influence the
context in which learning takes place. Some
organizations are more driven and successful than
others in their approach to develop an open
context propitious to learning. Von Krogh et al.
(2000, 25) argue that the most fundamental
organizational barrier to knowledge creation
is the company ingrained paradigms or worldview.
These paradigms are useful in socializing new
members and keeping the organization coherent
through shared norms, values and goals, and
they also have the power to make or break
knowledge creation. In their discussion of the
barriers to leading learning in organizations, Meisel
and Fearon (1996, 205) echo this view, and claim
that the greatest barrier to learning is often our
inability to unlearn, to leave the comfort of work-
tested ideas of the way things are supposed to be
done.
The propensity to unlearn corresponds to a
necessary safeguard against competency traps and
the effect of superstitious learning. In this regard,
Hedberg (1981) maintains that the process of
understanding requires both the learning of new
knowledge and the propensity to discard obsolete
or misleading knowledge. Only through reviewing
the principles underlying corporate dogma, chal-
lenging old premises, questioning prevalent orga-
nizational procedures and norms, can new ideas
find a favorable terrain to grow. In fact, in the
alliances context, Hamel (1990) argues that, to
learn, a firm must be capable of challenging
existing belief. For our study, organizational culture
will then refer more specifically to this type of
learning culture in an organization. It represents
the degree to which employees are encouraged to
rethink the logic of current behaviors, to question
established routines and beliefs, and to challenge
Journal of International Business Studies
Bernard L Simonin
established wisdom. Keeping in mind the influen-
tial work of Argyris and Scho n in this domain, we
will use the terms single-loop and double-
loop to distinguish between these two types of
organizational culture and to contrast their effect
empirically.
Likewise, the moderating effect of two alliance-
level variables will be considered: (1) the role of
alliance form (equity vs non-equity), and (2) the case
of different competitive regimes. With respect to the
former, it has been argued that the extent of
learning and knowledge transfer among partners
is likely to depend on the alliance structure (Osborn
and Hagedoorn, 1997; Dyer and Singh, 1998;
Anand and Khanna, 2000). Indeed, Mowery et al.
(1996) found some evidence that equity joint
ventures were more effective conduits than con-
tract-based alliances for the transfer of complex
capabilities. Therefore, a closer examination of the
role of equity on the proposed model of knowledge
transfer is warranted.
Some alliances involve partners that are direct
competitors, whereas others feature organiza-
tions that do not compete directly and are likely
to remain this way. The former context may
provide a better strategic window onto a compe-
titor/partners technology or competence, but
it is also likely to be surrounded by greater levels
of protectiveness and mistrust. Some have argued
that alliances between competitors tend to
create contexts that particularly favor inter-partner
learning (Dussauge et al., 2002). Others have
wondered:
Does competition among partner firms in end-
product markets interfere with knowledge shar-
ing in alliances even when partner-specific
absorptive capacity is high? (Mowery et al.,
2002, 292).
Thus, for a more complete understanding
of the process of knowledge transfer it is perti-
nent to examine the extent to which the postu-
lated model is affected by these conditions.
Rather than explicitly formulating detailed
hypotheses on the nature and direction of these
moderating effects, an exploratory approach is used
here.
Methods
Sample
The population for this study consists of large
and medium US companies (sales greater than $50
 Process of knowledge transfer in strategic alliances
million and a workforce of more than 500 employ-
ees). Accordingly, a sample of 1000 public and
privately owned US companies was randomly
drawn from the Corptech directory. From the
directory, key executives were identified as poten-
tial respondents, following a screening process
similar to Parkhe (1993). The strategic nature of
the surveys content, with its focus on cross-
corporate boundaries issues such as knowledge
transfer, and the probing of organizational issues
such as culture necessitated the participation of top
executives whose understanding and field of action
encompass the overall organization. These top
executives were the most able to observe and to
determine the impact of a specific alliance on the
rest of the organizations activities.
Instrument
The questionnaire design and the implementation
and conduct of the survey were based on the total
design method approach (Dillman, 1978). The
questionnaire itself prompted the respondents to
focus on a current (at least 1-year old) or past but
recent (terminated less than 3 years ago) interna-
tional strategic alliance with which they were the
most familiar. Respondents were invited to focus on
the technological expertise of their partner and on
the technological aspects of the alliance activities.
In addition to general facts and descriptive infor-
mation about the alliance under scrutiny, the
questionnaire included specific questions related
to the partner, the collaborative objectives of each
party, the context of the alliance, and issues of
knowledge transfer pertaining to technology and
process know-how. Most of the items in the
questionnaire followed seven-point Likert-type
scales.
Respondents
From the 192 companies that participated in the
study, 147 completed usable questionnaires were
collected, yielding a response rate not atypical for
this kind of research. The level of participation
was even more gratifying when considering the
profile of the respondents, the sensitive nature of
many questions, and the detailed nature of the
questionnaire. The majority of the respondents
were top executives (i.e., presidents, CEOs, vice-
presidents, directors, or general managers) in
some of Americas largest corporations. On average,
these respondents have been personally involved
with the alliance under scrutiny for a period of
5 years, suggesting an appropriate level of aware-
Bernard L Simonin
415
ness and expert knowledge with the collabora-
tive phenomenon. Over 50% of the companies
included in the study had a sales volume greater
than $350 million and a workforce larger than 2500
employees.
The possibility of non-response bias was checked
by comparing the characteristics of the respondents
with those of the original population sample. The
calculated t-statistics for the number of employees
(t0.19, Po0.85), employee growth (t1.01,
Po0.31), sales volume (t0.11, Po0.91), exports
as a percentage of sales (t0.28, Po0.78), and age of
the company (t1.63, Po0.10) are all statistically
insignificant, suggesting that there are no signifi-
cant differences between the respondent and non-
respondent groups. Furthermore, as all measures
were collected in the same survey instrument, the
possibility of common method bias was tested
using Harmans one-factor test (Scott and Bruce,
1994; Konrad and Linnehan, 1995). A principal-
components factor analysis on the questionnaire
measurement items yielded five factors with eigen-
values greater than 1.0 that accounted for 66% of
the total variance. As several factors, as opposed to
one single factor, were identified, and as the first
factor did not account for the majority of the
variance (only 24%), a substantial amount of
common method variance does not appear to be
present (Podsakoff and Organ, 1986).
Measures
The latent variables in the model are measured by
multiple indicators. All measures were assessed via a
seven-point interval scale ranging from strongly
disagree to strongly agree. These scales were
reverse-coded where appropriate. The wording of
these measurement items in the questionnaire and
their source in the literature are given in Appendix
A. To proceed with the multi-group comparisons
advocated for the investigation of the role of
organizational culture, firm size, alliance form,
and competitive regime, the sample was divided
(median-split) along each of these variables. This
split-half of the sample was performed one variable
at a time, resulting in four sets of two groups in
total. Firm size was measured by the number of
employees as reported in Corptechs directory, and
alliance form was self-reported in the question-
naire.
Model and analysis
To assess the relationships posited by the theore-
tical model in Figure 1, the maximum-likelihood
Journal of International Business Studies
 Process of knowledge transfer in strategic alliances
416
LISREL VIII program (Jo reskog and So rbom, 1996)
was used. This structural equation model approach
is characterized by its flexible interplay between
theory and data, bridging theoretical and empirical
knowledge for a better understanding of the real
world (Fornell, 1982). Such analysis allows for
modeling based on both latent (unobservable)
variables and manifest (observable) variables a
critical feature in the case of the hypothesized
model as most of the constructs are abstractions of
unobservable phenomena. Furthermore, structural
equation modeling takes into account errors in
measurement, variables with multiple indicators,
and multiple-group comparisons. In a second stage,
the structural equation modeling module of the
STATISTICA 6.1 program (StatSoft, 2003) was used
to assess the robustness of the initial results and the
stability of the models estimated by LISREL. First,
all the proposed models (main and multiple
groups) were re-estimated; second, a series of Monte
Carlo simulations were performed on each postu-
lated model and groups using STATISTICAs Monte
Carlo Analysis program.
Results
Main model
In terms of the quality of the measurement model
for the full sample, the constructs display satisfac-
tory levels of reliability, as indicated by composite
reliabilities ranging from 0.82 to 0.99 and shared
variance coefficients ranging from 0.62 to 0.98
(computed from the LISREL loading estimates
following Fornell and Larckers (1981) formula).
Convergent validity can be judged by looking at
both the significance of the factor loadings and the
shared variance. The amount of variance shared or
captured by a construct should be greater than the
amount of measurement error (shared variance
40.50). All the multi-item constructs met this
criterion, with each loading (l) being significantly
related to its underlying factor (t-values greater
than 4.17) in support of convergent validity. Like-
wise, a series of w2 difference tests on the factor
correlations showed that discriminant validity was
achieved among all constructs (Anderson and
Gerbing, 1988). In particular, discriminant validity
was established for the three latent variables
encapsulating LC (resource based, incentive based,
and cognitive based). This was done one pair of
variables at a time by constraining the estimated
correlation parameter between them (e.g., resource
based and incentive based for instance) to 1.0 and
Journal of International Business Studies
Bernard L Simonin
then performing a w2 difference test on the values
obtained for the constrained (w2153.24, d.f.79)
and unconstrained models (w2135.39, d.f.78)
(Anderson and Gerbing, 1988). The resulting
significant difference in w2 (Dw217.85, Dd.f.1)
indicates that the two constructs are not perfectly
correlated and that discriminant validity is
achieved (Bagozzi and Phillips, 1982). That is, from
a measurement model point of view, the constructs
resource- and incentive-based LC represent two dis-
tinct constructs, not one. Likewise, discriminant
validity is also achieved between resource-and
cognitive-based (Dw258.22, Dd.f.1) and between
incentive- and cognitive-based LC (Dw258.22,
Dd.f.1).
Turning to the structural model itself, Table 1
reports the parameter estimates and goodness-of-fit
indicators of the structural equation system.
Although the overall w2 is significant (w2142.81;
86 d.f.; Po0.00), as might be expected with this
statistics sensitivity to sample size (Bagozzi and Yi,
1988; Bentler, 1990), the ratio of w2 to degrees of
freedom (1.66, less than 3) corresponds to a
satisfactory fit (Carmines and McIver, 1981), and
the other fit indices (NNFI0.91; NFI0.85;
CFI0.93) and the low standardized root mean
square residual (RMR0.07) are all within accepta-
ble ranges and show that a substantial amount of
variance is accounted for by the model (Bagozzi and
Yi, 1988). Hence, the model is a reasonable
representation of the data.
Looking at the parameter estimates, a first,
notable result consists of the significant positive
effects of learning intent on knowledge transfer in
support of Hypothesis 1 (g110.59, t7.34). That is,
stronger (weaker) learning intent corresponds to
greater (smaller) knowledge transfer outcomes for
an alliance partner. Likewise, both partner protec-
tiveness and ambiguity display significant direct
negative effects on knowledge transfer in support of
Hypothesis 4 (g120.15, t2.23) and Hypothesis
5 (b150.50, t5.08), respectively. Finally, LC in
the form of incentive-based programs has a signifi-
cant positive effect on knowledge transfer in support
of Hypothesis 2b (g110.28, t2.24). Taken simul-
taneously, these initial results offer some strong
empirical support to a fundamental model of
learning that rests on the interplay between
motivation, capability, task ambiguity, and learning
outcome. Overall, a substantial amount of variance
is explained in the endogenous variables knowledge
transfer (R20.73) and ambiguity (R20.33) by the
model.
 Process of knowledge transfer in strategic alliances Bernard L Simonin
417

Table 1 Structural parameter estimates and goodness-of-fit indices (full sample)

Hypotheses Paths Estimate t-value

H1 Learning intent-knowledge transfer g11 0.59 7.34**

H2a Resource-based LC-knowledge transfer b12 0.14 1.03
H2b Incentive-based LC-knowledge transfer b13 0.28 2.24**
H2c Cognitive-based LC-knowledge transfer b14 0.09 1.45
H4 Partner protectiveness-knowledge transfer g12 0.15 2.23**
H5 Ambiguity-knowledge transfer b15 0.50 5.08**

H3a Learning intent-resource-based LC g21 0.23 2.64**

H3b Learning intent-incentive-based LC g31 0.08 0.85
H3c Learning intent-cognitive-based LC g41 0.30 3.13**
H6 Partner protectiveness-ambiguity g52 0.07 0.75
H7 Tacitness-ambiguity g53 0.55 3.25**
NFI0.85; standardized RMR0.07; NNFI0.91.
w2 (86 d.f.)142.81; CFI0.93; P-value0.00; n147.
**Significant at the Po0.05 level.

Focusing on the individual effects, the significant
relationship between ambiguity and knowledge trans-
fer constitutes an empirical verification of Reed and
DeFillippis (1990) theoretical postulate that causal
ambiguity constitutes a key barrier to imitation.
Out of the three proposed organizational mechan-
isms encapsulating LC (i.e., resource-, incentive-, and
cognitive-based LC), only incentive-based LC shows a
significant effect on knowledge transfer. Although
these variables have been shown to represent three
distinct constructs (discriminant validity), the pre-
sence of a significant correlation (0.54, Po0.01)
between resource- and incentive-based LC is not
unexpected.
Turning to the exogenous variables in the model,
Table 1 reveals that only tacitness (g530.55,
t3.25), not partner protectiveness (g520.07,
t0.75), is significantly related to ambiguity. That
is, Hypothesis 6 is rejected but Hypothesis 7 is
supported. This also means that partner protective-
ness tends to be related to knowledge transfer in a
direct way (Hypothesis 4), not through the media-
tion of knowledge ambiguity (failed Hypothesis 6).
Likewise, it has been established that learning intent
displays a significant direct effect on knowledge
transfer (Hypothesis 1); as with the prior case,
learning intent fails to affect knowledge transfer
indirectly through the mediating effect of LC.
Although learning intent exerts a significant positive
effect on resource-based (g210.23, t2.64) and
cognitive-based LC (g410.30, t3.13) in support of
Hypotheses 3a and 3c respectively, it has been
shown that, in turn, these last two constructs fail to
relate to knowledge transfer (Hypotheses 2a and 2c
rejected). Conversely, whereas incentive-based LC
has been shown to relate to knowledge transfer
(Hypothesis 2b supported), learning intent does not
seem to be one of its antecedents (g310.08, t0.85;
Hypothesis 3b rejected). That is, stronger (weaker)
learning intent is associated with the presence of
more (less) resource- and cognitive-based LC (not
incentive-based LC), while, simultaneously, out of
these three organizational capabilities, incentive-
based LC is the only one directly affecting knowl-
edge transfer.
Although not formally hypothesized, a pertinent
question concerns the relative magnitude of these
identified significant effects. Are all these compar-
able effects equal, or does any one of them affect
knowledge transfer, ambiguity, or LC to a greater
extent? Three sets of comparable effects are exam-
ined, one set at a time:
(1) positive direct effect of incentive-based LC vs
learning intent on knowledge transfer;
(2) negative direct effect of ambiguity vs protective-
ness on knowledge transfer; and
(3) positive effect of learning intent on resource-
based LC vs cognitive-based LC.
To test such hypotheses under LISREL, a w2
difference test is performed between a model where
the estimates are free and a model where these
estimates are constrained to be equal. For the first
pair of effects, the corresponding test reveals that,
statistically, the positive effects of incentive-based LC
and learning intent on knowledge transfer are of the
same magnitude (Dw23.66, Dd.f.1; NS). For the
second comparison, a difference exists (Dw27.10,
Dd.f.1; Po0.01), revealing that the overall nega-
tive effect of ambiguity on knowledge transfer is

Journal of International Business Studies

 Process of knowledge transfer in strategic alliances Bernard L Simonin
418

greater in magnitude than the effect of partner
protectiveness. This result is consistent with prior
research pointing to the criticality and multi-
faceted nature of causal ambiguity as a barrier to
imitation and knowledge transfer (Reed and DeFil-
lippi, 1990; Simonin, 1999a, b). Lastly, learning
intent is found to relate to resource- and cognitive-
based LC the same way (Dw20.32, Dd.f.1; NS).
Moderating effects and model robustness
These first results shed some important light on the
process of learning and on key organizational
mechanisms that facilitate and hinder technologi-
cal knowledge transfer between alliance partners.
However, further refinement is desirable through
the investigation of the possible moderating effects
of organizational culture, firm size, alliance form,
and competitive regime. Indeed, Table 2 shows that
the previous results differ somewhat across groups
characterized by a different organizational culture.
Again, organizational culture here (measured by
moderating variable M1 in Appendix A) refers to the
learning culture of the organization (the ability to
rethink the logic of current behaviors, to question
established routines and beliefs, or to challenge
established wisdom). On this basis, the two groups
to be contrasted are very distinct (mean5.58 for
the double-loop group vs mean3.18 for the
single-loop group; means are significantly diffe-
rent: t17.00, Po0.00). The results in the single-
loop group are almost identical to the general
results significant effect of learning intent, incen-
tive-based LC, partner protectiveness, and ambiguity
on knowledge transfer; learning intent on resource-
based LC; and tacitness on ambiguity with the
exception of the relationship between learning
intent and cognitive-based capacity, which is now
nonsignificant (Hypothesis 3c not supported).
In comparison, the double-loop group shows
that learning intent has a significant effect not only
on resource-based but also on cognitive-based LC (in
support of Hypotheses 3a and 3c). As with the
single-loop group, learning intent and ambiguity are
shown to have a significant effect on knowledge
transfer (in support of Hypotheses 1 and 5), and the
effect of tacitness on ambiguity is also found
significant (in support of Hypothesis 7). What
further varies with the double-loop group is that
none of the LC resources and mechanisms is found
to be related to knowledge transfer (Hypotheses 2a,
2b, and 2c are rejected); also, unlike the single-
loop group, partner protectiveness does not relate
to knowledge transfer directly. Rather, it relates
to it indirectly through the significant mediating
effect of ambiguity (both Hypotheses 5 and 6 are
supported). This pattern of results across the two
groups is consistent with a type of substitution
effect depending on the type of organizational

Table 2 Structural parameter estimates and goodness-of-fit indices for two-group comparison on organizational culture and firm size

Paths Hypotheses Organizational culture Firm size

Double loop Single loop Large Small

(n191) (n256) (n174) (n273)

Learning intent-knowledge transfer H1 0.43** 0.50** 0.53** 0.43**

Resource LC-knowledge transfer H2a 0.07 0.30 0.08 0.66
Incentive LC-knowledge transfer H2b 0.10 0.59** 0.42** 0.67
Cognitive LC-knowledge transfer H2c 0.10 0.03 0.03 0.10
Partner protectiveness-knowledge transfer H4 0.09 0.23** 0.21** 0.05
Ambiguity-knowledge transfer H5 0.66** 0.34** 0.38* 0.79**

Learning intent-resource LC H3a 0.19** 0.18* 0.00 0.34**

Learning intent-incentive LC H3b 0.02 0.04 0.09 0.33**
Learning intent-cognitive LC H3c 0.26** 0.08 0.25** 0.35**
Partner protectiveness-Ambiguity H6 0.17* 0.16 0.33 0.14
Tacitness-Ambiguity H7 0.38** 0.66* 1.49** 0.44**

CFI0.89
Standardized RMR0.12
w2 (172 d.f.)265.63
**Significant at the Po0.05 level.
*Significant at the Po0.10 level.
CFI0.82
Standardized RMR0.12
w2 (172 d.f.)378.76

Journal of International Business Studies

 Process of knowledge transfer in strategic alliances
learning culture: whereas the presence (absence) of
an explicit incentive-based learning system may
determine the level of knowledge transfer for
single-loop-driven firms, it is not consequential
for double-loop-driven organizations. Is it evidence
of a higher order of learning at work? An important
element in clarifying this point is to go beyond
examining the moderating effect of organizational
culture on the learning process and to assess the
impact of organizational culture on the actual level
of knowledge transferred. Based on the mean of the
three indicators of knowledge transfer (Y1 to Y3 in
Appendix A), the difference in the level of know-
ledge transfer under a double-loop learning culture
(mean3.83) and a single-loop culture (mean
3.29) is found to be statistically significant (t2.34,
Po0.05). This last finding is important in that it
demonstrates empirically the superiority of an
organizational culture that fosters non-conformity.
Table 2 also reports the results of the multiple
group analysis for the second moderator: firm size
(on average, about 1000 employees and sales of
$250 million for the small firm group vs over
20,000 employees and sales of $ 2.5 billion for the
large firm group). Consistent with the main
results, the effects of learning intent and ambiguity
on knowledge transfer, learning intent on cognitive-
based LC, and tacitness on ambiguity are significant
for both small and large firms (in support of
Hypotheses 1, 5, 3c, and 7). In terms of differences
between the two groups, a first noticeable result is
that the direct effects of incentive-based LC and
partner protectiveness on knowledge transfer are sig-
nificant only for large firms (in support of Hypoth-
eses 2b and 4). Conversely, learning intent
significantly affects resource- and incentive-based LC
simply in the case of small firms. That is, Hypoth-
eses 3a and 3b are supported in the case of small
firms, but not of large ones. Taken together, these
distinct results show that, for small firms, the full
range of resources, routines, and mechanisms
constituting the firms LC relates directly to learn-
ing intent; at the same time, this LC (or lack
thereof) fails to relate to knowledge transfer. Large
firms, in comparison, do not display a significant
effect between learning intent and LC (with the
exception of cognitive-based LC); on the other hand,
LC (in the form of incentive-based LC) does affect
knowledge transfer.
We now turn to the two alliance-level modera-
tors: alliance form (equity vs non-equity) and
competitive regime (measured by moderating vari-
able M2 in Appendix A: the competitive group
Bernard L Simonin
419
corresponds to the case of partners viewed as strong
and very strong competitors; the not competitive
group corresponds to the case of partners judged to
be a weak competitor or not a competitor). Table 3
reveals that, similar to the case of firm size, the two
sets of group comparisons display similar patterns
of effects for the effect of learning intent and
ambiguity on knowledge transfer, learning intent on
cognitive-based LC, and tacitness on ambiguity (in
support of Hypotheses 1, 5, 3c, and 7).
For alliance form, equity and non-equity-based
alliances differ in that, for non-equity-based alli-
ances, partner protectiveness and cognitive-based LC
relate to knowledge transfer (Hypotheses 4 and 2c
supported) whereas, for equity-based alliances, it is
incentive-based LC that affects knowledge transfer (in
support of Hypothesis 2b). In addition, for non-
equity-based alliances, learning intent is found to be a
significant antecedent of the three LC components
(in support of Hypotheses 3a, 3b, and 3c), in contrast
to equity-based alliances, where it is only an ante-
cedent of cognitive-based LC (Hypothesis 3c). Thus, for
non-equity-based alliances, there is both a significant
direct effect of learning intent on knowledge transfer
and an indirect effect through cognitive-based LC.
Differences across competitive regimes exist as
well. For alliances falling under a competitive
regime, partner protectiveness is associated with
knowledge transfer in a direct way (Hypothesis 4
supported) whereas, in the not competitive
regime, it is related to knowledge transfer indirectly
through the significant mediating role of ambiguity
(both Hypotheses 5 and 6 are supported). More
interestingly, the two groups differ significantly
with respect to the role of LC. Under the compe-
titive regime, none of the LC resources and
mechanisms is found to be an antecedent of
knowledge transfer (Hypotheses 2a, 2b and 2c are
rejected), reminiscent of the case of double-loop-
driven firms. In sharp contrast, under the not
competitive regime, the three constructs encapsu-
lating LC show a significant effect on knowledge
transfer. While the positive effects of incentive- and
cognitive-based LC are in support of Hypotheses 2b
and 2c, the significant negative effect of resource-
based LC on knowledge transfer is more surprising
and counter to the originally formulated Hypoth-
esis 2a. This last result translates into: under a not
competitive regime, the higher (lower) the
resource-based LC of the firm, the lower (higher)
the level of knowledge transfer. This finding may
point to inefficiencies or ceiling effects in resource
deployment, but it warrants further discussion.
Journal of International Business Studies
 Process of knowledge transfer in strategic alliances Bernard L Simonin
420

Table 3 Structural parameter estimates and goodness-of-fit indices for two-group comparison on competitive regime and alliance form

Paths Hypotheses Competitive regime Alliance form

Competitive Not competitive Non-equity Equity

(n160) (n287) (n183) (n264)

Learning intent-knowledge transfer H1 0.57** 0.41** 0.43** 0.41**

Resource LC-knowledge transfer H2a 0.09 0.42** 0.04 0.36
Incentive LC-knowledge transfer H2b 0.16 0.54** 0.06 0.68**
Cognitive LC-knowledge transfer H2c 0.01 0.19** 0.27** 0.02
Partner protectiveness-knowledge transfer H4 0.16* 0.09 0.41** 0.04
Ambiguity-knowledge transfer H5 0.41** 0.82** 0.42** 0.70**

Learning intent-resource LC H3a 0.12 0.19** 0.26** 0.07

Learning intent-incentive LC H3b 0.11 0.10 0.16* 0.11
Learning intent-cognitive LC H3c 0.33** 0.15* 0.13** 0.10**
Partner protectiveness-ambiguity H6 0.01 0.16* 0.01 0.23
Tacitness-ambiguity H7 0.53** 0.39* 0.29* 0.82**

CFI0.91
Standardized RMR0.10
w2 (172 d.f.)259.36
**Significant at the Po0.05 level.
*Significant at the Po0.10 level.
CFI0.88
Standardized RMR0.10
w2 (172 d.f.)282.53

Although not formally hypothesized, another Discussion and future research

issue of interest concerns the possible structural
differences between these two competitive regimes
when it comes to outcomes, motivation, and
protectiveness. A series of independent t-tests
reveals that, in fact, the two groups do not differ
with respect to the level of partner protectiveness
(mean4.23 for competitive regime vs mean3.83
for not competitive regime; t1.45, NS), learning
intent (mean3.55 for competitive regime vs
mean3.38 for not competitive regime; t0.50,
NS), and knowledge transfer (mean3.54 for com-
petitive regime vs mean3.69 for not competitive
regime; t0.62, NS).
Finally, given the relatively small size of the main
sample and subsamples used in group analysis, all the
models were re-estimated with a second technique to
assess the robustness of the LISREL estimates and the
stability of the results. First, the structural equation
modeling module of the STATISTICA 6.1 program
was used as a direct comparison. Second, a series of
Monte Carlo simulations was performed using STA-
TISTICAs Monte Carlo Analysis program. For each
model and group, a Monte Carlo analysis (using the
Bootstrap data option, with 100 sampling iterations
and a sample size reduction of 510% for re-sampling
purposes) provided the basis for re-estimating the
path coefficients and their significance. Overall, the
initial LISREL results held with the repeat analyses,
conferring some degree of reliability to our findings.
Through a structural equation modeling approach,
this study has focused on the process of technolo-
gical knowledge transfer between international
strategic alliance partners. We proposed and tested
a comprehensive model that explicitly articulates
the role of various key variables that in past
research received only partial and independent
attention. Rather than focusing on any one specific
relation, it is the simultaneity of all the hypothe-
sized relationships that confers integrity and rele-
vance to the model. The following discussion of the
results, shortcomings, and future research direc-
tions will:
(1) recap the main findings by highlighting the
consistently critical role of learning intent,
ambiguity, and tacitness at the core of the
learning process;
(2) underscore the changing role of LC and partner
protectiveness across various conditions; and
(3) discuss the dynamic nature of the learning
process on the basis of the presence of likely
substitution effects.
Learning intent, ambiguity, and tacitness at the
heart of knowledge transfer
The overall results point to the fundamental roles
played by learning intent, knowledge ambiguity,
and tacitness. The significant effects of these three

Journal of International Business Studies

 Process of knowledge transfer in strategic alliances
constructs on knowledge transfer are found con-
sistently across the main analysis (full sample) and
the various group analyses. They are therefore at
the heart of the learning process.
As isolated by Hamel (1990) and others, learning
intent represents a key component of the learning
process. The pervasive nature of this effect helps
reconcile the emerging divide between the propo-
nents and critics of the learning race. Indeed, some
alliances have a learning undertone whereas others
rest on co-specialization (Mowery et al., 2002; Zeng
and Hennart, 2002). What separates the two, and
paradoxically unifies them at the same time, is the
degree of learning intent by the partners: that is,
this single construct. It is pertinent to note that,
regardless of the competitive regime of the alliance,
learning intent was found to exert the same direct
effect on knowledge transfer. Furthermore, in
absolute terms, no difference in learning intent
was observed for companies paired with strong
competitors and those paired with non-competitors.
Overall, these results tend to show that, if there is a
learning race in strategic alliances, it is principally a
race against oneself. These results also speak to the
disconnect between learning motivation and degree
of competition in alliances. For instance, a strong
learning intent can exist in a non-competitive
setting (e.g., a critical benchmarking program by
Xerox on L.L. Bean, the catalog clothing company),
whereas the converse is also possible: a weak or non-
existing learning intent in a competitive alliance
setting (e.g., a straight-forward cross-distribution
arrangement between two global competitors).
Turning to learning inhibitors, the significant
effect of ambiguity on knowledge transfer provides
some empirical support both to Lippman and
Rumelts (1982) observations that ambiguity acts
as a powerful block on both imitation and factor
mobility, and to Reed and DeFillippis (1990, 96)
postulate that barriers to imitation are dependent
on the ambiguity in a firms competency-based
advantage. These results underline the theoretical
importance of ambiguity and coinciding with a
resurgence of interest (Szulanski, 1996; Mosakows-
ki, 1997; Simonin, 1999a, b) the need to account
formally for this construct in future research. In
terms of the antecedents of ambiguity, partner
protectiveness is found to play a role only when
either the alliance regime is non-competitive or the
prevailing organizational culture of the knowledge
seeker is double-loop oriented. On the other hand,
the effect of tacitness on ambiguity is consistently
significant across the various analyses.
Bernard L Simonin
421
This last result concurs with Zander and Koguts
(1995, 85) findings that the more codifiable and
teachable a capability is, the higher the risk of
rapid transfer. As such, and as evidenced by recent
research foci (e.g., Martin and Salomon, 2002), the
seminal work of Polanyi (1967) remains timely and
fundamental to understanding the flow of knowl-
edge transfer between partners of strategic alli-
ances. This result also underlines the desirability of
implementing knowledge codification programs
whenever active knowledge sharing is a requisite
or agreed-upon objective of the alliance. In light of
the rise of programs targeting the codification of
corporate knowledge (see Davenport and Prusak,
1998), the task, far from being obvious, is never-
theless feasible. Positive outcomes are attainable. At
the same time, much remains to be learned about
the mechanics and limits of codifying knowledge,
the value of data-basing corporate knowledge, and
the challenges of designing and managing an
efficient corporate knowledge system.
LC and partner protectiveness: different
conditions, different roles
The effects of learning intent, ambiguity, and
tacitness have been identified at the heart of the
knowledge transfer process in a consistent way, but
the role of LC and partner protectiveness is more
contrasted. The effect of these two variables on
knowledge transfer depends on pre-existing orga-
nizational and contextual factors. The presence of
these nuances in the results reveals that the actual
learning process is dynamic, and more intricate
than often assumed or represented in the literature.
With respect to LC, a first striking result concerns
the general lack of significance of the resource- and
cognitive-based components. Only the incentive-
based component of LC seems to have any
recurring influence. Cognitive capacity (encapsu-
lated here by attitudes and beliefs towards teaching
vs learning from a partner, in the spirit of Hamel
et al.s (1989) arrogance of leadership syndrome)
shows a positive direct effect on knowledge transfer
only for non-competitive and non-equity-based
alliances. Thus, in what could be considered a
favorable learning environment (in that no compe-
titive pressure or threats exists), cognitive capacity
or limitations do play a significant role in the
learning outcome. Going back to the example of a
benchmarking collaboration between two organi-
zations that operate in radically different sectors,
one could easily see why such cognitive elements
would affect the actual transfer of knowledge from
Journal of International Business Studies
 Process of knowledge transfer in strategic alliances
422
one partner to the other. One partner may not
be perceived as credible, and the other may feel
superior. Thus, under non-competitive alliance
regimes, the results seem to support Mais (1996)
contention that humility with regard to the value
and validity of other perspectives is not only an
antidote to intellectual arrogance, but also a key
enabler of learning. Of course, this study has focused
on one facet of cognitive-based LC, and much
conceptualizing and testing remain to be done to
fully comprehend the role of this component.
More surprising are the results pertaining to
resource-based LC: only significant under non-
competitive alliance regimes, where it displays a
negative effect on knowledge transfer. The lack of
general effect across samples is in sharp contrast
with what prior conceptual work has suggested
when it comes to resource deployment in alliances
(Pucik, 1988; Hamel, 1990, 1991; Inkpen, 2002). A
possible explanation is the existence of ceiling
effects and inefficiencies in resource deployment,
an important subject for future research. At the
same time, these results are not inconsistent with
other empirical findings. For instance, Buchel and
Killing (2002) found that initial staffing of the
joint venture is negatively correlated with joint
venture performance (measured by satisfaction).
These authors explain that sending the best people
actually leads to committing individuals with
strong parental bonds that may backfire in a
collaborative setting. Such rationale certainly
applies to a learning context, where the presence
of too many experts could lead to paralysis and
additional frictions with the partner, impeding
learning. The fact that, under a non-competitive
regime, higher (lower) resource-based LC corres-
ponds to lower (higher) levels of knowledge transfer
is certainly consistent with this explanation. In
non-competitive environments, it seems to be a
case of diminishing returns, where more is less:
increasing resource deployment adds complexity,
inertia, administrative, and coordination costs at
the expense of learning. The process derails. For
greater clarity on this issue, some additional
research is needed, particularly on the question of
optimal levels of resource deployment.
As noticed above, of the three LC components,
the significant effect of incentive-based LC on
knowledge transfer is the most widespread. This
effect, detected in the main analysis, holds for large
firms, single-loop-oriented firms, non-competitive
alliance regimes, and equity alliances. Thus there is
some partial support for the idea that learning
Journal of International Business Studies
Bernard L Simonin
needs to be recognized and rewarded to build
learning organizations (Marquardt, 1996; Daven-
port and Prusak, 1998). It also means that a
learning agenda needs to be clearly articulated
and communicated. As the results show, this is
more of an issue for large organizations and
organizations involved in more formally structured
alliances. One possible explanation is that, in light
of the more complex nature of such organizations,
competing tasks and priorities exist at all times.
Thus it is more important to clearly signal what the
actual primary objectives are. Consistent with this
view is the fact that the effect is present for single-
loop- but not double-loop-oriented firms. When
organizational culture does not encourage rethink-
ing the logic of current behaviors, questioning
established routines and beliefs, or challenging
established wisdom, again, clear incentives and
signals become critical. They are needed to foster
employees commitment beyond any doubt (Non-
aka and Takeuchi, 1995).
Turning to organizational mechanisms that hin-
der learning, partner protectiveness is found to
have a significant direct effect on knowledge
transfer in the main analysis as well as in the case
of large firms, single-loop-oriented firms, competi-
tive alliance regimes, and non-equity alliances. In
the case of non-competitive regimes and double-
loop-oriented firms, the effect of protectiveness on
knowledge transfer is mediated through knowledge
ambiguity. When interpreting these findings, one
must be cautious of the fact that partner protec-
tiveness may not always be detectable or observa-
ble. In its finest form, it may be totally transparent
to the knowledge seeker. From a managerial point
of view, it would be wise for managers to probe
regularly their partners disposition by formulating
specific requests that force the issue; only then
could an unequivocal opinion be formed and
corrective steps adopted if necessary (Simonin,
1999a). Non-equity as opposed to equity-based
alliances may be more propitious for detecting the
presence of partner protectiveness (clearer signals
due to formal communication needs and articu-
lated requests) as well as less favorable for mitigat-
ing its effects (more limited options to bypass the
protective wall). As protectiveness is likely to evolve
over time, a greater research focus on alliance life
cycles is warranted.
Substitution effects: a dynamic learning process
Turning to the relationship between learning intent
and LC, the main analysis reveals a significant
 Process of knowledge transfer in strategic alliances
effect between intent and both resource- and
cognitive-based LC. These effects hold for small
firms, double-loop-oriented firms, non-competitive
and non-equity-based alliances. Thus intent seems
to translate into greater capacity and resource
deployment in environments that are less bureau-
cratic, more flexible, open, and actionable. This
finding echoes Swieringa and Wierdsmas (1992)
observation that bureaucracies are more susceptible
to learning difficulties because of their lack of need,
courage, will and ability to learn. Likewise, the fact
that the cognitive side of LC can be affected by
learning intent carries some important implica-
tions. The influence of decision makers and chief
knowledge officers is not restricted simply to
building a proper knowledge strategy, culture, and
infrastructure (Davenport and Prusak, 1998). It can
also succeed in more tactical ways by shaping
attitudes, beliefs and expectations with regard to
learning in specific initiatives.
In contrast to resource- and cognitive-based LC,
learning intent seems to have no effect on incen-
tive-based LC, with the exception of small firms
and non-equity alliances. The case of small firms is
instructive in that, unlike large firms, small firms
display a significant and complete association
between learning intent and capacity, but not
between capacity and learning outcomes. In a
way, the build-up and deployment of LC from the
manifestation of an original intent may be more
actionable and observable in smaller organizations.
What is not detected is the impact of this capacity.
Possibly, LC may be superseded by other key
intervening variables such as the source of asym-
metric bargaining power between partners (Khanna
et al., 1998). The pace of critical capacity building
may be slower or, simply, its sheer level may be
insufficient, as smaller firms tend to lack the types
of resources mandated by alliances (Hagedoorn and
Schakenraad, 1994). Beyond capacity, it is impor-
tant to remember that, for both small and large
firms, learning intent exerts a significant direct
effect on knowledge transfer. In a type of compen-
satory effect, small organizations tend to rely more
exclusively on their motivation to learn. Of course,
with respect to the effect of firm size, our study has
looked only at large and medium-sized firms; future
research should also consider more extreme cases of
small firms (e.g., start-ups).
A similar type of substitution effect with regard to
the role of LC is observed in the case of double-
loop-oriented firms. Whereas single-loop firms
experience a significant effect of incentive-based
Bernard L Simonin
423
LC on knowledge transfer, double-loop firms lack
any direct effect between capacity and learning
outcomes. Is this the case of a proper organizational
learning culture supplanting the need for formal
organizational resources and mechanisms? Is this
evidence of greater efficiency? What this study was
able to show is that the learning process is dynamic;
different critical paths are enacted under different
conditions. More importantly, this study has also
established statistically that greater learning out-
comes are achieved under a double-loop learning
culture than under a single-loop culture. That is,
an organizational culture that fosters non-confor-
mity and encourages critical thinking is indeed a
better learning organization. Although many
researchers have stressed the importance of devel-
oping the right organizational culture for encoura-
ging learning (Marquardt, 1996; Davenport and
Prusak, 1998), the question of quantifying these
learning dividends had remained wide open. Given
the fact that there may be more or less advanta-
geous ways to achieve the same learning outcomes,
the next pertinent question is one of optimal
choices. In particular, the question of trade-offs
between generic organizational culture and specific
organizational mechanisms warrants further
research.
The dynamic nature of the learning process is
well represented in the differences observed
between a competitive and non-competitive alli-
ance regime. Here too, the role of LC fluctuates
from being significant in non-competitive regimes
to non-significant in competitive regimes. In terms
of the role of competition, Mowery et al. (2002)
have reported that learning seems to be attenuated
when alliance partners are direct competitors. In
comparison, the current study shows that there is
no difference in the level of knowledge transferred
under competitive and non-competitive regimes. In
a sense, this result is a middle path between the
observations of Mowery et al. and the argument of
Dussauge et al. (2002) that alliances between
competitors tend to create contexts that particu-
larly favor inter-partner learning. Maybe it is both.
The context is favorable in that there is, by default,
something there to be learned from a competitor;
however, owing to self-interest and other variables,
the path to get at it is more complex and inhibited.
What our results show is that there is no difference
in learning outcomes, but the path may be
different. On the protectiveness front, Inkpen
(2002) acknowledges that firms may be very
reluctant to share knowledge when there is a high
Journal of International Business Studies
 Process of knowledge transfer in strategic alliances
424
competitive overlap between partners. Our study
uncovers no such difference in levels of perceived
protectiveness between partners that are strong
direct competitors and partners that are not
competitors. Finally, no substantive difference in
learning intent was detected between the two
competitive regimes. Instead, this study recognizes
the existence of a dynamic learning process whose
core is meaningful to all contexts.
The aim of this study was to advance our
understanding of the process of knowledge transfer
across alliance partners at both the conceptual and
empirical levels. Conceptually, the model has
replicated at the organizational level a fundamental
model of individual learning (motivationcapacity
learning outcome). In particular, it has introduced
LC as a key determinant of absorptive capacity in a
way that refocuses attention on firm-level, not
simply partner-specific-level, variables. It is impor-
tant to understand the issue of similarities (Lane
and Lubatkin, 1998) and overlap between partners
(Mowery et al., 2002), but it is also fundamental to
consider the role of firm-specific factors. LC
represents the actionable side of absorptive capa-
city, its basic operating system. Further refinement
of the construct, its underlying dimensions, and
measurement are needed. Finally, alternative
research designs are needed to capture the duality
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Appendix A: Questionnaire items

Knowledge transfer Source: Simonin (1999a) Strongly Strongly

disagree agree
Y1 Your company has learned a great deal about the technology/process know-how held by 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
your partner.
Y2 Your company has greatly reduced its initial technological reliance or dependence upon the 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
partner since the beginning of the alliance.
Y3 The technology/process know-how held by your partner has been assimilated by your company 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
and has contributed to other projects developed by your company.

Ambiguity Source: Simonin (1999a) Strongly Strongly

disagree agree
Y4 The technology/process know-how held by your partner is easily transferable back to your company. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Y5 The association between causes and effects, inputs and outputs, and actions and outcomes related 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
to the technology/process know-how held by your partner is clear.

Resource-based Adapted from Hamel (1990) Strongly Strongly

learning capacity and Pucik (1988) disagree agree
Y6 Your company has committed a lot of personnel to this alliance. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Y7 The staff assigned by your company to this alliance is composed of highly trained and 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
talented personnel.
Y8 Your company has committed a lot of physical, financial, organizational, and logistical resources 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
to support the seeking, diffusion and sharing of information originating from this alliance.

Incentive-based Adapted from Strongly Strongly

learning capacity Pucik (1988) disagree agree
Y9 There are clear incentives or a well-established reward system designed to encourage employees 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
to seek and repatriate information from this alliance.
Y10 For this alliance, a learning agenda has been clearly defined and communicated for all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
personnel involved.

Cognitive-based Adapted from Hamel (1990) Strongly Strongly

learning capacity and Pucik (1988) disagree agree
Y11 In general, your staff involved with the alliance believe that they have less to learn from, than to 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
teach to your partner.

Journal of International Business Studies

 Process of knowledge transfer in strategic alliances Bernard L Simonin
427

Partner protectiveness Source: Simonin (1999a) Strongly Strongly

disagree agree
X1 Your partner is very protective of its technology/process know-how. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Tacitness Source: Simonin (1999a) Strongly Strongly

disagree agree
X2 Your partners technology/process know-how is easily codifiable (in blueprints, instructions, 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
formulas, etc.).
X3 Your partners technology/process know-how is more explicit than tacit. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Learning intent Adapted from Hamel (1990) Strongly Strongly

and Pucik (1988) disagree agree
X4 When deciding to enter into the alliance, your company had a strong desire, determination 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
and will to learn about a particular technology/process owned by your partner.
X5 This alliance is viewed as a means to learn about a particular technology/process held by 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
your partner, rather than as a way to simply use or rent this know-how.

Organizational culture Adapted from Hamel (1990) Strongly Strongly

(moderator) disagree agree
M1 In your company, rethinking the logic of current behaviors, questioning established routines 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
and beliefs, or challenging established wisdom, is encouraged.

Competitive regime Newly developed)

(moderator)
M2 To what extent do you consider your partner an actual or future competitor? (please check one)
Very strong competitor ( )
Strong competitor ( )
Weak competitor ( )
Not competitor ( )

About the author
Bernard L Simonin is an Associate Professor of
Marketing and International Business at the Fletch-
er School of Law and Diplomacy (Tufts University).
He holds a PhD in International Business from the
University of Michigan (Ann Arbor). His research
interest focuses on symbiotic marketing and spon-
sorship, market orientation, customer satisfaction,
brand alliances, strategic alliances, global strategy,
learning organizations, and knowledge manage-
ment. His work has been published in the Journal of
Marketing Research, Journal of Advertising, Journal of
International Marketing, Journal of International Business
Studies, Journal of Business Research, International
Executive, Global Focus, Academy of Management
Journal, and Strategic Management Journal. He has
taught at the University of Michigan, University
of Washington, University of Illinois, Harvard
University, and Kasetsart University in Thailand.

Accepted by Nicolai Juul Foss and Torben Pederson, Departmental Editors, 1 April 2004. This paper has been with the author for one revision.

Journal of International Business Studies